Cities of Inclusion—Spaces of Justice

Editors

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COGITATIO

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Editorial

Imagining Cities of Inclusion—Formulating Spaces of Justice

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Abstract

This introduction underlines some of the topics the present thematic issue focuses on, such as segregation and security, control and creativity, resistance and networking, presenting continuities and changes in urban governance and urban justice in different parts of the world. We argue that urban theory should be rethought to consider cities as fora that recentre the 'political' in relation to gentrification, rights to the city, justice, and alternative urbanisms. We highlight structural aspects of urban policy and planning, including the intersection of mega-development projects with disruptive acts of social dispossession and efforts to depoliticise institutional control. Simultaneously, we emphasise tactics that reinterpret hierarchical modes of governance and create initiatives for enhanced justice through claim-making, negotiation, improvisation, acts of everyday resistance and organised opposition.

Issue

This editorial is part of the issue "Cities of Inclusion—Spaces of Justice" edited by Anja Nygren (University of Helsinki, Finland) and Florencia Quesada (University of Helsinki, Finland).

Cities around the world are developing new forms of governing risks and novel modes of urban planning, social belonging, and political decision-making. The challenges related to societal insecurity, environmental vulnerability, and political representation are enormous, especially in many parts of the global South, with two-thirds of the world's population (United Nations, 2020). This thematic issue, *Cities of Inclusion—Spaces of Justice*, explores new theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches to understanding the multifaceted inequalities characteristic of contemporary cities, and emergent initiatives for enhancing the rights to the city, societal security and urban justice.

We argue that urban theory should be rethought to consider cities as fora for a "re-centring of the urban political" (Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017, p. 2) in order to explore past and present injustices and efforts for more just futures. Many of the articles in this issue contribute to an emerging body of scholarship that articulates politicis-

ing processes with urban theory, drawing on inspirations from Michel Foucault, Nancy Fraser, David Harvey, Henri Lefebvre, Jacques Rancière, Ananya Roy, AbdouMaliq Simone, Edward Soja, Erik Swyngedouw, among others.

We aim to provide insights for researchers, planners, activists, and development practitioners in a wide range of social sciences and other fields: novel approaches that explore initiatives for alternative designs for the future. Many of these efforts operate at the crossroads of formal structures and informal networks, and at the fringes of official legitimacy and unofficial recognition, involving a diversity of actors and initiatives in the creation of more inclusive ways to engage in city life.

We focus on topics of governance and creativity, segregation and recognition, violence and security, and resistance and networking, showing continuities and changes in patterns and processes of urban governance and urban justice in a wide range of locations. Based on the authors' rich empirical knowledge, each case illus-

trates the situated politics of these processes, demonstrating resemblances in forms of socio-spatial segregation and alternative urbanism in cities as diverse as Bogotá, Brussels, Dar es Salaam, Istanbul, Lima, Mexico City, Oslo, Santiago de Chile and Santo Domingo.

While most of the articles focus on the so-called global South, where segregation, inequality, legal pluralism and hybrid improvisation are prominent, serious problems with exclusion and hostility towards migrants in Europe are also addressed (Carlier, 2020; Tsavadaroglou, 2020). Cavicchia and Cucca (2020) identify links between urban planning and school segregation in Norway—which has been evaluated as the world's least unequal country (United Nations Development Programme, 2020)—providing important insights into how neoliberal strategies of urban planning involving spatial densification create social divisions mirrored in school segregation patterns. Urban insecurity studies involved in this issue mainly focus on Latin America, considered the most violent area in the world (Koonings & Kruijt, 2015), with forty-two of the world's fifty most violent cities, based on homicide rates (Seguridad, Justicia y Paz, 2020).

We support a broad definition of politics that directs attention to structural aspects of urban policy and planning including the intersection of mega-development projects with disruptive acts of social dispossession, thereby destroying irregular housing, criminalising informal activities, and harming informal residents' access to collectives crucial to their urban survival and belonging (Figure 1). Relocating these residents to peripheries is not simply hazardous planning; it also supports politically motivated goals to expand state control at the 'edges,' justifying coercive policing and calculated institutional absence in the form of limited access to services and political representation (Nygren, 2018).

Socio-spatial segregation and institutional stigmatisation also link to urban violence and societal insecurity. Violent security politics, especially in the global South, rest on the intersection of authoritarian forms of governance, clientelist policies, hybridisation of responsibility, and layered modes of sovereignty (Auyero & Berti, 2016; Coates & Nygren, 2020). As Davis (2020) shows in this issue, in her article on Latin America, such conditions promote grey acts of policing, allowing illicit power brokers and corrupt state officials to

Figure 1. Popular art in the central market of San José, Costa Rica, emphasising equality, beside a sign which prohibits the access of informal traders to the market. Photo by Anja Nygren.

institute coercion and rent-seeking as ordering principles of security politics in marginalised neighbourhoods. These extra-legal forms of control and governance by state- and non-state-armed actors in poor neighbourhoods, together with a widespread distrust in the law-enforcement capabilities of the state, further deepen the existing patterns of socio-spatial fragmentation (Koonings & Kruijt, 2015). Davis' (2020) study shows how violent governance connects with segregation and security politics that promote authoritarian patrolling of urban zones of exception.

Critical urban theory also needs to address the de-politicising effects of neoliberal governance, in which commodification is a key principle, while neoliberal 'self-responsibilisation' redefines political citizenship as individual responsibility for own's own well-being (Nygren, 2016). Simultaneously, participation is separated from agendas of empowerment and becomes a toolkit for transforming unruly inhabitants into responsible citizens (Vasudevan & Sletto, 2020).

This issue also questions conventional assumptions of the omnipotence of hegemonic structures of governance, highlighting people's strategies of reinterpreting hierarchical modes of planning, and resisting uneven ways of governing through claim-making, negotiation, escaping, and situational spontaneity (Meehan, 2013; Nygren, 2016; Roy, 2011; Simone, 2020; Sletto & Nygren, 2016). It presents attempts to (re)claim urban spaces, develop alternative forms of urbanism, and influence the urban fabric with subaltern discourses and practices, revealing the cities not only as products of formal planning and technocratic engineering, but also of resistance and improvisation (de Boeck, 2011; Simone, 2010). Vasudevan and Sletto's contribution to this issue sheds light on how residents in informal neighbourhoods of Santo Domingo engage in diverse tactics of sense-making to process their experiences of opaque planning and threat of eviction. By deploying technocratic planning language, people negotiate with the authorities to advocate their claim, while storytelling helps build historical understanding of state interventions and speculate on the impacts of environmental ordering. People also deploy rumours, banter, and other unsanctioned speech acts to make sense of the vagaries of policies and calculate when to intervene in planning. The study provides valuable insights into how people reinterpret confusing planning procedures and reflect upon their experiences of sacrifice and their aspirations for the future.

Because informal residents rarely own the spaces they occupy, unsteadiness and precarity become a form of property, engendering violent conflicts over authority and threats of expulsion. Yet many residents are quick to capture unexpected, if restricted, opportunities provided by the frictions of urban politics (de Boeck, 2011, pp. 271–272). Exemplifying such everyday resistance is the practice of establishing 'informal' connections to formal water and electricity networks in the absence of official provision or the inability to afford consumption

charges (Harris et al., 2020; Swyngedouw, 2013). The state often implicitly supports such acts as they help officials gain legitimacy and garner votes (Meehan, 2013; Nygren, 2018).

There are also initiatives that challenge the dominant power structures through more explicit refusals to work within the moral constraints of unjust policies: incipient political movements insisting on new forms of political acting (Caldeira, 2017; Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017). Tsavadaroglou (2020) examines refugees' struggles in Istanbul, where authorities have transformed informal neighbourhoods into areas of high-income residence and tourism. Drawing upon the Lefebvrian concept of the right to the city and Sojan and Harveyan notions of spatial justice, Tsavadaroglou shows how gentrification subjugates refugees by physical enclosure, building demolition, and police control; by destroying refugees' social relations through dislocation; and by stigmatising their way of life. In response, refugees establish communal houses and collective kitchens to demonstrate their way of inhabiting the city through commoning practices and social togetherness. Likewise, Carlier's (2020) study on Brussels shows that the tensions between policing migration and the politicisation of new urban citizenship require the provision of 'inclusive enclaves' that allow migrants to regain the dignity necessary to get through hardships marked by hostility. Although not all such initiatives succeed in consolidating a more just order, they create new political subjectivities to challenge dominant discourses and practices.

Simultaneously, a wave of political protests is spreading across world's cities, in which those who feel subjugated are demanding new processes for constituting urban spaces politically (Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017), including large-scale protests against racial bias in police work. The article by Sánchez Castañeda (2020) analyses the efforts of the Muisca Indians in Bogota to re-appropriate their sacred lands in the face of displacement and to reject hegemonic views of indigeneity through reinterpretation of their traditions as part of embodied practices of decolonisation. The study posits cities as sites for indigeneity-in-the-making, where performance of the Muisca rituals and their experiences of subjugation are part of the rebellion that displays indigenous bodies as political arenas to demand more just living conditions.

We also highlight the political character of cities through mobilisations that emerge at the crossroads of institutional marginalisation and claims for political recognition. Fuentealba and Verrest (2020) show, in their Rancièrean-inspired analysis of struggles over risk management in Santiago de Chile, how planning resilient cities has become a depoliticised governing order whereby policy-makers seek to obscure the planning's inherently political nature, while planners promote technological interventions although risk management is an issue tightly linked to politics of vulnerability. Many community initiatives disrupt such acts of de-

politicising by breaking the silence under the prevailing order and claiming politics that challenge segregated development. Some of these efforts reject working in alignment with injustices inherent to such policies, while others develop more obvious forms of rebellion, such as civil disobedience and organised mobilisation, to engage in broad debates over equality and justice (Harris et al., 2020; McGranahan, 2016). As the contributions to this issue show, people conceptualise alternative meanings of justice through strategic alliance-buildings, quiet encroachments, everyday acts of resistance, organised mobilisations, and other forms of social contestation and symbolic disruption, often using different tactics consecutively and parallel.

The authors' detailed knowledge of the cases they discuss reveals divergent procedures of urban governance, while their empirically grounded insights into local forms of agency enhance understanding of the potential and limitations of myriad acts of resistance. Most of the studies are grounded in ethnographic analysis, semi-structured and in-depth interviews, informal conversations, oral histories, and archival and media sources. Several articles also engage in action-research and engaged ethnography. Woodcraft, Osuteye, Ndezi, and Makoba (2020) developed a novel methodology to study collective understanding of the good life in informal settlements in Dar es Salaam, showing how notions of a fulfilling life extend far beyond the macro-scale measuring of income inequality or individual life satisfaction. Their discussion demonstrates the value of epistemologies that embrace co-production of knowledge in the juxtaposition of multiple ways of living and seeing the city. Similarly, Muñoz Unceta, Hausleitner, and Dąbrowski (2020) explore the links between socio-spatial segregation, economic activities, and social interactions in Lima, revealing dynamic formal-informal intersections and how access to economic opportunities and social relations are regulated by the city's spatial structure.

Overall, we emphasise the importance of aspects of the 'political' related to gentrification, segregation, rights to the city, justice, alternative urbanisms, and practices of sense-making to urban theory. We also support approaches that recognise the difficult conditions under which many residents seek opportunities for transformation and manoeuvre. Living in a poor neighbourhood marked by punitive control and infrastructural neglect, is a painful experience that is usually constructed comparatively, with the poor acutely aware of the physical and social contrast between their surroundings (Rivke et al., 2019, p. 6), and of how gentrification and social upgrading somewhere usually coincide with marginality and downgrading elsewhere. Therefore, it is important to conceptualise procedures of (in)formalisation as relational processes (Boudreau & Davis, 2017), in which the distribution of justice and legitimisation of authority include multifaceted debates on who is governing what, where, and why (Nygren, 2018; Zieleniec, 2018). Marginalised people's aspirations for (hyper-)modern de-

velopment should also be recognised. Although many residents are aware they will never be granted access to newly designed urban spheres, the desire for more advantageous navigation through such spaces and for more inclusive belonging to the 'core' of the city is attractive compared to harsh experiences of living at the edge (de Boeck, 2011, pp. 276–278). As Tsavadaroglou (2020) points out, the right to the city includes the right to be "in the heat of the action."

Contributions to this issue call for urban redesigns that create room for mixing different types of housing and land use to break segregated spatial orders, build synergies between fragmented urban spaces and embrace cultural diversity. Several articles also emphasise strategies for empowering informal residents to gain relative autonomy from the everyday agents of violence, while others call for activities and allegiances that interlink different neighbourhoods and support the (re)invention of spaces of conviviality. Several articles also suggest methodologies of co-production that challenge institutional control and access prohibition, while envisioning transformative urbanisms.

Overall, we emphasise recognition of political initiatives and social practices that seek to transform established orders associated with exclusive governance and hierarchical decision-making. We widen urban theory to consider claims for justice that are not necessarily part of institutionalised struggles, focusing on actions rooted in people's everyday experiences (Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017). As such, this issue serves as a diagnostic of the spatial politics of resistance in situations where institutional policies do not reflect citizens' sense of justice. It contributes to bringing diverse perspectives and situated geographies to urban theory, while recognising people's complex positions within the wider structures of governance and changes in urban landscapes.

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Article

City, Nation, Network: Shifting Territorialities of Sovereignty and Urban Violence in Latin America

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Abstract
Cities across the global south are seeing unprecedented levels of violence that generate intense risks and vulnerability. Such problems are often experienced most viscerally among poorer residents, thus reinforcing longstanding socio-spatial conditions of exclusion, inequality, and reduced quality of life for those most exposed to urban violence. Frequently, these problems are understood through the lens of poverty, informality, and limited employment opportunities. Yet an under-theorized and equally significant factor in the rise of urban violence derives from the shifting territorialities of governance and power, which are both cause and consequence of ongoing struggles within and between citizens and state authorities over the planning and control of urban space. This article suggests that a relatively underexplored but revealing way to understand these dynamics, and how they drive violence, is through the lens of sovereignty. Drawing on examples primarily from Mexico, and other parts of urban Latin America, I suggest that problems of urban violence derive from fragmented sovereignty, a condition built upon the emergence of alternative, competing, and at times overlapping networks of territorial authority at the scale of the city, nation, and globe. In addition to theorizing the shifting spatial correlates of sovereignty among state and non-state armed actors, and showing how these dynamics interact with urbanization patterns to produce violence, I argue that the spatial form of the city both produces and is produced by changing political and economic relations embedded in urban planning principles. That is, urban planning practices must be seen as the cause, and not merely the solution, to problems of urban violence and its deleterious effects. Using these claims to dialogue with urban planners, this essay calls for new efforts to redesign cities and urban spaces with a focus on territorial connectivities and socio-spatial integration, so as to push back against the limits of fragmented sovereignty arrangements, minimize violence, and foster inclusion and justice.

1. Introduction

In many parts of Latin America, urban violence has been on the rise (Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Bergman & Whitehead, 2009; Fruhling, Tulchin, & Golding, 2003; Laguerre, 1994; Moser, 2004; Rotker, 2002; Smulovitz, 2003). Although violence can unfold at the individual scale, or within the household (as occurs with gender-based domestic violence), one of the main challenges for citizens in urban Latin America is the trauma of violence at the scales of both neighborhoods and cities as a whole (Arias, 2006a). Particularly when driven by illicit trade and organized crime, urban violence creates insecurities, vulnerabilities, segregations and exclusions in urban spaces (Koonigs & Krujit, 2007; Perlman, 2010). These conditions affect all citizens, but may be most damaging to low-income populations who lack the resources and power to push back against the root causes of insecurity.

Scholars who study urban violence often focus on the employment or policing dynamics that create an environment where violence flowers. They focus on endemic poverty and low levels of employment and education that incentivize crime (McIlwaine & Moser, 2001) or on the insufficient professionalization of law enforcement and the state's unwillingness or incapacity to prosecute criminals (Hinton & Newburn, 2008; Uldriks, 2009). Clearly, all these conditions matter. Yet they belie a scholarly preoccupation with individual behaviors more than with the social, spatial, and governance contexts—themselves reinforced through urban planning decisions—in which these behaviors flower. In this essay, I will argue that urban planning priorities in Latin America have a direct impact on urban violence, precisely because the social, spatial, and economic logics of planning actions serve to territorially exclude and spatially marginalize the poor and the vulnerable. Such patterns not only have an impact on the existence of power relationships and their territorial distribution in the city; they also lay the spatial groundwork for the emergence of certain forms of urban violence. That is, even well-intentioned urban planning priorities can inadvertently produce spaces of exclusion where justice and rule of law are absent, and where violence readily flourishes.

In what follows, I seek to reveal the interrelationships between urban planning and urban violence, on the one hand, and these practices and the notion of sovereignty, on the other. In empirical terms, I connect the historical, political, and governance dynamics of urbanization to fragmented or reformulated networks of allegiance distributed unevenly across urban space, and show how conflicts over who controls territory in the city have combined to produce an explosion of urban violence. It goes without saying that urban planning practices may create social exclusion and injustice everywhere, and as such planning's disastrous impacts are hardly unique to Latin American cities (Yiftachel, 1998). Nonetheless, there are significant differences in urban Latin America owing to the unique relationships linking urban planning, state formation, and economic modernization during the mid-twentieth century that, when combined with the extreme poverty and limited employment associated with late development, will produce both extreme spatial exclusion and alternative governance practices. Because of this, I use the concept of sovereignty to reveal the unique relationships between urban planning, spatial patterns, and urban violence in Latin America. I argue that this notion allows for a more nuanced and revealing accounting of these relationships than do conventional frameworks used to understand urban outcomes, particularly those framed through the logics of 'state' action.

Although commonly associated with the nation-state, the concept of sovereignty can also be used to reveal multiple governance logics, not just those applied to cities but also those that unfold within neighborhoods and other territories beyond. While acknowledging the many influential rigorous historical and crit-

ical genealogical studies of the concept of sovereignty, offered by scholars such as Malabou (2015), Jackson (2007), Foucault (2003), Hardt and Negri (2000), and Bartelson (1995), a widely used (if encyclopedic) definition of sovereignty is supreme authority within a territory (see also Philpott, 1995). Colloquially, the concept is often used to denote supreme power over a body politic. When applied to urban spaces, the concept of sovereignty invites a focus on territorial locations that may be controlled or dominated by forces other than nation-states, including cities or other spaces within them. Further, the concept of sovereignty tends to be less bureaucratically state-centric and thus better able to capture the range of cultural, economic, social, and political actors as well as spatial practices that comprise the 'governance regime(s)' that characterize cities in Latin America, with these governance regimes unfolding at scales both smaller and larger than the city or the nation. One cannot forget that in Latin America the rule of law is weakly institutionalized (Méndez, O'Donnell, & Pinheiro, 2000; Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006). For this reason, quotidian struggles to establish authority over urban spaces are constant, often occurring at scales as small as the street or neighborhood (see, e.g., Arias, 2004, 2006b; Caldeira, 2001; Davis & Alvarado, 1999; Meade, 1997; Perlman, 1976). Sovereignty as a concept allows for an understanding of the ways that citizens may distribute their political allegiances to actors operating at territorial scales both smaller and larger than nation-states, including through relationships with non-state armed actors who may use violence to achieve their aims and seek to control territories of trade in ways that challenge the authority of states.

In making this argument, I do not necessarily seek to question or contradict other theoretical apparatuses used to explain spatial inequality, social injustice, or other related outcomes produced by hegemonic state planning practices in capitalist societies, such as those proposed by David Harvey (1985, 2001) among others, or their relevance for understanding power and inequality Latin American cities. Nor do I seek to engage in theoretical debate as to whether the territorialities of sovereignty in Latin America examined in this article are strictly speaking urban (Brenner & Schmid, 2015), as well as whether these conditions are 'universal' or generalizable across the global south, let alone considered to be exceptional versus ordinary (Robinson, 2006). My ambitions are analytical and empirical, and they consist of focusing greater scholarly attention on the ways that the conceptual notion of sovereignty will help us better understand the competing and overlapping scales of territorial governance that exist and now contribute to endemic violence in Latin America's largest cities. These aims not only build on recent writings from political geographers who seek to introduce the concept of sovereignty into the study of space (Mountz, 2013) as well as from those who raise questions about the importance of recovering 'the complex politics of the city' in order to exam-

ine the potential for equality or inequality (Davidson & Iveson, 2015). They also align with the work of critical geographers who examine the scaled territorial dynamics of urban governance (MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999) as well as those who seek to disaggregate the concept of urban autonomy to accommodate the empirical realities of 'fragmented' and 'networked' forms of association that operate in and through cities (Bulkeley, Luque-Ayala, McFarlane, & MacLeod, 2018, p. 705).

In order to synthesize these various theoretical, analytical, and conceptual threads into discussions of the territorial rescaling of sovereignty in Latin America, I examine the control of physical space and how efforts to monopolize coercive and political authority at the scale of the neighborhood have been set in motion by urban planning decisions embodied in the history of modernist planning paradigms as applied to the region. I draw on Mexico for much of my empirical evidence, where the level of violence has at times matched that of Iraq and Afghanistan. In certain locations in Mexico, of which the border city of Ciudad Juarez is perhaps the most notorious, violence levels were once so high that local officials called in UN peacekeeping forces, using both the nomenclature and the mechanisms historically created for dealing with wartime conflict. All this explains why in the current era, drug cartels control large swathes of Mexico's northern territories, leading to historic highs in rates of violence. Yet violence is not specifically a border problem; nor is it unique to Mexico. In Latin America, Brazil and Colombia have historically hosted high levels of violence, and in recent decades Argentina and Venezuela have joined the ranks. Currently, several countries in Central America such as Honduras and El Salvador have been ranked as among the most violent in the world. In all of these countries, violence at the scale the city has ratcheted out of control, and in the last 20 years has enveloped poor and marginal neighborhoods in ways that mark a dramatic break from the past.

While violence persists outside poor neighborhoods, historically it has tended to take hold in marginalized communities, often in informal settlements, where squatter occupations, ambiguous property rights, and lack of services accompany everyday life. Yet far from blaming the victim, I share this observation delete at the outset in order to focus our attention on urban and territorial planning roots to these problems, which, as shall be clear shortly, have reinforced ongoing struggles between state and non-state armed actors to control daily conditions and establish sovereignty at the scale of the city. Over time, these struggles have fueled transnational networks of coercive authority that are larger and smaller than the nation-state proper, thus recasting the territorial contours in which urban planning action might provide effective tools to reduce violence and the daily risks and vulnerabilities that accompany it. In the narrative that follows, I delineate these path-dependent processes, beginning with a focus on the historical impacts of mid-twentieth century planning priorities for

Latin American cities. After arguing that modernist planning paradigms produced a schism between the formal and informal city, I use the case of Mexico to connect planning-induced patterns of socio-spatial exclusion to the emergence of informal power brokers who offer alternative governance regimes built on illicit activities in marginalized areas of the city. I then discuss the rise of alternative sovereignties emerging from these social, spatial, and governance practices, again using evidence from Mexico where such strongmen have permeated informal neighborhoods and networked their illegal activities to a globalizing economy. The essay ends with a reflection on some possible urban planning tools that might be devised to address both these alternative sovereignties and the networks and conditions of violence they have produced.

2. Modernist Urban Planning Paradigms and the Production of Spatial Inequality

It is not news to anyone who studies Latin American cities that the poor often need to secure their own forms of shelter and subsistence (Caldeira, 2001; Heinrichs & Bernet, 2014; McIlwaine & Moser, 2001; Perlman, 1976). Nor is it a surprise that they may turn to illegal and unrecognized actors (or actions) to receive the services which planning and policy officials fail to provide. Local authorities, for their part, openly tolerate these informal practices (at least until recently with the resurgence of support for neoliberal property rights regimes) because such a posture helped governments achieve legitimacy aims (Harvey, 2001; Roberts & Portes, 2005). The toleration of informality has not only helped undermine established law in ways that may advance criminality; it also has empowered the police. This is because police have considerable discretion, given their mediating role in political systems where state authorities take advantage of the poor for personal gain. With high levels of discretion, police often abuse their power in ways that drive the twin problems of violence and growing insecurity. In many Latin American cities, the police have long been involved in extortion activities, and these practices have laid the foundation for their more contemporary networking with criminal elements (Dewey, 2012; Leeds, 1996). Even as they protect or engage with criminal elements, police also continue to abuse their power with respect to common citizens, whether because of the rent-seeking potential inherent to policing or just pure influence-mongering.

All this suggests somewhat of a paradox: In situations of violence, one of the first lines of action undertaken by governing officials is to deploy the police in order to establish order, not just through law enforcement but also by better regulating urban infrastructure and services. Such actions help authorities fulfil planning objectives even as they establish greater legitimacy among residents. These priorities are a further strengthened when police arrest local gangs or mafias leaders who have es-

tablished their authority through unauthorized control of urban infrastructural services and other local governance mechanisms (an extreme version of which can be seen in the deployment of the 'pacification police' to fight drug-traffickers in poor neighborhoods across Rio de Janeiro). Either way, policing and security interventions are high on the agenda of local officials across cities facing chronic violence, despite the fact that it is precisely the police who are frequently the most hated and the least legitimate arm of the government (Davis, 2012). Police thus see themselves on the frontline of efforts to stamp out any perceived 'moral disorder' marking informal areas, so as to ensure that the 'pathologies' of impoverished residents residing in informal areas do not spread to the formal city (Holston, 1989; Meade, 1997).

Even so, police interventions in poor communities—even when conceived by local authorities as a frontline move to pave the way for better planning action later—are highly suspect, and thus drive a cycle of mistrust over the rule of law (Perlman, 2010). The implications of this are clear: Both the genesis of and reactions to accelerating urban violence in Latin American have involved some mode of state territorial control, whether by means of urban planning practices or by policed-enforced spatial segregation of cities. So what accounts for this? Several factors related to the hegemony of modernist urban planning paradigms give us a clue, precisely because they have produced inequalities that are firmly established in physical as well as political space, and not merely 'social' space.

One key determinant of these troubling outcomes has been the widely adopted distinction between the formal and informal city, which permeates 'modernist' planning practices and has contributed to spatial exclusion and the toleration of socio-spatial inequality (Collier, 1976; Gilbert & Ward, 2009; Pezzoli, 1987; Violich, 1987). In Latin America and elsewhere in the postcolonial world, the actions of planners—both urban and national—have been fueled by the presumption that developmental progress occurs through the transformation and reshaping of 'untamed' space so as to establish social, political, and economic order. At the scale of the nation, these views were embodied in the twentieth century tendency toward the 'colonization' of territory, often by means of large-scale infrastructural projects (e.g., roads, highways, and electricity), which subsumed heterogeneous peoples, places, and natural resources into a project of national economic expansion (Almandoz, 2002; Violich, 1987). At the city-level, the programmatic concerns of planners and architects justified the rationalization of social and spatial order, often in the form of large-scale plans (Almandoz, 2006; Fraser, 2001). Influenced by modernist sensibilities imported from Europe, different parts of the city were preserved for different social and economic functions. However, in those sites marked for integration into the modern economic and political order, short shrift was given to any 'pre-modern' blending of land uses and to the preservation of informal activities. One result was the relegation of poor citizens and informal activities to peripheral and/or marginalized areas of cities. Even when planners sought to expand the project of modernization to include evermore citizens and neighborhoods (mostly through investments in worker housing, transportation, and other services), financial limitations often prevented the provisioning of such goods and services to the poorest (Davis, 2014).

One consequence of this was the emergence of socio-spatially divided cities across Latin America, in which significant proportions of the urban population inhabited segregated and stigmatized outposts existing 'outside' the city's formal economic and political orders. The residents of these neighborhoods were often invisible to city officials, and their urban servicing needs were routinely ignored. The studied failure of planners and city officials to better conditions within informal settlements allowed for the further explosion of settled areas without services, formal property rights, or political recognition, let alone sufficient access to the goods and services that characterized the formal city. In addition to enabling the conditions for ongoing social and spatial separation, planners' failures to address informal settlements further reinforced the widespread belief that those living in such conditions were mere second-class citizens, not morally worthy of inclusion or recognition. If anything, these everyday forms of life were considered both a stain on, and challenge to, the larger project of modernization (Holston, 1989; Meade, 1997).

Planning officials' unwillingness to acknowledge the social and economic value of these ad hoc forms of urban life, let alone accept them as legitimate or justifiable responses to the hardships endogenous to modernist urbanity, usually gave rise to state actions which at times included the ruthless destruction of entire neighborhoods populated by informal occupiers. Even when bulldozing was avoided, the threat of displacement fueled community instability and incentivized new forms of urban clientelism. All this led to residents' growing dependence on informal community leaders to protect them from state aggression. In the process, these clientelistic practices both undermined the strong horizontal networks among community residents and reinforced vertical networks of authority (both formal and informal) predicated upon the power of those who could protect residents in these marginalized areas. The result was the emergence of an array of informal, illicit 'leaders' whose legitimacy and authority were buttressed by their ability to control the activities taking place within these informal territories/spaces, usually for their own gain. Whether by directly protecting citizens and property within these informal territories, or through co-optation and extortion, informal leaders both cultivated and maintained their power by supplying an 'alternative' regime of governance—or in my terms, a form of sovereignty. The existence of these informal governance regimes also served as a check on the capacity of the formal state to in-

tegrate spaces of informal urbanization into master plans and grand-scale projects unfolding across the so-called 'formal' city.

3. Limitations within the Planning Profession: The Minimal Concern with Economic Livelihoods

A second explanation for the emergence of these 'alternative' sovereignties is the failure of authorities and urban planners to address the main livelihood exigencies of poor residents, which included jobs and basic services. Indeed, as planners endeavored to construct the modern city, they turned most of their attention to roadway infrastructure, leaving to the market questions of employment and resources, like electricity and water. Inability to adequately address employment and basic livability concerns has been a general weakness in the planning discipline more broadly, particularly in the early years of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Yet this was particularly the case in the developing world where the adoption of Euro-centric modernist paradigms privileged physical over economic and social interventions (Gilbert, 1986). Even those projects intended to facilitate the entry of citizens into working life (such as modernist housing blocs intended to provide shelter for the laboring classes and/or massive road-building initiatives to facilitate urban labor mobility), they tended to neglect other daily necessities. And while planners continued to prioritize abstract, formalized idealizations of the city, a similarly 'formalistic' logic continued to dominate the development of infrastructure in informal areas, where priority was often given to official housing programs (in order to promote formal property rights) and transportation. Efforts to provide alternative employment opportunities in informal territories were effectively absent (including attempts to cultivate and promote a flourishing commercial sector in these informal spaces), primarily because the growth of commercial activities was taken to be one of the foundational functions of urban centers and other highly-differentiated zones within the formal city. As a result, even when informal areas received infrastructural investments that corresponded or connected them to the formal city, local services and economic activities within informal settlements remained severely underdeveloped, at least in terms of state investments and targeted programs, therefore laying the groundwork for increasing impoverishment.

The government's failure to prioritize employment goals of the urban poor—coupled with the fact that state provided social services were offered primarily to those in the formal sector (often mediated by the demands from organized labor)—meant that the physical infrastructure of poor, informal neighborhoods soon turned into the object of economic production, if not employment (Davis, 2014). This was perhaps best evidenced in the buying and selling of access to physical services (housing, water, electricity) as a means of reproduction (Meade, 1997; Perlman, 1976). Such responses also made a great deal of sense in a context where the division of labor between local and national planning authorities reinforced the neglect of local livelihoods. In the countries of the global south seeking to foster national industrialization while also facing rapid urbanization, city authorities took care of physical planning issues, while national authorities focused on economic planning priorities and large-scale policy initiatives like workforce development, health, and education. The policy distinction between the physical and economic domains, or between reproduction and production, mapped onto the bureaucratic structures of the state in ways that fragmented political authority and urban governance in and over informal areas.

Local authorities may have struggled for the development of housing, but without command over employment and macroeconomic policy, they were not in a position to guarantee residents' income capacities to acquire homes, nor were city finances adequate to pick up the slack by offering full subsidies to the un- or underemployed. Furthermore, local and national authorities rarely coordinated their scale-specific developmental priorities. This led to an array of federally funded projects and arrangements (such as land regularization; sites and services; and squatter upgrading, imposed with grants to federal states from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund) that usually served only a small part of the urban population and that, when put into action, tended to spatially fragment cities even further. For example, such programs often divided informal settlements into multiple 'housing classes' (Gilbert, 1986). The imposing of property rights, without any consideration of the larger economic or social impacts of home ownership or its effects on solidarity within the community, led to social fragmentation between those with and without title. Such conditions pushed those without title to become more dependent on local power brokers, even as those with title became further tied to formal governance institutions. Both reinforced modes of patronage that sustained both informal and formal political authority in the same urban spaces. Such occurrences further weakened the horizontal relations of the community even as they increased citizen reliance on whichever leader could mediate service provision and heterogeneous community claims (Auyero, 2007; McIlwaine & Moser, 2001). In turn, those who possessed the power to mediate between the informal and informal systems of service provision, as well as between illicit and licit activities, gained both politically and economically

Yet precisely because such activities and exchanges were by their very nature conducted outside the law, they strengthened illegal markets for urban services and further laid the foundation for the rise of illicit brokers, further upping the stakes for those who had the political power to protect them (Leeds, 1996). To the extent that informal political leaders built local legitimacy on their capacities to protect illegal or illicit markets among the poor or informal areas, both residents and these in-

formal leaders needed each other (Arias, 2004, 2006b; Cross, 1998). These conditions further tied informal brokers and residents to each other in alternative reciprocities that distanced them from the formal city and from the rule of law. In the midst of these developments, violence soon became the currency of power.

4. Informality, Globalization, and Violence: Reinforcing Alternative Sovereignties

To the extent that informal brokers protected the livelihoods of informal residents, their activities challenged formal planning practices as well as the legitimate authority of local officials to regulate, monitor, and control the urban territory. Across Latin America, this usually meant that local police did not stand by quietly. As informality accelerated, police were expected to aggressively respond by displacing illegal occupiers and harassing or expelling street vendors (Collier, 1976). Police behavior may well have traced its origins to the state's desire to impose certain forms of spatial order and social values on marginalized groups. However, upon entering these informal spaces police usually accommodated and even perpetuated the informal order. Like informal leaders themselves, police were known to work with, negotiate, or extort vulnerable residents—especially those wanting to deviate from urban regulatory requirements (Davis, 2006b). In communities of lesser income, the opportunity for extortion was often so great that police and informal leaders alike wound up competing for control of local protection rackets, with citizens vulnerable to both the formal and informal actors who monitored or controlled everyday spaces (Hinton & Newburn, 2008; Koonigs & Krujit, 2005; Uldriks, 2009). Over time, however, this situation cemented durable networks of complicity between police and local leaders involved in illicit enterprises, with such relationships becoming stronger and more nefarious as informal economies expanded. This was best exemplified in instances where extortion markets dealt in traded goods that moved through urban, national, and transnational supply chains.

In those environments where police protected criminals at the expense of residents, and where the territoriality of unsanctioned and illegal trade transcended the local bounds of communities, violence was far more likely (Davis, 2013). This happened not merely because the participation of police in illegal enterprises undermined the rule of law, but also because police abuses of power led to widespread mistrust of state authorities by residents. In these conditions, informal political leaders at the community level gained greater powers of control over social and spatial dynamics. The further these informal systems of extortion and trade spread beyond community boundaries (a consequence of the inability of local states to isolate and control informal urban activity), the larger the sums of money exchanged and the more subtly dispersed such exchange networks became. In the face of territorially expanding illicit networks with higher financial stakes, violence—actual and threatened—had the tendency to become the prominent technique for the assertion of authority (Davis, 2006a).

The combined effect of all these developments produced an alternative governance regime embedded in informal urbanism, built on new modalities of loyalty and allegiance emanating from neighborhoods, but slowly expanding beyond. This is precisely where the conceptual lens of sovereignty begins to make sense: It refers to the emergence of alternative loyalties based on informal connections between marginalized residents and local leaders who built their governing power and reciprocities through illicit activities. That the emergence of informal forms of governance and illicit enterprises began locally, but over time began to operate at both the sub- and transnational scales, further strengthened the durability of these arrangements. Precisely because these emergent communities of allegiance and mutual-exchange enabled unique opportunities for meaningful welfare, they began to function as veritable 'mini-states' capable of sustaining novel instantiations of non-state-based forms of sovereignty, in stark contrast to the previous 'imagined community' of national state sovereignty (Anderson, 2006). These local imagined communities of allegiance must rely on 'homegrown' armed constituencies to protect and maintain both their economic livelihoods and their relatively autonomous dominion, particularly in cases of conflict with formal authorities and nation-state policies (Davis, 2010). This means that in many Latin American cities, state-administered mechanisms of control (such as providing 'security' or infrastructure provision) have been taken over by unsanctioned actors (such as mafias or private security forces and militias) whose allegiance is solely to their client communities and/or networked territories, rather than formal state, as has traditionally been the case (Muller, 2010). In this unrestrained, wild-west atmosphere of alternative sovereignty, violence is a central form of currency, serving to sustain economic and political power. Yet it lies in the hands of illicit and informal actors organized at the local scale as much as in the hands of the national state.

As violence is used by both state and non-state actors in the struggle to buttress their preferred forms of sovereignty, urban residents are increasingly caught in the crossfire. In an ideal world, both democracy and rule of law would be activated to protect and engage the citizenry in the face of growing violence, with such responses strengthening the legitimacy of state authority. Yet owing to decades of neglect as well as social and spatial exclusion, many residents have been unwilling to buy into a formal system of governance that promises to provide an antidote to violence, but that allows police impunity to fuel that violence. In the face of these failures, some of the most marginalized urban residents prefer to forge new loyalties or cast their allegiance to non-state 'authorities,' including local mafia leaders (Arias, 2006b; Colette & Cullen, 2000; Goldstein, 2003). Once this hap-

pens, the sovereign power of the national state, and its legitimate claims to territory, allegiance, and rule of law, may be broken in fundamental ways. In such conditions, both local and national efforts to use policy, planning, and policing tools to serve the population are also delegitimized, further laying the foundation for more exclusion, neglect, and violence.

Despite the fact that these rather depressing outcomes find their origins in mid-century modernist planning decisions, the intensification of globalization and neo-liberalization over the past few decades has worsened the problem. Neoliberalism has limited the budgetary powers of domestic authorities to accommodate the urban poor, while globalization has strengthened the economic networks that propel alternative sovereignties. In the contemporary era, the opening of borders and expansion of international trade privileges transnational connections among licit and illicit activities alike. This too has undermined efforts to control of violence, which in turn eats into the national state's capacity to monopolize the means of coercion. Moreover, the acceptance of global markets and the reduced legitimacy of the nation-state in the face of economic liberalization, increasing urban inequality, and violence have further eaten into patterns of allegiances and reciprocity between citizens and the nation-state. This is particularly so among those urban residents who remain socially and spatially enmeshed in informal economic regimes built on forms of subsistence that are constructed through transnational supply chains (Hasan, 2002). With neo-liberalization further undermining traditional import-substitution industrialization and the supply of factory jobs, even as it intensifies the financialization of the economy, formal employment opportunities for the poor continue to disappear. With these negative effects often felt most dramatically in major cities across Latin America, urban residents are now even more likely to turn local strongmen—including criminal mafias empowered by trade of illicit goods—for guardianship over and against nation-state efforts to police neighborhoods in an effort to restore formal socio-spatial orders (Arias, 2006b).

The problem, however, is not merely that transnational networks of illicit trade can bring more violence into local neighborhoods—a primary site from which these activities emanate. Nor is it merely that these strong transnational networks of illicit trade reinforce the power and territorial control of these alternative 'sovereigns' (Davis, 2006a). Equally significant is the fact that economic neo-liberalization is usually accompanied by state downsizing, in which the fiscal capacities of authorities to push back against both poverty and violence is markedly reduced. This is not to say that state authorities have given up on addressing urban violence. Yet, as recent examples from Mexico and Brazil both show, the response is often more intense militarization of coercive force against illicit transnational smugglers. In Mexico under President Calderón, for example, military operations against drug-traffickers generated opposition from citizens who become collateral damage, while in contemporary Brazil President Bolsonaro's adoption of extreme militarization has produced cries of opposition from human rights activists who see innocent favela residents caught up in armed police raids. Both responses reduce the state's legitimacy in ways that may allow alternative sovereign loyalties to persist.

