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Policing Ethnicity: Between the Rhetoric of Inclusion and the Practices and Policies of Exclusion

Editors

Abby Peterson and Malin Åkerström

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Special Issue: Policing Ethnicity: Between the Rhetoric of Inclusion and the Practices and Policies of Exclusion

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Table of Contents

Editorial

Introduction to the Special Issue “Policing Ethnicity: Between the Rhetoric of Inclusion and the Policies and Practices of Exclusion”

Abby Peterson and Malin Åkerström 1-4

Article

Policing Norwegian Welfare: Disciplining and Differentiating within the Bottom Rungs

Erika K. Gubrium and Ariana Guilherme Fernandes 5-17

Article

Does Antwerp Belong to Everyone? Unveiling the Conditional Limits to Inclusive Urban Citizenship

Nicolas Van Puymbroeck, Paul Blondeel and Robin Vandevooordt 18-28

Article

Outsiders Within: Framing and Regulation of Headscarves in France, Germany and The Netherlands

Doutje Lettinga and Sawitri Saharso 29-39

Article

Bouncers, Policing and the (In)visibility of Ethnicity in Nightlife Security Governance

Thomas Friis Sjøgaard 40-51

Review

Racial Profiling as Collective Definition

Trevor G. Gardner 52-59

Article

Meanings and Motives before Measures: The ‘What’ and ‘Why’ of Diversity within the Mossos d’Esquadra and the Politie Utrecht

Anne R. van Ewijk 60-74

Article

Diversity Policing–Policing Diversity: Performing Ethnicity in Police and Private-Security Work in Sweden

Cecilia Hansen Løfstrand and Sara Uhnöo 75-87

Article

Safety Work with an Ethnic Slant

David Wästerfors and Veronika Burcar

88-101

Article

Complaints as Opportunity for Change in Encounters between Youths and Police Officers

Tove Pettersson

102-112

Article

Policing the Borders of the 'Centaur State': Deportation, Detention, and Neoliberal Transformation Processes—The Case of Austria

Kenneth Horvath

113-123

Article

Aboriginal Agency and Marginalisation in Australian Society

Terry Moore

124-135

Editorial

Introduction to the Special Issue “Policing Ethnicity: Between the Rhetoric of Inclusion and the Policies and Practices of Exclusion”

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Issue

This editorial is part of the special issue “Policing Ethnicity: Between the Rhetoric of Inclusion and the Practices and Policies of Exclusion”, edited by Professor Abby Peterson (University of Gothenburg, Sweden) and Professor Malin Åkerström (University of Lund, Sweden).

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On the one hand European countries talk the humanitarian and cosmopolitan politics of inclusion of ethnic minorities with a battery of integration policies, on the other hand these same societies practice the policies and practices of exclusion. In this special issue we address this disjuncture and what we refer to as the European moral dilemma, in much the same way that Gunnar Myrdahl, in his influential study from 1944—*The American Dilemma*—pointed out that the oppression of Black people living in the US was at odds with the country’s moral grounds, its founding creed that all men are created equal and are endowed “with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” (*Declaration of Independence*). This special issue does not only include articles from European contexts, however the majority are analyses of European ethnic minority policies and practices. Nonetheless, all of the articles address in different ways how the rhetoric of inclusion is all too often at odds with the practices and policies of exclusion and control. In focus is what we call the policing of ethnicity, that is, the governance of inclusion and exclusion along ethnic lines.

Policing in its broadest sense will be defined as all of those activities involved in the provision of security and/or the maintenance of the social-economic order. While public police authorities and other state institutions with constabulary powers remain the focal for

this type of social control, policing *by* the state has been joined by a multitude of policing providers locally, nationally and transnationally. During the last thirty years we have experienced a dramatic transformation in policing resulting in what Loader (2000) and Jones and Newburn (2006) have called “plural policing”, or what Crawford (1997), among others, has called the “extended police family”, or what Bayley and Shearing (2001) have called “multilateralization”. We are now confronted with the recognized reality of a wide diversity of agencies and agents, both networked and fragmented that together are responsible for the delivery of policing and security services and technologies. ‘Policing’ is now both authorized (by economic interests, both legal and illegal; residential communities; cultural communities; individuals; and governments); and delivered by diverse networks of commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental regulatory agencies, as well as the public police. This network of policing agencies and agents extends beyond the direct provision and supervision of policing *by* the state, to include policing forms secured *through* government; to the rapid expansion of the private security industry providing policing *beyond* government; to transnational policing arrangements unfolding *above* government; to citizen initiatives in policing activities and corporate forms of self-regulation *below* government. The special issue in-

cludes articles, which address the plethora of policing instances. How is ethnicity impacting the new multiple modes of policing and what are their consequences for the everyday lives of ethnic minorities today?

Policing ethnicity within the nation-state is engaged with securing the borders of segregated urban (and even rural) landscapes. Within the nation-state there is a high degree of ethnic coding of spatial borders between urban areas perceived as more or less secure and those areas, the socio-economic marginalized housing estates with a high ethnic minority density often (often but not always, see Wästerfors and Burcar, this issue) surrounding urban centres, where the threat of crime and the prospect of meeting violence is perceived as high. The movements of ethnic minorities within these 'high risk' areas, as well as the movements of ethnic minorities beyond these internal borders, are policed by a plethora of agencies and agents involved in the provision of security and/or the maintenance of the ethnicized social-economic order—of controlling a 'suspect population'.

The articles in this special issue interrogate in different ways policing as the patterns of social control, or governance of inclusion and exclusion, along the dynamic and interrelated dimensions of ethnicity, class and gender. Questions posed are: How is the provision of (physical) security by the new multiple modes of policing constructing a topography of 'insiders' who enjoy the benefits of policing and 'outsiders' who bear the burdens? Who and in what ways are some consigned to the 'outside' and others are invited 'inside'? How and in what ways are countries policing their borders, both internal and external?

The issue focuses on *how* ethnicity is policed, the instruments that governments use to govern the conduct of ethnic minorities, their ways of life and the experience of their identities. While ethnicity—a status as immigrant or asylum seeker—is a powerful trope for social sorting and the policing efforts of exclusion, poverty and gender are enduring criteria for social sorting. Ethnicity, class, and gender come together in new ways to define people as flawed producers or consumers, "social pollutants" (Urry, 1995), and therefore targets for exclusion from, and control within, the new social and economic order (cf. Bosworth, Bowling, & Lee, 2008).

Following Foucault's line of thinking, modern societies are adapting normalizing disciplinary strategies, moving from more punitive forms of institutional discipline to 'softer', incentive-based forms. Furthermore, the 'problem' of exclusion is individualized, as are integration policies aimed at including ethnic minorities in social, political and working life individualized. Erika Gubrium and Ariana Guilherme Fernandes explore policing as a disciplinary means for governing ethnic minority welfare recipients towards a desired behaviour. Presuming cultural marginality and passivity, particularly among female immigrants and refugees arriving

from countries other than from Europe, North America or Australia, they have found that the so-called activation programmes they have analysed are designed to steer women into the labour market and away from the home. While these authors focus the 'deserving citizen' where the assessment of deservingness is strongly based on work ability, Nicolas Van Puymbroeck, Paul Blondeel and Robin Vandevordt focus the 'good citizen'. They interrogate the tension between the city of Antwerp's ostensibly universal rhetoric of inclusion with its slogan 'Antwerp belongs to everyone' and its exclusionary policies targeting ethnic minorities whose behaviour fails to comply with the municipality's conception of what the 'normal' conduct of its inhabitants ought to be—the ethnicized standard of the 'good citizen'.

The theme of the 'good citizen' also rears its head in European debates on Muslim women bearing veils. Analysing parliamentary debates over the headscarf in France, Germany and the Netherlands Doutje Lettinga and Sawitri Saharso found that historically entrenched citizenship models did indeed help to frame how each of the countries perceived the social inclusion of Islamic women, which has led to different regulations for bearing the headscarf. However, they point out that these models are not static and should rather be regarded as schemas that help frame the discursive battles over citizenship in processes of policy formation. Furthermore, they could detect a certain convergence in all of the three countries in which the framing of headscarves as a symbol of gender inequality and oppression gained strength when polarization around Islam increased and xenophobic populist voices emerged.

Thomas Friis Sørgaard in his article has also studied the urban rejuvenation and 'branding' projects of municipal governments, calling into question the universalist cosmopolitan rhetoric of inclusion with the reality of neoliberal and market-driven forms of ethnic governance that through the practices of private security doormen or 'bouncers' effectively exclude ethnic minority young men deemed as 'gangstas' and working class and under class ethnic Danish men from the nightlife economy in the Danish city of Aarhus. His case study of bouncers' administration of nightlife accessibility sheds light on the ongoing ethnicized processes of inclusion and exclusion in the so-called and highly touted 'cosmopolitan' city. Bouncers are examples of policing actors patrolling the micro-boundaries of urban life's micro-spaces (Franzén, 2001).

How are the micro-boundaries of these micro-spaces policed? An ubiquitous thread running through the practices of policing agents keen on anticipating 'trouble' is racial profiling, or what is more often referred to in European contexts as ethnic profiling. Racial or ethnic profiling is more or less tacitly regarded by policing practitioners (and many academics alike) as an indispensable and effective tool for their crime finding and crime fighting efforts. Trevor George Gardner

critically engages with the literature (pro and con) on racial profiling focussing on the social construction of race in the context of racial profiling. Meanings are attached to racial classifications through rhetoric, policy, explicit and implicit symbolism and role-play. He argues that “when police engage in racial profiling race and criminality take shape as co-constituted social constructs that inform a sense of racial hierarchy”—in the minds of the profiler, the profiled, and the society at large. Hence, racial profiling is not an innocuous tool in the hands of crime-fighters, rather racial profiling underpins society’s constructions of ‘suspect populations’, making possible pervasive forms of collective exclusion.

Anne Rienke van Ewijk compares what she calls the ‘diversity discourses’ in two police authorities, the one in Catalonia and the other in the Netherlands, highlighting similarities and differences in their definitions of diversity and motives for diversity policies. Cecilia Löfstrand Hansen and Sara Uhnöo analyse ‘diversity policing’, i.e. the promotion of ethnic diversity in the police actors’ workforces, and ‘policing diversity’, i.e. how the policing of ethnic diversity is performed on the ground by two policing actors—on the one hand the municipal police authority and on the other, a private security company. The authors found markedly similar discourses and practices at play within both public and private policing actors. While the official discourses in both contexts emphasized diversity policing with an ethnic diverse workforce as a socially responsible recruitment strategy and as a valuable resource for the effective execution of their policing tasks and the legitimacy of their actions, a more unofficial discourse on ethnicity using ethnicized stereotypes of the ‘criminal other’ highly influenced their day-to-day work—policing diversity. In both contexts diversity policing, what was perceived unofficially as strategically necessary for their effectiveness, underpinned the stereotypical policing diversity at the street level, which in turn perpetuated the stereotype of the criminal ‘foreign’ other.

Much like in Löfstrand Hansen’s and Uhnöo’s study, David Wästerfors and Veronica Burcar, in their study of safety work by municipally employed safety ‘wanderers’ in the ‘troubled centre’ of a small Swedish city, found that ethnic minorities were both the target of their safety work *and* at the same time a resource for carrying out their safety function—all of the eight ‘blue jackets’ safety workers were young people with ethnic minority backgrounds. As one of the blue jackets explained the situation, ‘immigrants were selected to control other immigrants’. The authors’ sensitive ethnographic fieldwork uncovered the subtle ways that ethnicities and ethnic hierarchies are produced and reproduced in ‘soft’ policing—reinforcing the image of norm violation as typically ‘un-Swedish’ and threats to public order as emanating from the ethnic minority ‘others’.

