Social Inclusion
Open Access Journal | ISSN: 2183-2803
Volume 5, Issue 3 (2017)

Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation, and the Role of Civil Society

Editors
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COGITATIO

Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3
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Published by Cogitatio Press
Rua Fialho de Almeida 14, 2º Esq.,
1070-129 Lisbon
Portugal

Academic Editors
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Available online at: www.cogitatiopress.com/socialinclusion

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COGITATIO

Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 1–6
DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i3.1127

Editorial

Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation and the Role of Civil Society

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Submitted: 3 August 2017 | Published: 19 September 2017

Abstract
This issue examines politics and practices that challenge the European border regime by contesting and negotiating asylum laws and regulations, practices of separation in refugee camps and accommodation centers, as much as political acts by undocumented migrants and activists seeking alternative ways of cohabitation. The different contributions all highlight the role of civil society initiatives during the migration movements in 2015 and 2016 in Europe by discussing critical perspectives on the European border regime and by looking at migration as a contesting political force. Topics related to mobilization and the appropriation of public spaces to actively declare one's solidarity, political activism to contest borders and boundary-making approaches (no border movements) and the engagement into voluntary work are critically reflected.

Keywords
border; civil society; contestation; Europe; mobilization

Issue
This editorial is part of the thematic issue "Perspectives on the European border regime: mobilization, contestation, and the role of civil society," edited by Ove Sutter and Eva Youkhana (University of Bonn, Germany).

In the wake of the "long summer of migration" (Hess et al., 2017) in 2015 when growing numbers of refugees headed to Europe, it became significantly clear that the European border regime does not only consist of discourses, legislations, security politics and practices of integration executed by the European Union (EU) and different member states, combining processes of sociopolitical inclusion of citizens and exclusion of non-communitarians and minorities within the EU. Instead, it should be conceived as a temporary and dynamic arrangement, permanently challenged and contested by migrants, political activists, civil society initiatives and acts of citizenship (Ataç, Rygiel, & Stierl, 2016; Isin, 2009).

Since then, different immigration laws and regulations, politics of externalization (e.g. closing the main flight routes under the pretext of fighting the root causes of migration, cf. Youkhana, 2017) and practices of spatial isolation have triggered conflictive debates among the member states about how to deal with future immigration movements. Not only was the Schengen Agreement put to the test, but also public authorities' capacities to deal with the immediate basic needs and the mid-term requirements for the attempted integration of immigrants into European societies.

According to the German human rights organization "Pro Asyl," there were 442,000 people searching for asylum just in Germany in 2015, most of them from Syria, but also from Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq (Pro Asyl, 2017).[1] At the point of culmination, the mass media took up the widespread "welcome culture" accompanied by the decision of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, in the autumn of 2015, to open the borders for refugees. The "refugees welcome" movement, initiated by activists and solidarity groups, was taken up

[1] The number of refugees coming to Germany amount to 1 million people in 2015 (cf. Fleischmann, 2016).

by many self-organized charity and humanitarian initiatives, which also activated the conservative and the middle class in the areas of migration. This surprising wave of humanitarian volunteering could take over many of the responsibilities for the care and first aid from communities and public authorities overburdened by trying to fulfill the basic needs of the immigrants.

Most of the articles assembled in this issue take up practices of relief and immediate support to refugees. Voluntary initiatives for refugees have been partly criticized and their practices have been controversially discussed not only by scholars in the field of critical migration studies, but also within the initiatives themselves. Some proclaim new forms of political commitment combining practices of humanitarian aid with political activism and the demand of political and social rights for refugees. Some condemned these initiatives as paternalistic neocolonial forms of domination uninterested in removing the unequal relationships between volunteers and refugees. The activist Bino Byanski Byakuleka, for instance, called it "racism of helping" (Byansi Byakuleka & Ulu, 2016). Others criticized that the civic engagement was driven more by emotions than political ideas and, therefore, would depend strongly on public moods (cf. van Dyk & Misbach, 2016). In fact, in the first few months, the media coverage on the "refugee crisis" as well as the widespread civic engagement for refugees in Germany was highly emotionalized (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015; Sutter, 2017; Vis & Goriunova, 2015). Referring to the criticism of humanitarianism, others pointed out that the emotionalized media discourse and the civic engagement relied very much on the image of the refugee as a grateful, innocent and deserving victim, represented ideally by children and women (cf. Karakayali, 2016; van Dyk & Misbach, 2016). Not surprisingly to many, the media and political discourse changed after the reports of attacks on women on New Years' Eve 2015 in Cologne, allegedly carried out by large crowds of young male migrants.

The media's coverage took on a controversial role during the time of the migration movements (Hemmelmann & Wegner, 2016). On the one hand, they supported the spontaneous civic engagement for refugees by amplifying its visibility and giving moral support. They played a central role in the emotionalized mobilization of volunteers by framing it as a "humanitarian crisis." On the other hand, they predicted the breaking points of the German society (Herrmann, 2016), which led to a tightening of the asylum laws in Germany, with Asylpaket I and II (compare Leko in this issue) and in other European countries, and political calls for territorial containment.

The EU member states have, since then, engaged in contentious negotiations about a common strategy to combine immigration policies with security politics, a topic that has moved into the center of the public debate by using the "war against terror" discourse as a justification for more techno-scientific border control (compare Hess & Kasparek, 2017). The European Pact for Immigration and Asylum from 2008 forms the basis for further harmonizing and synthesizing of the European border regime. The Pact shows the EU's main objectives, namely, to control irregular migration better and encourage voluntary return, to make border control more effective (FRONTEX), to establish a European framework for asylum and create international partnerships. This Pact has led to the establishment of programs in Germany, such as the "Middle East Employment Drive," the "Marshall Plan" for reconstructing Syria and Iraq, and the "Emergency Trust Fund" to support African countries to equip their border controls technically (Youkhana, 2017). A developmentalist approach towards migration is replacing the humanitarian access (compare Schwertl, 2017).

Europe, in general, and Germany, especially, need immigration to meet the increasing demand for professionals, mainly in the processing and care industries. European countries suffer from an aging society. The "Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge" (BAMF) stated in 2008 that the birth rate in Germany is low, life expectancy high and that society will suffer from the decreasing employment rates of the German population. These demographic expectations give immigration more attention, as it seems to offer a solution for the increasingly aging population (Shimany, 2008). In spite of an immigration rate of 300,000 in absolute terms, German society would still continue to decrease.

This ambivalence between partitioning Europe from the rest of the world and integrating those immigrants needed for economic growth and social care is also reflected in the political positioning of civil society actors and groups. These range from a lived culture of solidarity and humanitarian support to a new political right, appearing, for example, in PEGIDA (Patriots of Europe against the Islamization of the occident) and AFD (Alternative for Germany) in Germany or the "Identitarian Movement" in several European countries. These movements are increasingly taking over bridgebuilding functions between the traditional right, rather conservative factions and even the center ground, by carrying protest against immigration into the public space. (cf. Vieten & Poynting, 2016) Aid organizations, represented by charity groups, Christian churches and other civil society organizations, are struggling with a clear political positioning on how to deal with the challenges related to the integration of immigrants. At the same time, the "refugees welcome" and "no border" movement are forming solidarity networks and engaging in situated and decentralized political activism together with those immediately affected by segregation, racism and deportation (compare Gauditz, 2017; Leko, 2017).

This volume will broach the issue of politics and practices that challenge the European border regime by contesting and negotiating asylum laws and regulations, practices of separation in refugee camps and accommodation centers, as much as political acts by undocumented migrants and activists seeking alternative ways of cohabitation. The different contributions all highlight

the role of civil society initiatives during the migration movements in 2015 and 2016 in Europe by discussing critical perspectives on the European border regime and by looking at migration as a contesting political force. Topics related to mobilization and the appropriation of public spaces to actively declare one's solidarity, political activism to contest borders and boundary-making approaches (no border movements) and the engagement into voluntary work are critically reflected.

Most of the issue's contributors are involved in their field of research not only as researchers, but also as political activists, for instance, as members of the transnational "Network for Critical Migration and Border Regime Research (kritnet)" or as editors of "Movements," the affiliated journal for critical migration and border studies. Furthermore, all contributions are more or less methodologically and theoretically inspired by the approach of the ethnographic border regime analysis (Hess & Tsianos, 2010), which was developed by the research group "Transit Migration" (Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe, 2007). Thus, the articles all pursue an ethnographic and ethno-methodological approach by zooming into cases of social relations, political incidences, contested legal frameworks and cultural encounters that emerged during and after the 2015 migration movement. The highly contextualized cases unfold a sociopolitical landscape that makes the fragmentation, instability and fragility of the European border and migration regime apparent. The concerns presented of the authors, who actively studied the 2015 migrations, share a critical approach towards conventional scientific perspectives that turn a blind eye to the role migrants play as active protagonists shaping and contesting the European border regime in spite of their displacement, their physical and territorial exclusion and the deprivation of human rights.

Serhat Karakayali (2017) examines the role of emotions within the social interactions between volunteers and asylum seekers in Germany drawing on qualitative interviews and group discussions carried out between 2015 and 2016. Following a narrative approach and referring to examinations of emotions in the area of social movement studies, he discusses the connection between emotions, reasoning and the construction of social bonds that are capable of reshaping current modes of belonging. Karakayali argues that some volunteers avoid becoming emotionally involved and, therefore, state a kind of emotional management, while others highlight their experiences of an "empowerment" which they connect with feelings of happiness. Regarding the engagement's capacity to reshape social bonds, he concludes that the scope of solidarity seems to remain narrow. Volunteers frame their engagement more regarding local and national issues than connecting it to transnational dynamics of migration and, thus, a transnational scope of solidarity. Instead of expanding already existing social bonds towards asylum seekers, the civic engagement seems to maintain or reconstitute social relationships among volunteers.

Based on their ethnographic fieldwork, Larissa Fleischmann and Elias Steinhilper (2017) also examine the civic engagement for refugees as it occurred in Germany in the second half of 2015. By focusing on the engagement of volunteers belonging to the middle class with no personal history of political activism, the authors claim that the image of migration as a humanitarian crisis, as spread by the media and the political discourse, especially mobilized broader parts of the German population. At the same time, they argue that the volunteering for refugees should not be conceived as apolitical as claimed by the media discourse and by many volunteers themselves. To debunk the myth of apolitical helping and drawing on Michel Foucault, Fleischmann and Steinhilper argue that a new "dispositive of helping" emerged from the civic engagement for refugees consisting of different political dynamics. On the one hand, the humanitarian volunteering tends to reproduce inequalities and hierarchies which exist already and, therefore, becomes an accomplice of the repressive politics within the European migration regime. On the other hand, the broad range of different actors has the potential to contest and transform the politics of migration by creating new spaces of encounters and political subjectivities, as well as intervening in the public discourse.

Sara de Jong and Ilker Ataç (2017) also highlight the political potentials of spaces of encounter as a result of civic engagement for refugees. Drawing on their explorative inquiry of four Austrian organizations in the field of aid for refugees, they argue that these organizations occupy a space between NGOs and social movements which yields specific modes of action. De Jong and Ataç's biographical interrogations of the four organization's founders reveal how the latters' former engagement in social movements and NGOs helped them to identify gaps within the provision of services for refugees. Furthermore, the authors suggest that these organizations combine their service with a radical critique of the public asylum system's "organized disintegration" and, in doing so, create spaces of encounter. These spaces of encounter challenge and undermine the asylum system in four different ways: Firstly, they insist on the refugee's right to not only having access to basic supply, but to a social space of encounter independent from their status of citizenship. Secondly, the spaces of encounter are contrary to the public authorities' politics of isolation and segregation. Thirdly, they create new forms of belonging, solidarity and responsibility and, finally, these spaces of encounter urge volunteers to understand the refugees' situation in a more political manner and to participate in their political struggles.

Katherine Braun (2017) looks at the social relations and cultural encounters between volunteers and refugees immediately after the refugees' arrival in Germany. She shows that expectations of gratitude for charitable practices and the volunteers' everyday engagement within the welcome culture do not always match the reaction of the refugees. Instead, the feedback is dis-

appointing and creates bewildering situations at which mechanisms of "othering" are triggered. Giving two examples of situations of everyday encounters in refugee camps, Katherine Braun explores the feelings of the church-related volunteers, often middle-aged females, who feel offended when their best intentions are not properly appreciated. The author shows these conflictive spaces by conducting a situational analysis that allows for a visualization of hidden agendas and asymmetric power relations. These, in the author's point of view, are embedded in a "colonial matrix of power" (Mignolo, 2011) within which the volunteers' humanitarian idealism coincides with a claim of paternalism, or better, maternalism towards the immigrants.

Leslie Gauditz (2017) examines the everyday practices of anarchist-autonomous and refugee activists within the "no border" movement who follow a radical political approach shaped by a decolonial and anticapitalist critique of the nation state. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Greece and Germany, Gauditz discusses how activists attempt to translate their ideological ideas into their daily routines. Similar to de Jong and Ataç and Fleischmann and Steinhilper, she argues that activists create spaces of "activist encounter," for instance, in temporary and self-organized camp sites, squatted buildings or public squares, where they aim at prefigurative political strategies in terms of experiencing new egalitarian practices of sociality. By doing so, they interpret their everyday conflicts as effects of "a global system of inequality" and, thus, link them to broader political struggles.

Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek (2017) analyze the processes which led up to the migration movements of 2015 and 2016, as well as the subsequent and ongoing attempts to re-stabilize the European border regime. They reject the concept of the events of 2015 and 2016 as a "refugee crisis" and, by contrast, argue that the European border regime is in a permanent and inherent condition of crisis, as it is constantly contested by the movements of migration. Hence, they emphasize the approach of ethnographic border regime analysis, which conceives a border as an effect of performative practices carried out by a wide range of human and non-human actors and, thus, focuses on the everyday micro-practices of "doing border." Hess and Kasparek outline three external and internal events that led up to the migration movements of 2015 and, therefore, to the destabilization of the European border regime to underscore their argument: the democratic uprisings in the Arab world of 2011, the crisis of the Dublin Regulation and the humanitarization of the border following the deaths of hundreds of refugees near the island of Lampedusa in 2013. Drawing on their current ethnographic study in the Aegean region, they argue that the border regime will also remain conflictive in the future.

Focusing on the nexus of migration and development, Maria Schwertl (2017) presents two initiatives of migrants from Ghana and Cameroon living in Germany. She follows the traces of their activities and analyzes the motivations, requests and micro-politics of the migrants themselves by using a multi-cited ethnographic approach. She, thus, combines two scientific perspectives, namely, the autonomy of migration approach (AoM) and the migration and border regime analysis (MBRA). Both approaches are being addressed by scholars of different disciplines and originate in critical migration studies that aim at putting the agency of migrants into the center of the study. In lieu of applying a macro perspective on migration and defining migration as an issue of good governance and economic development (as is often done when focusing on resources flows, for example, of remittances), Maria Schwertl argues that these initiatives are often delinked from any strategy to develop home communities. They reflect more the solidarity and closeness to those stay at homes, which requires more ethical considerations when studying the nexus of migration and development.

Jure Leko's (2017) take on the topic of the European border regime is somehow different to the other contributions, as he looks at communitarians from the Balkan states, namely the Roma, who are being excluded from refugee rights. He shows how the Roma, specifically as a minority group, have been affected by social and economic disintegration, successive tensions between ethnic groups and the violation of human rights by describing the history of their migration within Europe, starting with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s. He argues that the civil wars in the 1990s in the Western Balkans strengthened the latent oppression and factual discrimination of Roma in the region. Based on an analysis of laws and regulations of the German migration regime and the related discourses, collective knowledge production and practices of the Roma, Jure Leko studies their struggle for recognition as refugees and asylum seekers. Having participated and observed activities and events of the Roma protest movement, he applied a multi-sited ethnographic approach to analyze how Romani migrants in Germany translate and appropriate human rights within a framework of increasing stereotyping and racism against them. He shows that their creative protest, which he illustrates by exploring the occupation of a memorial for the Sinti and Roma victims of National Socialism in Berlin in the year 2016, challenges the German migration regime and paves the way for a more reflected and visible debate about the continuity of social exclusion and prosecution of Europeans within Europe.

Acknowledgments

We want to thank all the authors for their dedicated work and their exceptional contributions to make this thematic issue a successful joint project. We also want to express our gratitude to the reviewers and their thoughtful feedback on a former stage of the papers as well as the patience and consecutive support of the editors of Social Inclusion.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 7–16
DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i3.1008

Article

Feeling the Scope of Solidarity: The Role of Emotions for Volunteers Supporting Refugees in Germany

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Submitted: 30 April 2017 | Accepted: 10 August 2017 | Published: 19 September 2017

Abstract
In recent political debates in Germany, volunteers and citizens who support the cause of refugees are often accused of being "too emotional". Based mainly on empirical evidence from 10 group discussions and 35 individual interviews with volunteers, conducted in 2016, this article undertakes a sociological analysis of the role of emotions for volunteers.

Keywords
emotion; Germany; refugees; solidarity; volunteers

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation, and the Role of Civil Society", edited by Ove Sutter and Eva Youkhana (University of Bonn, Germany).

1. Introduction

This article explores the emergence of a movement of volunteers who work with asylum seekers in Germany. Based on quantitative and qualitative data, it intends to facilitate a better understanding of the role emotions play in volunteers' motivations (see also Sutter, 2017). In the sociological study of social movements, emotions have mostly been framed as being particular to the individual's intrinsic motivations for his or her participation in the respective movement, or as an element which contributes to a movement's collective dimension. Based on approaches that understand emotions as being closely linked to reason, this article aims to illustrate that emotions also operate at the boundaries of such collectives. As emotions express judgments and imply reasoning, they can reconfigure modes of belonging.

2. Welcome Culture

The public reaction towards the arrival of large numbers of refugees in Germany has been labeled a "culture of welcome/hospitality", a concept which had previously been associated with a reform of the labor market for highly-skilled migrant workers.[1] However, during the summer of 2015, the meaning of "welcome culture"

[1] The Dublin Regulation can be considered a form of Europeanization of the measures that were taken during the reform of the asylum-related paragraph in the German constitution in 1992. After its first "refugee crisis" in the 1990s, when around 400,000 Yugoslavian refugees arrived only in 1991, the parliament voted to add a paragraph to the constitution according to which asylum seekers could only apply for asylum when they had not crossed a safe country on their way to Germany. This reference to safe countries in the regulation is the principle by which main destination states in Europe have established a *cordon sanitaire* both within and outside the borders of the European Union. Politically, although Germany came to terms with its historical flows of immigration in around 2000, it still has no proper migration law. Entry requirements for potential migrants are designed in such a way that only highly qualified individuals, whose incomes are higher than average, are actually able to successfully immigrate. This is partly the result of a political impasse, to which trade unions also have contributed in their attempt to prevent a decline in average wages. This is the historical background of the term "welcome culture": The failure of immigration law to attract foreign labor and increasing concerns about demographics and a shrinking German population led to demand for a reform of the labor laws, predominantly by economists and employers' associations. Thus, the term "welcome culture" was largely introduced to the German debate by organizations such as the VDI (Verein deutscher Ingenieure; Association of German engineers) and the BDA (Bund Deutscher Arbeitgeber; Federation of German Employers). Strikingly, the term was often mentioned only in connection with the recruitment of specialists. In other words, the demand for a welcome culture seems to be a consequence of negative experiences with the so-called "green card" model and bureaucratic obstacles in Germany.

changed for newly-arriving migrants. Beginning in August 2015, hundreds of thousands of Germans joined voluntary associations or formed spontaneous initiatives in an effort to support the large numbers of refugees arriving in the country. Several surveys indicate that between 10 and 20 percent of Germany's adult population have joined such initiatives and projects aimed to help refugees since August 2015 (Ahrens, 2015; Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2017; SI EKD, 2016).

Trade unions, companies, public offices, and the media joined in a chorus of celebrating both the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers, and of celebrating the hospitality offered by a significant portion of Germany's population. Even the populist and usually conservative-leaning tabloid *BILD* supported emergent grassroots hospitality with its own campaign, *Wir helfen!* (or "We Help!"). The events reported to the German public—refugees stranded in makeshift camps along the so-called Balkan route from Greece to Austria; trapped and beaten in a Budapest train station; the suffering of families and young children—and the positive response on the part of German authorities and the media helped to turn a pre-existent but small volunteer movement into a mainstream initiative, involving large and diverse parts of German society. At times, the engagement seemed to hyperbolize, particularly when Germans flocked to train stations in order to applaud arriving refugees, or when some drove their cars to Hungary or Croatia to bring refugees across the border to Germany or Austria (see Kasparek & Speer, 2015; Misik, 2015). The atmosphere of these weeks was marked by excitement and enthusiasm, which, in turn, led to a political debate about the alleged irrationality of the all-too-positive feelings towards refugees on the part of the German public. For example, Phillip Lengsfeld, a member of parliament for the conservative CDU party, criticized *BILD* for covering the refugee crisis "too emotionally", and asserted that its attitude would "invite" refugees to come to Europe (Handelsblatt, 17.2.2016). The same topic was addressed in a strategy paper which dealt with civil resistance towards the deportation of newly-arrived refugees. The paper, produced by representatives of the German state's "Innenminister" (Ministry of Home Affairs), argued that "for a small, but active part of the population, as well as in large parts of the media, deportation measures and decisions are being portrayed exclusively from an emotional viewpoint, and not from the viewpoint of the rule of law (*ordnungsrechtlich*)" (quoted in Scherr, 2016, p. 3). Authorities, politicians, and journalists expressed their concern about the role of emotions in politics, based on the widespread notion that emotions are inherently irrational.

For most of the political and academic observers, the welcoming atmosphere during the first months of the so-called refugee crisis (*Flüchtlingskrise*) came as a surprise. One of the reasons people were astonished might be that public opinion about migration in Germany has been negative until quite recently. According to ALLBUS[2] survey data from 1996, Germans wanted migration to be restricted (57,1 percent) or entirely banned (34,8 percent) for non-EU citizens.[3] The data is similar regarding asylum seekers or so-called "resettlers" from Eastern Europe who possess a German background. Ten years later, in 2004, the share of Germans who stated that migration contributes positively to the economy was only around 27 percent; in the same year, almost 72 percent wanted less migration to Germany. These numbers changed significantly in the following decade: in 2014, roughly half of the respondents (51,4 percent) thought that migration has a positive impact on the economy and 49 percent wanted less immigration. These figures suggest that although public opinion regarding migration has shifted towards a more positive stance, the issue is still far from being uncontroversial (see GESIS 2014, 2015). This change in attitudes has also affected the public's view of asylum, despite the number of asylum seekers in Germany having reached a historical low in 2007, when only 20,000 people applied—in fact, the lowest number in decades. From 2008 onwards, however, the number of applications started to rise again, almost exponentially. According to our own survey from 2014 (see below), the number of volunteers for refugees had increased between 2011 and 2014 by around 70 percent (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015). Although the timeframes accounted for here do not entirely match, they still suggest that these two observations are related to each other.

3. Database

The findings presented here are based on four sets of data. The first two are online surveys: one of them conducted among volunteers and professionals working in support organizations. The first survey, conducted in 2014, involved 466 volunteers and 79 representatives from organizations in the field of refugee work; the second survey followed one year later, and included 2291 volunteers exclusively. Both were conducted online (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015, 2016).[4] The initial survey was planned and conducted at a time when there were apparently few people actively volunteering in this

[2] ALLBUS is a general social survey of the German population, conducted since 1980. It covers a wide range of item batteries, from socio-demographic to opinion data. ALLBUS is part of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), so findings are largely comparable to survey data in many other countries.

[3] As international social survey data suggests, these figures are not specific to Germany. The vast majority of respondents in the countries—from Australia to the Slovak Republic—participating in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group, 1998) share similar attitudes towards immigration, i.e., between 60 and 80 percent of the respective populations are estimated to want immigration reduced. The only exceptions are Ireland—where only 21 percent of the respondents wanted less migration—and Spain, Canada and Japan with approximately 40 percent.

[4] The surveys were conducted together with Olaf Kleist (University of Osnabrück), the interviews were conducted in cooperation with Ulrike Hamann (Humboldt University) and our student assistants Mira Wallis, Leif Höfler and Laura Lambert.

field. According to representative survey data on volunteering in Germany, the number of volunteers working with migrants or refugees as clients from 2009 was extremely small (0,72 percent of the sample in the FSW Study from 2009, Gensicke & Geiss, 2010). The findings of this general survey imply that volunteering for migrant- and/or refugee-related causes was, until very recently, a minor social phenomenon; these findings also explain why it was not possible to use existing databases on volunteering for the purpose of this study. The figures in the 2009 survey—the only database available until very recently—suggested that random sampling methods would require the collection of rather large samples. We therefore chose to address volunteering initiatives, associations, and organizations directly, by collecting approximately 1500 e-mail addresses throughout the country. The downside of this sampling strategy is that we could not control its representativity. However, the repetition of the survey with an almost unchanged questionnaire, sent to the same addresses, partly alleviated this downside. It allowed us to compare the two datasets diachronically, revealing certain developments over time. What is striking about the samples is the increase in the number of respondents from the first survey to the second survey. This is likely due to the significant number of people who became active in migrant- and refugee-related work in 2015, rather than due to the use of a different sampling strategy. More than 60 percent of respondents in the second survey stated that they became active in 2015. The third set of data consists of semi-structured interviews with individuals who coordinate volunteer activities (mostly volunteers themselves) in thirty communities across Germany (dataset referred to as CO), which were led in February and March 2016. Another round of interviews was conducted with volunteers later that year, both as individual interviews and as group interviews held in different cities and "Bundesländer" (German states). For the analysis of emotions in the emergent volunteering movement, it is primarily these interviews which will be used.

4. Emotions, Atmospheres and Social Movements

The study of emotions had a comeback in Social Movement Studies, where it had led "a shadow existence for the last three decades" (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2000, p. 65), i.e. since social movement scholars towards the end of the 1960s felt the need to balance the then-prevalent notion that social movements were merely the result of the irrational behavior of crowds and mobs. Crowds were assumed to be governed by almost hypnotic processes that "overwhelmed individual personalities and moved them beyond reason and normal sensibilities" (Goodwin et al., 2000, p. 66). Breaking with the pejorative tradition, scholars since the 1970s looked for different theoretical models and mostly found them in approaches which emphasized the rationality of social and political agents: "The task for sociologists has been to show how these spontaneous and apparently unpremeditated outbreaks of disorder could still be defined as rational in terms of their underlying motivation" (Waddington, 2008, p. 6).

With the dominance of the mobilization model, researchers are now mostly interested in *how* protest is organized, framed and mobilized. What prominent scholars of Social Movements Studies such as James Jasper and others have criticized is that with this paradigm, emotions are kept entirely out of focus, although they apparently play an important role in protest—or, as Borch argues, they even led researchers to "misunderstand the causal mechanisms by which their own key concepts operated" (Borch, 2009, p. 71). As Benford has noted two decades ago, "we continue to write as though our movement actors (when we actually acknowledge humans in our texts) are Spock-like beings, devoid of passion and other human emotions" (Benford, 1997, p. 419) The main reason emotions needed to be kept out of the study of social movements was that the "new generation of theorists shared with the older ones one big assumption, namely, that emotions are irrational" (Goodwin et al., 2000, p. 71). There is a large body of literature dealing with the nature of emotions in the social sciences; the range of theories spans from hard and soft constructionist views, i.e. that emotions are social in nature or at least socially shaped (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012; Hochschild, 1983), to approaches that consider feelings to be naturally "pre-wired" in the brain (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1991). It seems that judgement about the irrationality of emotions is tied in with the latter, naturalistic idea, which also corresponds to the mind-body dualism which is characteristic of Western thought.

Of particular interest for the purpose of my argument is work which focuses on the role of emotions in the forging of social bonds and in the formation of collectives, such as the work of Thomas Scheff (1994), who, as did Goffman (1963) half a century earlier, has analyzed feelings of shame and pride as being constitutive for the formation of collective action. Scheff understands them to be essentially social, as they regulate the attachment of individuals to each other, where pride connects and shame disconnects. James Jasper (1998) adds to this, more generally, the affective ties of love, friendship, and—particularly important for the context of this article—solidarity as emotions that *make* collectives. Although feelings play a more prominent role now, they are still largely conceptualized within the mechanics of movements as organisms. Positive feelings have bonding functions for the respective "in-group", i.e. (potential) participants in a social movement or any given social collective. This line of thought corresponds with how sociologists since Durkheim have conceptualized the function of emotions for transindividual entities (families, groups, collectives, communities, nations, etc.). Randall Collins e.g. sees "emotional energy" as a key to understanding collectives, formed in face-to-face interactions and through "interaction ritual chains" (Collins, 2001). Soli-

darity, both in the recent conceptualization of emotion in social movement studies, and in most of the general sociological literature (Bayertz, 1999), is seen as the bond between members of a given group or collective. Feelings can create and constitute, or in a weaker version, enhance and influence, these bonds, but there is rather little attention paid to how emotions contribute to expanding the group or remaking it with new parameters. If emotions are important for in-group relations, they should also be important for those phenomena where actions and relationships exceed the group or collective, or where the constitution of the groups is characterized by strategies of expansion, as Wimmer (2008) has called them. To put it the other way around: if solidarity signifies that a number of otherwise unconnected individuals have something in common, and feel that they belong together or should form a collective, then what can be said of "international solidarity" or, solidarity with foreigners, immigrants, or in our case, refugees? If being part of a society means that people who are strangers to each other come to engage with through a network of dependencies and complex mediated relationships, a study of solidarities with non-members of a given group or society might contribute to a more profound understanding of solidarity in general. To be able to do this, we have to emphasize that our understanding of emotions should not be confined to the subject's inner sphere and that we should try to capture what escapes, exceeds, or transcends this inner life of the subject towards what "affects" others (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Richard, 1994). This includes questions of how feelings circulate, how they are transmitted, and how this sometimes results in a change of the social or political "atmosphere".[5]

5. Emotions as Judgements

There is solid evidence today that emotions are culturally shaped and that emotions as we know them would be unthinkable without social interaction. Emotions are linked to objects and reason, they are, e.g. structured by expectations, status, and hierarchy (Jasper, 2014). The emotions with which we react to a particular observation depend also on the process of attribution (or models of causation). We can only be angry or outraged if another subject (individual, collective, or juridical person) can be blamed, whereas we might feel shame if it turned out that we were responsible ourselves. The latter example also reveals how feelings impact us in different ways. Jasper associates indignation with activation ("can move us toward action"), and shame with passivity ("deflating", Jasper, 2014, p. 345).[6] This is also why emotions are linked with judgments, or can at least be understood to convey judgments. Without necessarily having to go as far as Nussbaum and others (Nussbaum, 1996; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988), who equate emotions with cognition, they clearly are more than pre-cognitive entities opposed to reason, as the century-long debate about crowds has implied.

6. Methodology

What people feel and what they say is not always coherent. Compassion and sympathy towards refugees is explained or reasoned for by participants of this study in a variety of ways. Individuals usually feel the need to "justify" or to provide reasons for their actions; rarely did we encounter a participant who simply said she helped because she "felt that way". The more contentious an issue is, the more subjects are exposed to what Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) call a "justification imperative". While all kinds of social action are framed by their agents, advocating for immigration might demand more reasoning (see data about attitudes towards migration from ALLBUS survey, mentioned above). Volunteers usually outline certain conditions for their willingness to welcome migrants. These include the geographical extension of their solidarity as much as refugees' readiness to adapt to cultural and social norms in Germany. These preconditions structure, I argue, the modalities of feeling (can refugees be blamed for their own situation? Are they really in need of help?, etc.) and they simultaneously represent building blocks of different modes of belonging, or the lack thereof. Responding to the need to offer persuasive reasons, rather than simply reflecting on intrinsic motivation, social agents are compelled to engage—often publicly—with private notions of what is accepted and understood as common sense, as well as with contested and opposing visions articulated in

[5] The term 'atmosphere', used above in a rather colloquial way, can shed light on this problem: From a sociological point of view an atmosphere is a field of emergence, just as the metereological background of the metaphor implies. Rather describing a definite state of things (in terms of weather: rain, wind, temperature) it represents an impersonal intensity or environment (McCormack, 2008; Stewart, 2007) that "presses upon us" to think, act or feel in a certain direction, exerting a force on everyone who is surrounded by it. Just as the metereological ones, sociopolitical atmospheres result from the interplay of myriads of micro-level events, i.e. (inter-)actions on the social plane. The "atmosphere", in which people feel drawn to participate in welcoming activities for asylum seekers is both impersonal, and nothing any social or political agent intentionally created, and extremely meaningful on a personal level. As Ben Anderson has put it, they are "an ill-defined indefinite something, that exceeds rational explanation and clear figuration. Something that hesitates at the edge of the unsayable. Yet, at one and the same time, the affective qualities that are given to this something by those who feel it are remarkable for their singularity." (Anderson, 2009, p. 78) The concept of atmosphere allows us to reflect upon how the sum of singular encounters, actions, etc. emanate into a transpersonal sphere, and how then this "atmosphere" provides the ground for the space of emergence (of new things). Atmospheres thus "are a kind of indeterminate affective 'excess' through which intensive space–times can be created." (Anderson, 2009, p. 80). They can contribute to the re-arrangement of the patterns that regulate the relation between the individual and transindividual level, which together form political bodies or the "socius".

[6] This is one of the central arguments of affect theories deriving from Spinoza (1677/2000): Affects have either passivizing effects or they increase the subject's power to act. While there are numerous interpretations and nuances added to this central theme in contemporary affect theory, Spinoza essentially believed that "passions" and their deflating qualities can be neutralised by our appropriate understanding of their true causes, i.e. by reason.

public. It is assumed that reason has a constitutively social quality: through reasoning, we make an implicit statement revealing our ideas regarding social relations and the ways in which human beings are connected to one another. For example, participants who reason that refugees are a welcome labor force rely on market-type social relations, implying a mode of connection which is rather utilitarian. Also, this kind of communication implies a certain strategic dimension (Snow & Byrd, 2007; Westby, 2002). Social and political agents calculate the possible successes of framing strategies by considering hegemonic norms, potential connections, interventions, or dynamics. Thus, frames are particularistic by favoring one perspective over another, but their particularism needs to be expressed in more universal ways. To be convincing, social agents will choose reasons and arguments which allow others to share their view and to find the perspective "convincing", as formulated by the Neo-Gramscian school of political theory (Overbeek, 2000). This is why reasons provided by individuals and other social agents do not necessarily represent their intrinsic motivation or emotional setup. One of the difficulties that arises from this constellation has methodological consequences: How to identify emotions if what people express in narrations is mostly situated on the level of reason, social norms, and justifications?

