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## Large Urban Developments and the Future of Cities

Editor

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Editorial

## Large-Scale Urban Developments and the Future of Cities: Possible Checks and Balances

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### Abstract

Urban planning deploys large-scale urban development as a preferred strategy in many places around the world. Such an approach to development transforms the urban form, generates new socio-spatial urban relations, and changes planning principles, decision-making and urban power dynamics. This editorial introduces large scale urban development as the current urban policy, discusses possible checks and balances and presents the thematic issue on “Large Urban Development and the Future of Cities.”

### Keywords

architecture; commercial center; housing; large-scale urban development; neoliberalism; waterfront development

### Issue

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In recent years, we have witnessed dramatic and unprecedented urban growth through large urban developments (LUDs). Relying on complex infrastructure and innovative design tools, LUDs are often promoted as part of general densification plans, and as the way to address both housing demands and environmental concerns. They are sometimes seen as a win-win solution that both supports urban economic growth and fulfills market needs (del Cerro Santamaría, 2019; Gualini & Majoor, 2007; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002). Such a mode of development is being activated in various urban arenas: tourism, residences, recreation, transportation, education, and commerce, and is being used to shape neighborhoods, commercial centers and business districts.

LUDs engender new planning cultures, new private-public relations, new urban demographic transformations and novel environmental concerns. In many instances, LUDs add a dramatic, dominant third dimension to the urban scape; they are built significantly taller than earlier developments (Drozd, Appert, & Harris, 2017; Graham, 2016; Graham & Hewitt, 2013; Greco, 2018;

Talen, 2018). The unprecedented pace with which high-rises are emerging, erected individually and in clusters, in cities throughout the Global North and Global South (Nethercote, 2018), has been recently captured as a new ‘vertical urbanism’ (Harris, 2015).

Neil Smith (2002) suggested that gentrification has become a global urban strategy. LUDs might be seen as the ultimate tool for this end. While such enterprises cater to the needs of the economically viable urban population, they rarely provide remedies for numerous public problems and needs. Advanced as the new urban policy (Gualini & Majoor, 2007; Swyngedouw et al., 2002), LUDs have, therefore, been critically perceived as the embodiment of the domination of neoliberal market forces over urban development.

Large-scale urban development poses several important challenges to urban scholarship and practice, and requires serious negotiation of the urban planning apparatus: first, to the existing planning framework with regard to urban scale, accessibility, and public-private relations; and second, to its *modus operandi vis-à-vis* public participation in planning, the dominance of en-

trepreneurs in urban development, and renegotiating regulations. This contemporary phenomenon of large-scale urban transformation led Brenner (2013, p. 91) to suggest that “the urban can no longer be understood as a particular kind of place—that is, as a discreet, distinctive, and relatively bounded type of settlement in which specific kinds of social relations obtain.” Thus, since contemporary cities are complex, non-homogenous entities, urban theory should focus on “the processes through which the variegated landscapes of modern capitalism are produced” through complex socio-spatial relations (Brenner, 2013, p. 99).

LUDs are a form of making space in the city, space in which to live, work, consume and recreate. In order for urban planning to dutifully reinvent the necessary adjustment and balances, questions should be asked about whom these developments are for, who are the excluded, and what kinds of socio-spatial relations they generate. This thematic issue on LUDs and the future of cities attempts to address these questions and demarcate the challenges they present. The purpose of such an endeavor is not only to expose the failures embedded in large-scale urban development as a dominant urban policy approach, but also to single out the points at which local context, local needs and preexisting frameworks find their way into the process of development and redirect it, or have the potential to redirect it, away from a purely profit-driven end towards a more integrative understanding of various needs. In so doing, it aims to begin to articulate other possible planning practices that may be able to overcome the problem and injustices produced by LUDs.

The issue collects research work on LUDs from three different continents and nine states, namely Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Israel, Serbia, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, and the Netherlands. It offers analyses of planning processes, power dynamics, and spatial relations that produce various types of LUDs in different geographical locations. At the same time, by bringing together these different accounts, it establishes LUDs as a microcosm for understanding contemporary local-global, private-public, and even North-South interplay and negotiations.

The collection begins with Talen’s (2019) insightful commentary in which she utilizes one of the most prevalent manifestation of LUDs—residential LUDs—in order to look critically at present-day neighborhood planning. Talen distills large-scale planning of the ‘neighborhood’ down to its familiar and more implicit guiding elements. She proposes the ought-to-be practices that balance local, small-scale planning that includes bottom-up input, with larger, more comprehensive approaches to neighborhood planning.

In “Post-Socialist Urban Futures: Decision-Making Dynamics behind Large-Scale Urban Waterfront Development in Belgrade and Bratislava,” Machala and Koelemaij (2019) unpack entrepreneurial decision-making regarding LUDs in post-socialist capitals Belgrade and Bratislava. Waterfront LUDs processes in these two cities are compared in order to highlight a complex dy-

namic between local particularities and more global domineering forces. They show how particularities are ultimately flattened to pave the way for urban growth dictated by private interests.

Israel, characterized by hyper-neoliberalism and extensive large-scale development, is subjected to three critical accounts. The first is by Weinberg, Cohen, and Rotem-Mindali (2019), “LUD as an Instrument for (Sub)Metropolitanization: The 1000-District in Rishon-Lezion, Israel as a Case Study.” It offers a critical account of the neoliberalization of planning processes and investigates the process of planning a new multi-purpose LUD in a secondary city at the center of Israel. Tracing the development of the planning process, the authors show how a project that was aimed at addressing local needs evolved over time into a marketing tool to reposition the city as a sub-metropolitan center.

On the same theme of negotiating the influence of neoliberalism on local planning decision-making, “Large Urban Developments as Non-Planning Products: Conflicts and Threats for Spatial Planning” by Ioannou, Nicolaou, Serrao, and Spiliopoulou (2019) examines how in post-economic crisis Greece and Cyprus, LUDs are promoted as a means of attracting foreign investment. Overlooking local problems and needs, planning policies bypass spatial planning frameworks, making flexibility a determining factor in the approval of LUDs. Thus, the capacity of urban investment in LUDs as a solution for local problems is interrogated.

In “Housing in the Neoliberal City: Large Urban Developments and the Role of Architecture,” Majerowitz and Allweil (2019) illuminate relations between neoliberalism and LUDs as manifested in the architecture of residential LUDs. Through a case study analysis of the architecture of featured residential LUDs in Israel, the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain, they unravel the tension between variety and multiple choice on the one hand, and uniformity and replication on the other hand. By analyzing elements of design, they demonstrate how design is used as a marketing tool by differentiating certain residential LUDs from the ‘standard.’

Residential LUDs, as noted, stand out in their magnitude and visibility. In “Neoliberalism Meets ‘Gangnam Style’: Vernacular Private Sector and Large Urban Developments in Seoul,” Park (2019) examines the evolution of residential LUDs in South Korea up to their present-day domination of the housing market. Focusing on the wealthiest and most dense district, Gangnam, the article shows how while Western planning concepts are enthusiastically deployed, sometimes without constraint, they nonetheless remain in negotiation with local, more traditional urban systems and concepts, thereby begetting hybrid urban forms, which Park refers to as ‘vernacular neoliberalism.’

Finally, LUDs are not only producing new relations between urban actors, new forms, and new planning process and principles, but also new urban spaces. In “Urban Morphology and Qualitative Topology: Open

Green Spaces in High-Rise Residential Developments,” Eizenberg, Sasson, and Shilon (2019) offer a typology of the open space produced in residential LUDs in Israel. Their analysis of the spaces between the buildings, used for recreation, parking, and ornamentation, offers, in addition to their morphology, indicators with which to evaluate the overall diversity, accessibility and green quality of a residential LUD complex. The juxtaposed analysis of how these spaces are perceived and experienced by users provides important planning insights into their scale and composition.

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Commentary

## Large Urban Developments and the Future of Cities: The Case of Neighborhoods

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### Abstract

The production of neighborhoods on a large or mass scale has not been successful. Procuring the neighborhood ideal requires an attention to detail that few large corporations or government agencies seem capable of instituting. Yet planned neighborhoods have definite pluses: institutionalized leadership, clearly defined social and spatial boundaries, and a sense of control. What is needed is an approach that combines the best of both worlds—a dose of planning, with plenty of flexibility and local empowerment.

### Keywords

incremental urban development; neighborhoods; top-down planning

### Issue

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Large, corporate urban development deserves deep and careful critique. We can look at the experience of large-scale neighborhood development to better understand the intrinsic problems such developments engender. Planning for neighborhoods has always required certain nuances and sensibilities—nuances that large-scale master planning has rarely been able to muster. When mass produced or produced on a large scale, neighborhoods tend to be reduced to single-use, monolithic, and mostly suburban developments. In particular, the principles of mixed housing type oriented around communal space are usually dropped.

Successful emulation of the complete neighborhood ideal requires an attention to detail that few large corporations or government agencies are capable of instituting. In the US, the federal government ordered that housing be constructed in the form of neighborhoods starting in the 1940s, but the models were severely diluted. The government’s hugely impactful *Successful Subdivisions: Planned as Neighborhoods for Profitable Investment and Appeal to Home Owners* bulletin equated “subdivision” with “neighborhood” and directed subdividers to keep lots uniform in size and to “segregate uses,” because, despite the benefits for pedestrians, “short blocks are

not economical” (Federal Housing Administration of the United States [FHAUS], 1940, p. v). Listed as causes of depreciated real estate values and the “break down of neighborhood character” were business uses “invading residential areas” and “mixtures of apartments and detached dwellings” (FHAUS, 1940, p. v). There was an attempt at nuance—stores were to be “conveniently located within walking distance” and shopping centers were to be “restricted in extent” (FHAUS, 1940, p. v), but these subtle restrictions were not maintained by developers, and massive shopping centers surrounded by parking lots became the norm.

The whole proposition of planning by neighborhood became suspect. It was a rejection of the planned neighborhood—of thinking about how neighborhoods ought to be rather than simply affirming their existing form. Critics of the planned neighborhood assumed that its repeated failures in practice were endemic to the model—and especially, endemic to mass produced, large-scale development, about which there seemed little alternative.

What are the alternatives to large-scale, all-at-once, top down neighborhood development? What is needed is an approach that combines the best of both worlds—a

dose of planning, with plenty of flexibility. Planned neighborhoods have definite pluses: institutionalized leadership, clearly defined social and spatial boundaries, and a sense of control. Unplanned neighborhoods are likely to lack these advantages.

Unfortunately, nuancing the plan versus process balance that neighborhoods might benefit from has rarely happened. Neighborhood plans have instead been mostly wholesale, all-at-once, expert driven formulations. Missing has been the transfer of the neighborhood ideal in incremental terms—redeveloping existing places one block at a time. Urban planners never developed a language or methodology that could implement the ideals of neighborhood as a physical and social construct in a way that was not top-down—not about blueprints, but not limited to process, either—plan and process combined.

The complexities of this balancing act come into view in the attempt to rely on incremental change as a way of improving neighborhoods. If there is no understanding of how incremental achievement leads to the gradual building up of something whole, with no ties to neighborhood, small improvements may seem like piecemeal shots in the dark, benefitting one landlord, one property owner, one gentrifier at a time. Would these catalytic efforts be that much more effective if they were contextualized within an identified neighborhood? A top-down plan is not necessarily the answer, but a clearer connection to a defined neighborhood may help broaden and deepen these efforts.

Plan versus process reveals the tension between collective input that requires planning protocols, and the desire for an agile response in the form of pop-up shops, bench bombing, and painted crosswalks. There is a need for spontaneity and there is a need for representation that is fair and democratic. Perhaps, at least, an explicit understanding of neighborhood and its attendant notions of collective enterprise, responsibility, and ownership could help resolve the two extremes of centralized planning versus DIY intervention.

There is always the danger that small-scale efforts combined with a strong sense of neighborhood will be over-played, resulting in an escalation of housing prices and eventual displacement. Neighborhood

improvement without disruption and displacement is based on the idea that improvements must be defined by residents themselves.

Narratives surrounding climate change, sustainability, and resiliency could potentially help resolve the dichotomy that pits bottom-up authenticity against neighborhood plans and planning. Neighborhood-scale governance and control is important for environmentalism because neighborhood scale is used as a basis of sustainable practices—e.g., water conservation, groundwater recharge, recycling, energy efficiency, and food production. Individual actions matter too, but many sustainability and resilience goals require local coordination, where the scale of operations is at the neighborhood level.

The processes of neighborhood—tactical, empowering, bottom-up, environmentally-based—requires a defined—to some extent, planned—neighborhood. But it need not be large-scale and corporate. Individual possibility can be maximized, with minimal limits on opportunity and movement, within the context of bounded urban space. The goal of planners should be to derive an individualized urban experience composed of varying and unbounded social worlds, while at the same time recognizing that the form and design of the neighborhood—if it adheres to certain principles—promotes neighborhood identity and, potentially, civic identity and spirit.

This is the balance between process and plan that has to be found, a sense of neighborhood versus the freedom to engage, small-scale intervention that adds up, neighborhood identity that does not impose too much control and too much order.

### Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

## Post-Socialist Urban Futures: Decision-Making Dynamics behind Large-Scale Urban Waterfront Development in Belgrade and Bratislava

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### Abstract

This article discusses the implementation of two large-scale urban waterfront projects that are currently under construction in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) capital cities of Belgrade and Bratislava. Against the backdrop of post-socialist urban studies and recent reflections on urban or ‘world-city’ entrepreneurialism (Golubchikov, 2010), we reveal how both elite-serving projects are being shaped according to their very own structure and agency relations. Our comparative analysis unravels the power-geometry of the decision-making processes that reshape urban planning regulations of both transforming waterfronts. The path-dependent character of “multiple transformations” (Sykora & Bouzarovski, 2012) in the CEE region can, even after three decades, still be traced within the institutional environments, which have been adapting to the existing institutional architecture of global capitalism. Yet, at the same time, the dynamic globalization of this part of the world intensifies its further attractiveness for transnational private investors. As a consequence, public urban planning institutions are lagging behind private investors’ interests, which reshape the temporarily-fixed flows of capital on local waterfronts into landscapes of profits, politics and power. We argue that suchlike large urban developments, focused on promoting urban growth, accelerate the dual character of these cities. Thus, while the differences between both investigated case studies are being highlighted, we simultaneously illustrate how national and local state actors respectively paved the way for private investors, and how this corresponds to similar overarching structural conditions as well as outcomes.

### Keywords

Belgrade; Bratislava; large urban developments; post-socialism; state-rescaling; urban entrepreneurialism; waterfront transformations

### Issue

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### 1. Introduction

Across the globe, urban waterfronts have been flourishing in recent years. Their widespread, yet geographically uneven re-emergence corresponds with the intensifying absorption of financial flows of capital into real estate in general, and iconic large urban developments (LUDs) in particular. For already more than half a century, global

circuits of capital, knowledge and policies have been temporarily fixed on spatially shifting urban frontiers, transforming derelict post-industrial urban sites into mixed-use luxury spaces for the new urban upper-middle class to live, work and consume (Desfor, Laidley, Stevens, & Schubert, 2011; Hoyle, Pinder, & Husain, 1988; Marshall, 2001). The political-economic origins behind these urban transformations are rooted in the structural crisis of

Atlantic Fordism and the subsequent switching of capital into urban development. Real estate and LUDs became the key intermediary between expanding financial flows of capital on the one hand, and extraction of the ground rent on the other (Aalbers & Haila, 2018).

Waterfront redevelopment has become exemplary of this new type of capital accumulation (Merrifield, 1993; Smith, 1991). It has furthermore been shown that their emergence is facilitated through variegated modes of entrepreneurial state-actors (Harvey, 1989; Kipfer & Keil, 2002). One of the key justifications legitimizing these urban strategies on behalf of those is the urban growth narrative, fuelled by the alleged necessity of inter-urban competition. Thus, urban waterfronts became the prime symbols of the changing nature of urban policies, which increasingly target external resources, on which cities seem to have become essentially dependent.

While the vast majority of insights on waterfront redevelopment and urban entrepreneurialism are still primarily derived from studies in the Anglo-Saxon case studies, similar geo-economic strategies are increasingly being observed in cities that are currently on the aforementioned frontiers of transnational capital investment (Golubchikov, 2010). This includes cities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which are undergoing dynamic post-socialist transformations. While the underlying structural conditions behind these intra-urban changes are linked to very similar principles and mechanisms of contemporary capitalist urbanisation, the ways in which such redevelopments are eventually being implemented differ sufficiently, depending on the local cultural and institutional context (Peck, 2015; Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2013). Existing institutional legacies and traditions indeed lead to different power relations and decision-making practices, materialized outcomes, and socio-economic consequences. At the same time, however, the implementation of large-scale waterfront development projects in itself generally accelerates institutional changes, such as regulatory experiments, responsible actors, or public-private policy networks. It is precisely this changing institutional context, in other words state-rescaling (Brenner, 2009), that traditionally counts as one of the central emphases within post-socialist studies.

Post-socialism as a concept originally used to serve as an analytical lens through which one could interpret and conceptualize the fundamental political economic and socio-spatial transformations that emerged in CEE, immediately after the revolutionary changes in 1989. Despite the intensifying discussion on today's relevance of the concept as an analytical tool for empirical research, as well as its position within urban theory (Ferenčuhová & Gentile, 2017; Hirt, 2013), some scholars continue to argue in favour of the path-dependent nature of post-socialism. According to them, the on-going transformations in urban space, social practices and institutional arrangements respectively, are inextricably

linked to one another (Bouzarovski, Sykora, & Matoušek, 2017; Sykora & Bouzarovski, 2012). Rather than portraying post-socialism as an overarching spatial umbrella concept, it is argued that these multiple transformations have led to locked-in and path-dependent evolutionary trajectories of individual states.

In this article, we critically examine and compare the similarities and differences between two large-scale waterfront redevelopment projects: Sky Park in the Slovak capital of Bratislava, and Belgrade Waterfront in the Serbian capital of Belgrade. In particular, we aim to reveal how the structure-agency nexus in the decision-making processes behind the implementation of both projects re-shapes local planning regulations, and to what extent processes of strategic state rescaling are connected to the post-socialist context of both cities. We specifically look more closely at the capacities of urban planning departments to regulate and shape both LUDs that are currently under construction. This approach is supplementary to a number of previous studies that were conducted on these projects, which mainly focused on the lack of public participation and the regulatory and legal adjustments that were conducted (Grubbauer & Čamprag, 2018; Lalović, Radosavljević, & Đukanović, 2015). Our comparative study allows us not only to provide deeper insights into the structure and agency dynamics behind contemporary LUDs but also to contribute to on-going debates on 'actually existing' post-socialism. By recognizing the distinct political-economic trajectories that Slovakia and Serbia have undergone since 1989, we investigate to what extent the communist past still matters in contemporary urban development practices within their capitals. Furthermore, both cities generally remain underrepresented cases in urban studies literature, being in the shadow of other CEE cities such as Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw. For this reason, we believe that the insights presented in this article offer an original and valuable contribution to the ongoing academic debates on urban transformations in CEE.

The comparative analysis draws primarily upon carefully selected semi-structural in-depth interviews. Interviews were held with urban planning executives and experts in both cities, alongside a variety of other direct or indirect, public and private stakeholders. Additionally, for both projects, we conducted qualitative analyses of official planning documents and marketing materials, online media research, as well as attendance of public presentations.

We begin the theoretical part by discussing three mutually intertwined themes, all being closely interlinked to 21st-century global capitalism. Above all, we illustrate how contemporary capital accumulation on urban waterfronts in CEE is related to post-socialist state rescaling and the formation of urban entrepreneurialism. This is followed by the two aforementioned case studies and the decision-making dynamics behind the implementation of both LUDs. Subsequently, we address the similarities and differences between the two. The article

concludes with theoretical reflections based on the processes that we observed behind the implementation of both waterfront-LUDs.

## 2. From the Collapse of 'Equality' to the Entrepreneurial Spirit of 'Inequality'

The shifting narrative of an egalitarian, socialist society towards the animal spirit of competitive entrepreneurialism is being formed and domesticated in a variety of ways across the CEE region. After the implosion of the communist regime in 1989, individual countries underwent variegated trajectories on their return to capitalism. Liberalization of markets, deregulation of prices, privatization of public assets, and decentralization of power were only a few of the key measures that have triggered today's neoliberalization of the urban landscape within CEE. The post-socialist transition, thus consisting of multiple transformations (Sykora & Bouzarovski, 2012), can be put into parallel with what Brenner and Theodore (2002) called "institutional creative destruction."

Whereas the initial destructive forces in most cases dismantled the state's monopoly power and its institutional arrangements, the 'creative moment' of establishing new rules of the game alongside the political-economic integration into new centres of power, opened up new "spaces of engagement" (Cox, 1998). Deregulation and the dismantlement of the state in urban development contributed to the victory of an exchange over use-value, and therefore to losses of industrial heritage, real estate speculations, but also to an increase of socio-spatial inequalities. This era of 'roll back' neoliberalism fuelled the rise of antagonism among local citizens due to the lack of responsibility and transparency of municipalities in urban development in CEE (Peck & Tickell, 2002).

Yet, this initial phase of post-socialist 'roll back' neoliberalism has become a fertile ground for a second phase of the creative moment, namely 'roll out' neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002). This conceptual process, which has been widely observed across the North Atlantic during the early 1990s, is mainly characterised by entrepreneurial state leadership, new forms of governance, and the reform of regulations. One important precondition for such novel institutional arrangements is the emergence of the entrepreneurial city narrative (Jessop, 1998) which is currently increasingly embraced by political elites and policy makers throughout CEE. It is important to note here, however, that the exact transition between these two moments has a strong path dependent character, which justifies the lasting interests of scholars in actually existing post-socialism up until today.

The revolutionary changes that occurred in CEE from the late 1980s onwards indeed triggered essential scalar reconfigurations, so state-rescaling became a political strategy (Brenner, 2009). Similar to the hollowing out of the nation-state after the crisis of Atlantic Fordism in the advanced capitalist countries (Jessop, 2000), the transfer

of power in the majority of CEE countries, especially the ones entering the EU, went in both directions, upward and downward. This twin process is known as "glocalization" (Swyngedouw, 2004), and refers to the institutional restructuring from the national to a supranational and global scale, as well as to local, urban and regional scales, but also to the strategies of global inter-firm networks for their regional embeddedness. An important symptom of these structural changes of capitalism following the secular crisis in the 1970s, were changes in the nature of how cities were governed, resulting in place increasingly becoming an entrepreneurial asset (Harvey, 1989; Logan & Molotch, 2007). In order to obtain higher positions on several rankings of the inter-urban world hierarchies, cities have become increasingly competitive in attracting mobile resources through place branding strategies and thus became more commodified in themselves. Scholars have labelled these strategies enforced by cities with different terms such as "policy boosterism," adopting city-marketing and urban planning practices to globally circulating 'best-practices' (McCann, 2013); or "glurbanisation," which refers to place-based strategies specifying the glocal relations and searching for the niche in inter-scalar divisions of labour in the world economy (Jessop & Sum, 2000).

Based on all the above, it is important to realise that urban waterfronts have become not only passive recipients of the switching and fixing of capital, i.e., 'spatial-fix' (Harvey, 2001; Merrifield, 1993), but increasingly outcomes of neoliberal urban planning, and active entrepreneurial strategies on behalf of local governments (Hall & Hubbard, 1996; Jessop, 1997; Kipfer & Keil, 2002). They are, in other words, the frontiers where the capitalist and territorial logics of power meet each other (Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2006). This distinction allows us to separate the growth logics from entrepreneurial practices, as two parallel forces behind contemporary urban development (Lauermann, 2018).

Three decades since the collapse of communism is a sufficient time period for a qualitative evaluation of the relationship between the real estate industry and urban planning. In particular, which logics did urban planning adopt, and which trends can be traced in the changing relations between urban planners, politicians, and the real estate sector? Scholars interested in post-1989 urban development in CEE extensively discussed the lack of transparency in urban planning, the speculative business culture, and broadly speaking the 'socialisation of risks and privatization of benefits' which made property developers and private investors the winners of the transition (e.g., Brabec & Machala, 2015; Cook, 2010; Horak, 2014; Suska, 2015). The role of local governance was, during the 'roll back' phase of the transition, associated with terms such as ad-hoc, fuzzy, or acting in a "fire-fighter style" (Feldman, 2000). However, a gradual institutional consolidation and adaptation to territorial planning based on the competition between multiple actors over space has steadily, at least in more advanced CEE

countries, led to rather standard forms of public-private cooperation and approaches to urban planning. Today's formation of the entrepreneurial narrative frequently overemphasizes the role of the built environment in delivering socio-economic growth and prosperity. This entrepreneurial strategy, known as property-led development, fuels the integration of growth logics, driven by real estate actors, into urban planning practices (Heeg, 2011). Such approaches are enforcing the built environment as a policy tool, however, it often narrows the focus down to aesthetic aspects. It is in this context that we introduce the emergence of, as well as the decision-making dynamics behind the formation of two waterfront LUDs in Belgrade and Bratislava.

### 3. A Regulatory Captured Waterfront in Bratislava: Introducing Zaha Hadid

The fall of the Iron Curtain opened a new historically important chapter for Slovakia. Even among the rapidly transforming CEE countries, its trajectory is particularly dynamic. The democratization of society accompanied by the decentralization of power, the transition to capitalism, the formation of the sovereign state with the capital city of Bratislava, EU membership, and the change between three currencies with the Euro being the last; all these events were compressed into two decades after 1989 and triggered fundamental spatial and socio-economic changes. Moreover, these were even accelerated by neoliberal measures put forward between 2002 and 2006 by the right-wing government, especially by the Minister of Finance Ivan Mikloš, which boosted the economy alongside rising inequalities within the country. The Slovak capital has been benefitting from the uneven geographical development within the country by its rapid, though unsustainable, urban growth. The trap of the mushrooming suburban ring in the metropolitan region of the city has occurred simultaneously with dynamic intra-urban transformations (Sveda & Suska, 2019).

The contemporary waterfront re-development in Bratislava is driven by multiple project-centric and profit-maximizing interests of primarily domestic real estate developers. The waterfront has become a matter of prestige and symbolic power for local real estate developers, related to their position on the domestic property market, as well as the key urban frontier of profit maximization (see also Machala, 2014). As one of the interviewed executive managers mentioned: "Our presence among powerful players at the centre of the capital gravity is a necessity." The relationship between the interests of the real estate industry and urban planning regulators is especially poignant when it comes to the decision-making processes behind LUDs that have been emerging on the waterfront since the beginning of the new millennium. One of the most recent ones is the flashy Sky Park project, designed by Zaha Hadid Architects and developed by Penta Real Estate. The mobilizing narra-

tive behind the project searches for parallels with the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao. The Sky Park aims to become a new symbol of the city that attracts visitors and increases revenues of the city. However, as it will be shown, and contrary to the strong public alliance that stood behind the Guggenheim museum, the Sky Park is a project-centric initiative driven by a single real estate developer without any comprehensive strategy. Similar to other large-scale waterfront projects in Bratislava, this case reveals how the key decisions of public regulators were systemically developer-friendly. The evidence is illustrative for the on-going property-led waterfront re-development in Bratislava.