Tove Pettersson turns our attention to a core policing actor—the police authorities, and their interactions

with ethnic minority young men in socio-economic marginalized areas in metropolitan Stockholm. Departing from a procedural justice perspective, Pettersson concurs with previous research that ethnic minority youth often express complaints, which are to a large extent about unfair treatment. However, she also concluded that the young people are at the same time often willing to take the time and effort to give voice to their discontent with the police. Furthermore, met with respect and understanding by police officers, these encounters provide the police authorities opportunities to enhance cooperation with ethnic minority youth and thereby conduct their policing mandate more effectively.

Policing ethnicity is a question of controlling spatial borders against the perceived threats posed by ethnic minorities to stability, order and social cohesion (Garner, 2007). Policing ethnicity at the nation-state’s borders, what Weber and Bowling (2008) call “policing migration”, is a transnational issue, where the flows of people—immigrants and asylum-seekers—are constructed as a security question. Within the European Union migration has been increasingly presented as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability; in short, according to Huysmans (2000), migration has been securitized. Within the EU Bigo (1994) has argued that by making border control a security problematique between EU member-states, and to various degrees within individual nation-states, immigrants and asylum-seekers are *per definition* connected to terrorism, criminal activities, drugs and people trafficking, etc.

Kenneth Horvath, using the case of Austria, examines what he claims are increasingly harsher forms of border policing emerging in neoliberal societal contexts corresponding to what Lööc Wacquant (2009) has called the ‘neoliberal Centaur state’—liberal at the top promoting the mobility of socio-economic elites and punitive forced immobilization at the bottom, relying on detention and deportation of unwanted migrant labour and refugees. The new forms of migration regimes emerging, he argues, operate with more differentiating criteria and more and more polices mobility itself at its borders.

Concluding our special issue is an under-researched topic—why and how cultural communities police themselves. Policing ethnicity, understood in its broadest sense as the governance of inclusion and exclusion, opens for an understanding as to how, paradoxically, ethnic minorities and ethnic minority actors can also be implicit in processes of ethnification and exclusion. Widening our geographical range from our European focus, Terence Christopher Moore critically engages with the Australian governmental policies of Aboriginal inclusion. He suggests that governmental policies, while at first blush are progressive, rest upon a singular bounded category and Aboriginal ideal type, which does not correspond with the lived realities and fractured subjectivities of Aborigines living in Australia to-

day. Cultural recognition of an Aboriginal otherness underpins a ceiling to social inclusion under which persistent inequalities and continued socio-economic marginality flourish. While the state bears responsibility for the only partial inclusion of Aborigines, Aborigines themselves are also agents in their relationship with the wider society. Moore argues that Aboriginal political elites, with vested power interests in the 'Indigenous Sector's' affairs, police the performance of an Aboriginality that for authenticity requires exaggerated and mythic difference and resistance to state inclusionary efforts. In this way, Aborigines' marginality and victimhood are maintained.

In this special issue we have strived to include the breadth of ways ethnic minorities are policed and their behaviour governed, thereby opening for further research on the subtle ways within multileveled spaces that ethnic minorities are the subject of enduring processes of control, differentiation and exclusion. The articles all show how the liberal rhetoric of inclusion and equality is fundamentally at odds with the realities ethnic minorities are facing in society.

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Article

Policing Norwegian Welfare: Disciplining and Differentiating within the Bottom Rungs

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Abstract

Policing is a disciplining means for using welfare services to govern welfare recipients towards a desired behaviour or goal. We apply Foucault's (1977) definition of institutional discipline as a means for exploring how the distinctions made by state and local welfare authorities in Norway when policing recipients may take shape according to normative perceptions of ethnicity and deservingness. More particularly, we explore the regulating understandings and activities linked to the inclusion and exclusion of eligibility to welfare benefits and services and the form of the services offered. Our focus lies at the point of entry from the lowest tier of Norwegian welfare benefits (social assistance) into two semi-parallel and higher tiers promising more (higher benefits, better services). The tiers are represented by programmes that share aims, yet differ in reach: the 2004 Introduction Programme and the 2007 Qualification Programme. The Introduction Programme is an activation programme targeted at immigrants and refugees newly arrived to Norway. Its aim is to strengthen opportunities to participate in society and labour market, as well as to promote economic independence. The Qualification Programme is an activation programme that was explicitly modelled after the Introduction Programme, yet whose target group reaches more broadly to include long-term recipients of social assistance and those whose work ability is severely lowered. While both programmes have been premised on the need to transform participants from a status of passive welfare benefit recipients to active participants in qualifying measures and society, the target groups vary and it is this contrast that is our point of focus. We contrast the two policies at two 'moments' in the policy cycle: (1) policy framing (public and policy-maker understandings/assumptions concerning the target group, the location of accountability for the marginal position of the policy recipient and the policy's political/social goals); and (2) the shaping and formative structure of these policies (how the relevant policies came into existence and what they look like).

Keywords

activation; discipline; ethnification; Introduction Programme; Qualification Programme; Norwegian welfare state; social assistance

Issue

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1. Introduction

Forty years ago, Michel Foucault (1977) traced the rise of institutional discipline as a mechanism of power regu-

lating the behaviour of individuals in society. In contrast to older, harder models of punishment, discipline was a 'gentler' way of imposing control. Yet with an emphasis on social norms and the creation of hierarchical catego-

ries of identity, its effect was to ‘punish less, perhaps; but certainly to punish better’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 82).

Since the rise of the welfare state in Norway in the early to mid-20th century, Norway’s social welfare policies directed to individuals living or in danger of living in poverty have followed the trajectory toward gentle control. In what might be called the ‘pre-modern’ period, Norway’s Poor Law of 1845 applied a ‘workhouse test’ that was punitive in a corporal as well as social sense. It denied help to the so-called ‘able-bodied’ unless they were so destitute as to be willing to accept accommodation under strict work-based regimes. As a result, they lived in conditions worse than those experienced by the poorest, independent worker (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office [HMSO], 1834).

The broad extension of generous social insurance benefits characterizing the Norwegian welfare system since the mid-1930s may be termed the ‘modern’ period. The Nordic Welfare State Model has been characterized as having a high level of de-commodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990), universal coverage with an emphasis on full employment and equality (Korpi & Palme, 1998), social protection as a citizenship right (Ferrera, 1996) and high, tax-based, social expenditure (Bonoli, 1997). The model has, however, come under pressure in recent decades due to Europeanization, globalization, economic crisis and demographic change (Greve, 2007; Kvist & Greve, 2011). The structure of the welfare system itself means that, as a range of ‘deserving’ risk groups have been lifted out of poverty, individuals *not* eligible for more generous benefits have been reduced to the few who are then eligible only for social assistance (Lødemel, 1997, p. 83).¹ Thus, social assistance has a residual role in the broader Norwegian social protection system.

It was only in the early 1960s that state aid to individuals living in poverty moved from an explicitly punitive system to one in which the goal was more ‘gentle’: the encouragement of self-reliance. Norway’s 1964 Social Care Act (*Lov om sosial omsorg*), replacing its Poor Law, emphasized the notion of free choice in its ‘help to self-help’ philosophy. Since 1964, the primary rhetorical focus in social assistance has been on reducing dependency on the welfare state through the work approach (*arbeidslinja*). This approach ties the right to social benefits to the duty to work (Lødemel, 2001). There has been broad political consensus on the work activation approach.

The 2004 Introduction Programme was passed in 2002 by the centre-right Bondevik government (Ot. Prop. nr. 28, 2002-2003) and the 2007 Qualification

Programme, passed in 2006 by the red-green Stoltenberg government, explicitly drew from the strategies proposed during the Bondevik period (St. meld. nr. 9, 2006-2007).² Both programmes have represented an offer of ‘more’ to social assistance claimants in terms of higher benefit levels and improved services (Gubrium, Harsløf, & Lødemel, 2014). The terms and conditions of these programmes reflect a shift in the way that the rights and duties of social assistant claimants have been rhetorically conceptualized. A hard focus on duties through strict work requirements in exchange for benefits is ‘softened’ by the introduction of new rights for programme participants (St. meld. nr. 50, 1998-1999). The focus on choice, active citizenship and empowerment on the part of programme participants and on competition, efficiency, benchmarking and performance measurement on the part of the institution and service provider reflect the hallmarks of a New Public Management (NPM) approach (Torfing & Triantafyllou, 2013; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007).

Institutions, Foucault (1977) said, effectively punish and control people through the processes of hierarchical observation, normative judgment and examination. Our working definition of policing follows Foucault’s notion of institutional discipline as it is a useful way to analyse the differing regimes of control in the two policies in focus. We focus on the disciplining that takes place in determining movement from Norwegian social assistance into the two semi-parallel and higher tier Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme, as well as on the differing sorts of disciplining that takes place within the programmes, themselves. Our study of disciplining is informed by an analysis of relevant policy documents and media coverage during policy development. Our data is limited to the ‘mechanisms of objectification’ that are present in the framing and shape of each programme. Admittedly, this sort of ‘top-down’ analysis might be criticized for presenting a hegemonic view of policy, as it does not allow us to grasp the values that may affect the implementation practices, understandings and interactions between service providers and recipients (Bogason, 1991). Yet our analysis does allow us to explore the policy terrain that limits and shapes how recipients might ‘constitute

¹ According to Statistics Norway (2010 figures) social assistance claimants make up 2.5 per cent of Norway’s population. Of this group, 39.6 per cent have received social assistance for six months or longer per year and are considered long-term recipients (<http://www.ssb.no/sosind/tab-2011-12-05-07.html>).

² The offer of a new work approach for long-term social assistance recipients was an easy call given the impetus for structural and strategic changes to Norway’s welfare system in the early 2000s. Research had suggested that the long-term social assistance recipient population to whom the Qualification Programme was targeted suffered from a complex set of health and social issues that required programmes and services recognising that recognized this reality (van der Wel et al., 2006). The Qualification Programme’s state-set benefit level answered cross-party proposals for increased state intervention into social assistance. Long-term social assistance recipients became a primary target group and labour activation measures the main instrument.

themselves as subjects of moral conduct' (Triantafyllou & Nielsen, 2001, p. 66). The agency of the subject and the choices made may be limited by the understandings and moral frameworks characterising the policies offered. This, certainly, speaks to Foucault's notion of technologies of the self.

Both programmes in focus have been premised on the need to transform participants from a status of *passive* welfare benefit recipients to *active* participants in qualifying measures and society. Yet the target groups for both vary and it is this contrast that is our point of comparative focus. The Introduction Programme (2004) is an activation programme targeted at immigrants and refugees newly arrived to Norway.³ Its aim is to strengthen opportunities to participate in society and labour market, as well as to promote economic independence. The Qualification Programme (2007) is an activation programme that national policymakers explicitly modelled after the IP, yet whose target group reaches more broadly to include long-term recipients of social assistance and those whose work ability is severely lowered. The Qualification Programme target group is heavily structured by the particulars of social class, physical disabilities, as well as by dominant notions of employability and mental health problems (Naper, van der Wel, & Halvorsen, 2009; van der Wel, Dahl, Lødemel, Løyland, Naper, & Slagsvoldet, 2006).⁴ Public conceptualizations of the target group have followed suit (Gubrium, 2013). Interestingly, participation in the Qualification Programme by immigrants to Norway has been considerable (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2009). According to a register-based survey of the Qualification Programme conducted in 2010, 40% of the programme's participants were immigrants to Norway (Naper, 2010). Thus, the

³ The target group consists of people between 18–55 who are granted residency as quota refugees (UNHCR), asylum, or for collective protection, residency on humanitarian grounds, family reunification with persons in the categories above if they have been in the country less than 5 years, residency after family reunification and marriage dissolution due to forced marriage, violence, abuse, or the prospect of facing severe difficulties in country of origin upon return (Rundskriv Q- 20/2012, § 2). In the beginning of 2001 the immigrant population in Norway consisted of 298 000 people or 6,6% of Norway's total population. 84 % of the immigrant population belonged to the so-called 'first generation'. The unemployment rate for immigrants was 7,9 % in august 2001, compared to 2,9 % in the total population (Østby, 2002). The largest immigrant groups in the 1990s were from Sweden, Denmark, Pakistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. By 1999, the demographics of immigration had changed: of 6 738 refugees who settled in Norway, the largest group was from Iraq, followed by Yugoslavia, Somalia and Croatia (NOU 2001: 20).