As Kleres (2010) has pointed out even within a sociological framework, there is little methodological insight on how to conduct an analysis of narrative material with regard to its emotional dimension. He suggests reconstructing emotional dimensions and layers of emotional meaning through a narrative analysis, based on the seminal findings of Schütze (1983). Schütze's basic argument is that a principle homology exists between "ad hoc narratives and original processes of experience" (Kleres, 2010, p. 196). The narrative structure of any face-to-face communication, he argues along with Schütze, "forces the narrator to include the necessary and sufficient aspects in order to constitute a plausible, coherent, and complete story" (Kleres, 2010, p. 196). While only the narrative structures run parallel to the past experience, the argumentative patterns are "expressive of present contexts". As I argue, they also imply a certain pattern of coherence. The barriers or fissures between present context and past experience are transported by all kinds of linguistic expressions, ranging from symptomatic leaps to hyperboles. Basing the analysis on the narrative dimension allows for a reconstructing of the ways in which agency is emotionally loaded. One way of understanding emotions here is to look at the attribution of agency and the construction of relationships in the narratives, in which e.g. harm is done from one person to another. Can we blame someone else, or is there no "social address", as with natural disasters? This corresponds to Spinoza's theory of the affect in which agency is defined as a capacity to act (and not be acted upon), which is correlated to feelings of joy or sadness. In anger narratives we can trace how a subject narrates the "self as an object" (Kleres, 2010), and helplessness can be determined by identifying grammatical features such as modal auxiliaries, try predicates, and negation (Capps & Ochs, 1995). We can see then how anger relates to the notion of a causal relationship, particularly when subjects do not become angry because "they found no one to ascribe agency to" (Kleres, 2010, p. 192). In his own empirical work, Kleres studied the relationship between types of emotional patterns and the scope of solidarity voiced by interviewees. Similar to his argument about the particular relationship between cognitive operations and feelings that result in different layers or scales of solidarity, I will in the following explore how emotions and reason interconnect in the narration of volunteers who help refugees in Germany.

7. Scope and Scale of Solidarity

One of the ways we tried to capture this problem was by discussing possible deportations of refugees following negative decisions about their asylum applications. In their study on deportation protests in Austria, Rosenberger and Winkler (2013) have outlined a typology of arguments used by those seeking to undermine deportation efforts. According to the authors, there are three different types of argumentation focusing, respectively, on concepts of integration, humanity, and human rights (Rosenberger & Winkler, 2013, p. 124). While local groups mostly invoke the first principle, translocal groups also refer to the other two. Campaigns against deportations are mostly local and centered around an individual case, as Ruedin and Merhaut (2016) have shown in a longitudinal comparison of three countries (Germany, Switzerland, Austria). The social proximity between citizens and deportees seems to allow for stronger kinds of engagement. Such local campaigns are often capable of mobilizing citizens across the political spectrum, under the condition that the initiative is stripped of a noticeable political affiliation. Personal proximity can also lead to the development of emotional bonds, sometimes expressed in family metaphors, in which German volunteers describe refugees as "children". While such involvement can produce strong forms of engagement, it does not necessarily lead to a universalizing reasoning about migration, borders, and citizenship. By asking our participants about such real or potential deportations, we wanted to explore the two tendencies involved here. Would volunteers oppose such a decision (and also act upon their opposition), or were the relationships that volunteers had established with refugees "conditional" on the formal validation of their status as refugees? In this context, questions about the scope of volunteers' solidarity also emerged: When do volunteers feel they need to act—when migrants were stranded in Macedonia, or after they arrived in German neighborhoods? During the initial months, at the height of the so-called refugee crisis, as mentioned above, there were numerous reports about volunteers travelling to Slovenia,

Croatia, and Greece to help the refugees on arrival and to try to facilitate their respective journeys to Germany. During group interviews, we discovered that volunteers employed a number of different approaches when discussing such topics. One of them was to frame responses on the micro-social level. Most of our informants began their involvement at the point in time when refugees arrived at local shelters or housing facilities, inevitably fusing local lives with those of the newly-arrived asylum seekers. Proximity and responsibility were connected, as one respondent underlined:

> We could not deal with the images from Budapest anymore. You cannot watch these scenes, happening 300 kilometers away. It's hard to bear—at least for me and many others I know, too. That does not mean that everyone in the whole world should come to live in Germany, of course—but there is a concrete problem that requires a concrete and immediate solution.

In the same conversation, another participant said that relationships with refugees would have to remain nonetheless casual:

> This might sound cruel, but we all have to move on to other places someday. I see it that way. So, if I meet you today, I might find you very pleasant, but I may well never see you again. Too bad. But I cannot pursue every possible friendship, because I already know enough people. However, if you need help now, or if I see you somewhere on a train and in need of assistance, I support you immediately.

In this sense, proximity and the bonds developed out of contact serve as a regulatory principle to organize decisions about when and to whom voluntary assistance is offered. This principle seems to apply to the emotional realm as well. Volunteers who emphasized that they tried to avoid emotional proximity often employed more utilitarian arguments to justify their involvement. For example, one participant explained that, in order to maintain a certain distance, she would never accept dinner invitations from refugees. Such a relationship also became the object of public debate at the height of the so-called refugee crisis in Germany, when the head of the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany, Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, advocated for what he called an *Abschiedskultur* ("culture of farewell") as opposed to *Willkommenskultur*. The term was soon picked up by other politicians, who argued that it was necessary for Germans to prepare themselves for the fact that many asylum seekers would be denied protection either because they would not fulfill the criteria determined by the asylum law or because they had already applied for asylum elsewhere. These asylum seekers would have to return. The statement highlighted the role of emotions in decision-making about refugee politics as an eminent dimension in the public debate. However, the importance of personal bonds with refugees, and the correlation with political claims, appear to be more complex.

Almost all informants in the study conveyed that emotions played a role in their volunteering experience. Data from two surveys (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016) suggests that, in particular, those volunteers who began helping refugees in 2015 assess their activities more often as emotionally important than did volunteers who were active before 2014. I want to highlight two cases here, which represent rather unusual accounts of narrating emotions, since they both emphasize their distance to emotionality. One informant in our study stood out for his self-depiction as sociopathic or non-social. His motivation to engage, and why he would not "fraternize" with refugees, was combined with descriptions of everyday avoidance strategies. His narrative starts with a story about his commute to work, which led him past a reception shelter for refugees; in the peak of the reception crisis, this shelter was crowded with refugees, many of whom had to sleep in front of the building. As seeing families lying on cardboard was "hard to bear" (VEG, Interview 3, p. 2) for him, he decided to change his route. Of course, he concedes, he could not entirely suppress the information, and he eventually had to engage. In another passage, this participant talks more generally about this strategy, i.e., that he tried to not let certain images and information affect him too much: "I try to not let that getting too close to me. I am not fading it out entirely, but I also try to not let it too near me" (VEG, Interview 3, p. 4). Volunteering for a good cause is something he portrayed as normal by referring to the environment in which he grew up as an "environment where you just help" (VEG, Interview 3, p. 5). Usage of the term "normal" or, more often, the phrase "helping is the most normal thing in the world" (VEG, Interview 3, p. 6), also in other cases, seems to help avoid talking about personal motivation and feelings. When it came to his feelings, he mostly seemed to recount how to avoid having them, thus implicitly conveying their impact.

This complexity can in part be attributed to the ways in which cognitive acts and emotions relate to each other. As mentioned above, one way to understand this relation is to look at the narrative structure of responses to the "deportation" question. This is a moment where most interviewees had trouble formulating a clear-cut answer. Usually, they had talked about their empathy towards the refugees that they worked with in earlier parts of the conversation. Being confronted with the possibility of deportation—which is not something entirely virtual but something that actually happens—their narrations slowed down, and the narrators stumbled. Interview 1 sets an example (VEG, Interview 1, p. 23), when the enumeration of the possible options the narrator would have is marked by indications of insecurity ("eh eh eh"). The tension between feelings and possible actions was highlighted in her statement "Or I,—I would certainly be affected….But I wouldn't know a solution". The overall pattern of the narration was oscillation, a

back and forth between the feeling of urgency and her incapability or hesitation to translate this feeling of "being affected" into what she considered appropriate responses on the level of action. Her conclusion, "I have never done such a thing", suggests that she could not, or she might not have wanted, to elucidate reasons why she would have to subscribe to decisions of authorities concerning the residence of asylum seekers. She rather shifted her *incapacity to act* to a merely pragmatic argument. "I have never done such a thing," is something we say when we do not want to perform the respective action without genuinely ruling it out. It is important to mention that her feelings of sympathy towards refugees are entirely generic. She had no personal social relationship with any refugee. Her reticence regarding the issue of opposing deportation might thus be rooted in the fact that her position was grounded in moral considerations, not in personal bonds. This might also explain why her strongest depiction of feelings referred to volunteers or people who showed compassion, not refugees. In her description of donations from the population (VEG, Interview 1, p. 13), she used the word "overwhelming" three times in a row (the German term "umwerfend" is unusual here because it is used more commonly in aesthetic contexts, when something is considered extraordinarily beautiful). When asked whether she remembered intensive moments, the informant first answered negatively,

> not with the refugees…
>
> but I do find intense the reactions of the population ehm, when there is a k-call for donations, what kind of a reaction there was. I found that quite,…really stunning. Stunning."
>
> Interviewer: Mmh.
>
> Informant: Stunning.

The majority of volunteers reported similar experiences of excitement. One interviewee described it as a feeling of sociality: "I am really happy and this is, is a feeling like, being part of a whole" (VEG, Interview 8, p. 29). She also used terms such as "pride", "joy", and a "feeling of happiness" (VEG, Interview 8, p. 29). Another participant (VEG, Interview 14, p. 2) recollected how she mobilized her social environment, starting with her own family: "Then I called my father, whether he could help out, and our older daughter and then, I have to say, we were suddenly 35 people. Really, that was very moving, very diverse, old and young, men and women, East and West. It was awesome." Here, reason and emotion address the formation of in-group collectives. The feeling of being part of a larger community can be associated with problematic tendencies concerning the effects of mass psychology, but it also reveals, in a Spinozian perspective, the appropriate insight that the individual's capacity to act is indeed tied up with external, social conditions of action. From the perspective of social movement studies, this is an example of a type of emotion which has cohesive effects on the virtual collective of volunteers (love, friendship, pride). The subject, rather than being affected by its own actions, is "overwhelmed"—apparently in a positive way—by the compassionate actions of others (of which she saw herself as being part of).

Thus, there are two ways in which one of the most common metaphors for proximity—the family—comes into play: 1) Refugees are seen and addressed as family members, and volunteers often describe being enriched socially and culturally by the experience. This reflects a particular possibility towards integration or "becoming German"; and 2) Family terms are not used as a means to describe emerging emotional bonds between volunteers and refugees, but are rather intended to mobilize empathy and evoke the notion of equality: refugees are said to be "just like us", and their decision to migrate is thus comprehensible, since "we" would do so, too (often referring to family experience in the aftermath of World War II).

When a desire to help others is based on the experience of proximity and compassion, one might assume that volunteering would contribute to the reproduction of asymmetrical power relations. As Didier Fassin and many others have argued, if caregivers retain the power to decide who will receive what kind of help, this reproduces a "relation of inequality" (Fassin, 2012, p. 3). Our study explored this phenomenon by introducing the topic of gratitude. According to Boltanski's work on the mechanisms of charity, based on Adam Smith's theory of Moral Sentiments, one of the decisive elements of the relationship between benefactor and recipient is the latter's display of gratitude (Boltanski, 2004). In our interviews, we asked volunteers whether they were ever frustrated with their work, or if they felt exploited etc. In our fieldwork, and also in the group discussions, we often came across stories about volunteers, who e.g. were angry with refugees "cherry-picking" donated clothes or not showing up to German classes. When we brought up these issues during our conversations, the majority rejected the notion that they would want "something in return". Volunteers wanted to avoid the impression that they condition their commitment on reciprocity. After narrating experiences of disappointment, they usually emphasized their understanding and provided a variety of justifications or explanations for those incidents. Here, the reasons given by volunteers seemed to dampen their own negative feelings. The most common way to do this was to remove or replace responsibility from refugees to, e.g. the asylum system. What volunteers achieve with this operation is not confined to the regulation of internal emotional mechanisms, it also contributes to the reproduction of a consensus in the volunteer and refugee supporters' movement, according to which refugees have to be portrayed as victims, deprived of their agency (see Hess & Karakayali, 2016).

According to Fassin, this imbalance lies at the heart of humanitarianism: it does not necessarily result in the claim for fundamental rights. Immanuel Kant made the same argument in his *Perpetual Peace*, insisting that the protection of strangers is not a question of philanthropy, but of rights (see Kant, 1795/1983, Article 3).[7] Philanthropy can be seen as a rather weak foundation, leaving the decision of whether or not an individual in need will receive assistance to entirely volatile factors. Most importantly, humanitarianism's tendency to exclude references to the social or political context of suffering plays a decisive role for such critiques (Whitebrook, 2002, p. 530). There are instances in which volunteers feel drawn to the experience of refugees as fellow human beings, leading to an identification of injustices that must be addressed. In other cases, however, volunteers seem to avoid the contextual themes that would bring questions of global inequality to the fore, and instead focus on issues of integration. The grievances in such accounts focus on the state authorities' lack of organization to provide resources for integration efforts.

8. Conclusion

The aim of this article was to better understand the relationship between emotions, reasoning, and the construction of social bonds (or of their expansion). The findings of the study show that some volunteers "manage" their emotions in order to avoid being affected, while others experience "happiness" as a result of their "capacity to act". Meanwhile, the emotional regime of charity, in which a certain hierarchy or imbalance is implied, seems to be in place. The scope of solidarity is rather narrow. There are only very few accounts of transnational social connectedness. Mostly, volunteers place their solidarity within a local or national framework. When volunteers reframe the cause of refugees as a local problem, a problem of local infrastructures, of the local hostility of other citizens etc., they tend to suppress other aspects, i.e., the political and social context of forced migration. The findings above suggest that volunteers, rather than expanding collectivities or redefining group membership, tend to engage in a way that allows them to maintain established boundaries of belonging. When it comes to the constitution of collectives, feelings of responsibility for refugees, in most cases, rather seem to help constitute the collective of volunteers—and respectively, the community or neighbourhood they live in.

Acknowledgments

The research for this article was financially supported by the Integration commissioner of the Federal government, the Hertie-Foundation and the Bertelsmann-Foundation. Thanks go to Mira Wallis, Leif Löffler, Mareike Heller and Laura Lambert for their assistance in data collection and to Ulrike Hamann and Olaf Kleist for productive collaborations in the different research projects that helped generate the data used in this article.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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[7] "Es ist hier, wie in den vorigen Artikeln, nicht von Philanthrophie, sondern vom Recht die Rede, und da bedeutet Hospitalität (Wirthbarkeit) das Recht eines Fremdlings, seiner Ankunft auf dem Boden eines andern wegen, von diesem nicht feindselig behandelt zu werden." (Kant, 1795/1983, Article 3)

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COGITATIO

Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 17–27
DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i3.945

Article

The Myth of Apolitical Volunteering for Refugees: German Welcome Culture and a New Dispositif of Helping

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Submitted: 23 March 2017 | Accepted: 12 July 2017 | Published: 19 September 2017

Abstract
During the so-called "refugee crisis", the notion of an unparalleled German hospitality toward asylum seekers circulated within the (inter)national public sphere, often encapsulated by the blurry buzzword "Welcome Culture". In this article, we scrutinize these developments and suggest that the image of the so-called "crisis" has activated an unprecedented number of German citizens to engage in practices of "apolitical" helping. We argue that this trend has contributed to the emergence of what we term a new *dispositif of helping*, which embeds refugee solidarity in *humanitarian parameters* and often avoids an explicit political, spatial, and historical contextualization. This shift has activated individuals from the socio-political centre of society, well beyond the previously committed radical-left, antiracist, and faith-based groups. However, we aim to unmask forms of "apolitical" volunteering for refugees as a powerful *myth:* the new dispositif of helping comes with ambivalent and contradictory effects that range from forms of *antipolitics* to transformative political possibilities within the European border regime.

Keywords
civil society; Germany; humanitarianism; migration regime; refugee crisis; solidarity; volunteering

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation, and the Role of Civil Society", edited by Ove Sutter and Eva Youkhana (University of Bonn, Germany).

1. Introduction: The Ambivalence of Volunteering in Times of a "Refugee Crisis"

During the so-called "refugee crisis",[1] the notion of an unparalleled German hospitality toward asylum seekers circulated within the (inter)national public sphere (Akrap, 2016; The Economist, 2015). Indeed, along with the rising numbers of asylum seekers, a "new movement of volunteering for refugees" seems to have emerged throughout the country (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015, 2016). More citizens than ever before provided support for refugees in different kinds of ways, ranging from highly visible ad-hoc actions, such as reception committees at railway stations or the overwhelming readiness to donate (Paterson, 2015), to more sustained engagements for asylum seekers, including the organization of language courses and leisure time activities, mentoring, and legal support (Aumüller, Daphi, & Biesenkamp, 2015; Daphi, 2016). These newly engaged volunteers, who often had not been committed to refugees before the recent developments, formed grass-roots groups and citizens' initiatives all over the country, involving individuals from a

[1] We intentionally put the term "refugee crisis" in inverted commas because we refer to the dominant framing of the developments in summer 2015. However, we claim that the phenomenon is better depicted as a "crisis of the European border regime" (Schwiertz & Ratfisch, 2016), a "crisis of refugee protection" (Scherr, 2016), a "political crisis" (Geddes, 2017) or, better, by avoiding the crisis terminology altogether, as "the long summer of migration" (Kasparek & Speer, 2015). In section two, we will outline how such metaphors of a "crisis" come with problematic effects.

broad spectrum well beyond the previously committed radical-left, antiracist, and faith-based groups. The blurry buzzword "Welcome Culture" came to encapsulate this new mainstreaming of supportive attitudes towards asylum seekers within German society (Hamann & Karakayali, 2017; Jungk, 2016).[2] Angela Merkel's famous quote "Wir schaffen das!" ["We can do this!"] helped to raise the willingness for public support and became an often cited mantra for new volunteers (Glorius, 2017).

In this article, we aim to scrutinize this upsurge of citizens' commitment to refugees. We claim that the image of the so-called "crisis" mobilized previously non-engaged parts of society to provide temporary "help" during the perceived emergency situation. This increase in committed citizens came with a myth of "apolitical"[3] volunteering for refugees and its framing within *humanitarian parameters*. Many volunteers explicitly distance themselves from "being political" and claim that they "just want to help" in order to relieve suffering (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016; Kreck & Gerbing, 2015).

We put forward a conceptual reading of these developments as implicating the formation of a *new dispositif*[4] of helping. Rather than being located outside politics, we will demonstrate that the new forms of volunteering are indeed highly political, although they come with ambivalent effects. On the one hand, they illustrate what has been discussed as the "limits" of humanitarianism (see e.g., Fassin, 2012) or the "antipolitics of care" (Ticktin, 2011): instead of initiating transformations, they can reinforce and become complicit in an increasingly repressive migration regime by reproducing hegemonic inequalities and hierarchies. On the other hand, these developments pull refugee solidarity out of a niche and can come with political possibilities that foster change. In resonance with the writings of Jacques Rancière (1999, 2010), we understand the political as a "rupture" in the dominant order—i.e. the migration regime—that comes with transformative effects which alter the status quo towards a more egalitarian alternative.

This article builds, in large parts, on a meta-analysis of existing qualitative and quantitative studies on the trend of volunteering for refugees in Germany. We therefore outline the key findings of seminal contributions that have emerged on the issue, mostly in German. In combining and discussing these predominantly descriptive studies, we intend to fulfil two tasks: firstly, we provide a more theoretically informed and systematic account of the developments in Germany; and secondly, we extend the debate to the Anglophone audience, which has so far scarcely addressed the peculiar, ambivalent case of the German Welcome Culture. This might also enable future studies to compare and parallel this case with developments in different national contexts. Beyond a secondary analysis, this article is also informed by our own empirical research on refugee solidarity and refugee self-organization—at times more, at times less, explicitly.[5]

To unfold our argument on the German Welcome Culture, we first sketch out the theoretical underpinnings of the *new dispositif of helping* (Section 2). We then discuss how this *dispositif* might function as a form of "antipolitics" within the European migration regime (Section 3). Subsequently, we show that the new volunteers' movement also comes with political possibilities through the creation of *spaces of encounter* (Section 4).

2. From the Margin to the Mainstream: The Popularization of Refugee Solidarity and the Emergence of a New Dispositif of Helping

In light of the rising number of asylum seekers arrivals over the course of 2015, concerned citizens jumped in where governmental actors failed to provide even the most basic necessities such as clothes, food, or accommodation (Speth & Becker, 2016). To many of these new volunteers, the catchphrase "Refugees Welcome" became the popular mantra, which was even picked up by the traditionally conservative tabloid "Die Bild" (2017). Scholars and journalists alike have commented on this extraordinary development as a "summer of welcome" (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016), an "explosion of citizens' commitment" (Hamann, Karakayali, Wallis, & Höfler, 2016) or "mass mobilizations for refugees" (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Indeed, our own research has shown that even in rural areas, where asylum seekers were accommodated for the first time in a while, the number of people who were willing to volunteer often exceeded the actual number of refugees within the community; the phones of volunteer agencies at city administrations did not stop ringing, and volunteer initiatives were unable to cope with the sheer number of people willing to help. The readiness to donate was so strong that storehouses were piled up with goods waiting to be sorted and processed. This upsurge in citizens' commitment throughout Germany was not only a numerical increase but also brought new motivations, parameters, and practical forms of volun-

[2] Despite our focus on pro-refugee mobilizations in this text, it is also crucial to highlight the "dark side of 'welcome culture'" (Jäckle & König, 2016): an unprecedentedly high number of violent attacks on asylum seekers and their facilities, rapidly increasing popularity of the far-right party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD), and the most severe restrictions in German asylum law in two decades (Hess et al., 2017; Schwiertz & Ratfisch, 2016).

[3] We put the term "apolitical" in inverted comas in order to highlight the emic use of this term. Analytically, however, we claim that it is impossible for refugee solidarity and help to remain apolitical, as we will demonstrate throughout this article.

[4] Following Michel Foucault (1978, p. 119 ff.), we understand the concept of the dispositif as a heterogeneous ensemble of utterances, actors, and rules, which follows particular philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions and, by doing so, legitimizes and "masks" specific practices. The concept is further exemplified in Section 2.

[5] Larissa Fleischmann has conducted intensive qualitative research on the topic of refugee solidarity in Germany. Through ethnographic fieldwork in various sites, she has participated in different events and meetings of volunteer initiatives and conducted more than thirty interviews with actors involved in the reception of asylum seekers. Elias Steinhilper investigates the processes of political self-organization of refugees. In this context he has conducted more than 30 in-depth interviews and participated in dozens of protest events and assemblies.

teering, and was highly influenced by the image of the "refugee crisis".

2.1. The Mobilizing Effects of the "Refugee Crisis"

In parallel to the highly visible upsurge in citizens' commitment throughout Germany in 2015, the national and international media reported extensively on the increasingly tense situation at Europe's borders, accounting for and reproducing the notion of an unprecedented "refugee crisis" (see for example Holmes & Castañeda, 2016; Kallius, Monterescu, & Rajaram, 2016). On a daily basis, new reports on the "Balkan Route" contributed to the production of what De Genova (2013) has called a "border spectacle".

The image of the "crisis" seems to hold an important mobilizing effect. An explorative survey of the new volunteers by Karakayali and Kleist (2016) found that almost two-thirds of the respondents (66%) were mobilised no earlier than summer 2015, when the media started to report extensively on the so-called "crisis". In addition, the authors assert that the media reports on refugees during summer 2015 formed an explicit and crucial motivating factor for the volunteers' engagement with refugees (see also Schwiertz & Ratfisch, 2016). This was also confirmed by our empirical research. Many of the interviewed volunteers stated that they perceived a "practical urgency" to help in order to relieve "misery", spurred on mainly by media reports of the atrocities in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq or reports of sinking vessels in the Mediterranean.

Both tendencies, the overwhelming rise in citizens' commitment and the image of the "crisis", thus appear to be importantly connected and co-produced. The official German volunteering survey found that in 2009 less than 0.1% of German society was committed to refugees (Gensicke & Geiss, 2010, p. 231). Recent surveys, however, point to an exponential increase in the number of committed citizens in support of refugees since 2011. Between 2011 and 2014, the number of volunteers rose by at least 70% (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015). During the perceived "crisis", this trend accelerated, with the number of volunteers doubling in 2015 alone (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016).

These findings resonate with previous contributions on the issue, in which scholars have indicated that the impetus for immediate action stems from the image of the "crisis". Fassin (2016) has argued that the "crisis" served to transmit the perception of an unprecedented humanitarian emergency situation or "moral crisis", demanding the immediate response of charitable citizens to those in need. Others have argued that the topic of (irregular) migration is particularly prone to alarmist perceptions of emergency and risk, as it is generally perceived as a deviation from a sedentary norm and a danger to sovereign power (see Malkki, 1996; Nyers, 2006a). In a similar vein, De Genova and Tazzioli (2016) emphasize how "crisis" narratives not only call for collective efforts by citizens but also legitimize technocratic emergency interventions by the state. Most importantly, the image of a "refugee crisis" tends not to regard the situation as an outcome of concrete political decisions and failures but instead puts forward a depoliticized and decontextualized view of asylum and migration more broadly (see for instance Calhoun, 2010). This is also mirrored in the volunteers' commitment to refugees, as we will demonstrate in the following section.

2.2. Changing Motivations, Parameters and Practices of Support

The image of the "crisis" not only mobilized an unprecedented number of citizens but also brought new motivations. Before the recent upsurge in refugee solidarity, committed citizens were a small minority in society and mainly originated in faith-based circles or networks of left-wing activists (see Twickel, 2016). However, for a large number of the new volunteers, neither religious nor political parameters played a major role (see Karakayali & Kleist, 2016, or Mutz et al., 2015). The recent popularity of refugee solidarity has thus activated mainly "ordinary citizens" positioned in the socio-political "centre" of society. This is supported by various studies, showing that many of the newly engaged volunteers had previously been neither politically active nor dedicated to other areas of voluntary work (Daphi, 2016; Karakayali & Kleist, 2016). At the same time, our own research finds that many of the new volunteers shy away from a clear political position and ascribe rather vague humanistic qualities to their actions. Many volunteers seem to frame their activities as a "sign of humanity", as one of our interlocutors termed it.

This indicates how a large number of the newly committed volunteers embed their activities in humanitarian logics, particularly those who started their activities during the "crisis" (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016). Many understand their "help" as a humane duty to people in need, aimed at providing assistance and care in order to relieve human suffering (Mutz et al., 2015). This humanitarian framing is immanently connected to an "apolitical" self-understanding of the newly committed citizens. Our own findings suggest that many of the new volunteers claim that they do not "want to have anything to do with politics". By doing so, they constitute themselves as "neutral" individuals and establish a neat dividing line between their forms of helping, which are perceived as standing outside the realm of politics, and forms of "political activism". Many distance themselves from (leftist) activist groups which have been engaged in the field of refugee and migrant solidarity prior to the recent media attention on the topic. In contrast to the volunteers, such designated "activists" claim an explicit left to radical-left political standpoint for their actions, embedding their commitment in a wider context of structural criticisms of neoliberal, post-colonial, or capitalist structures. This also points to what was indicated by our empirical research:

for many of the new volunteers, the "political" stood for the positioning on either one of the two sides, be it left or right, of the political spectrum.

Due to their prescribed "apoliticalness", however, the new volunteers fall short of embedding their activities in a wider political context. This also affects their ability to voice dissent, to take a stand, or to propose alternatives leading to formal political developments. At a first glance, they thus appear to be less "political"—understood in a Rancièrian tradition as dissensus or "rupture" in the given order—than those who are committed to refugees and deliberately regard their activities as political action. However, in Section 4 we will outline how this preconception is confounded by unexpected effects and developments which point to the political qualities of the new volunteers' commitment.

These developments are in line with a general feature of humanitarian practice that has been widely discussed in anthropology and cultural studies (see for example Bornstein & Redfield, 2011; Fassin, 2012; Feldman & Ticktin, 2010; Ticktin, 2014): humanitarian actors depend on their dissociation from the field of the political, since politics and humanitarianism come to occupy opposing poles. Nyers (2006a, p. 32), for instance, has argued that "humanitarian action and political action are cast as two distinct and separate modes of acting and being-in-the-world". In contrast to the negative connotations that are ascribed to politics, humanitarianism is seen as its positive counterpart and becomes discursively connected to the principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality (Nyers, 2006a, p. 27).

2.3. The Emergence of a New Dispositif of Helping

The recent popularization of citizens' commitment to refugees, we argue, can be conceptualized as a shift towards a dispositif of helping, which builds on humanitarian parameters. It consists of an ensemble of sense-making processes that evolve around the claim to provide ("apolitical") help to people in need and that are accompanied by an impetus to relieve human suffering. Foucault (1977, p. 194) understands the *dispositif* as:

> a heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions.

Thus, we think of the *dispositif* surrounding refugee solidarity as the discursive sense-making processes—including the motivations, principles, and framings—that legitimize and guide concrete practices in support of refugees.

Such a conceptual take on the new trend of volunteering is useful for our overall argument for two reasons. First, it highlights the power relations that are immanent to such a dispositif of helping. According to Foucault (1977, p. 196), a dispositif is always inscribed into "a play of power", which conditions and is conditioned by certain types of knowledges. This indicates how different actors take part in and compete over the meanings and sense-making processes in which the acts of volunteering for refugees become embedded. Indeed, Barnett (2017, p. 4) has recently identified this in the specific context of humanitarianism: "the world of care might present itself as an antidote to the world of power and interest, but it is not as innocent as it pretends to be". Second, and connectedly, the notion of the dispositif highlights the strategic functions of a dispositif of helping. Foucault has put this as follows: "its major function [is] at a given historical moment that of responding to an *urgent need*" (p. 195, emphasis in original). In the preceding paragraphs, we have sketched how the image of the "refugee crisis" appeared to demand immediate reactions and held important mobilizing effects. It consequently also points to the strategic function of the dispositif of helping in the governance of migration: it provided the necessary relief for governmental actors and thus presented a way out of the "crisis" which at the same time guaranteed the survival of the migration regime.

3. Reinforcing an Exclusive Migration Regime: The New Dispositif of Helping as Antipolitics

Journalists have celebrated and heralded the German Welcome Culture as an archetypical model of a transformative and progressive civil society (Dewast & Chasturvedi, 2015; Freedland, 2015; Prantl, 2015). Scholars, however, have advocated a more cautious reading of the recent popularization of refugee solidarity (Scherr, 2016; Steinhilper & Fleischmann, 2016; van Dyk, Dowling, & Haubner, 2016). In a similar vein, we propose that an "apolitical" understanding of volunteering for refugees might lead to what Miriam Ticktin (2011) has termed the "antipolitics of care". Instead of contributing to a progressive change, the new volunteers might reinforce the established order by reproducing hegemonic discriminations and exclusions and thus contribute to the survival of a migration regime in crisis.

3.1. The New Volunteers as Actors in a Restrictive Migration Regime

Many studies of humanitarianism have questioned the conventional notion of humanitarian practice as a set of politically neutral and impartial practices (see Fassin, 2007; Feldman & Ticktin, 2010). From this perspective, the "apolitical" claim needs to be unmasked as an illusion since the universal category of "humanity" is always embedded in a political context that is determined by sovereign power and the stratification of rights (see Scherr, 2016). Thus, authors such as Didier Fassin (2012) and Peter Nyers (2006a) have convincingly argued that, instead of constituting two separate areas, politics and humanitarian aid are inextricably connected. They point to the entangled nature of humanitarian and governmen-

tal actors and speak of "the politics of humanitarianism" (Nyers, 2006a, p. 29) or forms of "humanitarian government" (Fassin, 2012). From this perspective, humanitarian practice becomes immanently complicit in the governance of migration. Ticktin (2011), for example, speaks of a "regime of care", which reduces refugees to their suffering and represents them as "bare life" that does not possess a "right to have rights". This might even lead to forms of "humanitarian violence", which occur when humanitarian actors and governmental actors work in perfect symmetry (Nyers, 2006a).

In his influential piece "The Anti-Politics Machine", Ferguson (1994) claims that the *depoliticization* of certain areas of policy leads to a decrease of their democratic scrutiny and makes governmental interventions appear to be "technical solutions to technical problems". Similarly, Nyers (2006a, p. 29) has argued that supposedly "apolitical" humanitarian interventions "work to establish the refugee phenomenon as a non-political occurrence". This tendency became explicit in the context of the recent upsurge in citizens' commitment to refugees and the shift towards a humanitarian dispositif of helping: the reception of asylum seekers is perceived as a solely humanitarian occurrence, detached from (globalized) political contexts.

In line with Fergusons' observations, the *depoliticization* of refugee solidarity has coincided with the strongest tightening of German asylum law since the early 1990s (Hamann et al., 2016; Pro Asyl, 2016). This includes the "asylum packages" II and III, the classification of further states as so-called "safe countries", as well as a tremendous increase in deportations (Bundesregierung, 2016; Gruppe Blauer Montag, 2017; Scherr, 2015a; Scherr & Scherschel, 2015). These immediate and restrictive governmental responses are also encouraged by the image of the crisis, as different scholars have argued (see De Genova & Tazzioli, 2016; Scherr, 2016). Despite deteriorating conditions for many asylum seekers in Germany, new volunteers have rarely engaged in public contestations of the recent governmental interventions (Omwenyeke, 2016; Ulu, Byakuleka, & Arps, 2016). In our own empirical research projects, many of the volunteers interviewed stated that contestation of governmental politics lay outside their "sphere of responsibility" since it was considered incompatible with their neutral claim that they "merely" want to provide practical "help" to refugees. This, in many instances, coincided with a non-reflective acceptance and reproduction of government distinctions between those who are "wanted" and those who are "unwanted" and subsequently deported.

3.2. Reproducing Exclusions and Conditioning Deportability

Volunteering risks reproducing pre-existing notions of who counts as a "genuine" or a "bogus" refugee, based on the asylum seekers' nationality (see Schwiertz & Ratfisch, 2016, p. 25). Larissa Fleischmann's research project has shown that many of the new volunteers have clear conceptions of who "deserves" their help: mainly Syrians or other nationalities with a good "Bleibeperspektive" ["perspective of staying"], especially families and women. In contrast, asylum seekers originating from African countries or single young man are often perceived as "undeserving". This notion is supported by a representative survey by the Robert Bosch Foundation (2014), which found that the readiness to help is significantly higher towards asylum seekers who are perceived to be refugees from war-torn countries and significantly lower towards "economic migrants", who are said to claim asylum on false pretences.