5. Challenging Urban Violence and Alternative Sovereignties through Planning Action: Concluding Remarks

So, is there any exit from this troubling state of affairs? It goes without saying that planners across urban Latin America are bound to be hamstrung in their efforts to deal with the problems of ongoing urban violence, if only because their implementation capacities and authority frequently owe to the legitimacy of the local or national state 'sovereigns' on whose behalf they are planning and intervening. In that sense, planning theorists and urban practitioners will have to be cognizant of their own limitations, and will need to work with citizens and others whose efforts to wrench control of local conditions away from the perpetrators of violence must remain at the frontlines of action. Having said this, a focus only on a single community or bounded site where violence and illicit activities flower will not readily undermine or challenge the historically-produced networks of power and allegiance that keep illicit economies vibrant, territorially networked, and expansive. Moreover, dealing with networked urban violence in an environment where poverty persists and employment alternatives are limited will be difficult for the planning profession. This is particularly so because in recent years the discipline has moved away from comprehensive spatial planning even as it continues to undervalue the importance of job creation in planning praxis, instead focusing most of its attention on community level interventions and processes of citizen participation more than large-scale territorial reconfiguration. Yet pessimism and hopelessness are not going to solve the problem either. We have no choice but to think about productive pathways forward to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities associated with chronic urban violence, even if elimination of its root sources remains elusive.

In general, planners would do well to turn their attention toward recasting the spatial scales of intervention, and examining as well as questioning the scalar biases of planning action in an effort to cultivate synergies across the various competing territorial fragments that make up today's cities. The spatial fragmentation of Latin American cities was set in motion by the uneven application of infrastructure investments and resources in the first place, and a rethinking of ways to reduce or eliminate spatial inequities is a good place to start for future planning action. To a certain degree, planners may still be hamstrung by overarching ideological projects (whether in the form of allegiances to modernism, neoliberalism, or even the embrace of anarchism/critical

planning mantras) that accept a diminished state role. Yet in order to exit from the problems of violence generated by the shifting territorialities of sovereignty, planners must identify alternative planning and policy actions capable of networking spatially disjointed spaces and establishing shared social allegiances that link the city to the nation. These will require significant resources and possibly even concerted state action. Toward these ends, I suggest planners think along the following lines:

First, recognize that violence is a planning problem. For far too long, questions of urban violence have been relegated to the worlds of social policy and to specialists focused on police professionalization, the courts, or the justice system. Yet the spatial concentration and correlates of urban violence, which may be as obvious in cities like Newark as they are in Mexico City or São Paulo, cry out for spatially-sensitive approaches to mitigating or reducing violence. All future spatial interventions in a neighborhood or city should be reviewed for the impacts on socio-spatial exclusion and how they might inadvertently empower the perpetrators of violence. Certain investments or interventions may be more likely to strengthen as opposed to weaken illicit activities. Planners should think about actions or programs that undermine or transform the local economic activities that strengthen organized criminal leadership. They also should consider social, infrastructural, and economic interventions that reduce citizen dependence on illicit networks and the activities that fuel their vibrancy.

Second, strengthen novel forms of citizen mobilization or participation that empower residents to identify the root causes violence while also providing opportunities to construct alternative social and political spaces for action. Residents must be given the resources to cultivate relative autonomy from perpetrators of violence, whether they are informal leaders or the coercive forces of the state. Planners can support these efforts by helping citizens identify the activities and behaviors that prop up illicit networks, using this knowledge to construct security strategies that are appropriate to the room daily settings. This, in essence, is a call for constructing security practices from 'below' rather than from 'above,' so that residents are no longer forced to depend on state and/or market actors for protection. Instead, we must recognize that citizens caught in networks of violence have a better understanding of what is or is not possible then external experts looking for one-size-fits-all solutions. In light of this, residents of violence-prone neighborhoods must be empowered and resourced to make their own decisions about what to secure, how, and why. Failure to enhance the agency of residents with respect to the institutions and practices that propagate violence will slow down efforts to increase safety.

Third, radically transform urban planning epistemologies and practices to focus less on isolated communities, and instead recognize the overlapping networks of (inter)activities and mutual allegiances that work in, through, and beyond individual neighborhoods.

We must question standard planning practices built on the assumption that local communities are both the starting and ending point for action. We have seen that although chronic urban violence may start in a given community, it will network across the city as a whole, emanating across a nation and transnationally. Planning actions should be oriented towards transcending spatial isolation of communities while also reconfiguring the activities that embed them in networks of violence. This does not mean forgetting about the importance of fostering horizontal connections among community residents. However, community solidarity should be developed with an eye to programs that help residents break or disrupt the illicit activities that have pulled their communities into larger territorial networks of violence. Planners must pay attention to infrastructural, social, and economic programs and policies that foster such ends. New or increased investments as well as economic projects that redirect and inject wealth into informal and/or marginalized urban territories, but in ways that strengthen integral immersion within and spatial connection to the 'formal' city, are a first step towards reversing the territorial isolation that contributes to violence and precarity among the urban poor.

Fourth, question and re-conceptualize the current 'formal–informal' binary, which persists in urban planning practices. This will require greater appreciation for the array of 'alternative urbanisms' produced and practiced by marginalized and excluded populations, and a reassessment of the everyday practices undertaken by residents to create their own livelihoods in an environment of scarcity. Promoting or valuing the ingenuity of informality can provide a platform for challenging the inferior status ascribed to informal locations and activities, even as it can serve as a basis for learning from residents' own efforts to strengthen and protect their neighborhoods in the face of violence. One way to move forward ethically as well as constructively is to think about informality as a solution and not a problem. Planners should thus engage with informality, and possibly even augment it rather than try to banish it.

The bottom line is that the discipline of urban planning must re-conceptualize its long-standing assumptions as well as overarching spatial planning goals, with the aim of prioritizing connections among formal and informal activities and locations at the scale of the city. Breaking down the formal–informal divide in planning epistemology will help advance these aims, by ensuring that certain areas of the city do not become so severely stigmatized that authorities fail to integrate them into the urban economy and the larger polity. To accomplish such aims, informal settlements and other marginalized neighborhoods should be recognized as holding value while also being socially, spatially, and politically incorporated into all larger visions of city-building. This will also help urban planning practitioners to prioritize discussions of how distinctive communities can be linked to the city as a whole, and by so doing prioritize actions

that effectively connect citizens in one location to those in another, thus providing the basis for socio-spatial inclusion rather than exclusion or division. Such planning and policy developments can form the foundation for new networks of allegiance and new forms of political authority at scales larger than the community but smaller than the nation-state, thus allowing for pushback against transnationally networked activities that allow violence to flower.

In a globalizing world it may be easy for citizens to detach themselves from the idea of the nation-state as the primordial site for political allegiance and sovereignty, and instead become tied to alternative, 'imagined communities' grounded in local realities even if the latter are transnationally connected. In Latin America violence has flowered where these two scales of allegiance are in tension, leaving many residents with mixed loyalties. In situations of chronic violence, the desire for pacified order often becomes so urgent that there is a danger of succumbing to a nostalgia for the state-based modernist techniques of mass social and spatial control that helped fuel violence in the first place. Against such a regression, we must vigilantly pursue alternative scales of sovereign allegiance and new forms of imagined community formation, built around tangible planning actions that connect diverse territorial parts and wholes with the aim of creating new social and spatial synergies in cities that operate beyond simplistic, state-based understandings of the 'enfranchisement vs. disenfranchisement' binary. At the very least, such actions could cultivate a new sense of collective purpose linking human communities of citizens, committed and prepared to push back against the ravages of life-denying violence increasingly widespread in Latin American cities today.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Densification and School Segregation: The Case of Oslo

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Abstract

Urban densification has become a desirable development strategy in several cities. In addition to its environmental benefits, densification is also advocated as able to promote conditions for better coexistence and social mix. Studies have shed light on the likelihood of densification affecting residential patterns, but no attention has been paid so far to understanding the possible consequences on school segregation dynamics. As residential and school population composition are strongly intertwined, we argue that densification patterns may be associated with specific dynamics in school segregation. This study may thus pave the way to a better understanding of an understudied relationship. Using Oslo as a case study, we investigate how urban densification, here implemented through a neoliberal planning approach, can be associated with different forms of gentrification and new social divisions that are somewhat mirrored in the school segregation patterns of the city.

Issue

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1. Introduction

Urban densification has become a desirable urban development strategy in several cities. It has been identified as a solution to the environmental degradation deriving from urban sprawl since the 1990s. Indeed, the climate emergency has put considerable pressure on a shift in urbanisation towards a low-carbon city model (Rice, Cohen, Long, & Jurjevich, 2020).

Densification has been gradually incorporated in climate policies at a European and global scale, as a desirable tool to deliver positive environmental, economic and social outcomes in contemporary cities (OECD, 2012; UN Habitat, 2014). In addition to its environmental benefits (Lim & Kain, 2016), advocates for densification argue for its capacity to create socially diverse, mixed, and culturally vibrant urban areas (Ståhle, 2017). Evidence from various empirical studies suggests the opposite,

however, as the densification of central areas may benefit only a well-off minority (Rérat, 2012). While studies have explored the likelihood of densification to affect residential patterns, no attention has been paid so far to understanding the possible consequences on school segregation dynamics, despite one of the greatest challenges for social cohesion today being the integration of migrant and vulnerable students in urban education systems. School segregation, the unequal distribution of children of different social and ethnic backgrounds across schools, is an important manifestation of these increasing divisions, and is itself a driver of new social inequalities. The fragmentation of social space tends to polarise access to education between more and less privileged groups, and between native and foreign populations (Bonal & Belleï, 2018).

As residential and school population composition are strongly intertwined, we argue that there are several rea-

sons to believe that densification patterns may be associated with the specific dynamics of school segregation. Especially in contexts where strict catchment areas are enforced, there is a strong relationship between school choice and residential choice. School segregation is an important spatial phenomenon. It affects, and is affected by, the area in which people live and how people move and travel. Urban densification, having an effect on residential patterns (Quastel, Moos, & Lynch, 2012) and residential mobility dynamics (Wessel & Lunke, 2019), thus has to be seen as playing a substantial role in affecting conditions for school segregation. Using Oslo, the capital of Norway, as a case study, we explore the role of densification in shaping residential patterns, and consequently in affecting school segregation.

Oslo is an interesting location for a study on this topic for numerous reasons. First, Oslo is a growing context, in terms of both economic and demographic trends, especially due to internal and international migration. To avoid urban sprawl, the city government has managed urban transformations by promoting urban densification strategies since the 1980s. Urban densification was intended to improve not only conditions of environmental sustainability, but also a more balanced socio-spatial structure in the city, promoting social mixing. Secondly, Oslo's local educational policy reflects the egalitarian socio-democratic welfare state regime, with traditionally low school competition (Imsen, Blossing, & Moos, 2017). Thirdly, a (de facto) catchment area regulation on school admission is in place at primary and junior high school level (Haugen, 2020). These two school system characteristics mean that most of the observed differentiation between schools is consistent with the residential concentration of specific households in the catchment areas, rather than pedagogical differentiation.

In this article, we explore the following research question: How are the densification developments of the past two decades associated with changes in the distribution of children with different backgrounds in Oslo?

Using Oslo as a case study, we investigated how a neoliberal planning approach to densification, combined with a strict school catchment area geography, may increase the already strong social divisions of the school population. We draw on the literature on urban densification strategies and residential and school segregation, aiming to bridge the gap between these fields. This attempt is of particular relevance for two main reasons. First, it sheds light on the understudied relationship between urban planning strategies and school segregation. Second, it may have policy implications. As highlighted in North American studies, reducing school segregation, indeed, is estimated to significantly reduce economic costs for society or even diminish juvenile justice cases, and improve intergroup social cohesion (Mikulyuk & Braddock, 2018).

The article proceeds as follows: In the next section, we present the state of the art of the academic debate on densification, residential segregation and school compo-

sition; in the third section we present our research design and methods; in the fourth we introduce the case study; in the fifth we present the results of the investigation on densification and school segregation patterns; in the last section, we explore the relevance of urban planning strategies in shaping urban socio-spatial contexts differently affecting school segregation dynamics.

2. Densification, Residential Patterns, and School Composition

In this section, we explore the multifaceted relationship between densification, residential patterns, and school composition. We will first address densification, the narrative about its potential to create a socially mixed urban environment, and the challenges of turning such principles into practice. Then, we look at residential and school population composition, as potentially affected by densification, and as mutually influencing factors.

2.1. Densification Strategies and Residential Patterns

Claims about the advantages of dense urban environments in terms of social mix and urban diversity are not new. In the 1960s, Jane Jacobs advocated for a return to the traditional way of planning cities, through relatively high density and a mixture of functions (Jacobs, 1961). In her view, such an approach would make cities more diverse, vibrant and vital. These principles anticipated the compact city ideal and lead planning movements such as New Urbanism, Transit-Oriented and Smart Growth development (Sharifi, 2016).

With urban sprawl increasingly identified as a significant cause of socioeconomic and also ethnic spatial segregation (Ludlow, 2006), inner-city revitalisation through urban densification has been considered beneficial for improving greater social mix and cohesion (Power, 2001). It should be noted that there is no evidence that density per se delivers such outcomes (Bricocoli & Cucca, 2016), but it is rather the variety of housing types and tenures (more likely to be found in dense than in sprawled areas) that is likely to play a more prominent role in creating the conditions for a lower level of segregation involving low income groups (Burton, 2000).

Densification is now increasingly recognised as a possible driver of socio-spatial inequalities and criticised for creating opportunities mainly for the most well-off (Rérat, 2012). This, in turn, may cause gentrification and the displacement of the most vulnerable, even when densification is pursued to combat socioeconomic segregation and to achieve a greater social mix (Lim & Kain, 2016; Rosol, 2015). For instance, Rosol (2015) investigated Vancouver, where the combination of densification and social mixing policies has resulted in displacement and a lack of affordability, rather than greater social mixing.

These findings suggest that, if greater social mixing is the goal, densification strategies have to be comple-

mented with a policy framework oriented at enhancing affordability and preventing displacement.

Scholars have investigated the possible implications of densification strategies on displacement and gentrification, in particular in the context of cities in the US (Quastel et al., 2012; Rice et al., 2020). As the pressure of climate change has increased and the 'low-carbon life-style' has become more popular, particularly among young middle-upper income earners (Rice et al., 2020), densification has also become a discursively powerful tool for improving city attractiveness. Spatial proximity and the creation of 'live-work-play' spaces (Quastel et al., 2012), have been actively used as branding tools in the advertisement of dwellings in densification hubs. We could find in such branding strategies and in the role of housing developers in pushing for the height, density and price of housing around the transport hubs, processes similar to those currently occurring in Oslo (Cavicchia, 2020). As the development of densification hubs results in high profitability for developers and high costs for residents, the resulting residential patterns may show an overrepresentation of middle-upper income households (Quastel et al., 2012).

The economic accessibility of densification hubs thus plays a fundamental role in shaping residential patterns. At the same time, household residential choice also affects residential patterns, and neighbourhood characteristics play an important role in this respect. As our investigation concerns the relationship between densification and school composition, we focus on the residential choices of family households, and the factors that may affect such choice in urban contexts.

So far, urban scholars have mainly focused on specific aspects connected with urban regeneration policies that may eventually lead to child-friendly cities, with gentrification implications (Lilius, 2014). Strategies oriented to better conditions of street safety, infrastructure for sport and culture, green spaces, school buildings, and backyards, are supposed to increase the attractiveness of neighbourhoods for families with school-age children. Critical urban scholars have highlighted that while child-friendly strategies may suggest a very positive attitude towards family needs, they may also be used as a proxy for 'middle-class friendly.' According to these studies, families are becoming the new catalysts for gentrification. Certain groups of dual-earner families in particular seem to find the city an attractive place to live, because of the proximity of amenities, a liberal climate for those who wish to depart from patriarchal ideals, and proximity to work, which makes it much easier to combine work and family life (Karsten, 2003). Middle-class nuclear families now seem to be important agents in gentrification processes.

So far, the literature on the link between child-friendly regeneration, gentrification and school segregation has mostly focused on US cities (Candipan, 2019). Very few studies have examined child-friendly urban renewal, gentrification and school choice in Europe,

describing different patterns. As we will show in the next section, findings are mixed: In some cases, socio-demographic changes associated with gentrification have affected school composition, while in other contexts this has not been the case.

2.2. Residential Patterns, School Choice and School Composition

A large body of literature has demonstrated that residential patterns are crucial for understanding school segregation: Where children live determines, to a large extent where they go to school. In educational contexts characterised by a predominant public school system and strict school catchment areas, with one public school per district and very few private alternatives (Bernelius & Vaattovaara, 2016), the large majority of pupils attend the school in their residential neighbourhood. In this case, school segregation is a clear reflection of residential patterns, but in contexts with a strong degree of choice, where parents can choose a school outside their residential neighbourhood, such as in Dutch cities (Boterman, 2019), the majority of pupils also attend a nearby school. This implies that while school policies on admission mediate the relationship between residential location and school segregation, geography matters in all contexts (Burgess, Wilson, & Lupton, 2005). The importance of spatial proximity to schools implies that residential mobility behaviour is also often informed by considerations of school choice (Butler & Hamnett, 2007). Moving to specific neighbourhoods to be close to the 'right' schools is common in many contexts, and is driven by class-based and racially-based considerations of avoidance and peer-group seeking (Boterman, 2013). Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) have demonstrated that when school allocation policies are tied solely to residential address, schools can even have a direct effect on housing prices in the catchment areas around the most desired public schools: In other words, school choices are made through housing choices, and vice versa.

Scholars have researched the motivations behind residential mobility for households with school-age children in the Oslo context (Wessel & Lunke, 2019). These studies have pointed out that choices are relatively strongly influenced by the socioeconomic status and educational background of parents, and middle-and upper-class families are most likely to actively select neighbourhoods that are considered privileged choices for families. Neighbourhood characteristics and the socioeconomic and ethnic composition of neighbourhoods have an impact on the residential decisions of households. These decisions, in turn, affect and reshape a neighbourhood's socioeconomic and ethnic composition (Lilius, 2014).

In contexts characterised by free school choice or a high availability of private school options, strategies that do not involve moving into the vicinity of a de-

sired school include travelling greater distances from home to school. Butler and Hamnett (2007) have demonstrated that, in response to a mismatch between school and residential location, middle-class parents in London have adopted a metropolitan-wide strategy for (secondary) education. A second pattern, much less popular, is the middle-class 'colonisation' of local schools in diverse neighbourhoods. In the UK, this often implies the 'gentrification' of public working-class schools to create safety in numbers (Vowden, 2012), however, the relationship between urban planning strategies and school segregation and change dynamics remain largely unexplored.

Acknowledging that urban social and ethnic geographies tend to overlap (Huse, 2018), we attempt to explore how the residential patterns in densification areas are likely to be reflected in changes to the ethnic composition of the school population.

3. Research Design, Data and Methods

We primarily draw on the statistical analysis of quantitative data on school composition to investigate the multifaceted relationship between densification strategies and school segregation.

The statistical analysis focused on the evolution of school composition according to ethnic background (Arnesen, Mietola, & Lahelma, 2007). Specifically, we focused on the analysis of data on the concentration of native/non-native speakers of the dominant language (Norwegian mother tongue/minority language mother tongue). There are two reasons for this choice: Language proficiency is a factor that parents prioritize when considering school options; and the typology of available data on school social composition in Oslo. Data on schools have been combined with data on densification patterns, supplied by the Agency of Planning and Building Service of Oslo Municipality, and mapped with the QGis application. We also relied on quantitative data on the ethnic composition of the population to discuss changing patterns of school composition in the light of changing residential patterns.

Additionally, we draw on the results of the qualitative analysis conducted by one of the authors as part of a research project on densification and socio-spatial inequalities in Oslo (Cavicchia, 2020). Such qualitative analysis includes interviews with planners, developers and politicians in the municipality of Oslo as well as an analysis of planning documents. We rely on that analysis to briefly reconstruct in this paper the motivations behind densification interventions and the attention given to goals of social mix/balance in the municipal plans. We were then able to discuss changes in the school composition and link such changes with specific approaches to densification. Additionally, we identified possible conflicts between the aims and actual outcomes of densification and potential shortcomings in the current policy framework for city development.

4. Oslo: Socio-Spatial Dynamics, Local School System and Densification Strategies

### 4.1. Socio-Spatial Dynamics

Urban socio-spatial segregation has traditionally been strong in Oslo, compared to many other European cities (Tammaru, Van Ham, Marcińczak, & Musterd, 2015). Indeed, Oslo is considered a dual city, and the dynamics of social polarisation have long origins (Wessel, 2000). The Akerselva, the river that crosses Oslo in a north-south direction, has been considered the social and spatial division between the rich and resourceful West of the city and the poor East, since the 1800s (Wessel, 2000). Substantial East–West differences still exist. Single-family homes with gardens, urban parks, museums, and embassies characterise the West, where the upper classes live. The outer East is more characterised by highways, brownfield sites and block buildings, with many people with low-incomes and of non-Western ethnicity (Andersen & Skrede, 2017).

Increasing levels of immigration have further strengthened the socio-spatial segregation patterns, as most immigrants have settled in the neighbourhoods where socioeconomic deprivation has been most visible. According to Turner and Wessel (2013), the importance of voluntary residential choice is not negligible in explaining the residential mobility of minority groups in the Oslo region. They found that some minority groups have remained loyal to the Eastern edge of the city, despite their success in climbing the social ladder.

Housing policies have also played a fundamental role in shaping segregation dynamics. Due to the neoliberal wave of the 1980s, Norway switched in a few years from a social homeownership housing model to a typically neoliberal housing system (Sandlie & Gulbrandsen, 2017). The current Norwegian housing policy has been defined as poverty-oriented by Nordahl (2020) and its tools (housing allowance, municipal housing, and housing schemes) as likely to exacerbate the existing dynamics of polarisation. Indeed, studies demonstrate that recipients of housing subsidies and start-up loans from the State Housing Bank tend to settle in the most deprived districts of the city (Johannesen, Flatbø, Sellevold, & Bohlin Borgersen, 2018). In 2016, more than 65% of loans granted were used to buy a dwelling in the city's lowest-priced districts (Johannesen et al., 2018). The majority of the small proportion of municipal housing dwellings, often in highly segregated areas without decent housing standards, is also mainly in the inner and outer East area of the city. Although there has been a municipal effort in the past few years to increase the amount of municipal housing in the wealthier West, there is still a long way to go before there is an East–West balance.

Figure 1 clearly shows the patterns of ethnic divisions in Oslo. As of 2018, differences were very evident, especially in the outer city. The outer East, with the exception of Østensjø, has the highest share of people with non-

Legend:
- Inner east
- Inner west
- Outer east
- Outer west

Concentration of non-Norwegian
- 0% - 15%
- 15% - 30%
- 30% - 45%
- 45% - 60%
- Forest

As of 2018, the city average of people with non-Norwegian background was approximately 33%

Figure 1. Residential ethnic composition in 2018. Source: Authors' elaboration on data provided by Oslo Statistikkbanken (2018a).

Norwegian ethnic background. By contrast, the districts in the West of the city show an on average lower concentration of people with non-Norwegian background, and also with respect to the city average.

Two issues emerging from the map need further explanation. First, the district of Nordstrand, despite being physically located on the East side of the city, counts as outer West (see Wessel, 2000). Secondly, the red area in the city centre mainly indicates a high concentration of ex-pats, often highly skilled temporary workers, employed in the banking, consulting, and IT industry.

Even though the ethnic divisions are sharp, the latest trends (2013–2018) show a somewhat decreasing East–West polarisation compared to the previous period. The reason for this can be found in a more mixed situation in the inner city, where the historical inner East-inner West division has weakened compared to the past, and data for the periods 2008–2013 and 2013–2018 seems to confirm this trend. As we will show later, this is mainly related to gentrification dynamics and socio-demographic changes associated with densification interventions, which have been mainly implemented in the inner East and the fringe areas outside the inner East borders. We therefore do not measure the inner city according to the administrative borders, but extend it to include the newly developed densification hubs.

4.2. Educational Policy and School Catchment Areas in Oslo

The city of Oslo is divided into 115 primary school catchment areas. Students are mainly allocated to local schools according to their home address. Since 2004, families have had the right to choose a school outside their catchment area, but there is no guarantee of admission, as it depends on the available places in the receiving schools (Imsen et al., 2017). Currently 90 percent of primary school children attend school within their catchment area—although this percentage may vary in the city (Abildsnes, 2020), making Oslo an excellent location to study the effects of catchment area-based school policies and urban segregation (Hansen, 2017).

The role of public schools is strong in an international comparison, as the number of private schools is low (4.5 percent students in primary schools attend a private institution) and they are institutionally highly controlled. Schools are free, and most private schools are in part publicly funded (85% by the State, 15% by families). As the vast majority of students attend their nearest public school, urban segregation has a direct effect on the composition of the schools, which is further reflected in the educational attainment of the schools (Hansen, 2017).

Recent studies indicate that parents are also playing an increasing active role in school choice, in Oslo. As the pedagogy quality and orientation vary relatively little between schools (Haugen, 2020), school choice appears to be particularly linked to the school's social aspects. In particular, the results in the national test evaluation, and the percentage of minority language mother tongue students in the local school (information and data are available of the website of each public school in Norway) may be considered when choosing residential locations among school catchment areas (Wessel & Lunke, 2019).

The literature also suggests that families consider other aspects when selecting residential location, such as neighbourhood quality and the availability of appropriate housing for growing household needs.

As argued in the next sections, densification strategies creating certain neighbourhood quality, characteristics and housing typologies, turn out to be relevant in shaping socio-spatial contexts that affect primary school segregation.

4.3. Densification Strategies in Oslo

Densification in Oslo is a primary tool in environmental and climate policies. During the 1980s, after a long period of suburbanisation and outward expansion, Oslo started to combat the detrimental effects of urban sprawl and to use densification as its main development strategy (Næss, Næss, & Strand, 2011). Densification has mainly followed two strategies: densification from the inner to the outer city, and along public transport lines (Oslo Kommune, 2015b, 2018). Both strategies have been thought to guarantee efficient land use, while ensuring proximity to transport hubs and discouraging the use of cars (Hanssen & Hofstad, 2013; Mete & Xue, 2020). The municipal goal has been to create densification areas of high urban quality, with good networks and a functional mix (Oslo Kommune, 2018). In a recent study, Mouratidis (2018) provided evidence, by comparing compact and sprawled neighbourhoods in Oslo, about the likelihood of compact city characteristics having a positive effect on urban liveability. Proximity to public transport, to the most central areas, but also to services and leisure activities, which are typical elements of the newly densified areas, are emphasised as among the most influential aspects to positively affect neighbourhood satisfaction, and consequently liveability.

Geographically, densification has been disproportionally developed on the East side of the city, in particular in the districts of Grunerløkka, Gamle Oslo and Sagene. There are multiple reasons for this approach. First, Eastern Oslo is where industrial development mainly took place. The de-industrialisation process, started in the 1960s, left many brownfield areas and vacant spaces, which represented the most favourable ground for densification interventions. The West, instead, is characterised by more established residential communities, where resourceful inhabitants are powerful in protest-

ing against the densification of their neighbourhoods. Their interests are also supported by a plan—*the Small House Plan*—which protects several single-family house areas from densification, many of which are located in the West (Andersen & Skrede, 2017).

It should be noted that Oslo has limited expansion opportunities, due to both its topography and the protected forests around the city, so in addition to the mentioned power dynamics, city development has also experienced natural growth towards the East.

The outer city, instead, has been barely touched by densification interventions. The main motivations involve land-use efficiency and avoiding sprawl. However, economic reasons are also fundamental. Urban development in Oslo is largely in the hands of private developers, who also lead housing production. They built—and still build—where they can make the highest profit, in areas that are attractive, close to the city centre and to transport hubs, and where there is demand from people able to afford dwellings in such areas (interview with a developer in Cavicchia, 2020). This pro-growth approach, the neoliberal planning and housing systems in force, and other factors, have contributed to the creation of costly densification hubs (Cavicchia, 2020).

On this basis, it is evident that densification has played an important role in creating conditions for new spatial divisions and, consequently, new residential and school segregation dynamics. Balancing the living conditions between East and West Oslo and avoiding the reproduction of a more segregated city have been long-standing goals of the municipality (Figure 2). Attention to topics of social balance, social diversity and inclusion has become stronger in municipal plans across time. The plan approved in 2018 was the first elaborated under a red-green coalition, after around three decades of conservative administration, and the first explicitly mentioning the concept of social sustainability as a premise for housing development and better living conditions. Contextually, pro-growth arguments focusing on city attractiveness and competitiveness have also been recurring, as there is a vision of Oslo being a leading sustainable city nationally and internationally (Oslo Kommune, 2018).

Despite these goals, there are questions about the outcomes of densification strategies with respect to balancing living conditions of the city.

5. Densification and School Composition

In this section we describe recent patterns of school segregation in Oslo, taking into account the development of densification over the past twenty years. We explore such patterns in both the inner and the outer city and report our findings from the quantitative analysis.

The dataset we used involves primary schools and covers the period 2013–2018. Figure 3 shows patterns of school segregation in the 2018–2019 school year, and the areas affected by densification interventions in the

Figure 2. Municipal plans trajectory since the introduction of densification strategies. In red the wide longstanding city vision, in green emerging discourses. Source: Authors' elaboration based on the qualitative analysis of the municipal masterplans ('Kommune plan') of Oslo (Oslo Kommune, 1984, 1991, 2000, 2008, 2015b, 2018).

Figure 3. Densification and school ethnic composition. Source: Authors' elaboration on data provided by Oslo Statistikkbanken (2018c, 2018d).

last 20 years. Despite the temporal limitation in the data concerning school dynamics, the elaboration shows interesting school segregation patterns that are worth discussing in relation to densification.

5.1. Outer City: Low Densification and Consolidation of Traditional Patterns of School Segregation

As mentioned, the outer city (both East and West) has been less touched by densification. We have already shown a strong East–West ethnic residential segregation, which is remarkably reflected in primary school segregation patterns (Figure 3). At the school level, however, these socio-demographic patterns are even more important, as schools often tend to be more segregated than neighbourhoods in Oslo. In the outer West, primary schools are marked by a strong concentration of dominant mother tongue children: 90 percent of the primary schools have more than 80 percent of pupils with a Norwegian background. This percentage is only 4 percent in the outer East, which demonstrates opposing segregation patterns. Looking at the average data for 2018, differences are again very evident. Almost 70 percent of children attending primary school have a minority language as mother tongue in the outer East, while this percentage drops to 10,6 percent in the outer West. Schools more than 90 percent of pupils with a minority language as mother tongue are mainly located in the outer East, particularly in the district of Stovner, the farthest Eastern area of the city. The peak in 2018, 99,3 percent of minority language mother tongue pupils, was reached in Vahl skole, in the district of Grønland in the inner East of the city, where only two pupils out of 269 were native Norwegian. By contrast, the school with the highest concentration of dominant mother tongue children, 97,8 percent, was Berg skole, in the district of Nordre Aker.

The East–West residential division is sharp, and school polarisation patterns even show an increase in the 2013–2018 timeframe, both in absolute terms as well as with respect to the city average (Table 1).

5.2. Inner City: Medium–High Densification and the Risk of School Colonisation

While there is a remarkable ethnic polarisation of the school population between the outer East and the outer West, the inner city shows a greater mix and a more even distribution of children with foreign backgrounds, as the figures in Table 2 show. As mentioned, many areas of the inner East score better than in the past on several socioeconomic indicators and the increase of people with a foreign background has somewhat dropped (comparing the periods 2008–2013 and 2013–2018). These are partly the results of the gentrification processes that have concerned some areas of the Grunerløkka district since the late twentieth century (Børrud, 2005). Nevertheless, we argue that also the urban densification of the inner East of the city, resulting in expensive residential areas, has played an important role in the mentioned social changes. As we will show next, we identified in the inner East of the city two main patterns of densification, which are associated with different school composition dynamics at local level.

The first pattern is related to the projects developed in the inner part of Grunnerløkka. Here the deindustrialisation that started in the 1960s has been a critical driver of gentrification. The industrial stock along the river Akerselva has been retrofitted and the working-class neighbourhoods have become fertile ground for the dynamics of gentrification. In this part of the city, densification has thus followed previously activated gentrification processes. Densification has mainly happened here through demolition and reconstruction operations, as well as through large and small infill projects (see for instance the case of Rodeløkka, mentioned later). As noted by Hjorthol and Bjørnskau (2005), these operations have been part of the re-urbanisation of the inner core since the 1990s, accompanied by population growth, increasing housing prices, neighbourhood change and gentrification. Several publicly funded measures were also implemented in some of the areas in

Table 1. School segregation in Oslo. Concentration values and trends.

	Schools with less than 20% of minority language mother tongue (2018)	Schools with more than 80% of minority language mother tongue (2018)	Average % of minority language mother tongue (2018)	Average % of minority language mother tongue (change 2013–2018 with respect to city average)	Dissimilarity index (2018)	Dissimilarity index (change 2013–2018)
Inner East	/	10%	44,5%	−3,49%	0,03	−0,004
Inner West	/	/	32%	−2,9%	0,01	+0,0024
Outer East	4%	18%	69,6%	+1,8%	0,23	+0,0128
Outer West	90%	/	10,6%	−1,11%	0,17	−0,001
Oslo	37,7%	10,6%	38,6%	−1,73%	0,5	+0,0113

Source: Authors' calculations on data provided by Oslo Statistikkbanken (2018a, 2018c).

Table 2. School Composition and Densification Hubs in the Inner East.

Densification hubs in the Inner East	School catchment area	Average % of minority language mother tongue (2018)	Dissimilarity index 2018	Average % of minority language mother tongue (change 2013–2018)
Nydalen	Fernanda skole	49	0.0009	—
Kvænerbyen	Vålerenga skole	35,3	0,0007	−3,3
Lille Tøyen	Hasle skole	24	0,0024	−6
Ensjø	Teglverket skole	46,1	0,0011	—
Løren and Økern	Løren skole	40,5	0,0002	—
Løren	Sinsen skole	57,6	0,0036	−3,7
	Refstad skole	34,60	0,0008	−3,15

Notes: Fernanda skole and Teglverket skole were opened after 2013, and Løren skole was closed in the period 2005–2014. It was thus not possible to reconstruct the changes in school composition for these schools. Refstad skole was the catchment area for the densification area in Løren, while Løren skole was closed. Source: Oslo Statistikkbanken (2018c).

the inner East of the city as a response to a territorial stigmatisation that marked them as *immigrant ghettos* (Huse, 2018). Such measures were oriented at making such areas more attractive for Norwegian people and legitimised, according to Huse (2018), an existing gentrification process. These and many other factors (i.e., market pressure, increasing land value, new transportation hubs) have contributed to the increase in housing prices in this part of the city (approximately 200% in the period 2004–2018 (Oslo Statistikkbanken, 2018b). In particular, some areas of Grunerløkka have experienced great neighbourhood changes, with new cafes, trendy boutiques, newly decorated facades, and new contemporary buildings. Thanks to these aspects, Grunerløkka is today considered the coolest area of the city, particularly attractive for young people and hipsters. Here, the residential offer in terms of dwelling size, show a higher amount of one and two-room apartments compared to the city as a whole (Oslo Statistikkbanken, 2019). The gentrifiers have mainly been single people and couples, and families have met, and still meet, more challenges in finding housing solutions that match their needs in these areas. There are fewer multi-room dwellings compared to the outer city and parents may find bigger apartments too expensive to allow them to remain (Wessel & Lunke, 2019).

These urban areas are in the Grunerløkka skole school catchment area. There were 45,5 percent non-Norwegians pupils in Grunerløkka skole in 2018. Unlike the schools in the new densification hubs (see Table 2), Grunerløkka skole shows a 4,5 percent increase in non-Norwegian pupils since 2013. We could not see a similar change in the residential patterns of the area. Using data on ethnic background for census tracts (Oslo Statistikkbanken, 2018a), we could roughly reconstruct the residential composition of the catchment area of Grunerløkka skole. We could see that the share of Norwegian and non-Norwegian residents (70% and 30% respectively) has remained almost stable in the considered time frame. Interestingly, if we focus on recent den-

sification interventions, we can observe different patterns of change. For instance, in Rodeløkka (at the edge of the Grunerløkka skole catchment area), the biggest recent redevelopment area is located in the proximity of a chocolate industry—Freiaparken—and has been characterised by both new construction and the refurbishment of existing buildings. In 2013–2018 there was an approximate 5% increase in relative terms of native Norwegian speakers. Our hypothesis is that such residential patterns are not reflected in the school composition for two main reasons: (1) socio-demographic change has here concerned more singles and couples than families, (2) native young nest-leavers tend to settle in the inner city throughout their studies and early working career, but they typically move in the outer city when children arrive and approach school age (Wessel & Nordvik, 2019). This happens in several compact areas of the inner city and shows that densification policies have been unsuccessful in the creation of stable inner-city communities. We thus argue that the neighbourhood demographic change introduced by this pattern of densification has not so far fostered significant changes in school composition.

A different pattern characterises the newly developed densification areas. Going out from the core of Grunerløkka, it is in the areas of Nydalen, Løren, Hasle, Økern, Ensjø and Kvænerbyen, that densification has produced the major residential developments. Here, former industrial areas started to be transformed into new residential areas at the beginning of 2000, and neighbourhoods have been built from scratch, with new dwellings, infrastructure, public spaces and facilities. "From industrial areas to liveable urban hubs" has been the vision for these areas (Oslo Kommune, 2015a). Proximity to transport hubs, as well as their vicinity to the inner core, make them attractive and also expensive places to live. Indeed, land prices around transport hubs have skyrocketed and developers, the main housing providers in Oslo, can extract huge value from developing new real estate there. The combination of a deregulated housing market with the poor implementation of housing affordability tools,

also makes housing accessibility in the densification hubs rather low (Cavicchia, 2020).

Some of the newly densified areas, such as Løren and Hasle in the district of Grunerløkka, are evidently targeted at families (interview with a developer in Cavicchia, 2020). For instance, in Løren the offer of multi-room flats, car-free areas, playgrounds in the green areas and schools with good reputations make the area particularly attractive for families with children (Selvaag Bolig, OsloMet, & Rodeo, 2019). Compared to the rest of Grunerløkka, Løren's inhabitants have higher incomes on average, including among those with immigrant backgrounds, and a higher share of home-owners (Selvaag Bolig et al., 2019). There seem to be similar patterns, even though less evident than in Løren, in the new development areas of Kvænerbyen and Ensjø in the Gamle Oslo district and Nydalen in the Sagene district. Data shows that, compared to the subdistricts of the inner East where new densification hubs are not present, the subdistricts where major densification interventions have been developed: (1) score better on income and education level, (2) have lower shares of people with foreign ethnic background, and (3) have more housing options for families in terms of dwelling size.

There is a considerably more balanced distribution of pupils observable in these areas compared to the schools in the outer city. Indeed, none of these schools (Fernanda, Vålerenga, Teglverket, Løren, Sinsen, Refstad and Hasle skole) show remarkably strong segregation patterns. The proportion of pupils with a minority language as their mother tongue varies here between approximately 35 percent and 60 percent (the only exception is Hasle skole with 24 percent). However, we also observed a decrease in non-Norwegian pupils in the 2013–2018 period (Hasle skole is again the most evident case among those examined, with a decrease of 6 percent). Such decreases, indeed, may indicate that a sort of 'Norwegian-pupils colonisation' is in the making, and we expect that the patterns found will continue or even increase in the years to come.

6. Final Remarks

In this article, we argue that urban planning strategies may play an important role in shaping socio-spatial contexts that affect school segregation. While the literature developed so far has focused on urban renewal strategies and their possible impacts in terms of gentrification and changing school segregation dynamics in contemporary cities, this article has focused on the implications of urban densification. Densification has been introduced in many cities as a strategy to limit urban sprawl, however, compact cities are also believed to promote conditions for better coexistence and social mix (OECD, 2012). Indeed, in our case study, the city of Oslo, densification has been supposed to contribute to a better social balance between more deprived and privileged neighbourhoods, formally the East and the West of the

city. We have explored whether densification strategies in Oslo are associated with changes in the distributions of students with a different ethnic background in primary school. The main results of this investigation highlight some possible policy implications.

First, it is crucial to focus on *how* densification has been implemented. We have explained that densification in Oslo was developed following neoliberal principles in both planning processes and housing policies. The provision of affordable housing has been extremely limited, with private developers essentially being the only housing providers (Cavicchia, 2020). Additionally, following market dynamics, densification strategies have created certain neighbourhood quality, characteristics and housing typologies (more or less oriented to families with school age-children), turning out to be relevant in shaping socio-spatial contexts that affect primary school segregation.

Second, it is relevant to focus on *where* densification has mainly been implemented, and where it has not been implemented. According to both private market interests and urban sustainability criteria, densification in Oslo has mainly been developed in the inner city. In the outer city, where residential and school segregation patterns are remarkably high, we mainly observed mild densification interventions. The lack of significant urban transformation in both the outer East and West, together with the lack of strong measures for housing affordability, play a role in the consolidation of the existing East–West polarisation patterns. In the inner city, the situation is more nuanced and this approach to densification shows two main resulting patterns of school composition dynamics.