⁴ The offer of a new work approach for long-term social assistance recipients was an easy call given the impetus for structural and strategic changes to Norway's welfare system in the early 2000s. The Qualification Programme's state-set benefit level answered cross-party proposals for increased state intervention into social assistance.

programmes may differ more in their imagined target groups than in their actual participant groups.

Social scholarship has long considered the idea that policy measures that are selective, in contrast to universal, will stigmatize claimants to various degrees (Titmuss, 1976; Pinker, 1971). Both the Introduction Programme and the Qualification Programme may stigmatize because of their selective nature, yet ethnicity and race also matter in the framing, development and design of welfare services (Fernandes, 2013; Emmenegger & Careja, 2012; Sainsbury, 2006, 2012; Castles & Schierup, 2010; Faist, 1995). While scholarship focused on Scandinavia focuses on the interplay between increased immigration and the changing shape of policy (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012; Sainsbury, 2012), it does not specifically consider the role of hegemonic understandings in these processes. The concept of ethnification helps us to understand practices and processes of domination and subordination separating those 'inside' the majority population from those 'outside', with reference to the physical/biological or to perceptions regarding cultural norms (Eriksson, 2006). Our comparison enables us to trace the connections made between ethnicity and deservingness within the lowest tiers of the Norwegian welfare system.

We contrast the disciplining and ethnification processes that occur in each programme in conjunction with the policy development of each at two levels. First, through the framing of the programmes—the public and policymaker understandings/assumptions concerning the target group, the location of accountability for the marginal position of the programme user and the programme's political/social goals. Second, through the shape of the programme—what each looks like in terms of benefits, sanctions and services. We explore and contrast how the disciplinary mechanisms enabled by the frame and shape of the programmes operate under specific ethnic norms and work to govern welfare recipients towards a desired behaviour or goal.

1.1. Disciplining Processes

Foucault's (1977) modern disciplinary society consists of three key techniques of control: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. Institutions achieve control over people (power) by merely observing them. While the perfect system of observation would allow one 'overseer' to keep full oversight of the situation this is not usually possible. Instead, it is necessary to rely upon a *hierarchical chain of observers* placed at lower to higher levels through which observed information passes.

Normalizing judgment focuses on how people have failed to meet certain socially determined norms or standards. The more 'gentle' goal of the modern disciplinary system is to identify these failures in order to reform this abnormal behaviour rather than the goal of

corporal punishment. Discipline occurs through the imposition of specified norms (“normalization”). With this process comes the institutional activity of evaluating what is and who is normal or abnormal.

The *examination* is a tool for putting into practice the knowledge accumulated through hierarchical observation and the normalizing judgments involved. Its first aim is to determine what those undergoing observation know, how they fit with social norms and how they may have failed on both counts. The second is to control their behaviour by forcing them to follow a prescribed course of learning or treatment.

We apply Foucault’s ideas of disciplinary observation, normalizing judgment and examination and focus on how the distinctions made by national policymakers in Norway take shape according to normative public perceptions of ethnicity. More particularly, we explore the regulating understandings and activities linked to the inclusion and exclusion of eligibility to welfare benefits and services as well as the shape of the services themselves.

1.2. *Ethnification: Differentiated and Disciplined Identity*

It is a well-established finding within social policy scholarship that support for welfare benefits and/or generous benefits is closely coupled to the popular images of the target population of those receiving welfare services (Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Baldwin, 1990). Target groups perceived to be more deserving generally receive higher support, benefits and better welfare services compared to those viewed as less deserving (Larsen, 2006; van Oorschot, 2006). Those groups considered the least ‘deserving’ categories within public opinion typically reflect social vulnerable groups such as the unemployed, people with disabilities and social recipients (van Oorschot, 2006, 2007; Larsen, 2002, cited from van Oorschot, 2005, p. 2; Fridberg & Ploug, 2000). Conversely, the design of public policies themselves also shape public opinion (Mettler & Soss, 2004). The differentiation between deserving and less deserving targets groups has led to what certain scholars refer to a ‘welfare hierarchy of deservingness’, between those who get better and more services compared to those who get poorer and less services (van Oorschot, 2007).

In the wake of increased immigration to Western European countries, immigrants represent a relatively new target group, and add another dimension to the differentiation of the welfare system. Studies of European perceptions of deservingness of immigrants in relation to other marginalised groups in society report that migrants are broadly considered the least deserving of all comparable groups (van Oorschot, 2005). Thus, extending the notion of a hierarchical welfare state, with increased immigration we are witnessing new distinctions with the generation of welfare dualism (Bay, Finseraas,

& Petersen, 2013; Emmenegger & Careja, 2012). This results in a two-tier welfare system where ‘access to benefits and/or generosity of benefits is being systematically differentiated between immigrants and the general population’ (Bay et al. 2013, 200). We bring in the concept of ethnification to explore how and when welfare dualism operates at the bottom tier of the Norwegian welfare system, social assistance.

2. Methods

We explore how policy texts and the policy development process when establishing the Introduction Programme and the Qualification Programme have differently constructed the identity of their target groups. We also investigate how the benefits, sanctions and services availed to these two target groups have differed.

2.1. *Data Sources*

We analysed primary policy documents pertaining to the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme, respectively, with a focus on strategies underlying the reform process, the use of framing and discourse by social actors involved in this process, and the objectives tied to these processes. From Norway’s reigning government (www.regjeringen.no) and parliamentary (www.stortinget.no) webpages, we obtained and analysed pertinent *Norsk Offentlig Utredninger* (NOUs—green papers drafted by the ruling administration and conducted by government-appointed expert committees or commissions), *Stortingsmeldinger* (St. meld.—white papers that have been refined based upon public comment and which, given additional hearings, are further refined and sent to the Norwegian Parliament), *Odelstingsproposisjoner* (Ot. Prp—refined proposals that are to become law), *Instillinger til Stortinget* (Instill. St.—the Parliamentary response to government proposals), the resulting enacted laws, as well as subsequent circulars (*Rundskrivener*) providing further specifications.

We also analysed the comments of key public political figures as reported in *Aftenposten* and *Dagbladet*, two of Norway’s national newspapers with a prominent readership, using the searchable database, ATE-KST. The search focused on the period from 1997–2004 (Introduction Programme) and 2004–2007 (Qualification Programme), representing the years surrounding the development of these policies. We applied a combination of search terms, many obtained during a reading of secondary texts and government policy documents. Among the primary search terms used were the names of the government officials who were key to the Introduction and Qualification Programme policies. We also conducted searches using the names of political parties and employer/employee groups in tandem with the policies and terms representing these policies.

2.2. *Methods of Analysis*

Target group framing may shape the overall strategies aimed at a particular target group (Johnson, 2010; Loseke, 2010). In turn, employing certain ‘legitimation rationales’, policymakers may link these socially constructed understandings to describe the problem at hand (Bacchi, 1999, 2009) and to offer rationales as to how their favoured policies serve common interests (Habermas, 1975). In other words, policymakers use the specification, characterization and definition of target populations to legitimize (or disavow) policy rationales and tools. They frame their support for or their objections to policies on the basis of cultural tradition, social norms, or economic interests as they draw upon various discourses and attempt to persuade the public to accept their arguments (Schmidt, 2002). Rationales and tools, likewise, also further legitimize how the public at large imagines or understands these populations. Thus, a focus on social constructions helps to answer Harold Lasswell’s (1936) classic question, “Who gets what, when and how”.

Erving Goffman’s (1974) *Frame Analysis* argues that individuals frame their experiences and understandings according to the meanings of particular social contexts. Although our analytical focus is on the formational terrain of Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme, we are also concerned with the social norms and institutional understandings that shape policymaking for varying minimum income replacement target groups in Norway and the definitions surrounding these policies. Our focus is on contrasting how the two programmes were developed through the discursive arguments made by policymakers. Our focus is dialectical: the thematic categories forming the basis for our analysis reflect the ideologies shaping the programmes—for example, the normative rationales behind the work approach or social inclusion. They also reflect the meanings—concerning, for example, the welfare state, social assistance recipients, what it is to be Norwegian—that are discursively produced through the shape of the policies themselves (Gergen, 1994).

3. Findings

Norwegian policymakers have specifically focused on the policy problems of changing demographic composition and labour market requirements over the past two decades (St. meld. nr. 6, 2002–2003). Our findings contrast the broader discourse of equality with the policing activities that regulate norms concerning ethnicity and gender as we explore *who* it is and *how* it is that particular recipients are placed and moved along the lower levels of the Norwegian welfare hierarchy.

3.1. *Problems and Solutions*

The continued function of the social welfare system in

Norway depends on the productivist assumption of an economy with high employment levels and economically active people who may need to leave the workforce for short periods due to personal circumstances. Among the main challenges emphasized by Norwegian policymakers when introducing the Introduction Programme was that refugees, more often than the majority population, relied on social benefits for their income support (NOU 2001: 20). The normative judgments of policymakers followed dominant Norwegian expectations of full employment. The welfare dependency of the Introduction Programme’s immigrant target group was a social problem and represented a failure by the target group to properly integrate into the labour market and society-at-large. Policy document rhetoric focused on a movement ‘from passive to active’ (Ot. Prop. nr. 28, 2002–2003; NOU 2001: 20). Policymakers placed responsibility for passivity at the individual level and did not explicitly consider structural causes for immigrants’ high rates of unemployment, such as changes in the labour market or potential discrimination.

As with the Introduction Programme, the Qualification Programme also was to address the problems of macroeconomic insecurity and social exclusion of its target group, here, long-term social assistance claimants (St. meld. nr. 9, 2006–2007). Relevant policy documents from the reigning red-green administration relied upon an individualized discourse to describe the factors associated with being unemployed that resulted in resource deprivation and social exclusion. Among the factors noted: ‘bad health limiting work function and functional ability for everyday participation’; low work experience limiting entrance to the workforce; and ‘low competence’/education challenging the ability to enter the workforce (St. meld. nr. 9, 2006–2007, pp. 41–42). Opposition party leaders also used an individualized discourse and described the recipient’s location outside the workforce as the core problem, with little acknowledgment of the structural factors surrounding poverty and exclusion (i.e. workplace discrimination). The leader of Norway’s Conservative Party, Erna Solberg, drew from the discourse of equality and inclusion and noted that traditional class divisions were not the issue in Norway. Rather, the division was instead between those inside and outside work life (Brøndbo, 2007). Following Foucault’s (1977) ideas of institutional discipline, for both the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme the individualization of the problem to be addressed served as a rationale for the strategy of individual examination and observation (supply side focus), rather than a solution that entailed a focus on the labour market (a demand side focus).

For both Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme, the individually focused ‘solution’ entailed a mix of tailored programming, close follow up and a higher and standardized benefit levels. These features were to act as direct incentives for the otherwise un-

motivated target groups to work. For both groups, services had been of poor quality due to the numerous and different actors on both local and state level who had failed to cooperate and coordinate their services efficiently. The solution for those on long-term social assistance and new immigrants and refugees was 'more requirements and better follow-up' (Brøndbo, 2007; Q-20/2012).