Unlike Copenhagen (Desfor & Jorgensen, 2004), Toronto (Laidley, 2007), or Hamburg (Schubert, 2011), the transforming urban waterfront in Bratislava is not led by any particular place-based strategy or public development agency. The strategic plan of the city itself has a questionable role in urban development. The executive manager of a large real estate developer active also in Bratislava expressed his experience with the following words:

I haven't really seen the strategic plan and I don't even know about this document. What we care about is the city land use plan and transport documentation—that's it. The strategic plan of the city is only a paper and the municipality does not foster any particular strategy in our negotiations. No-one really cares about strategic documents of the city, they are really something virtual.

Nevertheless, the narrative of the city's land use plan aims to reinforce the position of the city as "the new European metropolis on the Danube" (City of Bratislava, 2007, p. 5, part C), and the waterfront is a vital part of such planning regulation. Both city and regional-level planning documents highlight the representative functions of the waterfront, its high scenic value, above-regional importance, and the opportunity for extending the city centre. In particular, their land-use plans favour a concentration of congress centers, high-rise buildings, and headquarters of public institutions as well as transnational corporations on the waterfront. All things considered, urban planning regulations boost scenic and panoramic aspects of the waterfront through the emphasis on quality architecture, functions of high added value, and placement of the key institutions. As a consequence, the currently emerging entrepreneurial narrative, which overemphasizes the role of the built environment in delivering prosperity, is underpinned by the above-summarized framing of the city's land use plan.

The origins of the narrative introduced here can be traced back to 2008 when the Old City district initiated a zonal regulation for a roughly 22ha largely abandoned area known as the Chalupkova locality. The underlying urbanistic study, a planning document which formally precedes the elaboration of a zonal plan, had two key

ideas. First, an extension of mixed-use functions in this formerly industrial zone. Second, due to contaminated soil in the area (an environmental legacy of an aerial bombing of the Apollo refinery during World War II), the study suggested a conditional development. This meant a flexibilization of regulations (higher maximal indexes) in exchange for the decontamination of the soil. The completed study was delivered by the external author to the urban planning department of the city in 2008 and was supposed to serve as an underlying document for an update of the city's land use plan, as well as the compilation of the new zonal plan. However, it took twice as much time than it usually takes to finish the zonal plan, so only after 10 years, in 2018, it finally became a legal document (see Figure 1). During this period, Sky Park obtained all necessary permissions, so at the moment the zonal plan was launched, all had already been set.

In parallel to the compilation of the planning documents, the real estate developer organized an open private architectonic competition for the site between 2008 and 2010. The competition attracted some of the internationally well-known architectonic ateliers. The winning proposal, designed by Zaha Hadid architects, suggested amorphous solitaire towers for the site (see Figure 2). However, these became a central issue within negotiations between the investor and the urban planners, as the city's land use plan favoured here compact blocks of houses. This mismatch was raised by several urban planners, who openly questioned whether the final proposal is in line with the city's land use plan. They also admitted that the architect's celebrity reputation partly served as a powerful tool in the decision-making process. The role of urban planners has, according to some respondents, shifted from planners to lawyers due to



**Figure 1.** From left to right: The urbanistic study 2008; the approved zonal plan 2018. Source: The Old Town City District (2018).



**Figure 2.** Visualisation of the Sky Park project. Source: Penta Investments (n.d.).

asymmetric power relations behind the negotiations table. In other words, the profession has been reduced to a more legal, technical interpretation of the land use plan. Interviewed planners in non-executive positions of the city and city district who attended these negotiations respectively admitted that, “in the case of large-scale projects it’s like machinery and we are in the position of figurants.” Furthermore:

The negotiating power has, in production and enforcement of large urban projects, a critical role. The pressure of the powerful in negotiations accompanied by lawyers is often enormous....The degree of our influence in communication reflects or depends on the strictness of investors interests.

These statements offer important insights into the atmosphere of these negotiations and at the same time create a context in which the land-use regulation is re-shaped.

The eventual implementation of the Sky Park project is the result of multi-scalar power dynamics, built upon a series of developer-friendly decisions taken by the key decision-making regulators. First, the integration of the urbanistic study into the land use plan, led by the planning department of the city, was a highly selective process. According to the authors of the study, two important regulatory conditions were removed: (1) an upper limit for building heights, and (2) a buffer zone (30m) from a neighbouring electric transformer. Second, despite the fact that the city department of urban planning removed these conditions, and therefore softened the planning regulation, the city district could integrate them into the zonal plan (the zonal regulation is in the competence of city districts). Indeed, in 2012 the completed zonal plan was sent to the district authority, which is obliged to issue an official position to the legal and formal status of the zonal plan within 30 days. This is the last procedural step before the city district’s parliament can officially authorize the zonal plan. However, the district authority did not act within the legally bounded period, and thus paralyzed the zonal plan between 2012 and 2015. Several respondents, independently from each other, blamed the real estate developer for being in the background of the district authority’s inaction. Third, after the communal elections in 2014, the city department of urban planning and the newly elected mayor issued mandatory permissions for Sky Park between 2015 and 2016. Once a construction obtains such legal permission, it is mandatory for the city district to integrate them into the planning documentation. As the zonal regulation was not approved at that moment, the city district was obliged to do so. Thus, by issuing the mandatory permissions for Sky Park, the city secured the integration of the project into an already completed zonal plan, thereby torpedoing the efforts of the city district.

All in all, unravelling the role of individual scales behind the implementation of the Sky Park project illustrates how systemic the nature of the developer-friendly

decisions in the decisive moments really is. The city took the leading role in its materialization. It actively paved the path for the implementation of the Sky Park by a selective integration of the urbanistic study into the city land use plan, and by issuing the mandatory permissions it avoided the Old town city district. Thus the planning procedures, as well as the multi-scalar power dynamics, turned out to be highly favourable to facilitating the large scale project, which contributes to the maximization of the project-centric vision and ultimately the duality of the city. Finally, after 10 years, the Old town city district approved the Chalupkova zonal plan in February 2018, but it had zero effect on the Sky Park project

#### **4. Belgrade Waterfront: Where Authoritarianism and Entrepreneurialism Meet**

The idea of developing a large scale, mixed-use Waterfront area in Belgrade was first announced in 2012 by Serbia’s current president Aleksandar Vučić. Back then, he was taking part in the elections in order to become the city’s mayor. Despite his promises to bring an investor from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that was willing to help the city forward by developing an eye-catching real estate project on the city’s centrally-located but derelict Sava amphitheatre site, he did not become mayor that year. Soon after, however, Vučić did manage to rapidly pursue a successful political career by consecutively obtaining the positions of deputy prime minister, prime minister and eventually president. In the meantime, his political party (SNS) managed to gain an absolute majority on both the state and the local level. In this capacity, Vučić and his closest political allies have been able to appropriate the implementation of the project to a large extent, in collaboration with the Abu Dhabi-based transnational developer Eagle Hills.

Prior to providing more empirical details on the implementation strategies, institutional adjustments and the scalar power relations behind Belgrade Waterfront, it is important to note that the post-socialist trajectory that Serbia went through in the past three decades significantly differs from most other CEE countries. While the Yugoslav model of socialism already contained many differences as compared to other CEE states in the pre-1989 period, the tumultuous 1990s in Serbia were mainly characterised by war, state disintegration and international isolation. Hence, capitalism and democracy were to a lesser extent embraced. Instead, the former *nomenklatura* members for many years succeeded in maintaining their system of interlocking positions in the dominant political and economic spheres (Lazić, 2015). This is one of the reasons why land in Serbia, contrary to many other CEE countries, has remained state-owned (Hirt, 2013): an arrangement that dates back from a law that was signed in 1995. Although from the early 21st century onwards state monopoly over urban development was gradually to be replaced through processes of decentralization, privatization and entrepreneurialism (City

of Belgrade, 2003; Nedović-Budić, Zeković, & Vujosević, 2012), the state ownership of urban land designated for construction has as yet been untouched. This particular post-socialist legacy is not only an important backbone of power for the political elite, but it also provides exactly the institutional context that made Belgrade such an attractive destination for transnational real estate developers.

The eventual arrival of the foreign Belgrade Waterfront developer in 2014 did not go unnoticed. The promise of a 3.5 billion-dollar investment soon led to a lot of speculation and conspiracy theories amongst citizens and fierce opponents of the plan such as opposition politicians and excluded domestic architects. In the Belgrade Waterfront brochure that was soon released, Eagle Hills describes itself as a company that “develops flagship city destinations that invigorate aspiring nations, [h]elping countries raise their global profiles to new heights” (Eagle Hills, n.d., p. 8). Their chairman, Mohamed Alabbar, is a well-known real estate businessman from Dubai who possesses close ties to the UAE’s rulers (Buckley & Hanieh, 2014). In his capacity as chairman of Emaar Properties, another state-related developer, he has a lot of experience when it comes to LUDs in the UAE itself. This is important to note since the way in which Belgrade Waterfront is being implemented in terms of urban design (see Figure 3) marketing strategies (see Figure 4), as well as decision-making, is very reminiscent of how real estate development usually takes place in Dubai (see Acuto, 2010; Koelemaij, 2019). In order to allow this development to actually happen, the Serbian political elite facilitated a number of widely-contested institutional adjustments.

First of all, the fact that Eagle Hills suddenly arrived with an instant urban design for the Sava amphitheatre was, according to many opponents of the plan, conflicting with existing planning documents on behalf of the City Assembly, which required a public tendering process for an architectural competition. Secondly, civil servants from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade, who had been for a few years responsible for developing urban master plans, admitted in an interview that the new planning document that included, and thus ‘legalized’ the Belgrade Waterfront project, came on behalf of the Republic Agency for Spatial Planning:

The government of Serbia has made a decision to declare this part of the city an area of great significance. Basically, this kind of plan goes under the jurisdiction of the Republic. Not the city. The city has the master plan, and detailed urban plans: This is the main division of the plans in the city, but this special spatial plan [of “national importance”] is something that goes under the jurisdiction of the Republic. (See also Republic of Serbia, 2014)

Subsequently, in early 2015, a *Lex Specialis* was introduced (Republic of Serbia, 2015), which specifically served to facilitate Belgrade Waterfront’s development by issuing the building permit to start the construction while overruling existing laws regarding building conditions, such as the maximum allowed height of a building.

At the same time, the Republic of Serbia and Eagle Hills signed a joint venture agreement through which they established the Belgrade Waterfront Company. According to this contract, which was revealed to the



**Figure 3.** The ‘instant design’ of Belgrade Waterfront as presented within the original brochure. Source: Eagle Hills (n.d.).



**Figure 4.** A billboard close to the construction site, advertising the project. Photograph by the authors.

public several months later after on-going demand for more transparency regarding the project, Eagle Hills largely provides the financial ‘inputs’ along with dictating the urban design as well as the marketing and sales strategies, while the Serbian state was required to enable any means necessary for implementing the project. Decontaminating the soil and preparing the basic infrastructural utilities on the construction site are examples of the latter, alongside the aforementioned institutional and regulatory adjustments. Additionally, it appeared from the contract that the investor is leasing the nearly 80 hectares of land for a period of 99 years (Belgrade Waterfront Company, 2015; Grubbauer & Čamprag, 2018).

What started as a personal prestige project of contemporary president Aleksander Vučić soon resulted in a dynamic network of actors representing different scalar levels and institutional arrangements. While Eagle Hills exclusively co-operates with international partners for designing the project, the Serbian government arranges local construction firms. At the same time, responsible state actors are somewhat ambivalent about their level of interaction with the Eagle Hills head office in Abu Dhabi. This was mainly illustrated by the Mayor’s

Office Chief of Staff, interviewed in 2016, who simultaneously represents the Serbian government at the Belgrade Waterfront Company shareholders meeting, a position he obtained thanks to his close relationship with then mayor Siniša Mali, in turn a close political ally of Vučić. Besides acting as if the Serbian government, or in other words him, Mali and a number of others, were completely in control of everything, he was also willing to admit that some implementation practices were forced upon them ‘from above’ as well. One example hereof is the aggressive marketing campaign of the project across public spaces throughout the city, something which they knew would be disapproved of by many citizens, but still got pushed through by those with more decision-making power: “We are not dealing with that [advertising campaign], it’s an investor-story you know...they provide the finance and they’re taking care of the project, because that’s something that they do best, you know. We cannot do that.”

The local managers from the Belgrade-based Eagle Hills office (which later merged into the Belgrade Waterfront Company), interviewed in 2015, generally applied very similar justifying rhetoric as the Mayor’s Office Chief of Staff. Interestingly though, they admit-



ted that they were “positively surprised” by the amount of freedom that the Serbian government had provided them with. According to them, said the Head of Business Development and Sales: “They are willing to make our job easier, to an extent we usually do not get.” They furthermore argued that changes in the law were actually a necessity since the current investor climate in Serbia is not suitable for the fast-changing international property market. Hence, they kept emphasizing the importance of “speeding up processes, otherwise, it will never work.” They saw it as their biggest challenge to “change the mindset of the [Serbian] people,” which they believed was a lot more difficult than constructing the real estate, even though the “client psychology works the same everywhere.” This is why, besides targeting the Serbian diaspora as potential buyers and sharing optimistic numbers regarding their levels of pre-sales, they were also actively involved in strategies related to improving the public discourse on the project. At the same time, however, they also indicated that they were often receiving direct instructions from the Abu Dhabi-based head office, which again indicates the ‘scalar hierarchies’ underlying the Belgrade Waterfront project.

Within the scope of this article, there are a number of features regarding Belgrade Waterfront that are particularly relevant to highlight. It has been illustrated how local urban planning civil servants are largely excluded from the planning process, while previous plans are being overruled by newly established ‘special purpose’ plans that come along with legal and institutional adjustments. These are being justified by the investor and the responsible government actors alike by emphasizing the inevitable need to adapt to the rules of the game of contemporary global capitalism. Furthermore, Serbia’s particular post-socialist legacy, which is characterised by still very powerful central state institutions which also possess much of the land, has allowed Belgrade Waterfront to be implemented in ways that echo authoritarian, speculative capital-driven real estate development practices within the UAE itself. While several scholars have addressed the severe dual city realities that exist in the UAE (e.g., Acuto, 2010), many critical voices in Belgrade have raised their concerns about the alleged mismatch between the elite-driven Belgrade Waterfront project and the average purchasing power within the city. Besides, Stanković (2016) highlights the forced displacement of a number of residents from the future construction site, while creative entrepreneurs in the adjacent area of Savamala feel threatened by the project’s future spatial claims (Wright, 2015). In other words, one could indeed argue that the project will contribute, and is already contributing to urban dualities.

## 5. The Comparative Reflection

The urban waterfronts in both capitals are undergoing significant changes. At first glance, Bratislava’s Sky Park and Belgrade Waterfront are being shaped by fairly sim-

ilar processes. Not only do they overlap in terms of attracting a lot of external attention as mixed-use and eye-catching architectural LUDs that materialize capital flows and of eye-catching architecture, which are supposed to up-scale the cities’ global profiles (Golubchikov, 2010). They also contribute to the formation of the entrepreneurial narrative, backed by a property-led development and thus the emphasis on the role of the built environment in delivering future prosperity (Heeg, 2011). Alongside these similar features, however, there are a number of cardinal differences regarding the implementation of both projects, as a result of the local context they are situated within.

Waterfront redevelopment in Bratislava is an example of ‘naturally’ market-driven transformation, formed into multiple LUDs, and led primarily by domestic real estate developers. The entrepreneurial narrative, emphasizing the quality development of the built environment, is currently being intensified and is based on a selective and technical interpretation of the city land use plan. The entrepreneurial vision of Sky Park is driven by a single real estate developer which increases vulnerabilities regarding its potential failure (Doucet, 2013), and ultimately contributes to the production of dual socio-economic realities within the city. The multi-scalar power dynamics behind its implementation can be observed between the state (the city district authority which acts as construction authority), the city (the department of urban planning and the mayor), and the city district (the department of urban planning and the Districts’ mayor) scales respectively. The urban scale turns out to be the key vehicle delivering the project, although the state actor plays an important role by paralyzing the city district as well. The case study indicates that in Bratislava, ties between public and private actors are characterized by systemic developer-friendly decisions on multiple scales.

Belgrade Waterfront, on the other hand, is a strong top-down political strategy of a single LUD. Here, allied politicians and public institutions are actively involved through legal (a *Lex Specialis*) and institutional (the Belgrade Waterfront Company) instruments. The state scale is the key vehicle for delivering the project, alongside the UAE-based transnational developer. The project is significantly different from Sky Park in this regard. It has been legitimized as being of national importance (see also Čamprag, 2019), and through personal relations between the political elite and the transnational capital, it forms a multi-scalar growth coalition (Logan & Molotch, 2007). This particular power geometry is only possible due to the deviant post-socialist context of Serbia.

Despite the above-mentioned differences, the fundamentally uneven power-relations between real estate developers and urban planning regulation is strikingly similar in both cities. In both cases, regulators have systematically adjusted regulations in favour of the project-oriented interests of these LUDs.

## 6. Conclusion

This article has, first of all, illustrated that it is currently not rare to find cases of ambitious LUDs within CEE. We argue that whereas there is not an explicit growth narrative per se, urban planning is increasingly forced to be driven by rent-seeking interests of the real estate industry, justified by the entrepreneurial narrative of property-led development. The way these projects are being implemented, however, can differ significantly. These differences are still largely caused by inherited institutional practices from the past, or in other words the particular post-socialist trajectories that countries have taken.

Slovakia has undergone a historically dynamic trajectory during the last three decades. Alongside obtaining independence, the post-socialist transition followed the ‘shock therapy’ recipe, which was accompanied by the decentralization of responsibilities and competences to lower scales of government. Thus, widely-assumed processes of glocalisation indeed occurred, partly as a result of joining the European Union. In other words, the inter-related processes of state-rescaling and urban entrepreneurialism are to a large extent reminiscent of examples from the Anglo-Saxon context: local governments have become the dominant actors that are increasingly facilitating growth-oriented, property-led developments such as Sky Park. Since Serbia’s trajectory has been more chaotic, and generally more ‘deviant’ as compared to other CEE-countries, national-level state actors still have relatively much decision-making power, and thus local state actors are actually easily bypassed and overruled. In both cities, one can observe how urban planning practices have recently become dominated and dictated by logics relating to capital accumulation and a speculative form of world city entrepreneurialism (Golubchikov, 2010). However, since the associated state-rescaling dynamics are so different, this happens somewhat more subtle in Bratislava, while in Belgrade the way in which the project is being implemented is more authoritarian.

Structural drivers, related to globally circulating capital, policies and ideologies, are clearly present across cities in CEE. Once they touch the ground, however, they become ‘real,’ and differences start to emerge. These differences are caused not only by the important role of agency, as both our case studies also revealed, but also by the inherited, path-dependent institutional context. This article thus contributes to on-going debates on the applicability of structural, universal theories such as ‘actually existing’ neoliberal urbanism, as well as of overarching spatial concepts such as post-socialism. We argue that the latter can still be useful as a lens through which one could look at contemporary urban transformations within CEE since it allows you to grasp the structure-agency nexus. On the other hand, however, one should be careful not to take CEE for granted as a geographic region, since our research has proven that trajectories of individual countries within the region can be significantly different.

Urban entrepreneurialism has been observed across the North-Atlantic from the 1980s onwards. The contemporary entrepreneurial strategies in Bratislava and Belgrade are not innovative, but rather imitate property-led development from elsewhere. Many critical scholars, besides Harvey (1989) or Mollenkopf and Castells (1991), warn us that these tend to contribute to increasing dualities, which means that instead of the popular trickle-down growth-narrative, social and spatial inequalities may subsequently increase. Further research on this topic should, therefore, deal with the exact socio-spatial consequences of newly established Waterfront-LUDs across the CEE once they are finished within the upcoming years.

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Article

## LUD as an Instrument for (Sub)Metropolitanization: The 1000-District in Rishon-Lezion, Israel as a Case Study

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### Abstract

Interest in the role of large urban development (LUD) projects in regeneration efforts of cities has risen in recent years. Studies of their planning process have often focused on global cities, examining challenges associated with their joint (public–private) governance structure, as well as those emanating from the need to balance local and global needs and interests. With few exceptions, the ways in which these projects fit in with metropolitan aspirations of small and medium cities were largely overlooked. In this article, we explore how a large-scale project was used by local authorities to re-position a secondary city as a sub-metropolitan center. Using the case of the 1000-District (*Mitcham HaElef*) in the Israeli city of Rishon-Lezion, it argues that while the project was originally designed to resolve the city's scarce employment problem, it was gradually used to endow it with higher-order urban qualities, re-situating it as a sub-metropolitan center in the Tel-Aviv area. To support our argument, we focus on the project's housing and employment components, including changes they were subjected to along the planning process, as well as the marketing campaign, which sought to re-present the city as a viable sub-metropolitan alternative. Drawing on qualitative methods, including personal interviews and content analysis, the article illustrates how one city's large project is instrumentalized to attain metro-scale objectives. In so doing, it contributes to a nuanced understanding of the complexity of LUD planning, its stated objectives at various scales, and implications for actors in and beyond metropolitan jurisdictions.

### Keywords

Israel; large urban development; metrotalk; mixed-use planning; regeneration; secondary cities; (sub)metropolitanization

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### 1. Introduction

The past two decades have witnessed a considerable surge in the number and scope of large urban development (LUD) projects (Gualini & Majoor, 2007; Salet, 2008; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002). Alternately referred to as strategic urban (Salet, 2006) or mega (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2004) projects, they were loosely-defined as massive and expensive projects of (re)-development, whose construction may take a number of years and involve major changes in land use

(Fainstein, 2008). A salient manifestation of the “new urban policy,” which saw redistributive policies giving way to market-oriented approaches to economic development and competitiveness of cities (Gualini & Majoor, 2007), mega projects have spread quickly from North America and Western Europe to South-East Asian, Arab, and Latin American cities (Barthel, 2010; Dogan & Stupar, 2017; Paling, 2012; Shatkin, 2008), resulting in “global convergence” (Hwang, 2014).

For cities, foreseen physical, economic and cultural impacts have been key motivations for embarking on am-

bitious, large-scale projects. Projects are expected to garner urban competitiveness by producing inter alia larger stocks of service jobs, more aesthetically pleasing physical environment and a culturally positive urban image. From a scalar perspective, these impacts were seen as instrumental for re-positioning cities within regional, national or global urban hierarchies (Dogan & Stupar, 2017; Lehrer & Laidley, 2008; Xu & Yeh, 2005). However, relatively little attention was thus far paid to the impact of projects at the metropolitan level. Given that inter-urban competition is (also) waged between cities that are part of the same metro area, mega projects could well serve as a means for city-repositioning within it. This is particularly relevant in small countries, whose urban landscape is dominated by a handful of large cities which constitute the core of the metropolitan area and are surrounded by multiple smaller, non-core cities. Such is the case of Israel, where the four metropolitan core cities (Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Beer-Sheva) are surrounded by multiple secondary cities. Especially in Tel-Aviv, the past two decades have seen secondary, non-core cities implementing urban policies designated to improve their strategic position within—and beyond—the metro area. While some, like Holon, opted for an all-out re-branding campaign (Herstein & Jaffe, 2008), others—notably Bat-Yam—implemented a series of cultural mega-events to reverse its negative image and reinforce its competitiveness vis-a-vis other cities, in and beyond metropolitan boundaries (Eizenberg & Cohen, 2015). As the current study demonstrates, Rishon-Lezion (thereafter Rishon), the second largest city in the Tel-Aviv area, has instrumentalized a large-scale urban project to bolster its status and re-position itself inside its metropolitan hierarchy.

This article aims to examine how the planning of a large-scale urban development project promotes the metropolitan aspirations of a secondary, non-core city. Drawing on the 1000-District (*Mitcham HaElef*) project in Rishon, it shows how a project that was conceived with the aim of promoting distinct local (urban) needs, namely enhance the stock of urban jobs, became a tool for its re-positioning within the urban hierarchy of the greater Tel-Aviv metropolitan area. Specifically, it shows how—in the course of planning—the project has shifted from a limited scheme aimed at spurring urban employment to an ambitious initiative geared towards replacing Rishon as a sub-metropolitan (commercial and residential) center, that is able to compete with other secondary cities in the area as well as the core city itself.

The remainder of the article consists of four parts. Following a brief conceptual section on LUD projects, including challenges associated with its planning process, it contextualizes our case within broader urban planning trajectories in contemporary Israel. The third section analyzes the dimensions of employment and housing in the project's planning process, including the final marketing phase, exemplifying how a coalition of interests was formed that sought to use it for the purpose of metropoli-

tan re-positioning. The article concludes by discussing its main contributions and, where possible, outlines avenues of future research about the metropolitan effects of LUD.

## 2. Theoretical Background

In the last two decades, large-scale urban projects have become strategically important tools for city-(re) development. Traditional mega projects were used to describe “large-scale capital investments focused on a single purpose, particularly...transportation networks and power facilities” (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008, p. 788). However, in the middle part of the century (roughly from the 1930s to 1970), the term was extended to include highways, airports, train stations and even social housing projects. These were state-led and delivered, reflecting the Keynesian-inspired interventionist approach of the Fordist state that was dominant in Europe (Moulaert, Salin, & Werquin, 2001).

By the late 1980s, as economic neo-liberalization was unfolding, a ‘new’ type of mega projects emerged, which as Home (1990, p. 119) notes, included “huge private sector commercial development incorporating all kinds of land-use usually associated with a central business district.” Facilitated by deregulatory state policies and increasing market demand, the new projects soon proliferated to suburban and exurban sections of mostly Northern cities. Over time, projects have taken different governance structures, financing techniques and land uses (Olds, 2001). In an oft-cited symposium, Orueta and Fainstein (2009) argue that contemporary mega-projects take two main forms; the first is “based on the construction of a huge edifice with strong symbolic significance” (e.g., flagship museums), and the second “a larger scheme with complex contents (mixed residential uses, service industries, shared facilities, new transport facilities” (Orueta & Fainstein, 2009, p. 760). They argue that the new generation of mega-projects refer to schemes of waterfront regeneration (see Avni & Teschner, 2019), (re)development of manufacturing zones, construction of transport infrastructure or (re)construction of urban districts to meet the residential and commercial tastes of upper, middle-class groups. In line with this broad typology, Fainstein (2008, p. 768) loosely-defines mega projects as “costly scheme[s] for development of a contiguous area, requiring new construction and/or substantial rehabilitation,” which “may take a number of years” to complete and “always include a transformation of land uses” (Fainstein, 2008, p. 768).

While earlier studies examined mega-projects as win-win solutions for cities seeking to re-bound from decades of de-industrialization and social decay (Loftman & Nevin, 1995), more recent accounts have taken a more critical approach (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2004). Denigrated for their neoliberal logic, which helps turn entire city sections into highly regulated and privatized spaces of for the upper-middle classes, large urban

projects are seen as potentially contributing to new elite formations, residential displacement, and higher levels of social polarization (Gellert & Lynch, 2003; Moulaert et al., 2001). Other critics called attention to the democratic deficit of such projects (Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013), arguing that despite their nominally mixed structure of governance, in practice they sidestep social justice considerations, and strain public resources in the name of securing predominantly private gains (Siemiatycki, Rees, Ng, & Rahi, 2003). As Gualini and Majoor (2007) concluded a decade ago, “projects that share in a market-oriented competition rhetoric are often mainly publicly led and highly vulnerable with regard to shifting market interests, putting the burdens of financial investments and risks largely on urban governments” (Gualini & Majoor, 2007, p. 298).