Different authors have illustrated how the emphasis on a humanitarian duty towards certain categories of migrants (i.e., those who are perceived as legitimately suffering) holds a strategic function: it serves to divert attention away from the increasingly repressive tendencies of the migration regime, that tends to illegalize a large number of migrants from the Global South. De Genova & Tazzioli (2016, p. 27), for example, have argued that:

> the spectacularization of the "humanitarian crisis" obscures other realities, most notably the subordinate incorporation of "rejected asylum-seekers" and other illegalized migrants through the exploitation of their labor.

The image of a "humanitarian crisis" thus legitimized the reception of some and the deportation of others.

3.3. The Reproduction of Paternalism

Our empirical research includes many instances in which volunteers have voiced clear preconceptions about the appropriate form of "helping" and determined its conditions and parameters. Some organized, amongst other activities, gardening, joint visits to museums, or sailing trips. Often, however, such activities were more in line with the benefactors' ideas and interests than with the concrete and immediate needs of newly arrived asylum seekers. Many academic studies have outlined how refugees are portrayed and de-subjectified as "mute victims" (Rajaram, 2002) or "speechless emissaries" (Malkki, 1996) through practices of humanitarian assistance. Instead of being recognized as self-determined individuals capable of desires, actions, and speech, or in other words, as political subjects with a "right to have rights" (Arendt, 1996), they are constituted as passive recipients of aid and charity (Nyers, 2006b). In consequence, humanitarian practice regularly constitutes asylum seekers as subjects who are reduced to their mere thankfulness and, in consequence, are increasingly dependent on the goodwill and intermediation of volunteers or other humanitarian actors (Hyndman, 2000; Khosravi, 2010). This image, which portrays asylum seekers as incapable of improving their situation on their own, reduces them to a state of passivity, infancy, and mute-

ness (Fleischmann, 2015). According to Stierl (2016), this tendency has been importantly influenced by the more recent media attention towards forced migration, which has presented refugees as helpless victims of atrocious wars and ruthless people smugglers.

Interactions that are based on a perception of the refugees as helpless victims are present alongside asymmetric power relations and reproduce forms of paternalism and discrimination (see Barnett, 2017). Fassin (2012, p. 4) has outlined, how humanitarian assistance and compassion "always presupposes a relation of inequality" and an "attitude of superiority" of the benefactors. Instead of empowering refugees to speak for themselves, it is often the volunteers who speak for the refugees and define the conditions of the help that is offered (Jakob, 2015; Ulu et al., 2016). This image also risks silencing the struggles of forced migrants who have organized themselves for decades in order to become visible as political subjects and to fight for their rights (Klotz, 2016; Omwenyeke, 2016; Steinhilper, 2016). Activist groups, which were active in the field of refugee solidarity before the recent upsurge of citizens' commitment, have long broached the issue of paternalism and problematized internal power structures (see Transact, 2014). So far, however, a profound discussion along these lines has been limited with respect to the new citizens' initiatives.

In the preceding paragraphs, we have argued that the "apolitical" self-understanding of the volunteers presents a powerful fiction. Instead of being located outside politics, the new volunteers are entangled with governmental actors and reproduce and sustain hegemonic logics of the governance of migration in multiple ways. We thus suggest that the new forms of helping can figure as *antipolitics* and reinforce a repressive migration regime. And yet, the new dispositif of helping also comes with transformative political possibilities.

4. Contesting Exclusive Migration Regimes: Spaces of Encounter and Interventions in Public Discourse

The new popularization of volunteering and the shift towards a dispositif of helping also holds important transformative political qualities. Informed by Rancière (1999, 2010), we refer to the *political* as the possibility of altering, reforming, or contesting existing hegemonic structures towards a more egalitarian societal order. In the following sections, we will outline three such possibilities for political change within the new dispositif of helping. These are not purely theoretical in nature but are supported by the emerging body of empirical literature on the issue.

4.1. Spaces of Encounter for Previously Detached Groups

Even though many volunteers started their engagement with a humanitarian motive, claiming to be explicitly "apolitical", this framing is not necessarily static. Building on academic work that deals with the "transformative effects" of engagement in social movements and civil society more broadly (Della Porta, 2008; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2009), we propose that volunteering for refugees comes with a similar effect: those involved are shaped by interactions with others during their involvement. Reviewing the existing empirical evidence on the issue, we suggest that the diverse acts of volunteering create *spaces of encounter* between established residents and the newly arrived refugees that bring about important personal and interpersonal transformations through at least three mechanisms.

First, personal contact significantly reduces the propensity for "group-focused enmity"[6] (Zick et al., 2008), including racism. In their analysis of determinants of violence against asylum seekers, König and Jäckle have found that:

> these assaults are indeed more driven by a "fear of the unknown". The co-presence of foreigners, in contrast, fosters a social climate in which ethnic violence is less likely to occur. (2016, p. 22)

Personal engagement and continuous interaction with refugees is likely to have a lasting effect for those involved, as—in the words of Christian Jakob—they are an "antiserum against xenophobia" (Jakob, 2016). Accordingly, representative surveys have shown that those who are volunteering for refugees describe their experiences as predominantly positive (Ahrens, 2015) and are thus either developing or reinforcing tolerant attitudes towards refugees. This is of particular significance since, as empirical studies show, it is the first personal encounter with refugees for many of the new volunteers (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016; Robert Bosch Stiftung, 2014).

Second, these encounters hold the potential for unveiling systemic contradictions within the European migration regime. In many cases of repeated exchange between volunteers and asylum seekers, affective relationships emerge that last even if the "welcomed refugee" is relabelled an "unwanted migrant" after the rejection of an asylum application. In a qualitative study, Hinger (2016) has traced this transformative process for volunteers in a welcome initiative in the German city of Osnabrück. Many members gradually became explicitly political through helping and have developed clear political positions (e.g., with regard to deportations). Individual cases necessarily unveil the connection between abstract (asylum) laws and the violent reality for those excluded from protection or social rights (Scherr, 2015a, 2015b). Similar processes of politicization within the dispositif of helping can be observed in many other groups in various cities (Fritsche, Kleine, & Tietze, 2016), including the highly visible group *Moabit hilft* in Berlin (van Dyk et al., 2016).

[6] "Group-focused enmity is a syndrome of various interrelated factors, all based on an ideology of inequality, devaluating out-groups based on race, sexual orientation, religion, or economic usefulness" (Zick et al., 2008).

Third, the newly emerging initiatives are embedded in a social movement of volunteering for refugees which also includes experienced activists from anti-racist and immigrant-rights movements. Indeed, most of the newly emerging initiatives had to rely on the expertise of established actors in the field. In this regard, many of the regional *Refugee Councils* [Landesflüchtlingsräte] and the umbrella organization Pro Asyl have served as relays between new groups and the established immigrant rights movement, providing information, training, and contacts. A more direct space of encounter for diverse actors was formed by the network "Welcome2Stay", launched at a conference in summer 2016. It involves more than 800 members of welcome initiatives, anti-racist groups, and migrant self-organizations (Welcome2Stay, 2016)—from "ordinary citizens" to "radical-left activists". Another example of diffusion is provided by the anti-racist association glokal e.V., which has recently published a brochure "Willkommen ohne Paternalismus" ["Welcome without paternalism"] (2017), which builds on the explicit idea of assisting newly established welcome initiatives and of making accessible the "lessons learned" from earlier pro-immigrant mobilizations. These networks often—though certainly not always—function as spaces of direct and indirect encounter for parts of society with previously little or no interaction (Fritsche et al., 2016). In consequence, debates with a long tradition in pro-immigrant and antiracist circles—on self-reflexivity in multicultural settings (critical whiteness as one variant), on the "limits" of help, or on the contextualization of forced migration (Transact, 2014)—have started to diffuse from an anti-racist niche into broader areas of society.

4.2. Breaking Isolation: The Dispositif of Helping as a Stepping-Stone to Empowerment

The *spaces of encounter* also hold the potential to transform those with a history of forced migration and to support them in becoming political subjects beyond their ascribed role as passive recipients of government or civil society aid. For decades, organized refugees such as *The Voice Refugee Forum*, *Women in Exile*, or the *Caravan for the Rights of Refugees and Migrants* have criticised and resisted isolation from the majority population imposed by various means: accommodation in often peripheral areas (Pieper, 2008); until recently, mobility restrictions ["Residenzpflicht"], work bans, or food vouchers (Jakob, 2016). These measures amount to a system of "organized disintegration" (Täubig, 2009). The recently established welcome initiatives de facto contribute to breaking this isolation; no matter how banal or apolitical their activities might seem, they constitute at times unique access points to German society (see also Jungk, 2016), providing temporary relief from the often desolate life in the camps, as well as information and contacts. Various studies in other issue areas have shown that *weak ties*—relatively loose relations to parts of society from which a certain actor would otherwise be isolated—are, in combination with affective and close strong ties, a necessary condition for processes of mobilizations in general (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Granovetter, 1973) and for migrants in particular (Nicholls, 2008; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016). Through such channels, marginalized actors can tap material (information, money, logistics) and emotional resources (Han-Broich, 2015; Laubenthal, 2007) which are necessary for subsequent self-organization and empowerment. It remains subject to further specific empirical analysis to investigate if and how these latent resources embedded in newly emerging spaces of encounter (in large parts of Germany these were absent until the summer of migration) translate into processes of political subjectivation among refugees.

4.3. Interventions in Public Discourse

In many municipalities, members of newly established "welcome initiatives" interact regularly with neighbours, local administrations and politicians, welfare associations, and the media. This points to another political mechanism of volunteering for refugees: welcome initiatives foster understanding of the needs of refugees in neighbourhoods, intervene in public discourse and, by doing so, perform a crucial integrating role in society (see also Daphi, 2016; Speth & Becker, 2016). Such processes can be traced in highly distinct contexts: a research project conducted in the wealthy neighbourhood of Hamburg-Harvestehude found that the work of welcome initiatives had contributed significantly to the mediation of residents' initial opposition to an accommodation centre and its transformation into strong approval (Friedrichs, Leßke, & Schwarzenberg, 2017). Another non-representative study commissioned by the Robert Bosch Foundation which also included economically underprivileged neighbourhoods such as Marzahn-Hellersdorf and Neukölln-Britz mirrors these findings (Aumüller et al., 2015). In a similar vein, more than 90% of the respondents in the EFA II-study stated that, through volunteering, they aimed to publicly demonstrate that in Germany, "besides the far-right agitation and violence", there is "also a welcome culture" (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016, authors' translation from German; see also Fritsche et al., 2016).

Both the unprecedented numerical strength and the diversity of the "movement of volunteering for refugees" (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015, p. 19), combining internet-savvy young people with entrepreneurs, churches, retirees, and anti-racist structures, shaped public opinion. In this way, cooperation at the local level also combined with a strong pro-immigrant discourse at the national level. All of these political possibilities immanent in the new trend of volunteering underline our key argument: "apolitical" help presents a myth, even though many individuals involved perceive their activities in solely humanitarian terms.

5. Conclusion: Contextualizing Volunteering for Refugees

Throughout this article we have unmasked forms of "apolitical" volunteering for refugees as a powerful *myth*. Far from being located outside politics, the new volunteers, who predominantly embed their activities in humanitarian parameters, have a political stake in the existent migration regime: they have guaranteed its survival amid a "crisis" of deficient migration and asylum policies.

We have offered a conceptual view of citizens' increasing commitment as a new dispositif of helping by scrutinizing how its humanitarian parameters come with ambivalent and, at times, contradictory effects. On the one hand, they reinforce and become complicit in an increasingly restrictive migration regime by reproducing dominant hierarchies, exclusions and discriminations. On the other hand, the new volunteers contest and transform the current migration regime. Whereas we have termed the former the *antipolitics* of volunteering, the latter constitutes, in a Rancièrian tradition, the essence of the *political:* the transformation of problematic societal structures in the direction of a more egalitarian order. We argue that this possibility for political transformation emerges when volunteers become aware of the powerful myth of "apolitical" help and begin to embed their volunteering activities in a wider context, instead of turning a blind eye to it. This involves the contextualization of volunteering for refugees in the spatial, social, institutional, and legal conditions of forced migration.

Last but not least, we want to highlight the empirical limits of this study. Our primary aim in this article was to combine and discuss existing studies in order to provide a more theoretically informed and systematic account of these recent developments. In this regard, we have introduced the idea of a new dispositif of helping. However, additional research is needed in various regards: firstly, our claims should be confronted with representative data on the motivations and framing of volunteers' engagement; secondly, qualitative and empirically rich research is needed to further refine our conceptualizations through an investigation of the power dynamics at play, the volunteers' sense-making processes, their daily practices, as well as their effects on the processes of emancipation among refugees.

After the more recent fading of the image of the "crisis" from the public eye, the question arises whether the recent mobilizations and popularizations of refugee solidarity will develop into sustainable and long-lasting commitment. This will depend to a great degree on the ability of the volunteers to think beyond the "crisis" and to re-politicize the topic of forced migration. Future humanitarian "crises", we argue, should be thought of as results of governmental decisions and contextual conditions. Furthermore, those who are affected by these processes must be empowered in order to obtain a political voice and to demand a "right to have rights". Under such circumstances, the Welcome Culture can bring about a lasting transformation towards a more egalitarian society with universal rights and global solidarity.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the editors and four anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions and are grateful for the financial support for this publication from the Open Access Fund as well as the Centre of Excellence "Social Foundations of Cultural Integration" of the University of Konstanz. Elias Steinhilper acknowledges the material and ideational support of the Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore.

Conflicts of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 28–37
DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i3.1003

Article

Demand and Deliver: Refugee Support Organisations in Austria

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Submitted: 30 April 2017 | Accepted: 10 August 2017 | Published: 19 September 2017

Abstract
This article analyses four emerging refugee support organisations in Austria, founded before the so-called refugee crisis in 2015. It argues that these organisations have managed to occupy a middle space between mainstream NGOs and social movements with structures of inclusive governance, a high degree of autonomy, personalised relationships with refugees, and radical critique combined with service delivery. Based on interviews with the founders of each organisation, we show that their previous NGO and social movement experience formed a springboard for the new initiatives. It not only allowed them to identify significant gaps in existing service provision, but also provided the space of confrontation with the asylum system inspiring a strong sense of outrage, which in turn developed into political critique. We argue that this critique combined with identifying the needs of asylum seekers and refugees has produced a new type of organisation, which both delivers services and articulates radical demands. Each organisation offers a space of encounter, which undoes the 'organised disintegration' of the asylum system.

Keywords
asylum seekers; Austria; autonomy; civil society; funding; governance; NGOs; refugees; social movements

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation, and the Role of Civil Society", edited by Ove Sutter and Eva Youkhana (University of Bonn, Germany).

1. Introduction

In the summer of 2015, Austria suddenly found itself in the limelight of international attention against the backdrop of the large inflow of people fleeing from wars, travelling over land via Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Voluntary organisations and initiatives responded rapidly to increasing numbers of asylum seekers and to changing local needs, especially in a context where limited resources and unclear policies kept governmental actors and established NGOs from providing adequate administration and services. While the scale of the issue and the fact that it exposed a fundamental solidarity crisis in Europe warranted some special attention, it is important to remember that asylum seekers are not new to Austria. Indeed, the "impressive civil society mobilization for solidarity with refugees" that Europe witnessed as an initial response (Bauböck & Scholten, 2016, p. 2), has roots in earlier practices of activism. At the time, Austria, and especially Vienna, already had a diverse landscape of established NGOs and smaller organisations supporting refugees and asylum seekers.

This article offers an analysis of the organisational histories and principles of four refugee support initiatives, *Flucht nach Vorn*, *KAMA*, *PROSA*, and *Queer Base*, established within the last decade in Vienna. All four quickly developed into respected players in the field of refugee support. In the summer of 2015, these relatively young initiatives already had an emerging infrastructure and could respond to and adapt themselves in the face of the new challenges. The aim of the research was to find out what principles and practices inspired these four initiatives, and why they were set up as autonomous organisations, rather than integrated as projects in the existing

refugee support sector. Our investigation was led by two research questions. First, where can the four recent initiatives be situated in relation to the existing refugee and asylum support field, as mapped out in the literature on NGOs, social movements and migrant self-organisations? Second, in what way, if at all, are these initiatives challenging and transforming the established field of refugee and asylum support? In this article, we argue that these four initatives created innovative organisations that combined service delivery with an articulation of demands for radical change. Before we elaborate this argument and introduce the theoretical framework, we provide a brief overview of the Austrian asylum and refugee support sector and the four initiatives.

For this exploratory study, we analysed the transcripts of semi-structured interviews with two founders of each organisation (n = 8), as well as organisational literature and printed and online media about the initiatives. The interviews with these key informants, all of whom were interviewed separately, lasted approximately two hours and took place in spring 2016. Through the interviews we sought to capture the "organisational biography"; the life-story of an organisation from its inception to its subsequent stages of development (Fairbairn, 2001, p. 25). We therefore addressed initial motivations for setting up the organisation, the way it evolved, as well as key turning points in the organisational history, organisational principles, the nature of relationships with asylum seekers and refugees, dilemmas or conflicts and, finally, future plans. In the first coding cycle, the authors co-developed codes to capture common patterns and characteristics and jointly refined the codes in the second cycle to analyse the data in more detail with qualitative data analysis software. The quotes that we use to illustrate our analysis have been translated by the authors from German to English. In order to ensure a degree of confidentiality, we omit the names of the research participants and only refer to the names of the initiatives.

2. The Refugee and Asylum Support Sector in Austria

Similar to the UK refugee system, which also is an "interorganizational domain" with various organisations with different and sometimes conflicting principles (Phillips & Hardy, 1997, p. 159), Austria's asylum and refugee support sector is diverse. New refugee support associations emerged in the course of the 1990s against the background of more politicised discussions on asylum issues and more restrictive asylum legislation. The most important independent initiatives in the field are *Flüchtlings- und Deserteursberatung* (Refugee- and Deserter-Counselling Service) and *Asyl in Not* (Asylum in Peril) in Vienna, and the association *Fluchtpunkt* in Innsbruck that offers mainly counselling services for asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Nevertheless, church-related humanitarian organisations such as *Caritas* and *Diakonie*, together with other major organisations like *Volkshilfe* and the *Rotes Kreuz* dominate the asylum and refugee sector. In the course of the last decade, commercial private service companies emerged as well as "gongos" (Government-Organised-Non-Governmental-Organisations), such as the *Verein Menschenrechte Österreich*. In Austria, the city of Vienna remains the centre of the refugee and asylum sector; the nationally organised quota system that should distribute asylum seekers per province (Bundesland) is effectively blocked at regional and local levels, thus Vienna is the only region that fulfils and exceeds the quota (OE1, 2014).

Langthaler and Trauner (2009, p. 454) found that there is almost no cooperation between self-organised refugee associations and NGOs that offer services for asylum seekers and refugees (cf. Cullen, 2009, for a similar observation in the Irish context). One exceptional event that brought these organisations together was the *Refugee Protest Camp Vienna*. It started in 2012 as a protest against the living conditions of asylum seekers, and turned into a highly visible protest movement organised by asylum seekers, supporters and activists. The protest movement created their own social spaces, which produced emotional solidarity ties among the refugees, as well as between refugees, NGOs and supporters (Ataç, 2016). As the established NGOs, such as *Caritas*, as well as the unconventional radical initiatives created alliances with protesting refugees, conflicts emerged around the aims of the protest and questions such as whether established NGOs were trying to co-opt the movement by reducing their radical demands and making them into objects rather than political subjects.

The four self-organised initiatives that are the focus of this article complement the work of the established NGOs. They differ from other, older autonomous organisations, which offer counselling services, because they offer services that relate strongly to the social rather than legal needs of asylum seekers. Each of these four initiatives, introduced below, witnessed rapid expansion and soon received recognition for their work by the established NGO field as well as the Austrian state.

The organisation *KAMA* was founded in 2007 in Vienna. KAMA is the abbreviation of "*Kurse von Asylsuchenden, MigrantInnen und Asylberechtigten*", translated as "Courses by asylum seekers, migrants and persons granted asylum". Its main goal is to facilitate courses offered by asylum seekers in which they share their skills (linguistic, culinary, musical, etc.) with the broader public. The courses are free of charge, but participants can pay a donation. Starting in Vienna, *KAMA* spread to other cities: Linz and Graz in 2014, Innsbruck and Salzburg in 2015. In 2013, KAMA was awarded the third prize in the Social Integration category of the ERSTE Foundation (25,000 Euros). The project is currently mainly financed through donations and based on volunteer work (Erste Stiftung, 2013).

The project *PROSA* stands for "*Projekt Schule für Alle!*" (Project: School for all!). Since 2012, *PROSA* has of-

fered courses to adolescent asylum seekers and refugees to finish secondary education, given that those over 16 years of age fall outside compulsory education in Austria. In September 2014, *PROSA* opened its own space for education, events, communication and encounter, called *Café PROSA*. In 2015, the project was financed through personal donations, through membership fees, as well as through a number of awards. For example, in 2015, they were awarded the *SozialMarie*, a European price for social innovation (Mauch, 2015).

Flucht nach Vorn is an association that organises leisure activities for minors and young adults in the fields of sports, arts, culture, music and education. Through these activities, young refugees can enter into an exchange with the "majority society". The idea was born in 2012; in spring 2013, the first event took place. In 2017, they opened their own space, a cultural centre, and in 2015 they received the *Ute-Bock-Preis für Zivilcourage*, a renowned Austrian price for civil society work.

Queer Base, founded in 2015, is the only initiative that was developed in the context of an established organisation, the *Türkis Rosa Lila Villa* for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and Intersex (LGBTQI) community. It has, however, an independent organisational structure. First, the organisation was mostly based on donations and volunteer activism. Later, the city council offered financial support to *Queer Base*. The organisation offers safe shelter, legal advice and peer-to-peer counselling, as well as a buddy system. In 2017, they received the *Bruno Kreisky Prize for Human Rights*.

3. Movements and Organisations

Civil society action in relation to migration, and in this case, refugees and asylum seekers specifically, emerges from a diverse field comprised of social movements, NGOs and refugee and migrant community organisations. Civil society's actions range from anti-immigration movements to pro-immigration groups, which cover a range of activities, from grass-rooted activism, the delivery of basic services for vulnerable immigrant groups, to advocacy organisations (Ambrosini & Van der Leun, 2015). The different organisational structures and political strategies of NGOs and social movements have frequently led to tensions. Petras, in a damning Marxist critique, has noted that in contrast to social movements, NGOs "emphasize projects not movements" and concentrate on technical assistance or service delivery over engagement with the "structural conditions that shape the everyday lives of people" (1999, p. 434). In slightly milder language, Alejandro Bendaña describes how social movements

> develop an organizing dynamic quite different from the networking carried out by entities fundamentally dedicated to policy advocacy, service delivery and monitoring, which are characteristic of many NGOs. That circumspection, or absence of a social base, in turn influences the degree of dependence on external funding and with it the need to take positions that do not upset the funders. (2006, p. 21)

Evaluating activities of civil society organisations in the field of migration and asylum governance, we can distinguish between a 'problem-solving-approach' and a 'critical-approach', depending on the respective aims of the organisation, its relation to policy actors and to migrants and refugees, as well as its organisational form (Ataç, 2015). 'Problem-solving' activities offer services for asylum seekers and migrants such as consulting, shelter and social services, which are often financed by federal and local governmental bodies. In the context of limited resources, the question arises whether governmental bodies intentionally use the participation of civil society organisations in order to fill the gap of public service provision with cheaper offers in a field that is increasingly dominated by market-oriented competition (Van Dyk & Misbach, 2016). This strengthening of ties between the state and the voluntary sector through subcontracting also limits the space for political agitation (Bloch & Schuster, 2002; McGee & Walker, 2016). In contrast, civil society activities categorised as belonging to a 'critical' approach include social movements, self-organised groups and NGOs, which express solidarity with migrants and refugees, conduct advocacy for their rights, campaign for pro-migration policies, and put political pressure on the government (Vickers, 2014). Finally, there are also organisations that represent a mix of both approaches, offering services as well as campaigning for improvements in the political framework (Castañeda, 2013; Mora & Handmaker, 2014).

A second form of division that marks the refugee and asylum support sector (and the migrant support sector broadly) is that between what Cullen (2009) describes as majority-led pro-migrant organisations on the one hand, and grassroots migrant-led organisations on the other. The first are usually more formalised and have a closer relation to the state and related resources (Cullen, 2009). The latter, as self-organised organisations, are usually based on a close relation between 'members' based on shared nationality, ethnicity, migration status, religion and regional origin or a combination thereof (Piacentini, 2015), reducing or even annulling the gap between providers and service-users (Martin, 2014). In the competition for direct and indirect state funding, grassroots migrant-led organisations that are new to the field, often lose out against more established organisations (Mackenzie, Forde, & Ciupijus, 2012).

To an extent the different types of organisation, migrant-led on the one hand, and majority-led, on the other hand, can be mapped onto the tensions between social movements and NGOs. For instance, grassroots migrant-led organisations, or Migrant and Refugee Community Organisations (MRCOs) as they are called in the UK context, share features with social movements in that they often rely on voluntary engagement and have structures of self-governance and close links to the commu-

nity. Majority-led pro-migrant organisations, in contrast, including those in Austria, often lack representation of migrants in the organisation, especially in management and coordination roles, and therefore have the tenuous accountability structures associated with NGOs (de Jong, 2017a). However, the tension between grassroots migrant-led organisations or MRCOs and majority-led organisations should not simply be *equated* with that between social movements and NGOs. Migrant-led organisations often become more formalised NGOs and are frequently engaged in service provision rather than political mobilisation (Bloch & Schuster, 2002). Moreover, the differences between social movements and NGOs should not detract from the fact that they also face similar dilemmas, for instance ones concerning the relationship to their social base. No Border movements, for instance, also wrestle with questions such as "Should advocates relate to non-status immigrants as clients or as allies?" (Nyers, 2003, p. 1081).

Hence, in a slightly simplified manner, five interrelated core areas of contention can be identified: 1) autonomy versus dependency on funders; 2) voluntary activism versus paid professionalism; 3) radical change versus reformism; 4) political mobilisation versus service delivery; and finally, 5) self-governance and accountability to the social base versus expert or formal governance.

Both the distinction between social movements and NGOs and between majority-led pro-migrant organisations and grassroots migrant-led organisations should be treated as generalising characterisations that are helpful to map the broad contours of and tensions within civil society action in relation to migration. However, as we show, the recent initiatives investigated in this article position themselves in relation to these tensions, while simultaneously problematising this typology.

4. New Refugee Support Organisations between NGOs and Civil Society

4.1. Funding, Autonomy, Voluntarism and Professionalisation

The four initiatives were each set up as a new autonomous organisation rather than integrated as programmes in existing migration support structures. This was remarkable, since many of the founders had experience in established organisations. In fact, it was often this experience that formed the inspiration to set up their own organisations. As the research participants recalled, they were confronted with the realities of the asylum system through formal employment or internships, and discovered a gap in the existing service provisions.

For example, remembering the early days of *Flucht nach Vorn*, the founder explained that a sudden increase in the number of unaccompanied minors posed a challenge for established organisations offering services to this group. At this time, she was working as an interpreter for an NGO that offered psychological support. Her work, which included translation, alerted her to the specific problems of unaccompanied minors. While they were fortunate to have access to psychological services, there was no form of supervision or activity outside the programme. Witnessing how the lack of social contacts and boredom led to depression, inspired her to establish *Flucht nach Vorn* with the goal to offer leisure activities to this group.

The founder of *PROSA* was working as an education counsellor for an established NGO in a town in Lower Austria. Working in a geographically isolated asylum accommodation centre, he realised that adolescent asylum seekers have very limited access to education. He suggested developing an alternative educational project to his employer—however, the organisation rejected the idea. Consequently, he decided to set up a project as an independent organisation, together with friends who were part of his social and political network. This narrative is also echoed in the founding history of *KAMA*. The founder studied Social Work and worked during her studies as a volunteer in another well-known NGO, which supports and offers services to irregular migrants outside of the asylum reception system. Through this work, she became aware of the living conditions of irregularised migrants and rejected asylum seekers. While the NGO she volunteered for, fulfilled the basic needs of shelter and food, it did not address issues of employment. Since access to the labour market is very restricted for asylum seekers (UNDOK, 2017) and also those with refugee status face significant obstacles (de Jong, 2017a), she developed the idea of *KAMA* as a way to support refugees and asylum seekers in offering courses in which they could share their skills.

The space that the initiatives sought to occupy demanded tightrope walking between the lure of institutionalisation, professionalisation and service delivery on the one hand, and autonomy, voluntarism, and protest on the other hand. When articulating their principles, the founders that we interviewed frequently referred to the large NGOs (notably *Caritas*, *Volkshilfe*, *Diakonie* and *Rotes Kreuz*) as a way to distinguish their own initiatives. This reflects the tensions addressed above, which describes how social initiatives that become institutionalised as NGOs lose their autonomy due to dependence on direct and indirect state funding, increasing susceptibility to co-optation. As Mackenzie et al. observe, "there is a risk that the institutional goals of…organisations, in terms of securing resources and influence, may take precedence over substantive goals of support provision" (2012, p. 632). From the interviews it became clear that the founders' decision to set up autonomous organisations, rather than programmes integrated in the existing NGO sector was partly based on the desire to resist this risk.

A *KAMA* founder reinforces the point that lack of funding and embeddedness in the Austrian mainstream NGO scene, provides *KAMA* with an important degree of autonomy. She explained that there have been internal organisational discussions about the possibility to em-

bed the organisation in the structures of *Caritas* or *Volkshilfe*. However, this would mean that, "we would not be as free anymore. Now we can do what we want." She reinforces the point of autonomy also in relation to funders' requirements: "What you all have to change to be worthy of funding…that leaves no longer any free space." This shows her awareness that increased formalisation has an "opportunity cost in terms of spending time and resources in pursuit of funding at the expense of actually providing support" (Mackenzie et al., 2012, p. 634).

A *PROSA* founder echoed this sentiment:

> We have to…have the courage to insist on things, also when there is a risk that we don't get it funded….[The logic that] we first need financial means to set up projects, that is a logic that other [organisations] already have, we don't need any more of that. One should, I think, do it and then one should look how can it be financed.

One of the *Flucht nach Vorn* founders focussed her reflections vis-à-vis funding relations and autonomy on political parties, given the fact that some of the large mainstream NGOs in the Austrian migration sector have strong links to political parties. As she explained:

> From parties or governments, we did not want any support, for various reasons. First we did not want to be embraced by them, second we did not want to lose the trust of our clients, because they have often fled for political parties, or also here [in Austria] suffered depressions or were threatened by deportation….And we have always tried to work with ethical and morally acceptable funders or with private donations.

Funding, and especially the refusal of certain types of funding and its concomitant dependencies, made possible by a strong reliance on both voluntary engagement and prize money, was therefore crucial to the way the founders described the principle of autonomy of their organisations. One *KAMA* founder succinctly expressed the significance of this for the organisation's identity: "Who knows who we would be, if we would work with money." Receiving funding was therefore regarded as a 'mixed blessing'; one that opened but potentially also closed off certain avenues and would risk fundamentally altering the organisation.

Yet most of the organisations that we studied collaborated in some way with the established NGOs. That their own position and principles were tied to a rejection of some of the deficiencies of NGOs that they named, did not mean an unequivocal rejection of such NGOs. Neither did it mean a complete alignment with social movements as an alternative form of intervention. One *Queer Base* founder we interviewed explained it eloquently this way:

> We originate from a social movement, but we are too much confronted with concrete situations….We cannot afford to be only idealistic. We therefore should collaborate with people and with organisations, we don't have to, but it makes sense, to collaborate with people or organisations, with whom as a social movement I might not align myself. Because I would say, I don't want to have anything to do with them, etc. But on the other hand, from an organisation like *Caritas* or *Diakonie*, I am very far removed, because we are too much a social movement for that.

In fact, a year after the interview was conducted, the founder reflected back on her earlier position and explained that the ties with these established large NGOs had strengthened in the last year and that the organisation had depended on them for its survival. At this point in time, she regarded the collaboration as fruitful as it affected a change in perspective on the position of LGBTQI asylum seekers and refugees within mainstream NGOs (email correspondence June 2017, cf. facebook post 27.06.2017). She provocatively countered the idea that they would be swallowed up by these larger NGOs, with the question 'who is eating whom?' (email correspondence June 2017, cf. facebook post 27.06.2017). Indeed, clear commitment to a goal can "act as a counterbalance to bureaucratisation, allowing social movements to sustain a more radical agenda against pressures to become more conservative and thus mainstream" (MacKenzie et al., 2012, p. 635).

A *PROSA* founder echoed *Queer Base*'s ambition to combine idealism with pragmatism. She recalled that she was once asked during a panel discussion whether taking over the responsibility of the state was the right political approach, and that she answered: "not right, but necessary." This reply, in fact, is not dissimilar from the principle of an established NGO in the Austrian migration sector, the evangelical Christian NGO *Diakonie*, which emphasises that they offer "support under protest", demanding change in the conditions that necessitate support (Diakonie, 2017).

The tightrope walking in the space of civil society requires constant readjustment and vigilance in response to changing circumstances. The interviews took place at a time when the initiatives were increasingly successful and were gaining recognition, which meant that funding became more readily accessible. For organisations that had initially solely run on the basis of intensive, unpaid labour (not unfrequently leading to symptoms of burn-out), and that had connected this to their sense of autonomy, this meant considering what the introduction of paid staff members would mean. This was especially poignant since they associated paid professionalised work with the mainstream NGOs that they wanted to distinguish themselves from. One *PROSA* founder sketched this contrast as follows:

> There are these very large organisations like *Volkshilfe*, *Diakonie* and *Caritas*, but these are professional organisations. Not in the sense of doing their work

> better in some way, but that they do it with a professional background, these are paid people, who are trained for exactly this area of work. Personally, they probably enjoy their work, but I believe that this personal, individual engagement is not foregrounded like in our case.

A *Queer Base* founder, who pondered aloud about their recent success in obtaining funding, which would enable them to remunerate some activists for their work, shared similar reflections.