In some areas of the city, densification can be associated with family-gentrification dynamics in the housing market and the potential 'Norwegian-pupils colonisation' of primary schools. This seems to be the case in the examined brand-new and expensive compact neighbourhoods, realised in previously low-medium status districts of the inner East of Oslo. Here, indeed, while the current situation shows a higher social mix compared to other areas in both the inner and the outer city, the described changes in socio-ethnic indicators show a shift towards increasingly homogeneous urban areas (Hill, 2012) and a risk of neighbourhood segregation, as in Løren (Selvaag Bolig et al., 2019). A second pattern of densification is consistent with more traditional gentrification dynamics and mainly concerns established compact areas in the inner city (Grunerløkka mentioned above). In this case, densification has taken place as part of the inner-city revitalisation, which occurred because of the city's deindustrialisation. The main aspects of the inner-city revitalisation have involved building upgrades due to the influx of better-off households, infill projects, increased residential attractiveness and artistic. These areas have become the preferred residential destinations of young adults, couples and hipsters, the so-called creative class, young gentrifiers attracted by the urban lifestyle. Consequently,

the neighbourhood demographic trends introduced by this densification pattern has not fostered significant changes in the social profiles of families with school-age children, and, thus, in the composition of schools. The residential stability of families with school-age children still appears to be quite low (Wessel & Nordvik, 2019).

This analysis highlights two main problems. Environmental, climate and transportation policies, together with substantial economic advantages, require densification in the inner city, fostering the greatest land-use efficiency possible. Densifying in the outer city would, indeed, goes against both environmental principles and the willingness of developers to build new residential areas (Cavicchia, 2020). However, existing segregation patterns would suggest the necessity of more affordable housing in the outer West, through densification interventions characterised by housing accessibility criteria. In the West, social balance in school composition is a long way off. Nevertheless, even where social balance seems to be a closer goal, as in the new inner-city densification areas, the lack of affordable housing is affecting a shift towards higher segregation, instead of a greater mix, both in residential and in school patterns.

As previously argued in the gentrification and social mix literature (Bridge & Butler, 2011), when it comes to school segregation dynamics, a strategy to break the segregation of privileged groups is also missing. In Oslo, while densification may also potentially be a tool to achieve higher social balance in school composition, the neoliberal approach, the lack of affordable housing, and of measures to prevent displacement risk, means that it reproduces existing inequalities and produces new social divisions. The coexistence of residential and school segregation, as well as possible new forms of gentrification, challenge the rhetoric of urban densification as a sustainable way of developing Oslo.

In summary, our analysis suggests that planning strategies may have a significant impact on school segregation dynamics in cities characterised by a predominance of the public school and strict catchment area systems, however, planning strategies and local education policies have not usually been integrated. In the case of Oslo, decision-makers should be more aware of the potential consequences of densification strategies for school choice practices, taking into consideration aspects related to the socio-demographic profile and trends in the existing and newly developed areas, as well as school segregation dynamics. Better integration in the policy domains of education, planning, and housing is needed to limit a further increase in school segregation processes. Investigations indeed show that it is only when such a cross-sectoral perspective is adopted that the successful governance of school segregation can be achieved.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

The Refugees' Right to the Center of the City and Spatial Justice: Gentrification vs Commoning Practices in Tarlabaşı-Istanbul

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Abstract

During the recent refugee crisis and following the common statement-agreement between the European Union and Turkey (18 March 2016), more than half a million refugees have been trapped in Istanbul. Although the vast majority is living in remote areas in the perimeter of the city, there is a remarkable exception in the central neighborhood of Tarlabaşı. Over the decades, this area has become a shelter for newcomers from eastern Turkey and, recently, for thousands of refugees from the Middle East and Africa. In this neighborhood, refugees with the support of local and international solidarity groups establish communal houses, social centers, and collective kitchens, creating an example of commoning practices, mutual help, and transnational togetherness in the urban core. At the same time, over the past few years, Tarlabaşı has been the target of gentrification policies that aim to dislocate poor residents and refugees and to transform the area into a high-income residential area and a tourist destination. Thus, ongoing urban conflict is taking place for the right to the center of the city. This article follows the Lefebvrian concept of 'the right to the city' and Soja's and Harvey's notion of 'spatial justice,' taking also into account the discussion on the spatialities of 'urban commons' and 'enclosures.' It combines spatial analysis, participatory observation, and ethnographic research, and its main findings concern the refugees' daily efforts against social segregation and exclusion shaped by commoning practices for spatial justice, visibility, and the right to the center of the city.

1. Introduction

Istanbul is an emerging global city where frenetic redevelopment and gentrification projects have been taking place over the last years. One of the most controversial plans is the Tarlabaşı Renewal Project, which aims to convert a very central neighborhood to a high-class area with hotels, shopping centers, and luxurious apartments. However, there is a remarkable delay due to the resistance from the local community. Tarlabaşı is a unique mosaic of people, from Romani, Kurdish, and Muslims from eastern Turkey to members of the trans and gay community, newcomers from Africa, and refugees from the war zones of the Middle East who rent cheap rooms in poor-quality houses or occupy abandoned buildings. Concomitantly, a network of self-organized solidarity initiatives and community centers supports the residents and organizes collective activities and anti-gentrification struggles. Although there is extensive literature (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Öz & Eder, 2018) on gentrification processes in Istanbul, there are few studies that focus on the articulation of gentrification with refugees' commoning practices which claim the right to the city and spatial justice in the case of the Tarlabaşı neighborhood. This article aims to explore questions about the potentialities of refugees to co-live and co-inhabit in the center of the city.

This article is based on critical scholarship on gentrification (Lees, 2012; Ley, 1996; Smith, 1999) and on the works of Lefebvre (1968/1996), Soja (2010) and Harvey (1973, 1996), which have aptly examined spatial inequalities as well as urban social movements and proposed the powerful concepts of the right to the city and spatial justice. Also, for the research, the aforementioned notions are linked to the discussion on urban commons and spatial enclosures (An Architektur, 2010; Chatterton, 2010). Although the concept of urban commons has become a key concept for radical scholars and social movements, except for a few studies (Trimikliniotis, Parsanoglou, & Tsianos, 2015; Tsavdaroglou, 2018b), there is not an in-depth effort to connect it with the refugees' right to the city and spatial justice. As such, the article takes also into account the approach of autonomy of migration (De Genova, 2017; Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2013) to conceptualize the potentialities for agency and commoning activities of the newcomers. Thus, it aims to examine and analyze the ongoing gentrification project versus the refugees' commoning practices in the contested neighborhood of Tarlabaşı, through the conceptual tools of the refugees' right to the city and spatial justice.

The article is based on socio-spatial mapping and ethnographic participatory research. Primarily, various papers and surveys for the history of Tarlabaşı and the ongoing renewal project were obtained and analyzed. 10 life stories and 30 open-ended interviews were also carried out, as well as numerous informal conversations with locals and refugees who are tenants or squatters in the Tarlabaşı neighborhood of Istanbul. The fieldwork took place for 15 months from summer 2018 to autumn 2019, during which I visited the neighborhood almost daily, participated in local meetings in community centers, and collected data in gatherings in tea shops, cafes, and restaurants, on the streets, in local markets, public spaces and peoples' homes. The research participants were over 18 years old and mainly from Syria, Palestine, Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Somalia, and Turkey. For confidentiality reasons and to respect anonymity, the interlocutors' names have been changed to pseudonyms.

The article has the following structure: The first section examines the theoretical positions focusing on the concepts of gentrification, the right to the center of the city, spatial justice, and commoning practices. The following two sections present the gentrification project in Tarlabaşı and the spatial commoning practices of the newcomers. The final section gives some suggestions for critical scholarship on the importance of refugees' commoning practices that claim the right to the center of the city.

2. Right to the Center of the City and Spatial Justice: Gentrification vs. Commoning Practices

The so-called 'gentrification' of cities has been a dominant neoliberal urban transformation strategy in recent decades. From the early studies of the 1960s and 1970s, it became clear that the dislocation of certain social groups is the main goal of gentrification, and not a side effect (Glass, 1964). More specifically, gentrification is considered to have its roots in the so-called 'revanchism,' which according to Smith (1999, p. 98) "blends revenge with reaction" and it is expressed as a "vendetta against workers…immigrants and gays, people of color…homeless people, squatters" (Smith, 1999, p. 98), all of whom are accused of having "stolen" the city, and especially the center of the city, "from a white middle class that sees the city as its birthright" (Smith, 1999, p. 98). Thus, an orchestrated effort for the reappropriation of the city centers through massive gentrification and urban renewal projects that combine economic (Smith, 1999) and cultural (Ley, 1996) motives, started initially in the USA, then in Western Europe and gradually across the globe. However, it should be noted that gentrification is not a homogenous process and it may take distinct forms in different ways in different places (Lees, 2012; Luke & Kaika, 2019). Decolonial urban theory especially has shown that gentrification "is not a simple export of urban formations and developmental patterns from global North to global South" (Jeffrey, McFarlane, & Vasudevan, 2012, p. 1251). The article takes into consideration the differentiating processes and responds to the significant lack of studies on recent urban conflicts between gentrification projects and refugees' commoning practices in Istanbul.

Along with gentrification projects and against their motives and policies, there are a plethora of urban social movements that claim the right to the city and spatial justice for all.

The concept of the right to the city was first developed in the work of Henri Lefebvre (1968/1996), who at the end of the 1960s proposed that the right to the city is expressed as "a superior form of rights: right to freedom, to individualization in socialization, to habitat and to inhabit" (Lefebvre, 1968/1996, p. 173). Several scholars have expanded the notion of the right to the city, for instance, Purcell (2002, p. 100) argues that it is a call for "urban politics of the inhabitant" and according to Dikeç (2001, p .1789), "it is not simply the right of property owners, in which case policies like zero tolerance might have been legitimized…but of all who live in the city." Furthermore, it should be noted that Lefebvre put particular emphasis on the right to the center of the city. In his words, the right to the city "would also cover the right to the use of the center, a privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos (for workers, immigrants, the 'marginal')" (Lefebvre, 1968/1996, p. 34). Building on the previous argument, Merrifield (2011) offers a renewed conceptualization of the Lefebvrian right to centrality that underlines how in times of urban agglomerations and suburbanization, special consideration should be given not to "a simple visiting right…no tourist trip down memory lane, gawking at a gentrified old town, enjoying for the day a city you've been displaced from, but a right to participate in life at the core, to be in

the heat of the action" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 475). This argument is particularly useful in examining the conflict between the ongoing gentrification processes in the Tarlabaşı neighborhood, which is a very central neighborhood in Istanbul, and the potentialities of the refugees' right to the center of the city in terms of participating in urban social life and claiming spatial justice.

At this point, it is essential to briefly examine the importance of the concept of spatial justice, which has a long tradition in critical geography literature. Until the '90s, the discussion on spatial justice revolves between scholars such as Davies (1968), who examined the conditions of distribution, and as Harvey (1973), who focused on the modalities of production and introduced the notion of 'territorial social justice.' Harvey's (1992, 1996) approach on "the forms of oppression as sources of injustice," (cited in Dikeç, 2001, p. 1786) based on Young's idea of the 'unoppressive city' that "must be open and accessible to all," (Young, 1990, p. 319) is a turning point in the discussion of spatial justice. Later, Soja (2009), taking into account the previous considerations, suggests that spatial justice primarily "involves the fair and equitable distribution in space of socially-valued resources and the opportunities to use them." An argument that I will show later is linked to the concept of commons. Moreover, Soja identifies that "the three most familiar forces shaping locational and spatial discrimination are class, race, and gender," which are particularly relevant to the examined neighborhood of Tarlabaşı, and finally he highlights the crucial interweaving of the right to the city and spatial justice for a "new spatial consciousness" (Soja, 2010, p. 96).

The aforementioned concepts of the right to the city and spatial justice could enrich the discussion on commons and especially urban commoning practices. According to several scholars (De Angelis, 2007; Hardt & Negri, 2009; Tsavdaroglou, 2019), commons usually refer to those collective social relations that maintain, resist or claim material or immaterial territories outside of the market-led or state-led management and are constituted by the triad: common-pool resources, commoning, and community. According to De Angelis (2007, p. 1), commons "are necessarily created and sustained by 'communities' i.e., by social networks of mutual aid, solidarity, and practices of human exchange that are not reduced to the market form." These social practices and activities of mutual care, reciprocity, support, and sharing constitute the so-called commoning, a term that has recently acquired increasing interest among radical scholarship. As Linebaugh (2010) argues, the common "as an action it is thus best understood as a verb rather than as a 'common pool resource.'" Particularly significant is that the practices of commoning are directed against multiple socio-spatial enclosures; thus, commoning always has a spatial character as it aims to (re)shape, (re)invent, and (re)produce egalitarian and unoppressive spaces of togetherness and coexistence. Consequently, here is the social and spatial locus of the interconnection of urban

commons with the right to the city and spatial justice. As Stavrides (An Architektur, 2010, p. 17) underlines, the right to the city "can be produced through encounters that make room for…new values, new dreams, new collective experiences. And this is…a way to see commons beyond the utilitarian horizon." Furthermore, Chatterton (2010) aims to combine commons with the concept of spatial justice and argues that "the quest for greater spatial justice…can be sharpened…through the use of the 'common' as both a political imaginary and vocabulary, and also as a material aspiration and organising tool" (Chatterton, 2010, p. 626). Consequently, urban commoning practices and experiences open potentialities for reimagining and rediscovering solidarity and justice in urban spaces against the manifold ways of spatial injustices and the prohibitions of access to the right to the city.

The abovementioned conceptualization of commons can help to unpack the less-visible urban commoning practices of refugees who claim their right to the city and spatial justice. Usually, refugees are seen as people in need of humanitarian assistance or targets of xenophobia and racism. Thus, they are seen as victimized or stigmatized and criminalized. However, in recent years, several studies mainly from the so-called 'autonomy of migration' approach (De Genova, 2017; Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2013) call for attention to the active agency of the moving population who are trying to transcend and cross the multiple physical and social borders. During these crossings, refugees often develop networks of solidarity, exercise sharing practices, and exchange knowledge, activities that may acquire an urban character and express claims to spatial justice and the right to the city (Trimikliniotis et al., 2015; Tsavdaroglou, 2018b).

Thus, the main research question of this article is how refugees' urban commoning practices and relations can contest gentrification policies to claim the right to the city and more accurately to the center of the city and mobilize everyday spatial justice.

3. "Tarlabaşı Will Remain a Nostalgic Photo on Your Mobile Phone": Spatial Policies of Gentrification and Injustice

Gentrification not only demolishes buildings but also destroys people's and city's memories. Tarlabaşı will remain a nostalgic photo on your mobile phone. It's like the photos we have on our mobile phones from our home in Syria before the war and now it doesn't exist because it has been bombed. Now, Tarlabaşı, this second home of ours will also be demolished. In Syria, we may at some point be able to repatriate and rebuild our houses, but here it will be impossible to stay in the future luxurious neighborhood. (Mohamed, Syrian refugee, personal interview, 10 June 2019)

Istanbul has evolved in recent decades into a rapidly expanding global city with a booming construction industry, extensive renewal and gentrification projects, hun-

dreds of gated communities, and impressive megaprojects (Aksoy, 2012; Erdi-Lelandais, 2013; Öz & Eder, 2018). These practices are depicted by Lovering and Turkmen (2011) as "bulldozer neoliberalism" and as Karaman (2013, p. 716) underlines, they "have been used as a tool of dispossession, expropriating residents and uprooting them from their social networks." At the same time, Istanbul is the city where more than half a million refugees have arrived in the last six years from the war zones of the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa (Asylum Information Database & European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2019). Most of the newcomers are living in poor neighborhoods, deprived areas, and slums on the outskirts of the city. However, the Tarlabaşı neighborhood, a very central area where some thousands of newcomers find shelter, is a remarkable exception. It is also the place in Istanbul where one of the most ambitious and controversial gentrification projects has taken place in the last fifteen years.

Tarlabaşı is located in Beyoğlu district next to the city's commercial and tourist center, less than 200 meters from the glitzy Istiklal street and the iconic Taksim square. The area of Tarlabaşı was always a multinational neighborhood, in which until the mid-twentieth century the residents were mainly Orthodox Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Muslims. However, after the nationalistic violent pogroms of 1955, the area was abandoned by the non-Muslims and re-inhabited during the three following decades of Istanbul's rapid industrialization by low-income rural migrants from the Black Sea region and central and eastern Turkey. Moreover, during the military regime of the 1980s, many Kurds lost their land in the conflicted areas of southeast Turkey and forced to migrate to Istanbul to find jobs and settle (Islam, 2010; Ünsal, 2015). Thus, many of them rented cheap apartments in the Tarlabaşı neighborhood, as it is "very central for accessing jobs" (Can, 2020, p. 142). Furthermore, the Tarlabaşı neighborhood has been home "to many

Romani musicians and dancers who have taken advantage of the cheap rent and proximity to Taksim, Istanbul's entertainment district" (Corry, 2013).

In the late 1980s, the design of the eight-lane Tarlabaşı Boulevard (Figure 1) connecting Taksim square with the Fatih peninsula, and separating "the beauty and the beast" (Pinar, 2011)—that is, the poor neighborhood—from the emerging commercial area of Beyoğlu, was a turning point in the history of the neighborhood. Indeed, the Boulevard functions as a physical and social border and especially in the night hours when police patrol the road entrances to the Tarlabaşı area. This is largely associated with the transformation of the area south of Tarlabaşı Boulevard into the city's main tourist, entertainment, and commercial district. While north of the Boulevard the impoverished enclave of the Tarlabaşı neighborhood is located; an area that provides a relatively safe place to unregistered and disenfranchised migrants, sex workers, and the transgender community. Sex workers and the transgender community moved to Tarlabaşı after the massive gentrification in the 1990s and 2000s in other parts of Beyoğlu, like the Karaköy and Galata districts that closed and banned most brothels in these areas.

During the last decades, Tarlabaşı Boulevard has become a place for street sex work linked to precarious and vulnerable conditions as sex workers are exposed to greater violence from clients and police controls and the threat of sexual exploitation networks. Concomitantly, newcomer refugees from the war zones of the Middle East and North Africa arrived in Tarlabaşı in mid-2000 and especially during the current refugee crisis. The vast majority of Tarlabaşı residents are working in informal and precarious jobs as sex workers, waste collectors-rag pickers, peddlers, and street vendors, selling food in the nearby tourist areas for very low pay (Can, 2020; Türkün & Şen, 2009). Other employments linked to the region's residents include temporary labor in the textile

Figure 1. Tarlabaşı Boulevard separates the Tarlabaşı neighborhood from Taksim square and the Istiklal street area. Source: Author.

and stamping industry, in the construction sector, call centers, and hair salons, as well as waiting and cleaning staff in restaurants, cafés, tea places, and night clubs, while, as mentioned, most of the Romani people are working as musicians and dancers (Corry, 2013; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Talocci, 2011).

Since the initial construction of the Boulevard, the residents of Tarlabaşı have struggled for their right to the center of the city against the imposed spatial injustice and marginalization while authorities and mainstream media stigmatize the area with negative attributions, such as "prostitution and drug dealers' area" or "the Bronx of Istanbul" (Sakizlioglu & Uitermark, 2014). The territorial stigmatization is regimented by declaring the neighborhood as a no-go area (Figure 2) and a dangerous crime zone, a characteristic strategy with similar processes and effects across the globe that makes it "easy for the authorities to justify special measures, deviating from both law and custom, which can have the effect…of destabilizing and further marginalizing their occupants" (Wacquant, 2007, p. 69).

It becomes apparent that spatial injustice and enclosure of the right to the center of the city has intensified with the special measures introduced under the 2005 Law no. 5366 voted by the Turkish Parliament, which transferred "extraordinary powers to local authorities to declare urban renewal areas and to implement development plans in run-down areas within historic heritage sites" (Aksoy, 2012, p. 104). Law 5366 became popular as the Tarlabaşı Law, as it was initially linked to the so-called Tarlabaşı Renewal Project. The first phase of the project concerns an area of around 20,000 square meters with an explicit aim to "renew 278 buildings in 9 blocks of the Tarlabaşı neighborhood" (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010) and to transform them into luxurious residential buildings, offices, shopping malls, cafés, and hotels. The second phase concerns 21 more blocks and with a final goal of gentrifying the whole neighborhood. The project is advertised with slogans such as "Tarlabaşı will be a rose garden in three years. Tarlabaşı is a poisoned princess and we are healing her. Tarlabaşı will be a safe place" (Can, 2018). These advertisements cover the high metal fences that surround the area while a cleaning out agenda was implemented with the first evictions in 2011.

Indicative are the words of Assala, a refugee woman from Syria who had lived for three years in the neighborhood until she received a visa to join her relatives in Sweden:

> Tarlabaşı is changing very fast, it is gentrified. In my house, I have a window overlooking the neighborhood, the poor people's homes. However, two months ago, a large hotel was built and unfortunately, it destroyed my view. It is very annoying. So, I think I am leaving at the right time, and in a little while, Tarlabaşı as we knew it will be gone, it will be filled with luxury hotels and apartments. It is already happening. (personal interview, 10 May 2019)

Real estate capital enters Tarlabaşı with the massive demolition of building blocks and the rebuilding of modern housing for high economic strata residents. These instances of spatial injustice and prohibition of access to the center of the city echo Merrifield's (2011) description that the global metamorphosis of the cities' centers took place as "a vicious process of dispossession…spitting [the poor] out of the gentrifying center, forcing poor urban old-timers and vulnerable newcomers to embrace each other…out on assorted zones of social marginalization, out on the global banlieue" (Merrifield, 2011, p. 474). Indeed, the commodification and touristification of the area have already started. Airbnb apartments and boutique hotels have appeared in the perimeter of the neighborhood. Moreover, the prohibition to the right to the center and spatial injustice are produced along with gender, ethnicity, cultural norms, and class lines (Öz & Eder, 2018). Characteristic are the words of Aisha, a Nigerian transgender woman who has been living in Tarlabaşı for

Figure 2. Google Maps' screenshot. The Tarlabaşı neighborhood is missing with no available street view.

the last four years; she is also a member of the Istanbul LGBTQ Solidarity Association: "For me, as a poor, black, and transgender woman, it is a constant battle to survive in the center of Istanbul," and as she stresses, with the gentrification project "increased rent prices but also police control, transphobia, violence against transgender people and migrants, thus we face an uncertain and vulnerable future" (personal interview, 12 April 2019).

However, the threat of forced displacement and "the pressure of the local municipality and the construction company to sell the buildings or flats at very low prices" (Can, 2013, p. 100) inspired a residents' self-organized association to defend their rights. Thus, although many of the old residents have been displaced, local struggles have prevented a radical change of the neighborhood and the plan has been delayed for almost 15 years. Thus, there is only one block of new luxurious buildings being constructed at the moment across the Tarlabaşı Boulevard. The backstreets are still inhabited by Kurdish and Romani residents, transgender people, homosexuals, and newcomers from Africa and the Middle East. This social amalgamation and plural identity of the neighborhood opens new possibilities of spatial commoning relations and the potentiality to reimagine the right to the center of the city and spatial justice.

4. Refugees' Spatial Commoning

I am living in Tarlabaşı the last two years and I would say that for refugees, Tarlabaşı is a very good neighborhood, it is right in the center of Istanbul, but it still keeps the features of a neighborhood, people are smiling at you in the street, the neighbors know each other. Also, besides the Syrians, there are many Kurds, other Arabs from Palestine, Iraq, and Egypt, and many from Africa, all of them are very friendly. We are all humans, with our difficulties, with our dreams, with our different cultures, but we are all equal, we are all humans. Maybe for a tourist when he or she hears the word Tarlabaşı it means fear, but for me, it means home, neighborhood, friends. (Karima, Syrian refugee; personal interview, 21 June 2019)

Beyond and against the gentrification policies and the mainstream stigmatization rhetoric of Tarlabaşı, there is a plethora of less visible social relations, gatherings, and gestures of daily commoning practices as well as self-organized refugees' and locals' solidarity groups and community centers that claim the right to the center of the city and spatial justice.

Behind the facade of flashy new high buildings across the Tarlabaşı Boulevard and the hydra of real estate speculation, there is a hidden neighborhood of micro-commons. Tarlabaşı is a labyrinth of narrow streets and dilapidated buildings marked by a deafening absence of state support and municipal social services. However, it is the home of various marginalized communities and a sanctuary for many newcomers-refugees from the

Middle East and Africa. According to novelist Ahmet Ümit, Tarlabaşı over time "had taken refuge those who had been chewed up and spit out [by life] and who struggled to keep on their feet" (Ümit, 2014, p. 168). Indeed, Fatima, a Syrian refugee woman who has been living the last three years in the neighborhood highlights:

I remember the first months when we, the Syrians, came to Tarlabaşı and everybody was trying to help us, both immigrants from other countries and older residents of the neighborhood, such as Kurds. They gave us food, clothes, and the kids were all playing together. Especially if you look at the micro-society of children, they will teach you a lot about how people can communicate across the borders of their nationalities. (personal interview, 16 April 2019).

In the transnational micro-society of Tarlabaşı, social, religious, racial, and even gender borders are negotiated, modified, and troubled. For instance, a Kurdish lady cooks and takes care of her disabled Syrian neighbor, a transgender woman receives help from her Nigerian neighbor to hack the electricity line, an Iraqi woman lowers a bucket from her window and her husband in the street fills it up with groceries with the help of Romani kids, a Syrian family uses the bath of their Turkish family neighbors every week to have a shower, Romani musicians offer impromptu music lessons to refugee kids in a local coffee shop, while every evening during Ramadan a big makeshift table is prepared on the street for the iftar-dinner for the whole neighborhood. Alireza, an Iranian refugee, says that "if a neighbor is very poor and cannot afford to cook, the rest of the neighbors offer him or her food, I don't think that this could happen in neighborhoods where only Turks are staying" (personal interview, 21 March 2019). Also, Aisha, a Nigerian transgender woman says that:

Tarlabaşı is the only haven for the transgender community in the center of Istanbul, and with the support of an LGBT organization we have established a collective house to take care of homeless or sick transgender people, Turkish and migrants from other countries as well as older retired transgender people who are not able to work. (personal interview, 12 April 2019)

Thus, these invisible commoning practices are essential in the everyday life and survival of Tarlabaşı residents. Although they are of different religions, ethnicities, languages, and cultural backgrounds they share a sense of cohabitation and togetherness. In the words of Ali, a Syrian refugee resident:

Tarlabaşı is a very poor neighborhood, but also a friendly neighborhood, it reminds me of something of the atmosphere and social life in Syria. I mean that in Tarlabaşı the residents care about each other, there are social relationships of care. Moreover, if anyone

has a problem, the neighbors, no matter where they are from, care about them or her and help or protect them, children from different countries also play together, and often you can see women cooking together or washing their carpets together all along the way in the streets. (personal interview, 8 May 2019)

Moreover, it is this environment of Tarlabaşı, created daily by various peoples and cultures, which produces an amalgamation of populations and provides a tolerant space for newcomers. In the words of Syrian refugee Mustafa:

> I have stayed in several neighborhoods outside of the city center. Now I live in Tarlabaşı and I like it much more here, because for me the most important difference between Tarlabaşı and other neighborhoods is that there are not so many Syrians here, to be precise, no national community dominates the neighborhood. There are people from many different countries. So here, there is not much social control exercised by a community that I felt in other more national homogenous neighborhoods. In Tarlabaşı there is much ethnic diversity, thus I feel freer, I prefer it. It is also next to the city center, so I have more opportunities for socialization and for getting to know the city better. (personal interview, 11 December 2018)

However, neighborhood coexistence in Tarlabaşı sometimes involves tensions and conflicts that divide residents into different communities. It is not uncommon that older residents, such as Turkish and Kurds, express negative views towards the newcomers and this might make refugees from Africa and the Middle East "keeping…in the periphery" (Genç, 2017, p. 125). Romani and transgender people are also occasionally victims of internal stigmatization. Similarly, political activists might be treated as foreigners, while often there is a gap between the expectations of migrants and the support they receive as their urgent daily needs cannot always be covered by the solidarity activities of political groups (Genç, 2017). However, "even though conflicts and tensions did occur, people watched out for each other and were careful not to let conflicts escalate" (Sakizlioglu & Uitermark, 2014, p. 1373). Most importantly, beyond internal controversies, all residents recognize the gentrification project and the increasing police control as the most crucial problem in the neighborhood. While the transgender community, which includes people of different origins, has developed a secret slang called *lubunca* to "communicate without police or clients understanding what they say" (Dangerfield, 2015). It contains terms from other languages, including Arabic, Armenian, Greek, and French, and "constantly evolves to remain secretive" (Dangerfield, 2015).

It is important to emphasize here, that apart from the daily micro-commoning practices and the occasional instances of internal difficulties described, the residents

of Tarlabaşı many times collectively claim their right to the city and spatial justice and organize or participate in numerous protests. For instance, the death of Eylül Cansın in 2015, a 24-year-old transgender sex-worker, led to a social protest organized by the Tarlabaşı transgender community against police brutality. Moreover, the local transgender community, among them transgender refugees, actively participates every year in the gay pride march and in the international Women's Day marches of the 8th of March and 25th of November. Equally important is the involvement of Tarlabaşı, mainly Kurds and transgender residents, in the 2013 Gezi Park protest (Potuoğlu-Cook, 2015; Tsavdaroglou, 2018a) and the emblematic direct action of burning the gigantic advertisement banners of the Tarlabaşı renewal project on the facades of the under-construction luxurious buildings across the Tarlabaşı Boulevard. Finally, one of the most significant collective organizations between locals and newcomers, property owners and renters to defend their rights against the gentrification project, was the establishment in 2008 of the Association for Solidarity with Tarlabaşı Property Owners and Renters. The neighborhood united beyond their differences against the common threat, and the association "has successfully mobilised almost all residents" (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p. 1492) and "called upon the help of many activist experts, including lawyers, journalists [and] planners" (Sakizlioglu & Uitermark, 2014, p. 1377).

In the words of Tamara, a refugee Syrian woman who has lived for the last five years in the neighborhood:

> We, refugees and locals, the residents of Tarlabaşı, are against gentrification, the neighborhood has to be preserved, there are so many memories, so many daily stories of people who are poor, who are suffering and have found shelter in Tarlabaşı. In a few years, the neighborhood will be unrecognizable. Many old buildings have already been vacated or demolished, and hotels are being built and tourists are flocking close to Taksim Square. (personal interview, 8 May 2019)

Moreover, in addition to the above mobilizations, it should be mentioned that the Tarlabaşı neighborhood has a long tradition of collective action and solidarity organization. Over the last decade, several refugee solidarity groups and community centers have emerged in the wider area of the neighborhood (Figure 3), and are motivated by commoning practices in a self-managed way. For instance, in the heart of the neighborhood, the Tarlabaşı Community Center (2010) "tries to make equal conditions in terms of the participation of city life for people in Tarlabaşı" and "protecting people live in the Tarlabaşı area who are excluded from social life and live in poverty and deprivation of fundamental rights…and raising awareness among Tarlabaşı inhabitants in terms of violation of their rights." Likewise, Mutfak, a self-organized migrant solidarity kitchen, which has been run-

Figure 3. Positions of community centers and the Tarlabaşı renewal project. Source: Author.

ning since 2012, aims to build "a social center formed by migrants themselves, as well as a space of interaction where different struggles would interact and have a propagative quality" (Genç, 2017, p. 124).

Mutfak is formed by the Istanbul Migrant Solidarity Network and organizes several activities that aim to "create connections between disparate migrant groups, as well as with members of the MSN [Migrant Solidarity Network] and the residents of the neighborhood" (Genç, 2017, p. 124). These activities include collective music events, children's workshops, Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, German, French and English language courses, legal assistance to refugees on their status and rights, support to refugee children to enroll and attend public schools, connect refugees and trade unions and placing refugee issues on trade union agenda, solidarity campaigns about refugees' working conditions. While the main activity is the collective kitchen, it is not, as Mutfak collective's (2016) own statement describes:

> Like any other kitchen. It has neither cooks nor customers. Here, everybody is a cook and all the food is shared. The kitchen belongs to the neighborhood and everybody. Everyone is welcome. So come, bring your ideas and let's share our skills and solidarity.

Also, the Mutfak collective gives special emphasis to non-monetary social relations, and as Genç, a member of Mutfak explains: "The Kitchen was an experiment where the monetary relations of daily life were practically abolished, interpersonal relations were formed based on solidarity, and the voluntary reciprocity be-

tween migrants and non-migrants was a central theme" (Genç, 2017, p. 124).

Another neighborhood initiative called Infial, an anarchist social center describes itself as a common space which "can be seen as a small step for supporting organization and mobilization to…a large spectrum of solidarity: from anarchist, anti-capitalist, ecological solidarity to animal liberation and queer solidarity." (Infial, 2017) Although Infial is not a migrant-based association, it aims to establish an egalitarian and non-hierarchical collective space that can forge social and political bonds between political activists and the local community. Collective cooking with neighbors, clothes that are donated and offered, queer workshops and events, environmental and working struggles, and actions against gentrification are some of the practices that bring together political activists and residents.

Finally, Ad.dar ('The Home,' in Arabic) is a volunteer-based community center which supports Syrian and Palestinian families to rebuild their lives. Currently, Ad.dar (2019) organizes "activities and classes, as well as various forms of practical, social, and emotional assistance for children, families, and youths. Ad.dar is unique in that the organization is…inclusive of all, completely regardless of sect or creed. All are welcome."

As it becomes apparent, all the collective practices of solidarity and commoning described shape the transnational community of Tarlabaşı daily and support the local struggle of resistance against the transformation of the neighborhood that causes the forced displacement of the urban poor. At the same time, everyday practices of mutual help, togetherness, and cohabitation produce

a shared space of visibility, tolerance, and negotiation among the different residents, which marks a common basis for claiming their right to the city and spatial justice in the center of Istanbul.

5. Conclusion

The spatialities of commoning social bonds created daily in the Tarlabaşı neighborhood are like the clotheslines between apartment windows that are hidden away from the tourist's gaze and that make up and sustain the newcomers' transnational community. Gentrification aims to cut these symbolic rolling strings-links and prohibit refugees and the urban poor from having access to the center of the city. The socio-spatial conflict around who has the right to live in Tarlabaşı neighborhood and thus who has the right to inhabit the heart of Istanbul offers an interesting case study to outline three main arguments for social awareness on refugees' spatial justice.

First, this research shows that the gentrification project is like a process of invasion in Tarlabaşı that produces spatial injustice and deprives refugees of the right to the center of the city in three ways. Primarily, it is the physical enclosure of fencing, demolition of buildings, and police control; secondly, it is the destruction of residents' social relations through dislocation and touristification of the area; and finally, it is the propaganda of negative stigmatization and criminalization of the marginalized residents. All these aspects constitute a clear case of spatial enclosures. However, gentrification policies do not develop and follow a fixed procedure. In contrast, they can be challenged and opposed. Indeed, the gentrification project has been delayed for almost 15 years and the Tarlabaşı neighborhood, in the heart of Istanbul, is still open to newcomers. This reminds us of Massey's famous position "for the space" (Massey, 2005), which is always open to the possibilities of coexistence of multiplicity and heterogeneity, as she points out, space is "always under construction…it is never finished; never closed" (Massey, 2005, p. 9).

Second, the aforementioned concept of open space could shed some light on the potentialities of refugees' commoning practices to transform the Tarlabaşı neighborhood to a possible common space. Openness means that refugee residents of Tarlabaşı, together with solidarity groups, can contest dominant urban taxonomies, resist spatial enclosures, stigmatization, and unjustness and at the same time open the center of the city by making their rights visible and participating in urban social life. Thus, commoning practices can potentially contest the dominant stigmatization rhetoric (Kirkness, 2014; Wacquant, 2007), that taxonomizes such places as 'ghettos,' 'the dark side,' or 'black holes' of cities (McFarlane, 2008). Against these spatial "stereotypes…and well-worn cliché" (Roy, 2011, p. 225), refugees' commoning practices in Tarlabaşı correspond to what Roy (2011) suitably describes as "terrain of habitation, livelihood, self-organization, and politics" (Roy, 2011, p. 223). They reflect practices of 'every-day' and 'silent' resistance (Bayat, 2013), and mark places where, in the words to Hardt and Negri (2009, p. 254), "the multitude of the poor…invents strategies for survival, finding shelter and producing forms of social life, constantly discovering and creating resources of the common through expansive circuits of encounter."

Third, taking into account the previous positions, I argue that the circuits of encounter, dynamic or silent resistance and everyday networks of solidarity can operate as a catalyst for the mobilization and utilization of the refugees' right to the city and spatial justice. Without overlooking the multiple internal difficulties, I argue that the social relations of commoning help the neighborhood community to strengthen a collective consciousness and empower bonds of solidarity. As Chatterton (2010, p. 628) reminds us, "as we seek spatial justice, we mustn't forget that we are commoners," which means in the case of refugees that emerging commoning values of caring, sharing and mutual help are the catalyst to activate spatial justice and the right to the city towards an "unoppressive city" as "openness to unassimilated otherness" (Young, 1990, p. 319).

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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Article

Experience of Urban Hospitality: An Ecological Approach to the Migrants' World

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Abstract
This article was inspired by a collaborative action-research experience undertaken in Brussels by ARCH (Action Research Collective for Hospitality), aimed at further understanding the dynamics of hospitality and improving hospitality towards refugees, based on collaboration with actors of civil society. In a context of spreading policies of hostility and exclusion in Europe and the lack of arrival infrastructures for undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, the people tend to occupy public spaces of the city. Consequently, these spaces become the central nodes where civil society organizes the humanitarian aid and practices of hospitality and at the same time are places for interactional tensions and institutional violence. In other words, they become an urban stage where the tension between hospitality and exclusion is played out. Based on this research, our article proposes to take the urban consequences of hostility policies seriously by analyzing the ecology of the migrants' world in the city. Our aim is to understand their experience of segregation and hospitality in the urban environment—and more specifically in public spaces. Public spaces are indeed the only livable spaces for people for whom no room has been made. However, what constitutes their hospitality for migrants, i.e., their capacity to be inhabited, enters into tension with the constitutive dimensions of urban publicness (like accessibility, visibility, or urbanity). Understanding the experience of hospitality in urban public spaces for those who have no other place to live is seen as a condition as well as a means to enhance their urban inclusion.

1. Introduction

This article is inspired by a collaborative action-research experience undertaken in Brussels by ARCH (Action Research Collective for Hospitality), a collective launched in January 2019, which brings together researchers and practitioners with diverse profiles. The aim of the collective was to further understand the dynamics of urban hospitality and to improve the latter towards refugees. Researches were developed in close collaboration with actors of civil society—the Citizen Platform BxlRefugees, which each day welcomes hundreds of migrants present in the city—and according to some of the needs and problems that it encountered on a daily basis (ARCH, 2020).

In a context of spreading policies of hostility and exclusion in Europe (Squire, 2009) and the lack of arrival infrastructures for undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees (Meeus, Arnaut, & van Heur, 2019), these people tend to occupy public spaces in Brussels (Depraetere & Oosterlynck, 2017). Consequently, these spaces become the central nodes where civil society organizes the humanitarian aid but are also places of institutional violence (Deleixhe, 2018; Daher & d'Auria, 2018; Lafaut & Coene, 2018). In other words, they become an urban stage where the tension between hospitality and exclusion is played out.

The spatial consequences of these policies of hostility thus raise a straightforward issue for the urban commu-

nity: that of its principles and practices of reception and inclusion. To address this issue, a collaborative action-research based on participatory observation, mapping, ethnography, workshops and intervention was carried out in order to understand how these vulnerable groups experience the (in)hospitality of urban spaces, to give a voice to their needs related to their environment and to redesign this environment more inclusively. Berger and Carlier (2020, p. 14) describe the collective's approach as follows: "We have tried to mobilize inquiry as a tool that can contribute to the understanding of a problematic situation, to relay voices and experiences that are currently absent from the debate, and to provide resources for action.''

Based on this research, our article proposes to take the urban consequences of exclusionary policies seriously by analyzing the ecology of the migrants' world in the city. The aim is to understand their experience of segregation and hospitality in the urban environment—and more specifically in its public spaces. Public spaces are indeed the only livable spaces available to people for whom no room has been made (Mitchell, 2003). However, what constitutes their hospitality for migrants enters into tension with the constitutive dimensions of urban publicness, such as accessibility, visibility, or urbanity. Understanding the experience of hospitality in urban public spaces for those who have no other place to live is seen as a condition as well as a means to enhance their urban inclusion.