Though projects are conceived to resolve particular local needs, like promoting physical rehabilitation of abandoned urban industrial zones left from the old zoning scheme, their impacts are typically felt at different scales. Light rail transit systems effect commuting choices of residents from adjacent cities (van Wee & Rietveld, 2013), and flagship museums draw patrons from distant parts of the region (Hamnett & Shoval, 2003; Loftman & Nevin, 1995), thus contributing to urban competitiveness. Such impacts are seen as instrumental to the re-positioning of cities within regional, national (inter-metropolitan) or global urban hierarchies. Xu and Yeh (2005), for example, examine how the provincial Chinese city of Guanzhou utilized mega projects to enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis other cities in the region, and Dogan and Stupar (2017) showed how three of Istanbul’s recent projects are aligned with development goals at the national scale, spelt out in the Turkish State’s Vision 2023. Drawing on the case of Toronto, Lehrer and Laidley (2008) demonstrate how its large-scale water redevelopment project was essential to generating economic activities and “establish the international presence of the city and its revitalization” (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008, p. 789). In some cases, though, mega projects that aimed to promote positive image at home and abroad were bound up with massive corruption and cost overruns (Orttung & Zhemukhov, 2014).

In contrast, and despite a surge of interest in the metropolitan scale and its economic development strategies (Kennedy, 2013; Salet, 2007), relatively little attention was so far paid to the ways in which mega projects are used in intra-metropolitan competition. Given that inter-urban competition is sometimes waged between adjacent cities in the same urban agglomeration, mega projects could well serve some of them for metropolitan re-positioning. This is particularly true in small and densely populated countries, whose urban landscape is dominated by a handful of large cities, which constitute the core of the metropolitan area and are surrounded by multiple smaller, non-core cities. Such is the case of Israel, where the four metropolitan core cities—Beer-Sheva, Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv—are surrounded

by multiple secondary cities (Shachar, 1998). Especially in Tel-Aviv, its principal metropolitan node (Razin & Charney, 2015), the past three decades have seen secondary, non-core cities implementing urban policies designated to improve their strategic position within—and beyond—the metro area. While some, like Holon, opted for an all-out re-branding campaign (Herstein & Jaffe, 2008), others—notably Bat-Yam, implemented a series of cultural mega-events to reverse its territorial stigmatization (Cohen, 2013), and reinforce its competitiveness vis-à-vis other cities, in and beyond metropolitan boundaries (Eizenberg & Cohen, 2015).

Recent years have seen a small but growing number of secondary Israeli cities making plans for costly, mixed-use mega-projects that aim to (re)develop a contiguous area by ways of new massive construction and/or substantial (brownfield) redevelopment. Salient examples, some of which are still subject to final approval by planning authorities, include *Tel-HaShomer* (Ramat-Gan), *Sirkin* (Petach-Tikva), *Techelet Beach* (Herzeliya), and *Western Quarter* (Lod). It should be noted that several of these mega projects are implemented on (urban) land recently evacuated by the Israeli military. Yet, with few exceptions, notably Jaffa’s waterfront redevelopment project (Avni, 2017), their planning trajectories have been understudied. Missing in particular are accounts that examine how secondary cities design, plan and instrumentalize projects to bolster their status and re-position themselves within the metropolitan urban hierarchy. The 1000-District project in Rishon makes a good case through which to explore these issues.

### 3. Methods

Our analysis focuses on the project’s planning process that had taken place between 2009 and 2018. It should be noted that its implementation phase, which began more recently, is beyond the scope of the article and so we are unable to assess whether it has attained its states objectives. To analyze planning, we employed two primary methods of inquiry.

First, content analysis of primary and secondary materials pertaining to the planning process (see Appendix). A common technique of qualitative data analysis (Mayring, 2004), content analysis allows a systematic, theme-based examination of data in social contexts and is especially suitable for geographical studies because it facilitates the testing of existing categories or concepts in new social environments. Two types of materials were analyzed. First, planning documents produced by pertinent agencies (e.g., local and District Planning committees) and protocols of meetings held by official bodies involved in the planning process (e.g., City Council, the Economic Company) were used, as well as the official website of the project. These documents allowed us to trace the official planning trajectory and examine the different stances articulated by partners with regards to the aims and outcomes of the project.

Secondly, relevant articles and ads appearing in local and national media outlets, usually in their electronic form (e.g., *HaShikma Rishon*, *Ynet*, *The Marker*) were analyzed. These complementary sources allowed us to go beyond the official planning narrative and helped us construct a sufficiently broad picture of the process.

A second primary methods of inquiry were the personal, semi-structured interviews conducted with senior officials who were directly involved in the process, including the chief architects, Deputy Director of the City's Planning Department, and the CEO of the Economic Company (see Appendix). Interviews were conducted in their offices and lasted approximately one hour. Interviewees were asked about their role and involvement in the project, interactions with other partners, the challenges faced during the planning process, and how they were resolved. Data obtained through interviews refined our understanding of the daily process of negotiation between partners to the planning process and shed important light on the motivations behind changes that were introduced along the way. They were then transcribed verbatim and content analyzed. In analyzing interviews, we paid attention to how informants conceive of the project itself, its stated objectives, and role in Rishon's metropolitan (re)-positioning.

#### **4. The 1000-District: An Urban (Re)Development Mega Project**

Although urban renewal in Israel is hardly a new phenomenon (for an excellent review of urban renewal policies through the late 1990s see Carmon, 1999), recent years have seen a frenzy of new projects. Motivated by, among other things, deteriorating conditions of apartment buildings, steady rise in land values, and population pressures, a plethora of cities have embarked on urban (re)development schemes in the past two decades. Fueled by "a neoliberal offensive on land-use planning" (Charney, 2017) and couched within a discourse of "creative destruction" (Fenster, 2019), renewal projects now dot the landscape of dozens Israel cities. While most are small-scale, single-use (residential) projects aimed predominantly to increase local housing stocks, others are significantly more ambitious, comprising of large-scale (excess of 1000 dunams), mixed-use (residential, commercial, and recreational) compounds. These mega-projects are typically executed by a steering committee (*Minhelet*) comprising representatives of private and public agencies. The Committee oversees a cumbersome planning procedure that entails considerable changes to the use of land, which often has numerous owners. This complex governance structure and the need to align multiple interests of urban, regional and national stakeholders make projects a tumultuous process of negotiation.

Although the majority of projects are intended to resolve specific local needs, like strengthening the urban economy or (re)aestheticizing a run-down neighborhood, they are typically used to secure wider, trans-


urban objectives. These objectives are increasingly defined in regional terms, reflecting as such the metropolitan aspirations of the city. For instance, Holon's new business center, which reinvigorates the city's partly vacant, old industrial zone by adding an assortment of new land uses, is promising to become "the logistical hinterland of Tel-Aviv...thanks to its location at the heart of the metropolitan area" (Hashikma Holon, 2019). Similarly, boasting over three million square meters of commercial, residential and office uses, Hertzliya's new business center promises to solidify the city's position as "a center of metropolitan employment" (see HR/2530 in the Appendix).

The 1000-District (see Figure 1) shares many qualities with large-scale projects mentioned above. Based in Rishon, the fourth largest city in the country and the second largest in the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area, it was originally conceived as a solution to its dwindling employment base. Fast population growth since the 1990s coupled with slow rates of job creation, led to a situation by which half of the local workforce was commuting beyond city boundaries, primarily to Tel-Aviv. Thus, whereas in 1990, 36% of residents were employed locally (see CBS5 and TMM 3/21 in the Appendix), in 2010, only 31% did so (see CBS1 in the Appendix). Municipal forecasts predicted that by 2030, approximately 80,000 additional jobs will be needed to increase the share of locally employed residents to 45% (see RZ/2030 in the Appendix).

Shortage of employment opportunities has long been a problem for Rishon, yet few attempts have been made to resolve it over the years. Only under Mayor Dov Tzur has the city begun tackling the problem more systematically. Upon his election in 2008, the Mayor set a vision of boosting urban employment to revive declining urban tax revenues. Simultaneously, he vowed to combat out-of-town commute, primarily to Tel-Aviv, and significantly reduce the negative, socio-ecological impacts associated with it. As the CEO of the city's Economic Development Corporation noted: "[The Mayor's] main concern was that more than half the...[working] population drives to Tel-Aviv daily, generating traffic jams, noise, pollution, [and] environmental damage" (PI1). Thus, it was economic and socio-ecological challenges, both of which adversely affecting the quality of urban life, that stood at the heart of the Mayor's new vision.

In line with his vision, in June 2009, the city issued a bid for planning a new employment compound. Its objective was to constitute the city's "main employment zone of advanced industries, combined with financial services and complementary uses" (see CH2 in the Appendix). In September, it was announced that *Yaad Architects* had won the bid. Their proposal, originally titled *The Dune Park*, consisted of an urban development project occupying a large contiguous tract in the Southwestern part of the city, owned co-jointly by the city and multiple private owners (it was about 1500 dunams, or 370 acres, comparable to that of mega projects in major European cities,





**Figure 1.** Tel-Aviv metropolitan area (A) and Rishon City (B). Source: Google Maps (2019); see also CBS3 in the Appendix.

like Zuidas in Amsterdam and 22@bcn in Barcelona; see Majoor, 2008).

The original plan, which, as we show below, was subject to various revisions, involved massive land use changes that were needed to create a large-scale, mixed-use (employment, residential, office, commercial, educational, and cultural) compound.

Planning began shortly thereafter, but the project itself was approved by City Council only in 2016. The reasons for the gap are twofold. First, bureaucracy combined with legal objections, who were submitted by parties to be potentially affected by the project, delayed the process. Second, the land allocated for the project was co-owned by the city (roughly half) and over one thousand private individuals. It should be noted that a co-owned land in this size is rare in Israel. Therefore, most urban mega projects are implemented on land that is owned in its entirety by public (city/state) or private agents. The city-approved plan was radically different than that proposed by *Yaad* Architects seven years earlier (see Table 1). Changes were particularly acute in the housing and employment dimensions of the project. In addition to considerable changes in the volume and composition of the residential component (i.e., apartments), there was a significant add-on to the number of proposed office space as well as number and types of foreseen jobs. These were to complement major commercial and recreational uses (e.g., restaurants, hotels, research labs and movie theaters) and substantial allotment for open public space like urban parks. The plan further stipulated that the project should be constructed in close proximity to Rishon’s active train station and (future) light rail stations, and major arteries, notably highways 431, 4 and 20, which dissect the city (Figure 2). Consequently, the grandiose project was described as an “alive and kicking compound with 24/7 life solutions” (see P12 in the Appendix), which would offer residents

and visitors “an innovative, lively and engaging urban life style” (1000muni, 2019).

To coordinate the arduous planning process, which required the involvement of planning committees at different scales (local, district and national), non-for-profit organizations, private corporations and multiple landowners, the city established a district administration (*Minhelet Mitcham*; see CH14 in the Appendix). As the next sections show, the administration orchestrated the local-turned-metropolitan urban (re)development project.

## 5. Findings

Rishon’s ambitions of playing a more significant role at the metropolitan scale preceded the project. Indeed, one of its current Masterplan’s key objectives is “ensuring quality of life for city residents by taking advantage of its location within Tel-Aviv’s metropolitan area” (see RZ/203 in the Appendix). Hence, quite early in the planning process it became clear that the project could be used to realize its metropolitan objectives. Over time and through a series of revisions in different realms, these objectives gradually crystallized. In this section we focus on two key dimensions, which were instrumental to the city’s metropolitan strategy, namely employment and housing. In addition, we highlight the role of the marketing campaign in ‘selling’ the project’s metropolitan qualities through what we term ‘metrotalk.’

In the realm of employment, it was project location and size, and type of jobs to be created in it, that became strategically important. Location was a key consideration from the outset. While the planning team initially considered creating smaller number of jobs at each of the city’s five industrial zones (Electra, Northeast, Ramat Eliyahu, Sorek and Western), it was rejected in favor of concentrating employment in one, new compound. One



Figure 2. 1000-District mix-uses. Derived from CH5, CH6 and CH11 in the Appendix.

reason for this was the poor image of some of the existing zones as hubs of traditional industries, which offer primarily blue-collar jobs. Electra industrial zone, for example, primarily consists of small-scale carpentries, auto shops, metal shops, and printing houses. Thus, concerns about being associated with a dated zone, whose economic value is relatively low and suffers poor infrastructure, including water, electricity and sewage, were compounded by the fear of exacerbating urban congestions along main roads leading to most of them. The chosen location, in proximity to current and future transportation networks, including cross-metropolitan highways (4, 20 and 431) and railroads (both south/northwards) were instrumental to promoting the project as a major hub of employment that is easily accessible from all parts of the metropolitan area. Finally, the composition of landownership in some zones was detrimental to the designation of certain land uses that may not be commensurate with

the interests of private owners. The chosen location, in contrast, which was co-owned by the city, facilitated a quick designation of the land for more profitable uses. As Mayor Tzur explained in a recent interview, implementing the project in a new compound, outside existing industrial zones would be beneficial not only because of the corporate tax it would generate, but also because “[s]elling the land [to corporations] would [generate] a lot of money for the city, between 2 and 3 billion NIS” (Ynet Rishon, 2019).

The physical size, both absolute and relative, of the project was also a sign for the metropolitan aspirations. Absolutely, in line with the Mayor’s vision, the project was meant to increase employment opportunities in the city. However, while the masterplan projected that the number of additional jobs needed to ensure urban economic stability was 80,000, planners set the bar much higher. Consequently, by 2013, the project was set to pro-

vide more than double that number, nearly 190,000. Not surprisingly, the surge was promoted aggressively by the city, primarily the Mayor, because, as the chief planner argued: “[H]e had a dream of making Rishon into a sub-metropolitan employment provider, [and so he pushed for] a large and powerful zone” (PI3). The Mayor’s vision, however, corresponded with that of the District Planner, which conceived of Rishon in regional terms as “a metropolitan primate city, that provides services beyond its residents and as such its economic dimensions were weighted in relation to other [neighboring] cities and it was found that it needs an improvement in the project” (see RPI3 in the Appendix).

It should be noted, though, that Rishon’s grandiose plans were not always well-received by neighboring cities. Indeed, some of them expressed serious concerns over its metropolitan aspirations and their potential repercussions. The objection of Bat-Yam, for example, its northern neighbor, were particularly noteworthy. A struggling municipality, Bat-Yam claimed that the project constitutes an “unfair competitor” to its own renewing business area and could potentially hamper its ability to fully realize its economic potential (see RPI1 in the Appendix). In response to the objection, which the court eventually rejected, the District Planner reiterated Rishon’s aspirations, noting that they must be understood in light of its justified efforts to gain a better hold over the metropolitan arena. The implementation of the project, she argued, “is appropriate and necessary at the local level given population increase and development patterns of the city, and at the regional [metropolitan] level, because of its national accessibility, as pointed out in...its masterplan” (see RPI1).

Relatively, the project was planned such that it is considerably larger—in both total size and area designated for office use—than most other employment zones in the region. Specifically, it was intended to surpass the metro’s two most profitable zones, namely *Atidim* in Tel-Aviv and *Gav-Yam* in Herzliya (see Table 2). Both are prosperous and quickly expanding hubs, which host some of the largest tech firms in the world, many of which are well-known for their ground-breaking innovations in information technology, pharmaceuticals, media and communication. The project’s location, one official claimed, would facilitate “transfer of businesses from Tel-Aviv to Rishon” (see CH4 in the Appendix, p. 231), and enable the city to become a “powerful hub...that [would] compete with employment areas in Tel-Aviv or Herzliya” (PI3).

The chief architect similarly declared: “In the future, it [the project] will attract from Rishon and nearby areas, meaning [it will] change the metropolitan picture” (see PI4 in the Appendix).

Beyond size and location, the project was to attract ‘creative’ firms (and professionals) associated with economically successful cities (Florida, 2002). In this spirit, the planning team was determined to entice prestigious firms in high-value economic sectors, including finance, insurance, and information technology (see CH6 in the Appendix). This, as noted above, stood in sharp contrast to the type of jobs the city attracted historically, including light industry, retail, and wholesale. Indeed, in the 1990s and 2000s, Rishon had the highest number of retail space per resident in the country and was known as Israel’s “Mall Capital” (Ynet, 2018). The project was to change its image. The change was recently described as follows: “The city, which was, until recently, Israel’s Mall capital is destined to become an alternative to Tel-Aviv, sweeping...not just headquarters of major banks, but many leading high-tech firms” (Ynet, 2018). Similarly, one of the project’s largest land sale bid defines to future landowners that “[new] modern offices will be built...that [will] address the needs of high-tech firms and enable them to draw clients from the entire [metropolitan] region” (CH14 in the Appendix).

Metropolitan ambitions were also evident in the project’s housing dimensions. Though the original plan aimed to create a primarily employment zone, it gradually shifted into an all-out mixed-use scheme. Changes had twofold motivations. First, from a planning perspective, adding a residential component, it was hoped, would diversify its functionality, stimulate ‘round-the-clock’ activities and distinguish the project from comparable, employment-oriented projects in neighboring cities (e.g., Holon). Secondly, the project emerged within the socio-political context of Israel’s 2011 social protest, which revolved primarily around the country’s so-called “housing crisis” (Charney, 2017). Against this backdrop, the city was pressured by the District Planning Committee to strengthen the project’s residential dimension, thereby help alleviating housing shortages (and rising prices) in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Consequently, while the original plan set the number of residential units at 1,500, it had gradually increased to 2,000 (in 2010), 2,500 (in 2014), 2,900 (in 2014), 4,900 (2015) and, finally, 5,500 (in 2016; see Table 1). In the words of the chief architect: “We started out with

**Table 1.** Offices versus apartments: Changes during the planning process. Derived from CH1, CH5, CH9 and RPI2 in the Appendix.

	6.2009 (CH2)	7.2010 (RZ/2030)	6.2014 (RPI2)	2.2015 (CH5)	3.2016 (CH10)	4.2016 (RZ/1000)
<b>Offices Area (m<sup>2</sup>)</b>	100,000 (Jobs)	1,750,000	1,750,000	Extra 13,652	1,750,00	1,750,000 (188,000 Jobs)
<b>Apartments (units)</b>	1,500	2,000–2,500	2,900	4,900	5,500*	4,900

Note: \* Including 500 units from Ramat-Eliyaho to the 1000-District (transfer-plan).

1,500...[that was] before 2011, but when we reached the District [Planning] Committee, it was after...the social protest and the Chief Planner kept pushing us, 2,500 is not enough, raise it to 3,000, 3,500, and that's how we ended up with 5,000" (see PI3 in the Appendix).

In addition to their number, the District Planner demanded that future units be suited for different populations. Alongside the traditional, profit-maximizing large units (120 square meters), advocated by the city, she required that smaller (70 square meters), more affordably priced apartments are added (see RPI2 in the Appendix). The latter were seen as vital for the attraction of socio-economically strong groups, necessary for the creation of a vibrant and productive urban community. As the city's Chief Planner explained, the main purpose was to court specific groups: "We wanted IT professionals to come [live] here and, eventually, work here because [it is] such an innovative neighborhood. [They would] buy apartments here...close to the beach and...[would] have everything they need 24/7" (see PI3 in the Appendix). Underscoring proximity to the beach and 'round-the-clock' amenities was a calculated attempt to position the city—and the project, more specifically—as viable alternatives to the free-spirited, beach-front urbanism that is typically associated with Tel-Aviv, Israel's world city in the making (Kipnis, 2004).

Embracing a larger, more diverse residential component was the result of both top-down, political pressures and a growing realization that it was essential for the attraction of so-called 'quality populations.' The latter were perceived as critical for the success of the project and for its ability to re-position the city as an upper-middle class community at the southern edge of the metropolitan area.

Nowhere were metropolitan aspirations more evident than in the strategic planning and marketing campaign. By 2015, as the planning process was drawing to an end, the city hired Aman, a Tel-Aviv-based firm specializing in 'smart' urbanism to prepare a strategic plan. Two international consulting firms had soon joined in to assist in the preparation of the overarching plan. Alongside ARUP, a world-renowned expert group "working across every aspect of today's built environment" (ARUP, 2019), Bechtel, a global engineering, construction and project management conglomerate was subcontracted. Assembling an international team, we were repeatedly told, was an early signpost that the city "was setting the bar higher" (see PI3 in the Appendix).

The international team has soon shifted some of the project's core elements. One of its earliest recommen-

dations, for example, was to change the project's name. Originally titled the *Dune Park* after the sandy hills that were characteristic of the city in its early days, it was renamed the 1000-District. In Hebrew, *HaElef* means both 'one thousand' and 'the millennium.' The new name reflected the innovative, forward-looking nature of the project, which the team sought to highlight. Explaining the idea behind the new name, the chief architect noted:

We made every possible effort to move away from the image of a [traditional] employment zone...to create an urban district experience....[We] needed to take a name that...was partly stuck in the past—an industrial park—and turn it into a [new] borough, an urban district. (see PI4 in the Appendix)

Furthermore, to ensure meeting international standards, the team explored similar projects around the world. Drawing on the experience of cities like London, Riyadh and San Francisco, it has incorporated globally popular planning principles like walkability, gentrification-mitigation strategies, and 'green' building codes (see CH4 and PI1 in the Appendix; see also Figure 3).

Nominal and conceptual changes were followed by an intensive marketing campaign. Geared towards residents of—and firms located in—the entire Tel-Aviv metropolitan area, it involved circulation of brochures and pamphlets, and advertisement in local, regional and national outlets. In addition to traditional marketing goals, namely enhancing project visibility (see CH10 in the Appendix), the campaign aimed to solidify the image of the city as a sub-metropolitan center. The costly scheme utilized multiple mediums, from print and online social networks (e.g., Facebook) to public billboards and e-magazines, to re-position Rishon as a viable alternative to Tel-Aviv. It is against this backdrop that Mayor Tzur has recently called "on companies and entrepreneurs to become part of Israel's new metropolis" (Danieli, 2018), and a leading economic journal urged its readers to "come invest in the future" because "once in a millennium, a carefully planned new metropolis is born" (Hirsh, 2019).

Rather than a project, or a compound, campaign ads have consistently used the word 'metropolis' or 'metropolitan area,' producing as they may a new type of discourse, which we term 'metrotalk.' The new discourse, we argue, draws on a new set of formations, namely representation of knowledge about particular objects (Foucault, 1980), which re-imagine the project—and Rishon, more broadly—as the new centerpiece of

**Table 2.** Employment zones. Derived from HR/1900, TA/3561 and RZ/1000 in the Appendix.

	Size (dunams)	Offices Space (square meters)
<b>Atidim</b>	346	250,000
<b>Gav-Yam</b>	650	725,000
<b>1000-District</b>	1000	1,750,000

**Updates between plans:**

1. More apartments : From 2,900 to 5,500 units; full public services with 24\7 life around the clock;
2. Mix-use diversity of buildings, purposes, diversity of apartment size, diversity of communities, diversity of jobs, diversity of shapes and size,;
3. Modern accessibility: "Last Mile" re-planning, from the train station to the district's center; More small streets to walk in, open to the street and not close to inside;
4. First ring around train station to be build first and present Urban Life from the first step;
5. Millennium Branding; internal street branding and massive marketing outside the city;

2010 plan (CH5)



2010 Name: "DunePark"



2016 plan (CH6)



2016 Name: "1000 District"



**Figure 3.** 2010 Local Needs Plan versus 2016 Metropolitan Plan. Derived from CH5, CH6 and CH11 in the Appendix.

the wider urban assemblage. By underlining its physical centrality and extensive transportation and logistical linkages with the entire metro area, it sought to convince (residential and commercial) out-of-towners, that a new urban, indeed metropolitan, geography with Rishon at its core, is well underway. Thus, for instance, ads posted on the user-friendly website 1000muni insisted that there were very few reasons to commute to Tel-Aviv because the 1000-District is "a diverse, exciting metropolis at the center of the country, which offers accessibility and...flexibility...and simultaneously saves its residents and employees the dreariness of conventional employment parks and the suffering of traffic jams" (1000muni, 2019). The website also features a short video (titled *1000 in the Center*), which mocks Tel-Aviv's centrality, asking defiantly: "Being at the center is great; but what's it worth, if it's incredibly difficult to get there?" (1000muni, 2019).

In one of the most ambitious public campaigns seen in Israel, humongous billboards were deployed throughout Tel Aviv and neighboring cities (Figure 3). Located primarily around main metropolitan arteries, billboards included a daring slogan, which challenged Tel Aviv's position as the only metropolitan hub, calling the project "a new core center for the metropolitan area." The witty message was invariably echoed in speeches and interviews conducted with city officials. One of the major real estate developers in the project, for instance, quoted competitive rents, low tax rates and easy access from the entire metropolitan area as the main motivations for the relocation of Tel Aviv-based firms to Rishon. Similarly, Raz Kinstlich, the recently elected Mayor, claimed that the majority of employees in Tel-Aviv are in fact residents of the metro's southern cities and would therefore "prefer to work in Rishon" (see CH14 in the Appendix).

In line with its plan to re-position Rishon within the metro area, the city has been aggressively pursuing sectors that have long been associated with Tel-Aviv, namely banking and insurance. Initial efforts have been quite successful, as the first several bids were won by the Discount Bank Group and Migdal—Israel's largest insurance corporation (Hashikma Rishon-Lezion, 2019). And, while it is still early to predict whether these are early signposts of success in re-structuring the (economic) geography of the Tel-Aviv area, it is clear that the project is stirring metropolitan relations in quite a different direction.

**6. Conclusion**

The article examines how a LUD project whose original purpose was to address challenges at the city-scale became—in the course of the planning process—a means to attain goals at the metropolitan scale. Using the 1000-District in the second-tier Israeli city of Rishon as a case study, it explored how the project, conceived to mitigate local employment shortages, has gradually become a springboard for metropolitan re-positioning of the city. Focusing on project's employment and housing dimensions, as well as its marketing campaign, we argued that planning a disproportionately large number of jobs, and agglomerating them in a single, massive and highly-accessible site was intended to endow the city with higher-order urban qualities and, consequently, position it as a viable sub-metropolitan center that is capable of competing with other existing sub-centers and the core city itself.

With respect to housing, initial resistance to residential units had gradually faded, as the city was pressured—professionally and politically—to plan a mixed-use scheme that would draw residents and customers from

across the metropolitan area. Subsequently, a powerful marketing campaign was initiated that centered on the innovative qualities of the project, emphasizing its metropolitan ambitions. Utilizing ‘metrotalk,’ a set of narratives that re-imagine the project, and the city, as a potential sub-center of the wider metropolitan area, it underlined their physical centrality and extensive linkages with other cities. In doing so, it sought to convince residential and commercial entities that a new metropolitan geography with Rishon at its core is being formed.

The article makes three important contributions to the literature on LUD projects. First, in contrast to much of the literature, which examines their impact at the regional, national and global scales, we focus on their metropolitan implications. The metropolitan scale is important because large projects are key tools in contemporary inter-urban competition, which is increasingly waged between adjacent cities in the same urban agglomeration. As we have shown, the 1000-District was used instrumentally to advance Rishon’s status and prestige in relation to a range of cities in the metropolitan area. In addition to the core city of Tel-Aviv, which the project intended to draw residents, workers and firms from, other secondary cities, including Herzliya, Holon and Bat-Yam were to be adversely affected by it, mostly economically. The objection of the latter, though unsuccessful, was especially significant because it signaled the sense of threat experienced by nearby cities in the context of intra-metropolitan fragmentation. Yet, the fragmented nature of Israel’s main metropolitan area is hardly unique. Indeed, since many city-regions are being carved up into multiple, smaller urban fractions, many aspiring for their own grandiose projects, assessing their implications for the entire metro is of imminent importance. Future studies should scrutinize these negative implications more closely, including the mechanisms to moderate them.