> It is about drawing clear boundaries, but still stay in a nice relationship with people…but empowering….And I would also always do more for the people than what I am paid for….[If I would be paid] I would have a task description, which states that I do this and that and that. But when something else is needed, something I can do, then I would not send the people away, but I would just do it.

Both research participants establish a negative relationship between remuneration, professionalism on the one hand, and passionate commitment and relations of care on the other, which corresponds to dominant discourses about a masculinised, rational, detached, instrumental ethics versus a feminised, emotional, involved ethic of care (de Jong, 2017b). As research into professional social workers' responses to austerity and managerialism in the non-profit sector has shown, forms of resistance are also present within professional contexts. Some paid professional workers, for instance, subvert the logics of efficiency by offsetting its consequences with substantial amounts of unpaid overtime, "in order to meet higher goals of care for others in an increasingly uncaring society" (Baines, 2016, p. 136).

What becomes clear from the above, however, is that autonomy as well as the nature of relationships between what in mainstream NGOs would be considered 'clients' and 'providers', were key to the self-understanding and principles of the initiatives that we investigated. In the next section, we discuss the kind of relationship that the initiatives sought to establish between refugees, asylum seekers and those that volunteered to support them.

4.2. Relationships and Governance

The origin stories of the initiatives as told in the interviews revealed that not only a growing awareness of asylum seekers and refugees' needs was an important impetus for establishing the initiatives, but also the relationships that the founders had developed with refugees. The founder of *Flucht nach Vorn* established a relation to one young refugee in the context of her NGO work. As she explains: "Well, it wasn't like I had planned to initiate *Flucht nach Vorn*. It simply came from the need to help first this boy, then his four friends, and then all those others."

One *PROSA* founder recounted how in the context of his former job with an NGO he realised that the Austrian educational system excluded young asylum seekers because of its monolingual set up. As he explains, his awareness of this fundamental problem "became personalised with these very keen, ambitious, sympathetic young men" that he had met. In the case of *Queer Base*, the social space provided by the *Rosa Lilla Villa* (the LGBTQI social movement initiative that *Queer Base* is an offspring of), LGBTQI activists who were already based in Austria started to build closer relationships with LGBTQI asylum seekers and refugees. "Of course we became persons of trust for them. And then entirely different themes emerged. Then we started to talk about health issues. These are people with post-traumatic distress symptoms and I don't know what else." Finally, one of the founders of *KAMA* described the impact of the relationships she established in the context of her initial voluntary work for an NGO:

> When one sits opposite to these people and talks to them, then, I mean I could not comprehend in what kind of situation these people live….How silly is that? They sit there and wait. They cannot do anything, not pay rent, not buy food, they cannot participate in any processes. Yes, that was at first really outrage and bewilderment. And [the feeling that] one should be able to do something, and with that, it was clear anyways, that I would do something.

Research has highlighted the relevance of affect in the context of activism in support of refugees and asylum seekers (Rosenberger & Winkler, 2014). Kynsilehto, in a study on solidarities found that emotions as "an integral part of activism" were "woven into the relational webs between people" (2017, p. 53). Sutter (2017) discusses the emergence of emotional politics of civic engagement for refugees in the most recent so-called refugee crisis through a case study of volunteers in a train station in Germany. He shows how the participants were able to create a framework of emotional practices, which was vital for the constitution of civic engagement in its early phases.

It is important, however, to emphasise that these affective responses were not articulated by our research participants as a politics of empathy or pity for asylum seekers and refugees. Instead, they generated a critique of inadequate state and third sector provision as well as national and international legal constraints. The activities of the initiatives were therefore not primarily conceived to make asylum seekers and refugees 'feel better', a sentiment discussed in research on volunteers in a Dutch asylum seeker centre in the Netherlands, who, in the face of the hard conditions, turned away from transforming external institutions towards transforming internal feelings (Larruina & Ghorashi, 2016).

Some of our research participants' early relationships with refugees and asylum seekers were established in the context of their work for established NGOs. How-

ever, the literature on majority-led professional NGOs is largely silent on relationality and affective politics, in contrast to social movement research. Only the literature on grassroots migrant-led and refugee community organisations (as well as on ethnic associations; cf. Cattacin & Domenig, 2014) assumes stronger affective ties based on common experiences in relation to marginalisation based on citizenship status, racialisation, linguistic and regional affinity. Hence, the intersection between emotions, relationships and engagement that we found, cannot be adequately captured in this framework. None of the initiatives were grassroots migrant-led initiatives that had emerged as a collective response to the challenges of navigating in the so-called host country. However, in two of the initiatives, the founders had experienced forced migration in their youth or had a migration history in their families, and continued facing racialisation and discrimination, which facilitated the building of relationships with those accessing the programmes of their organisations. "These are people affected by racism. That is my common denominator with them", as a *PROSA* founder put it. However, across all of the initiatives, the focus was on establishing personal ties rather than professional relationships of provider and client.

One *PROSA* founder, for instance, explained that the relationships they seek to build with their students are characterised by fairness and equality and form part of a long-term commitment. In his view, this could not be established in the context of a service delivery NGO, which he described as one "where the young people come as clients…get a service and should go again". This emphasis had implications for the founders' views on the structures of governance of their organisations. The initiatives are neither migrant-led grassroots organisations, which have structures of self-governance, nor social movements with seek to maintain close links to their social base (though as Nyers, 2003, points out, solidarity between migrants and non-migrants within social movements is a continuous struggle that cannot be taken for granted). Nevertheless, we found that the founders were keen, yet again, to distance themselves from professionalised established NGOs with majority-dominated management structures.

Both PROSA founders emphasised that the alumni of the programme were encouraged to take an active role in the organisation. As one of the founders put it: "they are not like our objects, but should be our subjects". The founders of the other organisations shared similar reflections on including refugee "alumni" of their programme in the (emerging) governance structure of their organisations. Encouraging the transition from service user to organiser was an important way in which the organisations tried to address representation of refugees. At the same time, they did not fail to recognise that many who came to their organisations for support faced structural obstacles in developing themselves as leaders within the organisations. Also, they observed that principles of equality and empowerment were inevitably compromised by the structural inequalities that underpinned the need for their organisation in the first place. In the next section, we will return to the issues of system critiques, politics, and affective ties, but shift our focus from the relationships of the founders with asylum seekers and refugees, to the relationships emerging through volunteers' engagement with the initiative.

4.3. Service Provision and System Critique

As discussed above, the four organisations differed in the content and scope of their activities, ranging from education for refugees, to courses by refugees, from social meeting space to counselling and leisure time activities. Each of these projects had been set up in response to an emerging demand and a gap in the provision of existing services. We suggest that each organisation went beyond the services necessary for mere survival, such as shelter, or those intrinsically linked to the asylum process, such as legal advice services, as well as that what the state is legally obliged to supply, such as mandatory education. As Vickers has noted in the UK context, "the depoliticized provision of basic services to help refugees survive…stabilize[s] the asylum system by softening the impact of hardships caused by a lack of state support, thus provoking less resistance" (2016, p. 449). Providing opportunities for leisure time activities, safe spaces for sexual expression, and education beyond compulsory schooling, consciously and explicitly challenged the way migration regimes channel asylum seekers and refugees into 'bare life' (Owens, 2009). This is well illustrated with an example from the website of *Flucht nach Vorn*, which states that: "We are of the opinion that every human being, in addition to basic human rights, has the right to self-development and creativity" (Flucht nach Vorn, 2014). An article in a local newspaper about the initiative reinforced this point in slightly different terms: "Their vision is clear: not just the basic needs of young people should be met, they should also enjoy life" (Cetin, 2013).

Hence, we argue that the most significant commonality between the initiatives can only be detected when looking *beyond* the specificity of the activities offered by each of the initiatives and attending instead to the *kind* of space that they build. We suggest that each of the organisations, in their own way, create a *space of encounter* between refugees, asylum seekers, other migrants and non-migrants. We consider such spaces of encounter political in radical terms due to four reasons that we will discuss in turn below. First, as established above, the insistence on people's right to a social space of encounter, regardless of citizenship status challenges asylum seeker's position as only having the right to basic services. As *Queer Base* emphasised in their acceptance speech of the *Bruno Kreisky Human Rights Prize* 2017: "it is for us not just about protection for asylum seekers, but also about a good life without hostilities, either from the majority society or from communities of origin" (Queer Base—Welcome and Support for Lgbtiq Refugees, 2017).

Secondly, the creation of spaces of encounter resists the politics of isolation and segregation to which especially asylum seekers are subject. With migration policies being geared towards an "organised disintegration" (Täubig, 2009, p. 58), or "policy-imposed liminality" (Piacentini, 2015, p. 436), these initiatives foster "integration" beyond the assimilationist hegemonic mode. In this context seemingly innocuous projects, such as facilitating courses taught by asylum seekers and refugees as in the case of *KAMA*, have a radical edge. As one founder explains:

> It is a form of statement, when one is engaged in an area where one gets around the ban on working [for asylum seekers] and when one brings people who should actually disappear, who one doesn't see and who should be invisible, on a platform.

PROSA also illustrates this point in their selfpresentation, which states that "With our educational offer, we create at the same time a space that guarantees our participants security through a structured everyday life and the building of supporting and social relationships" (Sozialmarie, 2015).

Thirdly, building spaces of encounter creates new identifications and belongings. When *KAMA* introduces volunteers and aspiring refugee teachers to each other, there is from the beginning "not a Them and Us, but actually only a We", as one founder explains. In spaces of encounter connections are established that cross various boundaries (Vickers, 2016). A *PROSA* member told us that "it is actually about identification and the work that we do ends up being about the fact that people identify with each other". As Piacentini (2016) argues, through everyday encounters bonds of solidarity can be formed that transcend the nation-state as the locus of belonging and inclusion. This is important since "face-to-face interactions between citizens and migrants [in the context of volunteering] is one way to break out of the cycle of volatility", that characterises media-induced moments of empathy with refugees, which are frequently followed by phases of indifference and hostility (Karakayali, 2016; cf. Phillimore, 2012). Connections also foster social capital that empowers racialised, marginalised migrants and counter isolationist migration policies. At the same time, these spaces also provided the setting for building relationships of care and solidarity beyond likeness and likeability. Someone from *Queer Base*, for instance, described how the people that met each other also "become family [and] just like in a large family, there is a cousin where it is good to only see him once a year." This quote highlights the affective labour and the challenges that come with constructing new communities. Creating these spaces of encounter also means taking the dominant, majoritised community out of their comfort zone and segregated enclave. It thereby shifts the onus of integration from asylum seekers and refugees to the wider community and thinks about common desires for a better world.

Finally, these spaces of encounter can be places where relationships are established, where people who engage as volunteers can be outraged by structural injustices, similarly to the founders' first experiences. This is illustrated in a quote from a founder from *Flucht nach Vorn*:

> One cannot work for refugees and then not be political or think that everything is all fine. It is not. Already the first time that one loses a friend because of a deportation, one cannot be apolitical anymore. And it is then not about small drawing workshops that one organises for sweet, small children.

This is in line with Bassel and Emejulu's observation that "solidarity both animates oppositional voluntary action and is the hoped-for outcome of this form of action" (2014, p. 133). We therefore suggest that these organisations manage "holding together the 'against' and the 'beyond'" (Dixon, 2014, p. 104). Their prefigurative politics of going *beyond* existing structures is coupled with "struggles *against* exploitation and oppression" (Dixon, 2014, p. 104, italics added). In contrast to the trend for social movements to move from "demanding" to "delivering" services as formalised NGOs (Gupta, 2014), these Austrian initiatives successfully manage, at least for now, to hold the two together in productive tension.

5. Conclusion

This article has analysed the organisational biographies of four new refugee support organisations in Austria, founded just before the summer of 2015. Based on interviews with their founders, as well as organisational and media literature, we have shown that their previous NGO and social movement experience formed a springboard for setting up their own organisations. Not only did it allow the founders to identify significant gaps in existing service provision and provided the space of confrontation with realities of the asylum system, which inspired a strong sense of outrage, it also led them to develop a political critique. This combination of factors inspired the founders to build organisations that occupy a middle space between established NGOs and social movements. Drawing on the social movement literature that has mapped areas of contention between social movements and NGOs, we demonstrated that the founders navigate these contentions by building structures of inclusive governance and maintaining personal relationships with 'service users' by creating a *space of encounter*.

Recognising the drawbacks and merits of both NGOs and social movements, the organisations moreover guard their autonomy, balance volunteerism with professionalism, and combine radical system critique with a reform of asylum and refugee services. Inevitably, this balancing act includes personal risks, such as of burnout, structural risks, such as co-optation and rapid growth, as well as financial risks. Nevertheless, we have argued

that these four initiatives successfully combine system critique with a response to asylum seekers and refugees' needs, inspiring a new form of organisation that both delivers services and demands change. Each of the programmes offered by the four organisations insist on the right of asylum seekers and refugees to a life beyond bare existence and on creating spaces of encounter that challenge the intentional isolation of the asylum system and foster new political collectivities.

Acknowledgements

The authors want to thank the founders of the four organisations for sharing their experiences with us, as well as Herbert Langthaler, Irene Messinger, Sonja Moghaddari, Stephan Scheel, Vita Terry, the participants of the workshop "Flucht, Solidarität und Ökonomie" in Vienna (30 June–1 July 2017) and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Open access funding provided by the University of Vienna.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 38–48
DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i3.1025

Article

Decolonial Perspectives on Charitable Spaces of "Welcome Culture" in Germany

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Submitted: 8 May 2017 | Accepted: 29 July 2017 | Published: 19 September 2017

Abstract
This article focusses on the relationships between volunteers and refugees in the German "welcome culture". I highlight the continuities between historical and colonial notions of feminine charity and contemporary volunteering efforts in support of refugees in Germany. The "welcome culture" is conceived here as a charitable space that is historically sedimented by specific understandings of gender, racial and class difference. In particular, the difference between the modern emancipated female volunteer and the female oppressed refugee plays a central role. The question of female self-determination, then, becomes an important social arena in the German "welcome culture", through which the rate and terms of participation of refugees in social life are negotiated. Thus I draw on decolonial thought as well as theoretical insights from post-development scholarship and critical studies of humanitarianism in order to consider the multitemporal and transnational character of current "welcome culture" as well as to gain a better understanding of the entailed power relations. These are more contingent than might first appear. Presenting findings from my ongoing fieldwork I conclude that the notion of "welcome culture" allows for the emergence of new forms of sociality.

Keywords
colonial difference; decolonial approaches; feminine charity; refugees; volunteer; welcome culture

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation, and the Role of Civil Society", edited by Ove Sutter and Eva Youkhana (University of Bonn, Germany).

1. Introduction

Since the summer of 2015, a new way of dealing with refugees has emerged in Germany. Falling under the broad label of "Willkommenskultur" or welcome culture, there has been a marked increase in new volunteer and charitable associations dedicated to assisting refugees (Karkayali & Kleist, 2016). Due to the large numbers of refugees arriving in a relatively short time period, the existing state infrastructures—both in terms of personnel and accommodation—became overloaded (e.g., van Dyk & Misbach, 2016). With refugees waiting at train stations or housed in temporary locations while the bureaucracy sought out accommodation, volunteers began to show up to help. This outpouring of volunteerism—including the setting up of soup kitchens and the finding of private accommodation for refugees—was largely spontaneous and only loosely organized, building on neighborly commitment and involvement. Yet, as many have argued (e.g., Hess et al., 2017) there was at the same time a considerable re-constitution of both the European and local border regime (Hess et al., 2017), with the overall aim of reducing refugee arrivals.

Many of the emergency shelters that were first run on a volunteer basis have since been taken over by local governments responsible for refugee matters and transformed into permanent formal structures (Hamann, Karakayali, Höfler, & Wallis, 2016). That said, volunteers still assume responsibility for a large part of the administrative tasks that were previously the remit of the government (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016). Because of their involvement in the material and political support of mi-

grants, volunteers have become significant actors both in their active participation in consultative round tables and advisory councils as well as in their role in providing public care and welfare. As this suggests, this new 'culture of help' (Haubner, 2016) has lead to a reorganization of local communities, involving the transformation of existing care infrastructures as well as everyday relations within such communities.

This article takes these processes of social transformation as the starting point. It is based on ongoing ethnographic research in the north of Germany, where I have participated as a volunteer in emergency shelters and community centers in affluent districts since August 2015. These efforts are largely organized by elderly, female volunteers with a bourgeois background, though as I discuss below, the participation of Germans with immigrant backgrounds within these spaces is increasing. While my own initial entry into this field was driven by a humanitarian and political commitment to assist arriving refugees, I was struck by the contested nature of these places, and began to use my tools as an ethnographer to document my time there with detailed field notes, and formalized my role as both researcher and volunteer. In addition to participant observation of the day-to-day affairs of these organizations, I conducted 15 biographical and expert interviews with volunteers, interpreters, and employees of the social service and immigration office. I complement these with a discourse analysis of media and policy representation of the so-called 'refugee crisis.' Following Clarke (2009), I take a situational analysis approach, in order to attend to the discursive, material, human and non-human constitution of situations. In this way, situational analysis considers power relations, different interpretations, spatial and temporal arrangements of a given situation as well as the situational negotiations of social practices. Situational analysis, I argue, allows for the consideration of the transnational and trans-local conditions of a situation, as well as for an attention to the contradictions, ambivalences, and conflicts it encompasses (Braun, 2016). As I will show, spaces of assistance are deeply beset by power imbalances related to the differentiated positionalities and expectations of the actors—volunteers, interpreters, and refugees—that come together within them. In this article, I consider the conditions for the production of these spaces and practices, as well as the contestations and possibilities that result from the constitution of these new socialities.

In my approach, I draw on decolonial thought as well as theoretical insights from post-development scholarship and critical studies of humanitarianism. I argue that these approaches allow us to consider the multi-temporal and transnational character of current "welcome culture" in order to gain a better understanding of the power relations entailed in, and the patterns of meaning and social imaginaries (Laclau, 1990) that shape charitable space, particularly as these relate to the interactions between helpers and refugees. By using concepts from critical development and humanitarian studies (Kapoor, 2005; Ticktin, 2012) in my analysis of charitable spaces in Germany, I argue that there are important parallels between "third world aid" and current welcome culture. Both rely on hierarchical and inegalitarian structures of "help" and are connected to particular ways of seeing and understanding both "self" and "other". In these social imaginaries, there are clearly (and dearly held) scripts of who is to be helped and in what way. These structures and imaginations are deeply shaped by gendered and racialized logics where the difference between the modern, emancipated female volunteer and the female, oppressed refugee plays a central role. In the German case, it is not possible to understand this trope of the helper and the helped without first considering the particular form of bourgeois femininity (*bürgerliche Weiblichkeit*)—which values education and takes a classically humanist view of what it means to be modern—on which it relies. The question of female self-determination, then, becomes an important social arena through which the rate and terms of participation of refugees in social life are negotiated (Clarke, 2009).

The article proceeds as follows. First I provide a short overview of the "welcome culture" (*Wilkommenskultur*) and explain my theoretical approach and the meaning of multi-temporality in relation to helping structures. I then provide a genealogy of charitable practices and spaces in Germany, in order to identify historical and colonial sedimentations that are affected in certain spatial and temporal settings. I trace the development of such charitable spaces, focusing in particular on the notion of feminine charity. I show how the emergence of feminized charity built on Lutheran principles relating to the gendered division of labor, and later, the German colonial project. I then show how contemporary charitable spaces continue to be shaped by this history, by exploring two moments from my fieldwork in refugee accommodation centers when ideas of charity were hotly contested. I conclude by highlighting the possibility, within the notion of "welcome culture", to allow space for the emergence of new forms of sociality.

2. Welcome Culture

The term "welcome culture" took center stage in German public life in the wake of the summer of 2015 when thousands of refugees began crossing into Europe. But neither the term nor the idea of actively welcoming newcomers in Germany was new. In fact, discussions regarding welcome culture originate from a wider debate on labor-related immigration after new policies were seen as being ineffective in addressing the country's demographic change and the shortage of skilled workers (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016; Heckmann, 2012).[1]

[1] Braun and Matthies (2017) highlight the selective logic of current "welcome cultures". They connect cultures of reception to the "economization of human rights".

The postcolonial German scholar Maria do Mar Castro Varela (Gonzalez Romero, 2014) points out that the debate on welcome culture is foremost one in which economic perspectives prevail over other immigration related concerns—as is evident by the omission of any measures to address discrimination against former guest workers. Migration scholar Klaus Bade (2014) highlights that the term "welcome culture" entails foremost institutional techniques (p. 37) and argues that its emergence can be understood as a reaction to a long-overdue revision of the German national self-image as a country of immigration. As he shows, at the same time that local and federal governments began promoting "welcome culture", they were not adequately addressing increases in racist incidents and far right attitudes

Yet welcome culture was not only defined by local and federal government policies and officials. It was also taken up and given new meanings by those who were active in various volunteer efforts supporting and advocating for migrants and refugees. Indeed, as recent scholarship has shown (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016; Haubner, 2016; Kleist & Karakayali, 2015; van Dyk & Misbach, 2016); volunteer and support structures are central to the public meaning of "Willkommenskultur". Some migrant activists have criticized "welcome culture" for being paternalistic (Omwenyeke, 2016) while others have focused on non-remunerated work by volunteers as contributing to a further neo-liberalization of the welfare state (van Dyk & Misbach, 2016). Some activists have noted that through recourse to the idea of "welcome culture", much of the care-work is being transferred from state welfare institutions onto volunteers, and highlight its de-politicizing effects. Haubner (2016), likewise, is critical of this "new culture of help" which demonstrates a marked socio-political instrumentalization of voluntary commitment to engagement with refugees, in what Steinhilper and Fleischmann (2016) have described as the emergence of a particular humanitarian-charitable dispositif.

Hamann and Karakayali (2016), on the other hand, point to the possibility of an opening in relation to charitable work with refugees. They show that volunteers are willing to learn from refugees and open up to get in touch with "the other". They see here the potential for a much-needed long-term shift in the dominant integration paradigm, which is assimilationist in orientation and calls for migrants to adapt to German "values" (Mecheril, 2011). The work of Karakayali and Hamann underline volunteerism in support of refugees is linked not only to a commitment to refugees rights as such but also to the need to counteract right-wing populist movements at the local level.

As Kleist and Karakayali (2015) report, elderly, literate and affluent women of the bourgeois milieu make up the majority of those involved in refugee support efforts. Yet, they note, there is also growing involvement in these volunteer efforts by individuals and their children who were themselves forced to flee their countries as refugees. They argue that a "new sense of community" is emerging in response to, and as a result of the "long summer of migration" (Kasparek & Speer, 2015). Yet, as I will show, this "new sense of community" engendered by the discourse and practices of welcome culture is highly contested, and therefore comes with considerable work and conflict. While Karakayali and Kleist highlight the ways in which welcome culture is gendered, the question of how this intersects and is informed by racialization and class has yet to be addressed, highlighting the need for a decolonial approach that considers both the various positionalities in the social field of charitable volunteering and its historical formation.

3. Decolonial Perspectives on Charitable Spaces

Decolonial approaches take a critical stance in relation to Western theories and epistemologies, by focusing on the question of how such histories, politics, and epistemologies are imbricated in particular (hierarchical) relations between the "West" and the rest (Hall, 1992; Mignolo, 2000). As such, a decolonial approach is particularly fruitful in analyzing relations and interaction between predominantly German volunteers and the refugees they seek to assist, insofar as the practices and subjectivities of volunteering are informed by such epistemologies. Anibal Quijano (2007) describes this hierarchical cognitive perspective on the western "other" as the coloniality of power and knowledge (Quijano, 2007). Likewise, Walter Mignolo (2000) defines this as Occidentalism which, he argues, frames the West as a progressive, rational, and civilized space and thus legitimizes and enforces the hegemonic position of the West as a global power model. In the German context, for example, Gabriele Dietze (2010) following Mignolo (2000) refers to Occidentalism as a subjectivizing neo-racism historically intertwined with colonial desires and projections. This is closely interlinked with the hierarchical classification of populations, and systems of knowledge (Quijano, 2007), which, as cognitive perspectives, become embedded in subjectivities (Castro-Gomez, 2005). Yet, the notion of power here is a relational and multilayered one. As Grosfoguel (2011) specifies, a decolonial approach takes an heterarchical perspective on the entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous historical formations, which are themselves organized in distinct sexual, political, economic and epistemic forms of dominance. Here, coloniality refers to persistent, colonial sedimentations, which become effective in certain spatial and temporal settings and contribute to the construction of perceptions and relationships. This "persistence" underlies a non-linear temporality (García Canclini, 2008, p. 46). History is thus not understood as a chronological succession of past, present, and future; rather, it is described as a simultaneity of various time-spaces: "multitemporal heterogeneities" (Braun, 2016; García Canclini, 2008, p. 46f.; Massey, 2005). As Mignolo (2000) contends, colonial difference emerges in this multitemporal and multilayered web of power relations. Fol-

lowing Gloria Anzaldúa (2012), spaces of colonial difference open us up to situational forms of subjectivity and "border thinking"—that is a mode of thinking *from* dichotomous concepts rather than ordering the world *in* dichotomies (Mignolo, 2000, p. 85). A decolonial approach, then, takes as a starting point that actors embody multiple and distinct geopolitical positionalities, epistemic perspectives and subjectivities, and attends to the ways in which these pluralities are contested and negotiated in a given situation.

Returning to the case at hand, I argue for an analysis of current welcome culture and the associated charitable practices in Germany that considers the central role such differing positionalities, forms of knowledge and temporalities play in shaping spaces of assistance. While theoretical insights of decolonial thought emerged in a distinct geopolitical context, I contend that they are useful here as they allow us to critically address the ways in which voluntary assistance efforts in Germany reflect hierarchical relationships as well as to explore continuities with more global charitable and political efforts, including development and humanitarian aid, as well as (liberal) international feminist movements.

There are important parallels to critical analyses of international development that date back to the 1990s. For example, Escobar (2012) critiqued the persistence of a colonial gaze in the ways in which international aid has long been discursively constructed as helping the 'third world'—coded as pre-capitalist, underdeveloped and uncivilized—develop along a path towards the modern, and secular West (Escobar, 2012). Building on this analysis and bringing in insights from psychoanalytical approaches, Ilan Kapoor (2005) examines the question of why these "neo-imperial and inegalitarian relationships" are still so persistent (p. 1204). He identifies the ways in which the "desire to empower the other" reflects a glorification of the benevolent "self" in relation to a colonial "other" (p. 1207)—a stance he labels "narcissistic samaritanism". He goes on to argue that this reflects a "psychical transference onto Third World Communities of the perceived inadequacies of our own democratic political system" (p. 1208).

The treatment of female refugees as taken up by international feminist solidarity movements follows a similar pattern. As Ticktin (2012) and others[2] point out, refugee women are constructed solely as the "damned of the earth"; victims of authoritarianism and bearers of the trauma of flight who are in need of saving (Ticktin, 2012, p. 49). In this political and social imaginary, not only are the actors robbed of their own voice, but there is a parallel process of rendering invisible the structural connections between migration, racism, and nation that enable this imaginary in the first place, a process Ann Laura Stoler (2011) characterizes as "colonial aphasia". Racism is consequently seen as an "aftermath" of the empire rather than as a constitutive part of it (Ticktin, 2012, p. 50). As I will later show, these tendencies are alive in negotiations between volunteers, helpers, social-workers and refugees within German spaces of refugee "welcome".

4. Temporalities of Helping in Education

I have discussed how a decolonial approach highlights the desire to civilize and empower 'others' that is inherent in the idea of development aid. Furthermore, I have also shown why this is relevant to forms and practices of assistance at 'home'. However, in this section, I want to explore the specifically German valences that this desire takes. In the German context, refugee assistance efforts cannot be divorced from broader discourses surrounding 'Leitkulur'. In these discourses, conservative political parties clearly articulate their belief in the supremacy of (supposedly secular) "German" values: cultural norms such as reliability, education and female emancipation (among others) must be transmitted to newcomers. The National Plan for Integration (Nationaler Integrationsplan) regarding refugees (BAMF, 2017a), for example, highlights the perceived need of female Muslim refugees for education, not only in relation to language learning, but also as way to emancipate them from what is assumed to be patriarchal family structures which might, it is presumed, bar them from attending German courses. One of the main goals of integration courses, as outlined by BAMF, is the emancipation of immigrant women and their protection from gender-based violence in their homes (BAMF, 2017a, p. 2). To that end, the German government offers special training on gender to volunteers working with refugees (BAMF, 2017b).

This perspective on the need to support migrant women's emancipation is not solely the purview of the government. In my interviews, female volunteers linked their own charitable practices of assistance to an "educational and emancipating mandate" in relation to refugee women. In this way, the German women with whom I spoke often understood themselves not only as volunteers offering help but also as mentors for the "correct way" of living in Germany. Following a decolonial approach, we must then ask: to what extent does this understanding of charitable assistance reflect persistent patterns derived from a colonial desire to help?

Historically, in Germany care work and practices of charitable assistance have been an expression of a particularly Western, civil gender order and division of labor (Notz, 1989). Contemporary charitable practices point to historical and colonial sedimentations regarding relations of gender and class that are entangled with Protestant forms of subjectivization. Yet, these charitable practices are also inherently linked to an ideal of femininity, tied to Lutheran teachings on women's role within the institution of marriage and in the raising of children. As Wunder (1988) points out, the coding of charitably moti-

[2] See for example Lisa Malkki (1995) and Rajaram (2002). Both discuss how humanitarian politics often work to reduce refugees to silence, dehistoricizing and depoliticizing their experiences and the reasons for their flight.

vated social service as a specifically female and bourgeois arena had already emerged in the 16th century. Thus, the emergence of this specific form of bourgeois feminity can be traced back to Lutheran teachings on gender complementarity and what constitutes a "Christian way of life" (e.g., Spory, 2013). As a result, women were increasingly excluded from public life due, their place in society relegated to the "home"—*Küche-Kirche-Kinder*, kitchen, church, or children—where the work of parenting and caring were to be done (Wunder, 1988). In this context by virtue of their connection with care, charitable spaces came to be coded as an extension of the private sphere, and thus constituted a safe haven for bourgeois women from motherly and marital obligations (Wunder, 1988). They were thus one of the few spaces where women were allowed to act (Notz, 1989). By the beginning of the 20th century, such spaces became the location of bourgeois female revolt and hotbeds of women's emancipation movements (Notz, 1989).

The constitution of bourgeois femininity within Germany—which persists up to today—should therefore be read through this genealogy, which was reworked once again in relation to German colonial policy in the late 19th and early 20th century. Within the colonial discourse at the time, the to-be-colonized were framed as deficient beings, while Europeans were viewed as helpers and saviors (Habermas, 2016, p. 139). In this formation, the white respectable bourgeois woman became a benchmark for civilization and an index of development. As Walgenbach (2005) notes, the transfer of knowledge and culture was seen as central to the German colonial project and reflected notions of white supremacy. The colonial project envisioned educated women as a vehicle for such transfer as purveyors of culture and values (Walgenbach, 2005). As a result, the colonies offered educated women from the bourgeoisie "room for free development" in a way that was unavailable to them in Germany due to their status and gender (Walgenbach, 2005, p. 139). Yet, it is important to recognize that the motivations of the women involved were not homogeneous at all; charitable motives were intermixed with economic and population policy goals in the emigration to German missions (Walgenbach, 2005). The immigration of women to the colonies was understood not just as a means of civilizing, teaching, and caring for the colonized (Habermas, 2016; Mamozai, 1982; Walgenbach, 2005) but also as a necessary demographic strategy critical to the maintenance of German rule, given the increasing frequency of 'mixed marriages' among colonial civil servants (Habermas, 2016; Walgenbach, 2005).

While it is important to understand the deployment of women to the colonies as a way to foster the cohesion of colony and "home" economically as well as culturally, we must also consider the way in which this process worked on the cognitive perspectives of the women involved, and shaped notions of German femininity more broadly. This took place in the arena of colonial education, a space reserved primarily for bourgeois white women. If the primary aim of the civilizing mission was "cultural exploitation" and "colonization of the mind", it also produced a profound "internalization of white supremacy" for the purveyors of colonial education (Walgenbach, 2005, p. 127f., translation by the author).[3] In the context of German colonial education, conversion to Christianity formed only one part of the transfer of cultural values, the inculcation of Protestant values relating to self-discipline and work were seen as being more important. Colonial women stepped into this role—in a direct parallel to their role in the care and education of children, what Walgenbach (2005) terms the "politics of mental motherhood."[4] The educational policy, then, was rendered an instrument of the civilizing mission in order to help solidify a colonial-racist gender order in which the role of the bourgeois woman was a model of moral stability and the bearer of civilization (cf. Habermas, 2016).

Reading these historical sedimentations together, we can see that the "politics of mental motherhood" persist in the social interactions, lived practices, worldview and self-conception of bourgeois female volunteers in the context of contemporary welcome culture. A decolonial approach renders visible the way in which these historical and colonial sedimentations surface in contemporary welcome culture, which as I will show in the next section, are alive in contemporary female bourgeois desire to "help".

5. *Visiting Bullerbü:* Welcome Culture as Conflict Zone

In this section, I build on my decolonial reading of German bourgeois feminity by considering how it is manifested in contemporary welcome culture. I do so by unpacking the ways in which everyday charitable practices in sites of "welcome" became sites of conflict. In a close analysis of two distinct moments of contention, I trace the ways in which the "politics of mental motherhood" (Walgenbach, 2005) surfaced in feminine spaces of refugee assistance and explore continuities with colonial "desires to emancipate the other" (Kapoor, 2005), especially in relation to access to education. At the same time, both situations show the ways in which refugees and interpreters contest these desires, and how they have appropriated the spaces of care for their own purposes.

The first conflict situation took place in October 2015 in an emergency shelter for refugees. The second occurred nearly a year later in September 2016. Both took

[3] Original wording in German: "kulturelle Erschließung", "Kolonisierung der Köpfe" and "Internalisierung weißer Dominanz".

[4] "Politics of mental motherhood" refers to the exercise of social and political influence of bourgeois women on family and society through charitable work in the late 19th century, and took place in the field of social work in Germany as well as in the colonies (Walgenbach, 2005, p. 139). The aim of this politics was not only to augment the relevance of bourgeois women in society but also to foster a certain German identity, promoting the idea of a German nation and "German values". This politics acted as a scaffold for the hierarchical relation between proletarian women in Germany and women in the colonies (Walgenbach, 2005, p. 140).

place in a well-situated neighborhood on the margins of a city in the north of Germany, labeled in the local press "Bullerbü" after the quaint village of children's stories. Indeed, the residents often refer to the neighborhood as a village. The Protestant community hall is a central meeting point for neighborhood residents, the majority of whom are typical of the German bourgeoisie and petit bourgoisie—professionals, teachers, civil servants, architects and retirees.