2. The Urban Consequences of Xenophobic Policies

In Belgium, as in Europe, asylum policy has taken on xenophobic overtones. Undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are, in the discourse of the political authorities competent in this field, widely considered as unwelcome or undesirable. Hostility towards them is institutionally organized: confinement in camps that look like prisons, expulsions, police harassment and violence, among others. Although they are based on national and European rules, these policies have spatial consequences that are particularly evident in the urban environment. Cities function as "circulatory territories" (Tarrius, 1993), as informal nodes in migratory trajectories. In a context marked by the importance of migratory flows as much as by the lack of arrival infrastructures, we can observe that many cities have several urban public spaces occupied by migrants (d'Auria, Daher, & Rhode, 2018; Sanyal, 2012).

Cities, and more specifically their occupied places, are sites where issues of hospitality and reception are concretely at stake. The obvious and visible presence of migrant populations turn these spaces into key sites for humanitarian aid and reception services set up by citizens and civil society, in the attempt to compensate for the lack of proper reception policies, in virtue of a moral duty and a principle of civic solidarity (d'Auria, Daher & Rhode, 2018; Depraetere & Oosterlynck, 2017; Lafaut & Coene, 2018). At the same time, these places become

hotspots for media and political attention, where institutional violence takes place on a daily basis (Mannergren, 2020). These occupied urban spaces become places where the tension between hospitality and hostility is played out.

However, there is little reflection today on the role of cities and their public spaces in issues of reception related to migration. According to Darling (2017), very little research has been undertaken at the academic level on the links between cities and "forced migration." Studies focus on the right of asylum, European borders, refugee camps or detention centers, the city appears, at best, "as a site of bordering" (Darling, 2017, p. 183). An emergent perspective considers "the city as sanctuary" based on "a culture of welcome towards asylum seekers and refugees, based on ideals of responsibility and hospitality" (Darling, 2017, p. 184) following Derrida's perspective. Darling invites us to redirect attention towards the city, because "it offers insight into the dynamics of refugee experiences" (Darling, 2017, p. 179) and it enables deeper exploration of the "political nature of urban life" (Darling, 2017, p. 186). For Darling, this implies moving beyond the framework of hospitality, in favor of that of urban citizenship. While the first focus, considered as 'management' of reception, would have little political potential through its distinction between those who receive and those who are received, the second would have a challenging and controversial dimension by proposing new ways of political belonging that undermine national categories of citizenship. The city, as the key site of the tension between 'policing' of forced migration and 'politicization' of new urban citizenship, thus deserves to be analyzed as "a space for a politics of critique relative to the state" (Darling, 2017, p. 192).

We propose to follow Darling's invitation, while taking a distance from his perspective on two points. Firstly, Deleixhe (2018) has demonstrated that the practices of hospitality developed by the citizens' platform in Brussels, bringing together citizens outraged by the reception crisis, were fully political, leading to politicization of migration issues. As proposed by Stavo-Debauge (2017), hospitality and belonging deserve to be considered together, rather than one against the other, because hospitality opens up to belonging (Stavo-Debauge, 2017, p. 15): "The stranger's arrival hangs on hospitality (given with more or less grace); belonging to the community that receives them is what is missing at first, inasmuch as they arrive as a newcomer" (Stavo-Debauge, 2017, p. 26). This raises the question of the different hardships each has to go through, from their reception to their inclusion in the community. If the perspective of hospitality distinguishes between those who are recognized as members of the community and those who come to it, it then invites us to take into account the existing asymmetries between the former and the latter: "Those who were already there and who together have appropriated the environment for their use, see others arrive, for whom they must make room and give enti-

tlement inside the community they formed before their arrival and without them" (Stavo-Debauge, 2017, p. 23). Therefore, this article, as its starting point, takes cities as places where issues of hospitality are concretely played out and looks at it from the experience of the migrant as a newcomer.

Secondly, analysis of the socio-spatial dynamics characterizing the issue of migration issue occurring in urban spaces deserves consideration for its own sake because it raises issues that criticism of national policies does not thoroughly address. If the city is a stage where migration issues are expressed and the place where the tension between hospitality and hostility is played out, it is relevant to understand this situation in order to address the specifically urban issues of reception and hospitality. This implies going deeper than legal and national frameworks, in other words, looking into the places themselves: "Hospitality can then be understood as a quality relating to spaces, environments and worlds, which presupposes being prepared to receive the newcomer and to take into account what he or she brings" (Stavo-Debauge, Deleixhe, & Carlier, 2018, p. 5). These places are taken up in various redevelopment projects, which redistribute the spaces and shape their hospitable or exclusive character. Addressing the urban issue of hospitality seems even more important given the lack of in-depth reflection on this issue at both the academic and political levels (Berger, 2020). In Brussels, the places occupied by migrants are located in the Northern Quarter, a railway station district which historically constituted a first settlement area for foreign residents in the city. A whole series of urban plans and programs are being developed in this area, based on several studies, diagnoses, information or participation sessions, and workshops where the migration issue is at best only marginally addressed, but always without consequence on the materiality of the city, without translation in the plans and the development of the urban fabric. While following objectives of inclusion, these policies aim, above all, to go beyond the transit character of the area and to improve the qualities of its public spaces, which are considered as dysfunctional and unsafe. However:

> A railway station district such as Brussels North is structurally and by nature a place of arrival for migrants of yesterday, today and tomorrow, and must be conceived and designed as a place where it is crucial that urban hospitality can be given. (Berger, 2020, p. 209)

This is why the ARCH collective was formed, to address the migratory situation in this part of the city where it manifests itself strongly, with a view to developing a politics of urban hospitality. In this perspective, various research projects considered the experience and perspective of civil society actors and migrants on the issues at stake for hospitality. This article focuses more specifically on one of these researches (Carlier & Printz, 2020), mobi-

lizing the of human ecology approach in order to understand the experience of hospitality in urban public spaces from the migrants' point of view.

3. The Urban Ecology of the Migrants' World

Exploring the link between migration and the city from the perspective of urban hospitality involves investigating the very heart of the occupied spaces, where the issues of hospitality are experienced. These occupied spaces form the living environment of migrants in the city, shaped by specific socio-spatial dynamics that determine their place within it. The human ecology approach, developed by the first school of urban sociology in Chicago, seems particularly well-suited to grasp these dynamics.

3.1. The Ecological Approach of Social Worlds

From the perspective of human ecology, the city is an environment shaped by ecological processes that determine the spatial distribution of social groups within it (Burgess & Park, 1925); it is "a mosaic of little worlds" (Park, 1925, p. 40). The 'ecological processes' that shape the living environment of a social world—like segregation/mobility, isolation/hybridization, succession or dominance (Burgess & Park, 1921; Park, 1936)—are influenced by its position in economic and political orders, and by its relations of coexistence with other social worlds living in the same environment (Wirth, 1928/1980, 1945; Zorbaugh, 1929). Human ecology has been forged over the course of numerous ethnographies dealing with "social worlds" (Cefaï, 2015) that must be investigated 'from inside,' observed in situ, in order to understand their living conditions and relation to the urban environment. Chicago researchers were quite sensitive to the way members of a social world perceived and shaped their own milieu. Human ecology was particularly interested in the living conditions of marginalized social worlds, in order to better address certain social problems. Understanding these social worlds 'from inside' was understood as a tool for the resolution of these social problems, which involved grasping the perspectives of the publics concerned—in the pragmatist perspective of John Dewey (1927/1954).

Among the works and ethnographies published by the Chicago school, one seems particularly suited to approach the ecology of the migrants' world, despite the temporal and spatial gap. Written in 1923 by Nels Anderson, *The Hobo* is a classic work that focuses on the social world of the "homeless bohemian," "figure of the frontier" (Anderson, 1923, p. 21), characterized by their mobility, deplorable living conditions, their physical and psychological degradation, ecological segregation and social and political exclusion. Hobos were "out of place" (Anderson, 1923, p. 151): They were part of this "class of undesirables" (Anderson, 1923, p. 150) that generated hostility and suspicion, seen as "parasites" by public opin-

ion and having no place in the community and its social life. Anderson describes Chicago as the "capital of hobos," their point of departure and arrival because of its position at the crossroads of their mobility trajectories. He analyzed the ecology of the "Hobo world," which was made up of a few places. First of all, "Hobohemia," a small area considered as a "haven of refuge" (Anderson, 1923, p. 13) because of the large number of services organized there, necessary for their basic needs (like accommodations or dispensaries). Outside Hobohemia, the Chicago hobos lived in "jungles" set up along the railroad tracks, close to the urban center and train stations, in accessible but marginalized open spaces that functioned as "a retreat, a resort, a social center" (Anderson, 1923, p. 17). The ecological process that determined their place in the city was segregation, in the form of concentration within restricted areas, which fostered their social isolation. Segregation was the ecological translation of their social and political exclusion, of a "social order which refuses to make a place for him" (Anderson, 1923, p. 200). Decades later, Snow and Anderson (1993) investigated the social world of homelessness from a perspective inspired by human ecology and studied the strategies of control, containment and expulsion that shape the ecology of this world.

3.2. An Ecological Approach to the Migrants' World

Despite the distinct spatial, temporal and political contexts, the parallels with the current situation of migrants in transit in European cities, contemporary figures of the border, are striking. The ethnography carried out in the framework of ARCH on spaces of hospitality in the Northern Quarter was inspired by this approach and focused on the migrants' experience of the urban environment. This article proposes an in-depth analysis of this work, based on data collected from participatory observation; workshops and focus group with migrants, volunteers and professionals (in the humanitarian hub and in the public spaces occupied); interviews with transmigrants, civil society actors, inhabitants of the surrounding dwellings, and shop owners of the station (all passages in italics in this article are excerpts from these interviews and focus groups).

In Brussels, the core of the migrant world's ecology is Maximilian Park, which has become an occupied space since the 'migration crisis' of 2015 (Daher & d'Auria, 2018; Depraetere & Oosterlynck, 2017). At that time, the queue of refugees in front of the National Foreigners Office, then located along the park, gradually turned into an occupation of this square by asylum seekers. Reception centers were hastily settled to accommodate them. Even when the National Foreigners Office moved at the end of 2018, the park remained occupied, mainly by migrants in transit:

> A new type of public in turn took up residence [in the Maximilian Park] from 2017: the 'transmigrants.'

This term refers to migrants in transit who only stay in Brussels for the time it takes to find a way to cross the Channel to reach Great Britain. They do not wish to apply for asylum in Belgium and are therefore neither protected by the Geneva Convention nor eligible for a place in reception centers. (Deleixhe, 2018, p. 131)

When the ARCH collective began its research, the park was thus mainly occupied by transmigrants—predominantly male, young and African-born—given the lack of arrival infrastructure with low-threshold services for the undocumented (Trossat, 2020) along with the need to be ready to leave in the middle of the night if a smuggler should give them a possibility to cross. The park constitutes a node in the migration networks, a temporary stop in the transmigrants' trajectory. They know (they hear it through the 'grapevine') that they will find humanitarian aid and various services essential for their survival: food distribution, dispatching to humanitarian services (medical, psychological and legal assistance, distribution of clothing and healthcare products, etc.) and accommodations set up by civil society (collective shelters and citizen housing), access to information (about services, possibilities to reach the UK, etc.) and so on. The park works as an intra-urban camp (although no tents are allowed), as well as a niche for humanitarian aid and civil solidarity, gathered within the citizen's platform created in 2017 and named Brussels Refugees. It is considered by transmigrants as the place where everything happens.

Until then, Maximilian Park was little used and not part of the mental map of the city dwellers; its 'public' character was primarily reinforced by the media coverage of the human drama played out there (Quéré, 2003). Residue of a major modernist project that had known some setbacks and finally failed despite the multiple expropriations that accompanied its beginnings, the park is composed of a few facilities (like a playground, sport facilities, a fountain, toilets). Until then, it was occupied by the inhabitants of the social housing towers located on its edge who used it as their backyard. It constituted a "transitional space" (Snow & Anderson, 1993) that welcomed an economically fragile population. The park itself is located in the Northern Quarter, a railway station area that daily welcomes thousands of commuters, holds many office buildings, and historically was a first settlement area for foreign residents in Brussels (Carlier, 2016; Daher & d'Auria, 2018). More broadly, the Northern Quarter itself functions as an "area in transition" (Burgess, 1925) housing marginalized populations (homeless people, prostitutes, undocumented, etc.). Burgess, one of the founding fathers of human ecology, defined an "area in transition" as a "port of first entry" (Burgess, 1925, p. 58) for incoming racial and immigrant groups, with a high degree of population mobility.

Maximilian Park, a 'transitional' public space located in an 'area of transition,' has thus, recently, come to be occupied by transmigrants, a population that is itself in transit; it functions as the core of their living environ-

ment in the city. Since its occupation, the park's facilities have been diverted to meet the occupants' daily needs, and the local inhabitants have deserted it, one social world succeeding another.

The park is connected with a few other places of hospitality set up by civil society, providing services that are temporary, thus particularly fluctuating. For example, the humanitarian hub and the shelters have already had to move several times, illustrating how difficult it is to make room for this population:

> This mobility…makes obvious the everyday quest for finding space and making room for solidarity as an unceasing and enduring proposition within the Northern Quarter, and this in spite of the area's undoubtable position within the geography of migration in Brussels, and Europe at large. (d'Auria, 2020, p. 58)

When we began this research (Carlier & Printz, 2020), the Hub was located in the North Station, which was itself occupied by a large transmigrant population. In order to spare passengers from trouble caused by their presence, a specific space was then allocated to them: the 'zero space,' located in the basement of the station, which also houses the bus terminal. On the doors of this enclosed place, an indication was given to passengers: "We hope by this action to offer more safety and cleanliness in the building." Hundreds of transmigrants slept there every night on cardboards, without access to water or toilets. Every day, professionals and volunteers distributed meals, tried to help out and support them, cleaned up the space. But opening the 'zero space' was not sufficient to contain their presence and prevent it from spreading and overflowing into other areas of the station dedicated to passengers. The unrest caused by the presence of transmigrants in the station gradually led to their evacuation. Shortly after the opening of the 'zero space,' bus drivers refused to stop at the North Station for hygienic reasons, due to information related in the media about cases of infectious diseases among the transmigrant population. Although this information was quickly denied, the rumor itself created a health crisis: the staff of the regional administration in charge of cleaning the station then refused to deal with the 'zero space.' These events worsened the situation and the station was in an increasingly pitiful state. Tension increased and the situation became unbearable for all who were confronted with it. Transmigrants claimed angrily "We're not animals!" to the many journalists on the scene to follow the situation, as widely reported on daily news sites. Actors of humanitarian aid, who were trying to manage the situation (anticipating, among other things, the evacuation that seemed more and more imminent), considered it to be 'the war.' Shopkeepers at the station were also particularly worried and rebelled against the policy of letting the situation rot. They were seeing their sales revenues shrink when passengers, their potential customers, no longer stopped to shop: "People

are scared because they're in droves." They listed the various nuisances caused by the presence of migrants in the station—lack of security, dirtiness, drug traffic—complaining that "it's the jungle now, here!" The 'zero space' was closed a few days later and the police evicted the migrant population still remaining in the station. The was done in order to give the station back to commuters and in the name of public order, to use the words of the public authorities. Transmigrants therefore retreated to the Maximilian Park. As the Hub was still located in the station, its users avoided going there except for situations of necessity. The Maximilian Park, from their point of view, became the only safe space until the hub moved a month later to another location, in the same district, still close to the park.

This episode illustrates how the ecology of the transmigrants' world is recomposed according to the few places allowed to them. In any case, it is drastically limited to enclosed humanitarian aid sites that are designed in line with a principle of sanctuary: hub and shelters, largely saturated and unable to meet all needs, and to the public spaces occupied, such as Maximilian Park.

In a context of policies of hostility, public space represents one of the few possible places of living for those who are considered as 'out of place'—who have no proper place, who necessarily occupy places not prepared for them and where they should not be (Wright, 1997), and whose presence necessarily takes the form of the "overflow" (Berger, 2018). Then, as we have seen above, this occupied public space also becomes a site where the tension between hospitality and exclusion is played out. It is the place of the first practices of hospitality, of solicitude (Bidet, Boutet, Chave, Gayet-Viaud, & Le Mener, 2015) and care, but it is also marked by institutional violence (harassment and regular police violence): "They kick us from the station. They kick us from the park. It's all the government do." According to transmigrants, the more activists, volunteers and human aid professionals there are, the more severe the police are said to be. The occupants of the park are frequently evicted by the police (one of the citizen platform's missions is to warn 'the guys' in advance of police raids) and then systematically return to it.

From the transmigrants' point of view, the park is the safest place in their ecology, all other places are frightening (Carlier & Printz, 2020; Mannergren, 2020). In these public spaces, concentration is a tactic of safety: to be gathered is a condition of safety, to be alone is risky: "If we're all together, there is no problem, it's a safe place. If we are two, three, the police arrive, and problems." They feel unsafe as soon as they go beyond because of the threat of police control and expulsion. The passage from one place to another (i.e., from the park to the shelter) is itself perceived as a danger:

> For residents of the park, mobility around the city to access a service, posed challenges to their safety due to police cracking down on their presence, albeit

undocumented. This makes their navigation around the city limited to certain stops and locations to and from which they feel secure. (Daher, Trossat, & Alexis, 2020, p. 51)

Their presence in the city is therefore restricted to the park and its surroundings. Massive occupation of public space is the means by which transmigrants seek to protect themselves from police violence and the risk of expulsion. From an institutional point of view, their containment in a given space, where their presence is manifest and implicitly allowed, facilitates their control, at the same time preventing their dispersion in the urban space and the nuisance that their presence could generate for other users of the city. Transmigrants, just like hobos, represent homeless people and other "undesirables," threats to "public order" (Lofland, 1998, Chapter 6), for whom containment represents "a control strategy that seeks to reduce the public visibility of the homeless and their likely interaction with other citizens by curtailing their mobility and ecological range" (Snow & Mulcahy, 2001, p. 160).

The processes shaping the ecology of the transmigrants' world in Brussels are similar to those observed for other "classes of undesirables" (Anderson, 1923, p. 150): segregation, characterized by isolation and concentration, taking the spatial form of containment and maintained by different political strategies, expressing exclusion from a social and political order. How do transmigrants experience these processes determining their place in the city and how do they perceive the qualities of hospitality of the places they live in?

4. Experience of Urban Hospitality

The research conducted in the frame of ARCH was devoted to the qualities of hospitality of places that are part of the transmigrants' ecology. Enclosed places, such as the humanitarian hub or the shelters set up by civil society, are perceived as places of hospitality because of their sanctuary nature, offering a place of respite for this social world, protected for a time from institutional violence and from daily hardships (Carlier & Printz, 2020; Lemaître d'Auchamp & Ranzato, 2020). If their hospitality stems from their disconnection from the hostile environment, what is the transmigrants' view of the qualities of hospitality of the open public spaces occupied? Let us start from the conceptualization of urban public spaces proposed by the heirs of human ecology and from what constitutes their hospitality in this perspective (Carlier, 2018), so that we can better describe the experience that they have of it.

4.1. Accessibility, Visibility and Urbanity

Public space is defined first and foremost by a principle of accessibility: it is a space open to all. This accessibility is understood in a logic of mobility: public space is a space

of passage, favoring connectivity between territories and ensuring freedom of movement for the passerby—this accessibility being considered in its opposition to the process of segregation (Joseph, 2007, Chapter 4; Lofland, 1998, Chapter 8). This is the basis of its "minimal hospitality" for the newcomer (Joseph, 1998, p. 93): It allows their "intrusion," because it provides everyone a "right of visit." For these authors, accessibility of public space is not only spatial, it is also a matter of perception and visibility: Characters, uses, practices and discourses are visually accessible, subject to the gaze of everyone. The visibility of public spaces, where differences are manifest, is linked to a principle of "civil inattention" specific to the order of civility regulating relations in public. It is defined by Goffman (1963, p. 84) as follows:

> What seems to be involved is that one gives to another enough visual notice to demonstrate that one appreciates that the other is present (and that one admits openly to having seen him), while at the next moment withdrawing one's attention from him so as to express that he does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design.

It is by virtue of this accessibility, both spatial and visual, that public space is the place that hosts urbanity, initially defined by Simmel (1908/2004) as a form of sociability specific to the city, characterized by social distance and physical proximity; and then by Wirth (1945) as a set of social attitudes in a urban context of density and heterogeneity. Urbanity is at the core of the "public realm" hosted by urban life, which Lofland defined as follows: "The public realm is constituted of those areas of urban settlements in which individuals in copresence tend to be personally unknown or only categorically known to one another" (Lofland, 1998, p. 9). These relations of copresence between strangers, limited and episodic, are guided by principles of interaction specific to the public order that include civil inattention, cooperative mobility and civility towards diversity (Lofland, 1998, Chapter 2). For Lofland, these principles, specific to the public realm, support the development of a sense of tolerance between strangers, who live together despite their differences: "Limited, segmental, episodic, distanced links between self and other may constitute the social situations that both allow and teach civility and urbanity in the face of significant differences" (Lofland, 1998, p. 242). These principles allow for copresence between strangers by ensuring privacy, dis-attention and avoidance (Lofland, 1998, p. 34), conditions of the hospitality of the public space for everyone regardless of their differences.

4.2. The Transmigrant's Experience of Publicness and Hospitality

Transmigrants' experience of urban public space is that of an inversion of its constitutive dimensions, at the same

time redefining what constitutes its qualities of hospitality. They represent the 'passerby' par excellence, a figure characterized by its mobility. The city is only a step along their road, where they are in transit. However, they are also the ones who are denied 'rights of visit' and freedom of movement, who find themselves trapped in a waiting situation, in a hostile environment. As mentioned, "it is a security risk to move into the unknown and the ambiguous….Migrants are on the move and they have learnt that it is unsafe to be in-between, in transit in public places" (Mannergren, 2020, p. 109). 'Out of place,' they are the ones who have nowhere to go. Consequently, the presence of migrants takes the form of occupation and fixity, which is reinforced by the way they protect themselves from violence (by being together, massively), and by the way public authorities seek to contain their presence in the city. As opposed to passage or movement, this occupation in turn limits the freedom of movement of other users—perfectly illustrated by the episode of the eviction of the migrants from the station. The station constitutes a public space perfectly defined by its qualities of accessibility, connectivity, transparency. It is designed to facilitate circulation of the user considered as a mobile individual, a passerby. The transmigrants' occupation of the station, however, enters directly into tension with the 'comfort of the user,' which justifies both their containment and their eviction from this space.

Since public space is one of the only 'livable' places for transmigrants, its qualities of hospitality therefore derive from its capacity to function as a place to acquire some resources so as to hold on while waiting to go on, for "going to chance"—in their own words—and as "a place of respite in a horrible road," as mentioned by one of the coordinator of the citizen's platform. The hospitality of the park is therefore due to its capacity to be inhabited: the presence of sheltered places to sleep under the slabs of the housing towers or at their doorways;

the presence of facilities such as water points and toilets, or amenities that can be diverted to adapt to needs and uses, such as a 'spider web' from the playground diverted into a giant tumble dryer. As described and drawn (see Figure 1) by Bosmans and Daher (2020, p. 41):

> The life of migrants in the park depends on the infrastructure the landscape offers. In it, they perform domestic activities, like sleeping, eating and washing; sport activities like playing football, working out or cheering; and chilling out activities like resting, socializing and walking. They appropriate everything they can find for their use.

The park also functions as a place of sociability, as a place to meet, to discuss ideas, problems, told us one of them who was in Brussels since six months before and who tried to 'go to chance' more than thirty times. Its habitability is also supported by all the services set up there by civil society and citizens, such as the distribution of food or of 'shower tickets'—services for which being in the park is often a condition of access.

However, this hospitality of the park is never a given, and it is often undermined by the political management of migration urban issues. Thus, it is not allowed to install tents and the capacity of spatial arrangement is very limited. Transmigrants consider their sleeping bags and backpacks as their home. When they sleep outdoors on cardboard, their 'right to rest' is undermined by the constant threat of control, confiscation of personal belongings, harassment or eviction by the police ("when we sleep, the police come right up to our heads and honk the horn"). This has led them to set up collective and individual strategies, like a collective watch enabling them to flee if necessary, or pepper around their sleeping bag to scare away the police dogs: "We don't really sleep," they said.


Figure 1. Migrant activities in Maximilian Park. Source: Bosmans & Daher (2020).

On a smaller scale, this hospitality is also undermined by changes in urban design observed since the start of the occupation. As demonstrated by Dresler (2020), benches have been removed, fences added, surveillance cameras installed, toilets added, some paths have disappeared. She points to the disappearance of "urban furniture allowing its users to rest, observe and interact," the several "elements of containment" added and "the reduction of the park's accessibility" that goes hand in hand with a decrease in its hospitality (Dresler, 2020, p. 69). Lofland analyzed how control of uses was achieved through changes in urban design, using filtering and surveillance devices, thereby reducing the public qualities of the spaces (Lofland, 1998, Chapter 7).

Transmigrants' experience of urban public space is therefore that of an inversion of its principle of accessibility: they occupy public spaces because their freedom to come and go has been denied, so these spaces are their only place to wait and have respite. Its hospitality therefore stems from its capacity to be inhabited (Breviglieri, 2002). This is why hospitality is more than accessibility, as developed by Stavo-Debauge (2017). In this perspective:

> It is not enough to 'leave the way' open to the one who comes, because it is also necessary to make room for them and give them a place, which can sometimes mean having to contain them and being able to accommodate them, for example by accommodating their differences and vulnerabilities.…In this sense, hospitality is the quality of what ensures a stay, facilitates an activity and invites someone to stay. It is also what offers support and assistance to newcomers, providing them with the necessary space and appropriate accommodations. (Stavo-Debauge et al., 2018, p. 4)

But this capacity of the environment to be inhabited weakens the constituent dimensions of urban public space. The space occupied inevitably accommodates the privacy and basic needs of transmigrants, which are, in spite of their will, public, disclosed and visible, exposed to the gaze of the others, subject to the visibility of publicness. This exposure, due to the lack of infrastructure to shelter basic needs, is perceived as a violation of privacy, and even more as a denial of dignity: "We're not animals," they contest, "Where is the democracy here? In Africa you will never sleep in the street."

Transmigrants aspire to the right to be unnoticed, to the right to 'civil inattention': In the distribution of clothes and hygiene products, the goal is to find what will best enable them to blend in and thus regain some dignity. For a coordinator of the platform in charge of this service, "it's all they have left," and "this is a question of mental health." The public exposure of privacy bars their access to the public realm and its principles of interaction. Hospitality thus requires enclosures, spaces where one may find some privacy and escape the hardships of public life:

> It is in the confidence of an enclosed space that one takes care of oneself, that one takes care, to begin with, of the physical appearance that will appear outside.…Whoever does not enjoy a place where, in the long term, he can take care of himself in privacy, look himself in the face and build up an image, has no resources to present himself properly to others, in public places. (Breviglieri, 2002, p. 325)

Thus, the hospitality of urban public space, from the transmigrant's point of view, is based on its capacity to be inhabited, in virtue of a freedom of movement that is denied. This hospitality comes into tension with the components of publicness, accessibility and visibility. The park's accessibility to passersby is weakened—they bypass it, avoid it. Its hospitality is lost for the residents of dwellings close to the park, who feel disappropriated from one of the rare outdoor spaces that welcomed their own needs and uses. This generates an explosive cohabitation in this environment between its regular users and transmigrants—as described by a social worker of this area. The visibility of privacy disrupts all the principles of interaction usually at work. These spaces, where copresence is avoided due to high interactional tensions, are therefore deprived of their capacity to host the public realm. The transmigrants' access to the public realm is prevented in virtue of the way their presence must take place, which only reinforces their segregation and isolation.

5. Conclusion: Democratic Issues of Urban Hospitality

Because of its constitutive accessibility, public space represents the only living space for those for whom no room has been made and who are excluded from the political order. If the public character of the park allows to take place there, the ways in which migrants necessarily live in, in the form of massive occupation and containment, also inverts its public qualities. It becomes the site for tension between hospitality to the passersby or users and hospitality to the most vulnerable, stemming from its capacity to be inhabited. This disrupts the constitutive dimensions of the publicness of space: its accessibility and its urbanity.

The park maintains its public dimension by being the stage of a media and political focus, as well as the heart of practices of hospitality carried out in virtue of a moral duty and civic solidarity. However, it loses its capacity to accommodate relations of co-presence between city dwellers unknown to each other. A paradox therefore emerges: the occupation has reinforced the public character of the park, which has become the scene both of the migration crisis and of politicization for civil society. At the same time it is gradually deserted by the public realm, a realm of urban life that transmigrants—like all who are without a place for intimacy—cannot experience, because of their inability to appear in public in an appropriate form.

Hospitality towards them requires a place capable of sheltering their privacy; it implies taking into account this vital need to inhabit the world, to occupy some space, along with other basic needs. Hospitality, in such a case, requires closure more than opening (Stavo-Debauge, 2018). This is why actors of hospitality plead for the establishment of reception infrastructures (for accommodation, help or care), whose hospitality derives from their ability to function as "inclusive enclaves" (Berger & Moritz, 2018) or "safe havens" (Mitchell, 2003, p. 171)—infrastructures providing protection and care, allowing people to regain some dignity necessary to get through the many hardships awaiting them in an environment marked by institutional hostility.

The creation of reception infrastructures, however, does not exhaust the issue of urban hospitality, given that public spaces are expected to receive those who have no other place to inhabit the world (Mitchell, 2003, p. 34). They constitute spaces whose capacity to manage with a certain disorder or unexpected presences contributes to their democratic and inclusive character (Lofland, 1998; Mitchell, 2003). This implies designing public spaces according to principles that can accommodate different situations and needs, including the need for the most excluded or vulnerable to live somewhere, to rest or retreat—in a way that does not reinforce the processes of segregation already at work for excluded people. It involves moving towards forms of spatial arrangement that enable people to live together without too many tensions, that make it possible to "put up with another's fully recognized differences" (Lofland, 1998, p. 238) in a situation of mutual accessibility and visibility.

The hospitality of urban public spaces towards excluded individuals and groups has a significance that should not be overlooked, given that principles of publicness have a political component. Hannah Arendt considered public space as a space of appearance, which is a condition for reciprocal recognition, and the emergence of a sense of community including those who are mutually visible and perceptible (Quéré, 2003, p. 81). Visibility is a fundamental dimension of urban publicness and of its political resources: Public spaces are essential to democracy as they are the only places where the excluded groups of a community make themselves visible to the members of this community (Mitchell, 2003, p. 33), and where asymmetries as well as processes of exclusion are made public: "By the visibility that [cities] impose on these processes of distancing and by the fact that the thresholds they produce are exposed, they dramatize the issue of citizenship, equal access and community belonging" (Joseph, 1998, pp. 110–111).

As such, urban public spaces represent places where the excluded may be visible, a condition for their inclusion into the community. But their hospitality towards them implies spatial arrangements allowing them to appear in public space without having to sacrifice their sense of dignity, without having to submit their privacy to the sight of the others. Only then can the visibility in urban public spaces of those excluded by the community take forms other than segregation, containment and isolation. Only then can the visibility lend to their consideration as much as their participation in public life.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

"They Sold Us Illusions": Informality, Redevelopment, and the Politics of *Limpieza* in the Dominican Republic

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Abstract

In the capital city of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, climate change and environmental concerns are used to justify massive redevelopment projects in informal settlements located along the rivers Ozama and Isabela. Residents in such river communities negotiate the uncertainty of state planning under a new socio-environmentalism that prioritizes the environment over social concerns, while continuing to pursue bottom-up neighborhood planning despite the powerful rationality of *limpieza* (cleanliness), the pervasive techniques of responsibilization, and the celebratory spectacles of megaprojects. The uncertainty resulting from governance under socio-environmentalism produces ambivalence towards environment-centered projects among residents. Drawing on oral histories and interviews with long-time community members, we suggest that residents engage in three 'sensemaking strategies' to process their ambivalence in the face of daily precarity, in particular the ongoing threat of evictions. Residents 'keep up' with the state and strategically utilize planning language to advocate for community priorities. They engage in practices of storytelling that reproduce a deep sense of community and provide a longer historical understanding of planning interventions. Finally, through verbal speculation and other 'unsanctioned speech acts' they analyze disruptions caused by socio-environmentalism, build solidarity with other communities, and think ahead despite uncertainty.

1. Introduction

During the current presidency of Danilo Medina, the central government of the Dominican Republic has prioritized cleanup and beautification efforts of the Ozama-Isabela river basin in the Province of Santo Domingo. Pointing to flooding, contamination, and health concerns impacting informal river communities located within the basin, the government has capitalized on a variety of international public-private partnerships to not only fund efforts around environmental cleanup, but also to develop an 'integrated strategy' that includes climate adap-

tation, economic development, and improved housing and community amenities.

However, these planning efforts obscure the ways in which the central government, as the capital city's major planning actor, and related institutions are failing to meet the basic needs of residents of river communities. Specifically, in the case of Santo Domingo we argue that a discourse of socio-environmentalism has reconfigured responsibilization tactics characteristic of neoliberal governance. This discourse of socio-environmentalism has local and global sympathizers as it responds to current climate change concerns, enabling the central gov-

ernment to frame the rationality of *limpieza* (cleanliness) as a reflection of the state's commitment to social good. By deploying neoliberal techniques of responsibilization (Gunder & Hillier, 2007; Sletto & Nygren, 2016; Swyngedouw, 2005) through the logic of citizen participation in environmental risk and waste management, authorities are able to forestall opposition to planning projects that are interventionist and often violent. Moreover, Santo Domingo presents a fragmented (Balbo, 1993; Koch, 2015; Larbi, 1996) planning landscape with unclear division of responsibility and poor communication between planning agencies and communities, leaving residents in a state of suspension (Roy, 2005) with great uncertainty about the intent and timing of future planning actions.

This article examines how river communities negotiate the uncertainty of state planning under socio-environmentalism, understood as a form of governmentality that seeks to develop compliant subjectivities through governance techniques premised on citizen participation and individual responsibility (Raco, 2007; Rydin, 2007). The production of these socio-environmental subjectivities is shaped by a powerful discourse of climate change and driven by a paradigm of sustainable development, which in turn serve to frame infrastructure and redevelopment projects in river communities as common-sensical interventions deserving of local support. Meanwhile, a rationality of participation that has long defined Dominican environmental governance (Sletto & Nygren, 2016) serves to bolster the disciplining of residents in river communities, prompting them to assume responsibility for their own environmental welfare while depoliticizing the violence of *limpieza*, evictions, and erasure of homes. This production of the socio-environmental subject through techniques of responsibilization thus permits the privileging of environmental cleanup and climate adaptation measures over human quality of life concerns.

In the following, we focus in particular on the ways in which residents continue to critically assess state planning strategies and pursue bottom-up neighborhood planning (Thomas, 2004) despite the powerful rationality of *limpieza*, the pervasive techniques of responsibilization, and the celebratory spectacles of megaprojects. In so doing, we situate this article within planning scholarship that sees and theorizes from 'global south' contexts (Kudva, 2009; Miraftab, 2009; Roy, 2009), foregrounding the practices and meaning-making of residents that are typically overlooked in planning research and processes. Drawing on oral histories and interviews with long-time community members, we suggest that residents engage in three 'sensemaking strategies' to process their ambivalence in the face of daily precarity, in particular the ongoing threat of evictions, and thus make sense of a fragmented and unpredictable planning regime. First, we suggest the sensemaking strategy of 'keeping up' with the state involves developing literacy around plans and planning language, the better to utilize these representational strategies as needed in their own claims-making. A second strategy involves holding close and repeating personal stories of the land and the community that encompass a longer arc than an election cycle, thus reproducing a sense of community. Finally, deeper analysis of oral histories reveals verbal speculation about the future through "unsanctioned speech acts" (Derby, 2014, p. 131), which enable residents to cope with the lack of clarity around planning processes.

All three sensemaking strategies inform a tradition of bottom-up neighborhood planning that is grounded in the logics of community building and caretaking, while at the same time allowing residents to hold and process both optimism and skepticism towards state planning efforts. While residents point to the historical failure of city and national governments to meet even the most basic needs of their communities, they also voice support of planning interventions that comport with their own traditions of placemaking and caretaking. Attention to sensemaking strategies, therefore, reveals the ways in which people attribute meaning to complex, paradoxical, and contradictory experiences, and, in turn, how meanings inform identity and action (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005), thus furthering a deeper understanding of how residents negotiate and engage with complicated and obscure planning processes over time.

We reflect specifically on residents' experiences and sensemaking strategies in the neighborhoods of Los Guandules, La Ciénaga, and La Zurza. Since 2014, La Ciénaga and Los Guandules have been the site of a contentious partial redevelopment called Nuevo Domingo Savio involving the displacement of a number of residents, while La Zurza has seen the development of a new riverfront street as part of the central government's redevelopment efforts. Residents in all three neighborhoods have experience with bottom-up planning efforts but also share vivid memories of past interventions, including a complete redevelopment and relocation plan, Nueva Barquita, that President Medina completed early in his Presidency to resettle residents in the river community of La Barquita just to the east of La Zurza. In this article, we draw on conversations surrounding the ongoing Nuevo Domingo Savio redevelopment project to demonstrate the complex, varied, and situated ways in which residents manage threat of evictions through strategies of sensemaking. In doing so, we situate the Nuevo Domingo Savio project and the resulting evictions within a larger history of precarity that river communities have had to manage.

2. Context

2.1. Research Site

La Ciénaga and Los Guandules are two of the oldest river communities in the capital city, first settled in the late 1950s, while La Zurza was established in the 1960s by migrants from other parts of the Dominican Republic

and Haiti. These river communities and others like them are primarily located in *Circunscripción 3*, one of the three census districts that constitute the capital area of Santo Domingo, *Distrito Nacional* (National District). *Circunscripción 3* primarily contains urbanized land, has the greatest population density in the city, and the greatest percentage of households living in multidimensional poverty (Alcaldía Distrito Nacional, 2019, pp. 34–35). The neighborhoods also have the lowest quality construction materials, and many neighborhoods lack access to basic services such as drinking water, electricity, and sanitation services (Alcaldía Distrito Nacional, 2019). River communities in *Circunscripción 3* have seen varying levels of consolidation over time, primarily through the multigenerational work of residents and community organizations. Over the years, and depending on the central government's redevelopment strategies at the time, parts of these communities have been subjected to threats of evictions or displacement.

According to the Global Climate Risk Index of 2015, the Dominican Republic is the eighth-most affected country by climate change (International City/County Management Association, 2018, p. 10). Drought, temperature increase, sea level rise, increased salinity in water tables, tropical cyclones, and lack of potable water are among the environmental risks facing the country and the Santo Domingo metropolitan area (Alcaldía Distrito Nacional, 2019). In the National District, those living by the sea face the greatest risk, as well as those living by the Ozama and Isabela Rivers because of river and stream floods. The area of vulnerable land in river communities totals 17.56 km^2 (19.17% of the city), placing roughly 292,332 residents (30.29% of the city's total) at risk (Alcaldía Distrito Nacional, 2019, p. 35). The numerous *cañadas* (creeks) that traverse the city have created micro-watersheds that make the land even more vulnerable during flooding and extreme rainfall, causing landslides and exacerbating public health concerns. In an initial diagnostic study conducted by Fundación Tropigás Natural, river communities are characteristically portrayed as a primary cause of the environmental degradation of the riverbanks: "Disorganized urban settlements and industrial development on the (river) banks are the main causes of this serious situation. The multiple discharge sources produce a decomposition that affects color, generates bad odors, and alters the nature of the waters" (Gutiérrez, 2014, p. 4).

Beginning in the 1990s, neoliberal governance led to decentralization strategies and an emphasis on economic development which in turn prompted the local and central governments to reduce their investment in social infrastructure in *Circunscripción 3* (Bosman & Amen, 2006; Goldfrank & Schrank, 2009). At the same time, however, because of the powerful logic of *limpieza* and the lack of accountability by public institutions due to the fractured planning regime in the Dominican Republic, major environmental cleanup projects on the Ozama and Isabela River associated with the discourse

of socio-environmentalism have been implemented with little to no resistance. In particular, the past presidency of Leonel Fernández (2004–2012) and the current administration of Danilo Medina (2012–present) have favored spectacle infrastructure projects, including the construction of the Santo Domingo Metro, the Santo Domingo *Teléferico* (cable car), and the massive housing project Nueva Barquita, which serve to obscure community impacts of *limpieza* projects.