Second, while the majority of studies have looked at large-scale projects planned and implemented in global cities, or city-regions, our article focused on a secondary, non-core city within a metropolitan area. Focusing on a secondary city is important not simply because it is smaller in size or located lower in the urban hierarchy, but primarily because these qualities present it with major challenges in planning and implementing a large urban project. As the case of Rishon demonstrates, secondary cities faced with the physical, financial and institutional complexity of such projects, are not only required to mobilize considerable resources, but simultaneously face key hurdles in their dealings with planning stakeholders at different scales. From concerns about the economic repercussions it might have on adjacent, less well-off cities to difficulties in fending off district-level planning regulations, smaller cities are often less equipped—economically, politically, and administratively—to handle the acute pressures that emanate from the erection of large projects. Hence, given the steadily increasing number of secondary cities (in Israel and beyond)

who embark on such projects, future studies should pay closer attention to these unique difficulties and, where possible, devise urban strategies to mitigate them.

Finally, the article underlines the importance of discourse in LUD projects. The role of discourse in urban planning has long been acknowledged (Tett & Wolfe, 1991), but for reasons that are beyond this article, it received relatively little attention in the context of large-scale development. However, since re-positioning a city is as much a material process as it is discursive, we attended, however briefly, to the ways in which the 1000-District was constructed as a metropolitan project. Especially during the marketing phase, the project—and the city—were portrayed as the new metropolitan core. Taking on Tel-Aviv is an ambitious plan and, given its entrenched status as Israel’s financial, commercial and cultural powerhouse, no one project could realistically pretend to accomplish it. Yet, Rishon’s ‘metrotalk’ should be seen as a strategic discourse, which attempts to reposition it within the metropolitan grid. Further research will tell whether the project had lived up to its promise “to change the map of Gush Dan [Tel-Aviv metropolitan area]” (1000muni, 2019).

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#### Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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## Appendix

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Article

## Large Urban Developments as Non-Planning Products: Conflicts and Threats for Spatial Planning

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### Abstract

The article approaches different concepts of Large Urban Developments (LUDs) as products of the notion of a “spatial fix” (Harvey, 2001), which explains why built or natural environments can be deployed in the process of creating opportunities for new investments. Greece and Cyprus are two countries in the south of the European Union that underwent delayed urbanisation and significant land fragmentation in the form of small size private ownerships and with limited experience in comprehensive development. Greece has adopted a well-structured but complex spatial planning system, bureaucratic with limited effectiveness, adaptability or flexibility of delivery processes. On the other hand, Cyprus has a flexible but centralized system, effective in processing change but problematic in regulating quality in the built environment. Both countries recently experienced major financial crises. In the early 2010s, both governments promoted, as part of an economic recovery policy, extensive real estate development on public or privately-owned land with emphasis on LUDs as ways of addressing economic shortfalls. Inappropriately, LUDs have been primarily “conceived” as opportunities to attract foreign investments rather than a means of tackling crucial current deficiencies. New spatial planning frameworks merely add greater “flexibility” to the system in order to accelerate large private real estate investment. The article attempts to reveal, through case studies’ reviews, the impact of LUDs in countries with no infrastructure or experience in accommodating large-scale investment. It explores how the experience in Greece and Cyprus differs in terms of the relevant legislation adopted, the effectiveness in fulfilling its primary objective in attracting investment, and what are the possible social and environmental consequences on the planning acquis.

### Keywords

large urban developments; planning framework; spatial fix; spatial planning

### Issue

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### 1. Introduction

The main objective of the article is to investigate processes and delivery models of Large Urban Developments (LUDs) in Greece and Cyprus. LUDs, in terms of their economic reasoning, are approached through the notion of “spatial fix” (Harvey, 2001). Both

European Union (EU) countries experienced a serious economic recession during the early 2010s and used means of prioritization in attracting global real estate investment as one of their main recovery policies. A distinct difference, which makes for an interesting comparison, lies in the impact of institutional and planning frameworks in the development process and outcomes.

The Greek planning appears to be significantly influenced by local interests/pressures which often shape the outcome of LUDs, whereas in Cyprus top-down decision making is strong and decisive in swiftly delivering projects. Key questions are: How far do the temporal trajectories of each case lead to different forms of spatial development? What are the terms of reference in each case? And what may be the future of long-term planning practice?

The article begins its investigation from a critical assessment of the top-down planning systems of both countries focusing on the planning tools that promote the effective implementation of the LUD policy. Comparative conclusions are drawn from the evaluation of three aspects of current practice: the nature of planning frameworks; how effective they are in delivering LUDs; and what the impact would be on the associated physical and environmental contexts. Key differences between Greece and Cyprus in LUD practice, like the preferred locations and development types, are highlighted.

Case study evaluation is one of the key methodological tools which focuses on parameters such as the relevance of projects to their wider conventional spatial and planning contexts, the discrepancies in the way special issues arising are managed, the consideration of environmental implications, the effective policy delivery in relation to initial objectives and, finally, the views of local communities in considering their associated values and impacts.

The article attempts to verify whether the comprehensive added value of LUDs for these regions is a positive aspect or if it simply constitutes a “spatial fix” of global economic activity.

## 2. Global Challenges, New Requirements for Spatial Planning and the “Spatial Fix”

During the past decades, a surplus of global investment funds alongside the supposed “security” of real estate investment became the basic premise for a trend, which can be observed worldwide, combining “ease” and “attractiveness” in property investment practices (Sisson, Rogers, & Gibson, 2019). Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) have become a crucial agent of economic development and competitiveness among cities and regions. Between 1990 and 2011, FDI increased almost 200% globally (Kalafsky, 2012). During the same period, an increasing proportion of wealth—almost 8% of the global GDP—was kept in offshore domains, seeking opportunities to launder itself through a network of companies and service providers that use real estate and property investment as a preferred vehicle (Cooley, Heathershaw, & Sharman, 2018). In this context, LUDs created a sophisticated economic strategy involving global real estate agents, research centres, engineering and software development firms, material and construction system providers, etc. (Nethercote, 2018). Furthermore, global forums such as the Council of Tall Buildings and Urban

Habitat (CTBUH) promote the idea of LUDs. CTBUH is active worldwide as a resource for professionals supported by influential global stakeholders: 26 of them come from Italy, Spain, France and Greece; 15 from Israel, Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt. This probably indicates an emerging global interest for this type of development in the Mediterranean Region.

Financial downturns contribute to the transformation of this latent dynamic into political pressure for the introduction of emergency planning frameworks. In most EU countries, a combination of re-forming and bypassing restrictions of formal planning was the answer to this new challenge (Reimer, Getimis, & Blotevogel, 2014). In this context, Greece—and to a lesser extent Cyprus, where the national economy was operating for several years under bailout programs—fast-tracked the design and adoption of special planning tools associated with real estate investments on public and private land in order to increase attractiveness for investors (Serraos, Greve, Asprogerakas, Balabanidis, & Chani, 2015). Factors such as the attractive and, in many cases, unique coastline, the Mediterranean climate, natural beauty, tax incentives and a tourism industry with a potential for growth created quick and easy investment channels.

Harvey describes how the global boom-bust cycles in the built environment related industries facilitate temporary “fixes” of the capitalist system, smoothing crises caused by over-investment or over accumulation (Clarno, 2019). The idea of “spatial fix” (Harvey, 2001) explains why built or natural environments can be deployed in the process of creating opportunities for fresh investments in order to absorb the pressure of the global over-accumulation (Jessop, 2010). Furthermore, Mayer (2017) highlights that major actors that develop cities and regions as mediators of global capital often form powerful alliances that assist in prioritising their interests rather than those of the local population (Büdenbender & Golubchikov, 2017).

In this context, the impact of “territorial entity” and its different temporal trajectories are extremely effective on the forms through which over-investment is realised in different spatial contexts (Harvey, 2001). Governance could be seen as a spatio-temporal trajectory that defines the footprint of global investments on land space. Planning and property development are complex aspects of governance, different in each case, with different resistances in top-down management (Jessop, 2010). Since the competition among states and regions for the attraction of global real estate investments is growing, central states are seeking ways to strengthen their executive authority on planning in order to become more effective in absorbing international funds (Jessop, 2010). This approach sometimes leads to the abandonment of long-term planning (Harris, 2019). The public authorities, therefore, find themselves as managers of these “firms following the logic of business management, being engaged in product development and marketing” (Madanipour, 2006).

### 3. The Formal Spatial Planning System in Greece and Cyprus

European planning systems and their instruments and policies differ considerably (EU, 1997), which makes comparison valid only on the basis of their output.

The Constitution of Greece is the cornerstone of planning policy. Along with the safeguarding of the right to property, it states that “the right to property therein may not be detrimental to the general interest” (Hellenic Republic, 1975). For public utilities, ownership may therefore be expropriated in all cases with full compensation of the land. “The protection of the natural and cultural environment,” as well as the “territorial restructuring of the country, development, urbanization and the extension of cities and residential areas in general” (Hellenic Republic, 1975) fall within the obligations of the State. Within this general framework, laws 947/1979 and 1337/1983 attempted for the first time to introduce a comprehensive spatial planning system in line with international practice. In the 1990s, two new laws, 2508/1997 and 2742/1999, were introduced in order to regulate all planning procedures with the deployment of a wide range of tools covering planning at a national scale and concluding with the establishment of urban plans (Angelidis, 2000; Serraos, 2007).

Despite the fact that the country had a comprehensive spatial planning system, effective spatial governance in practice was only partially possible since substantial weaknesses that emerged connected time-consuming procedures; delays in establishing the National Land Registry; the unsecured and erratic flow of associated financing; and finally the inability to reconcile opposing interests in the use and management of the space (Koudouni, 2014). Indicative of these problems is the fact that, after more than 30 years, a binding clear designation of land uses has not yet been finalized, while in parallel the building control system continues to show considerable deficiencies (Koudouni, 2014).

More recently, laws 4269/2014 and 4447/2016 (Hellenic Republic, 2014, 2016) were launched with the principal objective to “improve the coherence and functionality of the spatial planning system.” This new legislation is clearly interested in the accommodation of a desperately needed “flexibilization” of the planning system in relation to the facilitation of investments, which at the same time is supposed to exacerbate spatial fragmentation (Serraos, 2014). The current spatial planning system in Greece facilitates this objective by distinguishing the Strategic Planning (Special Spatial Programs and Regional Spatial Programs) from the regulatory level of Development Control. The latter also operates on two levels; the first refers to Local Spatial Plans (LSPs) and Special Spatial Plans (SSPs), and the second to Urban Planning Implementation Plans. It is argued that the SSPs serve the extraordinary and special needs of space development and weakens the regulatory planning value of the LSPs (Melissas, 2010). By operating at the same planning level,

they work in parallel and compete with the formal “regulatory” urban planning at the local level. SSPs in particular can also easily and quickly modify the regulations of the LSPs, as well as of any other specific urban planning local regulations, especially when they concern permitted land uses and building regulations and restrictions.

Regarding the equivalent regulatory conditions in Cyprus, the post-colonial 1960 Constitution pays almost equal attention to the human right of private property and to the right of the State to intervene in private property for the common interest, especially in relation to planning and development (Republic of Cyprus, 1960). Due to the Turkish invasion and the spatial division of the island, the Planning Law was not enforced until 1990 and neither was the “Island Plan” nor has any kind of national spatial planning framework materialised so far (Ioannou, 2016). The Constitution and the Town and Country Planning Law of 1990 gives the Government and the Minister of Interior the aggregated power to decide on all planning issues. The 1990 Law also recognises the deficiencies and defines the need for three levels of spatial plans: a) “Island Plan” to cover the whole territory; b) “Local Plans” for the main conurbations and other specific regions and a “Policy Declaration” which includes the general text and zoning maps for the rural areas; and c) “Area Schemes” which are detailed district and urban plans that have had a very limited application so far. The system continues to be incomplete with only the middle scale of intervention being fully developed (Ioannou, 2016, 2019).

The Minister of Interior was granted the authority of preparing “Local Plans” and “Area Schemes” to an independent “Planning Council” but acts its authority on the final draft of all plans. The Minister also intervenes through horizontal “Orders” and “Circulars” which can be published at any time if specific issues arise, more often through various political pressures than environmental ones. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers exercises from time to time its supreme authority on specific and general issues by passing the provisions of the official plans. These conditions of extended discretionary powers for a case by case planning decisions without a clear framework of procedures for deciding particularly large development plans, often and in principle, weakens planning practice. In some cases, planning authorities when pressured might be vulnerable to prioritising the benefit of individual owner groups, developers and investors (Ioannou, 2016). It is also important to understand that the development-planning context in Cyprus lacks a planning culture. Furthermore, the effort of building a planning culture after 1990 was slow but positive until the 2013 financial crisis (Ioannou, 2016), after which all development activity stopped, and several developmental factors were again put on hold.

### 4. LUDs’ Nature and Special Planning Context

Where piecemeal change clearly shapes “places” in the long run, LUDs are step changes not only of local environ-

mental significance but with impact on the norms and behavior of future development practice.

In Greek legislation, the concept of LUDs first emerged during the financial crisis in 2010, when important investments were considered “strategic” because of their potential for positive contribution to the country’s economy. The main spatial tool for servicing LUDs is the SSPs (Hellenic Republic, 2016a). The specific forms of the SSPs are: the ESCHADA plans (Special Spatial Development Plans for the Public Property; Hellenic Republic, 2016b), which refer to private real estate investments in privatised State property, and the ESCHASE plan (Special Spatial Development Plan for Strategic Investments; Hellenic Republic, 2010). The latter refers to investments in private land considered “Strategic Investment” (in accordance with the corresponding law, which provides associated benefits and incentives). From 2014 onwards, the frameworks of SSPs can be used for any major private or public projects deemed to require particular spatial regulation of planning parameters and aspects regarding land use and building capacity. Such special circumstances vary from projects relating to the regenerating of urban areas, the rebuilding and transferring of landslide urban settlements or even the constructing of large department store buildings (Hellenic Republic, 2014). Proposals are obliged to comply with the country’s strategic plans, i.e., the Regional Spatial Planning and the Special Spatial Planning Frameworks. In addition, SSPs also comply with legislation for the protection of the environment, forests, cultural heritage, defence and national security. The adjustment to these frameworks secures, to an extent, a level of alignment with planning principles.

SSPs, which are designed for large investments, apply to both urban and rural lands. Nevertheless, in most cases, LUDs are planned in areas outside local plans where land is cheaper and therefore such projects become more profitable (Spiliopoulou, 2018). An exception to this trend concerns the upgrading of existing urban developments, mostly shopping malls (i.e., Maroussi/Athens), where the local plan does not normally allow for further expansion. To date, the SSPs—as defined by their specific legislation—have been used to give the property a planning and investment character including land use and building capacity designations and the specific requirements of the urban planning legislative frameworks (such as environmental impact assessments, demarcation of boundaries of natural landscape elements, protection of antiquities, forests, seashores, etc.). However, it is noted that, while SSPs are designed to stimulate investments mainly towards the innovation and technology sectors, in practice they are initiated mostly for LUD construction projects, particularly in the tourism sector.

By utilizing these special spatial tools, rural or natural areas with very low development prospects are becoming development zones through fast track procedures. Whereas planning procedures seem successful in shift-

ing land designations, the delivery of projects and the associated specific spatial tools show certain malfunctions. According to the officially approved projects (Hellenic Republic, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b), 18 “Strategic Investment” projects were confirmed until the end of 2018, while only two have been further elaborated through the ESCHASE process. For publicly owned land managed through the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF), only seven ESCHADA plans were authorised. There are still no approvals of proposals outside the SSPs noted above, where until 2019 no major development approved through the SSPs’ tool had been implemented and none had completed the licensing procedures in order to begin construction. This evaluation suggests that LUDs would not have been feasible within the conventional planning system and at the same time, special spatial tools seem not to be sufficient as a mechanism for their effective delivery. Simultaneously, and because of this special treatment of LUDs, they have been particularly criticized by the academic community (Serraos, 2014) as being favourable for investors but having adverse consequences for the environment and its protection. The concern is that although the state facilitates investments by granting favorable conditions and tools leading to large capital gains, this whole endeavour does not seem to have been effective enough so far in delivering change or major local economic benefits.

Other factors and considerations at a national level which limit the attraction of foreign investment are the lack of confidence in the local economy and administration; the level of predictability of forecasts; the lack of consistency and certainty; the speed and ease with which cases are handled; etc. (Greek Industrialists’ Association, 2018). Furthermore, and from the experience of processing the first five LUDs, it seems the state ought to ensure both sufficient funding for supporting the implementation of projects by investors and compensatory benefit for local societies in order to be able to unlock the delivery of such large projects. As shown by the review of case studies in this article, one of the major stumbling blocks in the detail planning of large proposals is the necessary approvals and signings-off through public consultation needed for projects to become reality. Above all, however, it is necessary to realise that in cases where there is no interest by investors, the implementation of a LUDs driven primarily by the public sector will take much longer.

Whereas LUDs in Greece seem to remain “on paper,” the shape of Cyprus’ cities has been dramatically transformed by large-scale projects during the last years.

The range of projects, which can be characterised as large-scale developments in Cyprus, differs considerably from the practice in Greece. Large-scale out of town developments based on international models and comprehensive tourist resorts/villages, similar to the ones proposed in Greece, have been part of the urban landscape in Cyprus particularly since 1974. Such development aim-


ing lately at specialised, higher value markets, continues to prefer rural locations of high environmental values, acquiring planning approvals through procedures very similar to the ones described in the Greek examples. The introduction of emergency mechanism for the delivery of investments and the emphasis on LUDs affected similarly the Cyprus planning system (Council of Ministers, 2016), especially since 2013 with incentives often associated with increased capacity compared to the official plans' designations.

The availability in high value lands within built-up areas leads to large-scale proposals in urban areas often very close to the traditional city centres and coastal strips. Because of the difficulty of land assembly in urban areas, increased capacity can only be achieved through taller structures that indeed constitute the majority of LUD proposals during the last 10 years (mainly residential developments). Figure 1 shows the dramatic change in the landscape of the city of Limassol with the towers representing sites where planning approvals were or are allowed to be granted. While the capital of Cyprus, Nicosia, does not indicate the same level of pressure, the consideration of such development is similarly taking place in the total absence of locally specific planning frameworks simply on the grounds of lack of any other type of large-scale investment proposed by the private sector (Ioannou & Nicolaou, 2018). There are clear inadequacies in the following: building control; environmental assessment of regulatory frameworks; technical know-how associated with their construction and/or research on aspects of long-term viability and the effect of their social and cultural impact, etc. (Ioannou & Nicolaou, 2018). In stark contrast to the situation in Greece, many approved projects are constructed at a very fast pace, in a context of total lack of consultation (public or institutional), changing overnight the urban landscape of Cyprus' cities.

In contrast to Greek practice, changes to the planning and development control framework are prepared more

at the political planning level, rather than at the administrative one. This lack of specificity and legitimisation of processes relates to all LUDs, including tall buildings. The term LUDs does not have a specific mention in the formal Cyprus planning or legislative frameworks. Furthermore, the term "Urban" is not appropriately defined, with a lack of clarity in areas which are considered urban in contrast to suburban or rural lands with only the boundary of "development zones" marking areas where Development Plans apply. The only clear statutory designation refers to the Central Urban Areas that are clearly and accurately demarcated on maps for each of the Local Plans enveloping mainly the traditional historic city centres.

The legislation is also unclear on the term "Large Developments." The study of official planning documents clearly indicates that a development in a plot larger than four conventional residential building plots (2,000 m<sup>2</sup>) and/or in some cases of a scale larger than 5,000 m<sup>2</sup> is considered a LUD. Such definitions are independent of location, environmental significance or other compositional characteristics (density, mix of uses, etc.). At the "Local Plans" level the situation is similar, with no reference to structured strategies for the LUDs during the past thirty years. The issue of small-scale land fragmentation, dispersed multi-ownerships and the ineffectiveness of the real estate industry to provide sufficiently large development parcels at the centre or even the periphery of the city centres is referred to repeatedly in the text of Local Plans as a major hindrance toward regeneration and renewal (Ioannou, 2016). Attempts by incentive measures in Local Plans are mainly quantitative, where offering percentage increases in the cases of land assembly is proven not to be effective so far (Ioannou, 2016). An exception to this lack of references is the policy for "Integrated Developments of Large and Complex Land Uses" noted in all official plans, which aims specifically at the facilitation of strategic large-scale investments on research, health, higher education, culture and



**Figure 1.** Exercise of possible high-rise LUD locations using Limassol Local Plan as background. Source: Ioannou and Nicolaou (2018).

sports. Such investment is proposed almost everywhere at the periphery of the cities and the countryside, leading often to pepper-potting of key amenities across the Island's countryside with insufficient infrastructure provisions, high accessibility, etc.

Just after the 2013 economic crisis in Cyprus, similarly to Greece, there has been a stronger push by the Government to encourage Large Developments as a means of attracting foreign investments. The Council of Ministers enacted its horizontal powers—allowed by relevant legislation—and bypassed the official planning system with a new incentive plan (Council of Ministers, 2016). This plan benefitted plots larger than 1,000m<sup>2</sup> by an additional 0.30 building coefficient if the development was in the designated central urban districts. The plan also benefitted other types of urban or countryside developments but focused particularly on tourist areas and commercial streets. The planning context also allowed the accumulation of additional building coefficient from various incentives (listed buildings conservation, renewable energy, etc.). This plan was criticised by several distinguished journalists and academics as deriving from or being relevant to the Government's "Scheme for Naturalization of Investors in Cyprus by Exception," which essentially provided a European passport in exchange for a €2.3M personal investment on the island (Republic of Cyprus, 2014; Ioannou & Nicolaou, 2018). In this context, one can hardly suggest that the Cyprus planning context promotes LUDs in a controlled and structured manner.

An exception to the loose and discretionary framework of the Local Plans is the new generation "Local Area Plans," which are beginning to be prepared for the central areas of four big cities. The Nicosia City Centre Area Scheme (NCCAS), enacted in 2016, covers less than 5% of the urban conurbation of the city and it designates a specific central business district where increased building density and permitted height are maximised in a compact area of approximately 1km<sup>2</sup>.

In 2018, after pressures from society and various stakeholders both objecting to tall buildings, the Director of Planning published a circular on High Rise developments setting several criteria for permitting high rise development—most non-specific and non-binding, failing in this way to clarify the development framework for LUDs (Department of Town Planning and Housing, 2018a). In actual terms, the new Directive legitimises more than it regulates the liberalisation of height and densities in urban areas.

This context clearly reveals that the Cyprus planning context fails to promote LUDs in a controlled and structured manner or in one which can maximise the benefits of large-scale inward investment locally. Most fragments of policies are designed to facilitate the delivery of private developments assisted by policies of economic growth set by the central government agenda with no due consideration of spatial or environmental benefits or impact.


## 5. Case Study Review: Selected Recent LUDs in Greece and Cyprus

The case studies reviewed are drawn from the period post-2010 during which the most recent and unexpected economic crisis emerged in the wider South Mediterranean region (Hadjimichalis, 2014). The concept of LUDs as well as the need to develop and institutionalise appropriate planning tools is inextricably linked to the intense efforts to overcome quickly this economic crisis.

Two real case studies in Greece chosen for review concern large tourist investments and represent the first examples of approved integrated town planning proposals; the first on public land (ESCHADA) and the second one on private sector property (ESCHASE). Neither case, however, initiated construction until the beginning of 2019.

The development of Kassiopi on Corfu Island is the first example illustrated in Figure 2. It is located along the coast within public land of exceptional beauty and high environmental quality. It covers 447 acres (265 acres of forestry land). In 2012, after the transfer of the property ownership from the State to the HRADF in the form of shares, the tender and a public competition for its exploitation was issued. With a Presidential Decree in 2013 (Hellenic Republic, 2013), its spatial destination was approved in order to allow building on a natural landscape lacking spatial planning policy, the terms of its construction and the Strategic Environmental Impact Study. In 2016, the Area Planning Study was approved (Hellenic Republic, 2016a), the building conditions and the land uses per building block were specified and the necessary restrictions were set for the protection of cultural and natural features. The environmental conditions for the construction of all the necessary infrastructure projects were also approved. Upon the completion of the procedures noted above, HRADF transferred to the investment group a portion of the land in a form of a lease for 99 years, in order to be used in accordance with the urban plan already approved by the State. In 2017, the full ownership of the plots intended for the construction of residences was also awarded. 50% of the utilised land is being transferred to the Municipality (roads and communal areas), while the forest areas and the beach zone remain as public spaces with free access.

The local authorities reacted negatively toward the project from the beginning and appealed to the Council of State but without success. Additionally, nine court appeals—between 2012 and 2018—called for the cancellation of the project, all of which resulted in rejections. Despite all the positive legal outcomes concerning the project, until the end of 2018 the project had failed to secure all the necessary construction permits (building permits, authorizations for interventions, etc.). This is despite the fact that both the central government responsible for the procedures up to the approval of the urban plan and permits as well as the supportive approach of




**Figure 2.** Special Spatial Development Plan for Kassiope, Corfu, showing the boundaries of the estate, the development zones and the protected areas. Source: Hellenic Republic (2013).

the courts have managed very quickly to comply with their responsibilities and grant the necessary planning approvals. However, the implementation of the project cannot yet begin due to the ongoing opposition of the local community, which prevents the local authorities from granting the necessary building, and other permits still under their jurisdiction, with equal ease to the investment group.

The second example concerns the development of the holiday resort “Killada Hills” in Argolida, near Porto Heli, covering an area of approximately 2,100 acres near the sea. It is an area close to the capital Athens with remarkable spatial features combining a beautiful shoreline, tranquil scenery, very important ancient monuments and high-level cultural destinations/activities in the vicinity (Figure 3). The project is an investment on a private land that took several years for its plot-by-

plot acquisition and encountered great difficulties when the investors’ attempts to get the necessary approvals through the conventional procedures proved unsuccessful. Unlike the case of Kassiope, there seems to have been no significant reaction by the local community to the realisation of the project since there were no court appeals or negative references published. For this reason—and since 2013—the process of approval of the scheme proceeded at a relatively fast pace, while with the adoption of the relevant ESCHASE in 2015 (Hellenic Republic, 2015) all planning issues were resolved. At the end of 2018, the Joint Ministerial Decision approval of the Town Planning Study and the Environmental Terms for Projects and Infrastructure was published (Hellenic Republic, 2018) and, according to reports, earthworks have recently begun. It also appears that, according to press reports, the project’s financial difficulties have also been overcome.





**Figure 3.** Killada Hills. Special Spatial Development Plan indicating the development zones (pink) and the golf course area (light green). Source: Hellenic Republic (2015).

In the case of the “Killada Hills,” the acceptance by the local community has contributed significantly to the promotion of the project and eventually to the relatively quick start of the works. The approval of the Urban Planning took three years from the approval of the first stage (the Presidential Decree), which in turn took just over two years from the “official” launch of the project as part of the state’s relevant procedure. The respective time for the approval of both planning stages for LUDs was five years (land designation processes and planning approvals), in contrast to the official system of planning which is estimated to take 15 years at least (Spiliopoulou, 2018). This is mentioned in order to explain the level of acceleration of planning process towards approval with special spatial planning tools.

Although in the case of Kassiope the development takes place mainly in a forestry area it is a mild in-

tervention into the environment, in contrast to the dynamic intervention of Killada and specifically the size of the project in relation to the existing village. Despite that, the project will be realised in a rural, non-protected environment.