While the state already provided standardized indicative guidelines for entitlement levels for social assistance recipients, in practice, local municipalities had been free to determine the actual amount paid. This level had depended both upon the calculated income needs of the client and the financial resources and generosity of the particular municipality concerned (LOV-1991-12-13 nr. 81a, Sec. 5-1). Participation in the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme shifted the expectation from one of claiming economic benefits that were discretionary in nature to the incentive of a higher, standardized rate of benefit. Both programmes offered the promise of individual tailoring and increased user involvement. The solution was to introduce a mandatory activation programme with paid work as the ultimate end goal.

The 'softer work-approach' solution of increased rights and duties began with the 1998 centre-right Bondevik White Paper on Equalization (St. meld. nr. 50, 1998–1999) and continued to have broad political support over the next decade. The political right mostly stressed 'duties', 'responsibilities' and 'new requirements'. The appeal from the left framed empowerment via 'individually tailored offers' and 'equal possibilities' (Djuve, 2011; Brøndbo, 2007; Andersen, 2006; Gjerstad, 2005). Such appeals followed social policy debates in the 1990s that had contrasted the desirability and usefulness of more active strategies over passive welfare benefits (Lødemel & Trickey, 2001).

Ethnified norms shaped the differing ways that policymakers placed focus on the problematized individuals making up the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme target groups. Policymakers described the broader life challenges of the Qualification Programme target group as mostly individually generated. Policymakers described the immigrant target group of the Introduction Programme, however, as individually generated but also as members of groups engaging in life practices that stood in contrast to so-called Norwegian practices and values. Immigrants and refugees were especially dependent on social welfare compared to the majority population as 'customs and traditions, or attitudes and perceptions...contributed to limiting freedom of choice' (St. meld. Nr. 49, 2003–2004, pp. 10–11). Moreover, the underlying assumption was based on the idea that these groups did not pull their weight in the welfare state and would rather use the welfare system than be active and contribute to the society through work participation (St. meld. nr. 49

2003–2004; NOU 2001: 20, 2001–2002;). The Introduction Programme served as a 'necessary signal effect' that these groups were to conform to the same 'ground rules that everyone had to follow' (St. meld. Nr. 49, 2003–2004, pp. 10–11; NOU 2001: 20, p. 61). As a public integration policy, the programme would clearly communicate 'democratic, gender equality and human rights values' (Forskrift, 2012; Ot. Prop. nr. 28, 2002–2003; NOU 2001: 20). The Introduction Programme curriculum for social studies included 'knowledge about Norwegian culture, understood broadly' (Forskrift, 2005). This included topics such as 'what is meant by tax-financed welfare', 'foundational human rights', as well as the importance of 'individual rights, possibilities...and contributions' (Forskrift, 2012).

3.2. *Who Deserves More?*

Prior to the establishment of the Introduction Programme, all of Norway's legal residents—including newly arrived immigrants and refugees—were entitled to basic economic social assistance if lacking basic means of survival. Economic social assistance is means-tested and granted by local authorities according to economic need in order to meet basic costs of living. There has been a high degree of local autonomy and local variation in setting benefit levels and conditions (Lødemel, 1997; Terum, 1996). These features have arguably prevented a shift to a system based on predictable and stable standards. The presence of the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme has, however, changed the distinctions that occur within social assistance. They have created new, higher tiers based not only on need, but also on claimants' resident permit status and employability. One's ability to move into higher tiers is based on a judgment concerning what is normal for each target group. Different understandings concerning what is 'normal' for each are reflected in the examinations (or lack thereof) that are tied to determining eligibility for each programme.

The Introduction Programme target group includes newly arrived immigrants between the 18–55 years who have a need for basic (or further) qualification. Additionally, one must also have been granted asylum on political or humanitarian grounds, a member of a group bearing a collective residence permit, or granted family reunification with persons in the categories above.⁵ EU citizens are excluded from the group (Rundskriv Q-20/2012).

Among the government rationales for the creation

⁵ A more recent circular has added to the target group those seeking residency after family reunification and marriage dissolution due to forced marriages, violence, abuse, or the prospect of facing severe hardship in country of origin upon return (Rundskriv Q-20/2012).

of a restricted target group was that the inclusion of all immigrant groups, including those ‘with higher education from the U.S., Canada and Australia’, would result in the creation of a ‘highly heterogeneous’ target group, (Ot. Prop. nr. 28, 2002–2003, p. 48). This implies that the target group that was delineated for the Introduction Programme is, in fact, homogenous and more ‘troubled’ than those immigrant groups not included. This assumption is problematic for two reasons. First, the delineated Introduction Programme target group consists of members coming from at least 49 different countries (Enes & Henriksen, 2012). This understanding is surprising, given that the large heterogeneity between different immigrant countries was, in fact, noted in early Introduction Programme policy development documents. Second, the explicit exclusion of immigrants from western countries is based on an understanding that the needs, norms and cultural background of immigrants from the U.S, Canada and Australia are more ‘normal’ according to prevailing Norwegian standards and that they are distinctly different from those of refugees and immigrants from outside of Europe. In fact, one policy document reported that immigrant groups hailing from Asia and Latin America had a higher labour market participation rate than the overall Norwegian population while still others—including those from North America—had a considerable lower participation rate (NOU 2001: 20, p. 26).

As with the Introduction Programme, the target group for the Qualification Programme is disparate (van der Wel et al., 2006; Naper et. al., 2009). Policy documents state that the target group is comprised of long-term social assistance claimants with ‘weak ties to the labour market’ and who are ‘in danger of entering a passive situation characterized by income poverty combined with other living condition problems of a health or social character’ (St. meld. nr. 9, 2006–2007, p. 10). Those claimants wishing to enter the Qualification Programme undergo an initial evaluation and skills mapping protocol. The mapping process is to take place ‘in cooperation with the system user’ and to consider ‘user experiences and wishes’ (Ot. prp. nr. 70, 2006–2007, p. 27). The evaluation is used to gauge whether applicants have both ‘severely reduced work and income ability’, yet also possess a level of ability such that the Programme could be ‘helpful in strengthening the possibility for participation in work life’ (St. meld. nr. 9, 2006-07, pp. 34, 224).

While the Introduction Programme target group is eligible by dint of residency status, the Qualification Programme target group is subject to an examination shaped by local norms concerning what is best for claimants and by what it means to be a full and active citizen. The Qualification Programme matches Foucault’s (1977) idea of hierarchical observation: it is up to local caseworkers to gauge the ‘danger of passivity’ of those targeted for the Qualification Programme.

While activation itself (the disciplinary tool) occurs through national intervention, methods for defining eligibility have differed across municipalities, depending on municipal demographics and local office resources (Schafft & Spjelkavik, 2011; NAV Directorate, 2011; Naper, 2010). This supports the argument that local welfare traditions, norms and expectations may also variably shape eligibility criteria for the Qualification Programme across regions. The need for the Qualification Programme is viewed against the backdrop of people’s perceived failure to conform to societies’ values and norms. Where labour market integration is a strong norm, the identities and behaviours associated with long-term unemployment are evaluated and taken as signs of disintegration. On the other hand, the state takes for granted that the Introduction Programme target group is passive.

It is notable that both the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme have quite disparate target groups, yet it is only with the Qualification Programme that the process for determining eligibility considers this disparateness. The discretionary nature of the Qualification Programme follows a tradition that has long characterized social assistance (Terum, 1996). Yet the new system of determining eligibility intensifies the focus on the personal, as it shifts from a consideration of economic needs to a calculation of personal abilities and possibilities. And whereas eligibility to the Qualification Programme is discretionary, eligibility to the Introduction Programme is clearly formulated and narrowly defined, based on residence status. The fact that the Introduction Programme easily lumps a target population not necessarily sharing a similar history paradoxically results in its right-based eligibility process. Yet placement of this varied target group into a single category attached to a presumption of cultural marginality and passivity is likely to be stigmatizing.

3.3. Tools for Problem Solving

Policymakers have described the benefits and programme structures of the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme as tools to motivate target groups to enter the labour market. The structure of each, however, reveals different understandings of the programmes’ target groups.

3.3.1. Benefits

Both Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme participants receive a standardized benefit rate that is typically higher than that of social assistance. As opposed to tax-free social assistance benefits, the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme benefits are taxable (Ot. prop. nr. 70, 2006–2007, p. 38; Ot. prop. no. 28, 2002–2003, pp. 90-91). Policymakers based the calculation of the higher

benefit on rational choice understandings of individual needs and motivations. For both, the policy language outlining the thinking behind the higher benefit level reflect the idea that higher short-term costs are necessary to enable longer-term financial stability at the state level (St. meld. nr. 9, 2006–2007, p. 14; Ot. prop. no. 28, 2002–2003, pp. 65–66;). The notion of paying taxes is linked to the idea of full, active citizenship. For both, the benefits were designed to resemble an ordinary salary in working-life where participants have to ‘do something, to get something’ (Ot. prop. nr. 28, 2002–2003, 83). The benefits aimed to ‘motivate the individual to active participation’ and represented ‘an incentive to move into work life’ (Ot. prop. nr. 70, 2006–2007, 37). The incentive-based thinking tied to the offer of a higher, stable benefit represents Foucault’s (1977) gentle form of discipline, here based on the normative expectation of full employment and social responsibility.

While the thinking related to the economic benefit level itself is similar for the two programmes, we must also consider the nature of the total constellation of benefits for each. This includes the rules for maintaining the full benefit as well as the additional economic benefits tied to programme participation. There are three ways in which the benefits packages for the programmes differ.

First, while participants in the Introduction Programme are allowed to retain their full benefit if they find paid employment, the Qualification Programme benefit is reduced to the extent a programme participant has income-earning employment. Thus, the IP benefit does not fully retain the means-tested character of the social assistance scheme. Second, as opposed to a social assistance benefit offering only a ‘citizen’s salary’ without a ‘clarification of duties and rights’ (Instilling St. nr. 148, 2006–2007, p. 12), Qualification Programme participants receive a benefit that counts towards the accrual of a normal pension. This allows participants better ‘predictability’ in the long-term (Ot. Prop. nr. 70, 2006–2007, p. 38). Unlike the Qualification Programme, however the Introduction Programme benefit does not count toward normal pension contributions. Third, Qualification Programme participants receive a standardized benefit per child in addition to their regular program benefit, making the benefit better attuned to ‘the realities of family needs and responsibilities’ (LOV-1991-12-13 nr 81a, Sec. 5-9). In contrast, Introduction Programme participants do not receive an additional child benefit. This difference has been explained in policy documents. The Introduction Programme aims to ‘stimulate’ programme participation by ‘both caretakers in the home’ and to generate ‘equality between the genders’. In light of this, any consideration toward extra child expenses might risk ‘weakening’ the target group’s ‘responsibilities for their own priorities and decision making’ (Ot. prop. nr. 28,

2002–2003, pp. 70–71, italics added for emphasis).