Since Santo Domingo is the capital city, two central government plans are particularly important in reproducing this new form of socio-environmentalism in *Circunscripción 3.* The first, the National Development Strategy 2030 (*Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo 2030*), was conceived as a 'unifying' national document intended to guide government and private investment in the country's institutional, social, economic, and environmental sectors until 2030, regardless of which party is in power (Ministerio De Economía, Planificación Y Desarrollo, n.d., p. 14). In its vision of the future Dominican Republic, the National Development Strategy 2030 foregrounds individual responsibility as an essential element of citizenship: "A prosperous country where one lives with dignity, security and peace, with equal opportunities in a framework of participatory democracy, responsible citizenship, and competitive insertion into the global economy that takes advantage of resources to develop innovatively and sustainably" (Ministerio De Economía, Planificación Y Desarrollo, n.d., p. 25).

The second, the Ozama-Isabela Strategic Plan 2015–2030 (*Plan Estratégico Ozama-Isabela 2015–2030*), is specifically focused on the Ozama-Isabela river basin. The plan offers an integrated development strategy centred on the social and environmental challenges of the Ozama-Isabela river basin, pointing to excessive population growth, environmental pollution, and deterioration of the rivers as principal areas of concern. Calling for sustainable development as a framework for growth and investment in the river basin, the Ozama-Isabela Strategic Plan 2015–2030 is framed as a plan for economic development tampered by a modicum of necessary environmental and social changes (Comisión Presidencial, 2015).

The ongoing redevelopment project most visible under the Ozama-Isabela Strategic Plan is Nuevo Domingo Savio in La Ciénaga and Los Guandules. In conjunction with the Ozama-Isabela Strategic Plan, in 2013 President Medina created *URBE: Unidad Ejecutora Para La Readecuación de La Barquita y Entornos* (Executive Unit for the Redevelopment of La Barquita and Surroundings) through an emergency decree after his visit to La Barquita, another community located on the banks of the River Ozama. Initially, the office was responsible for developing an intervention protocol in vulnerable communities around the Ozama-River basin. Now, its purview has expanded to oversee all spectacle projects of the current President. To date, these projects include the Nueva Barquita project that displaced residents of

La Barquita to a newly constructed development, the Ecological Park being constructed where the La Barquita neighborhood used to be, the Teleférico (cable car line) that connects the two metro lines in Santo Domingo, and the Nuevo Domingo Savio project.

Initiated in 2014 and directed by URBE, Nuevo Domingo Savio is slated to be completed this year in conjunction with the end of the presidential term (J. Millet, personal communication, June 7, 2019). When asked how the area was chosen for redevelopment, Millet points to the dangers of flooding, stating that nearly 60% of Domingo Savio (encompassing the river communities of La Ciénaga and Los Guandules) is at risk of flooding and highly vulnerable to hurricanes. Deploying the logic of *limpieza* and its appeal to socio-environmental rationality, he suggests that overpopulation over time and the lack of "formal planning" led to people "occupying the territory, throwing trash in the river." Because of the failure of responsibility on the part of residents, Millet argues, a park will be developed:

> Along the edge of the river so that they (the residents who are evicted) do not return to occupy this area….If (the area) is left without being used, people could move back in (over the course of just) one night.

However, while the discourse of socio-environmentalism drives plan-making and shapes the development of environmentally responsible subjects in the Ozama-Isabela river basin, river communities share a long history of organizing and incrementally improving their own neighborhoods despite variable investment from the government. In La Ciénaga and Los Guandules, residents recall the community-based development of Plan Cigua. Published in 2004, the *Plan de Desarrollo para La Ciénaga y Los Guandules* (Development Plan for La Ciénaga and Los Guandules) includes an assessment of conditions in La Ciénaga and Los Guandules, a re-zoning strategy, and a process to relocate some of the residents. The plan-making process was referred to as "a protest movement with proposals" ("*un movimiento de protesta con propuestas*"; Codecigua with Ciudad Alternativa, 2004, p. 7). Thus the work of residents have long been fundamental to incremental improvements in river communities, fueling their retrospections of community-based action and providing resources for sensemaking in the face of recent state interventions.

2.2. Methods

This article draws on a combined 17 years of field research in Santo Domingo. The oral histories described in this article emerged from Vasudevan's broader feminist ethnography project to understand the socio-spatial mobilities and everyday experiences of residents in La Zurza. The project included ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation, semi-structured interviews, plan analysis, and oral histories. Interviews were conducted

with thirty-five planning stakeholders, including local and central government planners and policymakers, representatives from national and international development organizations, community-based planning actors, and independent architects and planners in the city of Santo Domingo.

Sletto has more than 12 years of experience working with river communities and maintaining governmental and academic partnerships in the Dominican Republic. For 10 years, he also conducted a long-term studio project with another river community, Los Platanitos, in Santo Domingo Norte. Long-term relationship-building with institutional and community partners enabled us to develop a grounded analysis of planning and urban development in Santo Domingo and its impact on river communities.

To provide insight into the ways in which sensemaking strategies inform bottom-up planning in river communities in Santo Domingo, we draw from community plans but center residents' oral histories. Oral histories were conducted with ten long-time residents in La Zurza, La Ciénaga, and Los Guandules, several of whom were among the first to settle in and organize their neighborhoods. As Thomas (2004) notes, oral history provides a unique perspective on bottom-up neighborhood planning, i.e., a form of planning that "aims to plan for the future in a way that helps create the process of capacity-building community development in affected neighborhoods" (p. 52), precisely because it enables residents to reflect on both organizational development and community change. Oral history also "unearths experiences of dedication and sacrifice over time that point towards potential future improvements" (p. 66), and creates a collaborative and empowering process through dialogue as people reflect on the past and look to the future.

A longtime resident and community organizer who was well-known by residents often accompanied Vasudevan during oral history interviews. Since residents felt quite comfortable in his presence, the interviews revealed important information at the margins of the formal oral history narrative through what Derby (2014) calls 'unsanctioned speech acts' or peripheral communication. For Derby, banter, rumor, and gossip are popular forms of knowledge production in the Caribbean that are typically excluded from historical analyses. We found that the rumors and other unsanctioned speech acts that emerged in our interviews provided additional insights into how residents are interpreting ongoing redevelopment processes.

3. Theory

3.1. Fragmentation of the State and Neoliberal Environmental Governance

The fragmentation (Koch, 2015; Larbi, 1996) or splintering (Roy, 2009; Swilling, 2014) of urban space in the Dominican Republic can be attributed to divisions cre-

ated during the colonial period. As Balbo (1993) suggests, the continuing fragmentation today stems from rapid population growth in urban areas, the dependency of the urban economy on the informal sector, and the inadequacy of urban planning tools. Relatedly, Swilling (2014) defines 'splintered urbanism' as "an expression in space of the neoliberal project that was first introduced into some leading OECD countries from the late 1970s onwards" where "'commodification' replaced 'universal access' as the primary urbanizing principle of urban governance" (p. 3182).

As a result of this splintering of urban space under neoliberal governance, planning processes typically led by state agencies now involve a host of other actors. In the case of Santo Domingo, various infrastructure agencies such as water utilities and public works, universities, private developers, national and international development agencies, and community-based organizations have emerged as major planning actors (Chantada, 2014; Sletto, 2013). Dominican organizations such as Fundsazurza, COPADEBA, Ciudad Alternativa, and others have assumed responsibility for a range of service provisions in river communities, including trash pickup and transportation infrastructure improvements. Whereas several of these civil society organizations were earlier involved in social movement activities, the fragmentation of governance structures has led these organizations to focus less on radical, broader "social criticism" (Chantada, 2014, p. 587) and demands-making than before. Instead, they have become more reliant on external funding and capacity building to facilitate 'progress' in their communities (J. Candelario, personal communication, June 15, 2018).

Regardless of whether they are based in a local or central government, or university setting, planning actors in Santo Domingo often know each other and move between the public, non-profit and private spheres. This porous boundary between public and private spheres also impacts the plan-making process, as limited central and local government resources require state planners to rely on agents from other sectors to contribute with funding, technical capacity, and political influence (Sletto, Tabory, & Strickler, 2019). To complicate the planning landscape even further, Santo Domingo falls under the purview of both city and state agencies, leading to lack of coordination and competing purposes between state agents. For river communities, this has meant navigating shifting and confusing relationships, not only with planning agencies but also with a host of other planning actors.

3.2. Responsibilization of Citizens

In Latin America, techniques of responsibilization under neoliberal governance place the onus on civil society actors to take charge of their own well-being. 'Active citizenship' by marginalized groups used to be defined by social movements through conceptualizations of rights

to the city and rights to difference (Dagnino, 2006). However, under neoliberalism, new governance arrangements have altered relationships between the state and civil society while also changing what political citizenship entails (Swyngedouw, 2005). In a neoliberal context where market-based mechanisms shape the planning landscape, authority structures that foreground governance through responsibilization place the onus on market-rational individuals to be autonomous, prudent, and entrepreneurial citizens (Woolford & Nelund, 2013) who assume responsibility for their own welfare (Raco, 2007; Rydin, 2007; Shamir, 2008).

In the case of Santo Domingo, we argue that techniques of responsibilization serve to depoliticize opaque and disruptive state interventions in river communities. For example, *Santo Domingo Soy Yo* (I Am Santo Domingo) is a citizen education campaign initiated by the municipal government that focuses on environmental and cultural education, calling on community groups and individuals to perform trash collection, cleanup efforts, and other preservation activities around the city: "(The campaign) aims to incorporate environmental education in municipal policy initiatives with the purpose of sponsoring the participation of people in the construction of a responsible citizenry committed to city pride" (Alcaldía Distrito Nacional, n.d.). Similarly, as highlighted in the Ozama-Isabela Strategic Plan, *Verde Somos Todos* (We Are All Green) is another, proposed environmental education program by the central government aimed at "creating a green and sustainable culture and mentality among populations in the river basin" (Comisión Presidencial, 2015, p. 34)."

Thus the narrative of *limpieza* coupled with the imperatives of economic development lead to the commonsensical prioritization of near-term, urgent care for the environment despite the threat of displacement, while residents in river communities continue to be responsible for their own well-being. As Sletto and Nygren (2016, p. 5) state, "through 'structures of inclusion' characteristic of neoliberal governance, participation becomes delinked from any projects of emancipation and instead conceived of as a 'loose toolkit' for 'good governance.'" The reconfiguration of responsibilization through the discourse of socio-environmentalism has worked particularly well in river communities, precisely because state planners' professed goals to maintain clean rivers and a healthy environment is shared by residents and community-based planning actors.

3.3. Making Sense of Change

Even while techniques of responsibilization serve to depoliticize redevelopment projects in river communities, residents actively work to make sense of a complex planning regime and its impact in their communities. The concept of sensemaking allows us to link the meanings that residents take from planning experiences over time to their identity-formations and actions as residents.

Sensemaking refers to the "interplay between action and interpretation," beginning with ordering events and then 'bracketing' and 'labeling' events into meaningful classifications, accommodating larger social or systemic factors with an intention of future action (Weick et al., 2005, p. 410). By highlighting the dialectical relationship between talk and action (Hutter & Kuhlicke, 2013), this conceptualization of meaning-making reveals how actors construct understanding and articulate potential action through retrospective reflection on past planning events.

As Weick et al. (2005) suggest, "explicit efforts at sensemaking tend to occur when the current state of the world is perceived to be different from the expected state of the world, or when there is no obvious way to engage the world" (p. 409). In river communities, where residents feel ambivalent towards current redevelopment projects, we find that oral histories reveal more explicit forms of making sense of the effects of planning and redevelopment, while unsanctioned speech acts emerge as a tacit form of sensemaking. As Derby (2014) notes, 'vernacular speech genres,' or those speech acts such as rumor, gossip, and banter that may not enter formalized spaces of dialogue such as governmental spaces or structured interview spaces, reveal specific ideas, conceptualizations, and metaphors that people deploy to manage, resist, or reframe events that are influencing their lives. All three sensemaking strategies described below enable residents to reflect on the history of government interventions while managing precarity and change.

4. Findings

First, despite the fragmented and opaque planning landscape, residents and organizers stay informed and continue to develop literacy around planning-related tools (laws, decrees, plans) that enable them to be strategic in their efforts to intervene in planning processes. Second, they hold onto and tell their personal stories as a means to retain their connection to other residents and to the land. Third, they deploy rumors and other unsanctioned speech acts to speculate on the impacts of urban redevelopment. In this section we reflect on the stories of Doña Martina, Evelin, Dannel, and Alfonzo. We use pseudonyms to protect residents' privacy in light of the ongoing displacement process; because Doña Martina is an elderly woman, it is a sign of respect in Dominican culture to precede her name with 'Doña' (Mrs.). As long-time residents and community organizers, their stories provide meaningful insights into the history of bottom-up planning efforts and the responses to state planning interventions over time.

4.1. Adopting the Language of the State

10 years prior to the inception of Nuevo Domingo Savio, residents in La Ciénaga and Los Guandules had already developed Plan Cigua, their own community-based plan based on a participatory process involving community-based organizations, neighborhood groups, and academics. Evelin, a resident of Los Guandules, recalls the Plan Cigua process quite well. She describes how 21 *juntas de vecinos* (neighborhood organizations) from Los Guandules and fifteen from La Ciénaga, as well as most of the churches in the neighborhood, participated in the development of the Plan. Residents along with technicians from civil society organizations such as Ciudad Alternativa and COPADEBA shared ideas and articulated priorities that were later developed into planning directives. A technical team from Ciudad Alternativa conducted a community census jointly with residents, and finally, proposals were developed in community workshops directed by Ciudad Alternativa.

In her recollections, Evelin demonstrates how community leaders appropriate language used by planners to make sense of and contest a fractured and unpredictable planning regime. According to Evelin, Plan Cigua specified where to construct new homes and facilities and where not to, which was a critical point of conflict within and outside the community. As she recalls, in the years following the development of Plan Cigua, a school was to be constructed in the sub-sector of Los Cocos in Guandules. When approached by a reporter from a newspaper about the project, she let them know that personally she was against the idea of building in that area. Drawing on the language deployed in Plan Cigua, she argued that the sub-sector had been categorized as the site of the biggest *cañada* in the neighborhood, meaning that it was contaminated by defecation and under constant threat of flooding. Since children would be playing in the vicinity, Evelin was adamantly against the idea of building a school there. She says:

> We want to leave the precarity, and for this reason, I was not in agreement with the school there. And immediately, they stopped the construction. You can imagine how I felt—I felt bad…the people who wanted the school were all over me. But thank God I was protected by the Plan Cigua book. Immediately we went to the Public Works Department and inquired, and we could see that there was no soil study, there was no permission to build there. We went to the mayor's office and the same thing happened….I took an engineer and an architect from Ciudad Alternativa because technically I am not anybody, just a community member, and then they could verify what I was saying. And then I felt a bit calmer because this is really not an area where it can be built.

As this excerpt from Evelin's oral history suggests, she became well-versed in the proposals written in Plan Cigua, making it possible for her to deploy planning language and rationalities to press her claims. However, at the same time, her statement reflects her feeling that she does not have the power to make change on her own. Instead, she felt 'protected' by Plan Cigua, using the opportunity provided by the planning process to partner

with an engineer, the face of Dominican planning rationality, to contest the building of the school.

Dannel, born and raised in the La Clarín sub-sector of La Ciénaga, relates a similar strategy of appropriating technical language to make sense of and contest city planning projects. His parents were some of the first to move to the neighborhood, and Dannel was born and brought up there. He is currently the lead coordinator of *El Concejo de Organizaciones de Fe y Base Comunitarias de La Ciénaga* (The Council of Faith and Community-Based Organizations of La Ciénaga), a group that brings together the Evangelical, Catholic, and Adventist churches as well as the *junta de vecinos* and other community organizations that do social work in the neighborhood.

Dannel, who is younger than Evelin, was not involved with Plan Cigua, but he recalls when President Medina visited the neighborhood in 2015. His community group had been trying to draw attention to the contamination of the Cañada del Arrosal for a long time, and they decided to take advantage of the President's visit to make the issue more visible. Rather than foment a protest, they presented the President with a petition signed by members of the community. The President read it and actually "came down to La Ciénaga, and walked with us in the interior of the neighborhood….He spent the night here walking with us through the alleys, and that's when the work began." Community organizations then took advantage of the presidential inauguration in March 2016 to publicly ask the President for help addressing the poor housing conditions in the neighborhood. Since then, his group has maintained a dialogue premised on technical discourse with URBE to influence the development of Nuevo Domingo Savio, which, Dannel says, continues to foreground *limpieza* and environmental concerns at the expense of social goals.

4.2. Storytelling

Unlike Evelin and Dannel, Doña Martina faces the imminent threat of eviction, as the houses in her block are marked with red 'Xs' to indicate the area is slated for redevelopment under Nuevo Domingo Savio. Doña Martina's sensemaking is based on organizing actions and episodic events into "an understandable composite" (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 13), allowing her to position her personal life and community activism within the context of government interventions that she has witnessed over many years. As Little and Froggett (2009, p. 459) argue, as opposed to a 'hero's journey' narrative, such storytelling strategies arrange and organize experience in reciprocity with broader social context, thus serving to mediate the perceptions of others. The following brief excerpt from her oral history provides an example of how Doña Martina uses storytelling to make sense of planning practice under the discourse of socio-environmentalism.

In 1968, Doña Martina moved from Loma de Cabrera in the province of Dajabón near the Haitian border to

La Ciénaga, which at the time was a scarcely populated community with merely a handful of *ranchitos* (informal homes) surrounded by sugar cane. One of the earlier settlers gifted her a lot in an area that was so swampy, she recalls, that her husband did not want to build on the site. Prior to arriving in La Ciénaga, her husband served in the military while she had been working in the Helado Frijol factory. They used their savings and borrowed a bit more, allowing them to build a little wooden house in 1971 that remains her home today.

Doña Martina's work in the community began in 1983 with her *junta de vecinos*, and she has performed a variety of organizing roles since then. Early on, she helped form an organization that improved houses in the neighborhood and built the first school in La Ciénaga. Then-President Balaguer had prohibited the entering of materials and new construction into this area from 1986–1996, claiming that it might spread cholera. As Doña Martina recalls, "we had to sneak it in" since construction had to continue to meet the needs of the population.

In 1998, Doña Martina founded an organization called *Sociedad de Madres y Niños Corazones de Jesús* (Society of Mothers and Children Hearts of Jesus). She still runs the organization but laments that it is not the same as it once was. During previous governments, she was able to obtain milk and medicine more easily and cater to the needs of single women, pregnant women, and people with diabetes in the neighborhood. She would go to the public health office with a letter specifying the medicine residents needed, and the office would ensure they received it. But today, she says, "this government took away the milk, took away everything."

By recounting the episodic events that make sense of her life in the context of state involvement in the community, Doña Martina is able to note the contrasts between Plan Cigua, which she was instrumental in developing, and the current Domingo Savio plan. As she reflects on Plan Cigua, she recalls that home construction was allowed in the area where her home is located. However, in the Domingo Savio plan, all the houses in her block are marked for demolition. Lamenting the contradiction between this earlier bottom-up planning effort and the current strategies driven by the rationality of *limpieza*, Doña Martina says:

> We worked really well with Navarro [then-head of Ciudad Alternativa, who led Plan Cigua]….We have a plan, but it was never executed because they [URBE] never saw it. URBE is doing whatever they want. Initially, we were with them [in support of them] because they sold us illusions. Then we turned the other way….I can't sit with people who ultimately want the destruction of the neighborhood….If I go [get evicted] I will get sick and die. Because I know all the work that has happened here. All the work I have done here, all the work to get these four walls.

As Sandercock (2003) posits, storytelling serves multiple functions in planning processes. In the case of Doña Martina's storytelling, she positions her personal life and community activism within the context of a series of government interventions that she has witnessed over many years, enabling her to retain a sense of active commitment to the community. The cultural reciprocity derived from material exchanges become organizing markers of episodic units over time, allowing Doña Martina to historicize efforts at redevelopment and thus make sense of the current discourse of socio-environmentalism and its economic and environmental imperatives: "They are planning to do something tourist-related" in this area, she says, in reference to the plan for a cruise terminal and greenways promoted in Nuevo Domingo Savio, and as a result her house is likely to be demolished.

4.3. Speculation

In addition to overt strategies of appropriation and storytelling, residents also deploy unsanctioned speech acts in their conversations to speculate about the impacts of planning strategies and thus imagine future community action. In doing so, Doña Martina, Evelin, and Alfonzo draw on a long oral tradition of sensemaking. As Derby (2019) suggests, "unsanctioned speech forms—the flourishes, the anecdotes, and the inadvertent details can reveal so much, and in the Dominican Republic, popular forms of speech such as banter, jokes, stories are high art."

The importance of rumor emerges clearly in community members' anecdotal dialogue about the threat of evictions resulting from Nuevo Domingo Savio. For example, Doña Martina reflects on past evictions in Los Guandules and says:

> Here [in La Ciénega] they haven't started the evictions because we are still in the midst of all this, but see what they did in Los Guandules. In Los Guandules, there were people they gave 14,000 pesos to…even here they are valuing people's [houses] at 22,000 pesos…for a house made of zinc. I have witnessed a lot of evictions right here, but I have never seen anything like this….It might be a house of zinc but it is also their mansion…it's their mansion because it was what they could buy. They come and they knock it down.

As Derby (2014) notes, speculative rumor in this case enables Doña Martina to "transgress the opposition between the imaginative and the material (p. 132)," thus revealing a rich, layered historical relationship with the state that is described through embodied relations with materiality, in this case residents' houses.

Similarly, Evelin illustrates how informal banter enables personal experiences and ideas to transcend the private sphere and become shared public knowledge. Evelin's manner of switching between 'we' and 'they' pronouns also demonstrates her ability to empathize with

those threatened with evictions because of the constant precarity the community faces. Speculating about the evictions following Nuevo Domingo Savio in a conversation with Vasudevan, a longtime organizer, and her own husband, Evelin says that the best option would be for the government to build apartments within the neighborhood so people could stay in place. But then she pauses, turns to her husband and says, "but if they [government] start it, will they finish it?" She describes how in the past, residents in other river communities were given temporary shelter as apartments were being built, but projects were never finished and they ended up having to stay permanently in the shelters. She goes on:

> And that's the insecurity that we have, will we be given the apartments or not, and it's another thing if we are given the apartments—what's the security we have that the state [party in power] won't change and snatch away the apartments? [Turning to Vasudevan] We aren't against the project because the project will rid me of this headache [contamination of the river]. I am in favor of the project, I'm just not in favor of how they [the residents being evicted] are being treated.

Evelin then switches to gossip, another unsanctioned speech act designed to manage complex situations (Derby, 2014), suggesting that some homeowners may have a second home in Los Guandules and will resettle there: "I am not defending the ones that have another home. I am defending those who don't have what is needed to live, who have spent all their lives living here, and for whom 300,000 pesos will not do anything." Finally, she turns to the organizer accompanying Vasudevan and says:

> You tell me, what can I do with 300,000 pesos? Or to be a house owner and get 18,000 pesos? Thank God I do not have a house over there [He nods his head in agreement] No, not even where I live. The cheapest house [there] is about 900,000 pesos.

Residents in other, nearby river communities also deploy gossip, rumor, and banter to make sense of government interventions and evictions. Alfonzo, a long-time resident and community organizer in La Zurza, turns to Nuevo Domingo Savio and the Nueva Barquita development when reflecting on the current lack of government support in La Zurza. While ruminating on the effects of a full-scale (Nueva Barquita) vs. partial (Nuevo Domingo Savio) relocation of residents, Alfonzo says: "Here in this country, when businesses take over a project, it gets done." Speculating on the prospect of compensation to residents who have been evicted as a result of the Nuevo Domingo Savio development, he turns his banter towards the situation in La Zurza:

> It's not only over there [in Los Guandules and La Ciénaga]….Here in La Zurza people were evicted be-

cause of the construction of the metro [in 2008] and the government has not answered to these families. These families now live on the banks of the river.

In this way, organizers utilize what they hear about government interventions and consequences in other communities to make sense and relate it back to their own communities.

Ultimately, as Derby (2014) notes, vernacular speech genres such as rumor, gossip and banter reveal how residents manage, resist, or reframe what is happening in their lives, allowing them to make sense of paradoxical and contradictory state interventions and project possible future scenarios. From the earliest days of their founding, Los Guandules, La Ciénaga, and La Zurza have experienced a series of planning projects resulting in resident displacement, only to see the retreat of state agencies and the return of residents to the neighborhood in a confounding cycle of re-informalization. The constant prospect of redevelopment coupled with the threat of displacement have added a deep sense of uncertainty to the social, economic and environmental precarity lived by residents. To manage this sense of uncertainty, residents turn to speculative speech forms to make sense of the vicissitudes of planning regimes that strive to evict residents from river communities only to see them return to their homes once the machinery of the state disappears. As Evelin says: "Each (government) has its own leadership and its own vision," that is to say, it makes sense that state planning interventions are cyclical expressions of shifting political priorities under evolving discourses of development.

5. Conclusion

In Santo Domingo, local and global concerns around climate change are deployed as justification for the massive redevelopment projects that are now reconfiguring river communities in the Ozama-Isabela river basin. The discourse of socio-environmentalism coupled with the rationality of *limpieza* and the visible spectacles of major infrastructure projects allow state and planning agents to prioritize near-term care for the environment over the needs and priorities of residents, even though they have long been stewards of the environment. Residents are asked to continue to be responsible for their own welfare, even though disruptive state interventions in the name of *limpieza* threaten residents' very ability to stay on the land and in the homes that they have built. The unpredictable redevelopment efforts in La Ciénaga and Los Guandules over time, combined with a fractured planning landscape in Santo Domingo, has left residents in a state of suspension as they observe the significant material and social changes taking place in their communities.

Yet, we would suggest that these tactics are not limited to the Dominican Republic. Rather than engaging in a dialectical process to simultaneously address both social and environmental concerns, cities in the 'global south' continue to be characterized by planning regimes that engage in modernist planning projects that foreground development that benefits the few, leaving the majority to face precarity and the threat of eviction. Additionally, neoliberalism has had the effect of fracturing planning landscapes in cities across the 'global south' while placing the responsibility on residents for their own well-being. Moreover, given the current global preoccupation with climate change, socio-environmental discourses serve to obscure the social implications of redevelopment interventions pursued in the name of climate mitigation, resilience, and sustainability.

However, we suggest that the concept of sensemaking constitutes an important resource for bottom-up community planning, particularly in neoliberal contexts characterized by fractured planning regimes bolstered by a discourse of socio-environmentalism. First, by appropriating and deploying technocratic planning language, residents advocate for themselves in official spaces despite the opacity and unpredictability of planning projects. Second, storytelling enables them to maintain strong social relations and foster a historical understanding of planning interventions. Oral histories serve to communicate the values residents place on their land and waters, illustrating how residents maintain a strong social fabric while caring for their communities. Material objects and exchanges become important episodic markers of community-government relationships, informing retrospective understanding of community expectations, disappointments, and resistance. Third, rumors, gossip, banter, and other unsanctioned speech acts are an important resource for residents, especially as they contend with fragmented planning regimes and devise new possibilities for community-based action. We suggest that these variable sensemaking strategies are particularly significant in 'global south' planning contexts characterized by unequal relations of power, lack of transparency, and conflicting rationalities (Watson, 2009), constituting an important source of agency for residents to critically assess the illusions and realities of complex and opaque planning processes.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Memory in Sacred Places: The Revitalization Process of the Muisca Community

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Abstract

The Muisca community of Suba, located in Bogota, Colombia, is a place-based community whose epistemology is rooted in what is now an urban environment. After enduring over five centuries of segregation, marginalization, displacement, and near cultural obliteration, the Muisca community has thrived to the present day and is currently undertaking the task of re-indigenization through the revitalization of their traditional knowledge and the process of ethnogenesis. The effects of urbanization on the Muisca have not only changed the physical spaces which they inhabit, but it has also disrupted the relational patterns between the community and their sacred places. This severing of the community from their sacred places has had the effect of further invisibilizing the Muisca's ethnic identity in the national social imaginary. As a form of resistance to their marginality, the Muisca are engaging in symbolic practices, in both public and private spaces, as a means of cultivating ideological resistance, memory revitalization, and generating new meanings of their collective identity. This article, based on an ethnographic case study, seeks to examine how the Muisca community is symbolically re-appropriating their sacred places in this urban context to mend the social fabric of the Muisca community. As such, this revitalization project represents an attempt to reconstruct a forgotten indigenous identity by rewriting the historical memory of a community that disappeared from the national discourse.

1. Introduction

Mi territorio, 'jicha,' es la conjugación de varias cosas. La superficie [y] el espíritu que habita allí. Es la parte física pero también las relaciones espirituales que guarda la tierra. (My territory, '*jicha,*' is the junction of several things. The surface [and] the spirit that lives there. It is the physical part but also the spiritual relationships that the Earth keeps; Interview with a member of the Muisca community of Suba, 2017)

Considering the rapid expansion of cities around the globe, the experiences of indigenous communities traditionally inhabiting those new urbanized spaces appear as a necessary focus for research in urban stud-

ies. It appears that the imaginaries of rural indigeneity are what determine the spatiality of the urban indigenous communities (Bocarejo, 2011), therefore making urban indigeneity a contradiction. Although significant attention has been given to the subject of recognition of land property in rural spaces, less attention has been directed towards the experiences of traditional inhabitants of indigenous communities within cities. While contemporary scholarship has explored urban settler colonial spaces, particularly within the Australian and Canadian experience (Povinelli, 2002), fewer studies have been done in places such as Latin America, where the colonial legacy remains present in those spaces. As Jane Jacobs affirms, in cities there remains "a very specific local politics deeply marked by the historical legacy of the colo-

nial dispossession of indigenous peoples" (Jacobs, 1996, p. 105). Nevertheless, this invisibility of indigeneity in urban spaces has been challenged through processes of revitalization of indigenous identity.

These processes of revitalization have increasingly taken place since political spaces began to open during the last decades of the twentieth century around the world. However, one can suggest that the political recognition of these movements is only a formal acknowledgment of cultural, social, and spiritual realities that have been backgrounded over centuries by the hegemonic structure. These global platforms, under the umbrella of the multicultural turn, amplified the reach of revitalization discourses and pushed certain national policies to acknowledge their pluri-ethnic identities (Ng'weno, 2007). For many indigenous communities, these processes of revitalization, also known as re-indigenization, have entailed the active and conscious path of reinterpreting their history through the constant battle between the historical and hegemonic discourse and their community's traditional history (Hill, 1996). In this sense, communities undergoing revitalization processes pose a direct challenge to the identity imposed onto them by the State and the academy, which have served to perpetuate essentialisms of indigenous identities (Ellison, 2018; Kuper, 2003). In contrast to those imaginaries, indigeneity in the urban environment is lived, negotiated, and constantly re-interpreted; it is negotiated within the spaces where it is present, while it also undergoes continuous change. As several scholars have argued (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005; Maddison, 2013; Shulist, 2016; Weaver, 2001), the imposition of those essential imaginaries of indigeneity not only misrepresents the reality of the communities, but also harms their processes of identity formation insofar as "such images of indigeneity, colorful and exotic, bear little resemblance to the lives of real people. Moreover, they can serve to dictate to Indians the parameters of their own identity by defining what is "properly" Indian or indigenous" (Canessa, 2005, p. 4).

Nonetheless, as this article shows, resistance to those imposed indigenous identities, including their spatialization comes from below; it emerges from the indigenous community's efforts to keep their traditional roots in local, familiar and personal spaces by way of re-appropriating their sacred lands through rituals and performances. Therefore, demanding spiritual liberties and, above all, rights to access and ownership of their sacred lands, is the principal goal of several communities in the pursuit of decolonizing their spaces, bodies, and memories. I am particularly interested in the process of revitalization of the Muisca community in Suba, Bogotá, Colombia. Recognized as the first indigenous community located in an urban environment in Colombia during the 1990s, the Muisca community of Suba has faced centuries of marginalization, segregation, cultural obliteration, and with modernity, displacement, and invisibility. Although the Colombian legislation, through Constitutional changes in 1991, has granted access to communal lands for ethnic minorities including indigenous and black communities, this process of spatialization has been put into action differently in urban environments, leading to the lack of land for the Muisca community. The ambivalent articulations of the legal framework regarding ethnic land reveal how the historic struggles over land take place in the urban space, where local policy continues to reproduce colonial regimes of dispossession of Indigenous lands.

Based on ongoing ethnographic research since 2017, I have used participant observation, in-depth interviews, and visual methodologies to engage with the Muisca of Suba's process of identity revitalization and land claims. I have conducted participant observation in events such as general assemblies, elections (which take place every year), seasonal festivals, census, *palabreos* (reasoning gatherings), hikes to the sacred mountains, rituals in their orchards, and educational sessions. Likewise, during those events, and in private sessions, I have conducted over 50 semi-structured and unstructured interviews to adult members of different groups, such as the *Consejo de mujeres* (women council), *Consejo de abuelos, mayores y sabedores* (elders and wise council), *Consejo de jovenes* (youth council), and with the political authorities of the community to gather a diverse set of experiences. Finally, I have engaged with visual methodologies including photography and video, in addition to drawing on visual material produced by members of the community themselves during public and private gatherings, rituals, and performances. In drawing on visual methods, I demonstrate how these sources can be used as a powerful instrument of visual representation of the Muisca of Suba's identity in their own places and contexts. As echoed in the community, their existence has been invisibilized, therefore, pictures and video materialize their presence.

In this article, I want to address how the Muisca community's process of revitalization is a form of resistance which involves symbolic practices such as rituals and performances in both private and public spaces. I seek to examine how the community is symbolically re-appropriating their sacred places in the city as an attempt to make their identity visible while reconstructing the historical memory of their community's members. I divide this work into two main sections: In the first section, this article explores theoretical debates on how indigeneity is spatialized, negotiated, and contested through everyday practices, particularly in the urban environment (Escobar, 2008; Lefebvre, 1991; Zieleniec, 2018). In the second section, I address the Muisca community's process of revitalization as a process of resistance which, through private and public rituals and performances, is re-appropriating their sacred land in the face of displacement and marginalization.

2. The City as a Space of Indigenous Alterity

Urban space has been problematized as a highly politicized and institutionalized, but contested space. On the

one hand, the urban environment has been shaped as a space where modernity is emplaced. Here, public spaces are organized to reproduce the relations between property, law, and planning as a means of perpetuating the needs of modern capitalism (Zieleniec, 2018, p. 10). On the other hand, the city appears as a space where possibilities of resistance to this functional logic remain present. In thinking on Lefebvre's work, the city also serves as a place of hope in which urban planning is thought of in terms of lived space, rather than a mere "functional habitat impelled by the needs of power and capital" (Zieleniec, 2018, p. 5). Understanding the urban space in these terms opens the spectrum of possibilities for social movements, among which indigenous communities are present (Blomley, 2004).

According to some theorists, both urban planning and property laws appear as mechanisms of governance insofar as they are seen as technologies of power that "shape material forms and social activities in urban space" (Wideman & Lombardo, 2019, p. 3). Far from being neutral, the molding of urban space follows certain imaginaries, none of which concerns ethnicity and race. The scholar Brenna Bhandar (2018), for instance, has developed the concept of 'racial regimes of ownership' to argue how there is a relationship between property regimes and race as a legacy of colonial presence. Racialization of space and nature, therefore, remains a powerful force in contemporary society (Brahinsky, Sasser, & MinkoffZern, 2014, p. 1135). In a similar way to Bhandar, other scholars have also suggested the racialized logic of land property in cities (Heynen, 2016), arguing that "exclusion was secured through a complex of everyday practices, most notably segregation and de facto discrimination in schools, workplaces, public offices, and local markets" (Pallares, 2002, p. 62). These ethnic spatial fixes (Povinelli, 2011) show how property and its concomitant legal structures are constantly being enacted within settler-colonial cities to facilitate dispossession and settlement.

Nevertheless, practices of resistance appear to subvert exclusionary logics of spatialization. Echoing the classic work of Henri Lefebvre (1991), the production of space is also possible through the everyday, collective lived experience which provides meanings of what Lefebvre refers to as representational spaces. While the modern-liberal logics of urban planning seems to be impermeable, the collective right to the city appears as an everyday process of appropriation of space that "prioritize[s] its use-value over its exchange value" (Wideman& Lombardo, 2019, p. 7). A rich scholarship has emerged in cities across the global south, particularly from Latin America, where scholars have echoed Lefebvre's notion of space as a process. In debates over the ambiguous and politicized use of the word *territorio* (territory), Latin American scholars have suggested that like space, *territorio* appears as an endogenous concept that responds to the history, geography and multiple forces that are grounded in place in this region (López

Sandoval, Robertsdotter, & Paredes, 2017, p. 43). This debate seems relevant, since, for some social and ethnic movements throughout the continent, the urban space is where their *territorio* is located. The city appears as a space of indigenous alterity, as a space for alternative epistemologies.

In contrast to the liberal construction of the urban space, indigenous epistemologies allow for an alternative perspective on the relationality that is lived within this environment (De la Cadena, 2015). Understanding the city as indigenous territory brings possibilities of "relational understandings of time and space that included human and non-human beings" (Bryan, 2012, p. 219), towards a more inclusive and just space. In the second section of this work, I am interested in how the Muisca community, like other "urban indigenous groups in Bogotá…have openly contested the strong legal spatial associations of indigenous groups and minority rights" (Bocarejo, 2011, p. 665). In contrast to the urban ethnic invisibility presented in urban planning in some Latin American countries, this process of indigenous revitalization presents how "the built environment is a crucial site for observing indigeneity-in-the-making, allowing one to historicize its contemporary importance as far more than an invention" (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). In this sense, both the community and the urban space produce, negotiate and contest their identities, in a co-constitutive process.

3. The Right to Sacred Space: The Muisca Territorial Appropriation

El territorio es sagrado, es vital. Un pueblo sin territorio es como un pez sin agua, es lo que nos identifica, es lo que nos hace ser una comunidad. Nos trae diferentes sensaciones, son olores, son sentires, colores, expresiones. El territorio es mi mamá, mi protección, la unión de todos los elementos. Para mí, territorio es vida, pero siempre que yo cuento la historia, hay una fractura, hablar de territorio siempre me llena de nostalgia. (The territory is sacred, it is vital. People without territory is like a fish without water. It is what identifies us, it is what makes us a community. It brings us different sensations, it is smells, it is feelings, colors, expressions. The territory is my mom, my protection, the union of all the elements. For me, the territory is life, but whenever I tell the story, there is a fracture. Talking about territory always fills me with nostalgia; Interview with a member of the Muisca community of Suba, 2017)

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Latin America, social constructions of indigenous peoples throughout the continent operated as discursive mechanisms which were used to misrepresent these communities within the cultural and economic realms, and in particular, in terms of ownership of the land. Categorizing the indigenous epistemologies as backwards and against

Western ideas of progress and development, this national discourse permeated the national imaginary and helped to maintain a hegemony of Eurocentric epistemology (Quijano, 1997, p. 117). During this timeframe, indigenous peoples were also classified in economic terms as peasants, which changed their relationship with their communal lands. In a pursuit to keep ownership over the lands they inhabited, indigenous communities had to buy or demonstrate their title deed through legal documents which, most of the time, they did not possess. The institutionalization of land rights within the economic liberal thinking was without a doubt, one of the most powerful and subtle governmental mechanisms of ethnic disintegration and displacement. Despite the end of the Spanish colonial system in Latin America, "internal colonialism [has been the] reformulation of the colonial difference within the formation of the modern nation-state after decolonization" (Mignolo, 2000, p. 197). The interiorized racial imaginary from the colonial period has remained, it has mutated, but certainly, it can be perceived not only in the legal structure but in the social imaginary itself.

During the last decades of the twentieth century, there was a significant shift in political discourse which moved towards indigenous recognition. Multiculturalism emerged as a political platform which, despite being framed within neoliberal policies, allowed for a transition to the indigenous struggle for recognition and differentiated rights. Moving from complete invisibilization—"from monoracial liberalism to multicultural neoliberalism" (Sánchez-Castañeda, 2018, p. 15)—indigenous communities, such as the Muisca of Suba, envisaged in the new multicultural policies a hope for their struggle for identity and land recognition. However, as some scholars have argued, multiculturalism operates as political mechanism of governance, allowing the states to secure a minimum of control over the resurgent identities, once the racially homogenous project of a nation was no longer successful (Escobar, 2008, p. 213).

As a consequence of centuries of colonialism, some have stated that "despite the language of multiculturalism in many nations and even constitutional reform any assertion of Indian identity is likely to be resisted by at least some of the political and social elite" (Canessa, 2005, p. 3). In this sense, the economic and political elite that opened the space for a pluri-ethnic recognition would remain the same that determines the relation between the communities and their territories. As a result, the political and economic elite which ushered in multicultural policies in Latin America continued to aggressively subjugate the environment and those minority groups whose values undermined capitalism. Following Marcuse, capitalism approaches nature "in an aggressively scientific way: It is there for the sake of domination; it is value-free matter, material. This notion of nature is a historical a priori, pertaining to a specific form of society" (Marcuse, 2018, p. 74). This form of society that in the same way that constructs an 'otherness' to the in-

digenous, also others nature to impose its power (Malm, 2018). The process of constructing an 'other,' whether it be nature or an indigenous community, is essential to territorial exclusion, misrepresentation and moral distancing. It represents a process that is foundational to colonial and imperial discourses, and has worked to justify the economic agenda of the colonies through the othering of indigenous peoples and nature.