Whereas in Greece the full implications and impact of the delivery of the LUDs’ case studies referred to here cannot be assessed, in Cyprus the construction of tall developments is beginning to emerge at a very fast pace. Unofficial data from the Department of Town Planning and Housing in January 2019 indicate that already 200 applications for LUDs had been submitted, primarily in Limassol, by Spring 2019. Approximately 12 of those are completed and occupied, some additional 28 of them are currently under construction, while 15 have been approved by the planning authorities. The time needed by the planning authority to examine and approve the ap-

plication is officially the same as any other application of similar complexity. The scale and often derivative height of proposals varies primarily according to the scale of the market and the nature of the developer/builder (Department of Town Planning and Housing, 2018b). This article examines two cases in Nicosia, one which represents the planning framework valid prior to 2013, and a second more recent one that encompasses the evolution of the planning framework. The second set of case studies describes the typical conditions in Limassol, which emerged as a direct result of the 2013 economic depression and attempts for the revitalisation of the economy.

Nicosia's interest in taller structures began in 2003 with the proposals for an architectural landmark central location along the moat of the 16th century Venetian walls of the city. Tower 25 was commissioned to the reputable French architect Jean Nouvel. A planning permit using the discretionary power of the Director of the Planning Department was given in early 2010s, prior the 2013 incentives and the 2016 NCCAS provisions that created a more beneficial environment for taller developments. At 62 meters high, it was the 4th tallest building in Cyprus at the time, where now it is clearly dwarfed by more recent proposals, and was delivered at the beginning of 2013 when the economic crisis became apparent. It was originally conceived as a residential building, a decision which was revised at later stages of its feasibility allocating the lower seven floors to high value office space with apartments above. The €25M construction cost was considered extravagantly high and its real estate value was never established since none of the accommodation became available for sale or rent in the open market. Most of the accommodation was kept as an investment by the development company—Nice Day Developers—and was sold through internal private deals. The development is around 7,000m<sup>2</sup> in a plot of 1,200m<sup>2</sup>. Its related planning gain amounts to merely a narrow public plaza (Ioannou & Nicolaou, 2018) at the front entrance of the building. This case might indicate the unaffordability of luxury accommodation or the low “commercial profitability” of LUDs prior the 2013 transition.

A second similar example of the Leventis Gallery was proposed a few years later and completed in the mid of the economic recession of 2013, and it portrays the same characteristics: privately owned luxury residential accommodation, owner occupied, near the city walls, and not part of the real estate market. A striking difference of this development, which makes it unique in Cyprus so far, is the contribution of the building to the social and cultural life of the city with the three lower floors of the building open to the public accommodating the first contemporary art gallery in Nicosia.

The first speculative residential building proposed in Nicosia—“360 Nicosia”—is by far the tallest, with 27 floors of residential accommodation and 7 floors of support amenities and ground floor retail (Cyfield Group, 2019). The site is a considerably larger plot of 2,000m<sup>2</sup>, with around 25,000m<sup>2</sup> of built space. The building lo-

cation falls within the tall buildings' framework of the NCCAS (Ioannou & Nicolaou, 2018), which allows unlimited height and capacity to the site. The development has accumulated all the plot ratio and height incentives that are allowed by the state and purchased extra building coefficient from the local municipality. One other difference from the previous examples is the fact that this building was not designed by a “signature architect.” This probably indicates the confidence of the local development industry in delivering a relatively conventional high profitability building. The turn of events in the relatively conservative Nicosia market clearly shows the shift of the initial interest from the LUDs as branding tools to profit-making large-scale projects.

Developments in the coastal city of Limassol are all speculative, driven by super profits on lands designated for conventional 5–6 storey buildings and are already built and occupied with 16 under construction, all of different scales, height, shapes/morphological character and all used the discretionary planning powers of the Planning Department for their approval. Approvals were negotiated with very little planning gain (often small parcels of publicly accessible space) which is very rarely delivered. In most cases, the full site is privatised as tenants' amenity turn blank walls onto the periphery of the site, with negative impact on surrounding neighbourhoods. The urban formation of towers is inevitably dispersed among its 20km coastline (Figure 1) in order for each building to benefit from the sea view, a condition determined by demand despite the fact that the Local Plan has stated in relevant studies a set of preferred locations. The extent of this dispersal is only now beginning to raise objections from the public and local media, as they are seen as unwelcome implications caused by discrepancies of scale (Ioannidou, 2018).

One other distinct difference in LUD in the coastal cities is the market the building refers to and the type of clientele. In Nicosia, residential units refer mainly to the local markets or newcomers employed by enlarged international firms. Most of the Limassol buildings draw buyers from the “Scheme for Naturalization of Investors” (Republic of Cyprus, 2014), a fact that very much reflected the vast difference in sale values across the two. In these terms, the alteration of the city's character is not only physical but social and functional, conditions which are noted by the local community and begin to create reactions and objections in the way the public sector regulates this type of LUDs (Ioannou & Nicolaou, 2018).

## 6. Conclusion

Formal planning frameworks in both cases have showed a weak trajectory in defining the footprint of global investments on space, while community reaction and bureaucracy seems to be more decisive in slowing and moderating change.

In both cases of Greece and Cyprus, LUDs are regarded as opportunities to benefit from the “spatial fix”

of international capital, rather than a means of improving either planning practice, local economies or the environment. Such policy in Greece so far has activated large parcels of “cheap” public and/or private land through fast track procedures, which provide legally binding spatial planning conditions designed to stimulate large-scale investment. Development policy in Cyprus facilitated LUDs by providing incentives well over and above the already flexible spatial planning through discretionary political powers resulting often in unregulated, fast track urban interventions. In both cases, the fragments of supplementary policies influence the “planning acquis” through the establishment of mechanisms that easily bypass the formal spatial planning system and its interest in structured planning, detailed considerations of impact and environmental quality. One other consequence, which becomes increasingly obvious, is the emergence of a common approach of a public policy shift of the decision-making process from the local planning authorities to the central state and away from local concerns. The flexibilities this change implies lead towards favouring LUDs more than any local considerations or benefits.

Although this strategic shift of dynamics and the economic and urban development challenges are similar in both countries, the corresponding institutional frameworks, processes, tools, planning context and development outputs differ significantly. While Greece features a well-structured formal planning system referring to all scales of planning as well as the special tools for LUD’s purposes, in Cyprus flexible, horizontal decision making and discretion in the absence of a tight formal planning regulations characterise development processes. In the Greek paradigm, the promotion of a high volume of binding legal acts and processes that bypass the strict formal planning system facilitates the relatively fast delivery of the LUDs despite delays caused by reactions locally. Alternatively, in Cyprus, the existing loose regulating system which bypasses the official Development Plans becomes even more flexible in favor of large comprehensive developments with no formal legal mechanisms within the planning procedures to facilitate the interference of public opinion, leading to a very fast delivery of large projects.

In both, interrelated factors seem to influence the location and type of proposed LUDs: in Greece, to a limited number, large-scale tourist development outside urban areas toward rural and mainly undeveloped low-cost coastal areas; in Cyprus, to smaller-scale urban residential projects in urban areas. One last factor, which seems to affect outcomes, is the consolidated cultural perception of the spatial urban landscape and the level of influence towards its shape by local communities. Both the planning system and processes associated with LUDs reflect a much stronger cultural attitude in Greece toward “democratic” and direct involvement of citizens in civic affairs in comparison to Cyprus. In these terms, where the political trajectory of each region seems similar, fundamental difference in systems and real estate conditions

also seem to lead to different outcomes in terms of the physical character and nature of the LUDs and their rate and ease of delivery.

The question of how far there is potential benefits in the future from the implementation of LUDs in localities remains open and controversial. In Greece, the investors’ response to new LUD projects is limited so far, probably due to political and socio-economic realities. Furthermore, implications can only be assumed since very few large projects have been delivered recently. The future of LUDs in this context seems uncertain and perhaps relevant only in the long term. On the contrary, in Cyprus—where foreign investors responded rapidly to the opportunities for large projects—potential benefits seem limited to purely economic interests and mostly relevant to the real estate sector. The potential for area regeneration and the triggering of wider area renewal dynamics, positive cultural change or obvious benefit for the local community are apparently not possible. Lack of relevant research and available data also fails to verify the nature of the financial benefits of “spatial fixes” to the local economy.

The basic criticism of the current LUD policy in both countries, which is again a verification of the “spatial fix” concept, is that new processes are adopted because of pressures by international investors to avoid integrating projects with obvious impact on short term profitability. The integration of LUDs into the formal planning system not only could have secured a better “fit” of non-local investment but also had the potential to improve mechanism and inform a step change to local planning practice.

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### Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

## Housing in the Neoliberal City: Large Urban Developments and the Role of Architecture

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### Abstract

Large urban developments (LUDs) have been driving contemporary neoliberal urban housing development worldwide, marked by scholarly and public discourses on the transition from housing as a basic civil right to housing as investment channel and financial good. Based on interviews, documentary films, architectural drawings and planning documents, this article examines the interrelations between architectural and entrepreneurial factors shaping LUDs in the contemporary neoliberal context. Analyzing several LUDs in Israel, Denmark and Spain, this article unpacks the paradox of neoliberal housing development—namely the unfulfilled free market promise of variety and multiple choice versus the reality of replicated, uniform dwelling units in repetitive residential buildings and identical neighborhoods characterizing residential landscapes worldwide. This article explores the corresponding relationship between design elements, design processes and entrepreneurial marketing decision-making. Our study reveals the cardinal role of architectural design in characterizing, financing, licensing and marketing LUDs, labeling them as unique—rather than uniform—developments compared with ‘regular’ neighborhoods.

### Keywords

architectural design; housing development; large urban development; neoliberalism; urban housing

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### 1. Introduction

A key contemporary venue for financial growth in late capitalism, large urban developments (LUDs) have come to dominate contemporary global urban processes (Harvey, 2010). This urban phenomenon has been largely framed through social and political consequences for the right to the city, as well as debates around urban planning—from planning policy to principles like community, walkability, and preservation of the social fabric.

This article expands the scholarship on LUDs by identifying a gap in the literature regarding the mechanisms producing these urban frameworks. While much scholarly attention is given to the economic, policy, and ur-

ban politics, we point to the role of architectural design of LUDs as the missing link in understanding this important phenomenon. Our article focuses on four cases of new middle-class housing LUDs, all pioneers in architectural design: Herzliya Hills (HH) by Braz Architects; the 8 House by the Bjarke Ingels Group (BIG); the VM House by BIG; and JDS and the MIRADOR by MVRDV and Blanca Lleó Associates. Located in large, unappealing tracts of land—flanked by highways, national infrastructures or the urban periphery—LUDs required a new development strategy that extends the simple neoliberal codification of housing as real estate commodity, which has dominated the development of housing in the past three decades.

These cases unpack the paradox of neoliberal housing development and its unfulfilled free-market promise of variety and multiple choice: uniform dwelling units arranged in repetitive residential buildings and identical neighborhoods that characterize the landscape of residential neighborhoods across the world. Like many neoliberal housing developments, LUD planning processes led by entrepreneurial companies employ comprehensive planning teams composed of economists, marketing experts, and lawyers. Nonetheless, our study exposes the central role of architects in characterizing, financing, licensing, and marketing LUDs. Aimed at marking the LUD as a unique—rather than uniform—development, architects assume an unexpected leading role for the design and marketability of otherwise-unappealing developments, when compared with ‘regular’ neighborhoods.

## 2. Methodology and Research Design

This article limns the interrelations between architectural and entrepreneurial decision-making shaping LUDs in the contemporary late capitalist urban development. Research methods include classic methods of architectural inquiry such as analysis of planning documents, visual data, design decision making, and architectural attributes like views, movement, etc. In addition, we conducted interviews with designers, real estate agent and developers, and conducted content analysis of interviews with designers and documentary films of the LUDs studied. We conducted comparative analysis of the various sources, checking documents of the buildings themselves against statements by the architects and developers, and interviews with marketing personnel and dwellers, and documentary footage.

We study locales in which LUDs were developed by national and/or municipal housing ministries. The context for this article, therefore, is the transformation of large housing estate development from government to the neoliberal market. As we elaborate below, Israel, Denmark, and France have been celebrated examples of state-developed housing for the greatest number. The comparison we offer here aims to go beyond Israel, to discuss the neoliberal transformation in housing development in former ‘benevolent state’ locales.

Our choice of case studies focuses on LUDs where renowned architects were involved, from the early stages of development, in designing commercial mass housing as a product in the neoliberal context. This phenomenon is relatively new, as market housing in the past decades has rarely involved architects in leading roles in producing estates. The cases chosen are well known in the professional literature for pioneering housing LUD in their specific locales, and for employing high-profile architecture firms—BIG, MVRDV, and Braz. Architectural, ethnographic, economic and design decision making data of these cases is available, marking them appropriate for comparative research of an emerging global phenomenon.

## 3. Conceptual Frameworks

In order to identify categories for inquiry and comparative analysis of LUDs where the role of architecture has been significant for neoliberal development of large housing estates, we have examined three related fields of inquiry: (a) LUDs as global, neoliberal urban development; (b) housing from social project to LUD; and (c) the politics of the architectural envelope. Employing these fields of inquiry, we were able to carefully select case studies for comparative study, and eventually identify the three thematic categories for critical analysis discussed below.

### 3.1. LUDs as Global, Neoliberal Urban Development

David Harvey identifies LUDs as a key tool for capital extraction at periods of financial crisis in modernity. His research harkens back to the role of LUDs as a key mechanism for the expansion of capital to the Haussmanization of Paris, as the first case of capitalist expansion via the city (Harvey, 2003a). As global capitalism has exhausted its avenues for geographic expansion to new markets, it now directs most efforts to intensifying urban development via LUDs. The social consequences of LUDs for access and right to the city as well as for urban citizenship are grave, forcing the poor and working-class out of the city (Harvey, 2004, 2012; Lefebvre, 1991; Mitchell, 2003). Discussing contemporary Chinese new towns, for example, Harvey portrays the urban setting as the key contemporary outlet for meeting capital’s constant need for growth (Harvey, 2003b, 2010).

The capitalist driving force behind LUDs has generally privileged capital extraction over urban planning and urban design principles, compromising the city and the wellbeing of urban citizens, as well as professional planning processes in many cities (Gualini & Majoor, 2007; Salet, 2008). Diverging from well-accepted professional principles of urban form—like density, walkability, human scale, and community—LUDs are producing a new form of urbanity and urban life (Amsterdam, Delft, & Eburon, 2017). Research regarding the significance of LUDs on urban form points to a sea of change in conceptions of planning. The dominance of LUDs in contemporary urban development places capital as the driving force in the planning of cities worldwide, while reflecting deep changes in policy making at state and urban levels favoring a neo-liberal approach (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002). This change is associated with the privatization of space—particularly the privatization of the housing market—dominated by the real estate sector that replaced social housing with for-profit urban politics (Novy, Redak, Jäger, & Hamedinger, 2001; Swenarton, Avermaete, & Van Den Heuvel, 2014).

### 3.2. Housing: From Social Project to LUD

The processes of dispossession and disenfranchisement revolving around LUDs are intensified by housing devel-

opments. Housing LUDs—compared to public or commercial complexes—decisively catalyze the neoliberalization of the city (Brenner, Marcuse, & Mayer, 2011; Marcuse & Madden, 2016).

Since modernity, housing for the ‘greatest number’ has posed great planning and design challenges. Urban housing for the masses requires developing large-scale design (Eleb, 2000). Mass housing emerged as a social, spatial, and political challenge following the Industrial Revolution, and stood out in its impact on society in early capitalism (Engels, 1872/1993). Since the late-nineteenth century, housing design and production has reshaped the urban fabric, social processes in the city and nation, and the integration of workers into the city and urban politics. Architectural design has been central in search for design principles shaping large housing developments since the articulation of mass housing projects in the 1920s (Bauer, 1934; Le Corbusier, 2008). Post-war rebuilding projects by welfare states involved the creation of new towns and mass housing estates worldwide. These were, by definition, LUDs in terms of planning and architectural design, albeit produced by state rather than the market (Cupers, 2014; Swenarton et al, 2014; van den Heuvel & Risselada, 2005).

The study cases reviewed, and others, are part of societies where social housing has dominated the housing stock in the post-WW2 period. These locales provide a fascinating context for studying transformations in housing LUDs, from state-produced housing for the ‘greatest number’ to market-based mass housing. Israeli nation-building has largely relied on housing as a key mechanism of sovereignty and statehood with large-scale development of new towns and mass immigrant housing nationwide (Allweil, 2017; Efrat, 2019). In France, social housing served as a tool for social and geopolitical reconstruction for modernizing and incorporating citizens (Cupers, 2014; Parvu, 2010). In the Netherlands, post-war ideology of an open society was explicitly constructed by means of designed explorations of social housing (van den Heuvel, 2015), while in Denmark and Sweden social housing has attempted unifying and equalizing goals towards social cohesion (Mattsson, 2015, Vestergaard & Scanlon, 2014). In the United Kingdom significant contributions to architecture theory involved the design of radical housing estates (Boyer, 2017; Smithson, Smithson., van den Heuvel, Risselada, & Colomina, 2004). In the early 1970s, state housing worldwide was gradually privatized. “The paradox in the story of the welfare state is that the moment when egalitarianism seemed to be finally realized...the system started to collapse due to the financial crisis,” states van den Heuvel (2014, p. 149). Rather than initiating, planning, building, and marketing housing units, state and municipal housing bureaus limited themselves to coordinating market-based developments (Swenarton et al., 2014). Consequently, housing gradually turned from public good to consumer product and from civil right to investment channel. Housing discourse is dominated by entrepreneurs, brokers, and ap-

praisers with architects largely marginalized from housing development processes (Mota & Allweil, 2019).

### 3.3. *The Politics of the Envelope*

In his pioneering discussion of late capitalist architecture, Fredric Jameson (1991) identified the role of architecture in late-capitalist LUDs as the chief cultural agent of what we now term neoliberalism. For Jameson, architecture reflects shifts in patronage and financing involved in creating urban and architectural spaces, as well as the deep changes to the social and political role of the architect versus developers and clients (Jameson, 1991). The architecture of late capitalism is often discussed within the framework of a shift in architecture culture, defined by the failure to bridge responsibility to social needs like mass housing with artistic creation (Marcuse & Madden, 2016; Martin, Moore, & Schindler, 2015; McLeod, 1989; Self, 2014). In his *The Architecture of Neoliberalism*, Douglas Spencer (2016) analyses several architectural projects to assert that neoliberalism and the architecture compliant to its agenda have produced projects designed to serve as forms of capital extraction. Spencer’s critique of the architecture of neoliberalism echoes the work of noted political economists Aalbers (2016) and Mazzucato (2018), who study the financialization of the housing market and the financial system’s attempts to rethink the nature and mechanisms for extracting value.

Architecture theoretician Alejandro Zaera-Polo (2008) discusses ‘the politics of the envelope,’ pointing to the building’s envelope as the most significant design element in the architecture of late capitalism. The ‘populist’ nature of neoliberal architecture revolves around designed envelopes: producing recognizable figuration, diagrammatic direct messages, and simplification of the buildings’ elements for easier communication (Zaera-Polo, 2017). In housing LUDs, building-envelope design can transform regular multi-family buildings into residential environments with desirable form (Stoiljkovi & Jovanovi, 2015). This is done by ‘dressing’ or ‘enveloping’ the development with the cultural agent of architecture. Yet how can we understand the ‘dressing’ or ‘enveloping’ of a development beyond theory? What are the actual practices and decision-making processes involved in re-engaging architecture in large housing developments, and in relegating it to the envelope? What effect does the explicit role of ‘dressing’ and its separation from space planning and other aspects of the design process have on the quality of housing produced?

## 4. Findings and Analysis

While LUD development is well discussed in planning and political-geography literature—with attention to the consequences for city planning—the role of architectural design in realizing large neoliberal urban housing developments remains understudied. This article aims to address



this gap by tracing the role of architecture in contemporary housing development by examining four housing LUDs developed in the last decade in Herzliya (Israel), Copenhagen, and Madrid.

We developed three analytical categories that cut across the design processes recurring in our four case studies, pointing to a corresponding relationship between design elements, design processes and entrepreneurial decision making: (a) value via architecture—desirability and image; (b) rearticulating urban form; and (c) the neoliberal estate. These analytical categories allow us to explore and compare design strategies employing architecture in the service of neoliberal development of housing estates as large urban segments. Shedding light on the significant role of architectural design in contemporary LUD creation, these analytical categories are informed by detailed data on the actual ways in which architecture works as a value-enhancing apparatus.

*4.1. Value via Architecture: Desirability and Image*

While housing for the masses have not tended to include investment in architectural design, in the past decade we can see a new phenomenon of market investment in housing LUD architecture from the early stages of development. Investing resources and involving architects in the process aims to produce and market housing as a desirable product, often in an attempt to overcome LUD drawbacks like remote location, lack of urban environment, or lesser-quality spatial characteristics like high

density. Our case studies 8 House, VM House, Mirador and HH, designed by BIG, MVRDV and Braz firms respectively, epitomize this new phenomenon and allow for comparative inquiry of its characteristics.

HH, a new housing development of large middle-class housing, offering 600 apartments, is a game-changing LUD in the Israeli context. Located on a large tract of land in an unappealing location between highways and national infrastructures, physically distant from the city center, HH is an isolated LUD whose development required a new strategy that extends neoliberal development processes which have dominated Israeli housing production for the past four decades.

Itai Cohen, the real estate agent charged with marketing HH discusses the marketing challenges revolving this project (I. Cohen, personal communication, May 14, 2019). While in close proximity to several large employment and entertainment hubs and with convenient auto access to major national highways, HH’s location amidst highways and railways produces extreme conditions of noise inferences and air pollution, as well as limited integration with Herzliya’s desirable urban fabric (Figure 1). As a popular newspaper put it: “A residential neighborhood combined with high-density offices right on Highway 2, facing the busy industrial zone junction, blocked from all directions between busy roads and interchanges. Who would want to live in such a place?” (Handel, 2018).

The developers of HH—Azorim Corporation—hired Kika Braz Architects in an attempt to deal with the site’s desirability problem using design (K. Braz, personal com-



**Figure 1.** Aerial photograph of HH. Source: Adapted from K. Braz private collection.

munication, December 18, 2018). According to Braz, marketing considerations played a leading role in the design process of HH as early as in the conceptual phase (K. Braz, personal communications, July 13, 2013; December 18, 2018). Her design approach to the constraints of the site proposed an urban landmark with iconic architectural image, in order to unify the 70-acre site and highlight its advantages as LUD. Facing the highways and rails “required a prominent visual effect to catch the eye at short exposure,” Braz says. Her design involved a study of slow-exposure photography of highway perspectives—long, continuous stripes of bright-red taillights over the dark landscape—which served as the catalyst for the long, red façades facing Highway 2 (Figure 2). Braz’s architecture converses with Zaera-Polo’s discussion of ‘the politics of the envelope,’ her design of the building’s envelope a recognizable figuration that simplifies the building for easier consumption.

Cohen indicates that the appealing architecture of HH was significantly profitable, able to contribute to the project’s profits compared with second-hand apartments in the adjacent neighborhood, which has similar advantages in terms of proximity and access to national transportation but is not trapped between roads. Cohen points to two aspects of his marketing strategy of the LUD that rely on values produced via architectural design: the self-sufficient character of the development, and the sense of community it offers (I. Cohen, personal communication, May 14, 2019).

Architect Dany Rozen, head architect of HH, defines formal simplification as the organizing design principle providing “a clear logic of the form” (D. Rozen, personal

communication, March 20, 2019). The Braz firm assigns a special designer devoted to envelope design, nicknamed ‘the dresser.’ This designer focuses on the envelopes of various projects in the firm, a task separated by Braz from the functional design of the building:

We developed a method we call ‘the dress’ [Braz explains] that strips the body of the building from its façade and allows designing the ‘dress’ separately from apartment plans. While ‘the dresser’ designs the elements and materiality of the façade, other architects can work on the programmatic and regulatory aspects of design. (K. Braz, personal communication, December 18, 2018)

The HH ‘dress’ is a structural element that, just like a dress on a human body, does not necessarily follow the body’s outline. The ‘dress’ camouflages the building’s form—the product of functional apartment outlines and regulatory requirements inscribed in building codes that determine opening directions and sizes, safety measures and economic considerations affecting floorplan areas—producing a complex needs-based structural outline for the floorplans far from the holistic design vision for the entire LUD. The ‘dress’—clinging to the ‘body’ at times, loose elsewhere—forms a mediated space disguised due to the natural shadow the ‘dress’ casts on the body while the dark tiles cover the original recessed façade (Figure 3).

The ‘dress’ consists of two parts: the red ground floors that constitute a long overarching façade unifying the LUD, and the white skin springing from the fourth



**Figure 2.** Braz’s inspiration image. Slow-exposure photography of highway perspectives. Source: K. Braz private collection.



**Figure 3.** The 'dress' zoom-in. Source: Authors (2019).

floor up, covering the six residential towers (Figure 4). The red slab shields six smaller residential structures at the inner part of the site, labelled 'boutique buildings' (Figure 5). The unifying role of the 'dress' is most expressed where it is distanced from the structure, primarily along the west façade viewed from Highway 2. Within HH, the 'dress' can be seen clearly from the penthouse level; in Figure 6 we can see it as a stand-alone, removed from the roof and the functional façade. D. Rozen (personal communication, March 20, 2019) explains that the full effect of the 'dress,' as seen from afar, was produced by using granite tiles painted several hues of red, in a pattern carefully designed using a parametric system in grasshopper software, to optimize its three-dimensional effect (Figure 7). Braz architects then traveled to the tile manufacturer in Spain in order to select the precise hues, and the refraction and reflection requirements for these tiles. The tiles were assembled on site using an expansive dry cladding method for better durability, uncommon for dwellings in Israel.

Construction of the 'dress' element exceeded the cost of HH by a conservative estimate of 25% compared with Azorim Corporations' similar housing developments (G. Guedj, personal communication, June 4, 2019). Nonetheless, Azorim was willing to invest financial resources in the 'dress,' reflecting a sense that architectural design would result in profit and value production. Gal Guedj, a regional manager at Azorim, explains that it was a pioneering decision. It extended the budget, yet contributed to the unique image of HH with marketing results (G. Guedj, personal communication, June 4,


2019). HH is indeed among the first housing LUDs in Israel to assign architecture a leading role in design decisions over marketing and sales in order to stand out in a built environment composed largely of replicated residential towers (Brand & Shalom, 2014).

'Dress-making' is a dominant mechanism of architectural design in contemporary housing LUDs, including award-winning 8 House development outside Copenhagen (Rosenberg, 2010). Located in Ørestad district, the new 'finger' of Copenhagen was at the beginning considered a controversial project as the island of Amager considered marginal and sleepy (Majoor, 2014). Ørestad's developing method was privatized with a neo-liberal approach (Andersen & Jørgensen, 1995; Majoor, 2008). The local authorities supported the entrepreneurial gain with interventions like transferring the university location, strengthening the area while understanding that the interest from the private sector was lower than expected (Majoor, 2008, 2014). This entrepreneurial development shows a drastic change in the traditional Danish social principles of bottom-up planning (Andersen & Jørgensen, 1995; Majoor, 2008).

The Ørestad district is divided into four different sections. The North section is the most connected to Copenhagen, and some consider it as one of the city's neighborhoods. The detached South section on the edge of the green area is the most populous with housing. Simmons and Krokfors (2015) consider Ørestad's housing as large and architecturally unique. The 8 House is one of the top three most recognized buildings in the district, emphasizing iconism with high quality architecture.