My field site emerged spontaneously in the Autumn of 2015. At that time, up to 2,800 people seeking protection were arriving at the local Central Station daily, as they made their way towards Norway and Sweden. Following a nation-wide trend, volunteers had gathered at the main train station and its direct vicinity in order to provide new arrivals, exhausted by months of flight, with food, clean clothes as well as medical care. As mentioned previously, I joined this spontaneous volunteer effort at the main station distributing food to refugees and helping them to coordinate their route to the north of Europe. Besides a few tents at the main train station, no formal accommodation existed at the time. As a result, local mosques and increasingly private citizens and volunteer associations began to take on the mantle of providing basic assistance in an unprecedented way. In addition, an increasing number of first and second generation migrants played an active role in refugee support, in particular, because their skills as interpreters were in high demand. Facing their inability to cope with the large numbers of people arriving at the station every day, a group of women from *Bullerbü* village repurposed an empty building owned by the protestant church to house the refugees on a temporary basis. This emergency shelter provided accommodation for up to 60 people every day for eight weeks. In addition to the emergency shelter at the Protestant community hall, the neighborhood also hosted a follow-up accommodation center, a result of ad-hoc municipal efforts to house the more than 20,000 refugees who arrived in the city in 2015.

5.1. The Pretzel Issue

The first conflict I wish to discuss centers on a moment of distress and contestation relating to the rejection of a pretzel by a refugee woman. The incident took place shortly after the first bus filled with refugees arrived at the emergency shelter. I happened to be at the shelter to donate bed linens and towels and I became part of a group 30, mostly female neighborhood residents, who welcomed the exhausted families as they arrived. Volunteer interpreters, drawn from newly active first and second-generation migrants to Germany, were then tasked with accompanying families to the dormitories, located on the upper floor.[5]

During this process, one of the volunteers who was a retired teacher was handing out fresh pretzels to the women who were arriving. The conflict emerged when one of the refugee women declined to take the pretzel offered to her. Instead of smiling politely or nodding sheepishly as the volunteer had expected, she rejected the pretzel and instead asked, in a mixture of Farsi and English, for خبز (*khubz*), the flat bread that she prefers. The volunteer distributing the pretzels reacted strongly, frowning and dramatically returning the pretzel to her basket. The refugee, now looking visibly stressed, walked away, retreating to the dormitories upstairs. At this, the volunteer yelled incredulously in the direction of the kitchen, "I can't believe it, she doesn't want the pretzel!"

It is clear that, in this situation, the pretzel became more than a bit of food that had been declined. Instead, the act of refusal was read and understood by the volunteer as a rejection of the welcome gesture itself. Some of the other volunteers joined in the outrage, with one commenting "you shouldn't be picky in such a situation" and another chiming in "that is not decent behavior."

Noticing the noise in the kitchen, two of the interpreters decided to approach. So far, their role in welcoming the refugees had been to explain the location of various amenities within the building, and to solicit from them any particular needs So that the community volunteers could address them. Both interpreters were young women who had previously arrived as refugees in Germany, and so were familiar with the experience of flight. Up to this point, within the social landscape of the volunteers, the interpreters had been peripheral to the community center's kitchen, which acted as an informal hub for the neighborhood volunteer association's planning and organizing efforts. The kitchen space was coded as exclusively the terrain of a core group of neighborhood volunteers. Even I, as a researcher, was not permitted to enter.

So, when one of the interpreters took notice of the fuss in the kitchen, she was at first nervous to intervene. However, she then seized upon the 'pretzel question' and interjected into the discussion forcefully. Loudly, she asked, "So what is the problem with the pretzel?" Continuing on in the same tone, she argued with the neighborhood volunteers that they should not get so focused on the pretzel in the situation. Then in a more conciliatory tone, she added, that whatever happened with the pretzel didn't mean that the refugee women were ungrateful. She explained that most likely the refugees were tired, exhausted and traumatized and that their behavior should not be judged.

The situation surrounding the pretzel is thus illustrative: here a small but uncomfortable interaction led to more general irritation among the neighborhood volunteers. One way to read this interaction is to consider it a reflection what Kapoor (2005) labels "narcissistic samar-

[5] To protect the confidentiality of the volunteers, translators, and refugees involved, I refrain here from describing them in specific detail, except as it relates directly to the analysis. Of the people named here as volunteers, the majority were German nationals, though there were also nationals of USA, Spain, and Japan among them. The volunteers had lived in the neighborhood for 5–30 years. Those labeled here as interpreters had generally arrived in Germany as children, had relevant language competencies and had lived in the city for several years. Because of inherent sensitivity of the issue as well as the specific context of arrival, I did not feel it was appropriate to inquire as to the origins of the refugees.

itanism", where the rejection of the pretzel ruptures the volunteers' social imaginary of their actions as benevolent and deserving of gratitude, thus provoking a conflict. But it also led to something else. For a moment, the kitchen, which had up to this point been a terrain for the expression of German feminine bourgeois values was opened up for dissent as the interpreter offered another reading of the interactions. This opening subsequently led to a long discussion about the interactions with refugees and divergent understandings of "decency" between the interpreter and the middle class neighborhood volunteers. The conversation continued throughout the evening, and in the morning a decision was taken to amend the list of foods accepted for donation to exclude the traditionally "German" dark rye bread and pretzels to avoid further conflicts.

The second conflict situation arose one year later. By this time, the Protestant community hall was no longer being used as an emergency shelter and was now the primary meeting place of the local "Refugees Welcome Initiative". The mood had likewise shifted away from the euphoric energy of the first days and weeks of refugee arrivals. In the media, the mood had also changed. No longer did empathy- and pity-inducing pictures of fleeing children and women dominate the media. Instead, these gave way to photos of (groups of) male refugees lingering in public places which, in a not-so-subtle undertone, presented them as being (sexually) threatening. This shift followed the much publicized (and later debunked) "sex attack" incident that occurred at New Year's Eve celebrations in central Cologne. In the aftermath of the media storm, many in the media proclaimed "the end of welcome culture".[6]

Even before the construction of the follow-up accommodation center was finished, volunteers had organized supply and support structures for the refugees. Over 30 working groups were constituted as part of this effort, including setting up play groups, a bicycle repair workshop and multiple offers of German language courses. Most of the volunteers in these groups were German women between the ages of 40 to 80. As part of the research, I attended the meetings of several of these working groups observing the interactions between volunteers and taking notes about their internal debates and discussions. Most of these planning discussions took place in the absence of either the volunteer interpreters or of refugees themselves. Some of the common topics of conversation in these internal conversations were volunteer's own experiences abroad, as well as discussions relating to current political events, like the Cologne "sex attack". With these events in mind, a recurring point of concern to the volunteers was how they might address the issue of (assumed) patriarchal family structures and the specter of sexual violence.

Far from being an abstract issue, these concerns manifested themselves in the ways that volunteers organized their work, and how they framed their own roles in the ongoing support of refugees. One of the venues where volunteers' concern over confronting patriarchal norms played out was in relation to the German language courses which they offered at the accommodation center. Even in the planning stages, the topic of providing safe spaces for women and children became a focus of considerable discussion and concern. Of particular concern was a worry that refugee women would have to gain permission from their husbands to attend classes, who (the volunteers imagined) might not allow them to join in. When this prospect was raised at a planning meeting (even as a speculation), it elicited a strong response from many of the volunteers: an elderly volunteer proclaimed "we want to offer all women and children the possibility of education! Education is key to integration" while several other women in the room nodded in agreement.

Then later, when the first week of German language classes was offered at the community center, the volunteers were dissatisfied with the turnout. In the regular working group meeting, volunteers complained that residents did not attend consistently, and this was especially true of the women. In one of the classes I observed, volunteers spoke to some of the male students exhorting them to "allow" their wives to attend the language courses. They talked to the male refugees not only as German teachers, but as moral authorities, who taught them how women should be treated in Germany, and in doing so exercising their mental motherhood. Over the course of about a month, concerns relating to language class attendance prompted more complaints about refugee behavior to surface in informal day-to-day conversations among volunteers, both at the accommodation center and around the neighborhood. Some volunteers griped that the refugee students took advantage of the courses for other purposes, for example, by bringing their homework from the integration courses along and getting the volunteer tutors to complete them. These simmering tensions between the volunteers and the refugees later came to a head when it was discovered that some of the bicycles that had been given to the refugees at the bike shop were later sold to other refugees. The volunteers' compassion then turned to outrage.

As this moment of heightened tensions, once again the volunteer interpreters we called in to help facilitate a conversation between the old and new neighbors. However, at the initial meeting, which was supposed to be a preliminary discussion, the situation continued to escalate. The interpreter, drawing on her work with volunteer initiatives elsewhere in the city and with political federations sought to reframe the situation, offering a distinct perspective. Rather than focus on the actions of the

[6] Reports about sexual assaults during the night of New Year's Eve 2016 dominated the media in particular. There were media reports from a several of European cities of large numbers of sexual assaults by "Mediterranean-looking men". The assaults in Cologne were the most widely publicized among these, serving as a cipher for the "end of the welcome culture" to many (taz.de, 2016); for a critical view see Dietze (2016), as well as Neuhauser, Schwenken and Hess (2017).

refugees, the interpreter turned the discussion to the actions of the volunteers, pushing them to reflect on their own sense of purpose and self-conceptions as volunteers. Following Carolina Moulin (2012) we can interpret the interpreter's questioning of hierarchies as a form of subverting the framework and implicit "laws of gratitude" (Moulin, 2012, p. 61). The selling of the bicycle disturbs this law and shows that the receipt of the bicycle (or pretzel, or German course) is conditioned on the acceptance of the helpers' terms. Through retelling their own experiences of flight, the interpreter offered a new narrative and contested the existing "topology by questioning the place of authority" (Moulin, 2012, p. 64). The interpreter instead overcomes her position as "former refugee" and her "supplementary status", contesting the given order of the place.

Once again, we see how the sedimentation of Protestant and colonial notions of charitable femininity surface in spaces of contemporary "welcome culture". Reflecting this sense of "mental motherhood" (Walgenbach, 2005), the anger of the volunteers was tied to their frustrated desire to emancipate refugee women through German language courses and the failure of their mentorship efforts in transmitting the codes of proper German behavior (in relation to the homework and the bicycles). Yet, as with the pretzel issue, the increasing participation of first and second generation migrants in these charitable spaces meant that these subjectivities did not go unchallenged. Instead, interpreters and refugees themselves pushed the volunteers to reflect on their own positionality, rather than to blame others.

After the discussion that came to a head in relation to the German courses and the bicycles, not only did they open up the process of program planning and design to include the interpreters and the refugees, but volunteers also took the collective decision to undergo anti-racist training. Furthermore, as volunteers gained a more intimate understanding of the effects of family separation and deportation as time went on, they became more explicitly political. What had begun as an explicitly "nonpolitical" effort to support needy people shifted, as volunteers increasingly felt the need to take more public and political stances in relation to migration policies, including securing funds to pay for refugees' lawyers. As this suggests a large number of previously "nonpolitical" volunteers became politicized through their experiences in the accommodation centers. And as time wore on, interpreters and refugees assumed greater leadership roles in organized refugee support work, transforming previous hierarchies. One interpreter and two refugees earned places on the neighborhood council, for example, while two male refugees took over responsibility for running the bicycle repair shop.

These situations, I argue, changed not only the volunteers but also the social position of the refugees and interpreters. When these conflicts surfaced, it prompted reflection on behalf of the volunteers on the social scripts charitable assistance that informed their actions—a bringing to consciousness of what Kapoor (2005) has called the trope of the "benevolent self" and "colonial other". This is not to say that there are no longer any conflicts between refugees and volunteers; different notions of help, education and especially emancipation remain points of dispute. But it is precisely by means of such conflicts and the dissent they elicit that charitable spaces of hierarchical care are transformed into spaces where subjects with differing histories, geopolitical locations, and social positions interact with one another. These everyday interactions in the situation, in turn, destabilize the hierarchical relations embedded in the feminine and bourgeois desire "to help" and to "emancipate" leading to new ways of understanding both the self and the other. While it is clear that global and local processes of racialization, gendering and the remaking of class difference intertwine in the community center to produce experiences of colonial difference, interactions in these situations also open up this process to new configurations of embodied geopolitics (Mignolo, 2000). Thus, it is as a result of the contested socialities in such charitable spaces that participants are reworking both practices and subjectivities surrounding charity as they become aware of and negotiate the historical and colonial sedimentations that have and continue to inform charitable practices of assistance. The emergency shelter and the community hall become a social arena in which effective relations and previously non-existent connections are made. These connections give place to forms of convivialities that are shaped by what Yuval-Davis (2006) names *transversal politics*—a politics that recognizes power relations, but is neither based on universalistic principles, nor on the grounding of fixed identities and homogeneous groups.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to show how relationships and interactions in the charitable spaces of "welcome culture" are shaped by historically sedimented understandings of gender, racial and class difference. Through a decolonial and multitemporal approach it is possible to highlight the continuities between historical and colonial notions of feminine charity and contemporary volunteering efforts in support of refugees in Germany. I have examined the mutually constitutive role of charitable practices in the definition of the female bourgeois subject as well as in the constitution of charitable space as the product of a particularly Lutheran gendered division of labor. Thus, we can see how the colonizing "desire to emancipate" (Walgenbach, 2005) refugee women which played out in the interactions between refugees and volunteers in accommodations centers in Germany, actually harks back to a long history of colonial encounters between western bourgeois women and "colonial others" (Kapoor, 2005). Taking into consideration the role of bourgeois women in the German colonial project in this analysis, allows us to better see the power relations that inform voluntary charita-

ble work—described here as a "politics of mental motherhood." This is a politics which defines not only who is to be "helped" and the scope of such help, but also which decides who is to be included in German society. A decolonial approach also highlights the necessity to consider the usefulness of cases of "colonial difference" even when these are moments of dissent and conflict. As I have shown in my account of some conflicts arising within spaces of "welcome culture", colonial sedimentations persist in the ways in which assistance has been organized. But, I also show that such power relations are always consistent and are more contingent than might first appear. It was, then in the process of negotiating dissent between the middle-class women volunteers, refugee women, and the interpreters—new volunteer actors who historically hadn't played a major role (or weren't allowed to) in charitable spaces—that everyday openings were made which lead to the transformation of practices, subjectivities, and power relations. Such acts of transformation arise within common practices and in relation to specific situations. What my analysis suggests, then, is that combining a decolonial approach with situational analysis allows us to ask how the multitemporal sedimentations of race, gender, and class are actively contested, and how these spaces of conflict and encounter re-shape subjectivities.

Acknowledgments

I thank my research partners who provided insights into their everyday life, as well as my colleague and friend Dr. Leonie Newhouse, Simona Pagano, Fadi Saleh and the anonymous reviewers for the helpful advice. Publication of this article was funded by the Open Access Publication Funding of Göttingen State and University Library.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 49–57
DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i3.968

Article

The Noborder Movement: Interpersonal Struggle with Political Ideals

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Submitted: 31 March 2017 | Accepted: 14 August 2017 | Published: 19 September 2017

Abstract
Over the last decade, self-organized refugee protests in Europe have increased. One strand of activism in Europe, noborder, involves a transnational network of people who are heterogeneous with regards to legal status, race, or individual history of migration, but who share decolonial, anti-capitalist ideals that criticize the nation-state. Noborder activists embrace prefigurative strategies, which means enacting political ideals in their everyday life. This is why this article asks: How do noborder activists try to meet their political ideals in their everyday practices, and what effects do these intentions entail? Noborder practices take place at the intersection of self-organization as a reference to migrants' legal status or identity, on the one hand, and self-organization as anti-hierarchical forms of anarchist-autonomous organization, on the other. On the basis of empirical findings of a multi-sited ethnography in Germany and Greece, this article conceptualizes that noborder creates a unique space for activists to meet in which people try to work productively through conflicts they see as being produced by a global system of inequalities. This demanding endeavor involves social pressure to self-reflect and to transform interpersonal relationships. Broader society could learn from such experiences to build more inclusive, heterogeneous communities.

Keywords
activism; asylum; everyday politics; noborder; prefiguration; protest; refugee protest; self-organization; social movements

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation, and the Role of Civil Society", edited by Ove Sutter and Eva Youkhana (University of Bonn, Germany).

1. Introduction

Over the last decade, refugee protests in Europe increased to the surprise of both politicians and civil society. One specific strand of activism, noborder, involves a transnational network of people who are heterogeneous with regards to legal status, race, gender, or individual history of migration, but who share a post-colonial, anti-capitalist ideology that criticizes the nation-state.

Research studying refugee protest combines migration research with social movement studies, focusing on protest repertoire and political strategy (e.g., Ataç, Rygiel, & Stierl, 2016; Klotz, 2016; Tyler & Marciniak, 2013). The literature regarding internal, relational processes in the movement has been growing (e.g., Blumberg & Rechitsky, 2015; English, 2017; King, 2016; Millner, 2011; Rigby & Schlembach, 2013). I build up on these studies' insights on the beauty and difficulty of building solidarity networks between people who differ in their self-definition (i.e., as refugee, undocumented, citizen, privileged, person of color, activist, volunteer). Moreover, I contribute to the literature, in discussing noborder's heterogeneity as well as on the conflicts emerging from it and on activists' practices in attempting to resolve them.

Noborder embraces prefigurative strategies, which means that activists' everyday practices should match the radically egalitarian goals of the movement. This is no small feat, which is why this article asks:

> In what ways do noborder activists try to meet their political ideals in their everyday practices, and what effects do these intentions entail?

Data collection was conducted in Germany and Greece from 2013 to 2017 through a multi-sited ethnography. With reference to the border-regime analysis (Hess & Tsianos, 2010), this involved tracking and tracing the research subject through various sources of data—participatory observation, interviews, and online documents that activists produced. Data was coded and mapped by applying the tools of Situational Analysis (Clarke, 2005). This article adopts a reflexive approach, the methodological reason being the author's involvement within the field.

The article argues that noborder's activism provides relational spaces for productive interpersonal struggles. Based on my data and experiences, I believe that a systematic analysis of difficult learning processes taking place in activist contexts is something that European societies can learn from more broadly. Insights presented in this article are no insular achievement, but part of a collective effort by activists and scholars to understand contemporary political practice.

The article proceeds as follows: First, the methodology of Situational Analysis and my position as the author is presented. Then a description of noborder activism is provided, together with a discussion of its involvement with refugee protest and anarchism. Thereafter, activist's discussion on 'privilege' is elaborated on, together with the analytical logic of prefigurative politics. Finally, I critically describe practices and social pressures inside noborder spaces.

2. Methodology and Positionality of the Author

As will be described in detail below, noborder's ideology is radically egalitarian, promoting the freedom of movement for everybody. Activists try to meet this ideal through anti-hierarchical practices. To investigate this, it is necessary to look at their everyday practices of direct action, collaboration, and relationships.

Between 2013 and 2017 I conducted multi-site research in Germany and Greece—in the context of an MA thesis and a PhD project. At the time of writing, data consists of 35 research diary entries (2015–2017), 21 half-structured interviews with people of different positionalities at various German and Greek cities (2013–2017) and multiple participatory observations mainly in Hamburg, Athens, and Lesvos. In addition, I collected online representations and public statements of noborder projects.

To analyze such varied data, tools were used from postmodern Grounded Theory, the Situational Analysis (SA) developed by Adele Clarke (2005). SA infers theoretical concepts from empirical data using the logic of abduction. This involves a circular research process of coding textual and visual documents and mapping the most salient elements of a field situation. SA is based on the interpretative methodological premise (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2013) that there is no 'neutrality' of science and that each instance of knowledge production is particular and shaped by structural and individual factors. The method is developed to be sensitive to power issues in the field and calls for researchers' engaged reflexivity.

The research perspective is always conducted from my position, having been born a white, female, German citizen from a middle-class family. I have been involved in refugee support since 2009. Seeing and understanding the exclusionary and restrictive system of asylum in Germany came as a shock and I grew to identify myself as part of the anti-racist scene. My research is motivated by wanting to understand this activism, which followed some different rules than those I grew up with, and why engaging in it appears to me worthwhile.

Data collection was conducted in ways which protect research participant's privacy and health as much as possible. Where necessary, events and sites are anonymized. Interviewees deliberately decided how they wanted to be represented.[1] They were informed about the broad research interest of the study. As SA involves a circular research process, the pre-determined research question, which guided data collection, was later modified according to the emphasis made by interviewees.

3. Noborder Activism in Europe

It is nearly impossible to join a demonstration related to refugees without overhearing the chant "No border, no nation," often accompanied by a hearty "Stop deportation!" But noborder is more than a popular slogan. Over the last 20 years, a critical normative framework informed a network of activist groups engaging in anarchist-autonomous practices.

Literature has largely discussed noborder politics, denoting the struggle for freedom of movement (Anderson, Sharma, & Wright, 2012; Burridge, 2015; King, 2016; Loyd, Mitchelson, & Burridge, 2012; Walters, 2006). Noborder politics criticize the legitimacy of nation-states and their borders that restrict human mobility based on citizenship. Classically, citizenship in social sciences is discussed as ensuring legal rights and access to social benefits in the tradition of T. H. Marshall. However, from a decolonial perspective, the rights and privileges of citizenship are based on exclusion and exploitation of people in the global south. The social inequalities produced by this are inherited and highly racialized (Boatcă, 2015).

Noborder activists have a difficult relationship with nation-states because they embrace this decolonial analysis. From this perspective, Western migration and asylum policies restrict people's freedom and produce classifications of humans as il/legal or (un)documented. In contrast, activists point out that humans have always migrated. They consider migrants not as problematic for national cohesion, but as productive humans whose potentials are constrained by it (Anderson et al., 2012, p. 74). Activists see Western capitalist states as being responsible for the welfare of migrants, due to their exploitation

[1] Anonymized names are marked through * when first mentioned.

of resources in Africa or involvement in warfare which has often lead to forced migration (Walters, 2006).

Noborder activists, therefore, distrust nation-state institutions, parties, and the police. The will to do politics beyond the logic of the state, but the real need to at least partly engage with it, is a central dilemma of noborder as Natasha King (2016, p. 57f.) insightfully argues.

In their struggle for the freedom of movement, noborder politics employs direct action. The protest repertoire includes demonstrations, hunger strikes, blockages, occupation or civil disobedience, especially against detention camps or deportations. Noborder activists engage in campaigns against restrictive immigration and refugee policies and are involved in protest camping (see below).

3.1. Historical Development of the Noborder Movement

The noborder movement began in the late 1990s in Europe and expanded quickly, reaching as far as the Americas. The first group to articulate noborder politics, according to Anderson et al. (2012, p. 83), was the so-called, 'sans-papiers movement' in France. The 'sans-papiers' ('without papers') are undocumented migrants who have continuously and visibly sought to claim their recognition of rights since 1996, demanding policy changes in spite of the fact that they were not citizens (Cissé, 1996). They inspired the founding of the so-called 'noborder network' in 1999. This network connects groups involved with migrant rights in central Europe, such as NoOneIsIllegal (Kopp & Schneider, n.d.). Members mainly identified as 'anti-racist', a strand of left-wing activism connected to the anti-fascist or autonomous movement. However, many were white people without a history of forced migration. Noborder activities then connected groups with different compositions of racial identity and legal status.

Today, the noborder movement transversally extends throughout Europe and beyond, with loose and tight connections between local groups, as well as transregional organizations such as Afrique-Europe-Interact or Welcome2Europe.

In 2015, significant numbers of refugees in Europe led to increased mobilization, for and against, migration—meanwhile, the noborder movement grew. The international 'noborder kitchen' collective on Lesvos has been feeding hundreds of people per day, while the 'noborder school' in Athens has been teaching languages and consensus decision-making.

The noborder movement is heterogeneous. Noborder politics in Europe mostly focus on the topic of refugees, but the movement is not necessarily linked to people who are juridically or discursively framed as such. It includes people of different race, gender, religion, and countries of origin. People engage in the movement who may or may not identify themselves as being refugees, migrants, or activists, and who may come from very different political and socio-economic backgrounds. They speak and read different languages, with educational levels ranging from illiterate to degree-holders. Their diverse upbringings entail differing societal and political norms and values. Legal statuses range from European citizen, precarious status, to 'being undocumented'.

3.2. The Double Meaning of Self-Organization

A prevalent use of the term self-organization in the movement caught my attention. Considering the diversity in the field, I wondered who the 'self' was. To my knowledge, it has not been systematically discussed—either in former studies or in the field—that self-organization in noborder has at least two meanings.[2]

Firstly, self-organization describes horizontal forms of organization used by anarchist or autonomous movements. For example, Platanos, a non-state refugee camp on the island of Lesvos, calls itself "Self Organized Forefront Solidarity Structure for Refugees". This means that it is anti-hierarchically structured without close connection to governments.

Secondly, 'self-organized refugee protest' indicates that people who identify as refugees or (undocumented) migrants are organizing and planning protests on their own behalf, instead of being represented by citizen activists. The year 2012 marked the beginning of a new cycle of protest around refugee and migration topics, in which refugees themselves visibly protested (Ataç et al., 2016). The Voice, a self-organized refugee group founded in the 1990s, put the slogan "We are here because you destroy our countries" on the left-wing agenda (Jakob, 2016, pp. 20-27). Noborder groups have been featuring this slogan prominently ever since.

Both logics of self-organization intermingle in noborder. Autonomous-anarchist self-organization encourages individual empowerment and criticizes representative democracy. This, I suggest, is why citizens of this political socialization took refugees' demands to represent themselves seriously, increasing cooperation. This cooperation makes up the movement, and "creates something new in anarchism" (King, 2016, p. 187).

4. Privilege and Solidarity

Still, the division remains between those who engage in protest because of their own material conditions and those who relate to it through inclusive values. From a noborder perspective, this cannot be perceived as neutral, but rather as creating inequalities. Mixed organizations are repeatedly and controversially discussed in the field of pro-migrant movements. Some view them as necessary, as citizens are able to mobilize resources for migrants. Others regard truly equal cooperation as being impossible and therefore opt for separated agitation.

According to King, this is a key dilemma noborder activists face (2016, p. 60). In analytically understanding

[2] For a related discussion of 'autonomy' see King (2016, p. 96f).

the inequalities reproduced within the noborder movement itself, the discussion on *privilege* is important for activists (King, 2016, p. 190; Millner, 2011).

Privilege refers to those characteristics that confer advantage or disadvantage to people, rendering them viable empowered subjects or vulnerable[3] (Millner, 2011, p. 326). Its problematic nature stems from the fact that its possession is no individual achievement or failure but it is generally inherited and inscribed in a global, social order of power. In noborder, privilege mainly comes down to the intersectional triad of racism, sexism, and capitalism (English, 2017), with religion and sexuality being increasingly involved. For example, racism or islamophobia influence one's possibilities to engage in paid labor or move within countries just as legal status does. Such difficulties are multiplied for women.

Privileges define borders, meaning not only a state's territory but mental and embodied borders, too. When people of different privileges cooperate in political action, conflicts can emerge. They hinder friendship, romance, and egalitarian working relations, binding people in asymmetric relationships instead in which they are "simultaneously separated by and bound together…by the violence of the border imperialism" (Walia, 2013, p. 6).

In the noborder context, it means that only those privileged 'supporters' who see their interconnectedness of a struggle for freedom for all are welcome. In 2012, in reaction to conflicts at a noborder event in Cologne, diverse activists put together a brochure. Its title references a quote of American indigenous activist Lilla Watson: "If you've come here to help me, you're wasting your time. But if you've come because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together" (Watson, cited by transact, 2014, p. 25). By choosing that quote to explain their own conflicts, activists can be interpreted as seeing themselves as a part of a global fight against systemic inequality, or as a non-refugee in Greece put it:

> Solidarity means that we understand that we are victims of the same politics. We are victims of poverty, of underestimating the value of our labor….That is why we show solidarity for those people, because we belong to the same class. (Mohammed*)

From this perspective, core conflicts are not interpreted as merely individual, but as an effect of the system. As I understand it, noborder's logic is thus: when conflicts are not individual, the answers cannot be individual either. Developing practical answers is a collective effort of learning, in which privileged and non-privileged people have to engage together to overcome inequality and to be able to meet each other in an authentic way.

4.1. Recurring Key Conflicts

So, what are everyday issues within noborder which lead to conflict? Numerous case-studies (Blumberg & Rechitsky, 2015; Burridge, 2010; English, 2017; King, 2016; Rigby & Schlembach, 2013) and activist accounts of events and discussions (Cissé, 1996; Lang & Schneider, n.d.; transact, 2014) tell us about recurring issues within noborder, all of which were present during my field work. In the limited scope of this article, I focus on three issues which mainly emerge from different histories of migration but which are specific in the inequality that they demonstrate which is tackled by norms of self-organization[4]. They are:

- who speaks for whom;
- language barriers;
- risk-taking during protest action.

The issues overlap. Language barriers appear when people do not share mother tongues. Using only one (hegemonic) language can cause separation and can be perceived as disrespectful. Translation becomes a powerful tool. Engagement in protest action involves differing risks according to a person's position, for example, undocumented people within demonstrations are in danger of being registered by the police, which could lead to deportation.

It is common, that privileged activists dominate public discussions, appeals to the state, and internal decision-making processes. Self-organized refugee protests show that speaking up for themselves is pivotal for non-citizen activists, who have limited possibilities to formally participate in the political system which they are subject to. By refusing representation, they ensure that they can shape actions according to their needs and knowledge.

4.2. Approaching Conflicts the Anarchist Way: Prefigurative Politics

In the above text, I have argued that developing solutions for conflict between people of different statuses is a collective effort in noborder. However, solutions are put into place at the individual level. What may seem to be a paradox is understandable through the logic of prefigurative politics.

Noborder has developed in parallel to other contemporary social movements which follow horizontal principles of organization. Like alter-globalization, the Zapatistas or Occupy, noborder is marked by a flexible, network-based structure of self-organization, relatively autonomous from political parties, trade unions, and other state institutions (Juris & Khasnabish, 2013, pp. 378–381). Activists in such movements follow a dual

[3] Where to draw the line between 'privileged' and 'non-privileged' is context specific, as refugees with long-term residency can be privileged against undocumented migrants etc.

[4] In reality they are never fully separated from the other topics. For a discussion of the entanglement of race and gender in the creation of safer spaces, see English (2017).

political strategy of challenging state policies and simultaneously creating spaces to establish and experience new practices of sociality within the sphere of daily social life (Juris & Khasnabish, 2013, p. 378).

This political strategy is also known as prefiguration. The term was coined by Carl Boggs (1977) to denote those social movement practices, which aim at creating a desired sociality—e.g., a world without borders—not in the future, but in day-to-day practice.

The logic of prefigurative politics contrasts with the common understanding of politics as state processes. Many noborder actors don't even view what they do as being political or activism:

In 2015, the Kampnagel Theater in Hamburg hosted a performance art project in which five refugees of the Lampedusa activist group in Hamburg lived in a temporary house for five months. The house was an open space allowing them to get in contact with the neighborhood. Martha*, one of the house's inhabitants, a black women in her thirties told me that she did not perceive this as 'political', a word she associated with political parties for whom she seems to have developed mistrust throughout the group's struggle for a right to stay. Rather, she saw the potential for everyday interactions in the project. She enjoyed hosting meals for Germans as a means of getting to know them, their tastes and mannerisms. As Martha explained to me:

> [T]he child has to crawl before it walks. The solidarity program here in the [house] is just a starting point. So it had its ups and downs, but we believe next winter it will be better, or at least we were able to show that we believe in ourselves…what we can do. (Martha)

An analysis, which is led by the concept of prefiguration, sees it as a political act that they demonstrate their abilities. Prefiguration means that an inner, personal transition is necessary to achieve a change in the political system. It means continuously trying out new things in an attempt to improve these experiences. Or as activists from the refugee squat City Plaza in Athens said: They have no solutions, only answers. Meaning, they don't have perfect solutions for the world's problems, but they try to answer concrete problems directly and to be self-organized in the best way they can.

Overall, noborder practices must be viewed as efforts to find answers to contemporary human mobility which are different to those proposed by NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (such as UNHCR) and political parties.

Ethnographic research emphasizes the demarcation of noborder actors from 'humanitarian aid'. Such a demarcation is usually made while framing strategies and actions (e.g., King, 2016; Millner, 2011; Rigby & Schlembach, 2013). Noborder-activism is defined as 'solidarity' in contrast to humanitarian 'help' or 'charity', which for noborder implies a hierarchically stratified relationship between those who give and those who receive. Noborder activists view this as maintaining borders between people.

Mohammed, who got in touch with anarchism in his twenties in Greece having grown up in a conservative Middle East household, told me his opinion:

> I/we dream about a stateless society. Well, not only dreaming we are making it happen…each day, each action we do is about this, but we realize it is not something easy….I would not say philanthropy or charity or activism. It is part of a struggle for a classless, stateless society….That's how we see it. (Mohammed)

This quote shows how Mohammed, who can analytically be defined as an activist because of his transformative goal, does not define himself as such. But more importantly, he realizes that the prefigurative struggle is not easy. In fact, there is a salient concern in the movement: that the direct cooperation between people of differing privilege is marked by the same paternalist structures it tries to overcome. The following will discuss this concern and the effect of the social pressure it produces.

5. Spaces of Learning

It was outlined above that noborder tries to meet a radical egalitarian ideal through prefigurative politics. In collaborations beyond mental, embodied and state borders, the noborder movements tries to find answers to human mobility which they perceive as being alternatives to those of contemporary mainstream political actors such as NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and politicians. I further described some issues that cause conflict which are debated at the intersection of anarchist and refugee self-organization.

This article questions what the effects are of activists' attempts to meet egalitarian ideals in their everyday action, be they intentional or unintentional. I argue that one effect is that, in noborder, heterogeneous activists open up specific relational spaces in which many individuals and groups are willing to engage in conflict productively and develop different answers.

Effectively every interaction can trigger learning processes, but activists' actions have established concrete relevant sites in which experiences intensify. These being: collaborative protest action, self-organized conferences, and most importantly, noborder camps and squatted buildings or public squares.

Noborder camps are temporary camp sites of hundreds of people in which refugees, other migrants, and non-migrants meet to engage in education, networking and the planning of protest action. Every year since 1998, at least one camp, has been organized in Europe and beyond. From the beginning, the "dark side of camping" (Lang & Schneider, n.d.) revealed how inequalities between people of different privilege were maintained against the better wishes of activists, who were actively engaged in the struggle against inequality.