3.1. Suba: Flower of the Sun

In muyscubun—the native Muisca language that is in the process of revitalization—Suba means 'flower of the sun' or 'flower of quinoa.' Suba is a locality within Colombia's capital city of Bogota. The locality is situated in the northwest region of the city, and is populated by more than one million inhabitants scattered throughout, including approximately 2,500 families—which represents around 8,000 people—that are Muisca indigenous. The district of Suba stands out among the rest of the other districts in Bogota in virtue of its biodiversity and landscapes, being a space where rurality is present in the city. Given these characteristics, Suba has been the target of multiple luxury real estate construction companies that, regardless of the vast inequality lived in the district, aim to produce exchange value over the sacred lands of the Muisca community. Historically, based on the accounts Muisca members I interviewed, there is a strong sense of discontinuity of their presence in this locality due to the multiple processes of colonization and internal colonization experienced by the community. One can trace the process of land dispossession back to the encounter with the Spanish colonizers. In contrast to other communities' experiences, the Muisca people of Suba affirm that the process of catholic conversion responded to political dynamics between their *cacique* (indigenous political leader) and the colonizers, as this member states:

> In 1537, the conquerors arrived at Suba. [Since] they arrived during the Holy Week, they were being pacifist instead of coming aggressively to this territory. They [the Spaniards] had been in the Americas for some time before, so they knew a couple of things about the organization in the communities. In the case of the Muisca community of Suba, the Spaniards took advantage of the old local quarrels to take control of these territories. The 'cacique' was converted to Catholicism, being the first Catholic Muisca. Moreover, three days after his baptism, he died. That was because he betrayed his beliefs, his community, and his identity. (Interview with a member of the Muisca community of Suba, 2017)

The settlement of the Europeans in Suba was made possible through establishing relationships with the local leaders; However, this dynamic was not well received by the entire Muisca community. In less than a century, the po-

litical arrangement between the European settlers and local leaders was no longer legitimized by the indigenous population, leading the colonizers to establish control over the territory without the support of the *caciques* (Langebaek, 2005). While the political authorities lost validity among the Muisca population, at the base of the social structure, the religious authorities resisted the assimilation of Spanish culture through creative adaptations of their cosmology to the reality of the colonial times. It was through the continuation of these practices, even in private spaces, that the assimilation of the Muisca culture was not a complete process. Although the exploitation of indigenous peoples and their lands has taken place since the Spanish colony in Suba, territorial institutions such as the *resguardos*—territorial communal unit administered by the indigenous peoples and legitimized by colonial titles—allowed the communities to maintain to a certain degree their traditional practices in-place. However, from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, under the laws of the Republic and its racial homogenization agenda, the dissolution of the *resguardos* reconfigured the Muisca's access to their lands. The results of these measures for the Muisca were a loss of autonomy and an integration of their community within the new nation into broad categories such as peasants and semi-urban workers (López, 2005, p. 333).

Notwithstanding the invisibilization of their identity, the Muisca community maintained a significant amount of traditional practices from within the marginality of their houses and pieces of land which, until the 1950s, constituted a great percentage of the region of the town of Suba. However, with the abrupt flows of migrants from many places in Colombia, urbanization became another threat for the community which had to start selling their lands facing the reality of possible expropriation. For the Muiscas, as for other indigenous communities throughout the Americas, *pueblos* (towns) "represent an intermediary space—not necessarily a place of transition between rural and urban life but a permanent in-between. Pueblos are the symbolic and ceremonial center of the rural highlands" (Pallares, 2002, p. 61). However, in the name of development, this town became a locality of the capital of Colombia in 1954 by a presidential decree. Suba went through a sudden urbanization of its rural areas wherein the Muiscas had their lands, not only displacing them but also disintegrating the families. As part of the capitalist agenda, ethnic epistemologies do not have a value in the market, therefore, they must be removed from those profitable lands, following the idea of progress. As Escobar affirms, "displacement is an integral element of Eurocentric modernity and development. Modernity and development are spatial-cultural projects that require the continuous conquest of territories and peoples and their ecological and cultural transformation along the lines of a logocentric order" (Escobar, 2008, p. 65). With the "desacralization of [their] place" (Routledge, 2017, p. 82), the Muiscas started a process of conscious resistance as a commu-

nity with a place-based epistemology. The community has since grounded their struggles in their territory, a space that has been irrupted, but is now being redefined through both the recovery and generation of traditional knowledge, memories, and relations.

During the 1970s, a group of Muisca families began a process of resignification of their own identity which contested the historical categorizations and representations of the Muisca produced by those in rule (Cabildo Indígena Muisca de Suba, 1999). The social insurgencies throughout Latin America for peasant and ethnic rights served as models for many social movements to explore mechanisms of resistance and resurgence; indeed, in response to the socio-cultural pressures, a series of constitutional reforms took place across the continent, leading Colombia to establish a new constitution in 1991. The Constitution of 1991 classified Colombia as a pluri-ethnic nation which recognized the diversity of ethnic and cultural groups. From a critical vantage point (Sánchez-Castañeda, 2018, p. 19), however, the constitution and its regimes of recognition became a means of pacifying the social movements emerging across the continent and worked to manage cultural diversity while legislating the minority populations. As such, the multicultural political agenda in Colombia can be seen as a form of "colonial governmentality" (Coulthard, 2014, p. 15).

The Muisca's revitalization of their identity began with an inner desire to destabilize those national imaginaries that kept them in the pre-Columbian past and categorized them as peasants, thereby attempting to erase their history. Through the revitalization process, the Muiscas have regenerated an epistemology which has been hidden in their past, but has nevertheless remained present in their practices. Today, the Muisca's revitalization practices can be understood as "a process…[a] new indigenism [that] seeks to undo hegemonic signifiers, affect their usual semantic chemistry to produce new valences, and thus reconfigure indigeneity itself opening it up to the acknowledgment to historical contemporaneity and radical social justice" (De la Cadena & Starn, 2007, p. 11).

3.2. Embodied Memory and Resistance

Public and private spaces have become the scene of collective activities, such as performances, where the Muisca community challenges the national imaginary by way of sacralizing those spaces that have been transgressed by capitalist perspectives of profit. In contrast to those economic perspectives based in capitalist logic, indigenous senses of place tend to situate culture within place, and therefore root their epistemology where "no degree of globalization can ever reduce place to the logic of capital, technology, or transnational media" (Escobar, 2008, p. 317). The Muisca's symbolic appropriation of their taken lands through performances has been a powerful tool of identity contestation to those who do not legitimize them as 'real indigenous.' These perfor-

mances can be viewed as displays of how the Muisca tradition remains alive in the urbanized town, confirming what Routledge argues in stating that "performance and the performance of emotions have become increasingly important in the practice of politics" (Routledge, 2017, p. 114). Through appropriating public spaces, the Muiscas exercise their right to appear and perform in the public space, converting their bodies into political sites that demand "for a more livable set of economic, social, and political conditions no longer afflicted by induced forms of precarity" (Butler, 2015, p. 260). In another way, ritual also becomes a powerful embodied tool to rebuild the Muisca's communal identity along with their sense of place. Insofar as their cosmology is being re-constructed and revived through the appropriation of their ancestral spaces, their bodies become living extensions of their sacred territory and their memory:

A major component of such remembering has to do with the how bodies remember certain places to have been and how orient and reorient themselves in regard to these same (and like) places. Similarly, cognitive maps, regarded as internalized representations of places, play a powerful role in orientation, often acting in conjunction with body memories. In both instances, places ingress into bodies in enduring and significant ways. (Casey, 2009, p. 103)

While the local government of Bogota has officially recognized the presence of Indigenous communities throughout the city in Decree 543 written in 2011 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2011), there has yet to be a restitution of lands to the Muisca community of Suba to this day. Therefore, through these rituals, the Muisca community aims to reestablish a sense of control over their sacred lands by consciously creating communal spaces of embodied connection to their territories. For this purpose, within their process of revitalization, the Muiscas have also engaged with, and re-signified, their mythology (Carillo, 1997). By invoking and re-signifying their mythology and cosmology while remaining present in these public yet sacred places, the Muiscas have created an ongoing ritual practice which regenerates and strengthens their communal memory. As Jenkins affirms, these rituals in particular places are innate to the indigenous ways of being in the world, "for many Indigenous peoples their way of life—including their stories, cosmologies, identities, and much else that we might put under the (perhaps alien) heading of 'religion'—depends on the intimate connection to specific creatures and particular places" (Jenkins, 2017, p. 242). For instance, one of the series of rituals which I attended was called, *paisajes sonoros* (soundscapes). This symbolic practice of place appropriation was a way to reclaim their ownership and relationships with places that are no longer maintained as sacred indigenous places. Through walking, listening, and speaking to the places in their native language, the Muiscas were remembering in place what these locations meant for the social fabric of the community. Open to Muiscas and non-indigenous visitors, we walked for four Sundays throughout different places that are recognized as sacred by the community: the Tibabuyes wetland, the Indio Park, the Nevados Park (Figure 1), and two mountains located in the eastern area of the locality. Some political au-

Figure 1. Los Nevados Park, June 2017. This sacred place for the Muisca community is under the administration of the government of the district. While it is a public park, there is a group of Muisca families—*raizales* (traditional inhabitants) who remain living in the park.

thorities and youth members of the community encouraged elders of the community to share their memories in place along with fragments of their sacred myths to be recorded as part of the digital archive of the community. Although some elders remain residents of areas around their sacred sites, most of the Muisca families have been displaced to other parts of Suba as a consequence of the expansion of the urbanization. In some cases, these activities of remembering carry an incredible sense of grief for the elders who have signified these places as sacred. The elders understand these places as parts of their family, and even extensions of their bodies. For the Muisca community, however, these rituals of remembrance are recognized as practices of healing their communal memory.

In the same manner, the Muisca community has engaged in seasonal celebrations in public spaces such as the main plaza of Suba. Town plazas have been essential public spaces where religious, political, and social authorities encounter one another, and also where peasants take their products on a weekly basis. The town plaza of Suba, in particular, was the center of the indigenous town during the arrival of the Spanish colonizers (Zambrano, 2003). Therefore, for their most important celebrations, such as solstices and equinoxes, and political events such as census and annual elections, the Muisca of Suba continue using this plaza as a public space that has to be reclaimed as Muisca territory. In one of these celebrations, what they called the Quinoa and Corn Festival, the Muisca held a day-long celebration in accordance with the solstice celebration (Figure 2). After a communal ritual of harmonization made by one active elder of the community, which consists of paying rever-

ence to sacred places in each of the cardinal directions and a cleanse with traditional herbs, the Muisca people started performing traditional dances to the sound of Andean music played by some members of the community. Likewise, many Muiscas were offering their products in different tents installed throughout the plaza; products such as pottery and handmade woven bags, or *mochilas*, as well as traditional food products such as *arepas* (cornmeal cakes), and *chicha*, a traditional fermented beverage which was prohibited for decades, that now has become a symbol of Muisca resurgence.

Whereas public appropriations of space have served to challenge outsiders' imaginaries, private spaces have kept their essence as places where their indigenous identity has been alive for centuries. Private spaces have been where traditional practices such as cooking, healing, and reasoning through their linguistic hybridizations have served as micro-practices of decolonization that have survived the multiple attempts to erase them. As Corntassel suggests, "often daily actions are overlooked during discussions of community resurgence and self-determination movements" (Corntassel, 2018, p. 17), leaving aside the valuable meaning of those hidden practices in the reproduction of culture. What urban indigeneity has meant to the Muiscas is a constant redesigning of mechanisms of cultural survival, but particularly of economic renegotiations. For instance, through the communal gardens initiative, members of the community with bigger lots—remains of what used to be their ancestral lands—have set up orchards which produce and guarantee a certain level of food sovereignty, in addition to helping the community reestablish their connection

Figure 2. Quinoa and Corn Festival, June 2017. Members of the community using tobacco and coca leaves as a means to appropriate the main plaza of Suba in one of their main annual celebrations. On the back, women are sharing *chicha*, a symbolic fermented beverage.

with the land and thereby reconstruct their social fabric. After the dissolution of the *resguardos*—indigenous territorial units under colonial rule—some indigenous families were able to acquire pieces of land in what used to be the town of Suba and keep their ownership until present times. However, for other families, there was not a possibility of buying their ancestral lands or keeping them after the abrupt process of urbanization (Zambrano, 2003).

Nevertheless, some families have opened their gardens to the community, recreating a sense of place, while renewing their connection with their land while "regenerating urban space" (Manzini, 2015, p. 190). For instance, in one of the gardens opened to the community, youth Muisca members in charge of the educational activities have promoted the revitalization of their native language in place. For several Sundays in July 2018, we would arrive at one of the community's gardens located on the top of a mountain in Suba early in the morning to set up lunch for the families that had facilitated the gathering. After a harmonization of the space, led by the *tanyquy*—spiritual leader—we started cleaning the garden and cooking; another woman and I were in charge of the fire, for the Muisca people women are the only one's allowed to light the fire. At the same time, one of the educational leaders started with the language lesson using memories at these places as a means to teach muysccubun (the native Muisca language).

Another element which was present in these educational sessions, as well as in other gatherings, has been the use of tobacco and coca leaves as substances of resistance. While these plants have historically been demonized and stigmatized in Colombia, the consumption of these substances is viewed as an important practice of communal healing and connection with the territory for the Muiscas. In contrast to the perspective of non-indigenous citizens in the city who have attached negative meanings to these substances and to practices associated with them, the Muisca people argue that in addition to helping make meaning of the territory of Suba, "the consumption of these substances allows the ceremonial concentration, the strengthening of loyalty within the community and even, collective decisionmaking" (interview with a member of the Muisca community of Suba, 2018).

Instead of reducing the land to mere space to be exploited as a commodity, placemaking has become an activity of resistance that is "strengthening people's capacity to withstand the traumas of capitalist modernity (from poverty to war) in place, building on people's struggles for the defense of place and culture, and fostering people's autonomy over their territories" (Escobar, 2008, p. 64). Not only have the Muiscas designed multivalent mechanisms of resistance which constitute actions in the margins of society which challenge the system of production and exchange within a capitalist system, but their practices also attest to the multiplicity of ontologies through the embodiment of alternative ways of being in the world. The recovery of their land goes hand

in hand with the recovery of their ancestral knowledge, their history, their identity, and their reciprocal relationship with the land. It is the reconstruction of a place, where the territory as a living entity, reclaims its memory (Ulloa, 2012).

4. Conclusions

The subjugation of indigenous identities has been historically connected with the transgression and degradation of their territories. Displacement, urbanization, and other desacralization methods have impacted how the natives have made sense of place, and therefore how they make sense of their existence. This marginalization of place and its relationships with a multiplicity of actors "has had profound consequences for our understanding of culture, nature, and economy" (Escobar, 2008, p. 30). However, even in the subaltern spaces where some communities have remained for centuries, they have faced their reality through developing unique mechanisms of cultural survival.

Cases such as the Muiscas of Suba represent other ways of being in an urban environment that respects the environment while reenvisioning their existence in relation to it. Certainly, given the current global environmental crisis underway, "we should foster the coexistence of solutions based on different logics and different rationales" (Manzini, 2015, p. 192). In addition to fostering this coexistence, however, challenges to the "coloniality of being" (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 242) are being undertaken by the Muisca community, whose resilient nature attests to the human potential to recreate and transform crisis into hope. The revitalization of the Muisca community's identity signifies a challenge the globalized discourses of progress and development in an urbanized environment that has left limited space for ethnic peoples. Their engagement with ritual and performative practices not only poses a challenge those political efforts aimed at reintegrating the Muisca identity within the national discourse, but these practices are also fundamental activities and reconciliations with the Muisca memory which strengthens the fabric of their community.

Similarly, like other local marginalized communities that have been subjugated by colonial domination, the Muisca continue to engage in everyday practices "of being, knowing and doing" while actively constructing "their socio-natural worlds" (Escobar, 2008, p. 31). Through the analysis presented here, the Muisca can be understood as an indigenous community that is rooted in what they consider to be their sacred land which has been taken from them and violated in front of their eyes. After centuries of marginalization, including the multiple strategies which have been aimed at the erasure of their ethnic identity, the Muiscas continue to thrive and remain present. In carrying on the traditional practices of Andean life, the Muisca epistemology has survived as a testament to the resilient nature of this community.

As Restrepo (2005) affirms, the Muisca people continue enduring their present as the product of their unresolved past; a present that manifests the multiple ambiguities, disputes, and mechanism of resistance that had to take place against centuries of Spanish colonization, and later on, internal colonization during the Republic. Although obscured, the Muisca memory has come to us, and it needs to be confronted and reinterpreted.

For the Muiscas of Suba, the regimes of authenticity (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005; Maddison, 2013; Shulist, 2016) imposed by the Colombian state have signified constant challenges against the delegitimization of the resurgence of their urban indigenous identities, situating them within discourses of false ethnic identity. This has resulted in the loss of their legal recognition once before, due to the lack of 'indigenous diacritic markers' listed in a governmental authenticity exam. In response to this, the community engaged with practices that could represent those imaginaries, in order to be recognized once again by the State. In addition to the romantic depiction of the Muiscas, there also remain essentialized representations of indigenous peoples which have further commodified their identities (Canessa, 2012; Vega, 2017).

Despite their current process of reindigenization, the national imaginary of the Muiscas continues to romanticize them as the legendary Andean civilization that was extinguished during the colonial period. Although this strategy had originally served as a means to not take responsibility for the structural violence exerted on this community in the past, it continues to marginalize the Muisca's revitalization today. In this regard, while the Colombian state has recognized the Muisca community of Suba, as well as other Muisca communities such as the one located in Bosa—a locality in the south of the city of Bogota—only one Muisca community which is not located in the city has been granted with territorial rights, the Muisca community of the town of Sesquile. While this article offers a window into the experience of the Muisca people of Suba, it also reveals how territorial struggles for indigenous communities play out in different environments. Given that the Muisca of Sesquile reside in a rural environment, and are therefore the only Muisca community to have been granted territorial rights, they fit the State's spatialization of indigenous identity while the Muisca of Suba and others remain landless. Although through Decree 543 of 2011, the district of Bogota clearly contemplates the foundation for a public policy for indigenous people in the city, little has been materialized in the everyday lives of the Muisca peoples in respect to their territorial claims. And despite the fact that Article 7 of the Decree contains a section on territorial policies or *camino territorio* (territorial path; Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2011), which promulgates identifying, characterizing, and re-signifying the Muisca territory in the city in accordance with the community's understandings of memory and ancestral practices, there has yet to be any specific actions taken by the city to fulfill these declarations. However, despite these pressures, the tra-

ditional knowledge of communities such as the Muisca of Suba continues to survive and exhibits the potential for new understandings of the relationship between indigenous communities and urban space. Everyday practices, and public and private performances of territorial appropriation, not only stand as examples of how indigenous identity is negotiated within urban space but also shows how indigenous groups embody their relationship with their sacred lands, thereby carrying on the legacy that they have had in this place for centuries.

Acknowledgments

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Disrupting Risk Governance? A Post-Disaster Politics of Inclusion in the Urban Margins

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Abstract

Facing climate emergency and disaster risks, cities are developing governing arrangements towards sustainability and resilience. Research is showing the ambivalent results of these arrangements in terms of inclusion and (in)justice, as well as their outcomes in emptying the 'properly political' through depoliticised governing techniques. Acknowledging this post-political thesis, however, critical analyses must also engage with re-politicization and focus on disruptive and transformative governance efforts. This article addresses the dual dynamics of de—and re-politicisation, focusing on the interplay of different modes of governing urban risk. We follow the political philosophy of Jacques Rancière and related interpretations in critical urban studies to recover the politics of the city. We focus on a post-disaster area in the foothills of Santiago, Chile. After a 1993 disaster, the State constituted a mode of governing risks based on physicalist interventions that discouraged local conflicts. This techno-managerial policing order made risks invisible while favouring real estate development. However, we show how local initiatives emerge in the interstices of formal and informal arrangements that contest this course. This emerging mode of governing risk, we argue, has the potential to recover incrementally urban politics and disrupt the dominant one through an egalitarian principle on the margins. Our contribution shows that, although these modes of governance coexist and are still evolving, advancing more just and inclusive cities require moving beyond consensus-based governance and focusing on the role of dissent and disruptive politics.

Issue

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1. Introduction

Cities face multiple challenges related to the climate emergency and disaster risks. Accordingly, a set of novel policies, institutions, and governance arrangements have emerged to create sustainable and resilient cities (UNDRR, 2017; UNISDR, 2015). Much research has reflected on the inclusiveness of these initiatives, especially in relation to low-income and vulnerable groups in urban settings (Chu, Anguelovski, & Carmin, 2016; Gupta, Pfeffer, Ros-Tonen, & Verrest, 2015; Mitlin &

Satterthwaite, 2016; Vale, 2014). Others have expanded on their inherent politics and justice concerns (Fainstein, 2015; Kaika, 2017; Meerow & Newell, 2016). Such reflections should be seen in the light of growing evidence that these policies, for example towards resilience, may produce exclusionary outcomes (Alvarez & Cardenas, 2019; Weinstein, Rumbach, & Sinha, 2019). Furthermore, questions have arisen on the democratic politics driving the coordination and reproduction of cities. These follow David Harvey's (1989) description of an urban governance shift from a managerial logic into

an entrepreneurial one, where competition and market-based development become primary forces. Lately, critical researchers have deemed consensus-based governance processes as non-democratic and post-political (Dikeç, 2005; Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017; Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010). Since the usage of techno-managerial logics evacuates and even forecloses the 'properly political' (Swyngedouw, 2009), it is important to consider the depoliticised contexts where these urban initiatives might emerge. This requires reflecting on the dynamics of de- and re-politicising urban governance on the ground.

Post-disaster contexts are interesting for examining such dynamics, given the widespread inequality of urban risks and the contentious character of disasters (Hewitt, 1983; Oliver-Smith, Alcántara-Ayala, Burton, & Lavell, 2017). While considering emergent exclusions from relief and recovery, post-disaster risk governance also sets forth long term interventions with ambivalent outcomes in terms of inclusion (Gotham, 2016; Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Ingram, Franco, del Rio, & Khazai, 2006). Moreover, reducing the political to techno-managerial modes of governance is "particularly relevant in environmental practices" (Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 605). In line with this assertion, urban planners and policymakers regularly prefer 'physicalist' interventions to manage risks (Hewitt, 1983), constructing more visible initiatives and showing powerful stakeholders how governance actors respond to risks (Pelling, 2003). However, managing risks is far from a technical issue, as "the choice, design standards and delivery of engineering projects are embedded in the politics and power relations of the city" (Pelling, 2011, pp. 383–84). In this regard, reducing risk management efforts into a technical issue is an important strategy for their depoliticization (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007). Risk management is thus intimately connected to historical vulnerabilities and associated spatial (in)justices that influence their effectiveness and inclusiveness (Huang, 2018; Nygren, 2018).

In this article, we examine the dynamics of urban politics in relation to risk management practices in a post-disaster context. This requires focusing on the politics of risks, which has been addressed by a number of contributors (Fraser, 2016, 2017; Nygren, 2016, 2018; Rebotier, 2012; Zeiderman, 2012, 2013). For example, Fraser (2016) analyses urban risks and adaptation in informal settings in Colombia, reflecting on the importance of non-expert and local knowledge to risk responses. From a Foucauldian approach based on biopolitics and governmentality, Zeiderman (2012) addresses risk as a subject of technology, and as such, in need of continuous work to make it a realm of governmental intervention (e.g., through a set of practices, meanings, and techniques). This work is critical as neoliberal urban development renders post-disaster communities to be responsible to manage their vulnerabilities (Nygren, 2016). While these debates show the tensions in risk governance regimes, a less explored dimension is how different modes of risk management interact, contest, and poten-

tially enhance a politics of inclusion. Cities are profoundly political in terms of enablers or restrictors of equality (Davidson, 2016). For that, we acknowledge the debate on post-political cities but focus on the potential to recover urban politics through disruptive processes in the name of equality (Davidson & Iveson, 2015; Dikeç, 2017). Such urban politics dynamics exist in how governance structures depoliticise social movements (Uitermark & Nicholls, 2014), and can co-exist with different outcomes: as described by Choplin (2016), slum clearance programs and subaltern politics of resistance have, respectively, depoliticization and re-politicisation effects.

Following a similar line of thought, we aim to analyse the interrelation of different modes of risk management and their potential results. We develop an approach inspired by the French philosopher Jacques Rancière and unpack an analytical lens into these modes using his ideas of 'policing' and efforts to recover an egalitarian politics. Rancière can contribute to delineate inclusive cities following a radical notion of equality that can potentially disrupt its governing order and recover the political character of cities. This has relevance for understanding spatial practices as well as discursive dimensions of the politics of inclusion, as this frame questions critically who counts as a legitimate actor of intervention and whose risks are addressed. To show this empirically, we focus on an area in the foothills of the Andes in Santiago, Chile, affected by a disaster in 1993. The question guiding the article is: Under what conditions does the interplay of different modes of governing risks advance more inclusive cities, and what is the role of politics in that process?

Up next, we expand further our framework based on Jacques Rancière. Then we describe the research design, followed by the results and a discussion section. The final section presents the conclusions.

2. A Rancièrean Politics of Inclusion for Urban Disaster Governance

Among critics of current political conditions of capitalism (e.g., Mouffe, 2005), Jacques Rancière has become a key figure in critical theory today (Keucheyan, 2013). His philosophy stems from a political ontology intending to reflect on the 'properly political,' and has influenced academic fields including critical strands of geography and urban studies (Davidson & Iveson, 2015; Dikeç, 2005; Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017; Swyngedouw, 2009, 2011; Velicu & Kaika, 2017). In our discussion, his approach is relevant because governance analyses require a strong and critical theoretical base to "identify and foster possibilities for a renewed urban politics" (Davidson & Iveson, 2015, p. 544). His philosophy begins with an extreme position about equality. For Rancière, equality is not a goal, but an ontological presupposition, it is an egalitarian principle (Rancière, 1991). From this starting point, two central concepts for understanding governance critically are the police and politics.

For Rancière, there is always a governing process he names the 'police,' corresponding to an imposed order through which society organises its functioning. The police are always in tension with the egalitarian principle and are thus by definition unequal. Supposedly based on consensus, the police define and allocates certain "ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task" (Rancière, 1999, p. 29). Although the police and the act of policing do not coincide with the State apparatus, it is the law through which certain shares are distributed. Echoing aesthetics, Rancière calls this "the partition of the sensible" (*le partage du sensible*; Rancière, 2010, p. 36). The police orders what is visible and the sayable: It defines why "a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise" (Rancière, 1999, p. 29). Viewed like this, the police can be applied to urban governance, in the sense of a set of regulatory arrangements coordinating and reproducing cities, providing a way to analyse the processual mode in which urban power is exercised (Davidson, 2017; Davidson & Iveson, 2015). This includes bureaucracies, practices, instruments, and discourses passing as technical interventions that mask their ideological character, along with how they delineate a certain sensibility.

While the police arrange groups in particular places within society, the essence of politics is to disturb this order. 'Properly political' events, characterised as disruptive and aiming towards dissensus (Rancière, 2010), are rare and infrequent: Politics only emerges when "the part of those who have no part" interrupt the natural order of domination in the name of equality (Rancière, 1999, p. 30). "Politics, before all else, is an intervention in the visible and the sayable" (Rancière, 2010, p. 37), making it the counterpoint of the police. Making noticeable that which was previously invisible is central here, as political activity "makes visible what had no business being seen…it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise" (Rancière, 1999, p. 30). The clash between the police and a part mobilised by an egalitarian principle requires a spatial counterpart. Rancière's position is that political communities disrupting the police always do so through "intervals of subjectification," which are constructed "between identities, between spaces and places" (Rancière, 1999, p. 137). In that sense, these 'in-between spaces' are multiple. Although politics is exceptional, it can emerge everywhere: As there is no 'no police,' that is, no place lacking a logic distributing the sensible, politics can emerge anywhere. Civil rights movements provide examples of this formation of subjectivities: The defiance of Rosa Parks to change her bus seat in 1955 or the counter sit-in staged by four black students in 1964 at a 'whites-only' space, are instances where equality is presupposed and thus properly political (May, 2008; Rancière, 2006). Critical geographers have expanded this to renovate spatial politics. For Swyngedouw, 'egalitarian spaces' refer to a "socio-

spatial configuration through performative practices of dissensual spatialization" (Swyngedouw, 2011, p. 375). Davidson and Iveson (2015) use Rancière to explore the city as a space through which politics is staged, and relatedly, a community of emancipation. The latter connotation has been used for discussing resilience as resistance (Boano, 2017), enhancing a more active role of communities in adaptation towards dissent, and ultimately transcending top-down adaptation programmes by verifying their perpetual equality.

How does Rancière's philosophy help to understand the interplay of different modes of risk governance and their politics of inclusion? Three ideas guide our analysis. First, disaster risk management structures, especially those following techno-managerial and physicalist forms, delineate the visible and sayable for dealing risks. Understood as a 'police governing' order, we unpack the historical constitution and socio-spatial effects of a dominant mode of governing risks. Second, to identify initiatives that potentially disrupt this order, we explore the origins, practices, and discourses of alternative risk management efforts, accounting for the demand for inclusion and potential for disrupting the police. Following Boano (2017), we recognise risk-related claims demanding equality through practices of resistance. And third, to recognise the potential political character of these initiatives, we analyse their interaction with the police, in relation to how the latter creates the conditions for their emergence. As argued by Dikeç (2005, p. 181), "if politics puts the police ordering of space to an egalitarian test, then politics is possible not despite the police, but because of it." To enhance the urban features of the political, we explore beyond formal and informal distinctions to see how risk initiatives emerge in their interstices, developing practices and discourses of risk management with justice connotations (Huang, 2018; Koster & Nuijten, 2016; Soja, 2010).

3. Research Design

We conducted empirical research in the district or *comuna* of La Florida, in the south-east of Santiago, Chile, along the Andes. In the article, we refer to this area as the 'foothills,' as it is how local inhabitants know it (Biskupovic, 2015). We address it as 'marginal' for its socio-economic conditions and its location, as shown in Figure 1. Throughout the 20th century, this area had a rural and low-density character and its land was used mainly for agriculture and recreation. An important urbanisation process took place during the 1960s and 1970s when families migrating from other parts of Chile settled here through squatting land and/or using State housing policies. Around 1982 this area had roughly a population of 5,500 people living in six distinguishable neighbourhoods (Ampliación La Higuera, La Higuera, Fernando Dominguez, El Progreso, El Esfuerzo, and Las Perdices). Around 10–20% of the population then was highly exposed to floods and landslides (Muñoz,

Figure 1. Research area in south-east Santiago. Source: Authors based on IDE.cl.

1990). During the 1980s they experienced a number of floods (1982, 1986, and 1987), but the main disaster to which we refer occurred on the 3 of May 1993. Then, strong rains with high temperatures produced a debris flow or 'alluvium' in the Macul Ravine, killing 23 people, destroyed two neighbourhoods (Fernando Dominguez and El Progreso) and damaging other three, and roughly 3,800 people lost their households (ONEMI, 1995). As we show below, this disaster marked the course of all risk management initiatives in the foothills.

Our research design followed qualitative and spatial methods. During the six-months of fieldwork, we conducted 48 in-depth interviews with disaster risk governance actors and residents of the foothills. Our informants were diverse in relation to their socio-economic background, as well as their historical attachment to the area. We interviewed long-term inhabitants of the foothills who experienced the 1993 disaster, new residents that have arrived in the last decade, and informants from different governmental scales working on risk and emergency management. While we refer below to the inhabitants of the foothills as a community, this does not mean this is a homogeneous group as some internal differences and tensions exist, especially between new and old residents. Our research developed a historical perspective to analyse the genealogy of the current disaster risk governance practices. For that, we incorporated life story questions in the interviews and reconstruct the informants' experiences and trajectories with risks in the foothills. We also collected and analysed secondary archival documentation related to urban policy and planning processes, newspapers, and previous research, to expand this historical approach.

During fieldwork, we visited a number of relevant places, such as the neighbourhoods affected by the 1993 disaster, the new settlement for relocated victims (the Santa Teresa village), some risk management infrastructure, and the new real estate development projects. We conducted participant observation in community meetings related to risk management. Access to these initiatives was granted through a long-term neighbour of this area, who introduced us to a new organisation we expand on in the following sections: the Brigada de Emergencias Alto Florida (BEAF, Alto Florida Emergency Brigade). From then, following a snow-balling principle, we met many members of the BEAF that participated as key informants. We also accompanied the work of the BEAF in different activities throughout the foothills. Finally, we used spatial analysis to provide further details on the research area, following the official repository of geographical data (at IDE.cl), complementing it with our own field experience.

4. Results

We structure the results in two sub-sections: first, analysing the mode of governing risks that emerged in the aftermath of the 1993 disaster as a police order; and second, analysing the BEAF as a community-based initiative that might transform the dominant mode.

4.1. Constituting the Police: The Emergence of a Techno-Managerial Risk Governance

The current mode of risk management in the foothills is marked by three instances: a post-disaster socio-environmental conflict, the implementation of a land use policy, and the construction of mitigation infrastructure. We expand on the three here, arguing that have produced a techno-managerial governing order similar to the police.

After the 1993 debris flow, the regional government of Santiago adopted a new metropolitan plan: the 1994 PRMS (Plan Regulador Metropolitano de Santiago). This had two important planning consequences in the foothills: It defined risk-related land use norms that restricted development and extended Santiago's limit to the east by redefining this land as urban. From be-

ing sparsely urbanised and given the absence of a local master plan in this area, the extension of the city's limit entailed the potential of developing the foothills with high population densities. To contest this, a socio-environmental movement for protecting the foothills emerged against the potential real estate development. The movement was led by upper-middle-income residents of different neighbourhoods (Biskupovic & Stamm, 2016) and was supported by local and national politicians. They demanded a land regulation to secure the area's historical low density, avoiding deforestation and erosion related to land use changes. They staged many protests throughout Santiago to make visible the potential risks associated with a private-led urban growth in the foothills. In their words, they aimed to enhance "urban planning as if the people truly mattered" (Figure 2, left) and "to inhabit the foothills with respect and conscience" (Figure 2, right).

The contrasting views between local communities and real estate companies for developing the area reached national attention. Around 1996–1997, thanks to this visibility, a municipal regulatory instrument was approved to maintain the low densities of the foothills (Res. 81, Plan Seccional Seccional Oriente, which modified the Master Land Use Plan of La Florida). However, real estate companies used their resources and the National institutional framework in their favour. Then, representatives of these companies sue the municipal government in the Chilean Supreme Court and ultimately won, rendering that regulatory instrument invalid (Rojas, 1996). With this, they were able to develop their projects, which from the perspective of the local communities, represented an ending of the foothills as a rural haven (Biskupovic, 2015). Despite some raising concerns about the sustainability of the area and likely exposure to natural hazards, the mobilisation ended abruptly and the conflict discouraged. Whereas some people maintained a critical position against the course of the area, the collective participation diminished, which is consistent with wider post-dictatorial trends in civil society and State re-

lations that demobilised and rendered policymaking a technical issue (Delamaza, 2015).

Real estate companies defended their project by either neglecting the risks associated with debris flow or by referring to the State initiatives. Asked about how to avoid the formation of new alluvium, the president of the Macalto Investment company said that "the Ministry of Public Works has made a huge investment in the Macul Ravine for building terraces that stop the advancement of rocks and other materials dragged by alluviums" (P.C., 1996). From the perspective of a mobilised local inhabitant, "on paper, the [real estate companies] will be asked to [follow] many regulations but nobody will enforce them." Ultimately, four years after the 1993 debris flow, the foothills started to shift from a rural landscape towards a densified urban area comprised of high-income real estate gated communities. This entailed a very high pace of growth as shown in Figure 3, and from the population of 5,500 in the 1980s, it reached roughly 25,000 in 2017 (INE, 2017; Muñoz, 1990). The established multi-level institutions for urban planning constituted a potentially unsustainable course for the area.

Alongside this transformation, planning instruments and risk management generated two initiatives. On the one hand, the 1994 PRMS also regulated spaces exposed to risks through land-use restrictions. Therein, three risk-related norms exist: due to the Macul ravine, to flood risks, and landslide risks. Based on the impacts of the 1993 debris flow and the potential overflow of the ravines, this land use defined buffer zones where urban development was excluded or restricted to specific functions, such as recreative infrastructure or public parks (in green in Figure 3). In practice, on top of the absent participation of communities in redefining these spaces, there are uneven results between public—and private-owned areas: Whereas some private spaces developed into green parks or mitigation infrastructure along with real estate development, public institutions lacked funding to establish such green spaces. While this land use plan has allowed urban development to grow more organically

Figure 2. From left to right: The Santa Teresa Chapel (C. Gutiérrez, 1997) and a protest during the post-disaster conflict in the foothills (P. Gutiérrez, 1997).

Figure 3. Development and risk management in Santiago's Foothills (1993–2017). Source: Authors based on IDE.cl.

and protected parts of the foothills, it is smaller than recommended given the high economic pressure of developing this area (Sepúlveda, Rebolledo, & Vargas, 2006), and furthermore, it has produced further marginalisation and exclusionary effects (Fuentealba, Verrest, & Gupta, in press).

On the other hand, the State developed a risk management initiative through the Ministry of Public Works, in the form of a hydraulic engineering project to implement in different stages (Ingenieros, 1994). It is a set of public infrastructure works, whose main component consist of seven mitigation ponds (or 'terraces,' as the real estate representative mentioned) of 1,4 kilometres long and with an average width of 50 metres for decanting the material that would be dragged by another similar event (in yellow in Figure 3). The ponds require permanent cleaning maintenance and an annual monitoring program (MOP, 2006), and its public investment reaches roughly 2.5 USD Million up to 2009. Experts conclude that debris flow risks from the Macul ravine are reduced with this structural intervention, as it has worked "in minor events related to intense rainfall," although

is "yet to be tested in future major debris flow events" (Sepúlveda et al., 2006, p. 94). Nonetheless, this infrastructure has produced a general sense of unmanaging risks, as it is the kind of engineering works that might protect from disasters while generating a "false sense of safety" (Cutter et al., 2012, p. 293). Given the occurrence of the 1993 disaster, risk management has centred on the Macul ravine, putting other ravines in a secondary place, particularly the Santa Sofia de Lo Cañas, which 'activated' in 2005, flooding some low- and high-income areas alike. The foothills, according to scientific and risk assessments, remains at high risk to natural hazards (Ferrando, Sarricolea, & Pliscoff, 2014; Garrido & Sepúlveda, 2012; Sepúlveda et al., 2006; SEREMI-MINVU & INDUAMERICANA, 2014).

The outcome of this mode of managing risks is that disaster risks are invisible, which inhabitants perceive as particularly critical given the trajectory that favoured real estate development. This trend, following our urban geographical approach inspired by Rancière, constitutes a 'policing' governing order. Risk governance delineates which discourses and spatial initiatives are deemed le-

gitimate. This regime defined real estate companies and the State as the sole actors managing risks, discouraging efforts to contest it. Regardless of the reactiveness of Chilean disaster risk governance (Camus, Arenas, & Lagos, 2016; Sandoval & Voss, 2016), the outcome of the 1990s socio-environmental conflict contributed to setting the stage for entrepreneurial urban governance. The balance between environmental sustainability and private-led development leaned to the latter. Thus, as private companies disregard the presence of hazards or used strategically public infrastructure in their favour, risk management was rendered technical. This policing mode defined community mobilisations as 'noise,' external to the legitimate work of the State and private actors. While opting to develop physicalist interventions assumes consensus-based governance, in practice communities are not involved in that. This governing order distributed the sensible, delineating an uneven regime of *who* manage risks and vulnerabilities. As any police order nonetheless, it can be potentially transformed, so now we turn to this.

4.2. A Demand for Inclusion in the In-Between Spaces of Vulnerability

Practices of collective contestation against the risk management order, despite some flooding occurrences (such as in 2005), remained infrequent. Some inhabitants criticised the development trend, but a silence about disaster risks prevailed for years. One crucial exception is the work of the Network for the Protection of the Foothills (the Network, hereafter), which emerged in 2006 and consisted of community leaders and citizens organised to defend this area against real estate development. Some of the members of the Network participated in the 1990s mobilisations, and along with a younger generation of activists, raised a voice towards conservation in this area, particularly around the El Panul forest (Biskupovic, 2015). The impacts of this network are important and have worked on the background to mobilise people to preserve their environment. Alongside this effort, a new initiative emerged that is explicitly concerned about risk management. That is why in this subsection we expand more on the recent and practical experience with risks of the BEAF. As we show below, there are particularities of this initiative that might disrupt the police and thus recover a politics of inclusion in the foothills.