**Figure 4.** The HH model with and without the ‘dress.’ Source: K. Braz private collection (2014).




**Figure 5.** Ground floor plan with the ‘boutique buildings’ in red. Source: K. Braz private collection (2013).



**Figure 6.** The ‘dress’ from the penthouse floor. Source: Authors (2019).

Designed by Danish architects from BIG in 2009, 8 House comprises 505 apartments with an overall housing area of 538,195 square feet, sitting on 129,167 square feet of commercial space (Stephens, 2009). Rich in apartment types and combining mixed-use spaces for offices and communal services, the LUD is unified via an overarching structural layout in the form of the number 8, producing a holistic form and organizing element (Figure 8). While embodying a complex mix of open-

ings, rotations of apartment façades, and various apartment plans, the LUD’s continuous eight-form main-slab ‘dresses’ the LUD and gives it a holistic image (Figure 9). Apartment schemes do not necessarily follow the continuous outline of the eight-form. And apartment volume does not necessarily fill the entire eight-slab. Left-over spaces function as public space while extended spaces serve as overhead bridges. This architectural act shares similar characteristics to the HH ‘dress,’ using an overall



**Figure 7.** Up: The HH’s carefully designed tiles pattern, using grasshopper software. Source: K. Braz private collection (2018). Down: Mirador’s ‘dress’ packaging ‘neighborhoods,’ a rigorous façade design method. Source: MVRDV (n.d).

packaging element that produces a clear unified form by ‘dressing’ functional elements of housing like apartments and service areas.

Two additional LUDs which have employed ‘dressing’ as a design strategy include the Mirador LUD outside Madrid by Dutch firm MVRDV, and VM House in Copenhagen designed by JDS and BIG firms. VM house contains 225 apartments with a gross area of 25,000 square meters, located in the east part of Ørestad district, like the 8 House also suffers from urban fragmentation and zoning. According to BIG’s official website, the LUD includes 80 different unique apartment types, most of them multi-leveled. VM façade design is an elaborated, iconic ‘dress’ that covers this mixture of apartments

to create a unifying envelope for the entire LUD. The Mirador, a large block-long building of 156 dwelling units in 22 floors and part the wide social housing program Initiated by the Municipal Council of Madrid, is located at the new residential district of Sanchinarro at the city’s North-east. MVRDV design schemes portray the design concept for Mirador as an urban block raised and placed on its side, producing a block sized LUD conceived as one building. Mirador’s façade is composed by reassembling the organs of the urban block and packing them together vertically. The façade is therefore a unifying ‘dress’ that packs the vertical block and holds it together. A transparent veil exposes all the different functions and dwelling types in the LUD, all recognized from the façade by differ-




Figure 8. The number 8 layout—the 8 House. Source: Minner (2010).





Figure 9. The main slab (blue) packs the apartments all together (red). Source: Adapted from Minner (2010).



**Figure 10.** The Mirador urban organs packed together into one LUD. Source: MVRDV (n.d).

ent tile materials and hues (Figure 10). Unlike VM House, Mirador exposes the diversity of spaces in the estate as a design principle, expressed in the façade, employing the ‘dress’ design method as a unifying structural system of horizontal and vertical movement and shared open spaces, marking it a self-functioning vertical urban block.

#### 4.2. Rearticulating Urban Form?

Our case studies are not integrated to the city, following the trajectory of insular development often critiqued for the lack of classic values attributed to urban life (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). The design of 8 House and VM House, both located in Copenhagen’s new Ørestad district, arguably revolves around the articulation of an alternative urban grid. Ørestad district faced criticism for

the lack of street life and urban variety with the housing building tendency to singularity, creating shallow urban connections with no mutual identity (Simmons & Krokfors, 2015). The housing area is wholly disconnected from the commercial area by massive boulevards. One of the zoning impacts of the district is the large configuration the developments within—among them Denmark’s largest hotel, largest mall, and largest apartment buildings. The VM, in particular, is trapped between the railway infrastructure, creating a dichotomic separation to the West side (Zenari, 2019): “With regard to street liveliness the central area of Ørestad, with the construction of Fields...lost its opportunity for real urban quality” (Olsson & Loerakker, 2013). As can be noticed in the aerial view (Figure 11), the southern section of Ørestad contains on its West and South edges several housing de-



**Figure 11.** 8 House aerial view on the edge of the south section of Ørestad. Source: Authors (2019).



velopments filling the insula of the grid comprehensively while most of them share a self-centered form. According to Bjarke Ingels, from BIG, the main challenge of this project was dealing with the inherent paradox: While the building architecture requires a coherent form, the urban design seeks for diversity and multiplicity, “in other words, to create a city in a building” (BIG, 2009).

This introverted formation of housing shows an alternate grid that architecture articulated into the housing development. The documentary film *The Infinite Happiness* follows life at this housing development for 21 days, providing us with a detailed account of both architecture and lived conditions in this celebrated LUD (Bêka & Lemoine, 2019). The film dedicates each day to one of the building’s elements, unpacking the eight-shaped LUD by focusing on the mutual relationships between the many elements of the functional operation of the estate and the unified form tying it together. The film describes the main ramp—following the LUD’s eight-form comprehensively—that functions as its main open street. Following a resident traveling on a scooter, the film unfolds the diversity of spatial situations the street offers. The street is lined with successive entry balconies to the apartments, separated from the ramp by a low wall and vegetation. Paved with outdoor-use bricks, each of the balconies contains different garden furniture and family chattels, producing an urban street façade. The other side of the ramp-street opens to the inner space of the LUD and overlooks the inner façade. The ramp encounters several covered passages, where atypical floor-plan apartments are located, or transparent public-use spaces. As the continuous ramp circles the outside perimeter of the 8 House, it borders entry balconies and an open view to the LUD surroundings, accessible to all residents. The lower part of the ramp is characterized with more turns, most facing to the inner garden space of the LUD. As the documentary shows, the super-size scale of the development allows it to employ elements of classic urban grid into the large housing development, rearticulating urban form via a unifying design element that does not undermine spatial variety and complexity.


In a similar way, Braz characterized her approach as an integrative typology she terms ‘Urban Park Housing Development’ that promises to provide the benefits of both precedents using architecture as mediator between developer needs and resident needs. Braz presented her design approach for HH at the Israeli real estate industry’s annual conference in 2014. Under the title Challenges in increasing land rights in high-rise construction (K. Braz, personal communication, November 19, 2014), she located HH at the intersection of two key architectural precedents: a street in central Barcelona, embodying urban intensity and diversity with a sense of human scale; and Le Corbusier’s ‘Ville Contemporaine’ representing, for her, the entrepreneurial approach of high-rise densification with advantages of privacy, light, and ventilation (Figure 12).

In order to meet the limitations of its site, HH consists of several urban organs along a linear-scheme of disassembled urban elements, with several design principles aiming to produce this new urban typology (Figure 13). The LUD is thus broken down by six pedestrian alleys which divide the built mass in six residential towers placed upon the segmented red slab, to produce a sense of human scale associated with quality-built environments (D. Rozen, personal communication, March 20, 2019). The alleys cross the LUD’s main axes, constituting the crossing-element of the new urban grid that connects large-scale office and restaurant developments on its East and the high-tech park across the highway via pedestrian bridge (Figure 14).

Mirador is another new LUD aiming to rearticulate urban form. Its location in Sanchinarro, a new suburb settlement on the edge of the city of Madrid, resulted in the Mirador’s antithetic architectural design approach contrasting the conventional housing in an area lacking typological variety and introverted housing development. Mirador is part of a new homogeneous grid of the new district, unlike the rich, variegated and multi-temporal grid of the great city of Madrid. Like the 8 House and HH, Mirador’s surroundings suffer from no street vitality. Calvo del Olmo and Garbayo (2017, p. 135) argue that architectural attempts like the Mirador, having a sin-



**Figure 12.** A street in central Barcelona (red) and Le Corbusier’s ‘Ville Contemporaine’ (green). Source: K. Braz private collection (2014).



**Figure 13.** Braz’s linear-scheme: reassembling urban elements. Source: K. Braz private collection (2013).

gular feature, is the result of the neoliberal city which is the “non-city.” Sanchinarro, planned as part of the ‘Programas de Actuación Urbanística,’ resulted from filling the shortage in housing by sprawling the city to the suburb under the influence of the neoliberal policy denying urbanity using unsustainable planning approaches

of low-density populated settlements (Alonso, Barquero, Vega, & Pérez, 2014). The starting point for the design process, MVRDV claims, was an ‘escape’ from the uniformity and claustrophobia of the surrounding neighborhoods filled with six-story blocks (MVRDV, n.d.). In contrast to the grey apartments, the circulation is colored



**Figure 14.** The alleys: crossing the HH’s main axes. Source: Authors (2019).

red. Very distinguished and bold, it contains a variation of different mobility methods that can be seen due to the decision to open the system with no walls facing outside as a vertical open street. The red-colored elements of the circulation system agglomerate the compendium of dwelling types in the LUD and structures them like small suburbs. Vertical sequences of stairs, halls, platforms, and streets, thus create a vertical neighborhood (MVRDV, n.d.). One of the iconic pictures of Mirador is a perspective from one of the ‘corridors’ designed facing the green-blue view, supplementary to the circulations in red (Figure 15). The corridor, almost three floors high and open to the sky, defines the apartments’ entrances crossing stairs with balconies overlooking this ‘street.’ The vertical LUD boasts an open terrace, 40 meters above the ground. The semi-public sky-plaza overlooks the city, puncturing this large housing development and marking it as organ of the city.


#### 4.3. The Neoliberal Estate

The welfare state initiated public housing and had a crucial part in the role of determining the mixture of the population. This responsibility reverted to entrepreneurial companies, minimizing state involvement in decision-making. Star-architect Patrik Schumacher eschews the modern idea of community-creation to point to the private developer who sells a platform of community forma-

tion through a bargaining process between customers. With this perspective, Schumacher identifies a new role assigned to architects in creating new communities, as they mediate between social-collective interests and economic ones (Schumacher, 2002).

HH marketing agent Cohen identifies the LUD’s 42 different apartment types in six towers and smaller ‘boutique’ buildings as one of its powerful marketing characteristics, offering buyers the future ability to extend—or shrink—their residential environment. HH therefore produces a diversified community by appealing to three main categories of buyers: young families who can only afford a small apartment and want the ability to expand and buy a bigger apartment without leaving the neighborhood; families with older children who may later want to move to a small apartment in the same neighborhood; and elderly couples who want to move from their spacious villas to a smaller urban apartment (I. Cohen, personal communication, May 14, 2019).

While HH provides the different types of apartments sporadically in the development, Mirador packs every different type as a ‘neighborhood’ showed at the façade and glued together into a superblock. This architectural approach was declaring the story of the building as hosting different dwelling units, producing a mixed community. The apartments are packed tighter leaving no space, the in-between of these neighborhoods contains the public space open to air, light, and view.



**Figure 15.** The Mirador corridor as a ‘street.’ Source: MVRDV (n.d.).



Likewise, 8 House includes a multi-generation community, as shown in *The Infinite Happiness*. The film follows three generations of one family living in three separate apartments. The family’s choice to purchase apartments at this development and live in proximity is explained by their past experiences of communal residence, with positive memories shared by parents and children. Family members indicate that since 8 House is commercial housing, one can choose privacy but still enjoy community life in this estate. Residents testify that they do not lock apartment doors, revealing a sense of security reasoned by the small community, where everybody knows each other’s faces and unexpected guests can be identified quickly (Bêka & Lemoine, 2019).

This market based, neoliberal community therefore presents itself as choice-based collective home, whose terms of membership are nonetheless determined by the financial capacity thus producing market-controlled social diversity. “8 House is a three-dimensional neighborhood rather than an architectural object,” says Bjarke Ingels (Minner, 2010). Compared to a regular neighborhood, with most community life limited to the ground floor, the 8 House enjoys social interactions in all floor levels. The row of 150 houses stretching from the bottom to the top provide the building with complex multi-dimensional community engagement (Minner, 2010). Fostering social interactions, the focal point of the project is the vertex of the number 8, the position of the intersection of both courtyards connects all the communal facilities: common room, guest apartments, lounges, cinema, and roof terrace. The most centralized location in the building, it also provides vertical connections and East-West connection paths to the neighboring buildings in the area. In an article titled “BIG’s 8 House succeeds where the Smithsons’ ‘streets in the sky’ failed,” Bjarke Ingels (Mairs, 2016) extols the ambitious design principle of encouraging social interaction in mass housing. First proposed by Le Corbusier and later discussed by Team X members and especially the Smithsons in the British context, housing architecture attempted to design encouraging social interactions between dwellers.

Ingels claims that after this brutalist approach failed in Britain, it is now achieved in Copenhagen at 8 House due to its three-dimensional interactions, while the Smithson focused only on the ground floor (Mairs, 2016).

While the material of VM’s ‘dress’ shares similarities to the commercial and cultural building’s façade in the center of the district, the architects (JDS and BIG) interpreted community life through diversification. The variegation related to the experimental architectural figuration of the housing building in Ørestad, aimed to compensate for the homogeneity’s morphology, making it strategically attractive (Losasso & D’Ambrosio, 2012). In a 2005 magazine article overviewing the architects and the project, BIG is presented as a young architect firm, with no LUD experience, that inventively mixes typology of forms and programs (Stephens, 2009). Although the project is creative and has a bold look, the developer indicates that the project met budget limitations, thus suggesting that good variant architecture is independent from big economic resources (Stephens, 2009). With this limitation, the VM house came to be an affordable residential project with sustainable social configurations. Its apartment diversity opened the development to a wider range of residents resulting from the different qualities and costs (Losasso & D’Ambrosio, 2012). The architects present VM as a take on Le Corbusier’s ‘Unité d’habitation,’ claiming to improve the long successive corridors, making them open to light. The open view from the two edges making the corridors “attractive social space” (BIG & VM Houses, n.d.). Another similarity to Le Corbusier’s innovative mass housing project is the packaging morphology. The VM presents a rigorous Tetris-packaging method of the variant apartment offering a diverse community (Figure 16), a progressive version of the L-shaped in cross-section. The architects’ allusion to Le Corbusier’s famous project indicates their communal approach—and role—in shaping the new community while taking into account entrepreneurial developing limitations and requirements.

Creating neoliberal housing estates that attempt to produce the architectural values aspired by social hous-



**Figure 16.** The VM Tetris-packaging method of the variant apartment versus the ‘dress’ covering the verity. Sources: BIG and VM Houses (n.d) and BIG + JDS (2008).

ing estates of the post-war period, the architects of HH, VM House, 8 House and Mirador attempt to employ the opportunity given to them by LUD developers to extend architectural design from the envelope to the private and public spaces of the LUD housing as housing estates.

## 5. Conclusion

This article expounds on the crucial role of architectural design of housing LUDs in the current neoliberal context. While mass housing emerged as a social, spatial, and political challenge following the Industrial Revolution, contemporary housing production is dominated by entrepreneurs' interest in using LUD housing as an investment channel. Neoliberal market housing has nonetheless presented us with the paradox by which the market's promise of variety is unfulfilled, producing replicated, repetitive built environments like many of the mass housing it aimed to replace.

But as LUDs exhaust the city as vehicle for capital growth towards less-desirable sites, developers assign renewed roles for design in early development processes even in housing. Seeking new ways to re-engage with social action in large housing developments, LUD architects employ architectural methods to confer LUDs with the variety and multiple choice promise of market development, unpacking the neoliberal paradox. LUD architects intentionally attempt to deal with the site's desirability problem using design. In so doing, they contribute to the project's entrepreneurial capital gain. As shown, architecture takes a leading role in marketing considerations foregrounding the design process. New architectural interpretations of introvert urban typology propose alternate grids of streets with varying scales, alleys, and squares. 'Dressing' the LUD with unifying and iconic architectural elements contributes to the goals of functional variety and the marketing needs of urban landmarks. Isolated and self-contained, LUDs constitute independent urban elements. The role assigned to architectural design in our case studies sets the fundamental terms of the large-scale built environment for the 'great number' and presents the capacity of for-profit housing LUDs to foster neoliberal communities premised upon the LUD platform.

Comparing the case studies discussed in this article along the three analytical themes we identify—(a) the value of architecture; (b) re-articulating urban form; and (c) the neoliberal estate—we exposed the actual decision-making and design-thinking involved in introducing architecture into large housing developments.

The role of architecture in producing value and image via envelope design is manifest in the four cases. Mirador's 'dress'—based on a 'quilt façade' packaging every typology separately—tells a story of diversity with its large-scale appearance, high-floor plaza, and using coloring between apartment types. The 8 House, 'dressed' in the illustrative image of the number 8, reveals a detailed façade implying the richness of typologies. HH's

'dress,' with most of its 42 different apartment types less noticeable, reveals only the differential between the six separate high buildings (white) to the successive ground floor (red) connecting while even hiding the boutique small buildings. The VM House proposes a dichotomic relationship between its façade appearance and its extraordinary architectural diversity. Made with glass and steel, the VM 'dress' outlines the form of the letters V and M and boasts a large number of pointed triangular balconies. This singular 'dress' conceals the 80 different types of apartments packed in this LUD.

All four case studies exemplify dis-integration with the city and lack of classical urban values. Their architectural design presents an introverted formation of dwelling that creates a new articulation of the missing urban grid inherent in the singular housing development. BIG architects harness this situation in Ørestad housing buildings, combining two different approaches: coherence (a building) and diversity (city), making a multidimensional grid. HH and Mirador embed urban organs in the singular form: successive ground floor with crossing alleys cutting the buildings in the HH; 'sky plaza' and multi-floor alleys open to the view in Mirador. This re-articulation takes the classic urban organ and reinterprets it in the form of LUD.

The neoliberal era entrusts entrepreneurial companies with determining the population mixture, in the absence of the welfare state. Architects take this opportunity to design large-scale housing developments and further develop architectural design approaches and tools of post-war housing estate architecture. HH, 8 House, VM, and Mirador offer diversified apartment types. HH provides the ability to change apartments attuned to changing family situations. 8 House, a three-dimensional neighborhood, embeds communal facilities for a wide range of ages. VM uses a progressive method of 'Unité d'habitation' in a rigorous Tetris packaging, while Mirador ties different 'neighborhoods' to one superblock, using it as a design method.

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## Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

## Neoliberalism Meets “Gangnam Style”: Vernacular Private Sector and Large Urban Developments in Seoul

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### Abstract

Globalised neoliberalism does not unify urbanisation processes but rather varies according to local contexts. This article explores the unique neoliberalisation process in large urban developments that have contributed to Seoul becoming a global city. Not only has the formal process of privatisation been important but also the vernacular practice of the ordinary people has informally grown during the process. By establishing a matured market of the mass production and consumption of high-rise apartments since the 1970s, more than half of the housing stock is now composed of high-rise apartments in South Korea. Gangnam represents the wealthiest district shifting from rural sites to highly dense urban areas due to their large-scale high-rise developments. Not only have societal changes made way for super-high-density apartment complexes as a rational response to population and economic growth, high-rise developments have also allowed Seoul to grow its population and expand its spatial footprint. Because of the dominance of universal western knowledge, this phenomenon has not been fully understood. While neoliberalism has been broadly adopted, the actual development process in Korea is distinctive not only from the West but also the East. The article argues that ‘vernacular neoliberalism’ has evolved not just by the formality of the ideological market system but also by the informality of survival practices of Korean lives largely under the colonial period and the aftermath of the Korean War. It particularly shows how large urban developments have been widespread by integrating a vernacular private rental system called *chonsei* into the formal structure.

### Keywords

Asian cities; *chonsei*; housing policy; Korea; neoliberalism; Seoul; urban redevelopment

### Issue

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### 1. Introduction

In 2012 a music video called Gangnam Style by the Korean musician Psy parodied an image of middle-class lifestyles in Seoul that centre on life within high-rise apartment complexes in the city’s Gangnam district. Despite its wide popularity once over the world, few would know the true meaning of Gangnam Style. Without a doubt, South Korea is one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, having increased from one of the world’s poorest countries with less than US \$100 GDP per capita in 1960 to the world’s 12th largest economy in 2018 recorded by the IMF. Accordingly, its economic geography ranked in the beta world cities in 1998

and was upgraded to alpha world cities in 2018 according to the inventory of alpha, beta and gamma world cities assessed by the Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network (GaWC). This shows how globalised Korea has become and how a global city Seoul is by the international standard. However, how it has been achieved is not yet fully understood. Whilst Gangnam style was a popular phrase throughout the rest of the world, not many people may have had the knowledge that Gangnam is the wealthiest district consisting of large-scale high-rise developments in Seoul, established by the process of modernisation and globalisation from the 1970s in Korea. In short, according to Robinson (2006), Seoul is on the map, but off the theory.

Large urban projects have now become a widespread development pattern within developing countries so that they can be included in globalised economic networks (Roy, 2009, 2011). Peripheries of the cities become eminent for such projects to be developed by the private sector-led entrepreneurialism, attracting a global flow of finance and ideas (Percival & Waley, 2012; Shatkin, 2008). They are thus seen as a distinctive form from previous urban developments, mostly described by rather small numbers of Western cities like Paris, London, and New York, which contrasts between ‘mega-cities’ of the Third World and implicates them as problems and ‘global cities’ of the First World cities as models (Roy, 2009). Whilst this phenomenon of large urban developments has recently attracted academic interests, Korea was an early developing country having grown from being a Third World to a First World country in a short space of time and with its large urban projects being produced to solve urban problems and to grow the national economy under dominant western knowledge. Although Seoul has resulted in being listed on the map of global cities, how it achieved its status differently from other First World cities is less known. Instead, the view that a large-scale of high-rise developments is an abnormal phenomenon pertaining to Korean society is more common.

Not only have societal changes made way for large-scale high-rise developments as a rational response to population growth, high-rise apartments have also allowed Seoul to grow and expand its spatial footprint. Following the transformation of social contexts forced by external pressures especially by the colonisation by Japan (1910–1945) and the Korean War (1950–1953), their effects on the urban situation brought a contingent and somewhat inevitable outcome of a privatised market structure over the 20th century. This was due to both the indifference of the colonial government towards the Korean population and the incapacity of an unprepared government to respond to them after the independence in 1945 and the following Korean War. Given the circumstances, large-scale urban developments based on high-rise residential buildings as a mix of commercial, public service, residential and recreational space were seen as time and cost effective to respond to the rapid urbanisation by the Korean government in the 1960s. This was brought by combining the modernist ideology of standardised quality and mass production based on modern technology by Le Corbusier (1960) and the concept of the neighbourhood unit as a self-contained community conceived by Perry (1929). Since then, they were proliferated throughout the country by involving large construction companies called *chaebols* (Korean multinational conglomerates, such as Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo and LG). There is no doubt that such large-scale urban projects have contributed to the economic growth of the country in which the residential construction industry increased up to 68.1% out of the whole construction industry in the 1990s (Lee, 2007).

Recently, the Korean model has been more commonly imported to other nations as it is perceived as being ideal not just as an urban model but also as an economic model for developing countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia in South-East Asia and increasingly extending to cities in CIS, Middle East, Africa, or Latin America going through serious housing shortages or slums (Lee, 2014). With the accumulated expertise and construction techniques to build high-rise buildings and to design large urban projects through Korea’s rapid urbanisation process, most large-scale developments are predominantly composed of high-rise residential buildings in these overseas developments (Paling, 2012; Percival & Waley, 2012). Recent events, such as the MOU agreement between the Korean government and the World Bank in 2015 to support building new towns and infrastructure in developing countries, and the naming of a road within a new town as ‘Avenida Corea’ in Bolivia symbolising the cooperation and friendship between the two nations in 2017 are examples of such intended outcomes. While there exists a number of challenges such as lack of global acknowledgement, network or funds, these efforts show that Seoul is aiming to firmly secure its status of being recognised as a global city (The Seoul Institute, 2014).

As Robinson (2002) noted, nevertheless, “the complex inter-referencing of models across Asia may be related to ‘Western’ urban theories, but they are not defined by them.” However contradictory or complementary they may be, Euro-American perspectives have not grasped the understandings of other worlds; particularly the earlier developing countries such as the ‘Four Asian Tigers’ and also other emerging countries like China and India (Featherstone & Venn, 2006). How and why did large-scale urban projects become pivotal to urban solutions and economic growth for Korean governmental policy? How did private developers as providers coupled with residents as consumers indulge in shaping the market of high-rise developments in Korea unlike other cities rather based on low-rise suburbanisation processes in the West? Hence, global city rankings that are ascertained by Western standards cannot account for differences of developments across other world cities (Friedman, 1995). It is because the approach tends to ignore the lived experience such as struggle or resistance that can be understood as a ‘clash of rationalities’ between formal marketised systems and informal conditions (Watson, 2009). In this sense, the article argues that ‘vernacular neoliberalism’ has evolved not just by the formality of an ideological market system but also by the informality of survival practices of Korean lives largely under the colonial period and the aftermath of the Korean War. It shows how a vernacular private rental system called *chonsei* has been integrated into the formal structure of large urban developments. Therefore, the research is mostly based on a documentary approach with complementary secondary data to understand the historical process of development.

## 2. Variegated East-Asian Neoliberalism in Large-Scale Urban Development

Through globalisation processes, a new ideological paradigm of neoliberalism accelerated in the 1980s crossed over multiple geographical and sociological conditions (Park, Hill, & Saito, 2012). By the winning ideology of neoliberalism, urban governance has shifted from managerialism in the 1960s to entrepreneurialism in the 1970s and 1980s, which has brought about a general shift in attitudes towards housing provision away from public concerns to private acquisition over the last decades (Forrest, 2003; Harvey, 1989). Such an entrepreneurial approach towards the private-led growth becomes more apparent particularly due to the outcomes of Asian developmentalism since the global financial crisis (Cammack, 2012). Because capitalism is adapted to a heterogeneous global world with a so-called 'variegated capitalism' (Peck & Theodore, 2007), there are therefore some important local differences within the broad neoliberal landscape.

Early developed countries, such as those in northern Europe, had established the welfare state to reconstruct society from the aftermath of the World Wars in the beginning of the 20th century, which was based on Keynesian managerialism (Park et al., 2012). Within this, housing was largely provided by the state in which it was generally considered as a public responsibility rather than a market product. However, given the lack of public resources and its concomitant economic recession, the strong regulated turn towards the market-oriented housing system based on home-ownership ideology has swept through countries (Forrest, 2003). Compared to the Western world, in Eastern countries developmental ideology has been particularly concerned in 'catching up' with already-developed countries, replacing public welfare services with the aim of economic growth (Holliday, 2000; Park et al., 2012). In the development of these countries, housing has been particularly important not just in terms of a duty to distribute opportunity but more as a trigger of the nation's economic development (Lee, Lee, & Yim, 2003).