The shape of the benefits attached to the two programmes reflects the normative judgments made about the target group of each. Target group constructions have shaped the strategies for solving the ‘problem’ at hand. Policymakers have designed the Introduction Programme with an ethnified and essentialized understanding of its non-western immigrant target group in mind. Paradoxically, figures provided in an early Introduction Programme policy document show that employment levels for immigrants from North America and Oceania were lower than for Asia and Latin/South America. The gender division was also greater (NOU 2001: 20, p. 27). Nevertheless, it was non-western immigrant women who were singled out as the specific group to be targeted for the gender equality-focused Introduction Programme. Gender inequalities and a lack of women’s agency were among the key problems to be addressed. Successful integration was understood as being on par with gender equality (Annfelt & Gullikstad, 2013; Rugkåsa, 2010; Gressgård, 2005; Gressgård & Jacobsen, 2002, 2003). This reflected an assumption that a non-western cultural background necessitated the inculcation of ‘correct’ western cultural norms regarding gender equality (Midtbøen & Teigen, 2013). The constitution and representation of non-western immigrant women as involuntarily trapped in ‘patriarchal cultures’ is a reoccurring phenomenon found in official policy documents in Norway (Annfelt & Gullikstad, 2013), and not exclusive to the Introduction Programme.

Thus, in contrast to the Qualification Programme, policymakers have applied a ‘gentler’ means test to the Introduction Programme so as not to create disincentives for non-western immigrant women to come out of the home to work. Furthermore, the refusal to provide extra child support to Introduction Programme participants is to ensure that the incentive will be to work rather than to have more children. There has been no provision for pension accrual because the target group lies at a lower point on the welfare system hierarchy—having not yet qualified themselves to count for minimum citizenship status and therefore not in need of provisions that provide stability for the future. The Qualification Programme benefit, on the other hand, is pension generating, comes with a childcare benefit, and is means-tested against waged employment. This reflects an understanding of the target group in which gender inequalities are not the problem, motivation to work is. The goal is to move the target group into full social participation through regular employment and to provide security for the long term.

3.3.2. Program Shape

In addition to the examination that takes place for potential Qualification Programme participants, an addi-

tional tool for examination used in both the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme is the 'individual plan'. On the one hand, the content of each programme is to be shaped 'in cooperation between the caseworkers and users' and according to a detailed mapping of participant's background (St. meld. nr. 9, 2006–2007, p. 2; Ot. prop. nr. 28, 2002–2003, p. 59).⁶ The plan serves as a 'welfare contract', directly connecting the rights associated with programme participation with a discrete set of duties. It is this plan that serves as the link between individual progress at the local level and the award of state-provided benefits.

In addition to shared points of examination, the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme share similar logistical requirements and rights that simulate the contours of ordinary work life. Each programme's day resembles an ordinary workday and participants are required to engage in full-time activity on a yearlong basis (St. meld. nr. 9, 2006–2007, p. 226; Ot. prop. nr. 28, 2002–2003, p. 54). Programme participants are to receive the same vacation and leave privileges as regular wage earning workers (Ot. prop. nr. 70, 2006–2007; Ot. prp. nr. 28, 2002–2003, p. 54). The requirement of full time activity and training is designed to encourage social inclusion by providing a 'transition to work life.' The format of the programmes 'counteracts' the 'passivity' of those 'with weak connections to the labour market' (Ot. prp. nr. 70, 2006–2007, p. 11, 29; Ot. prop. no. 28, 2002–2003, p. 54).

The Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme share the same normalizing labour market aims and, in fact, participants partake in many of the same labour market-oriented measures. Yet the Introduction Programme also has additional aims related to integration. Its programmatic content is designed with the aim of teaching about Norwegian society, 'to provide basic understanding of Norwegian society life' and to contribute to 'economic self-sufficiency and self-responsibility' (Rundskriv Q-20/2012, pp. 14, 23). At a minimum, the programme includes 250 hours of Norwegian language training, 50 hours of civic studies and measures preparing participants to assimilate into working and ordinary social life. Included in the civics course is a focus on liberal democratic values, human rights and Norwegian history. Among the listed goals in the civics course is for students to learn about Norwegian 'values', including that 'violence against children and other family members...and forced marriage are forbidden' as well as to 'discuss different perspectives on child rearing' (VOX, 2012, p. 5). Participation and completion in Norwegian courses and civic studies are a requirement for Introduction Programme partici-

pants to achieve permanent residence or, eventually, citizenship. This ability to sanction creates a division between who is 'in' and who is 'out' in terms of who has access to full social, economic and political rights.

Participants in the Qualification Programme are entitled to 'work-related measures and work seeking'. Other measures such as 'training, motivational counselling, skills training' are optional, as is 'time set aside for health aid, training, ability activities, etc.' (LOV-1991-12-13 nr 81b, Sec. 5A-2). While the focus of the Qualification Programme is primarily on transition to work, the aim of the Introduction Programme is mainly on promoting first time labour market integration for new immigrants who have not had the time to yet establish themselves in working life. While language training is arguably a necessary ingredient for successful labour market integration, it is less clear how and why social studies training fits in with this effort. It would seem that the social studies requirement is not directly attached to employment aims. Moreover, the focus on values, violence and appropriate childrearing predicates understandings concerning the Introduction Programme target group on the assumption that many members stand in violation of dominant cultural norms.

4. Conclusion

We have compared and contrasted the disciplinary mechanisms enabled by the frame and shape of the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme, as well as explored how each programme reflects varying ethnified understandings of their target groups. The following section summarizes and discusses the main findings within the context of changing forms of discipline within Norwegian activation at the lowest levels of the welfare system.

The Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme have been framed and shaped as a solution to the problems of worklessness and low social integration. The focus on divisions between those lying inside versus those lying outside work life has shifted focus to individualized problems and solutions (Daguerre, 2007, p. 7). Furthermore, and in contrast to the Qualification Programme, the problem of being 'outside' for the Introduction Programme target group is also cast as a matter of cultural difference. The individualized and ethnified casting of the 'problem' leaves us with a policy problem description that moves attention away from recognition of broader socio-structural problems.

As the problem is individualized, so is the solution. The modern, individualized strategy applies a strategy of softer, incentives-based disciplining (Daguerre, 2007; Lødemel & Trickey, 2001), fitting with Foucault's (1977) description of institutional regimes of control. Yet, while problems and solutions are focused on the individual, they are also ethnified, representing essentialized notions of culture and the target group in focus

⁶ In terms of broader reform, this could represent a shift from NPM thinking to the collaborative and trust-based approach of New Public Governance (Torfing & Triantafillou, 2013).

(Schinkel, 2013). Differing hierarchical systems of deservingness between the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme are revealed at the point of eligibility determination. Both programmes have established new hierarchies within the lower tiers of the Norwegian welfare system. The Qualification Programme is framed around an individual assessment tool, yet the assessment of deservingness is overwhelmingly based on work ability. The Introduction Programme is also based on work ability, yet rather than individualized, its rights-based eligibility protocol adheres to an essentialized notion of outsidership with the inherent goal of cultural assimilation for the entire target group.

The tools for solving problems are also the tools for control and examination. The benefits structure of both programmes offers a softer means for incentive-based control. Yet while the benefits structure of the Qualification Programme allows for a more holistic consideration of the life situation of the participant, the Introduction Programme structure is more rigid to encourage/control (especially female) participant movement into the labour market and reflects essentialized understandings of the culture and norms of the target group.

Yet while the benefits offered by both programmes represent a softer means of disciplining, the shapes of the programmes reveal differing strategies for control. The content of both programmes is to be shaped according to an individual plan. The plan functions as a second tool for examination linking various levels of hierarchical observation. Both programmes reflect a strategy of normalizing discipline—with a focus on both measuring abnormality and transforming it. Yet while it is the worklessness of Qualification Programme participants that is the problem in focus, Introduction Programme participants are imagined to be troubled both in an economic and cultural sense. Thus, the Introduction Programme ‘solution’ also consists of a requirement for cultural indoctrination. This activity is tied to the right of residency and the threat of physical sanction harkens back to the pre-modern system of hard control. Loïc Wacquant (2011, p. 13) writes it is easier for the welfare state to introduce and uphold punitive measures in societies with a clear ethnic divisions when the measures are mainly directed at immigrants. The harsher form of control taking place within the Introduction Programme is acceptable for its immigrant target group. This dual system of control is another form of welfare dualism, now introduced through activation strategies.

It has long been recognized that selective measures may contribute to the marginalization of their target groups (Titmuss, 1976). In the last decade, activation and conditionality have indeed introduced ‘softer’ forms of discipline. Yet additional distinctions along ethnic lines within the Introduction Programme also illustrate movement back to slightly harder forms of

control. Norway’s activation strategies at the lowest tiers of the welfare system represent a dual approach, wherein culturally normative divisions enable a move away from modern discipline and may represent a newer movement back to harsher forms of examination and control. Low public support for the welfare system reportedly reflects racialized divisions in the U.S. (Larsen, 2013; Schram, Soss, Fording, & Houser, 2009). Public perceptions of welfare deservingness in Norway and Denmark also now reflect support for a dual welfare system (Bay, Finseraas, & Pedersen, 2013). Our article shifts focus to the distinctions taking place within the framing and shaping of activation policies themselves.

While our findings imply that the different framing and shaping of the Introduction Programme and Qualification Programme encourage recipients to ‘constitute themselves as subject of moral conduct’, our data only allow us to provisionally suggest how this may translate into varying ‘relationships with the self’, ‘self-knowledge’, and ‘self-examination’ (Foucault, 1992) for the participants of the two programmes. Still to be seen is whether the policies *in practice* are also (further) divided along ethnic lines.

To be sure, the programme frameworks as suggested in policy documents can only hint at the actual content of the two programmes and the interactions occurring within each. As both the Qualification Programme and Introduction Programme are provided at the local level within a country with a strong tradition of decentralized control and discretionary practice, our analysis of policy language can only speak to the moral frameworks that form the basis for the content of the programmes themselves. Future research might also explore potential sites of individual transformation: resistance, re-definition or unintended consequences (for providers and recipients, alike) at play in the real-life practices taking shape during and following policy implementation. Our analysis of the framing and shaping of the two policies has provided a useful account of the regimes of control within which active subjects—providers and recipients, alike—are encouraged to act. Interviews and observations of practices and interactions would allow fuller exploration of Foucault’s notion of the technologies that act ‘upon the self by the self’ (Rose, 1996; Rose & Miller, 1992).

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Does Antwerp Belong to Everyone? Unveiling the Conditional Limits to Inclusive Urban Citizenship

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Abstract

Recent theoretical discussions have indicated that citizenship is not only a way of being, but also a way of behaving. This article aims to show how attempts to regulate the behaviour of the citizenry can introduce a new topography of inclusion and exclusion, thereby exercising a direct effect on particular ethnic minorities. We investigate the issue in Antwerp, the largest city of the Flemish Region in Belgium. With his slogan 'Antwerp belongs to everyone' former mayor Patrick Janssens gained significant international attention for Antwerp's supposedly inclusive conception of urban citizenship. In this article, we argue that the universality of Antwerp's city slogan has nevertheless veiled the introduction of new exclusionary prescriptions centred around citizens' conduct. Drawing on a Foucauldian account of power, three different modes of policing are discussed that have rearticulated the boundaries of urban citizenship in Antwerp. The disciplinary, bio-political and etho-political techniques of power each show in a different way attempts by the state to steer and effectively regulate what counts as appropriate conduct. As a corollary of governmental power, particular ways of behaving have been labelled as deviant and abnormal, thus rendering full citizenship conditional on a set of substantial expectations on how to perform as a citizen. As these expectations are only apparently neutral with respect to ethnic identities, a tension arose between the city's universal and inclusive rhetoric and its particular and exclusionary policies.