Experiences of temporary camping are translated into squatting.[5] A prominent example being the City Plaza hotel in Athens, squatted in 2016. At the time of writing, four hundred refugees lived in a "self-organized" manner together with non-refugee activists. This is no casual project, but a result of network-building over decades. For example, on an actor level, the foundation of the Trans-European Welcome2Europe network which sustains City Plaza can be traced back to the 'noborder camp' in Lesvos in 2009.

5.1. Practices Inside the Spaces

In the following, I briefly illustrate practical answers to the issues of conflict described above.

Imagine a squatted square or building in a European city. Citizen activists gather and people who irregularly migrated to Europe live there. Journalists want an interview, approaching the European, white activists. But they often refuse, to ensure that a more varied selection of people—or even just migrants alone—speak to the media.

Decisions have to be made on how to clean up, get food, where to demonstrate, what public statements to make. They are made in regular plenaries where people sit in circles and discuss. Privileged people can be asked to talk less or even leave the room if they dominate discussions.

Perhaps, a rally is planned to protest the detention of undocumented migrants. Asking who wants to be on the street is part of carving out strategies. Information on the risks according to a person's position are gathered and then everyone is supposed to decide for themselves.

Translation chains are in place. People sit in groups, focused around those who speak two or more necessary languages, whispering translations of what a speaker says. Instead of having paid translators, this is a horizontal, reciprocal practice in which the same person can quickly switch from translating to listening. Longer chains, e.g., are from Greek to English to Farsi to Arabic (and back). The length of a chain is mostly constrained by time because it is important to pause a discussion for the translator to finish. Controlling one's speed of speaking, and making sure others do so during heated discussions, becomes a symbol of respect to those who do not speak a dominant language.

Written communication is circulated in as many relevant languages as possible, but translations are mostly available for longer statements as opposed to fast discussions. Often mailing lists are used, a common tool of communication by activists, because they are of low-cost and are regarded to be horizontal. However, the medium has undesired exclusionary effects, as it strongly favors those who are verbal and literate. Furthermore, people in precarious living situations do not often own laptops which enable easier access to long emails or attachments. As smartphones become more widespread, groups in instant-messengers increase in relevance. Still, a combination of online and offline communication, which includes diverse people and nonverbal interaction, is necessary to engage people in mobilization and to build trust.

Finally, activists cooperate with other refugee groups, preferring those which are inclusive and self-organized. In 2015 and 2016, Syrian refugees had privileged entry to central Europe. This caused conflict between Syrians and migrants from other countries. Noborder activists promote freedom of movement for all migrants and reject working with selective groups.

5.2. Social Pressure and Emotion Management

Such practices do not produce perfect solutions; rather, their enactment is based on trial and error. Activists I spoke with, demonstrated a devotion to social change combined with high expectations of interpersonal behavior. But often things don't work out. For example, activists of the self-organized refugee camp PIKPA on Lesvos struggled with a Syrian group who had co-opted a cemetery exclusively for people of their belief, leaving the noborder activists at loss about how to react. In such situations when expectations are not met, emotional reactions including disappointment, frustration, and anger likely develop. They might even cause further conflicts.

Emotion management is expected when the causes of conflict are seen in the distribution of privilege. The activist strategy to be able to identify conflicts caused by borders and to be able to transform them is self-reflection of privilege (e.g., Millner, 2011, p. 326). For example, for white people, it is more difficult to see everyday racism, and men with any citizenship should consciously learn to consider the psychological effects of patriarchy.

I want to illustrate this with an example from my own experience, where external social pressure was internalized. In 2013 and 2014 I attended workshops in which positionality was discussed. Still, in 2017 I found myself in a paternalistic situation when a former flat-mate who had been granted asylum in Germany, needed to find a new room. I found the young man's expectations of apartment size unrealistic and suggested alternative options. When he did not pursue these, I silently considered him ungrateful of my efforts, but I did not verbally blame him.

The activist way of seeing this conflict as external to the individual worked as a psychological strategy to let go of negative emotions. I learned that it is not sufficient to reflect on positionality verbally. Rather, dealing with its (emotional) effects is an ongoing process. Eventually, I understood how he strategically dealt with the constraints of the state's asylum system. I understood that I was frustrated because I felt useless, and I wanted him to take my advice in order to feel helpful. While he actively developed a network of support, he needed to make his own decisions and was quite capable of doing so.

[5] For further insights into the contemporary entanglement of migration and squatting see Mudu and Chattopadhyay (2017).

Therefore, efforts to implement egalitarian ideals in everyday personal interaction often manifest in carefully controlled behavior. Accepting social pressure and adapting a self-reflective stance concerning one's own position of power—or discrimination—is necessary to be part of a noborder group and space.

5.3. Seen from Outside

I have often perceived noborder spaces as a sort of parallel world in which the rules and values are different to that of mainstream society. Strikingly, a French activist told me in 2016 that to him the anarchist migrant support in Athens felt like a recovery center for disappointed activists from other countries.

Prefiguratively, activists can try to set examples for people outside their own circles. Longtime Greek citizen activist Efi Latsoudis, described the self-organized refugee camp PIKPA on Lesvos as an example of better refugee housing and wondered if its existence might have actually fostered the huge international refugee support that emerged on the island after 2015.

However, activists' well-intentioned efforts of inner transition often manifest in a certain wariness of outsiders and newbies who have not yet been proven to have integrity, often mixed with an omnipresent (and rightful) fear of being infiltrated by state institutions. I assume this is why noborder activists repeatedly were described to me from 'the outside' as closed off and wearisome. Hannes*, a blond, tall German who, in 2015, volunteered at a refugee support group at an urban train station, expressed annoyance at having been suspected of being an undercover policeman. He said he preferred less political contexts, as he feels there are fewer prohibitions. Also, the theater director of the refugee housing project mentioned above expressed surprise that the project was well received amongst the activists, because "from their perspective, you always can do something wrong" (Amelie).

Returning to the concept of prefiguration, this means that a shared learning process which may take place inside the movement is not apparent from outside.

This is relevant given the increase in refugee support after 2015 in Europe, which not only resulted in a proliferation of noborder but also in a wave of civic support in Central Europe in which the term 'welcome culture' was coined, picking up the logo of "Refugees Welcome" (see Figure 1), which had been produced in anti-racist contexts (Wallrodt, 2015).

Figure 1. Refugees-welcome logo. Source: Linkes Grafikarchiv (n.d.).

However, the positive connotation of "Refugees Welcome" is critically discussed by refugee activists, who argue that 'welcoming' focused on citizens' efforts, and covered up immigrant self-organization (Omwenyeke, 2016). This could mean that experiences of a noborder struggle were not translated to the civic support actors.

6. Conclusions

This article attempted to answer the following questions: In what ways do noborder activists try to meet their political ideals in their everyday practices, and what effects do these intentions entail? It described the noborder movement's normative and practical foundations and the heterogeneous composition of its members.

The noborder movement emerges at the intersection of self-organized refugee and migrant protest and anti-hierarchical practices of organization in anarcho-autonomous groups. In contrast to what the slogan suggests, noborder is not only 'against' something (the border), but in favor of building a world in which solidarity reaches beyond culture, religion, and citizenship. Activists try to meet their political ideals prefiguratively in horizontally organized practices of interaction that aim to provide authentic human encounters.

I suggest that noborder creates a unique space of activist engagement in which people attempt to work productively through conflicts they regard to be a product of a global system of inequalities. Spaces can open up in every daily interaction and do so at a larger scale at noborder camps, squats, and collaborative protest events.

Creating productive spaces is easier said than done, as idealistic goals are difficult to achieve in a world structured by inequality. The noborder movement includes a multiplicity of actor identities and legal statuses. Conflicts emerge along the lines of inequality, discussed in activist circles as the unequal distribution of privilege. It is embedded in the trial-and-error logic of prefiguration, where efforts can fail and reproduce top-down relations, causing frustration and anger. In such situations, social pressure compels activists toward emotional self-control and reflection with regards to their individual position of privilege. This is a never ending and complicated process but necessary to stay inside the noborder movement's circles. I interpret that this is one reason why noborder activism is often, at least from the 'outside', perceived as being closed-off and highly demanding.

There are two reasons for continuing research on noborder. First, since 2015, these spaces have been quantitatively multiplying and therefore affect an increasing number of people. Second, broader society could learn from the experiences within these spaces to build more inclusive, heterogeneous communities.

As a shared learning process inside noborder depends on interpersonal relationships and is complicated

to communicate to more civic or state actors, future research could further investigate the lines of exclusion and how to enhance relationships between these groups.

Acknowledgements

The author deeply thanks everyone who donates their time to the struggle for freedom and equality, and especially those who spent valuable time sharing their experiences with her. She also thanks the editors of this thematic issue, the Colloquium "politics from below" in Berlin and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Fieldwork in Greece in 2016 was funded by an "Impulse Grant" of the University of Bremen's Central Research Development Fund, which the author gratefully acknowledges.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 58–68
DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i3.1004

Article

Under Control? Or Border (as) Conflict: Reflections on the European Border Regime

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Submitted: 30 April 2017 | Accepted: 10 August 2017 | Published: 19 September 2017

Abstract
The migrations of 2015 have led to a temporary destabilization of the European border and migration regime. In this contribution, we trace the process of destabilization to its various origins, which we locate around the year 2011, and offer a preliminary assessment of the attempts at re-stabilization. We employ the notion of "border (as) conflict" to emphasize that crisis and exception lies at the very core of the European border and migration regime and its four main dimensions of externalization, techno-scientific borders, an internal mobility regime for asylum seekers, and humanitarization.

Keywords
asylum; border conflict; borders; externalization; humanitarianism; migration; smart borders

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation, and the Role of Civil Society", edited by Ove Sutter and Eva Youkhana (University of Bonn, Germany).

1. Disputed Borders

In one of the most bizarre turns of the ongoing Brexit negotiations, the British Overseas Territory Gibraltar and its future status has become a bone of contention. The Spanish government is using the Brexit process to renew its claim to the 6.7-square kilometer territory, and indeed the dispute heated up quickly, with alleged violations of territorial waters by the Spanish Navy (MacAskill & Jones, 2017), analogies to the Falklands War (Asthana, 2017), and (deliberate) chaos at the border crossings (Agence France-Presse, 2017). Similarly, the issue of Northern Ireland and the possible re-imposition of a "hard border"[1] towards the Republic of Ireland in the wake of the Brexit is troubling the EU. These territorial disputes remind us that despite the purported stability of the nation-state system, the issue of bordering, of ordering territory, is still fraught with fragility and contention.

These Westphalian border disputes, which William Walters (2002) described in his seminal work "the denaturalization of the border" as typical aspects of the "geographical border," are characterized by a high degree of symmetry, usually with two nation-state entities facing off over disputed territory. In this article, however, we want to focus on a different challenge to borders, namely that posed by the movements of migration. This challenge is inherently different in character. For one, the asymmetry and number of actors could not be starker. For the other, the center of the challenge is not possession or control over bounded territory, but rather access

[1] The term "hard border" has been used by various newspaper and media outlets to refer to the probable future configuration of the Irish–UK border, e.g. O'Hagan (2017) in The Guardian, or Anonymous (2017) in The Telegraph. The Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus (n.d.) defines a hard border as "a border between countries that is strongly controlled and protected by officials, police, or soldiers, rather than one where people are allowed to pass through easily with few controls." Whether there is a co-semantic with the term "hard Brexit" can only be speculated, but the choice of the term certainly points to the normality of invisible borders in the EU context, even if both the Republic of Ireland and the UK are not part of the Schengen Area.

to territory—it is the "biopolitical border" that is at stake here (Walters, 2002). The issue at core is not the bordering of territory, but the ordering of populations, and their different hierarchical positioning. To this end, the border disputes of contemporary migration are already an indicator of a post-Westphalian global order.[2]

However, both phenomena share the fragility, the instability, the constant need of re-production of the border through patches, "quick fixes" (Sciortino, 2004) and border work on a daily basis. This has become blatantly obvious through the "long Summer of Migration" of 2015 (Kasparek & Speer, 2015), and the temporary collapse of the European border regime and its fragile re-stabilization since. The classical description of the events of the 2015 and 2016 as a "refugee crisis" is misleading in several respects. For one, it was at its very core a crisis of the border regime, while for the other, its assumed temporality—the crisis as a strictly limited period of time with a beginning and an end leading to a phase of stabilization—is not empirically tenable.[3]

In contrast, we argue that the border, and especially the European border regime, is structurally ridden by moments of crisis as its order is constantly contested by the movements of migration, and that this contested and inherently unstable relationship between the border and migration has to be put into the center of any analysis of contemporary border theory. In order to underline this perspective, we will approach both the period before the summer 2015 as well as its aftermath from the notion of border conflict, i.e., through a perspective on the past and present struggles and contestations in the context of migration control at the borders of Europe. To this end, we want to analyze in this article: a) which processes and dynamics led to the so-called 'refugee crisis' of 2015; and b) the multidimensional, hybrid, and at times contradictory re-stabilization attempts that demonstrate that the crisis of the border regime is not solved by drawing on our recent research project in the Aegean region and along the Balkan route.[4] Even though the scope of this article prevents us from presenting our ethnographic material in more detail, we nevertheless find the ethnographic approach, meaning observing dynamics *in situ* and *in actu*, indispensable for arriving at the conclusions we present later.

2. From Border Work to Border Conflict

It is a common denominator of border studies to emphasize the transformation of the border from a demarcation line surrounding national territory to a ubiquitous, techno-social, de-territorialized apparatus or regime producing geographically stretched border spaces described as "border zones," "borderlands," or "borderscapes." At the same time, these concepts include the idea of mobile, fluid, selective, and differentiated border situations. In this context, Balibar argues in favor of describing borders as "overdetermined, polysemic (that is to say that borders never exist in the same way for individuals belonging to different social groups) and heterogeneous" (cited in Salter, 2011, p. 67). There is thus also talk of "mobile borders" (Kuster & Tsianos, 2013, p. 3) or "networked borders" (Rumford, 2006, p. 153; Walters, 2004).

This shift not only induced a geographical refocusing away from the level of the (nation) state, but also a methodological reorientation with a focus on bordering processes and practices, on *doing border*, "rather than [on] the border per se" (Newman, 2006, p. 144; van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002, p. 126). The border is now being conceptualized as an effect of a multiplicity of agents and practices, as becomes clear in the concept of "border work" (Rumford, 2008). The concept of border work in particular draws attention to the everyday micropractices of a wide range of actors. Following this perspective, "to border" is to be understood as a performative act. Drawing on Judith Butler's notion of performativity, Marc Salter points to the fact that also "sovereignty, like gender, has no essence, and must continually be articulated and rearticulated in terms of 'stylized repetition of acts' of sovereignty" (Salter, 2011, p. 66).

All these recent practice-oriented conceptualizations indeed understand the border as an effect of a multitude of actors and practices—human and non-human alike. However, many of these constructivist approaches still ignore the constitutive power of migration, or once again conceptualize migrants as structurally powerless and as 'victims.' The dominant focus of border studies, especially those following the classical securitization approach looking at the function of the border as a barrier or filter—to exclude people—also seem mostly to lead to an epistemological exclusion of the agency of migrants.

By contrast, in their recently published volume *Border as Method*, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013) define borders as "social institutions, which are marked by tensions between practices of border reinforcement and border crossing" (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 3). Here, they employ the notion of border struggles indicating the decisive role migration plays in co-constituting the border.

This has many aspects in common with our approach we labeled "ethnographic border regime analysis" as a methodology to theorize the border from the perspective of the autonomy of migration (Transit Migration

[2] Walters points to the fact that the different border typologies cannot be seen as historical clear-cut periods, but rather overlap to some extent and in different degrees. For the colonial context, the border-drawing projects by the imperial powers were replete with the biopolitical rationality of ordering populations, whereas one could say that it was the age of decolonization and the formation of post-colonial nation states that brought about the "geographical border."

[3] For an extended discussion of the various crises and notions of crisis especially in relation to Europe and recent events, please refer to New Keywords Collective (2016).

[4] In the context of a research project entitled "Transit Migration II: De- and restabilisations of the European border regime" (http://transitmigration-2.org), funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, we carried out fieldwork in different countries of the Balkans, Greece, and Turkey from April to September 2016.

Forschungsgruppe, 2007). This approach allows to look at the border regime[5] as a space of conflict and contestation between the various actors trying to govern the border and the movements of migration—without minimizing the border regime's brutality. These conceptualizations represent a methodological and theoretical attempt not only to think about the relationship between migration movements and control regimes in a different way than in the classical sociological way of object-structure, but also to conceive of migration differently than has previously been the dominant practice in the cultural and social sciences—namely, not thinking about it in the sense of a "deviation" from the paradigm of the sedentary way of life in the modern nation state, or as a functionalist variable of economic processes and rationalities. Instead, this theoretical and methodological approach represents an attempt to conceptualize migration both historically and also structurally as an act of "flight" and as "imperceptible" forms of resistance, in the sense of withdrawal and escape from miserable, exploitative conditions of existence (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, & Tsianos, 2008). Yann Moulier-Boutang (2006) described this aspect as the "autonomy of migration." This draws attention to migration as a co-constitutive factor of the border, with the forces of the movements of migration challenging and reshaping the border every single day.

This perspective of putting migration central to the analytical endeavor points to the intrinsic structural fragility of the border regime. Crisis in this respect is not reducible to a temporary anomaly or emergency situation, but instead must be seen as a central structural condition for borders.

3. The EU as a New Border Laboratory, or Crisis as Permanent Condition

The European Union can be regarded as a paradigmatic laboratory of the border transformations described above. With the Schengen agreement of 1985, the European project had heralded the creation of a continental border regime, with the newly created notion of an "external border" as the pivotal mechanism and space for migration control. The process resulted in the creation of an "area of freedom, security and justice" through the Treaty of Amsterdam and the parallel construction of the European border regime as a fluid, multi-scalar assemblage involving European Union agencies such as Frontex (the European border and coast guard agency), bodies of European law (like the Common European Asylum System. CEAS), processes of standardizations and harmonizations especially in the field of border management (called "Integrated Border Management"), a growing military-industrial-academic complex largely funded by the EU (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013), alongside more traditional national apparatuses of migration control that had evolved since the 1970s and a flexible involvement of IGOs (international and intergovernmental organizations, such as the UNHCR or the IOM).

If there is one central rationale at the core of the European border regime, it is driven by what Lahav and Guiraudon (2000) have called the fundamental "control dilemma". Culminating in the creation of the EU internal market, this dilemma refers to the question how to reconcile a neoliberal economic paradigm of a—preferably global—free circulation of goods, services, and capital with a continued biopolitical will to control the movements of people.

In regards to the border regime, the main practical answer to the control dilemma was, according to Lahav and Guiraudon (2000), to move border controls "away from the border and outside the states," leading to the described new spacialisation and geographical expansion of the border. In addition, there existed a techno-scientific vision of a 'smart,' invisible yet selective border that itself is able to distinguish between *bona fide* travelers and unwanted migrants (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). To this end, broadly speaking four paradigms were enacted within the European border regime. First, to the outside, a paradigm of "remote control" and externalization (Bialasiewicz, 2012; Hess & Tsianos, 2007; Lavenex, 2004; Zolberg, 2006). Second, as already indicated, a paradigm of a fortified, yet smart external border through technology, digitalization and biometrization (Broeders, 2007; Dijstelbloem & Meijer, 2011; Kuster & Tsianos, 2013).

While these two dimensions have been extensively studied by border studies, there is also a third one, namely an internal regime steeped in the institution of asylum and put into practice through the Dublin/Eurodac regulations, aiming at the immobilization of migrant populations within the European territory (Borri & Fontanari, 2016; Kasparek, 2016a; Picozza, 2017; Schuster, 2011). Finally, fourth, especially in recent years, we can observe an increasing humanitarization of the border (Cuttitta 2014; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Walters 2011). This has accelerated in the context of the growing number of shipwrecks and subsequent deaths in the Mediterranean in recent years. However, the humanitarian discourse dates further back, to a white paper by former British Prime Minister Anthony Blair from the year 2002, entitled "Secure Border, Safe Haven" (Home Office, 2002) that strongly appealed to a humanitarian discourse and ethics.[6] However, only in 2013 and in light of two major disasters resulting in nearly 500 deaths off the coast of Lampedusa did hu-

[5] We employ the concept of "regime" in a Foucauldian sense to indicate the multiple levels and dimensions at play constituting the "border" as a dynamic and somehow contingent apparatus based on laws and regulations, institutions, techniqual devices, moral beliefs and representations, discourses, actors, and practices (Kasparek & Hess, 2014; Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe, 2007).

[6] Also in the context of the first Transit Migration research project in the early 2000s, we could infer processes that we called "NGOisation" and a "governmentalization of politics," pointing to the fact that the expansion of the border regime not only functioned by means of "security"-actors, but particularly operated via specific appeal to and articulation of humanitarian positions, such as in the field of anti-trafficking policies and in the context of asylum (Hess & Karakayali, 2007).

manitarianism become an apparatus (i.e., a Foucauldian *dispositif*) in its own right.

This fourfold architecture of the European border regime broke down in summer and autumn 2015, temporarily collapsing when confronted by a new characteristic—that of increased arrivals of migrants. In the end, this challenged not only the European Union's border and migration regime, but the EU and the European project as a whole.

4. An Announced Crisis

The advent of a quantitatively and qualitatively new level of migration to Europe in the summer of 2015 caught the European governments by surprise.[7] Despite indications dating back to 2011 that warned of such a rise in numbers, European and nation-state institutions did not respond in time, e.g. regarding an adequate emergency response along the Balkan route or reception facilities. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring in early 2011, the parameters of a pan-European regulation of its borders have shifted quite drastically. External events accelerated by the ongoing Syrian civil war and mass refugee-migration movements in the direct neighborhood of Europe, as well as internal EU and European developments (especially in the legal systems of the EU), have led to severe fragility of the border regime and have undermined several of the above outlined paradigms.[8] In the following, we briefly outline three main external and internal processes leading up to the developments in 2015.

4.1. The Arab Spring and the Breakdown of Externalization

The ongoing crisis of the European border regime cannot be understood without analyzing it in a double relationship with the social and democratic uprisings that started in North Africa 2011. While the uprisings had already strongly destabilized the Euro-Mediterranean border regime as established in the years before 2011, their more long-term consequence was destabilization of the European Union itself.

Prior to the Arab Spring, the European border regime stretching towards Africa was built heavily on the externalization paradigm. Through diverse processes such as the Barcelona Process, initiated as far back as 1995, or the Rabat process of 2006 and the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue, dating back to 2007, many North and West African countries were to some degree involved in the European Union's migration and border management project. Its different components were usually driven by EU Member States, with the backing and support of Brussels.

The Spanish government was more or less in charge of dealing with the western Mediterranean transit routes and rather successfully included transit countries like Morocco and even further south, Senegal and Mauretania, in its migration control policies (Domínguez-Mujica, Díaz-Hernández, & Parreno-Castellano, 2014).[9] In the central Mediterranean, the central driver, Italy, faced stronger obstacles than Spain. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, Italy had sought an agreement with Libya, in which the latter would stop the departure of migrants towards the former, and would readmit migrants from there. Under the 2008 Italian–Libyan friendship treaty, a secret protocol created the conditions for the externalization of migration control. Soon after it entered into effect in May 2009, Italy commenced pushback operations towards Libya outside of Italian territorial waters (Bialasiewicz, 2012; Heimeshoff, Hess, Kron, Schwenken, & Trzeciak, 2014).

Immediately after the successful initial uprising in Tunisia, the Tunisian interim government canceled its cooperation with Italy, and no longer continued preventing migrants' vessels from departing from its coast. In the following months, around 30,000 Tunisians arrived in Italy (Cuttitta, 2016). This new quality of migration as well as the ensuing conflicts within the Schengen system were already indicative of the instability to come, even though both aspects were rather short-lived at that time. Subsequently, the Schengen border law was amended in 2013, granting a provision that in times of the arrival of large migrations, internal border controls could be reinstated for a certain period.

With the outbreak of the Libyan civil war in February 2011 and the subsequent NATO intervention, Italian–Libyan cooperation also ended. By the end of 2011, the externalized border regime in the Mediterranean had significant gaps. The number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean by boat started to rise sharply, and has continued to do so ever since, despite ongoing efforts and attempts by the EU and Member States to reestablish cooperation with the different northern African regimes, such as the military-led government of Egypt, or Libya (Heller & Pezzani, 2016).

A legal development dating back to 2009 created further obstacles to the return to the previous status quo.

[7] This can for example be evidenced by the annual risk analysis (ARA) of the European border agency Frontex. The agency is tasked with forecasting irregular migration at Europe's borders through a specialized risk analysis model. However, the ARA for 2015, published in April 2015, does not predict a considerable rise in detections of irregular entries compared 2014, with 280.000 irregular entries detected, and continues to assume that the Central Mediterranean route between Libya Italy will remain the main entry route to the EU (Frontex, 2015).

[8] In addition to these external and internal political dynamics, there is also a societal dynamic to be addressed that led—in most western European countries—to a normalization of the acceptance of the fact that they were countries of immigration, while post-migrational cultural and societal dynamics became more mainstream. This holds especially true for Germany. After years of ardent denial of being a country of immigration, Germany over the past few years officially turned to a new paradigm of a proclaimed "culture of welcoming" (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016).

[9] As early as the late 1990s, the Spanish government succeeded in integrating Morocco into its migration management project, even if events such as in Ceuta and Melilla in October 2005, when hundreds of migrants managed to scale the fences and enter Spanish territory, constituted bumps in the road. With the active support and financing of the newly created European border agency Frontex, Spain also managed to inhibit migratory movements towards the Canary Islands.

After the commencement of the Italian pushback practice towards Libya, a group of migrants subjected to the operations sued the Italian state which became famous as *Hirsi et al. vs. Italy* (ECHR, 2012) at the European Court of Human Rights. Since Libya could not be considered a "Safe Third Country" for refugees, the Court ruled that the Italian pushback operations constituted a violation of the Geneva Convention's *non-refoulement* principle. This specific case had deep implications for the practices of the European migration and border regime. While not an unsurpassable obstacle to externalization, the ECHR's verdict created a legal limit to such measures.

4.2. The Crisis of Dublin

With externalization and 'remote control' increasingly failing in the eastern and central Mediterranean, the EU's internal system for mobility control of asylum seekers and refugees came under increased pressure. As a complement to externalization, the creation of the Common European Asylum System, after the Treaty of Amsterdam, established an internal mobility regime (Kasparek, 2016a) for third-country nationals without residency permits or visas, with the Dublin and the Eurodac regulations as central components. The Dublin system deals with the question which European state has the obligation to process an asylum application. It is explicitly not a quota system, but instead assigns this responsibility according to different criteria, the country of first entry being the most prominent. In practice, this meant that the Member States situated on the EU's external border were obliged to process the majority of applications. The implementation of these rules was predicated on the Eurodac database, in which the fingerprints of all apprehended migrants were stored.

Member States situated on the external border such as Greece, Italy, Malta, and Cyprus had begun arguing around 2008 that this mechanism was to their disadvantage and lobbied for intra-European reallocation of asylum seekers.[10] These attempts were largely unsuccessful. The revision of Dublin in 2013 (Dublin III) and the proposed Dublin IV regulation do not depart from the "country of first entry" rule. The political conflict around Dublin thus moved to the area of implementation. The EU Member States most affected all started to move towards a lax fingerprint registration practice, thus beginning to undermine the effectiveness of the Dublin system.

Dublin also constituted a large problem for refugees and migrants. Many migrants start their journey knowing where they want to go, due to transnational networks of information and social relations that make certain places in Europe more desirable as end destinations. In this way, many migrants ignore the Dublin rule and start so-called "secondary movements" towards other destinations (Borri & Fontanari, 2016). This not only started to clog the Dublin bureaucracy, but had a spillover effect into the national and European judiciaries; migrants, threatened with intra-European deportation, petitioned for protection, citing the deteriorating asylum standards in the Southern EU Member States as an argument for their case.

An earlier judgement by the European Court of Human Rights in 2011, *MSS vs. Belgium and Greece* (ECHR, 2011), had marked the preliminary apogee of the breakdown of the Dublin system. Citing the virtual non-existence of an asylum system, and the resulting appalling living conditions for asylum seekers in Greece, the court found both Greece and Belgium (which had sought to deport the plaintiff) to be guilty of human rights violations. This judgement not only effectively excluded Greece from the Dublin system, but also destroyed the fiction of a homogeneous asylum system in the European Union. In 2012, the European Court of Justice followed suit and reinforced this consequence. More and more EU Member States came under scrutiny (Kasparek & Speer, 2013), while the reform of the CEAS in 2013 did nothing to rectify this situation.

4.3. Lampedusa and the Humanitarization of the Border

While the discussions on the Dublin crisis and the legal interpretations of the applicability of international law extra-territorially were largely confined to experts, the volatility of the European migration and border regime was brought into sharp focus with back-to-back tragedies that occurred in October 2013 in Lampedusa. Within the space of a few days, two shipwrecks resulted in the deaths of nearly 500 people. While these were not the first, nor the last, they captured the attention of the European public in an unprecedented manner. The legitimacy of restrictive border controls was severely called into question not only by a liberal public but by prominent members of the European Commission, such as Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, and the President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso (Kasparek, 2015; Ticktin, 2015).

However, while on the EU level there was a decisive discursive shift towards a humanitarian rationale that prioritized the saving of lives at sea, in the immediate aftermath no decisive policy shift was discernible.[11] The Ital-

[10] See, for example, the paper "Combating illegal immigration in the Mediterranean" by the Cyprus, Greek, Italian and Maltese Delegations circulated at the informal meeting of the JHA Ministers held in Prague on 15 January 2009. In the paper, the so-called "Quadro Group" (Group of Four) reaffirmed the general direction of the European migration and border policies, only then to stress that "[a]s a matter of principle Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta prefer a more formalized approach to intra-EU reallocation in the longer term which may also include asylum seekers, although at present the utmost priority is to start implementing intra-EU reallocation under existing arrangements as early as possible" (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 7).

[11] Only five days after the first shipwreck, the European Council initiated a "Task Force Mediterranean" that, under the leadership of Cecilia Malmström, worked on a reform program, e.g. envisioning humanitarian visas and other humanitarian, legal channels to facilitate entry into the EU. However, as a team of journalists could show, this reform paper never reached the public due to strong criticisms, especially by the German Minister of Interior (Gebauer et al., 2015).

ian government's decision to initiate the Mare Nostrum operation proved to be more decisive, as, for the first time, a national government reframed its border policies, putting the saving of lives before the securing of borders (Cuttitta, 2014). However, the increased arrival of migrants placed more stress on the Dublin system and registration practices in Italy slowed down severely. European Union pressure to replace Mare Nostrum with a mission to police the borders led to its substitution with Frontex's Operation Triton, which again reprioritized secure borders over the lives of humans. This turn, however, was itself short-lived as another tragedy struck in April 2015. Costing nearly 800 people their lives at sea, the disaster put the humanitarian rationale squarely back on the table and underlined once more that the EU border regime needed to take a decisive step if it wanted to stay on top of developments. This was felt by the Commission, which released a portion of its upcoming "European Agenda on Migration" beforehand as the so-called "Ten-Point Plan" (European Commission, 2015b) stressing the necessity to reinforce Frontex operations in the Mediterranean, urging a deployment of a navy mission (EUNAVFOR Med) against smugglers and already hinting at improved cooperation of EU agencies.

5. Re-stabilization? Dimensions of a Post-2015 Border Regime

In the last section, we argued that by 2015, the European border regime was straining under different types of pressures, i.e., new movements of migration, external and internal developments, and political and legal processes. The collapse of 2015 was inevitable. In this section, we will show that from the perspective of the notion of border (as) conflict, this dynamic did not come to an end. In fact, Giuseppe Sciortino's description of the main characteristic of the border regime as being structurally "a result of continuous repair work through practices" (Sciortino, 2004) was never as to-the-point as in the year 2015 and onwards.

In May 2015, the Commission presented its central policy document, the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) (European Commission, 2015a), which attempted to address the obvious shortcomings of the previous years and relaunch a dynamic of Europeanization of migration and border policies that had been lost. However, even this move turned out to be at least one step behind developments, since the arrivals on the Aegean islands, and the number of people organizing their transit from Greece, through the Balkans, and towards Central and Western Europe, were already rising sharply, culminating in the temporary collapse of the European border regime in September 2015. The movements and following reactions by the diverse actors overwhelmed the European Agenda and its policy rationales almost overnight. For the answer to the structural crisis of the European border regime, the Commission had given in the EAM was more Europe, more centralized competencies, and more harmonization.

This is most evident in a strategic proposal labeled the "hotspot approach" (European Commission, 2015a, p. 6). In this approach, the Commission posited the deployment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex, Eurojust, and Europol to the hotspots of migration, namely parts of the border perceived as especially under migratory pressure, in order to "swiftly identify, register and fingerprinting incoming migrants" (European Commission, 2015a, p. 6). After registration and identification, migrants were to be separated into appropriate channels. Redistribution (relocation) within the EU for some, access to the national asylum system for others, special care for those found to be vulnerable, and deportation for the rest (and possibly most).

Even though the hotspot approach first of all pledged support to the EU Member States most affected by migration, it was clearly designed to address the crisis of the Dublin regulation, by means of close supervision of the procedures by EU agencies. This intervention of European agencies at the borders of Europe heralded a new mode of Europeanization, as it aims at transferring central competences towards Brussels, but the EAM confines this transfer to scenarios of crisis and exception and does not necessarily aim at normalizing this transfer (Kasparek, 2016b). On the other hand, genealogically, the hotspot approach also draws on the idea of the externalized "Transit Processing Centres" proposed in 2003 by the UK's Prime Minister, Anthony Blair (Blair, 2003). While the latter were supposed to be situated outside the EU's territory, the problem-ridden externalization process as described above prompted a geographical shift inwards, towards the very border of the EU (Antonakaki, Kasparek, & Maniatis, 2016; Kuster & Tsianos, 2016).