Due to such different traces, whilst recognising the 'failure' of high-rise living in the West in the mid-20th century until recent regeneration projects based on sustainable development in many parts of the earlier developed western world (Baxter & Lees, 2009; Colomb, 2007), there is a contrasting situation in the East, where large-scale development of high-rise housing has been largely adopted along with the developmental engine of economic growth (Forrest, Lee, & Wah, 2000). Despite similar tendencies of direct state provision, the universal home-ownership model in Singapore was based on a 99-year lease with state land ownership whilst Hong Kong's regime of property-led accumulation and its hegemonic urban redevelopment may have led to high speculation tendency and widened social inequalities with a much slower home ownership program (Huat, 2003; Lee

et al., 2003; Tang, 2017; Wah, 2000). On the other hand, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have much more limited state provision of housing being largely dependent on private developers in line with economic development (Chen & Li, 2012; Lee et al., 2003). In both sectors of public and private provisions since the 1970s, Korea started with mostly private ownership and then shifted focus towards social welfare, following the Asian and global economic crises (Ha, 2010; Ronald & Lee, 2012). Unlike Korea, in Japan (and Tokyo in particular), the change in high-rise ownership from public to private may have come from new policy practices of encouraging construction of high-rise condominiums from the 1990s after the collapse of the country's economic bubble (Hirayama, 2005; Ronald & Hirayama, 2006). Hence, there has not been universal convergence with no clear distinction between public or private, ownership ratio and household affluence (Lee et al., 2003), although policies across the world have generally taken a direction towards the market production and consumption of housing. This may be because "economic globalisation does not alter urban cultures in deterministic ways, as cities are nested in different national, social and cultural contexts from which emerge different strategies for the management of or resistance to globalisation" (Clammer, 2003, p. 404).

As such, 'process' rather than 'trait' geographies are more likely to produce dynamic knowledge beyond Euro-American hegemony of urban theory (Roy, 2009). Actually existing urbanisms involve the complexity in global and local juncture via experiencing social dynamics such as informality, resistance, which is much less known in dominant theorisations of global city-regions on the map (Roy, 2009; Shatkin, 2011). Because the diffusion process in globalisation is never direct or one-way and instead imported ideas are re-formed to adapt to the local contexts through variation and contestation, the formal planning process rationalised for techno-managerial and marketised system confronts the other end of rationality by the informality of the survival from hardship (Watson, 2009). Moreover, rapid and unpredictable growth relies more on such informality rather than the established power (Watson, 2009). In this sense, the current system of large urban developments in Korea cannot be fully understood without understanding social conditions inherited from the historical contexts. In particular, vernacular institutions have grown to survive during the harsh time over the external and internal power, which became informally integrated into the dominant market structure and has played a crucial role in large urban developments. Here, 'vernacular neoliberalism' can be seen as a process integrating the informal privatisation (*chonsei*) to formal marketised privatisation (ownership). As such, the concept of 'vernacular neoliberalism' can be defined as a form of variegated neoliberalism that although it is basically operated by privatised activities to provide public services (e.g., housing) within the free market system of neoliberalism, instead of fully evolving out of formal institutions it is however com-

plimented by ordinary people developing an informal system through everyday practices. That is, it can be characterised as practical, informal or indigenous, non-professional or elite, which can be effectively vulnerable by its insecure status. Because of such vulnerability, there have been attempts to protect tenants (the special civil law of tenancy protection) or to integrate the *chonsei* system into a formal system (*chonsei* loan, governmental long-term *chonsei*) by the Korean government since the beginning of the 1980s when it became apparent that landlords were manipulating the system, leaving tenants with housing insecurity and it becoming a serious social issue (note that this discussion is not further explored for this article).

### 3. The Historical Housing Shortage in Korea

Since the Ganghwa treaty forced by Japan in 1876, the tremendous changes from the closed and fixed Korean society under the Confucianism in Choson society were seen in the physical transformation of traditional urban areas (Jeon, Son, Yang, & Hong, 2008). The extension of urban areas was led by the population growth in Seoul due to a new social order and populated by Japanese settlers at the end of the 19th century (Jeon et al., 2008). During the Choson dynasties spanning over 500 years from 1392 to 1910, the growth of the population was not significant, and the administrative boundary of the city continued without major differences (Cha, You, & Lee,

2004). Although Seoul was characterised by a relatively high density in its urban parts, with 100,000 people in 16.5km<sup>2</sup> within the walls (approximately 60 persons per hectare), but only 10,000 people in outer walls in 1428, the population of Seoul remained at around 200,000 since the mid-17th Century for 200 years (Cha et al., 2004). While this figure represents a big size of urban population for a pre-industrialised society, housing shortage was not a big problem for over 500 years as the ratio of a house per household was roughly 1 to 1 (Son, 1986). This remained steady until the 1920s with little growth of the population at 0.8% in Seoul, even though other local cities had more significant growths (Son, 1986). Since the 1920s after the independence movement in 1919, the population increased sharply in Seoul, especially out of the central urban area because of central Japanese occupation (Son, 1996a). It reached up to around 730,000 in 1936 and 900,000 in 1945 compared to 250,000 in 1910 when Korea was annexed to Japan, largely due to changes in socio-economic structure leading farmers to move into urban areas (Cha et al., 2004). There was thus an inevitable result that the issue of housing shortage came to the fore during these periods.

Table 1 shows that, as the population went up increasingly since 1919, the shortage of housing became significant at 5.77% in 1926 and doubled to 10.62% five years later in 1931. With continuous increases, the shortage of housing stock was around 10–15% through the beginning of the 1930s and became worse at over

**Table 1.** Housing shortages (Seoul) in the Japanese colonial period. Data extracted from Kim (2010) and Son (1996b).

Year	Households	Housing stock (units)	Housing supply (%)	Housing shortage (%)
1925	—	—	95.55	4.45
1926	68,862	64,889	94.23	5.77
1931	77,701	69,453	89.38	10.62
1932	78,261	57,965	74.06	25.94
1933	79,519	70,599	88.78	11.22
1934	80,961	68,186	84.22	15.78
1935	131,239	101,767	77.54	22.46
1936	138,583	107,946	77.89	22.11
1938	148,856	—	—	—
1944	220,938	132,000	59.75	40.25
1961	485,129	275,436	56.78	43.22
1962	554,136	306,289	55.27	44.73
1963	597,132	322,386	53.99	46.01
1964	633,026	331,133	52.31	47.69
1965	649,290	345,657	53.24	46.76
1966	724,043	361,943	49.99	50.01
1967	754,261	406,119	53.84	46.16
1968	837,362	506,810	60.52	39.48
1969	961,491	543,645	56.54	43.46
1970	1,029,000	584,000	56.75	43.25
1980	1,724,000	968,000	56.15	43.85
1990	2,518,000	1,458,000	57.90	42.10
2000	2,548,000	1,973,000	77.43	22.57
2010	2,610,400	2,525,210	96.74	3.26

20% since the mid-1930s. Surprisingly, in 1944, its figure reached 40.25%, as housing stock increased only just over twofold but households increased more than three times compared to 1926. However, Son (1986) emphasises that the problem of housing shortages was only of concern to the middle classes at the time of the colonial government, and these figures thus include only them, not lower classes or squatters for whom the problem was doubtlessly worse. As such, the housing shortage reflected the severe housing condition of those that could not secure their own housing and were prone to rent a part of a house let by its landlord with extremes of a single room for a family of 5–8 members, whilst those who even could not afford partial renting built informal shelters in the peripheries of the city (Jeon et al., 2008). During the 1920s to 1930s, while the residential settlements for higher classes were thus expanded around and out of the city centre in Seoul, which was encouraged due to the land development by private industries, the informal settlements of squatters also increased significantly (Cha et al., 2004; Yang, 1991). Given the context of the colonial period that was interested in exploitation rather than the welfare of Korean citizens, it seems that the problem of urban housing was broadly left to private solutions, and poor housing was not considered generally a central issue.

To make matters worse, it is estimated that 50% of Seoul housing stock was damaged by the following Korean War, being the most attacked area and approximately 30% of the whole stock was to be rebuilt due to its complete destruction (Kim, 2001). The housing shortage was yet to be severe though, because most citizens were evacuated to other provinces during the war until the armistice agreement in 1953. Soon after, however, the population increased greatly due to a variety of factors such as returning citizens and rural exodus, which led to the extended areas of illegal buildings and slums in addition to the previous poor settlements since the 1920s. Consequently, the housing shortage continued to increase up to 50% in the mid-1960s when it was the worst due to the explosive population growth with rural exodus in the poor conditions of the economy (Kim, 2010). Even though the government started to construct housing with assistance from international aid right after the ceasefire of the war, it was very limited to meeting the needs of housing shortage but rather triggered the encouragement of private supply (Kim, 2001). These series of historical housing shortage and poor conditions may have become an inevitable vehicle of privatisation of housing in Korea, which is not so much based on the ideological underpinning, but instead a competition of survival.

#### 4. Privatisation of Urban Housing

##### 4.1. Construction of Private Housing Industries

The public ownership of land that was not limited to construct houses in Choson society also faced privati-

sation as Japanese settlers insisted on ownership of land on which they bought a house in 1909 (Jeon et al., 2008). The colonial government commenced the Land Readjustment Scheme (LRS) in 1937 following the *Choson Urban District Planning Act* (CUDPA) in 1934 in order to accommodate the increased population, to manage the urban growth, and to make effective administration (Cha et al., 2004) by improving their use value and to regulate development on empty land (Lee, 1986). However, in 10 districts designated by the scheme before 1945, they were spatially separated broadly in two forms in which one was comprised of Japanese residential settlements based on industrial areas, and the other was simply housing sites for Koreans to solve housing shortages in urban areas (Song, 1990). Even though the colonial government managed the process of development and the land supply of housing construction, the actual provision of housing predominantly relied on private development because housing shortages only affected Koreans, not Japanese (Son, 1986).

Through the difficulty of the housing shortage there was a change in housing perspectives in that housing came to have a meaning as an asset, which led to the growth of the house-building companies and housing lease businesses (Park & Jeon, 2002). Whilst private developers were actively involved in the construction of housing within the walls of Seoul from the 1920s, they were spread to outer areas of the walls with mass provision since the LRS in 1937 (Jeon et al., 2008). The private housing market was thus naturally structured from the beginning of the 1920s and dramatically increased in the 1930s in which houses were built by private developers, and largely consumed by those who were to sell or to let them, which were mediated by leasing companies (Park & Jeon, 2002). Whilst many of them were sold to those who were the rich landowners in local areas and who moved to Seoul, a large portion of new houses was also consumed by letting to students who came from local regions or poor classes (Park & Jeon, 2002). Eventually, it can be said that the privatised ownership was important for the higher class, whereas the private rental market of *chonsei* was the important and probably only method for the lower class to survive under the colonial government with indifference toward Korean lives.

##### 4.2. Vernacular Private-Renting System (*Chonsei*)

The private renting system called *chonsei* evolved from the modern historical contexts by external forces from the Japanese colonial period and the Korean War described above, which is a unique method for South Korea. Whereas monthly rent is common all over the world in contexts such as industrialised urban areas due to a variety of factors including the population growth and consequent housing shortage during the urbanisation, it was rarely adopted for housing rather than commercial property until the mid-20th century in Korea according to the survey report of the Choson customs by the

colonial government in 1910 (cited in Choi & Ji, 2007). While the origin of *chonsei* is not exactly known with little written records, the report recorded it as the most general housing rental method that tenants pay a lump-sum deposit of between 50% and 70–80% of the property value for a fixed period of tenancy, instead of monthly rent, and the deposit is reimbursed at the end of the contract (Choi & Ji, 2007). Whether *chonsei* originated before or from Choson society is considered as a matter of controversial debate. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the *chonsei* renting system emerged spontaneously over time through individual transactions due to the increase of population who moved away from rural areas to Seoul in the process of constructing Japanese settlements since the Ganghwa forced treaty opening three ports in 1876 (Park, 2000). Although the colonial government somewhat weakened it to limit tenant rights, it continued to proliferate and was recorded as the most prevalent pattern of renting housing according to the 1944 survey report of the *chonsei* custom (Park, 2000). Furthermore, it was widespread from Seoul to other areas as well throughout the rapid urbanisation and its housing shortage after the Korean War (Kwak, 1966, as cited in Choi & Ji, 2007).

Despite the controversy between the pros and cons of this informal renting system, it is widely recognised that the *chonsei* transaction is based on mutual benefit between landlords and tenants in Korea. Firstly, it can be an informal financial source for landlords. Those who need a large lump-sum of money can procure it easily by letting their own properties without any formal procedures, while the *chonsei* deposit could be regarded as identification when letting to strangers (Park, 2000). Because of a relatively large sum of the deposit, it can be used to attain multi-buy housing. On the other hand, a *chonsei* deposit can be a secure saving of their assets for tenants until achieving ownership compared to high risk of a private loan or low interest of a formal banking scheme (Lee, 1985, as cited in Park, 2000). Also, Ambrose and Kim (2003) argued that *chonsei* could provide better housing than the one that can be bought by immediate cash purchase. That is, whereas landlords can benefit from the increase of housing price and the lessened risk from inflation, tenants can reduce the risk to lose the deposit and be more secure without paying high monthly rent (Cho, 1988). Therefore, the next section explores how it has played a significant role in the current large urban developments in Korea.

#### 4.3. Passing the Baton to the Private Sector in Gangnam's Large-Scale Urban Development

During the reconstruction of the country especially from the aftermath of the Korean War following a weakened Korean government after a long colonial period, the country's economic reorientation into an export-oriented structure included the aim of replacing a public housing solution with macro-economic growth so

as to increase households' income that enables consumers to purchase their own housing in the private market (Lim, 2005). This was because the government's efforts to improve urban squatter areas and the housing shortage by introducing apartments were unsuccessful during the 1950-1960s. The provision of mostly small apartments achieved through national public funds and foreign aid finance was for lower-income households, whereas middle- and high-class households preferred detached houses until the 1960s (Gelézeau, 2007). To make matters worse, the negative perception against high-rise buildings came from the accidental collapse of the Wawoo apartment complex just three months after completion in 1970, which resulted in 34 deaths and 40 injuries.

Whereas the incident caused the end of the provision of such redevelopments by the demolition of existing settlements and forcibly relocating evictees to outside areas of Seoul, however, it became a motive of breakthrough that the aim of apartment policy was diverted into middle-class housing (Lee, 1995). Seung-up Lim, who was the chief of the Korea Housing Research Institute at the time, rationalised the initiative to attract private funding for middle-classes based on the realisation of the limits of the governmental support:

A number of apartments have been built with public funds, but it inevitably resulted in poor condition for lower classes as the nature of public funds....It would be the effect of killing two birds with one stone, on the one hand, to solve housing shortage, on the other hand, to relieve the public financial burden of the government if apartments could be supplied for middle-classes without the support. (Lim, 1970, pp. 58–59)

In 1971, therefore, two successful developments targeting the wealthier classes in Yeoido and Dongbu-ichon-dong constructed by the government turned such dislike into a positive attitude, which came to be successful without any public funds, and acted as a pioneering model for the 'Gangnam development' onward (Gelézeau, 2007; Son, 2003).

In order to boost large urban developments, the reinforcement of housing policies came throughout the 1970s. By the 10-Year Plan for Housing Construction to provide 2.5 million units of housing in 1972, a series of laws were enacted to make large urban high-rise developments more flexible through the *Housing Construction Acceleration Act* (HCAA) in 1972, the designation of apartment districts in Gangnam under the urban planning law in 1976 and the *Land Development Acceleration Act* in 1980. To do so, 'high-rise apartments' were defined as residential collective buildings with over six floors and more than 20 households by architectural law, which was a typical development pattern throughout the 1980–1990s. This is in comparison to 'low-rise apartments' with five floors which mostly comprised of earlier developments in the 1970s and 'super high-rise


apartments' that are greater than 60 metres (approximately 21–23 floors) which developed more towards the end of the 1990s that applies different architectural laws and planning policies in terms of design, structure and facilities (e.g., number of elevators, earthquake-proofing, concrete or steel, sprinklers, etc.; Land and Housing Institute, 1990). By altering the HCAA in 1977 and 1978, the policy of designated companies (mostly applying to *chaebols*) aimed to achieve the goal of mass production and to bring the large builders' capital into urban housing markets, which have a legal priority to construct large urban projects and benefited from financial support based on pre-sales of apartments (Ryu, 2004). This was to distinguish from registered builders (of which there are over 7,000) who can provide over 20 units annually and smaller-sized non-registered builders who are restricted to building fewer than 20 units per annum according to their size, output, and capability. Alongside the pre-sale policy, the Housing Saving Scheme (HSS) in 1977 enabled those with savings accounts to have priority allocations for new apartments at below-market prices before they were built (Ha, 2006). Because of the pre-sale, the instalments paid during the construction period effectively became an interest-free fund for large builders. Furthermore, loans made from the saving scheme were given to large designated construction companies at low rates of interest by the government (Ryu, 2004).

Since the HCAA in 1972, therefore, mass-production targeting the middle classes started with a series of new neighbourhoods in Gangnam (Figure 1). This was intended to alleviate overpopulation in Gangbuk, the traditionally settled area of the city. Starting with the Banpo complex in 1973–1978, a continuous sequence of apartment blocks were developed in Gangnam. Above all, the most significant milestone of the Gangnam development was the shift from public to private towards large-scale housing provision. The Apgujung-Hyundai complex (no. 5 in Figure 1) was the first apartment complex in which a private company was involved in constructing ur-

ban middle-class high-rise housing (Kim & Choe, 1997). Since then, private developments (in italics in Figure 1) came to become proliferated in Gangnam development of the 1970s that had made Gangnam a special region. In socio-economic terms, therefore, the meaning of Gangnam (grey area in Figure 1) points out the area where large urban high-rise developments were lined along the south of Hangang, whilst the literal meaning is the south of Hangang river contrary to Gangbuk (the north of Hangang). As a result, Gangnam, originally located in rural areas outside of the city, came to be a representative of the richest residential settlements in Korea, and a trigger of widespread apartment developments and extension of the city afterwards.

However, without the contribution of funding from *chonsei* deposits, the proliferation of large urban high-rise developments would not have been widespread. Those who can afford with saving accounts of the HSS are eligible to buy new provision of apartments and become owners or possible to own multiple units with *chonsei* tenants. On the other hand, *chonsei* tenancy could be a way of resolving housing needs for those who are not eligible for purchase schemes. In addition to the weak public financial system, public provision of housing has been very limited and the majority has been for sale in which long-term public rental housing comprises only 2.3% of total housing stocks in 1999 (Ha, 2006). Accordingly, the vernacular system of *chonsei* has continued and in fact, it has been increasingly dispersed by time and space during the mass provision of the large urban developments since the 1980s after the initial Gangnam developments.

As shown in Table 2, the *chonsei* ratio continuously increased from 13.05% to 55.1% in comparison to ownership ratio which fell from 82.82% to 41.2% while the rate of housing supply dramatically rose from 56.15% to 96.74% between 1980 and 2010 in Seoul. That is to say, greater housing supply does not correlate to greater ownership. Its figure in Gangnam is even higher at 17.57% in 1980 increased to 58.51% with the very low ownership



**Figure 1.** The Gangnam developments of apartments in the 1970s. Adapted from Gelézeau (2007).

**Table 2.** Housing tenure ratio.

Year	Region	Total (%)			Apartment (%)		
		Owned	<i>Chonse</i>	Monthly rent	Owned	<i>Chonse</i>	Monthly rent
1980	Nation	86.89	8.28	2.70	68.21	22.61	3.51
	Seoul	82.82	13.05	3.02	75.66	21.09	1.31
	Gangnam	80.48	17.57	1.28	78.46	20.11	0.92
1985	Nation	83.82	10.91	1.87	68.76	24.93	0.96
	Seoul	80.51	17.32	0.52	74.16	23.36	0.52
	Gangnam	76.30	22.01	0.71	73.61	25.05	0.75
1990	Nation	78.96	15.39	2.34	66.08	28.53	0.95
	Seoul	74.66	22.13	2.07	69.49	27.97	1.26
	Gangnam	72.60	24.48	1.92	71.21	26.16	1.80
1995	Nation	74.89	21.42	1.08	64.56	32.27	0.35
	Seoul	69.57	29.21	0.36	61.03	38.06	0.18
	Gangnam	64.26	34.69	0.35	62.39	36.83	0.31
2000	Nation	70.58	25.30	1.35	61.91	35.09	0.44
	Seoul	65.70	32.55	0.49	58.88	39.72	0.23
	Gangnam	59.53	38.68	0.45	56.75	41.55	0.40
2010	Nation	54.30	39.90	3.30			
	Seoul	41.20	55.10	2.20			
	Gangnam	38.19	58.51	1.99			

Notes: Data from Statistics Korea (KOSIS). *Chonse* data includes the partial *chonse* with monthly rent for the rest of deposit.

ratio of 38.19% in 2010. Moreover, in apartments, *chonse* consisted of more than a fifth in 1980 and increased to 41.55% in 2000 in Gangnam districts. The apartment price ratio of *chonse* to ownership for Seoul and nationally was recorded at 47.9% and 50.8% respectively in December 1998, and increased to 70.7% and 75.3% in December 2017. In Gangnam, it was recorded at 62.6% in December 2017. This means that a large portion of high-rise construction was actually financed by *chonse* deposit. Meanwhile, monthly rent without any lump-sum deposit is insignificant throughout the given period.

As a result, the number of housing stock increased almost thirteenfold from 260,000 in 1960 to 3,379,773 in 2010, relieving the housing shortage as reached around 97% of housing supply in Seoul. By replacing detached houses with apartments, this has led to the reconfiguration of the total housing stock where 4% of the stock was apartments and 85% was detached-houses in 1970, to the situation where apartments exceeded 60% of the stock and detached-houses (except multi-households) were less than 16% in 2016. Due to a change of preference towards apartments since the 1980s, while the transformation from single-household detached houses to dense multi-households housing (less than 4 floors and 660m<sup>2</sup> of total floor areas) has largely been accredited towards lower class housing, reaching around 30% of housing stock in 2000 in Seoul (Jeon et al., 2008), such transformative activities have been manipulated in the redevelopment process so multi-holders possess the rights for multiple apartment allocation. Also, earlier developed low- and high-rise apartments are being reconstructed to super high-rise complexes in which density becomes higher by increasing the building height in or-

der to increase business profits and to alleviate the fees for residents to pay for their increased unit size and construction costs. As the redevelopment or reconstruction process can take between 10 to 20+ years, *chonse* for older apartments are set up at much lower prices compared to newer constructions. For instance, examining the first Gangnam development of Banpo apartments that comprised of three complexes, the 2nd and 3rd complexes were reconstructed in 2009 and their price ratio of *chonse* to ownership is 47% and 55% respectively by the actual transaction record of the second quarter of 2019 by the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport. On the other hand, this record shows that whilst being in the process of reconstruction, the 1st complex of Banpo is only 7% and Apgujung-Hyundai is 27% in their *chonse* price ratio. This wide gap attracts a variety of demands, for example, those who could afford to buy in other areas but prefer to rent in new apartments or those who cannot afford to rent new apartments but could rent for old ones in order to enjoy lifestyles or to benefit their children's education in Gangnam.

Therefore, turning back to the beginning, not only is the formal system important but also the informal system of vernacular *chonse* has been a crucial factor for Seoul to become a global city and for the globalised Gangnam style according to the figures of the ratio between ownership and *chonse*: *chonse* was more than a third in 1995 whilst Seoul became a beta global city in 1998 index; more than a half in 2010 whilst Seoul included in an alpha global city in 2018 index. To brief, privatised large urban high-rise developments in Korea has been constructed by combining the neoliberal approach with the middle-class ownership and vernacular



approach with lower income *chonsei* system together, which contributed to worlding the city Seoul. Hence, the Gangnam style is not just about middle-class lifestyle but also represents the wider groups of the population.

## 5. Conclusion

The article explored how large urban high-rise developments have been widespread by not only the formality of the marketised system but also the informality of the vernacular *chonsei* system. Evolving from the rapid urbanisation and its consequent housing shortage by external forces from the Japanese colonisation of Korea and the Korean War, the *chonsei* system has survived for more than a century extending even into the fully developed system with formal financial system and the saturated housing supply. Even though the global ideology of neoliberalism has predominated in the development framework, the vernacular *chonsei* system has played a crucial role by being informally adapted to the formal structure of large urban developments. This shows how globalised neoliberalism can be variegated in local contexts according to social, cultural and historical conditions in which ordinary Koreans practised the *chonsei* system spontaneously to survive under harsh living environments. Under the rather forced privatisation process of housing, they found a compromising way through individual transactions due to the formal housing system being out of reach for the lower classes. This vernacular practice of a private renting system is clearly distinctive from not only the West but also the East in that it could contribute differently to the economic growth of a country as well as towards individuals. In other words, the urban development and its influence on the economy and housing conditions could have arisen in alternative ways if the *chonsei* system had not evolved. Although there is no definitive answer to say whether it is a superior system or not, its endurance could mean that it deserves greater global recognition. However, given the dominance of the monthly rent system that is widely adopted in the West, the *chonsei* system is hardly recognised over the world. This led to a controversy that some policy makers and academics in Korea have criticised the informality of the *chonsei* practice compared to the Western system, while others advocate its role and meanings. As such, the *chonsei* market is vulnerable to fluctuation due to government intervention towards housing supply policy. Whilst the article has not explored its influence and status in the housing market, the findings show that it has contributed to not only the urban development pattern but also ordinary lives, which means that it should be better understood within its own contexts beyond the framework of Euro-American knowledge.

To conclude, although the higher ratio of ownership could be perceived as the ideal to achieve, the survival of *chonsei* means that such an informal system can fill the gap between the ideal and the actual market operation, serving those who are not eligible to secure formal own-

ership from the government scheme. It would have not been possible that large-scale urban developments have spread over wider population due to the private sector-led development of high valued high-rise apartments. In this way, large urban high-rise developments based on the formal structure and informal practices have continued over the last half-century, which has transformed its physical and socio-spatial structure in Korean society and has contributed to Seoul and Gangnam becoming globalised. Therefore, the role and influence of informal system need to be better appreciated within the broad structure in the development process.

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## Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

## Urban Morphology and Qualitative Topology: Open Green Spaces in High-Rise Residential Developments

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### Abstract

High-rise housing complexes (HRHCs) are a prominent trend in urban development. They generate new configurations of open green spaces, thus creating a new set of human-environment relations and a new constellation of urban landscapes. However, little attention has been devoted by the literature to these new spatial configurations and the urban experience they offer. Focusing on the spaces between buildings, this research article examines the urban morphology of these large urban developments and how they are being experienced by residents. Based on morphological analysis, we propose a set of outputs with which to discern and evaluate various characteristics of these new spaces. Namely, a typology of HRHCs complexes, three evaluation indexes, and a green/gray nollis map. Drawing on morphological analysis, the research discusses the role of green spaces of HRHCs in the experience of residents. We portray different tensions arising from the residents' experience based on walking interviews and propose how these tensions are connected to the morphology of space. Juxtaposing the morphological and qualitative topological analyses, we focus on the way that different planning aspects of HRHCs' open spaces might foster everyday use and function as well as attitudes and feelings.

### Keywords

high-rise housing; large urban developments; green open space; urban morphology

### Issue

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### 1. Introduction

Contemporary cities pose new challenges for urban planning and architecture as to the kind of spatial and social experiences they afford. Vertical urbanism—building much higher than ever before, or 3D urban growth—has become a dominant mode of urban development and redevelopment in many cities around the world. This mode of urban development also includes housing developments (Harris, 2015), though housing types are the outcome of the state's housing policy and, in many places, urbanization proceeds based on medium/low-rise and single-family housing developments (Winston, 2017). The volumetric cities that grow as a result offer a new design and functions based on technological in-

novations and new planning cultures (Drozd, Appert, & Harris, 2018). Nevertheless, research in urban-related fields mostly generates horizontal analyses of urban realities; therefore, Graham and Hewitt (2012, p. 74) have emphasized the need for understanding the multiple meanings of volumetric urbanism and its effects on social, cultural, spatial, and political life in cities.