Keywords

exclusion; Foucault; governmentality; Marshall; power; urban citizenship

Issue

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1. Introduction

In 2008 Patrick Janssens, the mayor of Antwerp, Flanders' largest city, was shortlisted for the World Mayor Award. His nomination represented a landslide change in the city's international reputation, which had deteriorated ever since it had become the hotbed for the

Flemish ultra-right-wing party Vlaams Blok in the 1990s and what has been labelled to be 'Muslim riots' in the early 2000s (De Decker, Kesteloot, De Maesschalk, & Vranken, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2000). By 2003, the inability of authorities to regain control over the city came to a climax when the entire municipal government resigned after a corruption scandal involving some of its

leading politicians. The socialist politician Patrick Janssens then entered the scene as the new mayor, announcing a different political future for the city. To counter the widespread image of a highly 'divided city', he immediately launched a new slogan which was to embody Antwerp's identity for years to come: 'The city belongs to everyone.'

The city slogan gained significant international attention for its supposedly inclusive conception of urban citizenship. Compared with the divisive political program of the extreme right it indeed explicitly distanced itself from any legal exclusion of unwanted persons. However, in this article we want to raise some critical questions about what it means for the city to belong to everyone. We argue that the universality of Antwerp's slogan has in fact veiled the introduction of a set of new exclusionary prescriptions that define what citizenship is and who belongs to the city. In our interpretation some policy measures expect the behaviour of citizens to correspond to the standard of the 'good citizen'. Yet this often also tends to exclude a range of individuals, often the most vulnerable categories in society like homeless people, immigrants, tenants, or poor people. Rather than being excluded legally, they risk being degraded to a form of second-class citizenship.

In the field of Urban Politics many authors have approached the issue of contemporary societal exclusion from the perspective of who factually runs the city (Smith & McQuarrie, 2012). The general argument is that those who remain at the margins of the political power structure will be excluded from the city in various ways. Separate bodies of research have therefore looked into the distribution of power over gentrification (Smith, 1998), public space (Mitchell, 2005), homelessness (De Verteuil, 2006) and migrant policies (Uitermark, Rossi, & Van Houtum, 2005) across many cities.

Even though the Urban Politics approach is valuable in its own right, it has overemphasized the question of *who* is responsible for exclusionary policies, at the expense of understanding *how* these policies factually exclude people. In addition, research somewhat lost sight of the broader connection between several exclusionary policies. Discussions on 'the right to the city' (Marcuse, 2009) or the 'just city' (Fainstein, 2010) have pointed in general to the exclusionary effects intrinsic to the contemporary capitalist city, yet they suffer from an analytical deficiency to account for the *specific nature* of different *forms* of exclusion.

This article will therefore draw on a Foucauldian reading of power techniques to complement the dominant perspective on who is responsible for exclusionary citizenship policies. Foucault (1988; 2004) approaches power from a 'depersonalized' perspective whereby *who* is in power is not of foremost importance. His work is therefore well-suited to discuss *how* the governmental reach of the state tries to steer and effectively regulate the behaviour of its citizens. It is espe-

cially useful to distinguish the underlying rationale and structure of power techniques that regulate who counts as a citizen and who doesn't.

We begin this article with a theoretical sketch of the distinction between a classic Marshallian approach to citizenship and a Foucauldian approach. Then we will discuss three different case studies that each illustrate a distinct power technique regulating the boundaries of urban citizenship. While the three illustrations only focus on the city of Antwerp, the theoretical leverage of the analysis is much broader. As scholars working in the field of Urban Politics have extensively shown, exclusionary policies are popping-up across the globe. This paper is a first attempt to classify the nature of these policies building on a Foucauldian take on power. To conclude, we will show how the different power techniques are interconnected and add up to a new urban topography of in- and exclusion.

2. The Political Construction of Citizenship

2.1. *The Renaissance of Citizenship: from Being to Behaving*

Sociological research on citizenship has long been inspired by T.H. Marshall's (1963[1998]) account of 'Citizenship and Social Class'. At the dawn of the era of the European welfare state, he argued that the relationship between citizens and the state had gone through a natural process of rights extension. Distinguishing between three periods, Marshall saw the rise of formalized citizenship in the 18th century when the state became the protector of civil rights such as free speech, in exchange for complying with civil duties such as paying taxes. In the 19th century, a second rights dimension was added: (some) citizens obtained political rights, enabling them to legitimately elect representatives. Finally, social rights were added to the bundle in the middle of the 20th century, as the state obtained responsibility over the welfare of its citizens. Sociological research subsequently showed that the bundle of civil, social and political rights varied depending on the type of welfare state or political system.

In the late 1990s, research on citizenship experienced a sudden renaissance (Isin & Turner, 2007), mainly due to the rise of the 'active' welfare state. The Marshallian approach seemed unable to understand how states could regulate the behaviour of their citizenry without modifying the bundle of rights. It became increasingly clear that Marshall had only grasped the juridico-political dimension of citizenship. For authors like Nikolas Rose (2000), Barry Hindess (2000), Mike Raco (2003), Engin Isin (2002) and Willem Schinkel (2010) however, citizenship was a more complex phenomenon.

These authors argued that citizenship is not only a legal status granted to individuals, but also entails a set

of expectations on how to behave as a citizen. A central source of inspiration to understand this ‘culturalized’ dimension of citizenship was the work of Michel Foucault. As Olson (2008) summarizes, the Foucauldian approach to citizenship shares the “claim that citizenship is not simply a legal status conferring political rights and obligations, but one that additionally shapes identities and forms of subjectivity. Here citizenship not only certifies political membership, but more profoundly serves as a means of social differentiation and of fabricating interests, opinions, and preferences.” (2008, p. 40).

The Foucauldian approach importantly shed new light on the principles of inclusion and exclusion from citizenship (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996). For Marshall and his followers the distinction between citizens and non-citizens was unambiguous and formalized: exclusion from the political community implied the subduction of membership status or the restriction of rights and duties. Foucauldian scholars saw citizenship as ‘conditional’ and ‘virtual’ (Schinkel, 2010). Apart from a juridico-legal sense of belonging, citizens are often asked to ‘perform’ certain expected behaviour as a condition to become a full citizen. Exclusion from the political community then occurs when formally recognized members do not comply with the required behaviour of the ‘good citizen’.

This is the point where ‘ethnicity’ enters the picture. At least since Fredrik Barth’s (1969) classical work, scholars have been at pains to emphasize the cultural nature of ethnicity. As Malešević (2004, p. 4) argued recently, ethnicity is now generally understood as “(...) a social relation in which social actors perceive themselves and are perceived by others as being culturally distinct collectivities”. The logical consequence is that, in contemporary societies, ethnicity is policed primarily through cultural conceptions of citizenship—that is, through policy measures enforcing norms of ideal behaviour, in the process shaping citizens’ identities and subjectivities. In the cases discussed in this article (see Section 3) we will focus more particularly on how policy measures which appear to be ethnically neutral, nevertheless have direct consequences for very particular ethnic groups organized around modes of behaviour constitutive for their identities.

To understand how ethnicity is being policed today, we therefore need to focus on the instruments that governments have developed to steer citizens’ conduct, their ways of life and the experience of their identities. According to Foucault, these advanced ‘power techniques’ are distinct from sovereign power instruments in the sense that they do not use physical force, such as incarceration or bodily violence. Instead of physically repressing its subjects, the power techniques that regulate the daily behaviour of citizens depend on the latter’s cooperation to understand and comply with the requisite behaviour. Citizens are se-

duced to identify with the state and its demands because these are portrayed as rational and in the best interest of the individual. Ultimately the exercise of these types of power tries to annul itself: citizens should internalize the requisite habitus as natural. Those who fail to comply, are not threatened with juridical exclusion from the community, but risk being stigmatized within the boundaries of the state. Their citizenship becomes second-rate because they do not comply with the hegemonic view on society.

The main advantage of such a Foucauldian approach is that it enables an in-depth analysis of the power techniques used to ‘police’ the cultural dimensions of citizenship, which are crucial to understand how ethnicities are policed today. On the other hand, this approach’s main weakness is that some of the boundaries usually drawn between forms of exclusion are increasingly blurred. Most research on social exclusion is indeed differentiated with respect to the substantial ‘identity’ of its subjects (e.g. class, ethnicity, gender,...). In other words, while using a Foucauldian approach enables us to analyse the instruments with which ethnicity is being policed, it no longer allows us to distinguish sharply between the policing of ethnicity and, for instance, class and gender. In many cases, as we will demonstrate further below, these exclusionary techniques operate identically for different groups of subjects. In the following section, we will therefore shortly elaborate on three such power techniques.

2.2. Three Power Techniques

The regulation of citizens’ conduct can take on a multiplicity of forms dispersed over many societal domains. Despite this variety, Foucault has tried to organize them into more generic types, in particular ‘disciplinary power’ and ‘bio-politics’ of the population (sometimes also referred to as the power of security).

Disciplinary power is composed of a set of techniques that are aimed at subjecting an individual to a particular code of conduct (Foucault, 2001). The use of this type of power is highly localized in specific institutions (e.g. clinics, prisons or schools). The internal structure of these institutions regulates the spontaneous behaviour of individual persons. In the context of the active welfare state, for instance, we think of the power exercised by public employment services. The unemployed are expected to register at regular intervals at the employment office to report on their activities of job-seeking. The take-up of their social rights is thereby made conditional on their collaboration with the employment service. Although repressive sanctions do exist, the ultimate goal of service providers is qualitatively different: they want to educate people and strengthen their labour skills. Compliance is mainly assured by convincing subjects that it is in their best interest to find a job. Employment agencies thus pro-

mote the meritocratic ideal in which happiness and societal prestige derive from income and work. This productive power over subjects operates according to the principle of the norm. This means that it evaluates individual progression against a common standard. So if most people need three months to apply for a job, everyone should. As a result, people who do not fit the norm, for example because there is little demand for their specific expertise, are stigmatized as unwilling to work.

The second power type, bio-politics of the population, is less tied to specific institutions (Foucault, 1984). Instead, it aims to establish order in a community in its totality, that is, across institutional boundaries. Rather than regulating the conduct of individual persons according to a norm, this power type is exercised over citizens as a 'population'. It starts out from a specific view on what a 'normal' population should look like, and tries to identify the necessary parameters to change from the existing distribution of citizens to a normal one (Foucault, 2008). In our earlier example of the active welfare state measures to counter the 'unemployment trap' give a good illustration of bio-political control. Often the surplus income of work is very meagre for the low-skilled unemployed, dissuading them to look for a job. Many people consider this to be an abnormality in the social security system. Lowering benefits might be a parameter for the system to restore its balance. Again, this normalization can entail serious exclusionary consequences, for example in establishing the so-called 'working poor'.

Foucault's power typology is historical, which means that it remains principally open to new types of power. In this respect, authors have so far highlighted one additional type. Rose (2000, p. 1399) distinguished a new 'politics of behaviour' called 'etho-politics': "If discipline individualizes and normalizes and bio-power aggregates and socializes, etho-power works through the values, beliefs, and sentiments thought to underpin the techniques of responsible self-government and the manifestation of one's obligations." Etho-politics dig deeper into what Raco (2009) has called the 'existential dimension' of citizenship. Just like disciplinary power it 'individualizes' a political subject, yet it does not operate in a special place or institution, and it can be exercised virtually anywhere and at any time. A good example is the possibility to take into account a broad range of private information, often distributed through social media, to evaluate people's claims on social benefits. The possibility of permanently controlling private conduct is used to encourage citizens to reflect on their public ethos, and to behave as the norms prescribe.

Important in this account of the power techniques is that they do not exclude one another: "So, there is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier one to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age

of security. (...) In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which (...) what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation (...)" (Foucault, 2007, p. 8). This implies that repressive sovereign techniques often accompany techniques aimed at the regulation of behaviour. Nevertheless, the way in which these techniques link up and are discursively legitimated can take many forms. Foucault coined the neologism 'governmentality' or 'governmental rationality' to refer to the overall construction of power over citizens as individuals and as a population.