Since March 2016, we have been confronted across the board with multidimensional re-bordering efforts by the EU and its agencies, as well as by different European states; this has resulted in highly regionalized, ambivalent, and hybrid securitarian-humanitarian regimes. These occasionally frenzied efforts were often aided by a notion of a 'state of emergency,' especially along the Balkan route (Fassin, 2012; Kasparek, 2016b). The accompanying notions of exception have determined the re-stabilization of the EU border regime up to today. This makes it possible to systematically undermine the standards of international and European law without serious challenges. Indeed, in various instances, we have observed carefully designed policy elements, which we call "anti-litigation devices," in the wake of the drastic consequences the rulings of the ECHR had had for the European border regime. The design of the Hungarian "transit zones" as the only border crossing points for fleeing migrants is a striking case. They are an elementary part of the border fence towards Serbia, and allow for the fiction that the border has not been closed for those seeking international protection, but rather that their admission numbers are merely limited due to administrative reasons: each of the two transit zones arbitrarily opens its

gate for approximately 15 asylum seekers to enter Hungary every day on a highly arbitrary basis (Beznec, Speer, & Stojić Mitrović, 2016). The resumption of Dublin deportations to Greece in March 2017 follows a similar logic, where specially assigned EASO officers in Greece are to guarantee that the human rights of the Dublin returnees will not be violated in a manner which could lead to new condemnations by the ECHR.

The main event structuring the current status was the entering into force of what is called the EU–Turkey deal in March 2016, pushed primarily by the Commission and the German government and drawing on the paradigm of externalization. In short, Turkey agreed to stop irregular border crossings towards the Greek Aegean islands, and to allow for the readmission of all migrants that had arrived on these islands after the signing of the deal due to Turkey being labeled both a "safe third country" as well as a prospective "country of first asylum" for Syrians. In return, the EU offered substantial financial assistance to improve the situation for Syrian refugees in Turkey, as well as the resettlement to the EU of one Syrian refugee for every Syrian deported to Turkey from Greece, the so-called 1:1 procedure (Heck & Hess, 2016).

The actual implementation of the deal, however, has not been that straightforward. Returns to Turkey, and resettlement to the EU, have so far been slow.[12] The only element that seems to be working is a sharp decline in border crossings, which may in part also be attributed to the deterring effect of being stuck on a Greek island. The deal, in conjunction with the hotspot system set up on the islands, has led to massive respatialisation following the "excision" of the islands from the European and Greek asylum system. Also here akin to the Pacific solution (Devetak, 2004), the islands are used as spatially suitable sites for a creative exclusion of migrants from rights, similar to what Alison Mountz (2011) has described as an "enforcement archipelago." In combination with the deal, the hotspot system has been turned into a machine for the denial of asylum. As we learned from interviews with officials from both EASO and the Hellenic Asylum Service in Chios during our fieldwork, both agencies understand that it is their task to prove, in each individual case, that the person that has arrived on the island and has made an asylum application is a) inadmissible in the Greek asylum system and b) can be readmitted to Turkey. Here again, we detect an anti-litigation device: Since most asylum applications are deemed inadmissible after an individual assessment of the case, the ban on collective expulsions from the Geneva Convention is circumvented.

But this systematic disenfranchisement and undermining of the right of asylum finds its continuation in Turkey due to several dynamics and contradictory legal provisions that not only burden Turkey with the task of being the watchdog for the European Union and turn it more and more into a country of highly precarious immigration; as our field research has also shown that the effects of the deal led to a virtual collapse of the more-or-less UNHCR-based asylum system at Turkey itself. Although Turkey is labeled as a "first country of asylum" by the EU-Turkey deal, it still applies a geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention, which means it only accepts European citizens as "convention refugees." All non-Europeans have to apply to the UNHCR in order to receive refugee status and becoming eligible for resettlement, which in many cases lasts up to six or even more years (Soykan, 2012). According to one lawyer we met, more than 250,000 recognized refugees are currently waiting in Turkey to be resettled. However, Syrian refugees are excluded from these status altogether. They have no right to seek asylum; instead they have been granted a "temporary protection status" by the Turkish government that puts them in an extremely precarious legal and social condition (Baban, Ilcan, & Rygiel, 2016). However, in 2013, UNHCR also suspended asylum applications from Afghans, citing a backlog of cases. According to our conversation partners, due to the tremendous increase of asylum seekers, the UNHCR might consider suspending the applications of all nationalities and restrict the resettlement to vulnerable cases.

Domestically, the deal gave the AKP government the power to use the Syrian presence as a biopolitical card to play in the context of its internal conflicts, which are heavily coded in ethnic and religious ways (Heck, Hess, & Genç, submitted). This shows clearly that the externalization policy has had a boomerang effect and has produced uncontrollable dependencies for the European Union.

6. Conclusion

The dynamics of the European border regime which we have paradigmatically described in this paper remain conflicted. It is not yet possible to argue conclusively which direction the development of the European border regime, and thus the European project as a whole, will take. Nevertheless, we will formulate tentative conclusions.

The first is concerned with what we have called the gravitational center of the European border regime. If the EAM was designed to firmly place the Commission in this center, that particular attempt has been thwarted by the subsequent developments of the Summer of Migration. While the efforts of the Commission to maintain their various initiatives, such as the relocation mechanism and the hotspot approach, can only be described as diligent, the initiative yet again lies with the Council these days, which has not been able to find a consensus on the central problems of 2015—the crisis of Dublin and a "fair distribution" scheme.

The second concerns fragmentation. This obviously applies to a geographical and geopolitical context. Both outside as well as inside the EU, the influence of the EU has decreased, and new regional centers of powers with

[12] As of June 9, 2017, 20,869 people have been relocated within the EU, and 22,504 have been relocated from Turkey to the EU (European Commission, 2017).

divergent interests are emerging, be it the countries of the Visegrad Group or post-coup Turkey. Also on the level of rights, the analysis of fragmentation applies as well. It is not only the Brexit process that has underlined that the vision of European citizenship, i.e., a homogeneous landscape of post-national rights throughout the EU, has failed. This is especially true for those that have from the start been excluded from EU citizenship. Most dramatic, this fragmentation of rights applies to the fringes of Europe, precisely to the Aegean islands, where a population has been systematically rendered "deportable" (De Genova & Peutz, 2010), even if the actual mass deportations have not yet happened. While the bodies could not be kept external to the EU, their exteriority is re-produced in the hotspot centers, where deportation to Turkey under the terms of the deal serves as a deterrence.

In this, the fence constructions and severely deterring laws criminalizing border crossing via the northern Balkan EU states like Hungary and Croatia seem to have effectively blocked the Balkan route and—similarly to the deal's effects on the Greek Islands—are transforming Serbia into a buffer zone and waiting room without any proper asylum or migration system in place. Moreover, the EU–Turkey deal has entered into its second year and seems to be a more durable and institutionalized policy than many commentators thought in the beginning. However, the number of crossings in the Central Mediterranean continue to stay at a high level, showing that the struggles of migration are not coming to an end. Instead, the most recent attempts by Italian prosecutors to criminalize the civil society rescue missions clearly show that the conflicts on the very meaning of border crossing and the permeability of the border still continue. Bordering territory and ordering populations has always been imbued with violence and resistance, while the space of the border knows no single monopoly of power.

Acknowledgments

We thank our colleagues from the "Transit Migration II" research group for their valuable thoughts as well as the "Network for critical migration and border regime research" for providing us with a yearlong context to follow and theoretically discuss the dynamics of the European border regime.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 69–76
DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i3.950

Article

Transnational Solidarity—Not Aid: The Perspective of Migration on the Hype about Migration&Development

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Submitted: 27 March 2017 | Accepted: 29 July 2017 | Published: 19 September 2017

Abstract
Migrants have organized transnational support for non-migrants, stay-at-homes, citizens and noncitizens, as well as for developmental or integrationist nation state projects for decades. These solidarities have been framed as "cultural programs," "autochthone support of hometowns," "development aid" or "diaspora politics." Since the turn of the century especially those projects that could be framed as "development aid" have gained a lot of interest from official development aid and its agencies. More and more programs have been launched to coordinate and professionalize the transnational support labor of migrants under the aegis of development. This is what I call the hype about migration&development.[1] In this article, I want to show why the notion of "migrant development aid" used in the hype falls short of what is at stake when it comes to transnational migrant solidarities. Thereby, I want to argue that looking at migration through its governance and through migration or development politics is short-sighted and insensitive towards the desires, ethics and politics of migration. This is the reason that a perspective of migration—such as that propagated by the autonomy of migration approach—needs to be brought into debates on migration&development.

Keywords
autonomy of migration; development; migration; migration&development; regime; solidarity

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation, and the Role of Civil Society," edited by Ove Sutter and Eva Youkhana (University of Bonn, Germany).

1. "But If I Somehow Go One Step Further…": Transnational Projects from a Perspective of Migration

When Aurelien Fedjo[2] started studying engineering in Munich in 1999, he still wanted to take care of "problems at home," in Yaoundé (A. Fedjo, personal communication, September 20, 2009). Aurelien wanted to stand up for the "rights of the disadvantaged" and to "strengthen civil society in Cameroon". This is why he founded an organization with the motto "action—justice—development".[3] It is not only his nongovernmental organization that he is supporting though: He also launched the website of the West Cameroonian 3000-soul village Toula-Ndizong on August 18, 2011. It gives information on the village's political system, its traditional "chief" and its developmental plans, and, thus, wants to promote its development projects—especially to the Cameroonian Diaspora. Aurelien Fedjo wants to advocate a "Brain Gain for Cameroon" with his different initiatives, as he argues himself. It is not only development, but also justice and action that he is aiming for and that are, therefore, prominent in the motto of his nongovernmental organization. His mul-

[1] When referring to the current debates about the nexus between migration and development, I do not use any blank space between the two words "migration" and "development" to indicate the assemblage and coalescence of the two regimes. Current debates on the nexus imply that development can be used to stop migration and migration can be used to further development. Therefore, a triple win effect is implied and it is argued that migration policies and development policies could and should have common goals and, thus, have to merge (cf. Angenendt, 2012, p. 5).
[2] All names used here are pseudonyms.
[3] One of its more recent projects was the mobilization of the handicapped in Cameroon to go to the polls during the 2011 elections.

tifaceted objectives and activities are in stark contrast to the framing of migrants' transnational projects as solely "developmental" that has been prominent in the international realm for the last decade (cf. Kunz, 2011). Consequently, I will argue in the following that looking at migration through its governance and migration or development politics is short-sighted and insensitive towards the desires, ethics and politics of migration. Therefore, a perspective of migration—such as that propagated by the autonomy of migration approach (AoM) —needs to be brought into debates on migration&development.

Kofi Busia, just like Aurelien, has been active in and for his hometown in Ghana for decades now. He has erected a schooling and occupational training center there and is spending several weeks a year in the village to talk to the different actors and to visit "his school" (K. Busia, personal communication, September 10, 2009). Long ago, the project turned into his "life-task" that he "cannot withdraw from anymore"—although, from time to time, the sixtysomething would certainly love to do exactly that, because he is spending "more time on this organization than on my private life". He is constantly on the road, giving lectures and readings to raise money for his organization, for the *Ghana Community* and the *Ashanti Union* in Germany. He is repeatedly putting his own money into the project whenever there are too few donations. Kofi exhausts himself beyond self-abandonment just to keep the school, his school, running. The kind of responsibility he takes is accompanied by a strong personalization of "his project," with the effect that he considers the school to be "his school". In conflicts and negotiations with other members of the organization he repeatedly has voiced sentences such as "The organization is me!", "The school is me" or "These are my children!". Kofi feels a "perpetual responsibility. I feel responsible for this building as long as I live," he explains. As for Aurelien, calling Kofi's activities for his hometown "developmental" would be reducing his multifaceted aims, wishes and desires to one dimension—and a governmental one at that. This is the reason I want to explore the ways in which migrants frame their transnational actions (in their hometowns) here.

I met Kofi Busia and Aurelien Fedjo when researching what I call "the hype about migration&development." That is the recent and enormous interest in the nexus between emigration (particularly from so-called developing countries) and development, or put more specifically, in the developmentality, the development potential, of migrants or diasporas. In my research project on the hype, I was especially interested in the effects and changes the hype brought about for migrants and migrant organizations that had already sometimes been transnationally active for decades: What did it mean to them to "have been discovered," as one of my interview partners framed it (Muriel, 2010, p. 4)? To answer this question, I conducted more than thirty interviews with members of (transnational) migrant organizations (in three countries: Germany, Cameroon and Ghana), development agencies and municipal administrations between 2009 and 2011.[4] I followed a networking project to bring migrants into municipal development aid in Munich. I attended meetings of various migrant organizations and did three internships, each of three months, in Yaoundé/Cameroon, Kumasi/Ghana and Munich/Germany with migrant organizations and Munich's international office. Kofi Busia and Aurelien Fedjo are the heads of the organizations I followed to Ghana and Cameroon.

In this article, my aim is to contrast their perspective on what they are doing transnationally, diasporically and in their hometowns to discourses of migration&development. Furthermore, I will explore their perspective on the hype and on "being discovered" by development actors. To do so, I will follow the AoM and the Migration and Border Regime Analysis (MBRA) that operationalizes the notion of AoM. I will argue that what is at stake here from a perspective of migration is transnational solidarity and not aid. In a first step, I present both AoM and MBRA as the methodological perspective chosen here to engage with the existing research and literature on migration&development, that I summarize in the second part of this article. Finally, I contrast these two perspectives by looking at migration&development debates in the context of a project in Munich (Germany) and by introducing the notion of solidarity.

2. Bringing the Perspective of Migration into Research: The Autonomy of Migration Approach and the Ethnographic Migration and Border Regime Analysis

An increasing number of critical migration researchers (cf. Bojadžijev, 2011; Bojadžijev & Karakayali, 2007; King, 2016; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, & Tsianos, 2008) have argued for "a 'different sensibility', a different gaze" on migration (and border regimes) during the last decade (Mezzadra, 2011, p. 121). A gaze "that prioritize[s] the subjective practices, the desires, the expectations, and the behaviours of migrants themselves" (Mezzadra, 2011, p. 121), yet, at the same time, does not regard migration as an individualistic, but a political and social project. Within this thread of research, migration is understood "as a creative force" within social, cultural and economic structures (Papadopoulos et al, 2008, p. 202), as a force changing borders and border regimes (cf. Hess & Tsianos, 2009) and as the *primum movens* of history. Building on *operaismo* and Yann Moulier Boutang's (1998; 2006) notion of autonomy, to the AoM,

> [m]igration is not the evacuation of a place and the occupation of a different one, it is the making and remaking of one's own life on the scenery of the world. World-making. You cannot measure migration in changes of position or location….Even if migration

[4] I interviewed 18 members of migrant organizations in Munich and 5 representatives of municipal and national development actors in Germany. I also conducted 9 interviews with members of the two migrant organizations I followed in Ghana and Cameroon.

> starts sometimes as a form of dislocation…, its target is not relocation but the active transformation of social space. (Tsianos, 2007, p. 169f)

Migration seen from this perspective is, therefore, an intensity, a transformative power or rather a voting with one's feet. The AoM aims to take the desires and struggles for rights, security and solidarity that are expressed in migration seriously and to put them center stage (Bojadžijev, 2011, p. 142). Instead of staring at border infrastructures and governance attempts, the AoM, thus, looks, for example, at the "sharing of knowledge and infrastructures of connectivity, affective cooperation, mutual support and care among people on the move" at "social spaces below the radar of existing political structures" (Papadopolous & Tsianos, 2013, p. 1).

In this perspective, (b)orders are regarded as places of negotiation, as places where struggles and fights about rights, in- and exclusion take place. Here, not only the forces of border control, but also of migration manifest. This is also the reason why Sabine Hess and Vassilis Tsianos, in an attempt to operationalize the AoM and to bring it into research designs and interpretation, have picked up Giuseppe Sciortino's regime concept and called their methodology "Ethnographic Migration and Border Regime Analysis" (2009). According to Sciortino, negotiations, "turf wars," "quick fixes" and "continuous repair work through practices" (Sciortino, 2004, p. 33) are the basis of structures and stratifications. With his notion of "regimes," he is propagating a decentral concept of power that does not focus on instances of governing, such as the production of borders through border guards, but on negotiations and practices around the border. Voting with the feet and its management and attempts to control physical and social movements are in constant interplay: "A central element in producing migration [and migration regimes] are [thus] the actions of (potential) migrants themselves, developing strategies to realize and perpetuate spatial movements" (Pott & Tsianos, 2014).

Translating these perspectives into methodology, Hess and Tsianos (2009) suggest using ethnographic approaches, i.e., to be in the field, get involved, experience oneself, do interviews and participant observation, do informal talks and collaborations. This preference for ethnography arises from its open-endedness, its processuality and its closeness to daily life and agency.

3. The Shifting Tides of Discussions on Migration&Development: And What Is Missing from It

Although several authors and institutions have diagnosed a new "enthusiasm" (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2008), "mantra" (Hilber, 2008) or "trend" (Kunz, 2011) about migration&development and this trend has been critically explored and commented on by various researchers (cf. Delgado Wise & Márquez Covarrubias, 2007; Faist, 2010; Glick Schiller, 2010; Kunz, 2011; Raghuram, 2007), the AoM approach and the perspective of migration has not yet been brought into the debate. One reason for this is that most of the critique on the "hype" addresses its discourses and the subjectivities it creates. The structural (i.e., neoliberal) context in which it occurs is also problematized. Thomas Faist (2010) and Nina Glick Schiller (2010), for example, have both highlighted that the hype has emerged at a time in history at which the relationship between state, community and market is being heavily transformed and, increasingly, responsibility is being transferred to the citizen him- or herself. For migrants, this comes down to the appeal to take responsibility for their countries of origin and to act as a kind of insurance for their relatives and compatriots in times of diminishing social security structures—as voiced in the hype (cf. Glick Schiller, 2010). Raúl Delgado Wise and Humberto Márquez Covarrubias have, therefore, argued that the notion that migration has to contribute to development also "contributes to presenting a 'human face' to negate the climate of social un-sustainability" (Delgado Wise & Márquez Covarrubias, 2007, p. 102). Making migration productive for development is deepening inequality by transferring responsibility for the effects of global disparities to those who have already tried to change something by migrating. One of the most pronounced and nuanced dissections and critiques of the current hype has been voiced by Parvati Raghuram (2007). She has not only highlighted the discursive power of international organizations, but also the comeback of modernist paradigms of development in the current debates on migration&development. Furthernore, she has carved out the colonial assumptions of the hype: While migrant destination countries are seen as "spaces of acquisition" of wealth and knowledge, countries of origin are seen as "spaces deserving redistribution" (2007, p. 11). In addition, Rahel Kunz (2011) has shown that the hype invisibilizes not only non-migrants, but also women, who are mostly regarded as unproductive receivers of remittances. She also highlights forms of resistance to these governmentalities and, thus, is one of the rare authors who have explored the situational, life world effects the hype has (cf. Kunz, 2011). A critique that comes closest to the argument followed in this article is that by Thomas Faist (2010), who finds that questions of social justice and transnationality are totally ignored by the current literature on migration&development. Although it puts the migrant and migrant organizations center stage, the hype invisibilizes the perspective of migration I would argue and follow.

One last thread of literature on the hype must be mentioned here, because it historicizes the current debates and interest: While a lot of international, national and local organizations from migration and the development sector have been interested in migrants' potential for development projects since the beginning of the 21st century, this interest is not at all new. Instead, activities of migrants in their hometowns have been called developmental by colonizers since the 1930s (cf. Geschiere,

2009, p. 15; Mercer, Page, & Evans, 2008). Since that time, the nexus between migration and development has been discussed with changing premises. The sociologist Thomas Faist (2010) has argued that the discourse is moving in waves: While migration was thought to have positive effects on development in the 1960s, in the 1970s, the brain drain perspective and, thus, a negative perspective was dominant, which was then balanced out by an emphasis on brain circulation in the 1990s. Faist has stressed that these changings paradigms are strongly connected to the economic situation in the global North (a lack in labor force would lead to brain gain perspectives, an economic crisis to brain drain perspectives). The sociologist Hein de Haas (2007) has highlighted that they are also strongly connected to the changing development theories favored since the 1950s: The strong critique of development aid that was formulated in the 1980s, for example, led to a strong emphasis on self-aid, capacity building and micro-credits. The call on migrants to develop fits this new, neoliberal paradigm in development politics very well.

Although the nexus between migration and development has been discussed since the 1930s, what is to be emphasized here is that until the beginning of the new millennium, this nexus had never been put center stage in development or migration politics. This changed with the "discovery" by the World Bank in 2003 that migrants transfer three times more money to development countries via remittances than Official Development Aid (cf. von Hagen, 2004; World Bank, 2009). The "discovery" has entailed a plethora of projects by international and national development and migration organizations trying to make migrants agents of development, to train them developmentally or to inform them about ethical standards or project management.[5]

In addition to the historic context of neoliberal transformations and changing paradigms of development, the hype can only be understood if it is situated within a recent shift in migration governance towards migration management. This has not only brought about the notion that migration could be a "benefit for all" (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010) if managed properly, but also a highly economic perspective on migration that ignores aspects of social and political rights (cf. Kunz, 2011).

4. On Being Discovered: The Perspective of Migration on the Hype about Migration&Development

When Kofi Busia and Aurelien Fedjo were both invited by the city administration of Munich in 2009 to participate in a one-year project to "connect local, developmentally active migrant organizations to other municipal or local developmental initiatives (one world organizations, partnership organizations, etc.)" (Wilhelmy & Held, 2008, p. 68), Aurelien decided to participate, while Kofi decided not to participate. Just like Lucia Muriel, another of my interview partners and a development expert from Berlin, Kofi found it absurd that he now was "discovered" as a development actor, while he had carried out projects in his hometown for twenty years. In the words of Lucia Muriel:

> For us, the migrants, the white trend topic [of migration&development] is a topic that we have collected expert knowledge and experience on for decades. We reached our limits on the topic and went through existential identity debates…! These processes were not a luxury that we pursued because we had nothing better to do, but an existential necessity, a survival strategy! And now we have been 'discovered.' (Muriel, 2010, p. 4)

Just like Kofi and Lucia, a lot of my interview partners who had been invited to the project were irritated by the call on them to become developmental—as migrants. Some had a problem with being categorized as migrants, others with the category of development aid, and some had a problem with both categories. Daniel, for example, one of my interview partners stated:

> I always regard myself to be a person from these poor countries, that is a problem. Because somehow, when you come from these countries and you also have so many relatives that are so poor, that need so much support…well, you just are afraid to get involved in something where there is so much responsibility, you just are yellow of that. And then you think: I do not even manage to [support my relatives] and now I am expected to do something institutional. (D. Razafindrasamba, personal communication, August 15, 2009)

This resistance to become developmental is also caused by the circumstance that developmental activities quickly become life tasks for migrants, as Kofi had underlined in our conversations. Others addressed as migrants expressed that they just did not want to work with other migrants, that they did not want to be collectivized in a migrant development organization or migrant development project, because they could not trust other migrants. Daniel explained:

> Migrants have gone through so much on their way here, that they have forgotten who they are in the end. They do not believe in anything anymore, they are totally changed. They are afraid of everything. They have done things, they never thought they would do. (D. Razafindrasamba, personal communication, August 15, 2009)

[5] Both the projects, like the discourse, do not explicitly differentiate between migrants and refugees and, thus, do not reflect that refugees are often in a different (economic) context due to restrictions to enter the labor market in their country of residence. There are, however, few studies focusing explicitly on the remittances sent by refugees, especially when it comes to the Somali context (cf. Jacobsen, 2005; Lindley, 2010). This is also why I have focused on migrants, not refugees, in following the hype.

Becoming a migrant changes you, according to him, and it changes your relation towards your country of origin. As Edouard explained to me:

> When you are here and each time you look at news on your country of origin something challenging comes up, you stop thinking about doing anything about this….We are just losing the overview of what one could actually do. (E. Kome, personal communication, September 20, 2009)

Furthermore, he criticized the belief that migrants should do development work for free while development workers should be paid: "You need a lot of patience for that!".

The quotes cited here express what is at stake subjectively for people being positioned as migrants when it comes to the hype about migration&development. They express subjective expectations, positionings, experiences and practices and, thus, introduce the perspective of migration (cf. Mezzadra, 2011). They make it obvious why the perspective of migration is so important here, especially when seen in contrast to the project's aims. In the project description the following benefits of bringing together migration&development were named:

> From…the [project's] perspective, the role of migrants is important for…international cooperations or educational work: (1) As a benefit for "German" development agencies (including the municipal administration), to be able to use local, regional and cultural knowledge of migrants as well as their authenticity to raise awareness of problems in their countries of origin; (2) As a benefit for migrants, who find support and reinforcement for their activities with "German" development agencies; (3) As a benefit for countries of origin, because projects become more culturally sensitive and, thus, get higher quality. Structural racism in development cooperations due to "white experts" can be cut down when more and more migrants are employed as development experts in their countries of origin; (4) As a benefit for urban society: It is merging through the cooperation between migrants and "German" organizations—a contribution to integration. (Unpublished protocol of the 1st project workshop in Munich in 2009)

In this quote, the developmentality of the project becomes obvious: Migrants and their organizations are seen as a benefit for German development aid and the only benefit for migrants is the support of their development projects. The needs, desires and aims of migrants and the question whether they want to do development projects at all are not addressed. The guidelines of cooperation are prescribed: They have to be about development. However, it becomes obvious from the examples of Kofi and Aurelien and the quotes given above that it is not development *per se* that migrants aim for necessarily in their transnational support labor. As it happens, Kofi and Aurelien have sometimes called their involvement in their hometowns developmental during our talks; most notably, however, they have emphasized the direct support they are giving, the discussions they are leading with people in Yaoundé and Kumasi, the problems they are solving, and the goal-orientness and emotions with which they pursue their initiatives. Aurelien, for example, highlights: "I prefer there being more emotions than protocols when doing this kind of work" and goes on: "My people in Cameroon…do not live any better because I do some networking here [in Munich]." His commitment is neither about himself "feeling comfortable in Germany," nor about "discussing for hours with other people [in Germany]," instead, he wanted to be in direct interaction with people in Yaoundé and to find solutions for their problems. "If I only collect [money], what do I learn from this then? Nothing. But if I somehow go one step further, I can…discuss with people about certain topics, what kind of solutions there are" (A. Fedjo, personal communication, September 20, 2009). Kofi, in turn, stresses that his work would create a different understanding of the world, a (cultural) exchange. Thus, what they talk about is not (only) development. Instead, they express their aim of acting in solidarity and to bring about a different understanding of global connectedness—as I will argue in the last part of this article.

5. Solidarity—Not Aid

In opposition to the governmental perspective on migrants' translocal and transnational activities that frame it in an economic way and leave out questions of social and political rights (cf. Kunz, 2011), I do not want to understand and frame it to be developmental, but to (transnationally) express solidarity. When Aurelien Fedjo and Kofi Busia stress the direct support, the problem solving and the emotionality of their work, this rings a lot of similarities to how Paul Mecheril (2014) has defined solidarity.

Mecheril, a professor in educational sciences, writes that solidarity is "a commitment that aims at enabling or preserving ways of life" (2004, p. 81), that claims a just, livable state of affairs not only for some, but ultimately for everybody and, thus, goes beyond compassion, indignation or morality: "Characteristic for solidarity is a commitment that changes or even impedes a state of affairs in which social cooperation partners close and distant to me cannot thrive and develop—or at least solidarity is concerned with doing so" (2004, p. 86). In activities grounded in solidarity, the other is not considered to be needy, but independent and responsible. They do not aim at dissolving differences—instead solidarity means "connectivity despite difference" (2004, p. 86). Solidarity is based on an unease and exasperation, on an understanding of common suffering in an unjust world which needs to change. While some authors, such as Richard Rorty (1989) have emphasized that solidarity can only

emerge in groups—which also draws on the prominent use of the concept in the labor movement—others have noted that what is most important about solidarity is its addressing of injustice (Bayert, 1998) and its groundedness in emotions (Bierhoff & Fetchenbauer, 2001). Thus, solidarity is support between equals to create a more just world.

In contrast to solidarity, development aid aims to optimize nations or populations economically and to fight poverty. Neither does this change in more recent human capital approaches that do not only aim to strengthen human rights, political empowerment and social systems, but also want every single human to optimize his or her (cap)abilities and, thus, at least partly, remains in capitalist logics. Thus, there is a huge difference between framing and understanding migrants' transnational support labor as solidarity, on the one hand, or as developmental, on the other hand. A developmental understanding always implies—as I have reasoned in other publications (cf. Schwertl, 2015)— positioning migrants as learning, as developees and project workers, as translators and bridges for development. To understand the activities of Kofi Busia und Aurelien Fedjo as solidarity, means to recognize that they are not only about projects, schools and the rights of handicapped people in Cameroon, but also about changing the relationship between parts of the world, changing the global state of affairs, and about doing this not in and from Germany, but transnationally. The ethics and politics that is the foundation of Kofi Busia and Aurelien Fedjo's actions in their "countries of origin," thus, exceed developmental logics. They want more or different things than Official Development Aid. They are putting emphasis, for example, on the structural racism they and "millions of Cameroonians living abroad" face: "If you are a foreigner here, you have to struggle," "people only see a black face, black skin…and they ask strange questions like 'are there…peanuts…or…houses in Africa?'" (K. Busia, personal communication, September 10, 2009). Thus, they do not only seek recognition for themselves, but also want to bring about some societal changes and changes in the relationship between global South and North. Their work is more than developmental, it is also antiracist and grounded in enabling different forms of life. This solidarity remains invisible from the perspective of governing. Furthermore, governmental forms constantly try to capture and captivate migration and the perspective of migration on transnational projects. They try to define them in developmental ways.

What is needed when trying to understand migrants' transnational projects and activities, therefore, is a perspective that does not reproduce the perspective of governance. The aim of critical migration studies should not only be to reconstruct or deconstruct the logics of migration politics and technologies, as has been done by several critical authors (Kunz, 2011; Raghuram, 2007). Instead, we need to bring the perspective of migration into our research. The AoM approach looks at the "sharing of knowledge and infrastructures of connectivity, affective cooperation, mutual support and care among people on the move" (Papadopolous & Tsianos, 2013). It, therefore, helps us to understand that migrants' transnational activities are not (necessarily) developmental. They are multifaceted and, in the instances and positionings I have highlighted in this article, they are about global justice and solidarity (cf. Faist, 2010).

6. Conclusion

The recent awareness of migration in the development regime and vice versa has invisibilized not only that migrants have ooorganized transnational support for non-migrants, stay-at-homes, citizens and noncitizens, as well as for developmental or integrationist nation state projects for decades. There have been migrant organizations supporting their hometowns at least since the 1930s. These solidarities have been framed differently, depending on the current development and migration policy perspective as "cultural programs," "autochthone support of hometowns," "development aid" or "diaspora politics." Yet, they can never be reduced to these governmental logics. This is also why the city of Munich's project caused so much resistance and debate: People opposed being positioned as migrants or developmental or both. Furthermore, when talking about their projects, they did not talk about project management, but they wished for something to change.

What follows for research on migration&development is that we should not only talk about politics here, but also about ethics and morals. As anthropologist Michael Lambek has stated:

> Ethnographers commonly find that the people they encounter are trying to do what they consider right or good…or are in some debate about what constitutes the human good. Yet anthropological theory tends to overlook all this in favor of analyses that emphasize structure, power, and interest. (Lambek, 2010, p. 1)

Taking seriously what people want and desire, what they wish for and how they treat themselves and others is important to understand their daily politics. Solidarity is not taking place so much in (development) project management, but at its fringes; it is a question of relations and relationships as well as of politics.

Furthermore, we should not consider migration to be about moving across borders or changing places. We should take the changes in relationality that it brings about seriously. Seen from the perspective of migration, the relationality migrants' transnational projects and activities bring about can be hugely different from the one brought about in development cooperation. Instead of developers, developees and bridge-builders (i.e., migrants), there are people working together. But to see this, we have to listen to what people are actually saying, how they explain what they are doing and what they fight. The AoM and MBRA bring about research designs

and perspectives that enable the researcher to do exactly that.

Bringing together AoM and MBRA with debates about migration&development, therefore, has two effects: 1) The AoM's perspective on transnational and global struggles is strengthened. Movements of migration are not only about the right to move and stay, but also about changing global and transnational relations. Research in the perspective of AoM often focuses on the former, but the latter is equally important, as Sandro Mezzadra has highlighted repeatedly; and 2) Another form of critique is possible when it comes to migration&development. A critique that shows that migration is always excessive and can never be reduced to developmentality.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the LMUMentoring Programme for funding the publication of this text.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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COGITATIO

Social Inclusion (ISSN: 2183–2803)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 77–88
DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i3.894

Article

Migration Regimes and the Translation of Human Rights: On the Struggles for Recognition of Romani Migrants in Germany

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Submitted: 31 January 2017 | Accepted: 31 July 2017 | Published: 19 September 2017

Abstract
The current claims for asylum and refugee protection of Roma from the so-called "Western Balkan states" are rejected by the German state. Based on this practice, Romani migrants are not recognized as genuine refugees but classified as irregular migrants and thus labeled as "bogus" asylum seekers. This article discusses the discursive process through which the legal status of Romani migrants is irregularized within the German migration regime. Furthermore, through an empirical study, the article shows how Romani organizations and migrants are struggling for a collective right to remain in Germany. In their political-legal struggles for recognition, Roma reinterpret not only their legal status as irregular migrants, but also their legal-cultural practices: by appropriating the semantics of human rights through the lenses of their cultural backgrounds. This, in turn, shifts the analytical focus to the productivity of human rights discourses. They are assumed to be an effective tool to enforce legal claims against the German migration regime. In this context, the article examines legal-cultural practices, which become visible in the struggle, by exploring six justification narratives—through these, the Roma's political-legal belonging to the German nation-state shall be legitimized.

Keywords
asylum; human rights; migration; migration regime; refugee; Roma

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Perspectives on the European Border Regime: Mobilization, Contestation, and the Role of Civil Society", edited by Ove Sutter and Eva Youkhana (University of Bonn, Germany).

1. Introduction

While the number of Roma[1] from the so-called Western Balkans[2] who migrated to Germany has sunken since the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Kosovo War, figures have been continually rising since 2008, with 2015 presenting the peak of the development for the time being (Alscher, Obergfell, & Roos, 2015; Heuser, 2014; Wenke, Jadžić, & Jeremić, 2016). The reasons for the current migration vary depending on political context and individual fate; beyond all differences, Roma's motivations for migrating rest particularly on the fact that they became the "losers" after the collapse of Yugoslavia, which manifests in everyday practice in the form of diverse human rights violations (Sardelić, 2014). Since 2009, however, a process of visa liberalization, which has made it easier for Western Balkan citizens to obtain valid emigration paperwork, has been reinforcing the current migration (Cherkezova, 2014, p. 5).