Unlike their affordable predecessors, contemporary high-rise housings are developed for middle- and upper-income populations and share some prominent characteristics (Brumann, 2012; Fincher, 2007). When developed as large urban developments, usually in the outskirts of cities or as part of new towns, they are usually developed in the form of high-rise housing complexes (HRHCs). In some places, such as Hong Kong, Singapore,

and Israel, HRHCs have become the dominant form of development (Lowry & McCann, 2011; Turkington, van Kempen, & Wassenberg, 2004; Yuen & Yeh, 2011). In Israel, for instance, in 1992, only 2% of new apartments were built as 10 to 20-story buildings, compared to 2012, when the rates climbed to more than 30% (Aviv et al., 2018).

The open (green and gray) spaces of HRHCs receive little attention in the literature, although they in effect produce a distinct and divergent urban landscape for their residents. Moreover, given the magnitude and spread of HRHC developments, the form of HRHC open spaces and their encapsulated experience will presumably dominate the future urban landscape and, as a result, the general urban experience. Understanding them is thus crucial for envisioning the future of cities.

The literature on large urban developments in general and verticality in particular, suggests that topological analyses should be integrated into more common topographical accounts (Harker, 2014). This article follows the call to consider horizontal and vertical, topographical and topological aspects for explaining contemporary urban development of HRHCs. More specifically, the article juxtaposes the form of the open green spaces of HRHCs with the everyday topologies of HRHCs' inhabitants. Focusing on the spaces between buildings, we ask what the urban morphology of these large urban developments is and how they are being experienced by residents. In order to expand the understanding of the form, function, and experience of the open spaces of HRHCs, a morphological analysis is juxtaposed with a qualitative analysis.

The article is organized in four sections: First, it reviews the relevant literature on the meanings and functions of urban open space and urban morphology. Then, the methodology of combining morphological and qualitative topological analyses is presented. The findings demonstrate the use of urban morphology to characterize HRHCs, which are then juxtaposed with the qualitative analysis, producing an encompassing evaluation of the use, function, and experience of the open green spaces of HRHCs. The conclusion discusses the relations between new urban formations and the residents' experiences of them to produce long-term planning solutions that better meet users' needs and desires.

## 2. Urban Open Space

Research on urban open space is rich, well-grounded, and multifaceted (Kabisch, Qureshi, & Haase, 2015). City planners have long grasped the importance of these green spaces and integrated them into the city in different shapes and forms to serve different agendas. Manicured nature in the form of parks and gardens in the urban fabric has been designed to promote recreation and people's well-being (Gandy, 2003).

The impacts of urban green space on people are well established in the literature and cover a wide range of implications (e.g., Hartig, 1993; Kaplan, 1995). The research

focusing on the positive impacts of urban open green space covers health and recovery capacities, psychological well-being, and affectional capacities as a sense of belonging and caring, as well as cognitive processes, such as attention. All of these benefits are associated with exposure to green space and nature. These physical and psychological benefits to people's health and well-being are well demonstrated by research (Peters, Elands, & Buijs, 2010; Soga & Gaston, 2016).

Nevertheless, today, most of the world's population lives in biologically impoverished cities. People spend most of their time indoors with limited opportunities to interact with nature in their day-to-day life, and the human–nature interactions that occur are often restricted to green areas in open spaces (Lacoeuilhe, Prévot, & Shwartz, 2017). Pyle (1978), who coined the phrase “extinction of experience,” argues that the process of urbanization—which increasingly isolates humans from the experience of nature—is also one of the greatest causes of the biodiversity crisis. The extinction of experience, thus, is recognized as a major contemporary social and environmental issue (Miller, 2005; Soga & Gaston, 2016). Cities are built for humans, and given the growing recognition of the importance of interacting with nature for people's lives—at least in Western societies—green infrastructures should be integrated into any form of urban development. Planning our cities with both people and nature in mind can align the agendas of public well-being and ecological benefits and make efficient use of urban open space (Shwartz, Pett, Irvine, Dallimer, & Davies, 2016).

To benefit from social interactions in public spaces, physical settings that encourage and strengthen their occurrence are required (Kaplan, 1995). Creating good physical conditions in open spaces can prolong necessary activities (i.e., everyday tasks), create an inviting atmosphere for recreational activities, thus indirectly encouraging a broad spectrum of social activities (Gehl, 2011), and improve people's physical and psychological well-being (Jackson, 2003). Although open green spaces of HRHCs can benefit their users and produce a new and unique experience, the literature has yet to study these new urban forms. An exception is the work of Huang (2006), which ties the form of high-rise courtyards to residents' social interactions. However, a comprehensive view that portrays the morphology of open spaces created by HRHCs and provides a deeper insight into the qualities, observations, and practice that they offer to their users has yet to be found.

The urban landscape is abundant with forms and functions that are produced by planners' zoning and land uses, private and public divisions, and environmental and societal considerations. However, the urban landscape is also the result of multiple experiences, practices, and meanings created by users: “Urbanism exists only through the process of inhabiting the city, where inhabiting refers both to everyday forms of education of attention and to the mobile constitution of urbanism,

which are the product of historical accretion and alignment” (McFarlane, 2011, p. 668). The different forms of the built environment are often instrumentally organized and evaluated as better or more sustainable than others and as more attractive than others for different functions and use (Jabareen, 2006). This study scrutinizes the urban morphology of green spaces in HRHCs and juxtaposes it with a qualitative topology of HRHC residents.

### 3. Urban Morphology and HRHCs

The well-established field of urban morphology dates back to the end of the 19th century and has since yielded various concepts and frameworks (Whitehand & Gu, 2007). The focus on urban hierarchy structures the basic components of urban morphology as an enclave, a block, a superblock, and a neighborhood (Patricios, 2002) and their repeating arrangements establish a pattern. Pont and Haupt (2010) suggest four key territories for urban morphology: lot, island, fabric, and district. Rode, Keim, Robazza, Viejo, and Schofield (2014) suggest three fundamental physical elements of the urban form: buildings and their related open spaces, plots or lots, and streets. There are other examples as well. Regardless of its components, rather than producing mere categorical analytics of different city formations, the urban morphology of the built environment, as Kropf (2018) suggests, exposes the more complex relations among physical objects and people, layouts, urban ecologies, and processes at the practical level as well as concepts and thinking tools for urban analyses at the theoretical level. In this way, a multilevel understanding of the urban landscape and its uses, functions, and potential can be derived from a morphological analysis.

Hall and Sanders (2011) claim that there are some valuable (and generally well-established) qualities of urban design that are difficult to implement in large urban developments. They argue for the importance of urban morphology when facing challenges arising from urban planning and design, and especially for its importance regarding the planning of large-scale developments by emphasizing the persistence of the physical form over time—the loci of the morphology—in contrast with land use that shows little persistence. Moreover, urban morphology provides a “more precise language” and terminology that supports planning interventions and that is also “a contextual architectural language” that helps “integrate development into its surroundings” (Hall & Sanders, 2011, p. 430). Finally, as exemplified by recent research (e.g., Hall & Sanders, 2011; Rode et al., 2014), urban morphology can be used to compare different places, whether they differ in their planning regulations and culture or not.

The accelerated process of vertical urbanization in the last few decades is associated with economic and political processes such as neoliberalism. These processes are accompanied by the growing use of technology that enables higher towers to grow at faster rates than ever

before (Nethercote, 2018). A major facet of contemporary volumetric cities is high-rise residential projects (Harris, 2015; Nethercote, 2018). Following these urban trends, scholars have begun to study the experience and use of different vertical residential projects in detail, as well as their constitution and assembly (see, e.g., Baxter, 2017; Harker, 2014). Understanding the morphology of this form of urban development may yield “a range of concepts and tools that articulate the different aspects and elements of urban form, the relations between them, and our role as the agents who create, use, and transform them” (Kropf, 2018, p. 9).

In Israel, contemporary housing and planning policy are closely related to the proliferation of volumetric urban forms (Aviv et al., 2018). Particularly, the development of HRHCs has become a recent trend with several common characteristics in terms of physical and social aspects: 1) HRHCs’ residents are of relatively high socioeconomic status, which enables them to meet the high housing prices and maintenance cost (Alterman, 2010); 2) complexes are usually developed at once as a large urban development, by one or two entrepreneurs; and 3) regulations of minimal distances between high-rise buildings influence the size of the complex lot as well as the open space in the complex. By offering a morphological analysis of HRHCs that emphasizes the complexities of their open and green spaces, as well as people-setting relations, we hope to develop a mechanism for aggregating, representing, and analyzing the new and expanding patterns of large-scale and vertical urban landscapes.


### 4. Methodology

The research is based on five medium-size cities in Israel (with over 50,000 residents), wherein large-scale developments of high-rise housing in the last 15 years were common: Haifa, Hadera, Netanya, Petah Tikva, and Ashdod. This case study approach, which requires multiple sources for information and methods (Creswell, 1998), was chosen in order to discern common characteristics of HRHCs in Israel.

Large-scale, high-rise housing developments in these five cities were analyzed using plans, aerial photos, Google street view, and GIS. Within these large-scale developments, the complex was determined as the main component of the analysis, alongside the building and neighborhood. The demarcation of the complex in this research was based on Pont and Haupt’s (2010) definition of the ‘island component’ of urban morphology. The island, just like the complex, is comprised of multiple contiguous private properties (lots) surrounded by public space. The combination of streets and a series of islands surrounded by streets constitute the urban fabric (Pont & Haupt, 2010), which can also be referred to as ‘a neighborhood.’

The complex comprises a distinguishable hierarchy of parts. Figure 1 details the subdivision of the complex unit into areas and their hierarchy. The built area of the com-

plex contains the total layout of the buildings in the complex. The unbuilt area comprises a gray area and a green area. The gray area represents the surface area that is mostly used for parking, access roads and sidewalks; it is less accessible and useable and consumed by vehicles (Dovey & Pafka, 2014). Green spaces in this research are defined as a coverage of planted vegetation and other elements that serve people for different functions and social activities (Gehl, 2011).



**Figure 1.** A hierarchy of areas in the complex.

Initial analysis of HRHCs in the five cities yielded 81 complexes for further morphological analysis. General variables were compiled for the morphological analysis, including the size of the complex, the size of the gray and green open areas in it, permeating areas, public and private areas, the number of buildings, the number of floors, the number of residential units, land uses, and more.

Integrating various research tools and approaches in planning research (Eizenberg & Shilon, 2016), we juxtapose the morphological analysis with a qualitative analysis of users' experience and perceptions of the open space in HRHCs, based on observations and walking-interviews (Evans & Jones, 2011) with residents. A total of 16 residents from seven complexes, 2 to 3 residents from each complex were interviewed (in one complex in Netanya only 1 resident was interviewed). Eleven interviews were conducted in 4 complexes in Petach-Tikva and 5 interviews were conducted in 3 complexes in Netanya. Out of the 16 informants, 10 are women, and 6 are men. 5 are in their 30s, 8 are in their 40s and 3 interviewees are more than 60 years of age.

The interviews were conducted while walking in the open spaces of the complex and lasted between 1–1.5 hours. The interviews were conducted in complexes that represent the two most dominant types of HRHCs in the study (as elaborated in the morphological analysis and Table 1) and with a green space area that is more than 1/5 of the total area of the complex. We drew on snowball sampling to initiate a connection with informants. The interviews targeted different aspects of vertical lives in HRHCs, such as uses, functions, perceptions of HRHCs and social interactions in HRHCs, with a focus on the uses and experiences of the open green spaces.

Interviews were gathered to the point that stories and themes started repeating themselves.

## 5. Morphological Analysis and Evaluation

In line with the research question on how to discern HRHCs open space and users experience of these spaces, we draw on the morphological analysis of HRHCs in Israel to provide three innovative outputs: HRHCs' typology, three evaluation indexes, and a nuanced representation of HRHCs through green/gray nollis map. The following presents these outputs, how they were derived, and how they can be used in learning and evaluating the form of HRHCs. The next section will juxtapose these outputs with a qualitative analysis of HRHC users' experience based on walking interviews.

### 5.1. A Typology of HRHCs

A matrix of HRHC types was generated based on the general variable. As Figure 2 and Table 1 present, the produced matrix includes the general layout of the buildings in the complex (line or shape), the scale of the complex (small, medium, large) and 5 forms of gray-green organization. Based on this matrix, it is possible to suggest that the 'shape' form is clearly the dominant form of HRHCs, accounting for 77% of the complexes. In terms of scale, most complexes are small-scale (up to 4 buildings)—40% and medium-scale (5 to 9 buildings)—38%. Finally, type C—a cluster of buildings surrounding an open green space—is the most frequent organization of gray-green in our sample (30%), followed by type D (26%)—a sort of a mirror image of type C, with a green area demarcating a cluster of buildings. Type C was also the most flexible in terms of scale, accounting for 56% of the large-scale HRHCs.

### 5.2. Evaluation Indexes

Three data-driven indexes were developed to create a grading method that can evaluate and compare the qualities of HRHCs: design variety, accessibility, and green-quality. Each index was calculated based on a combination of the form and function variables that were measured.

#### 5.2.1. The Variety Index (VI)

The VI is calculated based on three parameters: height variety, design variety, and land-use variety. The height variety (vh) is determined by counting the different building heights in the complex. The design variety (vd) is determined by counting different design styles of the complex buildings, and the land-use variety (vl) is determined by the number of different land-uses in the complex (see Figure 3). To compare between complexes, vh and vd are calculated as a ratio of the number of buildings in the complex and are therefore represented by a ratio




Figure 2. HRHCs morphological matrix scheme.

Table 1. The classification matrix of complexes.

Green Form	A	B	C	D	E	sum	%
No. of complexes	11	15	24	21	10	<b>81</b>	
% of total	<b>14%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>12%</b>	100%	
No. of buildings	57	95	200	117	86	<b>555</b>	
% of total	<b>10%</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>15%</b>	100%	
<b>Scale</b>							
Small	9%	9%	10%	11%	1%	<b>32</b>	<b>40%</b>
Medium	4%	5%	7%	14%	9%	<b>31</b>	<b>38%</b>
Large	1%	5%	12%	1%	2%	<b>18</b>	<b>22%</b>
<b>General form</b>							
Shape	7%	12%	30%	15%	12%	<b>62</b>	<b>77%</b>
Line	6%	6%	0%	11%	0%	<b>19</b>	<b>23%</b>




Figure 3. Parameters of the VI.



between 0.00–1.00). The VI is calculated by the equation:

$$VI = v_h * v_d * v_l$$

producing a range from 0 to 1. Based on the scores’ distribution, the index rates the complex variety as ‘low’ if the scores are lower than 0.15, as high if the scores are higher than 0.26, and as medium if the scores are between 0.16 and 0.25.

### 5.2.2. The Accessibility Index

The Accessibility Index (AI) refers to the effortlessness of reaching a site, providing a measure that evaluates the relative opportunity for contact or use (Gregory, Jhonson, Pratt, Watts, & Whatsmore, 2009). Accessibility to parks is defined as one of the major factors influencing green space utilization (Byrne, Wolch, & Zhang, 2009; Giles-Corti et al., 2005). It combines 4-way intersections around the complex and pedestrian passages (the number of options for getting around and across the complex) as a relatively simple means of operationalizing accessibility. These two indicators (see Figure 4) are calculated as a ratio—the pedestrian passages variable is the count of the pedestrian passages across the complex divided by the number of buildings in the complex (PPR), and the 4-way intersections variable is the number of the 4-way intersections around the complex divided by the number

of total intersections around the complex (IR). The AI is calculated using the following equation:

$$AI = PPR + IR$$


producing a range from 0 to 2. Based on the scores’ distribution, the index rates the complex accessibility as ‘low’ if the scores are lower than 0.49, as ‘high’ if the scores are higher than 0.8, and as medium if the scores are between 0.5 and 0.79.

### 5.2.3. The Green-Quality Index


The Green-Quality Index (GI) discerns and evaluates the quality of the green space as part of the open space of the complex. It is calculated based on three variables: the ratio of the green area to the total area of the complex (gt), the ratio of the green area to the gray area (gg), and the ratio of the permeating green (in which substantial vegetation can grow) to the total green (pg). The GI is based on the separation of ‘shades of green’ and enables an analysis of the relations between them. Figure 5 describes the diagram of the GI equation and its parameters. The GI is calculated by the equation:

$$GI = (gt * gg) + pg$$

producing a range from 0 to 1.3. Based on the scores’ distribution, the index rates the complex variety as ‘low’ if



**Figure 4.** Parameters of the AI.



**Figure 5.** Parameters of the GI.

the scores are lower than 0.49, as high if the scores are higher than 0.90, and as medium if the scores are between 0.50 and 0.89.

To sum up, the analysis of 81 complexes, summarized in Table 2, suggests that types C and D rank relatively high on the GI, and types A (with no designated green) and B, to a certain degree, rank very low. These two types (A and B) are also low in accessibility ranking whereas type D shows the best accessibility ranking (see Figure 6). However, the results are inversed in ranking the design variety; type B presents a relatively high variety of design, type C relatively low, and types D and E present a medium variety level.

### 5.3. Green/Gray Nolli Map

A considerable part of urban morphology research focuses on urban open space and questions how the infrastructure of public space enables and constrains human activity (Gehl & Svarre, 2013; Huang, 2006; Peters et al., 2010; Skjaeveland & Garling, 1997). A meaningful measure of green open space further relies on the development of a clear and mappable typology of public space (Dovey & Pafka, 2014). The familiar black and white nolli map demonstrates the proportion of the built area (colored white) and the unbuilt area (colored black) in the complexes. However, in line with the focus of this article, we propose a gray/green nolli map to capture more and new complexities of the unbuilt area. Thus, the gray-green nolli map represents the non-build open space through 1) a distinction between the gray and green open space, and 2) a distinction between two 'shades of green': 'permeating green' are colored in dark green, and 'non-permeating green' are colored in light green. Figure 7 compares a regular black and white nolli map of

seven exemplary HRHCs with the proposed green/gray nolli map of these HRHCs.

Figure 8 graphs the scale and the three evaluation indexes in respect to the green/gray nolli map of seven exemplary HRHCs (types C, D, and E) to suggest a representation of the three outputs together. Such a representation supports the capacity to evaluate each complex and to compare different qualities of the complexes.

### 6. Juxtaposing HRHCs Morphology with Users' Experience

The following qualitative analysis investigates the practices and perspectives of the users of the HRHC open spaces in order to indicate how the morphological outputs are experienced by HRHCs' residents. A major part of the general experience of HRHC living relates to its scale. The scale of the complex appears to be crucial in residents' experiences of their everyday environment. The scale of the complex was referred to in association with issues of responsibility and control, maintenance of green space, ownership and sense of ownership, sense of community and belonging, and comfort and walkability. In line with Huang's (2006) argument regarding urban open space, residents noted that they favor and usually spend time in the open green space close to their home. As an interviewee (L.Y.) from a medium-scale complex describes: "I don't go to other gardens. I stay with him [her three-year-old boy] only in this garden." The magnitude of these neighborhoods and of each of the buildings is somewhat balanced by the immediacy of the usable open space just downstairs. In the public areas of HRHC neighborhoods, this immediacy and relative intimacy cannot be easily found. The scale of the HRHC and the derived uses of the open green spaces (see Figure 9)

**Table 2.** Indexes and HRHCs types.

Green Form						
Indexes:	A	B	C	D	E	Total
<b>No. of complexes</b>	11	15	24	21	10	<b>81</b>
<b>% from total</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Green</b>						
Low	14%	6%	9%	1%	1%	30%
Medium	0%	9%	7%	12%	6%	36%
High	0%	4%	14%	12%	5%	35%
<b>Accessibility</b>						
Low	6%	12%	9%	9%	2%	38%
Medium	2%	4%	12%	7%	5%	31%
High	5%	2%	9%	10%	5%	31%
<b>Variety</b>						
Low	4%	4%	16%	7%	6%	37%
Medium	6%	4%	6%	17%	5%	34%
High	4%	11%	7%	1%	1%	25%


Note: Standout low rankings are marked in yellow; standout high rankings in green.



Figure 6. Accessibility scheme of HRHC neighborhoods.



Figure 7. The gray/green nollis map of 7 exemplary complexes.



**Figure 8.** Green/gray nolli maps and the evaluation indexes of seven exemplary complexes.

can produce a very intense experience, as another resident (S.G.) suggests: “On holidays and weekends it’s a total nightmare. We hear everything....Once in a while, when we cannot bear the noise, especially at night, we call the municipal police” (Type C, large-scale).

Since HRHC neighborhoods are relatively new, their public areas offer a higher standard than older neighborhoods. Thus, next to the density created by the HRHCs, these public areas attract outsiders from other parts of the city. This might happen in the center of an HRHC neighborhood or in the center of a type C complex. In both cases, the local residents suffer from the presence of outsiders in different ways:

In the beginning, the fountains worked all the time, and a lot of people from all over the city started to come, it was like a small waterpark for free. There

was noise, waste, and mess. Then, they closed the water, and now it is working for half an hour twice a day and that pretty much destroyed the point of it. There is a delicate balance here that needs to be understood. They [the municipality] didn’t think about it in advance well enough. They gave us candy, and then they took it. (D.H.; Type C, large-scale)

The presence of ‘outsiders’ and their engagements with the space of HRHCs can evoke an experience of disappointment as well as loss of intimacy and even control the residents’ place-making. A local resident (Z.K.) from a small-scale complex, compares her area to a nearby medium-size complex:

Every garden has its own character; here it is domestic and local, whereas the garden in Ilanot [a medium-



**Figure 9.** Green spaces of HRHCs. From left to right: small-scale Type C; large-scale Type C. Photographs by author Orly Sasson.

size complex] is more of a ‘playing wild’ of all the children. You see it when you come on Saturday morning, after Friday night, it’s full of garbage and messy.

The scale of the complex or group of complexes was also juxtaposed by residents with a variety of uses and aesthetics. A mono-used environment (i.e., a complex that is planned for residential use only) often requires an additional large-scale built area for complementary uses, such as commercial or educational uses. Thus, the urban form resulting from a mono-use environment is one that requires residents to engage with large-scale services and commercial centers. This urban form produces a different experience of the space in HRHC; that is, distance, lack of intimacy, and alienation. As one resident (E.L.) suggests: “We miss the grocery store and the green-grocer in Ramat Gan. Here, everything is big” (Type C complex with VI = 0.56). Another resident (T.Y.) added: “There is no small-scale shopping center around here. In our area, there’s no service store one can just go down to buy from and enjoy” (Type C with VI = 0.06).

Not only is the experience of the HRHC residents altered by bringing together the parameters of scale and variety of uses, but the daily practices of consumption are also changed under these varying conditions. As another resident (S.G.) explains: “If I had a grocery store here like we used to have under our house, then my consumption would be different. I wouldn’t have to plan so much in advance and buy these large amounts of food every time” (Type C complex with VI = 0.13). How she experiences the space where she lives is closely entangled with her daily practices and the different ways that she and other residents inhabit the space and make it their home.

Accessibility is also an important issue that affects residents’ experiences of HRHCs. A major part of the problem is that these new neighborhoods in Israel are planned almost exclusively for vehicle use, usually causing traffic jams in rush hours, among other things. However, the emphasis on designing a private vehicle-oriented environment is also related to how people move around without a car. Residents of an HRHC neighborhood in Netanya suggest:

The idea of continuous paths is wonderful. It was important for us when we bought the house. (Y.F.)

The planning here is great, there are no roads, it’s very friendly to children. (Z.R.)

A resident (T.Y.) from a different neighborhood suggests: “I prefer to go inside the complexes; it’s more pleasant, especially because trucks are driving to the construction areas.”

However, the AI compiled here demonstrates that in many of the complexes, this aspect receives little attention, and in fact, residents’ movement by foot or non-motor means is channeled to the sidewalks along the

road. Even in cases in which the morphological analysis represents the presence of pedestrian trails as part of the HRHC, they are not always accessible or experienced as pleasant for use. A local resident from Neve Gan (R.C.) explains: “The accessibility here is quite bad....I’m not lazy. I usually take a longer stroll just to walk on a better trail.” The residents would prefer to consume the space and reorganize it according to their own experiences, feelings, and needs.

These various topological instances, juxtaposed with our morphological analysis, offer a nuanced and encompassing understanding of how present-day urban developments and redevelopments function, what they afford, and how they are experienced by users. By bringing together the more rigid and instrumental analysis of urban morphology with a qualitative analysis of daily practices, perceptions, feelings, and uses, the multiple dimensions of socio-spatial relations in contemporary urban formations are identified.

## 7. Conclusion

The rapid expansion of large urban developments and particularly HRHCs requires additional understanding as well as tools for the examination and evaluation of their forms and capacity to cater to their users’ needs. The morphological analysis introduced in this article demonstrates the complex physical data of HRHCs by relatively distinct means to clarify similarities and distinguish between attributes.

In addition, a topological approach towards spatial analyses was introduced in order to address the relational aspects of spaces and places; how they are experienced and produced by the daily practices of users. Ordinary topologies trace the dynamic and daily practices that constitute inhabited space (Harker, 2014). Integrating a qualitative topological approach with topographical analysis encompasses, as we have demonstrated, the multifaceted socio-spatial relations of the vertical space.

Juxtaposing the morphological analysis with a qualitative topological analysis of daily uses, practices, and experiences of HRHCs offers a new understanding of the constitution, consumption, and function of contemporary HRHCs. Moreover, this urban form in general, and its open green spaces in particular, has a broader effect on the city and its dwellers as a whole, not only because people tend to favor being close to home and in familiar urban open spaces (Huang, 2006), but also because of the reconsideration and reallocation of the general green spaces of cities in light of growing urbanization patterns (Kabisch et al., 2015).

This study offers a unique approach and analysis, combining two major tools, i.e., morphological and qualitative topological analyses, to produce a more nuanced understanding of the interconnections between urban forms and users’ experiences of these forms. As such, it provides an evaluation scheme to be utilized by plan-

ners and plans examiners as to the different qualities of the open space and its potential to create a positive experience for its users. For an HRHC neighborhood or a group of complexes in which high-pedestrianism levels and the high use of green spaces (Giles-Corti et al., 2005) is part of the planning goals, the AI may be checked for a minimum required score. Moreover, the scale of a complex may be balanced with types of open spaces. The qualitative analysis suggests that people's experiences of type D complexes (open space in the center) is positive at a small and medium scale, but present different challenges at a large scale (correlation research is needed to sustain this and other insights). Planners may discern the preferred complex type in association to scale considerations that are often formulated based on technical instructions.

While this research offers a new direction for scrutinizing contemporary urban forms, it only takes a first step in examining the vast potential and possibilities offered by HRHC open green spaces. The methodological decision to focus only on the popular types of HRHCs (C and D types) for the qualitative inquiry limits the discussion on residents' experiences as it pertains to the scale, variety, green-quality, and accessibility of HRHCs to these forms alone. Although we managed to provide insights for practitioners, this direction can and should be further developed. Future research could elaborate on these intersections and the opportunities and challenges they bring about. Moreover, future research would benefit from an in-depth inquiry of the other types of HRHCs as well as from a quantitative inquiry to depict the relations between specific spatial attributes and the feelings, attitudes, and use of residents. Furthermore, applying the three morphological outputs—the typology, the evaluation indexes, and the green/gray noll map—to HRHCs in other places may help fine-tune, as well as enrich and develop these outputs into a comprehensive tool of studying, assessing, and representing the open spaces of HRHCs.

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### Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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