To sum up, we can say that our theoretical approach draws on the insight that citizenship implies more than a mere legal relationship, it also entails a cultural dimension. Inspired by Foucault, we distinguish different techniques of power that the state can employ to substantively regulate the conduct of its citizenry. As a correlate of this, different modes of conduct appear as abnormal and do not receive full recognition in society.

3. Antwerp, a City that Belongs to Everyone?

The remainder of this article will reconstruct in detail how Antwerp's municipal government developed its own conception of urban citizenship between 2003 and 2012, a period in which the city was governed by a socialist-led coalition. We focus mainly on three sets of policy measures which gave rise to tense public debates because of their implications for particular groups of subjects, not in the least for ethnic minorities. First, we reconstruct the factual origins and official goals of each of the policy measures. For this purpose, we draw on in-depth interviews, public policy documents, Community Council minutes and statistics from municipal and regional authorities. Secondly, we propose to interpret the policy measures as illustrations of the three Foucauldian power techniques discussed above, i.e. the disciplinary, bio-political and etho-political power techniques. With the help of our theoretical framework, we try to enrich our understanding of these measures' general rationale and functioning of these policy measures, thus linking it with the city's emerging conception of citizenship. From this we derive whether and how new boundaries of exclusion arose. While it is not our aim to evaluate or criticize these policy measures, we do seek to lay bare these measures' exclusionary effects.

As a result, our interpretative reading shows clear affinities to Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (Mitchell, 2009), by focussing on the disarticulated practical effects of official policies and its legitimations. We do not contend our interpretation of the policy measures to be exhaustive, but the Foucauldian lens should offer a way to recast the rhetorical force of city marketing by critically asking what it means to live in a city that pre-

sents itself as 'inclusive'.

3.1. *Disciplinary Power and the Neutrality of Service Provision*

On March 7, 2007 Antwerp's municipality introduced a dress code for city staff, which became better known as the 'headscarf ban in public functions'. Nonetheless, in its original formulation the guideline did not mention any garments in particular. It merely defended a general ban on all 'External symbols of ideological, political, syndical, sportive,... belief' for city staff working in direct contact with the public (City of Antwerp, 2007a). The dress code was experienced however by the Muslim community of Antwerp as a restriction of the basic individual freedom of religion. A Women's activist group called BOOH! (Boss Over Own Head) was established by a group of Muslimahs who defended the right to always wear a headscarf. At regular intervals they organized protest, catching the attention of local and national media alike.

In his book *The Best Is Yet to Come*, it was mayor Patrick Janssens (2006, p. 134) himself who had advocated a ban on all ideological signs for city staff: "despite my understanding, it is not appropriate to authorize the headscarf (or any other religious or political symbol) while exercising a public function, which has to visually express the neutrality of the government." The headscarf ban was just one of the measures in a broader attempt to guarantee the secular nature of the state. Another measure for instance consisted in not authorizing religious people to perform prayers at work.

Many of the politicians from Moroccan or Turkish decent in the socialist party and in the coalition parties resented the measure as a stigmatization of religious minorities. Janssens' original rationale to guarantee the political neutrality of the city was therefore subsequently complemented with the pragmatic policy goal to help support an ethnically mixed recruitment policy. Since the 1990s the municipality had tried to make the city staff more ethnically heterogeneous, but with little result so far. With the dress code, it was said that the resistance among the broader population to a mixed city staff would gradually diminish. Nevertheless, this resulted in a governmental paradox; while the aim was to make the city staff into a reflection of the ethnic diversity in the urban society, religious diversity as such should not be visible in front-office functions.

In our view, this first policy measure can be identified as a disciplinary power technique. The exercise of disciplinary power is quite common in professional settings, as it certifies that employees fulfil the general aims of a company. Still, a more symbolic issue was at stake in the context of city staff: the secular, neutral representation of the state and the political community as such was the main driver for the policy measure. The dress code then became the norm against which

each individual civil servant's appearance needed to be evaluated. As we will now explain, this inevitably implied the construction of a new exclusionary fault-line of citizenship.

The municipal government considered it legitimate to make the basic freedom of religion conditional in order to guarantee the secular nature of the state. As Council Member Cathy Berx argued: "We have to learn to cope with diversity, but also with the predicaments of our democratic system of law. These state that fundamental rights and freedoms, like the right to free speech and the freedom of religion, are not absolute basic rights, and negotiations need to be made, in particular in the case of the neutrality of the public service." (City of Antwerp, 2007b, p. 1721) So it was in the defence of a specific secular interpretation of universal citizenship that certain basic laws were denied to a subset of citizens.

The municipality stigmatized any refusal to comply with the dress-code as a sign of immature citizenship and religious fanaticism. As mayor Janssens (2006) put it: "In such a situation, the employee needs to be mature enough to choose for the neutrality of his function instead of being loyal to an absolute belief." (2006, p. 134) Put differently, the norm of the dress code established a political fault-line between those who could deal with religion in a mature way and those who could not.

The municipal government denied that it wanted to extend this norm outside the confines of its institutional boundaries. For mayor Janssens, "the headscarf and other religious symbols are not forbidden in Antwerp (...). We only ask for people to take off their symbols during their public job." (City of Antwerp, 2007c, p. 64) Again this is common for disciplinary power: the disciplinary norm is organically bound up with the institutional context in which it originated and cannot travel freely outside its original context. However, when a government promotes a disciplinary measure, governmental norms tend to inspire other institutional contexts and contaminate them. It is the legitimacy of the state which strengthens institutional 'mirroring'.

In fact, this is what happened in the case of the headscarf ban; suddenly it started to trickle down in other public services as well. For example, in public day-care centres employees were forbidden to wear a headscarf. But also in public schools the fault-line was drawn, forcing young Muslim women to stop wearing headscarves at school. What started out as an institutional norm thus grew into a broader imagination of the public tolerance for religious diversity. In the original context of the city administration women with a headscarf were offered back-office jobs, but the symbolic effect was unprecedented. The establishment of the widely supported BOOH! was one of the clear indications that religious migrant minorities felt stigmatized and relegated to a second-class, merely formal citizenship in the urban political community.

3.2. *Bio-Politics and the Normalization of Urban Neighbourhoods*

During Janssens' term as mayor of Antwerp, the municipal administration transformed into an apparatus that aimed to increasingly influence the composition of its urban population. The objective was twofold: more better-off people had to live in the city and the number of poor people had to decrease. In this paragraph we discuss the means and the strategies by which this two-sided concern was set into motion. In our view, both strategies illustrate the functioning of a bio-political technique that aims to regulate and effectively normalize who lives where. We discuss how the attraction of better-off people became part and parcel of Antwerp's loudly approved urban renewal policy, whereas reducing the number of poor inhabitants in the inner city remained a silent process. The latter took the form of backstage agreements between administrators and local politicians. From 2008 on, this silent Antwerp experiment became more or less official legislation in the Flanders Region: from then on a system of technically refined parameters 'proved' that a certain percentage of poor inhabitants was the sufficient justification for a deliberate freeze in the social housing supply. A vast majority of these urban poor were immigrants, people to whom both ownership and the better equipped rented houses remained unattainable (Vaneste, 2007).

Let us now return to the more publicly visible aspect of these policy measures, the attempt to attract specific high-profile groups to the city, such as dual earners, higher income groups, and young families. The Municipal Coalition Plan repeatedly identified them as target groups whose presence would help create a better functioning and bustling city: "The municipality wants to get more young people into the city. Firstly young families with children and baby boomers coming from the suburbs. Therefore high-standard urban living is one of the major tasks for this policy term and the years to come." (City of Antwerp, 2007d, p. 3) This endeavour was attached to the Municipal Spatial Structure Plan, a document indicating the strategic interventions to be made. Under Janssens' administration, this Plan was used more systematically to integrate new housing in urban renewal projects. This endeavour was rather new for Flanders as most of its real estate projects are developed almost without prior urban design or planning. The Antwerp Coalition Plan completed its focal objective with a bulk of interventions in the domain of arts and culture, education, shopping and nightlife inter alia, in order to become the 'bustling city' where youngsters, young adults and young families like to live (City of Antwerp, 2007d, pp. 3, 17, 27).

Taking its own apparatus and governance techniques into account, the Coalition Plan noted that 'good and goal-oriented governance' was the best way to rejuvenate Antwerp's 'leadership and its leading

character. By showing that bigger towns like ours have to offer a lot of fascinating things, to young families with children as well' (City of Antwerp, 2007d). The Janssens' administration took a leading role in the de-regulation of older business models by reshuffling municipal departments into corporate units and granting specific administrations extensive autonomy, such as the planning department. This has been instrumental in attracting substantial funds for big strategic renewal projects. The former retirement fund of Antwerp was converted into the real estate and urban development company Vespa. Vespa became capable of intervening in local housing markets and in this way acted upon important parameters that influence the composition of the urban population. Vespa was said to influence the supply and demand of existing and new housing, inter alia by intentionally buying and selling land properties and buildings on specific locations (e.g. disadvantaged neighbourhoods, ragged areas and/or newly designed districts).

The second part of the case we discuss here, deals with the overall reduction of social housing opportunities in Antwerp, especially in the city centre's social rental sector. Between 2004 and 2012 the number of socially rented dwellings decreased by nine percent in the city, some districts showed an even bigger decline. This reduction was achieved by demolishing older dwellings, assembling formerly individual apartments, freezing programs for new social houses, and selling social parcels to commercial companies. In some remote neighbourhoods however, new social housing projects were started nevertheless (e.g. in the harbour district far north). From 2005 on, the social housing companies did not initiate any major project in the city centre, and when some smaller corporations did apply for such projects, they received a municipally disapprobation.

Although Antwerp did not deploy income policies for new residents (as Rotterdam for instance did), the city did try to interfere in its demographic composition, especially by reducing its lowest socioeconomic segments, many coming from an immigrant background. The administrative parameters to do so were prepared and composed from 2003 onwards, and since 2008 the Antwerp dispersion policy for rental housing in the public sector became largely standard policy in Flanders. From then on, the municipality had more legal and technical instruments to freeze or decrease the number of social housing in specific neighbourhoods where the rate of social (rental) housing was considered to be too high.

The legal framework provided refined techniques to calculate the precise number of rented social housing in each statistical sector. These parameters created the illusion that the considerations to be made were purely technical instead of societal or political. This opinion seems to be illustrated by casting an eye on the statements and discussions in the Flemish Parliament on this selective and area-bound public housing policy.

The preparation and establishment of this legislation was discussed in terms of risks for the real estate sector and the deliberate reduction of socially rented housing stock in the inner cities itself was not discussed as a matter of public interest.

Today experts in the social housing sector are critical on this issue. Gert Eyckmans, managing director of a smaller housing corporation in the Antwerp region, notifies that especially in the districts and neighbourhoods with high rates of social housing, the public sector should remain present and sometimes even increase its activities. "The mere technical calculations veil what in the near future will be needed in these neighbourhoods. As urban demography will rise, these districts in fact will need even more dwellings in the public sector. A great deal depends on how one positions the referential values decisive to whether one increases or decreases the supply". In this context Janssens' policy was quite different compared to that of other cities where corporations and the city administration decided to remain present in these neighbourhoods.