[1] In the European context, Roma is both an ethnic self-representation and depicts a politically enforced umbrella term for diverse, heterogeneous subgroups. In the latter case, this term includes—next to Roma— the Sinti, Kale, Manush, and related groups—although it cannot always be assumed that individual members of the respective groups approve of this political convention of speech (Knecht & Toivanen, 2006). The term "Roma" is used particularly as an umbrella term in the first part of the article because it appears as such in the sources used; however, I employ this in my own empirical analysis as a self-description for people from the Western Balkans and those who label themselves as such, for instance, in public or before authorities, and, in this context, differentiate themselves from other subgroups. According to Hancock (2002, p. xix), I use the term "Romani" as an adjective. I only use the often pejoratively found and politically discredited term "gypsy" (Knecht & Toivanen, 2006) when it appears as such in the sources used.

[2] The so-called "Western Balkans" is a relatively new political umbrella term that, next to the successor states of former Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia), also includes Albania.

This development is embedded in the EU integration process of Western Balkan states which prioritizes the protection of minorities. This, in turn, accompanies the fact that it is in the interest of the respective governments not only to accept Roma deported from Germany as well as from other European member states, but also to prevent the migration of potential asylum seekers so that they do not lose credibility as possible EU Member State candidates (Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2012). At the same time, a desired "side effect" of the Europeanization of the Western Balkan countries was to tame and control the migration of Roma, by which the "Roma question" became an aspect of securitization within the German and European migration regime (Kacarska, 2012; van Baar, 2011b). Nevertheless, for many Roma, applying for asylum or refugee protection after arriving in Germany presents a chance to escape diverse forms of discrimination. The German government does not view Roma's protection claims as being worthy of recognition, as they are usually neither politically persecuted nor fleeing from war and thus fail to meet the criteria for German asylum and refugee protection. Instead, German authorities are irregularizing the Romani migrant status and classifying them as "economic" or "poverty" migrants (Sardelić, 2016; Scherr, 2015a).[3]

Against this background, a clearly visible Romani protest movement, which fights for a collective right of residence that employs human rights in order to disrupt Roma's history of infringement, at least in regard to refugee law, began forming around 2008. The shared fundamental attitude is that a structural discrimination against Roma dominates in the Western Balkans and that the present asylum and refugee protection should be extended to include them.[4]

This article has two main goals: Firstly, it aims to depict Roma's current migration from the Western Balkans within European policy at present, and subsequently reveal through which practices they are categorized as "bogus asylum seekers" in legal and political discourse as well as in the media (Kacarska, 2012; Lee, 2014; Sardelić, 2016). By using selected examples, I sketch which role Western Balkan governments play within the German as well as European migration regime.[5] Secondly, based on my own empirical study, the article attempts to illustrate legal-cultural practices, which become visible in the struggle for recognition, by illustrating six justification narratives.[6]

In the following, I first detail the article's theoretical framework (2.) and continue by elaborating on my methodological approach (3.). The analysis then begins with an outline of the current human rights situation of Roma from the Western Balkans (4.). Building on this and within the context of the European Union, a closer look is taken at the German migration regime, which, by utilizing various border practices, tries to categorize and control the migration movement as well as include it in its political economy (5.). Subsequently, I offer the general results of my field research by presenting an in-depth overview of the central justification narratives used to enforce the right to political-legal belonging (6.). Lastly, by way of an example, namely the occupation of the Sinti and Roma Memorial in Berlin, I illustrate how the translation and appropriation of human rights can tangibly take place as well as how selected justification narratives are staged and which social effects can result therefrom (7.).

2. Theoretical Orientations: Migration Regimes, Translation of Human Rights, and Law as Culture

The present article is based on a theoretical perspective that relates migration regimes, translation theory, and law-as-culture analytics. The concept "regime" has proven to be extremely fruitful when trying to adequately understand discursive practices of legal inclusion and exclusion as well as forms of border control and legal categorization of migrants. Karakayali and Tsianos (2007, p. 14) consider a regime:

> An ensemble of social practices and structures —discourses, subjects, state practices—the arrangement of which is not determined from the outset, but rather consists precisely in [generating] answers to questions and problems [stemming from] the dynamic elements and processes…" (own translation)

Based on this definition, a migration regime can be considered institutionalized practices and structures in which principles, norms, and legal conceptions concerning how to address migration are defined and "the actors installing it accept as an objective set of rules for a certain period" (Hess & Karakayali, 2007, p. 48, own translation).

Accordingly, the categorization of migrants can be understood as a contingent process, whereby determining the difference between "legalized" and "irregularized" migrant status is carried out through social struggles. However, according to the regime perspective, it is not a state's legislative, judicial, and executive branches

[3] From a sociological/anthropological perspective it is not possible to determine who is a poverty migrant and who is a refugee. As this differentiation occurs in political and legal negotiation processes, the analytical task is rather to show how this differentiation takes place in political-legal practice and which alternative definitions exist. Cf. Scherr (2015a).

[4] Comments on the protest movement are based on my own field studies that I conducted while completing my doctoral thesis. For more on the empirical approach, see Chapter 3 (Methodological Framework).

[5] In this article, I present on the one hand a general overview of the human rights situation of Roma in the Western Balkans; concrete examples, on the other hand, focus especially on Serbia and Macedonia as well as occasionally on Kosovo.

[6] Several works on this thematic field do admittedly exist, however, not in the presented synopsis and German context. For instance, in their insightful works, Sardelić (2016) and Çağlar and Mehling (2013) also address the question of how Romani migrants try to achieve political belonging via acts of citizenship. In contrast to their particularly normative perspective, this article does not explore the citizenship debate in such detail, but instead more deeply reveals the cultural *modus operandi* of appropriation and translation of universal norms (human rights). On general debates about struggles for recognition and human rights in relationship to Roma, see Tremlett, McGarry and Agarin (2014) and Sigona and Trehan (2009).

alone that are involved in the struggles, but also a multitude of actors operating at various levels that interact with each other: from supranational institutions (such as the EU, UNHCR) to NGOs and the media to civil society and migrants themselves (Müller, 2010, p. 26).

Following Benhabib (2004), I assume that the conflict surrounding the recognition of rights for migrants ignites at the central contradiction within democratic states: namely that between national self-determination and the preservation of human rights. By making strategic use of human rights and attempting to exert normative pressure on state institutions in the process, Roma and their representatives also subjectify human rights semantics with the aim of renegotiating the relationship between national interests and universal human rights, thus posing the question of legal affiliation anew.

The productivity of human rights therefore moves into the focus of analysis, whereby the Geneva Convention on Refugees and asylum law are to be understood as a segment of the international human rights regime (Benhabib, 2004, p. 7ff). However, their potential only unfolds when they are translated into concrete practice complexes and appropriated there. Following Renn (2010), I assume that this appropriation is not a seamless process of translation, but rather one riddled with numerous shifts in meaning, as human rights must pass through different application filters. A translation is successful when a normative linkage of meaning is formed between two or more sub-contexts. Roma, together with refugee organizations, initiatives, networks, and experts, play a crucial role in coordinating the struggles over the right of residence, for they form, to put it in a simplified manner, the interfaces between political-legal decision makers and the affected persons. Through their accumulated knowledge and material resources, they have the potential to successfully translate human rights claims into the political-legal field (Göhlich, Nekula, & Renn, 2014, p. 9ff).

In order to present the *modus operandi* in which Roma appropriate certain human rights semantics in light of their cultural knowledge and respectively intertwine legal codes with cultural presuppositions, I refer to Gephart's (2015) "law-as-culture analytics". With the help of his analytics, it is first possible to disengage the legal concept of a strictly codified understanding and open it up to a multidimensional perspective in order to capture (general) notions of norms not fixed by the state. In the context of this article, the protest movement as well as Roma involved in it not only claim human rights as codified in asylum and refugee law, but likewise produce new rights in the course of cultural appropriation and reinterpretation of human rights codes and then retranslate them into the political-legal field (Stammers, 2009). Beyond conventional legal analysis, an adequate investigation of legal-cultural practices, moreover, requires a concept of law in which the focus is not only on the purely (juridical-) normative aspects. By including symbolic (Gephart, 2015) and narrative (Suntrup, 2013) dimensions in addition to a normative dimension in the analysis of the struggle for recognition, I would not only like to demonstrate how normative claims of validity (*Geltungsansprüche*) are derived by seizing (historical) symbols and justification narratives, but also how the representation of cultural knowledge is intertwined with universal codes of human rights.

3. Methodological Framework

As the analysis of discourses, collective knowledge, and practices takes a central position in this article, the "sociology of knowledge approach to discourse" (Keller, 2011) appears appropriate for reviewing the issue adequately. While in the first step of the analysis—which reflects upon the German migration regime—attention is given to linking general reflections (on discourses, knowledge, and practices) to findings gained primarily through an analysis of legal documents and statements, the second section—which addresses the struggle for recognition of Roma as well as justification narratives—offers research results that I obtained from observations and interviews, in particular.

Against this backdrop, I analyzed the practices of the protest movement as well as those of the German migration regime within the scope of multi-sited research (Marcus, 1995) carried out in multiple phases between 2012 and 2016 in numerous larger German cities. The *sites* were specially determined by participating in diverse demonstrations, political information and cultural events, as well as by maintaining (close) contact to Roma. In addition, I conducted interviews, including ones with Romani migrants, Romani representatives, (high ranking) politicians as well as various lawyers and NGO activists.

4. On the Contemporary Human Rights Situation of Roma from the Western Balkans

The primary reasons for the difficult human rights situation of Roma from the Western Balkans (but also from the Balkans in general) are not only due to a political shift to the right that began setting in with the collapse of communism/socialism. Such an explanation falls short: in order to grasp the dimension of the transformation process in the Western Balkans, one needs to take neoliberal developments into consideration. The promise of neoliberalism (e.g., prosperity for all) never materialized with the introduction of post-socialist states in the Balkans. Rather, it accelerated the division of these societies. With the onset of neoliberalism in the post-socialist Western Balkans, vehemently supported by the EU through its enlargement process, a new underprivileged class and a new form of poverty emerged. Not only are Roma affected, but they are situated on the lowest social rung, struggle the most with the already difficult living conditions, and are used as scapegoats for the adverse social and economic situation (Mappes-Niediek, 2012; van Baar, 2011a).

While Roma *de jure* have the same rights as all other citizens of the respective states, they are *de facto* permanently denied these rights (Sardelić, 2015). According to Balibar (2003; 2009), the discrepancy between minorities' codified rights and rights in social practice cannot be resolved, as the current concepts of citizenship (particularly in the Balkans) are dominated by nationalism: a state for Roma that Balibar terms "European apartheid". Roma, who can at best be said to have semi-citizenship (Sardelić, 2016), are consequently exposed to a vicious cycle of structural discrimination whose individual components can scarcely be isolated: racism, high unemployment, ghettoization, poor institutionalized educational capital, almost nonexistent social mobility, lack of trust in (state) institutions, retreat towards kinship networks, etc. (Mappes-Niediek, 2012).[7]

Migration into foreign European countries then appears as a possibility to escape structural discrimination and claim fundamental human rights. How this migration occurs in each individual case, however, depends not only on the respective level of economic and social capital, but is also directly related to refugee policy and migration control in the EU, namely those of the respective destination states.

5. Romani Migration and the German Migration Regime Within the European Context

In the process of the Europeanization of migration control, the European Union has developed its own migration regime that has led to new and differentiated forms of securitization. The harmonization of migration policy and migration law within the EU has also brought about the consequence that not only external European borders, but also neighboring countries (as transit countries and the migrants' countries of origins) have become subject to migration control and have since been requested to assist the EU in selecting and regulating migrants (Banse, Müller, & Stobbe, 2007; Betts, 2010). In this process, the EU established a *cordon sanitaire* around its territorial borders starting in the 1990s, through which it includes states into its political economy as needed and grants these states' citizens certain mobility rights (Andrijašević et al., 2005; Hess, 2012).

In reaction to the increasing numbers of migrants from the Western Balkans, the German government, as a constitutive and constituent part of the EU, began successively institutionalizing diverse legal measures in order to regulate the migration movement and carry out deportations more efficiently in 2009 (Heuser, 2014; Paech, 2016). However, since the arrival of large numbers of refugees in Germany in 2015,[8] the German government reacted with the extreme tightening of asylum and refugee law in multiple steps (Wenke et al., 2016), which, in addition to the "asylum comprise" in 1993 (Cremer, 2013), can be considered the largest encroachment on refugee protection in German post-war history.[9] In order to relieve authorities and courts of asylum procedures in terms of time and money, the German government, as part of Asylum Package 2, classified Kosovo, Montenegro, and Albania as "safe countries of origin"[10] and thus declared them as "free from persecution" (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015a; Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, 2016).

Within this context, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) codes the migration of Roma as economically motivated, and thus they do not qualify for asylum or refugee protection. With this classification, the legislation creates a blanket presumptive rule of non-persecution, resulting in asylum seekers being required to present even more convincing and coherent persecution stories in order to be recognized as legitimate refugees. Unless those seeking protection do not assert facts satisfying the conclusion that they have been persecuted against this presumptive rule, they will receive a negative decision (Paech, 2016, p. 13ff).

The increasing number of Roma who migrated to Germany or other European member states beginning in 2009 can be explained in the context of visa exemption for citizens of the Western Balkans, whereby this is again closely related to a process that Kacarska (2012) labels as "Europeanisation through mobility". Whereas (most) Western Balkan states have already received visa liberalization (within the Schengen Area) in the long-term,[11] they still only have the prospect of EU membership,[12] also conditional on their protection of minorities. Nevertheless, the EU encourages the respective states to neglect human rights standards in order to more effectively reduce the number of asylum seekers (Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2012).

In this context and using the example of negotiations between the German, Serbian, and Macedonian governments, lawyer Nizaqete Bislimi (2014) demonstrates how, in the process of visa liberalization, they had to perform numerous administrative reforms in return

[7] For a detailed overview, see European Roma Rights Centre (2016).

[8] According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2016), approximately 890,000 people seeking protection were registered in 2015, notably refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

[9] The Asylum Packages 1 and 2, passed by the Bundestag in 2015, constitute the spearhead of this development. In addition to declaring "safe countries of origins" and expediting the asylum process, the laws are accompanied particularly by restrictive work bans, unannounced deportations, deportations of those with serious illness, benefit cuts, tightening of family reunification processes, as well as an increase of integration courses, see Pro Asyl (2015a, 2015b).

[10] The German government already classified Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia as safe in 2014. Cf. Deutscher Bundestag (2014).

[11] Citizens of Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina received visa exemption between 2008 and 2010, which enabled them to move within the Schengen Area for a limited time (Kacarska, 2012). Such visa exemptions have yet to be granted for citizens of Kosovo. Cf. European Parliament (2017).

[12] Not including Croatia, as it already became an EU member state in 2013.

—including drafting bilateral readmission agreements that came into effect in 2002 and facilitating deportations of war refugees obligated to leave.[13] With visa exemption in 2009 and the accompanying increase of asylum applications by Roma in Germany and other EU member states, the former German Federal Minister of the Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, as well as the EU Commission threatened the Serbian and Macedonian governments with reinstating visa requirements as long as the rising number of asylum applications did not stop. In the course of this, Friedrich approached the press and defamed migrants from Serbia and Macedonia as poverty migrants—targeting especially Roma even if only through implicit semantic references (Heuser, 2014, p. 71; see also Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2012; Lee, 2014).

To divert attention from the social issue of the critical human rights situation, for instance, in Serbia in 2012, not only the media, but also the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Ivica Dačić, labeled Romani refugees as "false asylum seekers", migrating to Germany in order to leech off the German welfare state. In order to prevent Roma, who are not legally permitted to do so, from departing to Germany,[14] border practices have emerged that represent "ethnic profiling", which is a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights (Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2012).[15] Due to the overall precarious human rights situation, a large part of Roma avoid deportation—which in the course of the Europeanization of migration policy is increasingly coordinated by the Frontières Extérieures (FRONTEX)—by escaping into "illegality" before deportation is enforced or by leaving the Western Balkans again after deportation (see e.g. Deutscher Bundestag, 2015b).

Against this overall backdrop, particularly the classification of Western Balkan states as safe countries of origin has been disputed: Paech criticizes the classification by stating that German legislation has not fulfilled the requirements for the careful examination of potentially safe countries of origin imposed by the Federal Constitutional Court. Paech therefore submitted a constitutional challenge, as he considers the legislation on the classification "unconstitutional" (Paech, 2015). Numerous studies by, for instance, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF, 2012), arrive at a similarly critical classification of the Western Balkans that considers the situation of Roma, when seen in its entirety, to constitute "structural discrimination" (see also Paech, 2016, p. 14).

Criticism from the perspective of EU law relates to the latter point. According to European Parliament and European Council (2011), persecution is also present when there is "an accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights, which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner as mentioned in point". In order to claim cumulative infringements as a serious violation of human rights at the state level, Scherr (2015b, p. 161ff) indicates that a normatively coherent implementation is required. In practice, however, the imprecise formulation of the article means that this implementation ends up being disadvantageous to the refugees. He qualifies this open-ended formulation at the European level as not only "legally insufficient", but also "politically functional", as it serves to attenuate political controversy at the state level and redirect "moral responsibility" to the juridical field.

Based on the aforementioned points, it is evident that the term "refugee" not only functions as a legal category with which the respective receiving states classify the migration of people according to determined criteria, but also shows to what extent the receiving states politically and legally code the countries of origin (Nieswand, 2015). Nevertheless, at which point persecution and suffering becomes relevant to gaining asylum status remains an issue that is both in need of explanation and highly controversial in practice. As the migration of Roma usually arises as a mixed migration movement (read: a mixture of social, political, and economic reasons for migration) (Castañeda, 2014) and as these complex and interlocking connections are not fully reflected in the categories of German asylum and refugee law, an appropriate political and legal process of distinguishing between recognition and rejection of refugee status does not exactly become any easier. By classifying the Romani migration and thereby coding them as irregular migrants, however, German legislation has not only created legal facts, but also confirmed mainstream public media discourse in which Roma are *a priori* considered poverty migrants and accused of asylum abuse. Politics, law, and the media thereby not only contribute to further criminalization of migration, but reinforce and recreate stereotypes as well. Such attitudes, which Heuser (2014) frames as "anti-Romani racism", both stand in the way of an impartial public media appraisal of the human rights situation and structure the political and legal patterns of meaning (see also Lee, 2014).

6. Struggle for Recognition of Romani Migrants: Translation of Human Rights

In regard to the struggle for recognition, particularly active at the federal level are the Romani initiative "Alle bleiben" ("Everyone Stays") and the "Bundes Roma Verband" (BRV, "Federal Romani Association") as well as "Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg" ("United Roma in Hamburg"), "Initiative Rromnja" (Berlin), "Roma Center Göttingen e.V.", "Roma-Art-Action" (Essen), "Aktion 302/GGUA" (Munster), and "Rom e.V." (Cologne) at the regional or communal level. These (partly) well-networked "grassroots" organizations are (directly or indirectly) aided by numerous interest groups advocating

[13] Between the EU and the Western Balkans, readmission agreements entered into force from 2007 (respectively, in the case of Albania, in 2005). Cf. Migrationsrecht.net (2007).

[14] The right to depart requires certain criteria to be met, including monetary reserves, declarations, travel insurance, etc.

[15] Current developments in the Western Balkans (except Croatia) again show that their EU accession process is at a standstill. This is due, on the one hand, in particular, to the unclear perspective of joining the EU and, on the other hand, to flourishing nationalism. Cf. Milačić (2017).

on their behalf, such as political associations, church associations, or NGOs. These include not just the "usual suspects", for example leftist or refugee organizations, but also institutions located at the EU- and UN-level.

When I now sketch out the practices of translation and appropriation, which gain validity within the struggles, I assume, following Gephart (2015), that Romani migrants and their representatives are intertwining universal codes of human rights and legal-cultural practices. In the course of this, they reinterpret the actual jurisdiction, produce new rights, and enforce legal claims in form of justification narratives. The translation of justification narratives into the political-legal fields thus comes to the fore in two disparate ways. On the one hand, this occurs as strategic essentialism in which particular cultural traits and identifications are essentialized and politicized (Spivak, 1988). On the other hand, certain justification narratives are expressed as strategic universalism in which general norms and values, such as democracy, solidarity, and integration, are referenced (Gilroy, 2000). Based on my empirical analyses, I have identified six justification narratives that apply to differing extents depending on the spatial and temporal context and are intended to lead to a successful normative linking with current asylum or refugee law, in particular:

a) According to trustworthy estimates, approximately 500,000 people persecuted as "gypsies" fell victim to the atrocities in Europe carried out by the Nazis (Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, 2009, p. 10). In the course of reappraising the genocide and history of injustice during the Third Reich, appeals have been made to Germany's historical responsibility towards Roma from the Western Balkans, as no adequate compensation has been made so far.[16] By relating their history to that of Jews, Roma latch on to the universalization process of the Holocaust as a relatively new form of normativity and link transnational memorial structures with legal-moral claims.[17]
b) The next justification narrative also relates to the Holocaust as a universal norm, but in a decontextualized manner. In 1999, the Holocaust served as a legitimization figure for an offensive NATO war in Kosovo (Wallerstein, 2006). The European Roma Rights Centre (2001), for example, spoke of the biggest catastrophe for Roma since World War II—first directly through the bombardments and then through the subsequent retaliatory attacks through Kosovar troops who caused a mass exodus throughout Europe. Since the German government at the time was co-responsible for both the need to relocate and the destruction of the cultural livelihood of Roma, the narrative thus argues that the current German government bears responsibility here, too.[18]
c) The following narrative comprises the category "integration" as a domestic political code. In contrast to the previous two narratives, this one should not be interpreted as strategic essentialism, but rather as strategic universalism, as no differences, but instead shared democratic values are articulated here. Various Romani organizations and their supporters point to feats of integration and, rooted in this context, particularly those for Romani children born and raised in Germany.[19]
d) A further justification narrative refers to the legal order of the EU. Proponents of a right of residence argue that the Geneva Convention on Refugees should be interpreted more generously, namely in the way it is fixated in the Qualification Directive of the European Parliament and European Council (2011), which argues that structural discrimination should also find increasing recognition as a reason for seeking refuge.[20]
e) Another narrative is targeted at the classification of the Western Balkan states as safe countries of origin. This classification is not regarded as an objective situational assessment, but rather as a consideration implicitly aimed at preventing the entry of Roma that leads to an unreasonable distinction between legitimate refugees and poverty migrants.[21]
f) The last justification narrative draws a connection beyond the cultural context towards a larger democratic and whole-societal level. Since the resistance is aimed against the further hollowing-out of civilizational feats, these struggles serve democracy. Asylum law, according to the argument, is a suitable field of experimentation for future legal standards, as bio-political scenarios can be tested with irregularized migrants or refugees and then also be extended to other marginalized or precarious groups as needed, such as the unemployed.[22]

Following this outline of the different justification narratives, I shall conclude by elaborating on the occupation of the Memorial by "Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg" in cooperation with the German nationwide initiative "Alle

[16] See, for example, author's interview with a former federal minister, Büdingen (2016); Romani representatives, Cologne (2015).
[17] For general information on the topic "Universalization process of the Holocaust", see Alexander (2012).
[18] See, for example, author's interview with Romani representative, Cologne (2015), field note in the context of a political event, Frankfurt (2016).
[19] See, for example, author's interview with Romani migrants, Cologne (2012), Munster (2012), Berlin (2016); Bonn (2016); former human rights representative of the German government, Munster (2016), representative in European Parliament, Bonn-Strasbourg (Phone Interview) (2016).
[20] See, for example, author's interview with Romani representative, Hamburg (2016); field notes in the context of political events with the participation of Romani representatives and civil society organizations, Cologne (2015), Berlin (2016).
[21] See, for example, author's interview with Romani representative, Hamburg (2016); Romani migrants, Berlin (2016).
[22] See, for example, author's field notes in the context of political events with the participation of Romani representatives and civil society organizations, Munster (2016) and Frankfurt (2016).

bleiben", as this example illustrates both the intertwining of justification narratives and forms of mobilizing protest participants. Further, conflict lines between the occupants and other organizations can be shown, which in essence surround the question of a legitimate translation of human rights claims as well as the appropriate interpretation and various appropriation of historical symbols and memory.

7. Forms of Struggles for Recognition: The Case of the Memorial of the Sinti and Roma in 2016

On May 22, 2016, a group of approximately 50 Roma from Hamburg and Kiel, led by "Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg" and "Alle bleiben", occupied the Memorial to the Sinti and Roma Victims of National Socialism in Berlin. The Memorial was opened in 2012 following several political debates since the late 1980s. The fact that the massive and systematic murder of those persecuted as gypsies under the Third Reich was recognized as genocide by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1982 can be attributed to an earlier well-organized civil rights movement by German Sinti and Roma, with the activist Romani Rose leading the way (Schulze, 2010; van Baar, 2015).

According to Rose (2012), the Chairman of the "Central Council of German Sinti and Roma", the Memorial's political-remembrance relevance exists not only in commemorating the genocide, but also in combating contemporary and future forms of "antiziganism" and "antisemitism".[23] Although Rose considers the current discrimination and persecution both a German and European challenge, the Central Council, the strongest political representative of the German minority, views its task primarily as representing, securing, and claiming the rights of German Sinti and Roma. The occupants again build on strategies that can be labeled as the "Europeanization of Roma representation" (van Baar, 2015). The "Europeanization of Roma representation" was employed most recently in the eastward expansion of the EU, whereby the EU did not see the Roma's living situation (here as an umbrella term) to be in line with general human rights. As a result, this was defined as a "European problem" that needed to be solved via legislative measures and (development) projects (van Baar, 2011a). By drawing on the European representation form and the symbolism that emanates from the Memorial and connecting the two as well as the German state's view of its historic responsibility to do justice to all European Roma, especially those from the Western Balkans, they are hoping for an extension of current German asylum and refugee protection in the form of residence rights. How this takes place and which justification narratives thereby come into play will be explained in the following sections.

No longer feeling solidarity and disappointed by politicians, the occupants considered the Memorial an appropriate place to make a political statement against deportations and raise awareness for the human rights situation, according to a Romani representative from the initiative "Alle bleiben" and the "Bundes Roma Verband".[24] The classification of the Western Balkans as safe countries of origin, in particular, is viewed as a consequential misinterpretation and an abolishment of asylum law. As the Romani representative of "Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg" formulated: "These states may be safe, but not for Roma". Against this background, the representative demanded a halt to deportations and a right of residence on humanitarian grounds. In this context, he also pointed to Germany's historical responsibility, adding that he could not comprehend the hierarchization of victims by the German government. He thereby criticized the preference given to the fate of Jews and called for "compensation", which neither his grandparents nor he had received. The case of Jewish contingent refugees who obtained a humanitarian right of residence in the early 1990s shows that such a justification narrative can lead to a right of residence.[25]

With these arguments, the protest participants from Hamburg and Kiel could also be mobilized. Since they are subject to compulsory residence, not only their travel to Berlin, but also the unannounced occupation placed their already fragile status in jeopardy. According to a Romani migrant who participated in the occupation, the initiators' justification was convincing even though the actions constituted criminal offenses according to German law. The significance of the Memorial, which they had previously not rated so highly, aroused hope in them that they could, in fact, still receive right of residence during the occupation.[26] Further, the organizations enjoyed the trust of the protest participants, a Romani representative of "Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg" maintained, as they had gained knowledge about resistance over many years of political activity. This knowledge was acquired through networking with other Romani and refugee organizations.[27]

While the occupation, according to a Romani representative of "Alle bleiben", garnered great media attention, it did not lead to the desired success, as riot police vacated the premises after an unresolved conflict between the occupants and the property owners, the "Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe".[28] The eviction did occur, however, in consultation

[23] The significance of the location of the Memorial is thus strengthened as it is directly beside the Reichstag and close to Brandenburg Gate and the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. For more on the political-remembrance significance of the Memorial, see van Baar (2015).
[24] Author's interview with Romani representative of "Alle bleiben" and the "Bundes Roma Verband", Berlin (2016); see also field notes in the context of political event, Frankfurt (2016).
[25] Author's interview with Romani representative of "Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg", Hamburg (2016).
[26] Author's interview with Romani migrant, Berlin (2016).
[27] Author's interview with Romani representative of Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg, Hamburg (2016).
[28] Author's interview with Romani representative of "Alle bleiben" and the "Bundes Roma Verband", Berlin (2016).

with the "Central Council of German Sinti and Roma", "Roma Trial", and high ranking politicians of the Green Party and the President of the German Parliament—who demonstrated solidarity with the protesters, but nevertheless legitimated the eviction with the argument that the dignity of the place had been compromised by the protest action (Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas, 2016).[29]

Whereas the occupiers interpreted the Memorial as the one place where their demands could still be heard due to its sacral symbolism, the property owners and their supporters had a different stance. While they, too, viewed the Memorial as a sacred place, they considered political protests there tantamount to sacrilege, as the murdered had found their final resting place there (Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas, 2016).[30] "Alle bleiben" (2016) countered that the eviction by a police unit itself should be considered a practice that was both political and based on violence. They accused the foundation of reserving the right for political actions on their own premises, while denying this right to protesters. They further reproached the property owners and their supporters of a failing, formulated in a commentary as follows: "What happened last night in Berlin is a demonstration of the inability of the powerful to face the suffering of Roma moved to and fro for decades" (own translation). Next to the social problem of constant human rights violations committed against Roma, a conflict concerning the legitimate interpretation of the past and its symbols can be detected here as well. In this regard, "Alle bleiben" raises the question: "Where does remembrance end and where does politics begin—and who decides?"

Shortly following the occupation, the foundation convened at a round table in the "Sicherheitstrakt" (roughly: "security wing") of the "Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe" (Berlin) in order to find a solution to the residence law situation of the Romani migrants. While several established politicians participated at the round table—including members from Green and Left Parties as well as a subordinate of the Minister of State and a former Federal Minister on the governmental side—"Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg" or "Alle bleiben" were not invited. The only Romani representative was from "Roma Trail", who sided with the property owners during the occupation. While the round table was not a governmental institution and the participants therefore had no direct influence on the residence law situation of Roma, their professions meant that the participants were well networked and influential.[31]

However, the participants of the round table came to the assessment that the demands to revoke the classification of the Western Balkan states as safe countries of origin, establish a quota solution, and secure an unrestricted right of residence did not represent realistic options that could be plead for to the German federal government. Rather, considering the political developments in Germany (see, for instance, the "refugee crisis" and the electoral victories of the right-wing party "AfD"), a pragmatic solution should be targeted. Given the tense public media discourse surrounding refugees, however, one could not carry out the demands for right of residence in public, but rather behind the scenes in the form of lobbying efforts or legal practice.[32]

The analysis of the occupation could show that while the actors involved have the same goal, namely right of residence for Romani migrants, they prefer other strategies for the ensuring of human rights. Whereas the round table did not give consideration to the demand for a collective right of residence but "merely" advocated lobbying and stronger efforts in individual cases,[33] "Alle bleiben" and the "Bundes Roma Verband" insist on a humanitarian right of residence and are attempting to succeed in this goal through a petition and further political activities.[34] In addition, it was also shown that the Memorial's symbolism is interpreted against the background of cultural application filters, whereby the thus involved conflict presents a struggle for the legitimate representation of political resistance in the face of the German migration regime.

8. Conclusion

Factually seen, the human rights claims for a collective right of residence for Romani migrants is misconceived and distorted by the German federal government. A quote from the former Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble (2007), clearly illustrates this situation, notwithstanding the fact that it already dates back a decade: "But first it is not possible to treat Roma and Sinti differently than other foreigners with the same status in this manner, for that would amount to positive discrimination" (own translation). In other words: Once Romani migrants apply for asylum or receive a *Duldung* (temporary suspension of deportation), thereby applying for a state decision, the remainder of the process is then also legally carried out according to this logic. The moral responsibility that follows the question of affiliation of Romani migrants is consequentially rejected by German policy and is redirected to asylum and refugee law, in the course of which the majority of protection claims are denied.

At the same time, the German government is attempting to steer the migration of Roma from the Western Balkans by embedding this in their political economy. Given the increasing number of asylum seekers from

[29] See also author's interview with civil society organization representative, Berlin (2016).
[30] See also author's interview with civil society organization representative, Berlin (2016).
[31] Author's interview with civil society organization representative, Berlin (2016).
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Field notes in the context of political event, Berlin (2016).

the Western Balkans in the year 2015, the federal government slightly opened the migration corridor in accordance with legal measures. However, especially trainees, highly-qualified persons as well as professionals, whose longer stays were made possible through strongly regulated work visas, benefit from this. Within these measures, an incentive for asylum seekers to voluntarily leave Germany and demand a work visa in their countries of origin, which would enable a stable residence, should simultaneously be created. Aside from the fact that many work visa applications fail due to bureaucratic hurdles (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017), the economization of immigration law diametrically opposes the protest movement's demands for human rights.

In the overall context, the negative decisions and deportations are in turn culturalized by the protest movement and are recalled as a further episode in the history of rights infringements or even as an "anti-Roma" legal state. In the course of this, human rights, however, are no neutral topos. On the contrary, the Romani protest movement has appropriated the power of human rights to the extent that it strategically makes use of the objection in order to exert normative pressure on state institutions. Romani and refugee organizations, in particular, repeatedly demonstrate new and creative ways to problematize practices of the German migration regime and produce new human rights semantics. They make their efforts visible in form of counter de-politicization of irregularized migrants, and, last but not least, justification narratives. Within these narratives, strategic essentialism and universalism are not to be understood as antagonisms, but rather as necessary forms of representation that interact with each other in order for Roma to become visible as a collective. In the "name of culture" (Gephart, 2012, p. 43), together with its inherent universal human rights norms, they thus convey belonging to the German nation-state. Nevertheless, the occupation of the Memorial has demonstrated that differing translation and appropriation throughout the legal struggles can lead to (inner) conflicts, which in this case resulted in a further differentiation of the protest movement.

By analyzing additional cases, the connection among Romani "grassroots" organizations and non-Romani organizations could be shown in more detail as could the concrete knowledge translated between them and the forms associated with reciprocal politicization. From a more comparative perspective, there are still questions concerning Romani migrants' relationship to Romani organizations, on the one hand, as well as to non-Romani organizations, on the other. This approach could also shed light on how different *modi operandi* of the appropriation and translation of human rights within the struggle for recognition become visible.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all interview partners. I also want to thank the editors of this issue for giving me the opportunity to publishing the article, António Vieira from *Social Inclusion* for his professional cooperation during the editing process, the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on an earlier version of this article, Candice Kerestan and Johannes Winckelmann for their English proofreading of the manuscript, as well as Daniel Witte for his valuable content-related feedback.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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