The BEAF started in 2013, based on a double concern from local inhabitants about prevalent risk management. First, given the marginal position of the foothills within the *comuna*, its neighbourhoods are very distant to main emergency services, which is critical for landslides and floods, as well as other hazards excluded in local planning such as wildfires and seismic risks. And second, given the increased hazards brought by real estate development and increased awareness of possible disasters, they realised that risk-prevention measures in the area were insufficient: physical interventions such as the ponds are

important but not enough. From this, some inhabitants founded the brigade as a way to understand the hazards and develop emergency preparedness measures and enhance awareness. Given the presence of forests in the foothills (e.g., Panul), the BEAF focused initially on wildfires but has expanded to other hazards.

The BEAF has a peculiar institutional basis. It is a local emergency organisation, but one that emerged at the crossroad of other institutions, such as the firemen or the National Forestry Corporation (CONAF). As the captain of the BEAF defines it:

> We are not firemen, we are not CONAF, we are not the police, we are not civil defence, we are not Red Cross. In a way, we opened a door that never existed….We are creating a new institution in Chile.

The BEAF lacks permanent resources and functions primarily with voluntaries, the majority being local residents. Being voluntary entails that its members come from different backgrounds and expertise. They participate in official training programmes from CONAF or the Red Cross, in topics such as first aid, or forestry and emergency management. Although lacking resources, the BEAF has acquired better equipment and improved its infrastructure. Figure 4 describes the space in which they intervene in La Florida, which is over 15 square kilometres. We also show the BEAF's headquarter, located in a community centre; and the Panul forest location. As the captain of the BEAF says: "It is an enormous area, with an important hazard risks associated," which requires an important preventive work. Thus, their strategy was approaching local neighbourhood associations, to make them conscious of their environment.

They have developed ties with myriad institutions and organisations. This includes State actors, although the captain remembers that initially they "closed many doors to the brigade because there was a strong opposition, particularly from the firemen companies, who saw us as a competition." On the contrary, a strong positive relationship exists with the local community. As a former president of a neighbourhood association remembers, "when [the BEAF] was forming…but did not have a place to function, I gave them permission" for settling in the neighbourhood association's centre. Depending on donations, the BEAF regularly organises funding campaigns with the community to collect resources. They have constructed a horizontal and inclusive local network, developing educational initiatives and prevention campaigns throughout the foothills. For example, in the midst of poorly organised formal networks with the State, a resident of the Santa Teresa Village states that:

> The BEAF works with all the hazards, so they can teach us about all the risks, an alluvium, a flooding….We attended the inauguration of the new watchtower of the BEAF and it is wonderful, an amazing idea, and managed by our own neighbours.

Figure 4. Map with BEAF-related places in the foothills of La Florida. Source: Authors based on interviews and IDE.cl.

There, she refers to a new project that emerged from the BEAF, as given the lack of risk-awareness initiatives in the foothills, they designed and constructed a watch-tower in a higher zone of The Andes (Figure 5). Funded mainly through local donations and implemented together with CONAF who provided the lookout workers, the watchtower is five-metres high and has a visibility of over 40 kilometres and aims to help with early hazard warning.

In line with risk assessments, the BEAF voluntaries recognise the long-term vulnerabilities of the foothills. This concentrates especially in the settlements closer to the Macul Ravine (many of which had already suffered in 1993) and those in the urban-forestry interface of higher areas, urbanised by real estate companies over the last two decades. They know that one of the main problems with this private-led development is the complexity of evacuating thousands of people: As the captain warns, "in the event of an emergency, more people will die evacuating than from the catastrophe." Awaiting such a natural hazard event, the BEAF has successfully worked as a first-responder in many emergencies. In these, the close link with local communities is critical. For example, as neighbours called the BEAF directly in the case of wildfires in El Panul, they managed to arrive within four min-

utes, so while affected areas used to be many hectares in size, the captain reports that "now they are less than half a hectare because of our quick first intervention." Emerging from the community and working directly with them has allowed a very close engagement with the diverse inhabitants of the foothills. A critical characteristic of this success is their being a local initiative and exposed to the same risks as the population they serve. As a BEAF volunteer puts it: "With our work in emergencies you get closer to people, you know them in different circumstances….It has helped with social integration, to recover community life, to live closer, not in isolation."

Since its inception, the BEAF is becoming an integral part of risk management in the foothills. In itself, the BEAF is not an initiative intending to advance an alternative or counterhegemonic societal change. Arising from an institutional vacuum left from the prevalent mode of risk management, it maintains a close relationship with the police by interacting with formal institutions. Despite this, through the BEAF's working with neighbourhood associations and other community-based organisations such as 'the Network,' an alternative mode of risk management is emerging. Three features of the BEAF are critical for this: its egalitarian logic, its emergence 'at the margins,' and its formation of subjectivities. These three,

Figure 5. From left to right: The BEAF watchtower and its view of Santiago. Source: Authors in January 2018.

which are closely connected to our Rancièrean frame, can potentially recover the political through a long-term work of risk management in the urban margins. We discuss this in the next section, as central characters of the interaction of both risk management modes.

5. Discussion

The results presented depict a process of exclusionary urban development, in line with a techno-managerial mode of governing disaster risks. On top of the known exposure to floods and landslides, a significant proportion of the local residents are vulnerable. This is critical in a setting that for decades lacked preparedness and emergency awareness initiatives. In this sense, the technologies implemented for governing risks are different to those described by Zeiderman (2012): While he expands on the emergence of planning practices and techniques that construct an active relation between the State and citizens, in our case this is reduced to advance physicalist interventions and regulation of development. Here, risk management is carried out solely by the implementation of land use and the construction of mitigation infrastructure—while providing a laissez-faire developmental logic for real estate companies.

Transforming such mode of policing risks, as any regime (re)producing injustices, is at the core of a critical urban lens. In our view, this required to identify ways

to politicise governance and thus recover the politics in the city (Davidson & Iveson, 2015). To contest it, a disruptive moment must be found, which echoing Dikeç (2017), exist within the same logics of the police. Along with this, we expanded on the emergence of the BEAF as a marked step forward in terms of risk prevention and education. Their practices and discourse are enhancing an alternative way of risk management. A crucial question is how the presence of the BEAF, the increased community participation, and discussion of risk, might disrupt the dominant mode of risk management. In this sense, if we follow the notion that genuine political moments are rare and infrequent, and aimed at perturbing the order of things, it is unlikely to address the foundation of the BEAF as a political moment. The foothills are still ruled by processes which cause environmental degradation, leave neighbourhoods at risk, and which do not emancipate communities from long-standing exclusionary processes. Despite this, through the interaction of the police and the BEAF, an experiment towards more sustainable and resilient living in the foothills might be emerging. This interplay is embedded in the BEAF's features mentioned earlier: its egalitarian logic, its emergence 'at the margins,' and its formation of subjectivities.

First, the BEAF emerged with an egalitarian logic: being equal with the community of the foothills is a given throughout its work. The BEAF learnt from past experiences such as the 1993 disaster, the 90s envi-

ronmental mobilisation, and the recent floods. Unlike the dominant mode, it works in an inclusive and integrative manner by principle, educating people and enhancing their knowledge of local risks. In that sense, it brings forth and enacts a common understanding of hazard vulnerability through an inclusive and egalitarian discourse. Second, emerging at the margins is important in a double meaning: located at the geographical margins of Santiago, and in an institutional margin given the absence of State-sanctioned organisations in the area. This makes the foothills a breeding ground for organising urban risk initiatives that contest the dominant paradigm. Local risk management efforts such as the BEAF extend beyond formal and informal distinctions, emerging at the crossroads of institutional recognition. The foothills are thus an example of Rancière's 'in-between spaces' where politics can be staged (see also Biskupovic, 2015). Finally, the engagement of such initiatives brings new subjectivities. Through the BEAF's work, unmanaged risks are no longer invisible. On the contrary, more people realise the fragility of the environment in which they live and the role of the current trend of rampant urbanisation in that. From this, the inhabitants of the foothills enhance a more autonomous way of managing risk, against the hierarchical and technocratic form of risk governance. By recognising their vulnerabilities and discussing their risks, the BEAF is contributing to dissent regarding State institutions and private developers.

Ultimately, the present conditions of risks show the co-existence of different modes of governing risk, as described in other urban domains by Choplin (2016). The interplay between these modes is still evolving and it is difficult to predict their course. The BEAF and the ongoing contestation of the Network could be demobilised as occurred to the 1990s movement, or furthermore, it could be co-opted by wider forms of governance (Uitermark & Nicholls, 2014). Equally, the extent to which these developments are framed as resistance and resilience (Boano, 2017), or expanded as a further feature of neoliberal governance as self-responsabilisation (Nygren, 2018), is yet to be seen. We argue that through the interaction of these modes, there is potential to transform the dominant mode. An alternative, egalitarian mode that is explicitly intervening on the 'distribution of the sensible' is emerging, but it is not there yet. We will see how this marginal community, demanding for decades to live in a sustainable environment, can imagine and unlock a more just and inclusive urbanisation.

6. Conclusion

Current urban challenges highlight the need for new policies and governing arrangements. As profoundly political entities, cities are tensioned by power relations and these new policies are no exception. Beyond the truism that everything is political, critical urban studies are increasingly showing the dynamics of de- and re-politicization for such urban arrangements. Our purpose

in this article has been to understand such dynamics for different modes of risk management, reflecting on their results regarding justice and inclusion. To do so, we followed the work of Rancière and showed how the State's role in managing risk can render disaster risk as something technical and invisible. In the interstices of this policing order, local communities organise emergent initiatives that are disrupting the visible and sayable. These modes are still evolving and coexisting on the ground, but we have shown initial efforts which potentially disrupt the trend of risk creation, and which hence advance more inclusive cities.

This article aimed to know under what conditions the interplay of these modes can move towards this more inclusive trend and what the role of politics is in that process. Our analysis shows that in order to advance in a more inclusive direction, bottom-up modes of risk governance must follow egalitarian principles, emerging through in-between spaces, and enact initiatives of subject formation. These features, which we described for the BEAF, are central in Jacques Rancière's view of politics. Nonetheless, we also described that the BEAF is not a counter-hegemonic initiative in the sense of being explicitly a disruptive endeavour aiming to transform society. The BEAF's foundation is, in Rancière's logic, not a 'properly political' moment, as it does not aim for a radical disruption of the police.

While it is not an exceptional politics, the emergence of the BEAF and associated risk management have the potential to shift the dominant mode, although in a different way. We see it less as a disruptive moment and more as an incremental one. The BEAF occupies a position balancing the police order and the more bottom-up potential for interrupting that governance. In this sense, the inhabitants of the foothills are experiencing an ongoing recovery of the political, but their context is still widely governed by the police. This view of politics contrasts to the position of Jacques Rancière and it is closer to Davidson and Iveson (2015), and potentially to Boano's (2017). We thus argue that incremental transformations in the domain of risk management can still contribute to enhance a renewed view of politics.

Finally, our analysis shows the theoretical contributions that Jacques Rancière can bring to address ongoing urban challenges, particularly to governing risks and inclusive cities. Although many planning initiatives have good intentions, they can produce exclusionary results that should be better understood and further resisted. We recognise that an inclusive governance process of disaster risk is complex and needs technical advances through infrastructure and land-uses. However, the tensions of these with inclusion and sustainability need socially-embedded and egalitarian forms of risk management, such as the one we described. Based on Rancière, we offered a way to understand the interplay of divergent sets of urban risk initiatives, while expanding a more radical politics therein. This requires urban planning and risk management to move beyond consensus-based gov-

ernance and focus instead on the role of dissent and disruptive politics.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Pathways to the 'Good Life': Co-Producing Prosperity Research in Informal Settlements in Tanzania

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Abstract

Residents of informal settlements in urban centres in Africa are known to suffer disproportionate burdens of environmental and socio-economic inequalities and are often excluded from macro-level visions and policies that seek to make cities safer and prosperous (Birkmann, 2007; da Silva & Braulio, 2014; Dodman et al., 2013). This tension undermines the validity of orthodox, 'expert-led' visions, policies and measures of prosperity that are distant from the lived-experience of marginalised urban residents. Based on new empirical work with communities in three informal settlements in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, this article argues that novel methodological and theoretical approaches to co-producing context-specific policy-relevant knowledge about pathways to prosperity (translated by the communities as *maisha bora*, 'the good life') creates inclusive spaces for both community participation in processes of urban knowledge production and critical social enquiry that can lead to grounded theory building. By co-producing both an agreed and relevant methodological approach for the study, and its subsequent documentation and analysis, this work contributes valuable empirical insights about the capacities and capabilities of local communities to shape and influence urban policy-making and in this way speaks to calls for a global urbanism (Ong, 2011; Robinson, 2016) that brings diverse voices and geographies to urban theory to better account for the diversity of urban experiences and processes found in twenty-first century cities.

Issue

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1. Introduction

The United Nations' *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,* which launched the 17 global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, opens with the statement: "This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity" (United Nations, 2015, p. 1). It seeks to eradicate poverty and hunger, reduce inequalities and create the conditions to "ensure that all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives and that economic, social and technological progress occurs in harmony with nature" (United Nations, 2015, p. 2).

This vision of human and non-human flourishing represents a significant shift from the definition of prosperity as material wealth, fuelled by economic growth, which dominated global policy throughout the 20th century (Moore & Woodcraft, 2019). It signals potential for the emergence in urban policy and governance of a more expansive, equitable and inclusive understanding of prosperity, which acknowledges that the range of conditions,

rights and freedoms, and capacities necessary for people everywhere to live a 'fulfilling life' extend far beyond sustainable economies, inclusive growth and decent work.

In this article, we argue that at the beginning of the 'decade of delivery' (2020–2030) on the SDGs, policy-relevant knowledge for transformative action on prosperity is lacking. Prosperity is under-studied and under-theorised relative to concepts like poverty, risk, resilience, quality of life and wellbeing in urban and social theory. Much of the knowledge currently driving policy and action on prosperity, in particular in the Global South, is based on concepts and measures developed by the World Bank to operationalise its mission goals of poverty reduction and shared prosperity. The Bank's mission agenda seeks to address the issue of income inequality in relation to inclusive growth (Basu, 2013), hence shared prosperity is narrowly conceptualised as "the growth in the income or consumption of the bottom 40% of the population in a country" (World Bank, 2016, p. 1). The Bank's approach has attracted widespread criticism for focusing narrowly on income inequality and failing to reflect the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, particularly at the subnational level (Alkire & Santos, 2013; Shifa & Leibbrandt, 2017) and without a distinction between rural and urban contexts (Khan, Lucci, & Bhatkal, 2016; Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2014).

Academic literature on prosperity is also limited in scope (Woodcraft & Moore, in press). The disciplinary dominance of economics and psychology in the burgeoning field of wellbeing and happiness studies drives a narrow conceptualisation of prosperity as 'wealth plus wellbeing' (Moore & Woodcraft, 2019). Such approaches measure the levels of wellbeing generated by a nation's economic productivity, employment and household income (Diener, 1984; Diener & Suh, 1997; Easterlin, 1974), adopting a universal definition of wellbeing as a state of individual happiness, life satisfaction, absence of anxiety and feeling that life is worthwhile (Tay & Diener, 2011). In this context, cross-cultural studies addressing the measurement equivalence of wellbeing, happiness and life satisfaction in different contexts have proliferated (Delle Fave et al., 2016; Diener, Ng, Harter, & Arora, 2010; Disabato, Goodman, Kashdan, Short, & Jarden, 2016; Fadijia, Meiring, & Wissing, 2019; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), prompting a critique of efforts to translate 'global' measures to developing country contexts rather than paying attention to differences in the meaning, value and relevance of these concepts in the Global South (Camfield, 2012; Fadijia et al., 2019; Phillips & Wong, 2016; White, 2009, 2015).

While participatory research examining poverty as a lived and multi-dimensional experience is well-established (Brock & McGee, 2002; Robb, 1998), similar approaches to building context-specific multi-dimensional models of wellbeing and quality of life are less common (Camfield, 2012; Fadijia et al., 2019), and studies examining 'lay' meanings of prosperity in the Global South are notably absent from quality of life and wellbeing literature. As a consequence, prosperity is often presented in development literatures and policies in a binary relation to poverty: 'prosperity' being the outcome of poverty reduction efforts that focus on wealth, assets and enhanced livelihoods (Msambichaka, Mduma, Selejio, & Mashindano, 2016; World Bank, 2016). This normative framing limits prosperity to material concerns, overlooking research acknowledging that categorising people as 'poor' or 'living in poverty' can misrepresent their lived experience, which is not always one of lack, deficit or deprivation in other domains of life (Sen, 1999). Research examining definitions of wealth and forms of assets ownership in rural Tanzania identifies the limitations of commonly used asset indices to meaningfully measure prosperity, noting a range of issues from collective rather than individual asset ownership and asset use rather than asset ownership, as obstacles to meaningful and accurate measurements (Brockington, Howland, Loiske, Mnzava, & Noe, 2018; Howland, Noe, & Brockington, 2019). This points to the importance of theorising, conceptualising and measuring prosperity as both a multi-dimensional and situated experience, which is shaped by cultural meanings and values, individual aspirations and systemic and structural factors.

The lives and futures of individuals and communities, in particular in cities in the Global South, will depend on the forms of evidence and knowledge that drive policy and action on the SDGs in the next decade. Delivering shared prosperity, re-imagined on the terms of Agenda 2030 as fulfilling and prosperous lives for people everywhere within planetary constraints, will be a highly complex and politicised process requiring new forms of dialogue within and between societies about whose visions of prosperity are put into action and the constraints and trade-offs to be negotiated. A critical question at this pivotal moment then is: In whose hands should this process of knowledge production lie?

We argue that transformative action for shared prosperity requires new, more democratic and accountable forms of knowledge that can bridge the gap between expert-led theories and concepts and diverse, culturally-specific meanings, values and prosperity practices. Measurement frameworks must be developed from knowledge and understanding about prosperity as a lived experience in ways that allow for action on the ground and meaningfully include marginalised communities in the design and delivery of policies, thereby making them co-produced and relevant (Durose, Beebeejaun, Rees, Richardson, & Richardson, 2012). This is particularly relevant in urban centres in Africa, where the urban poor suffer disproportionate burdens of environmental and socio-economic inequalities and are often excluded from macro-level visions and policies that seek to make cities safer and prosperous (Birkmann, 2007; da Silva & Braulio, 2014; Dodman et al., 2013).

In this article, we describe an innovative process of knowledge co-production with communities in three informal settlements in Dar es Salaam, which has gen-

erated a new context-specific framework for conceptualising prosperity (*maisha bora*) based on lived experience. Community co-production methods are well-established in fields such as international development, humanitarian and resilience-building research and processes (Collodi, Di Vicenz, Murphy, & Visman, 2017; Galuszka, 2019; Osuteye et al., 2019). However, having settlement dwellers lead a process of knowledge production for action on prosperity is unusual and opens up new directions for the methodological application of co-production. Co-production is understood in this article as a deep engagement with different perspectives to create knowledge that can support the development and implementation of progressive policies and planning; resting on an epistemology of knowledge that challenges unitary visions and instead embraces knowledge production borne of the confrontation and juxtaposition of multiple ways of living, working and seeing the city (Osuteye et al., 2019). Co-production, therefore, marks a point of departure from conventional expert-led, top-down and centralised approaches, based on an appreciation of citizens' views, knowledges, experiences, preferences and needs, with communities then contributing to improved outcomes and achievable solutions to urban challenges (Galuszka, 2019; Ostrom, 1996). It is particularly relevant in the Global South as a means of overcoming institutional bureaucracies and regulatory norms that are exclusionary and otherwise counterproductive for the welfare of the urban poor or informal settlements (Galuszka, 2019; Watson, 2014). The relevance and utility of co-produced knowledge in urban processes goes beyond the provision of requisite services in contexts where communities were hitherto detached from development, to a more central recognition of the value of community knowledge in conceiving, shaping and actively contributing to the urban realities they aspire to. Co-production of visions of shared prosperity constitute a space of inclusion where marginalised urban communities have a central role in envisaging alternatives and more just urban futures.

2. Context and Case Study Sites

Dar es Salaam as the main commercial and cosmopolitan hub of Tanzania is one Africa's fastest growing urban centres, driven by an influx of residents from rural and suburban regions. It has an estimated population of over 5.5 million (up from 4 million in 2012 census) and an average growth rate of 5.8 percent. It is expected to expand by more than 85% through the next decade and exceed the 10 million mega-city status by mid-2030s (African Development Bank, 2014; Sturgis, 2015; see Figure 1).

Although urban growth in Dar es Salaam provides some economic opportunities for residents, the rapid population growth has outstretched the supply of adequate and affordable housing and other requisite services. As a result, about 70% of the population lives in informal or unplanned settlements (see Figures 2 and 3) leading to increasing socio-economic and spatial inequalities (Abebe, 2011; Kombe & Kreibich, 2006; URT, 2000), and the rate of growth of the informal settlements is two times the average urban growth rate in the City (Kombe, Ndezi, & Hofmann, 2015).

Widespread informality and unplanned settlements are a manifestation of poverty and social exclusion that occurs in many African cities, as they house the urban poor, recent migrants and other marginalised groups who are unable to afford improved land and rental housing in the city (UN-HABITAT, 2003). This is coupled with the growing demand for proximal housing in areas that support livelihood opportunities such as small-scale industries and markets near the central business districts, major transport nodes and harbour. Consequently, many residents live in overcrowded conditions in hazardous locations, such as floodplains, riverbanks and wastelands, which further expose them to risks such as flooding, disease outbreaks further accentuating poverty and inequalities (Abebe, 2011). Besides the obvious housing and environmental challenges that residents of informal settlements face, and the need to fill infrastructural deficits, there remains a more compelling imperative for planners and urban managers to understand the role of

Figure 1. Population growth trend for Dar es Salaam city (1891–2052). Source: Sturgis (2015).

Figure 2. Projected informal settlement expansion in Dar es Salaam (2002—2052). Source: Abebe (2011).


Figure 3. Projected densification of informal settlements in Dar es Salaam (1992–2052). Source: Abebe (2011).

socio-economic factors and other forces that underpin organic urban growth (Kombe, 2005), including how the wellbeing and prosperity of residents can be understood and improved.

This study was conducted in three informal settlements in Dar es Salaam selected from three different Municipal areas: Mji Mpya, Bonde La Mpunga and Keko Machungwa. Administratively, the city is divided into five municipalities, which are subsequently divided into Wards, Sub-Wards (called 'Mtaa') and Ten Cell Units. The leadership of these devolved local government structures are appointed by the central government with the exception of the Sub-Ward leaders who are elected by residents. The size of Sub-Wards varies in area and population and may cover one or more informal settlements. For this study, each of the three settlements represent separate Mtaas, within their respective Wards and Municipalities. The selected Mtaas were further zoned for ease of access and navigation to ensure further spatial spread and representation in the sampling of respondents and methods employed (see Figure 4). The three selected informal settlements are representative of the nature and distribution of informality in Dar es Salaam which are typically described as either 'booming' or 'saturated,' mainly as a reflection of housing vulnerability and density (Abebe, 2011). The settlements are said to be booming when despite the formation of a critical mass of residents, they continue to attract new residents (including middle-income groups) and have less that 80% of land area used for construction. The saturated settlements on the other hand would have been formed ear-

lier in the city's growth, and typically have more than 80% of land area used for construction. The saturated settlements have also been referred to as homogenous or uniformly unplanned and low-income settlements, as compared to the booming settlements that are mixed (Osuteye et al., 2020). Both Mji Mpya (Figure 5) and Keko Machungwa are saturated settlements closer to the central business district and major highways, and the third Bonde la Mpunga is typical of a booming settlement of mixed low income and middle-income housing clusters, built on reclaimed former rice fields in the periphery of the city.

The research was conducted in partnership with local NGO the Centre for Community Initiatives (CCI), which works with and supports the federated collectives of urban poor residents, under the Slum/Shack Dwellers International umbrella. CCI, through its work on advocating pro-poor policy and practice in informal settlements in Dar es Salaam, has built strong relationships with many communities since its establishment in 2004. The sampling of the settlements draws heavily on this existing relationship between the NGO, the federated groups and the local government leadership in all the three settlements.

3. Prosperity Index Methodology: Understanding and Measuring Prosperity in Context

This section describes the process of using the Prosperity Index (PI) methodology in Dar es Salaam, a process led by CCI, working with a team of community researchers

Figure 4. Map of Dar es Salaam, showing selected study sites. Source: Authors.

Figure 5. Map of the zonation of Mji Mpya sub-ward: one of three study sites. Based on the unpublished CCI and AXA Project output "Metrics for Policy Action in Urban Areas: Characterising Risks Facing Low-Income Groups" of 2018.

from three settlements and supported by academic researchers from the Institute for Global Prosperity (IGP) and the Development Planning Unit at University College London, as part of the "Knowledge in Action for Urban Equality" (KNOW) Project, funded by the Global Challenges Research Fund.

3.1. Principles of the Prosperity Index Methodology

The PI is a mixed-methods community co-production process, led by residents working in partnership with academic researchers and NGOs, to address the lack of context-specific policy-relevant knowledge about prosperity and to challenge normative definitions and frameworks that privilege income growth over a broader understanding of what people need to live fulfilling lives (Moore & Woodcraft, 2019). The goal of the PI process is to co-produce a locally—and culturally—specific conceptual model of prosperity and prosperous lives, from which context-specific measures of prosperity can be de-

veloped. And using new household survey data, local Prosperity Indices can be constructed.

Critically, the PI methodology recognises that knowledge innovation in itself is not sufficient to guarantee action or long-term changes in practice. In this regard, it recognises the limits of the actionable nature of co-produced knowledge, and equally the critical and distinct process of "knowledge integration" (Antonacopoulou, 2009), which must be situated within decision-making and governance frameworks. Consequently, the PI seeks to bridge this divide and offer insights to "understanding of the complex interrelationship between knowing what (cognitive/theoretical knowledge), knowing how (skills/technical knowledge), knowing to what end (moral choices) and doing (action/practice)" (Davoudi, 2015). While the process is citizen and community-led, a wider group of stakeholders are involved from the outset to build a coalition of actors with different capacities to respond to the knowledge that is generated (Woodcraft & Anderson, 2019).

The PI methodology is based on the following assumptions: (1) Co-producing knowledge about the lived experience of prosperity with citizens and communities—examining aspirations, practices, situated conditions and the effects of policy—generates more accurate, relevant and actionable knowledge about context-specific challenges and pathways to prosperity; (2) working collaboratively through multi-actor, multi-sector partnerships will create more transparent, democratic and inclusive spaces of knowledge production and critical social enquiry that can lead to grounded theory building; and (3) working through these multiple partnerships builds the capacity of communities and government, development and public actors, increasing the likelihood that new concepts, forms of evidence and ways of working are adopted. The PI methodology has been developed and tested by IGP, in partnership with citizen scientists and NGOs in cities in Lebanon, Nairobi and rural centres in Kenya, and five neighbourhoods in east London, UK.

The PI has been deliberately designed as a process for understanding prosperity as a lived reality in context rather than as a fixed research methodology. It is based on three principles that determine the essential purpose and nature of each step in the process yet leave considerable scope for local adaptation and context-specific action (see Table 1).

3.2. Applying the Prosperity Index

Methodology in Dar es Salaam The process began with a five-day capacity-building workshop (July 2019) to introduce the research team to the PI process. A series of participatory exercises and group discussions were used to guide the research team through a reflective process including: dialogues about the lived experiences of the group; personal aspirations for a prosperous life; societal and cultural expectations of prosperity; and a discussion about the factors that shape opportunities and capacities for settlement dwellers to live well.

The design process began with group discussions about the concept of 'prosperous and fulfilling lives'—the terminology used in the SDGs—to identify an equivalent conceptual and linguistic translation, in this case to the Swahili *maisha bora*, 'the good life.' A series of collective exercises then followed—building on the PI core research questions to develop a discussion guide: design a programme of focus groups and one-to-one interviews with settlement dwellers; develop participatory exercises for use in the focus groups; and map actors from municipal and city government, public services, other NGOs, local businesses, development agencies and academic researchers to identify potential research participants and potential collaborators for longer-term action.

The research team co-designed a qualitative data collection programme to capture the lived realities of settlement dwellers and to enable people to describe *maisha bora* in their own terms and based on individual experiences. Consequently, focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews explored four broad questions: What does *maisha bora* mean to you? What are the most important things to live a good life in this community? Are there particular things here that allow people to live a good life or prevent it? What barriers are preventing you and your family from living a good life? It was important for the research team to examine both the meaning of *maisha bora* and the practical ways in which people negotiate between cultural expectations and individual aspirations of a good life and the multiple everyday and systemic factors that shape their opportunities.

Drawing on personal experiences of settlement life, the research team categorised different household types to identify a diversity of experiences such as levels of livelihood security and income, forms of vulnerability, visibility and capacities for community participation, and how these conditions are shaped by gender, age, ethnic-

Table 1. Prosperity Index principles.

Principle	Description
1: Citizen and community-led partnerships for knowledge co-production and action	The process is co-initiated by residents working in partnership with NGOs and other local actors to co-produce knowledge for action on prosperity in ways that are inclusive, transparent and locally accountable.
2: Knowledge based on an in-depth understanding of the lived experience of communities	Underpinned by in-depth qualitative investigation of culturally-specific specific meanings, values and practices of prosperity, and the intersections between individual and cultural aspirations for a prosperous life, individual practices in pursuit of a prosperous life and material, economic and political conditions that shape opportunities and obstacles to prosper (Moore & Woodcraft, 2019).
3: Action, policy and metrics built on local visions for prosperous and fulfilling lives	Co-produced knowledge places local experience and priorities at the centre of action—developing policies, programmes, interventions and metrics—recognising this may challenge normative concepts and definitions of prosperity.

ity, disability, housing tenure and other socio-economic variables. There was extensive dialogue about the importance of capturing a wide range of perspectives, the hidden voices and experiences in the settlement, and the ethics of researching prosperity with individuals who, for the most part, are living in poverty and with exposure to various shocks and risks. This led to a nuanced consideration of different experiences and identities, and a process that generated an intersectional framework for the recruitment of research participants taking account of gender, age, disability, marital status, and housing tenure and income-generating activities as proxies for class differences.

Two pilot focus groups were convened to test the research questions before data collection began in one settlement. The project was then expanded to a further two informal settlements, involving the recruitment and training of additional research team members—a process that was managed by the initial community research team. Between July and October 2019, a series of semi-structured interviews (10) and focus groups (N = 179) were undertaken by community research teams in all three informal settlements, and a further six interviews carried out with municipal government officers, city policymakers, public agencies and academics.

In November 2019, a second five-day workshop focusing on capacity-building to collectively analyse and interpret data from the qualitative research phase was held in Dar es Salaam. The first three days focused on introducing the research teams to an open-coding method, building a coding framework based on the words and phrases used by research participants, and collectively coding data. The final two days of the workshop were spent discussing and interpreting the findings, organising coded data into thematic clusters, and collectively developing a multi-dimensional conceptual model to represent the factors and conditions that constitute a good life for settlement dwellers (see Figure 6). The exercises and extensive dialogue ensured the concepts and terminology used to represent thematic findings accurately expressed lived experience. The research team then proposed different ways to symbolise connectedness, reflecting the relationships between different components of a good life, before collectively agreeing on a chain (*mnyororo*) as an appropriate visualisation of the *maisha bora* model.

The next step in the co-production process is for the research teams to share the qualitative research findings, initial interpretations and conceptual *maisha bora* model. A public meeting will be held in each settle-


Figure 6. *Maisha bora* model Dar es Salaam. Based on the unpublished CCI and IGP KNOW Project output of 2019.

ment for research participants, residents and community leaders to provide feedback on the conceptual model. Following public dialogues, the feedback will be analysed and any necessary refinements made to the conceptual model, before it is translated into a set of indicators to enable larger-scale quantitative analysis, comparing how opportunities to prosper vary in different settlements and by gender, housing tenure, economic circumstances and other variables. Household survey data will be collected in 2021 as the basis for developing a PI to track changes to prosperity in Dar es Salaam's informal settlements over the coming years.

## 4. What Is *Maisha Bora* (the Good Life) for Informal Settlement Dwellers in Dar es Salaam?

How does our understanding of prosperity and prosperous lives change when the starting point for inquiry shifts from 'experts' to the lived realities of communities? What does this kind of knowledge reveal about how policies and action to enhance prosperity should evolve? In this section we address these questions: First, we examine what *maisha bora,* a prosperous life, means from the perspectives of settlement dwellers. We look at the intersecting factors that residents say enable or obstruct pathways to prosperity and comment on peoples' accounts of inequalities within settlements, which create

distinct, context-specific challenges, possibilities and experiences. Second, we reflect on what a lived experience lens can bring to our understanding of prosperity and the implications for policy.

4.1. Prosperity as an Idea and Practice in Everyday Life

Taking lived experience as the starting point, community researchers discussed the meanings and values that settlement dwellers associated with *maisha bora*, and the everyday challenges, practices and choices individuals make in pursuit of their own vision of prosperous and fulfilling lives.

The diversity of factors included in the *maisha bora* model (Figure 6) make it clear that in everyday life the conditions shaping prosperity encompass material, social, environmental, economic and political spheres and operate at different scales from individual to household to community, city and state. Figure 7 shows the 14 themes discussed most frequently across all three settlements in response to questions about the meaning of *maisha bora* and the most important things required to live a good life. Themes fall into two groups: seven priority themes that receive between 100 and 280 references in the research, and a further six themes that receive between 20 and 40 references. Discussing each theme in detail is outside the scope of this article. Instead, we sum-

What supports *maisha bora*, a good life, for residents in informal settlement in Dar es Salaam?
Most common themes discussed in qualitative research by reference count

Figure 7. Most common themes in qualitative research in three informal settlements in Dar es Salaam (July–October 2019). Based on the unpublished CCI and IGP KNOW Project output of 2019.

marise the seven priority themes and the significance settlement residents attached to these factors as determinants of a good life.

The first priority is secure livelihoods, which research participants described as reliable income-generating activity from employment or entrepreneurship that enables them to meet their basic needs (including adequate and affordable shelter, food and nutrition three times a day, safe water and affordable energy). Key social services (childcare, healthcare, education and transport) were identified as critical aspects of livelihood security, in terms of providing essential infrastructure and enabling conditions to generate income and care for household members. This highlights an important consideration in relation to policy on shared prosperity: Although academic literature recognises that individuals draw on a range of assets and capacities to make a living (including access to land, food production, social networks and services, in addition to income-generating activities; Chambers & Conway, 1992), sustainable livelihoods are more narrowly defined in Tanzania's policy frameworks as income growth, poverty reduction and enterprise in relation to green growth (UNDP, n.d.). Settlement dwellers' accounts demonstrate the tightly interwoven nature of livelihood security and settlement conditions for example, reliable income-generating activity is essential in urban settlements to obtain nutritious food, rent or upgrade housing, and afford transport costs to access markets, work and essential services. Secure income enables some households to privately access clean water and energy.

Discussions about health and good settlement environments also focused on interactions between individual aspirations for good physical and mental health, individual circumstances such as hunger, chronic health conditions and wellbeing, and wider conditions in the settlement (clean air, safe water, lack of pests, proximity to polluting industries), and in the city more broadly that can support good health including both provision of hospitals, health centres, maternal and child health services, and capacities to access those services (health insurance, able to pay fees, transport connections and affordability to reach services, which were particularly challenging for elderly and disabled residents). Similarly, access to good quality and free childcare and basic education are described as important foundational conditions for a good life, in terms of personal development and attaining secure employment or income-generating activities. Educational provision is a common measure of human development and prosperity, however, participants identified the importance of other forms of education for youth and adults specifically relating to capacity-building for business and enterprise, and to enhance capacities to access micro-credit, loans and capital for investments, and household and business financial management to reduce problems associated with debt.

Housing and secure shelter are acknowledged as a basic need and foundational for a good life. However,

discussions about aspirations for, and pathways toward, *maisha bora* recognise the multiple significances and possibilities afforded by secure land and housing rights, whether ownership or tenancy, in the present and future. Examples included control over housing upgrading and expansion, opportunities for small scale enterprise and industries that additional space allows, including food production and animal rearing which both offer scope to generate additional revenue.

Questions of individual agency, space for community action and enterprise, power and local leadership ran throughout the discussions, connecting themes around livelihood security and household living conditions to wider issues of community empowerment, enterprise and settlement improvement. This extract from a group discussion between Mji Mpya residents reflects a widely-shared sentiment that critical services like waste management should be "grasped by the community, not contractors'':

> We can be trusted by the municipality to form a group and facilities to remove solid wastes. It will create employment opportunities for unemployed people. [Put] in another way…we can solve community problems like waste management. (Woman, 45 years old, tenant and small business person, living in Mji Mpya for 20 years)

4.2. Beyond the Poverty:Prosperity Binary

It is evident, even from this brief discussion of research findings, that opportunities to prosper and live well are dependent on a wide range of conditions, networks, practices and infrastructures that extend beyond conventional poverty reduction measures such as increasing incomes and assets. Access to collective goods and services such as settlement sanitation and water, free childcare and healthcare are critical to living well: enhancing individuals' capacities for economic activity and reducing the risks of financial shocks related, for example, to ill-health. Policy based on a narrow formulation of shared prosperity as income growth for the poorest households obscures the complex inter-dependencies between individual capacities, settlement and wider city infrastructures, and economic and political conditions in enabling people to live prosperous and fulfilling lives. Examining prosperity through the lens of lived experience begins to illuminate how the conditions that shape *maisha bora* cut across social, economic, cultural and environmental domains and different scales of urban life and governance, as the following statements from research participants show:

> City planning also contributes to people not having maisha bora, for instance the government was supposed to plan well this area before people started to establish settlements here, on the other hand, the government has constructed several drainage sys-

tems at the middle of the settlement which contributes much to the transmission of diseases like malaria and cholera. (Woman in her 50s, home and small business owner, settlement resident for 30 years)

You cannot live in the area like this, which is an informal settlement with lack of improved sanitation service, poor drainage systems, often times flooded and lack of good road infrastructures, and say you have maisha bora even if you can manage to have three meals per day. Maisha bora depends [on the] type of settlement pattern. (Man in his 30s, settlement tenant for over 30 years, entrepreneur)

These examples illustrate how poor-quality city and settlement infrastructures undermine efforts to prosper and live well, regardless of the material resources households are able to deploy. The 'prosperity gains' that secure income, food, clean water and investments to upgrade family housing might offer are eroded by systemic factors, inequalities and risk exposures linked to urban governance, land use, industrial policy and political representation. Looking at questions of power and scale through their everyday effects on settlement life draws attention to the diversity of experiences within communities and the context-specific ways that social identities based on class, gender, disability compound forms of inequality and risk exposure. Woven through the research are issues of informality, marginalisation, and systematic exclusion from power and processes of decision-making that affect everyday life, highlighting the range and nature of inequalities experienced by marginalised communities and showing how urban processes produce context-specific obstacles to prosperous lives. Urban policies that construct prosperity and poverty in binary terms fail to take account of these critical intersections.

5. Reflections on Co-Producing a Contextual Understanding of Prosperity

This research shows prosperity to be multi-dimensional: Shaped by urban political economy, individuals' capacities to act, the daily practices and trade-offs that settlement dwellers in Dar es Salaam engage in to make a living and to live well. Examining maisha bora as a lived experience demonstrates the inadequacy of prosperity policies that focus solely on income growth and poverty reduction. Instead, what emerges from a 'lived prosperity' lens is a nuanced dialogue about the intersections and negotiations between meaning, practice, politics and structural factors. Neither knowledge co-production methods or intersectional analyses are new approaches in urban research and policymaking in the Global South (Castan-Broto & Alves, 2018). However, attention to the situated meanings and practices of prosperity is a new field of inquiry that will require new models, research instruments and knowledges to shape policy and to ex-

plore and theorise the relationships between prosperity and other policy concepts—wellbeing, resilience and poverty. We argue the unique value of the PI methodology is that it offers an opportunity for the integration of lived experience into urban policy, bringing alternate views about prosperity to evidence-based planning in contexts that rarely take account of non-dominant perspectives. Consequently, the novelty of the PI method used here is very much place-specific, and in the context of Dar es Salaam, both the in way the research is conducted and the critical involvement of local decision-makers in the research design, data collection and shaping of interventions, marks a departure from the traditional participatory research, and the ways in which policy makers are used to being engaged.

Furthermore, the epistemological strength of the PI method lies in adding layers of subjective and experiential qualitative data to quantitative metrics, which allows policy and decision makers to gain valuable and measurable insights from communities. Its suitability is highlighted especially in settings like Dar es Salaam, where formal data may be unavailable, difficult to collect, inconsistent, or of poor quality. However it goes further than being just a useful process for objective data collection and is intended to stimulate local debate, priority setting, and action planning that altogether help to shape appropriate local interventions (Allen, Osuteye, Emmanuel, Koroma, & Lambert, 2020; Twigg, Christie, Haworth, Osuteye, & Skarlatidou, 2017). Besides the novelty of co-producing shared visions of prosperity, we also argue that the value and impact of the PI as a methodological process can be seen in four other ways, elaborated in the following sections.

5.1. Co-Producing Pathways to Prosperity and Urban Equality

Co-production is critical to create new forms of urban knowledge that reflect the diversity of contemporary cities and bring new voices, specifically from the Global South to policymaking. The PI goes beyond the knowledge-generation realm and proposes a framework for transformative change with the community at the centre. The co-produced PI emphasises the need for community-led action that can improve quality of life and livelihoods, whilst highlighting the broader questions about the functioning of power structures and how inequalities are reproduced (Castan-Broto & Alves, 2018). It enables the generation of rich contextual understandings of the underlying issues and factors driving inequalities, that require such nuanced 'pathways' out of them. In this context, the PI as a co-produced approach and tool can be conceptualised as a 'pathway(s)' of shared prosperity that confronts the embedded structural and social inequalities in urban settings, such as the exclusion of community voice in planning, it is the application of such knowledge that marks the beginning of change that can be termed as transformative.

The attempt to bridge the gap in inclusion draws on the relationship of the local NGO with the federation and community residents, which mediates the process of sampling and recruitment of respondents, based on a deeper understanding of where and how vulnerabilities manifest. Inclusion in this context has been conceptualised as a two-fold process of both recognition and participation of hitherto excluded voices and groups in envisioning, planning and implementing community aspirations beginning with the PI. And in this regard the research design accounted for a collective discussion on the variety of experiences, demographics and social identities that were representative of the communities, and served as the basis for the purposive sampling (such as age, gender, disability, household composition, housing tenure, employment status, and income brackets). The PI's effort to address inclusion and diversity starts with an attempt to align with the different social identities that are recognised by the national government's legislative and policy structures on paper but nonetheless have in practice been excluded from decision making. This effort does not preclude the need to progressively work to recognise other forms of diversity and social identities in the frameworks used locally but consolidates the first steps that need to be taken now as a result of the identified gap.

Consequently, it is the recognition and utility of the PI as a community planning tool and not the outcomes alone that are noteworthy, as it contests and shifts the status quo of urban practitioners and policy makers in the Global South. It also sets the pace for innovative relationships between communities and decision-makers; using the PI as a tool to hold them to account and monitor their progress. The success of the latter remains subjective and open for testing, but the avenue for community groups (in the case of Dar es Salaam at the Mtaa level) to have co-produced such a tool, and ownership of the data, is worth celebrating.

5.2. Capacity-Building for Urban Equality

The process of developing the PI is embedded with opportunities and spaces for building capacities of community residents and leaders, the researchers' teams and participating local decision-makers geared towards advancing the ideals of urban equality. The PI levels the hitherto technical 'research fieldwork' process, and embraces the principles of knowledge co-production with partnerships of equivalence which re-balances internal power hierarchies and relationships within the teams, and the communities, purposively aiming to bring about contributions from participants that are innovative and propositional in seeking to challenge structural barriers to urban equality (Osuteye et al., 2019).

The involvement of local decision-makers in the research itself, makes a deliberate attempt to bridge the divide between research and practice. Officials in formalised urban planning systems are used to tools and metrics configured for the kinds of processes that they have to manage, and the PI allows communities to be able to 'speak their' languages through simplified outputs and metrics, and provide some basis and justification for claims made. The PI as a tool also allows for community knowledge generated to be captured and documented as a form of reference that allows for easier and continuous engagement. This is critical in urban settings like Dar es Salaam, that experience volatile political cycles and the high turnover of government and municipality staff.

5.3. Creating Spaces of Justice and Inclusivity

The inclusivity of the PI goes beyond the mere conceptual aggregation of diverse voices and actors to actively create moments and spaces for sustained engagement throughout the process. There is an explicit element of community mobilisation that exposes participants to new policy discourses such as those on 'shared prosperity.' Although the collective interaction of diverse actors and the community mobilisation during the co-production is not the end goal, it creates invaluable spaces of inclusion. The PI creates the opportunity for diverse voices to get together through different 'spaces'—shaping questions and methodology design, workshopping, community feedback mechanisms—and extending the spatial and geographic sites for interaction within the settlements. These spaces may be both intermediary and transient rather than a conceived output at the end of the process.

It is critical to note that the PI engages with, and conceptualises the 'spaces of inclusion' as factors of both time and space, and allows for the creation of 'intermediary' spaces of justice and inclusion through the process of co-production and action research. Consequently, the purposive long-term maintenance of the co-production process itself allows for the creation, curation and maintenance of the spaces of inclusion and justice.

Furthermore, the inherent capacity-building spaces in the process of PI earlier mentioned also become spaces of inclusion and contribute to the erosion of inequalities and, by extension, injustices that arise from those. The PI methodology recognises that building capacity is not merely consequential, but rather that it would not be possible for people to address structural inequalities without building their capacities, and breaking down dependencies and power hierarchies that reinforce inequalities at every level, beginning with the research design and co-production.

6. Conclusion: Contributions to Theory and Practice

The targeted focus of the co-produced PI, which allows for different forms of knowledges and experiences concerning what constitutes a good life for urban dwellers in Dar es Salaam to emerge, is a noteworthy contribution to research and policy-making spaces in urban Africa.

This case contributes valuable empirical insights about the diversity of urban experiences found in twenty-first century cities, and the capacities and capabilities of local communities to shape and influence urban policy-making. In this way the research speaks to calls for a global urbanism (Ong, 2011; Robinson, 2016) that brings diverse voices and geographies to urban theory. Its strength lies in its simplicity and replicability as an approach, bringing to light locally-specific dynamics that shape our understanding of prosperity in different contexts and offer new directions for theory-building and policy-making.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Socio-Spatial Segregation and the Spatial Structure of 'Ordinary' Activities in the Global South

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Abstract
Planning practice in the Global South often defines a border between formal and informal developments ignoring the complex and nuanced reality of urban practices and, consequently, worsening segregation. This article proposes an alternative view of socio-spatial segregation that shifts the distinction between formal/informal towards one that emphasises access to opportunities and their relationship with the spatial structure of the city. Under this alternative framework, applied to the case of the Valle Amauta neighbourhood in Lima, Peru, we reflect on how socio-economic activities, shaped by spatial conditions and social practices, increase or reduce socio-spatial segregation. Our findings suggest that a shift towards strategies aimed at increasing accessibility to centrality, provided by the density of social and economic activities, could offer new opportunities for planning practice and theory in the Global South.

1. Introduction

Socio-spatial segregation is a phenomenon in which space is organised "in areas of strong internal homogeneity and strong social disparity between them" (Castells, 1977). It expresses relationships of exclusion, subjection or inferiority (Marcuse, 1997) between different social groups in space. These groups may be defined by income, ethnicity, age or any other socio-economic characteristics. It takes place in many cities and regions around the world (Aguilar & Mateos, 2011; Marcuse, 1997; Sabatini, 2006), but especially in those with deep social differences (Watson, 2006).

In many cities in the Global South, 'formal' and 'informal' categories are often used to steer and control urban development. The term 'informality' was origi-

nally coined to describe practices that do not have a place in the formal economy and the official set of rules and laws (International Labour Office, 1972). In the context of urban development, informality often refers to a complex and ambiguous process of development that takes place outside of the norm and often (but not always) ignores building regulations (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011). In Latin America, informality is often connected to the intense rural-urban migrations that led to explosive urban growth during the 20th century. The areas where vulnerable migrants settled were often labelled as informal in official planning and policy (Calderón, 2014). This labelling is a premeditated gesture aimed at stigmatising the city-making process taking place outside of the 'formal' hegemonic state institutions (Delgado, Peek, & d'Auria, 2019) and excluding people in these areas from

the right to property (Calderón, 2016, p. 76), in order to justify the policies and planning instruments focused on the 'formalisation' of those areas (Roy, 2005), upgrading or, in some cases, clearance and replacement with new developments (Watson, 2016).

These measures often reinforce the formal/informal dichotomy either by overlooking the intrinsic characteristics of urban space (McCartney & Krishnamurthy, 2018) or by displacing people. Socio-spatial segregation of vulnerable groups in informal-labelled areas excludes them from material means, services and opportunities, or from decision-making processes (Smets & Salman, 2016). This, in turn, reduces their possibilities to overcome poverty or to meet their basic needs. At the same time, this formal/informal dichotomy results in a misunderstanding of the genesis and everyday realities of segregated and deprived neighbourhoods in the Global South, which, in reality, remain intertwined with formal processes (Delgado et al., 2019). Against this background, informality should be understood "not a separate sector but rather a series of transactions that connect different economies and spaces to one another" (Roy, 2005, p. 148). In this study, we echo these arguments and provide novel evidence to underpin a new perspective on segregation going beyond the formal/informal dichotomy by exploring (1) how 'ordinary' socio-economic activities in deprived neighbourhoods transgress the boundaries between areas developed in an informal or formal way, and (2) how spatial configurations facilitate or hinder those activities. For Fainstein (2011, p. 3), a just city would be "a city in which public investment and regulation would produce equitable outcomes rather than support those already well off." Nevertheless, mechanisms of redistribution of resources and political representation studied in spatial justice theory often come from a Western tradition and remain difficult to apply in contexts of deep inequality (Watson, 2006), where institutions, activities and agreements do not always follow official rules. Alternative developments also produce different spatial characteristics to those usually studied in urban morphology theory (McCartney & Krishnamurthy, 2018).

Moreover, the planning distinction between so-called formal and informal developments associates informality with specific areas of the city rather than with urban practices that have a bearing on inequality. In planning practice, socio-spatial segregation is thus mostly approached from a property and land rights perspective, assuming that a change in the status of land would promote integration of its inhabitants. This article proposes to shift the lens away from informality and focuses on how access to opportunities helps overcome socio-spatial segregation. Opportunities are related to social, economic, or political activities in the city that are shaped by the features of the spaces in which they happen (Habraken, 2000).

Access to opportunities in many cities of the Global South is also enabled by different mechanisms than those usually implemented in traditional Western planning and policies and studied in spatial justice literature. As Ruiz-Tagle (2016) argues for the Chilean case, integration policies often focus on territorial dispersion and access to land rather than on the redistribution of opportunities and resources. The former, often used in European planning and housing policies (Giffinger, 1998) is often insufficient to overcome socio-spatial segregation in other parts of the world. Redistribution of resources, on the contrary, may involve actors and responsibilities different from those usually included in Western policies. For example, the community redistributes opportunities, including the use of land, water or communal work in rural areas of Andean contexts (Dollfus, 1991; Malengreau, 1992), collectively managing a delimited physical space. This is also reproduced in urban contexts by migrant groups (Golda-Pongratz, 2007; Matos, 2012) and populations who face precariousness and scarcity of resources in cities. Similarly to rural communities, communal practices and community management of resources in urban areas take place in collectively owned land when individual land rights were not yet acquired (Salcedo, 2010). These spaces, in contexts developed outside official planning rules, also operate differently, limiting the explanatory power of urban morphology theory produced in the West (McCartney & Krishnamurthy, 2018). Against this background, this article explores the following research question: how does the intersection of socio-economic activities and spatial conditions increase or reduce socio-spatial segregation in deprived neighbourhoods that tend to be labelled as informal?

Using insights from the literature on the Global South, a case study of Valle Amauta, Lima, as well as examples of practices from other neighbourhoods in Lima, this article identifies the specific links between spatial features and socio-economic opportunities. The alternative approach proposed here aims at understanding the endogenous potential of the territory and the socio-spatial practices embedded in cities of the Global South advocating a shift of focus in planning and policy from land formalisation and traditional housing provision to upgrading the spatial potential linked to the density of social and economic activities.

2. Towards an Alternative Framework to Understand Socio-Spatial Segregation

Spatial justice literature (Fainstein, 2011; Soja, 2013) offers a critique of urban development understood as a pursuit of growth and competitiveness, proposing an alternative perspective based on the need to promote the right to the city and, in particular, to make the distribution of benefits and burdens of urbanisation more equitable, paying more attention to how the access to resources and decision-making is distributed across space, and focusing on how it affects the most deprived social groups and areas, including socio-spatial segregation. Fainstein (2011), building on the cases of Amsterdam,

London and New York, explored the policies and planning practices that favour the three hallmarks of what she calls a "just city"—equity, diversity and democracy. These range from the provision of social housing, zoning that prevents discrimination, land-use that promotes porosity between neighbourhoods and interactions between social groups, progressive transit fares, access to public space or engagement of disadvantaged groups in decision-making. The focus here is on what public authorities can do to promote spatial justice, in terms of equitable distribution of access to public goods and negative externalities of urbanisation as well as of access to democratic processes of decision-making in the context of a (Western) capitalist socio-economic system.

Both spatial justice and socio-spatial segregation, however, require some adaptation for application outside of the Western context. It has been argued (Aguilar & Mateos, 2011; Salcedo, 2010) that socio-cultural distance may be more important to socio-spatial segregation than physical distance in Latin America. Having access to land or property rights is not enough to avoid exclusion when there is a big gap in economic, political, cultural or symbolic capital (Ruiz-Tagle, 2016). In fact, one needs to consider the socio-spatial reality in contexts of 'deep difference' (Watson, 2006, 2016). The latter refers to profound material or cultural inequality and the predominance of informal urban processes (Robinson, 2006; Roy, 2005). Such processes are especially relevant in relation to the stakeholders and practices (activities) that provide access to material or immaterial means guiding urbanization processes in the face of the weakness of the state. Examples of such bottom-up practices in Lima's deprived neighbourhoods include collective 'survival activities' such as the organisation of social dining rooms or communal construction of local infrastructure (Calderón, 2016; García Naranjo, 1992). Thus, 'access to opportunities' in such a context is determined by access to economic and social activities (Robinson, 2006), regardless of whether these are provided by the state, private or civil society actors. This access, in turn, is shaped by the place-specific socio-spatial conditions in which these 'everyday life' or 'ordinary' activities take place, calling for a more nuanced understanding of how the spatial morphology of deprived neighbourhoods (often labelled as informal areas) creates conditions for these activities.

The field of urban morphology describes, defines and theorises knowledge on form and formal change (Scheer, 2016) and suggests how it relates to the socio-economic conditions of a place. Vernez Moudon (1997) considers form, resolution and time as three basic components of morphological studies. Three main elements of form can be distinguished: streets, plots and buildings (Kropf, 2009; Scheer, 2016; Vernez Moudon, 1992). The resolutions are building, plot, block, street, city and region. How the main spatial elements are organised on the different resolutions explains how the organisation of the physical elements together is governed by territorial rules (Habraken, 2000). In other words, the organisation

of spatial elements determines the control over space, which comes not only from ownership of land, but also from the appropriation of land by everyday activities that modify it.

The 'urban structure' of 'everyday environments' developed in 'self-sustaining' growth processes and its understanding is shared by the people of a place. The everyday environment can be observed by describing and analysing the relation between the location of activities, the control and form of a specific place. Understanding 'ordinary' everyday environments, means acknowledging a diversity of urban economics and dynamics of spatial settings. This is, according to Robinson (2006, p. 162), of higher relevance "in contexts with substantial levels of informality in economic practices." This means that the spatial reading common in Western analytic practises—based on streets, plots, and buildings—is not enough to understand the dynamics of a place in the Global South. Despite being subdivided into plots, land in many urban settlements throughout Lima is not privately owned and managed collectively until individual land rights are obtained. The border between private and public spaces in these settlements is often blurred by 'survival activities,' such as community breakfast services for children that take place in private kitchens (García Naranjo, 1992). Nevertheless, plot formalisation, working as a commercial unit of individual land control, often weakens social organisation (Malengreau, 1992). The understanding of appropriation of space, and how it influences what is dynamic and what is stable for a longer duration, is essential. Unclear property boundaries that are constantly changing in so-called informal areas, lead to blurry borders that have an effect on where and what activities can take place. The unbuilt spaces of blurred ownership can become a "negotiated movement" (McCartney & Krishnamurthy, 2018, p. 8), enabling access to otherwise inaccessible places and therefore providing new opportunity spaces. Further, building typology should be defined by the permanence of the built and unbuilt form, which depends on the level of investment in housing and security of tenure (McCartney, 2012).

For McCartney and Krishnamurthy (2018, p. 9), "within informal areas, a lot line or a boundary is a result of negotiations between a space's inhabitants rather than a formal contract." This is a key difference to Western morphological studies, which follow the precise boundaries and delineations of the built and unbuilt, as formalised on plans, questioning the transferability of solutions from areas developed with formal conditions towards those developed without standardised norms in plans. Without an understanding of the practices and decision-making processes of local communities, there is a risk of oversimplifying the specific qualities of space and overlooking existing opportunities based on these local practices and activities.

The current approach to socio-spatial segregation in deprived neighbourhoods, labelled as informal areas, very often and in many countries, neglects the role of

spatial features as a factor preventing or deepening segregation and focuses on the role of the State in setting the conditions to 'integrate' areas under the jurisdiction of official urban regulation and 'formal' development. Policies tend to focus on economic regulations and formalisation of ownership as a mechanism to overcome poverty and, therefore, positively influence segregation. This often operates under the assumption that the economy operates similarly in different parts of the world, despite the social and cultural context. In Lima, regularisation in itself has been criticised for being insufficient to create opportunities and foster development in low-consolidated areas (Fernández-Maldonado, 2015). Moreover, the properties of specific spatial features are often assumed to be similar everywhere, neglecting the specificity of urban development happening outside the 'norm' and, therefore, displaying different spatial characteristics (McCartney & Krishnamurthy, 2018). Against this background, an alternative approach to socio-spatial segregation that considers the specific opportunities brought by a different type of urban development is needed. The approach proposed in this article aims at understanding these opportunities by looking at the interconnections between its specific social and economic activities and the specific spatial conditions, and how these two are tied to the decisions that shaped the alternative (i.e., not sanctioned by the State authority) urban development process (Figure 1).

3. Case Study Selection and Data

3.1. Case Study Selection

In order to explore the potential of this alternative framework, a case in Lima, Peru, was selected. In Lima, relationships between formal and informal activities in urban development happen both in high- and low-income areas. Land-trafficking and other illegal activities have

created a very lucrative business both in affluent and poor areas, usually bringing new and deep inequalities. These new economies are completely intertwined with formal processes, administrative and regularisation actions (Calderón, 2016), often blurring the line between formal and informal practices.

The case selected for the analysis, Valle Amauta (Figure 2), in Ate district in East Lima, was chosen because, firstly, there are different socio-economic groups living in segregated homogeneous areas (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática [INEI], 2016). This segregation pattern is similar to many other areas of the city. Secondly, urban development in Valle Amauta started in the 1980s and many of its smaller settlements are currently under a regularisation process. Formalised areas coexist with areas that attempt to formalise individual land tenure ship. Thirdly, Valle Amauta is often the object of specific policies that target so-called informal areas, e.g., the Barrio Mío slum upgrading program (Municipality of Lima, 2013b). Therefore, a comparison between the two approaches described in a theory review is possible. Lastly, detailed GIS cadastral data was developed in 2016 by the Municipality of Ate District and the Inter-American Development Bank. In addition, documented cases from other similar areas of the city are used to complement the analysis in Valle Amauta and present examples of how social and economic activities matter for overcoming segregation.

3.2. Variables

The variables used in this analysis reflect both the current and the proposed approach to socio-spatial segregation. Under the current approach, the socio-economic profile of the population is linked to *informality* and property. Access to better life conditions (less *vulnerability*) is granted by access to formal property. Meanwhile, the alternative approach, considers social and economic *ac-*

Figure 1. Existing and proposed approaches on socio-spatial segregation. Source: Authors.

Figure 2. A view of Valle Amauta. Source: Authors.

tivities as well as contextual and spatial variables. The variables of the *decision-making process* and *topography* are given, according to the context. The spatial variables of *centrality*, *plot size* and *Floor Space Index* are three variables known to be linked to socio-economic activities (Chiaradia, Hillier, Schwander, & Wedderburn, 2009; Hausleitner & Berghauser Pont, 2017; Hillier & Hanson, 1984; Sevtsuk, 2010; van Nes, 2005). Thus, the analysis used variables as described in the following sections.

3.2.1. Spatial Variables

- *Centrality*: Centrality describes "how the line is positioned with respect to the system as a whole" (Hillier, 1996, p. 119). Centrality, as measured here by 'angular choice,' is calculated by "how often a line falls on the shortest path between all pairs of lines in a network" (PST Documentation, 2019), being every path counted once for every direction. It thus defines how many shortest paths pass through a street segment, which describes possible movement flows in cities (Hillier & Iida, 2005). Mapped based on Open Street Map (2019) edited and completed for the case study area.
- *Plot size*: The total area of land comprised between the borders of a plot in square metres (sqm). The plots are the spatial property of basic land division (Whitehand, 2001), their size is the spatial property that influences building form (Siksna, 1997) and indicates the potential for "diverse users and owner strategies" (Berghauser Pont et al., 2019). Plot size is one of the variables that determine pop-

ulation density in a neighbourhood, along with the number of houses per plot. Data from GIS Cadastre of Ate District (Municipality of Ate, 2016).
- *FSI (Floor Space Index)*: The number of built sqm in relation to the plot size in sqm. The distribution of buildings on plots expressed in built density influences the number of people or activities that can be accommodated on the plot. FSI is an indicator of how consolidated a plot is in terms of built density. The higher the FSI, the more investment in construction has taken place. Data from GIS Cadastre of Ate District (Municipality of Ate, 2016).

3.2.2. Socio-Economic Variables

- *Activities*: Points per activity location. Social and economic activities that provide opportunities for collective (social organisation, healthy food or childcare) or individual development (economic profit, family house construction). Data from schools' data (Ministry of Education of Peru, 2019) and economic activities' data (INEI, 2019).
- *Vulnerability*: Average income per person by household. Vulnerable groups are defined according to the socio-economic scale developed by INEI (2016). This scale goes from A (high income) to D (low income) and is defined according to education, social status and economic wealth.
- *Informality*: For the maps, official spatial boundaries of 'informal' areas defined by the Informal Property Formalisation Organism (COFOPRI) and the delimitation of 'informal' land development ac-

cording to the Municipality of Lima (2013a) are used. Informality is understood as a process taking place outside of the norm (Herrle & Fokdal, 2011). The analysis on the current approach uses Calderón's (2016, p. 76) understanding of 'informal' areas as places in which people "are excluded from the right to property and whose situation must go through a process of regularisation." Based on COFOPRI's data in 2013 (Municipality of Lima, 2013b).

3.2.3. Contextual Variables

- *Topography*: The given difference of height in the territory. Given that Lima is located in a valley, many factors are influenced by topography. Accessibility for mobility systems, the possibility to implement infrastructure (water, sewage, roads), the cost of delivering building materials or the exposure to risk. These factors influence where different types of activities take place. Data from Ministry of Environment of Peru (2019).
- *Decision-Making Process*: Cultural, normative, and social context for ongoing urban development. The power and interest balance of different stakeholders influences decisions on where, how and what is developed in a neighbourhood. The decision-making process is described using examples or micro-stories of specific urban processes in Valle Amauta. Data gathered from fieldwork and interviews (Muñoz Unceta, 2019).

4. Analysis

4.1. Context

In Valle Amauta and many other parts of the city, borders between so-called formal and informal areas have played, and still play, an important role in urban development. In Lima, policies have targeted differently areas that were labelled as formal and informal. Different laws, since 1961, have defined the regularisation process for so-called informal settlements, establishing the requirements for a settlement to transition from one category to the other, including proving possession of the land, its registration in the local municipality, holding an official risk assessment or having water, sewage and electricity networks implemented, among others (Congreso de la República del Perú, 2006, 2015). According to this process, urban upgrading programs such as *A Trabajar Urbano* (2002–2006), *Agua para Todos* (2007–2013) or *Programa de Mejoramiento de Barrios* (2004–present) implemented urban infrastructure in low-income areas and developed outside the norm. These programs remained fragmented and uncoordinated due to the barriers created by the administrative boundaries and formal/informal labelling of neighbourhoods (Espinoza & Fort, 2017). Meanwhile, urban

regulation and zoning plans have been the main instruments to steer the process of urban development in areas designated as 'formal.'

In both sets of regulations, property was not only a central issue that defined the approach of policies, but also determined where policies and programs were applied (Calderón, 2016). Some urban upgrading programs only target settlements that are considered ´formal´, while others focus on the infrastructure needed for formalisation. Ownership was also influenced by whom and how the land was developed. Figure 3 shows the official differentiation of ´formal´ or ´informal´ areas according to the initial process of land development (Municipality of Lima, 2013a). Private property dominated in central areas of the city, whereas development labelled as 'informal' tended to be located on public land (Fernández de Córdova, Fernández-Maldonado, & del Pozo, 2016), often in the least accessible places on the fringes of the city. Property was thus used to define and tackle the problem. Formal and informal labelling of areas both influenced the current gradient of socio-spatial segregation and provided a framework for policies addressing it.

### 4.2. Discrepancy between Scales; or the Need to Look Closer

Formal and informal borders, however, do not correlate with the location of socio-economic groups or the centrality structure of a neighbourhood on a smaller scale. Whether an area went through a formalisation process or not, does not necessarily imply in itself a better opportunity for social or spatial development. This is observed in Valle Amauta (Figure 4), where many of the so-called 'formal' areas host both vulnerable and very vulnerable populations, while showing different degrees of centrality and spatial integration. At the scale of Valle Amauta, the official definition of formal and informal areas, based on the requirements needed for formalisation, does not provide an accurate lens to understand socio-spatial segregation: spatial integration and vulnerability are similarly observed on both sides of the official formal border.

The spatial centrality structure, similar to segregation seen through multiple scales, also differs depending on the radius of the area analysed (Figure 5; Vernez Moudon, 1997). Mapping is used to visualize and compare spatial characteristics, such as the structure of the street network or the size of plots, through different scales.

4.3. The Interconnection between Activities and Spatial Conditions

In the following cases, the location of hardware shops, hotels, schools and community activities in Valle Amauta is paired with spatial characteristics such as the integration of the street network, the FSI, the size of plots and the topography of the urban area (Figures 6 and 7). These types of activities showcase the relationship between the decision-making process, the spatial characteristics

Figure 3. Distribution of socioeconomic groups and areas labelled as informal and formal in Metropolitan Lima. Source: Authors, based on data from INEI (2016) and Municipality of Lima (2013a).

Figure 4. Socio-spatial segregation and urban informality in Valle Amauta. Source: Authors, based on data from INE (2016), Municipality of Ate (2016) and Municipality of Lima (2013b).

Figure 5. Relationship between the centrality structure and scale in Metropolitan Lima. Source: Authors, based on data from Municipality of Lima (2013a) and Open Street Map (2019).

Figure 6. Spatial characteristics and activities in Valle Amauta. Source: Authors, based on data from Ministry of Education of Peru (2019), INEI (2019), Municipality of Ate (2016) and Municipality of Lima (2013b).

and the activities themselves, providing an alternative lens to look at and tackle socio-spatial segregation.

Relationships through topography provide a basic framework to understand urban development and segregation in Lima. The formal city was mostly developed at the bottom of three river valleys. Flat areas were originally agricultural fields or, later, industrial areas owned by few families, who became land developers in time (Calderón, 2016, p. 118). At the other end of these valleys, the slopes gradually hosted a low-income population in so-called informal areas. The latest settlements were developed on the steep land of the periphery. In Valle Amauta, the location of social and economic activities also follows a rationale connected to their position in the cross-section of the slope and their accessibility (Figure 7). Profitable economic activities, such as hotels or hardware shops are located in semi-flat and high integrated areas, while areas less integrated and higher up on the slope have less value, and are therefore left for schools or community activities, which were also consolidated later in time. In the following, the main economic and community activities are described in their relation to the other variables.

Hardware shops are a very profitable business in Lima. Urban development in many areas starts with land occupation and is followed by progressive development of housing and services. Hardware shops usually become the main supplier of construction material for self-builders. They are usually located in highly integrated streets of semi-flat areas of the valley and even sometimes in the low areas (Figure 7). This advantageous position allows them to be reached by people from different

areas of the neighbourhood. This type of activity is found in medium-size plots (100–150 sqm) among housing areas. Hardware shops are often highly consolidated buildings, with an FSI of 1.5 to 2.5 sqm/sqm (Figure 8). The income provided by this economic activity grants the shop-owners money for the construction of new floors. These are often rented out as rooms or apartments, generating additional profit. This densification process usually takes place spontaneously, outside of the control of the State and often ignores housing regulations.

Young couples in Lima often live with their parents until they get married. Nevertheless, they need a place to have some intimacy. Hotels satisfy this necessity in many neighbourhoods. Hotels in Valle Amauta are located in areas that are highly integrated (Figure 6) and accessible by many people in the neighbourhood while offering enough anonymity not to be easily recognised by a neighbour or a relative. Hotels in Valle Amauta are developed in flat areas of the valley (Figure 7), which previously hosted industrial uses and where large-size plots (200 to 500 sqm; see Figure 8), despite being accessible, are not located in main streets. FSI is often high (0.75 to 2.50 sqm/sqm), showing a higher built-density than other plots in the area. Hotels bring opportunities to other businesses, such as pharmacies or restaurants, clustering around them.

The decision on where public *schools* were located in Valle Amauta and many other neighbourhoods of Lima answers to economic criteria. Semi-flat areas of Valle Amauta were developed around the 1990s (Figure 7) without following urban regulation, thus fostering occupation first and then the construction of housing and

Figure 7. Spatial characteristics and location of activities in Valle Amauta on the cross-section. Source: Authors, based data from INEI (2019), Ministry of Education of Peru (2019), Ministry of Environment of Peru (2019), Municipality of Ate (2016) and Municipality of Lima (2013b).

Figure 8. Spatial characteristics for different types of activities in Valle Amauta. Source: Analysis and mapping by the authors with data from INEI (2019), Ministry of Education of Peru (2019), Municipality of Ate (2016), Municipality of Lima (2013b). Pictures from Google Street View (in 2013) and by the authors.

the implementation of infrastructure and services second. This informal planning process designated land that was the furthest away, at the bottom of the steep slopes, for public facilities, whereas the lowest, most accessible and most profitable areas of the valley were developed as housing and commerce. Schools were nevertheless given big portions of land along a topographic 'fracture line' where the slope begins. These large and irregular portions of land were preserved under public management despite the most recent developments on the slopes, which extended the neighbourhood beyond the 'fracture line' and sometimes redefined and shifted the school border as a result of negotiations between the "space inhabitants" (McCartney & Krishnamurthy, 2018). Schools remained at an intermediate height in the neighbourhood, becoming a second-tier centrality in low consolidated areas, drawing other economic and social activities, such as bookshops, print shops, corner shops or social services (Figure 8). These irregular portions of land, also delimited for public spaces and other low-benefit land-uses have, nevertheless a great potential to become integration spaces for people living on the steep slopes and to those staying in semi-flat areas, due to their intermediate location. Nevertheless, proximity of different social groups does not grant social cohesion (Ruiz-Tagle, 2016) and these potential integration spaces may have to consider activities that tackle political or cultural distance as well.

Social and community activities in Valle Amauta, such as collective dining rooms, NGOs, churches or nursery schools, are usually located in medium—to low-integrated areas, close to very steep land (Figures 7 and 8). The same logic behind the low land value and the position of schools operates for community activities. Nevertheless, the size of plots differs for activities located in low-integrated areas (plot sizes from 150 to 500 sqm) to those located in semi-flat and medium integrated areas (less than 150 sqm). The latter are often clustered around schools or markets, which foster centrality in the fringes of topographic changes, while the former remain disconnected. In both cases, community activities present low FSI values (0.10 to 0.75 sqm/sqm; see Figure 8), and sometimes, especially in the case of open space or sports activities, plots have irregular shapes due to topography (Figure 8). Social and community activities located in recently developed areas are fostered by material scarcity and collective land management in areas without land titles, increasing territorial control over its immediate environment (Salcedo, 2010). Many of these activities, once the land tenure is formalised and individualised, change their nature or tend to disappear, similarly to what is observed in rural communities (Malengreau, 1992).

4.4. Findings: Valle Amauta and Lima

In sum, the presence of these activities is connected to decisions that aim for social or economic benefits and are influenced by spatial conditions. Activities do not cluster only in areas defined as formal, but they benefit from the size, position or interrelations of a place regardless of its property type and they answer to processes that connect areas across the formal/informal border. Formally recognised economic activities, such as hardware shops, benefit from houses that are progressively built in self-constructed settlements and, at the same time, favour informal densification processes in formally tenured land. Public facilities, such as schools, provide centrality by acting as a social destination, which attracts other activities along the streets, both in areas on the slopes labelled as 'informal' and in semi-flat areas that tend to be labelled as 'formal.' Hence, the formal/informal border does not define access to opportunities. Instead, the connectivity between different activities influences access to opportunities.

Local centrality of places, determined by high connectivity between activities, is therefore a core characteristic that allows the generation of further opportunities. The consolidation of land, in terms of built density, differs between commercial and community activities, showing commercial opportunities in highly consolidated places, whereas community opportunities seem to appear in less consolidated places. The role of plot size remains still rather vague.

Despite the limitations of the current approach to formal and informal borders and illustrating the potential of the proposed framework, the extent to which activities and the spatial features that enable them to provide access to opportunities in Valle Amauta, would require further research, including empirical cases, interviews or case studies. The present article focuses on where and what activities were enabled by certain spatial characteristics in Valle Amauta. Who has access and in which way could not be analysed on the basis of the presented empirical material. Nevertheless, the following examples from similar neighbourhoods in Lima illustrate that: First, the border of former industrial areas in the Independencia district, which were initially owned by the Aliaga family, determined the location of El Ermitaño in 1962, one of the oldest large-scale informally developed areas in Lima (Bosio & Renteria, 1985). The presence of large numbers of inhabitants along with the spatial characteristics of the former industrial area (big plot sizes, high metropolitan integration) fostered the redevelopment of some areas of Independencia district into a thriving economic cluster based around 'love hotels.'

Second, Huaycán, an occupation of land led by civil society organizations and the Municipality of Lima in 1984 in the East of the city, followed a spatial and social scheme structured around housing units. Each of them hosted sixty families, who would decide the shape and organization of plots and streets in a 1-hectare piece of land following two rules: two perpendicular streets would always cross the housing unit and plots could not be bigger than 90 sqm (Figari, 1986). These spatial guidelines, along with the density of the housing unit (number

of families per hectare), have provided opportunities for small businesses benefiting from the density of people and the interconnected street-network. The third example, Horacio Zevallos, a neighbourhood which was developed at the same time as Huaycán a few hundred metres closer to the city of Lima, allowed lower densities and bigger sizes of plots. Central areas of Horacio Zevallos, compared to central areas in Huaycán, have created a dormitory city, where not much economic activity is seen (Godiño & Sulca, 2017) (Figure 9).

Finally, La Balanza, a neighbourhood in the high slopes of Comas district in the North of the city, has been an example for an urban regeneration process that has benefited from the connection of different social activities. An existing social dining room, managed by a group of women, was the scenario for spatial improvements that allowed other activities to share that space. A second floor was built and used by cultural and theatre associations in the neighbourhood to rehearse and present their work. The public space was improved for sports, new green areas and a skatepark were developed, and improved streets and public staircases connect this spot to steep areas of the neighbourhood. All these spatial interventions, funded by NGOs and the Municipality

of Lima, improved the connectivity of the social dining room in a low consolidated area of the periphery, thus turning it into a second-tier centrality, which provides opportunities for social interaction and development in La Balanza (Vera & Cuadros, 2016).

5. Discussion

The proposed approach to socio-spatial segregation applied here puts forward at least two inter-related issues for discussion. Following Robinson's (2006, p. 164) idea of the 'ordinary' city as "diverse, contested, connected" and the research on post-coloniality (Roy, 2005; Watson, 2006), this sheds more light on the connection between spatial conditions and socio-spatial practices in a highly unequal context where the Western tradition is not enough to explain urban processes.

The lens of 'survivalist creativity' in a context of scarcity, as in the case of nursery schools or collective dining rooms in Valle Amauta and wider Lima, invite a different perspective on economic development (Robinson, 2006). Potential collective development, brought by these activities, is closely related to the characteristics of the urban space that they use and produce, includ-

Figure 9. Comparison between central areas in Huaycán (top) and Horacio Zevallos (bottom). Source: Authors and Google Street View (in 2013).

ing material scarcity, low consolidation, and collective land tenure ship. Spatial isolation or opportunities for connectivity across space are closely related to social and economic activities and the specific spatial conditions in which these activities take place. Our empirical evidence provides insight into how relationships of opportunity emerge, provided by relationships between formal and informal practices and their connections and overlaps in space, also in deprived areas which appear segregated. Intrinsic spatial characteristics from areas developed outside of the norm, such as negotiated borders (McCartney & Krishnamurthy, 2018) or left-over spaces used by collective activities, such as schools, public spaces or community services, enable opportunities to increase connectivity to these services and further attract complementary activities. This is in line with Robinson's (2006, p. 160) argument that, "cities enable opportunities for frequent interactions and sustained relationships amongst economic agents and social groups, both within and even across 'segregated' spaces and relationships."

However, our findings also challenge the current policy approach to socio-spatial segregation developed and applied in many cities of the Global South, having a focus on informality and land regularisation as a mechanism to create opportunities to reduce socio-spatial segregation. The analysis of Valle Amauta shows how the interrelations between socio-economic activities and specific spatial characteristics provide opportunities to reduce the negative effects of segregation, regardless of whether they are in areas labelled as 'informal' or 'formal.' The opportunities provided by schools, hotels, hardware shops and community activities are tangible examples of this. Planning and policies which tackle socio-spatial segregation could benefit from shifting their focus to socio-economic and spatial connectivity rather than formalisation of land and property (Figure 1).

Nevertheless, this does not, per se, grant fair access to these opportunities. Centrality and integration in the street network used by hardware shops or hotels to locate themselves in space and take advantage of economic opportunities, only create profit for individual landowners. Benefits are rarely distributed fairly across the neighbourhood or the city. A permissive approach to alternative 'everyday' urban practices could enable participative service delivery and build 'ordinary' cities (Robinson, 2006), but not necessarily fair cities. Under Fainstein's (2011) premise on the fair city, regulation and policy should provide equitable outcomes, benefiting the collectivity and, especially, those who are in the worst situation. Thus, who is profiting from the opportunities created and how to redistribute benefits more fairly must be discussed. In a socio-spatial reality of 'deep difference' (Watson, 2006) and a weak public sector, policies may also propose alternative mechanisms to foster redistribution of benefits beyond the idea of a strong State, predominant in Western societies. Community activities, like the ones observed in Valle Amauta or the

case in La Balanza, demonstrate how redistribution is not only brought but also perceived as more legitimate (García Naranjo, 1992) when provided by recognised civil society groups, such as those of the organised women who manage social dining rooms.

6. Conclusion

The evidence presented in this article challenges the current focus on informality and land regularisation as a mechanism to tackle socio-spatial segregation. The analysis of Valle Amauta shows how the interrelations between socio-economic activities and specific spatial characteristics provide opportunities to reduce the negative effects of segregation both in what is labelled in the planning discourse as 'informal' and 'formal' areas.

Our research indicates a clear opportunity for future research on how urban policy in contexts like Valle Amauta could take advantage of the development process already happening instead of importing policies from cities in Western contexts, thus, looking for ways to amplify and redistribute opportunities, connecting the efforts and potentials of civil society and both the formal and informal branches of the private sector.

The limitation of this research is that the lens under which the spatial characteristics that enable socio-economic activities are observed, depends on local cultural and social norms, making it difficult to directly transfer policies from one place to another. However, this also presents opportunities for further research, across different scales and contexts, on the relation between local cultural contexts and the way in which the spatial form of deprived neighbourhoods creates or restricts access to opportunities.

In sum, this article provides a new perspective to understand and tackle segregation, thus offering new insights for planning practice and theory in the Global South. By focusing on land regularisation and using imported solutions, planners in many cities dismiss the real potential of space and society in their local contexts, overlooking chances to reduce socio-spatial segregation.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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