Combined, the two dimensions of the policy installed a new topography of in- and exclusion. As affordability of private rental housing is growing weaker in Flanders, the public rental sector functions as a shelter for urban tenants, especially for people with low incomes (Winters & Elsinga, 2008). This precarity is even fiercer for ethnic minorities for whom tenant properties in the private sector are often unaffordable because of repeatedly reported discrimination by landlords (for an overview, see Özüerken & Van Kempen, 2003). Due to the silent and technocratic relocation of social housing however, poor people are 'in a natural way' displaced to the urban periphery where they symbolically live through their second-rate citizenship. Still they remain dependent on amenities in the inner city, and as social workers and grass-roots associations report, poor people perceive the new suburban environments often as inadequate, especially in terms of social networks. By contrast, the inner-city tends to become a purified domain, a place for leisure and consumption, a realm for middle- and upper-class residents. The neighbourhoods where the decrease in social housing was most dramatic were often those districts that functioned as an arrival city for immigrant newcomers, a particularly obvious example being the area around the central railway station, where a large renewal program was deployed. This reshuffling of urban functions, combining the restyling of urban areas with an implicit regulation of who lives where, can be conceived as a bio-political intervention on the definition of urban citizenship.

3.3. Etho-Politics and the Regulation of Behaviour in Public Spaces

As a third case, we discuss Antwerp's local security pol-

icies, focussing on the Local Administrative Penalties (LAP's). In short, LAP is a system of administrative fines that remains outside the regular court-handling of sanctions. During Janssens' term, the LAP's became the corner stone of the so-called 'integrated security policy'. We argue that these fines can be interpreted as a specific etho-political power instrument. The LAP system was initially designed to identify and re-educate youngsters and individuals behaving inappropriately in public spaces. As the system was designed to re-integrate these individuals, experts considered it to be generally inclusive (Devroe, 2010). In its implementation, however, the system thereby drew new lines of exclusion, as citizens relying on public spaces for daily activities had to face new and unknown regulations, and particular areas housing ethnic minorities were subjected to close attention and behavioural control, especially with respect to these minorities' youngsters.

At the end of 2004 the Antwerp municipality presented its 'Plan Safety', a master plan in the struggle against urban decay, petty crime and what was phrased as 'problems of quality of life', e.g. noise nuisances, dirt in public space or dog waste on the sidewalks. The approach was said to be 'integral' as civil servants started a systematic collaboration with social workers, police forces and juridical officials. Through new forms of 'assertive outreaching' the administration wanted to make house calls, focusing on hard-to-reach groups and multi-problem families. An important strand of the approach was oriented towards young adults and early offenders, most of them belonging to ethnic minorities. Night-shops and non-profit gathering places for immigrants would be followed more stringently than before because they were suspected of being involved in drug trade and causing public nuisance. The bulk of measures was supplemented by actions bound to migrant concentration neighbourhoods and specific target groups (under aged immigrant offenders with no criminal record).

New forms of mediation and early intervention were developed. Municipal cleaning and restoration campaigns were set up, involving both city services and neighbourhood residents. The 'Plan Safety' did not yet entail administrative (financial) sanctions. Its reach was broader and encompassed a wide range of programs and counselling instruments aimed at supporting both victims and perpetrators of nuisance, while using these programmes for building up a local policy-relevant database. The programme was monitored citywide, enabling the mayor to request immediate interventions. Nevertheless, all these local programmes and interventions remained curative or preventive, as for most offenses there were no repressive municipal instruments.

On the national level however, the idea became dominant that municipalities should indeed be able to act repressively. Local authorities and particularly mayors should be able to punish small offences, such

as noise nuisance and illegal dumping. By establishing a financial fine instead of a legal prosecution, a double logic could be installed: petty criminality would no longer remain unpunished, and prosecutors' caseload would be diminished, thus creating time for dealing with serious offences. The installation of the LAP's was said to be a form of de-penalisation, a rather veiling label as the offending citizens were still being punished while no longer protected by ordinary juridical rights and procedures.

However, in order to make these federal LAP legislations locally applicable, municipalities had to organize a complex of new regulations and implementations: new civil servant functions had to be created, a list of punishable offences had to be compiled, and these new regulations had to be integrated with existing local practices. Moreover, a mediating organism and procedure had to be installed, as the federal law on LAP's guaranteed that the suspected offender could appeal to a mediator.

What types of behaviour did the LAP legislation consider to be offences? The national legislator only indicated the general types of acts and situations that were apt for local fines, in the sense that classic penal procedures no longer applied. The majority of the legislative energy was mobilized for the technical de-penalisation, rather than reflecting on the implications of the radical shift in criminal justice and its implementation. Major aspects of the latter now became the sole responsibility of mayors and their municipal councils. Moreover, the de-penalisation created a hyper-localized legislation, with town-based regulations, sometimes comprising up to 200 pages listing offensive actions.

When the LAP's were implemented and the new apparatus became operational, something paradoxical happened, at least in Antwerp. The procedure proved to be a lot easier than the more refined interventions and campaigns from the initial 'Plan Safety'. Small offences were being fined massively, and in some parts of the town problems indeed seemed to diminish. Civil society discussed the logic used to determine what counted as an offence, and who was to be suspected of such offences. The officials declaring the offences were small in number, but since they were not uniformed, they were ubiquitous and invisible. These peculiar features, we argue, made the LAP into an etho-political power tool.

As in the first two cases, these fines tried to regulate citizens' behaviour. In the case of Antwerp, the LAP's had a wide-ranging impact on the power relations between citizens and their political communities. Because the decision determining what counts as an offence was now taken at a local level, local actors became increasingly able to influence those definitional practices. The range of 'acceptable behaviour in the public space' was transformed radically as municipal au-

thorities now obtained the responsibility and the competence to partially define both its range and content.

The LAP's regulate citizens' behaviour in a way that differs qualitatively from the disciplinary and the biopolitical technique, in that the former intervenes on the individual without restricting itself to a limited institutional setting. This can be illustrated by the case of the shop owners in Antwerp's Main Street wanting to get rid of beggars and homeless people in what they consider to be 'their' street. In federal legislation begging is not forbidden and for some beggars, the activity may be a substantial strategy to obtain an income. However, the shop owners perceived begging to be a form of nuisance, and managed to persuade the local authorities not to tolerate such behaviour. Instead of police officers starting a juridical procedure again and again, LAP officials could fine the beggars much easier and seemingly more effectively, as the beggars did disappear from Antwerp's Main Street. In terms of ethopolitics, the beggars probably internalized the required dispositions as they not only evaded the Main Street but other popular shopping areas as well. Unlike disciplinary power techniques, the LAP's are not bound to any one particular place: the fines could be distributed everywhere. The risk of being fined is ubiquitous and in this sense 'virtual': the eyes of the regulating power seem to be patrolling permanently. Wherever the beggar goes, his mere presence and activity may suffice to be accused as committing an offence. As beggars may choose for even more anonymity, the LAP's can be considered to be effective not only in fighting nuisances but also in making some people more invisible. This may (re)produce a new articulation of inequality for the societal means to label what should be treated as nuisance, as some are granted a legitimate 'voice', whereas others are not. In combination with the ethopolitical techniques, the already existent inequalities may therefore reinforce themselves. Not all citizens can thus realize their right to the city and its amenities; this right seems to become more conditional, bound to specific behaviours that get labelled 'normal'.

4. Conclusion and Discussion

In this article we explored how some policy measures endorsed by Antwerp's municipal government between 2003 and 2012, can be interpreted as power techniques intended to regulate the behaviour, lifestyles and identities of its citizens. To round up this contribution we will go one step further by identifying what we think is the key thread running through these policy measures. In this section we will, in other words, sketch the general 'governmental rationality' emerging from particular uses of the power techniques described above. In doing so, we will situate the logic underlying Antwerp's governance within broader political philosophical discussions on citizenship.

We argue that Antwerp's governance shared a number of key characteristics with the 'liberal' tradition in political philosophy. According to liberal philosophers such as John Rawls or Isaiah Berlin governments should only interfere with their members' behaviour if that behaviour forms a threat to the universal freedom of other members. Individuals are, to put it differently, free to live and develop their identities as they please, without fear of the state imposing its preference for any particular conception of a 'good' citizen. In this vein, Antwerp's municipality legitimized its policy measures pertaining to beggars, civil servants and social housing in the name of a universal good and the protection of the free individual. This general vision on urban citizenship was summarized symbolically by the new city slogan: 'The city belongs to everyone'.

In spite of this inclusive rhetoric, a number of tensions inherent to such liberal universalist accounts arose. These tensions can be clarified by invoking two recurring critiques of philosophical liberalism. Firstly, communitarian authors such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer have argued that all conceptions of citizenship, even liberal ones, are inevitably rooted in specific cultural-historical contexts. With respect to Antwerp, this became clear when we analysed the concrete techniques the municipality used to put its universalist, inclusive conception of citizenship into practice. The three policy measures analysed in this article all used power techniques enforcing and therefore assuming a particular 'normal' conduct for its citizens. As a result, a new topography of inclusion and exclusion emerged: 'normal' ways of behaving or displaying one's identity were distinguished from their 'deviant' counterparts.

Interestingly, these distinguishing and normalizing practices were generally legitimated by invoking a universalist, inclusive reasoning. The city officials' dress code forbidding the display of religious symbols was not legitimized by referring to a particular conception of a Flemish or autochthonous identity, but rather by referring to the secular, a-cultural nature of the state. In practice, however, this meant that only a small minority of the civil servants had to adjust their appearance to the new institutional context, thus establishing the majority of individuals not wearing religious symbols as the general norm. Similarly, the municipal government sought to obtain a more ideally 'mixed' urban population by attracting high-profile residents and by gently pushing out the poorer, often 'coloured', segments of its citizenry. And in a different vein, the LAP's formally prescribed detailed rules of conduct for public spaces, thereby establishing what was to be the right behaviour in particular public spaces. Out of many, the example was given of begging in a popular shopping street, which from then on was considered to be inappropriate for the economic function of that space.

Secondly, republican and democratic authors such

as Hannah Arendt, Iris Marion Young and Chantal Mouffe have argued that a liberal, universalist conception of the political community neutralizes the conflicts between different groups and individuals, whereas in reality they compete with one another for a place in the public sphere. Whether the municipality was dealing with civil servants wearing headscarves, beggars in a shopping area, or people from lower socioeconomic classes searching for an affordable place to live: the three of them were invariably excluded from specific parts of the public sphere in name of a broader, universal good. The struggle between such groups to belong to that public sphere was taken out of the picture, to improve the general appeal of the city. The image created by the municipality was one of a public order without conflicts, a transparent public sphere without groups competing with one another. The LAP-fines emerged out of the intention to guarantee a more 'liveable' public order: the sanctions in the shopping street were not considered to be the final result of a struggle between shop owners, consumers and beggars as equal members of the political community. The ban on visibly wearing religious and cultural symbols for front-office civil servants was considered to be a precondition of a neutral, tolerant government, rather than the result of a cultural struggle for recognition between a majority and its minorities. And, in a similar vein, the city's housing policy was no longer seen as a competition between rich and poor for the right to live in the city centre, but as a technical affair which can (and has to be) dealt with in a formal way, based on mathematical equations that pre-empt any public debate.

The implications of this double critique on the liberal, universalist conception of political citizenship became clear by examining the policy techniques that were used by the municipal government. The key thread running through these policy techniques, we argue, is that the city should be made as 'liveable' and attractive as possible for the highest common denominator: the city belongs to everyone. From our reading, however, it appears that this universality is (inevitably) highly conditional when put into practice: in every of the three policy techniques the municipality used a specific conception of what the 'normal' conduct of its individual members ought to be. The interests of the majority of people who made use of the city are thereby given priority vis-à-vis those of the deviant minorities. In other words, the city belongs just a little bit more to those who behave, live or express themselves appropriately.

In October 2012, Patrick Janssens lost the municipal elections to Bart De Wever and his New-Flemish Alliance. The newly elected majority identified itself with a markedly different rhetoric, prolifically replacing the old, universalist slogan by the more demanding 'Respect for A(ntwerp)'. Interestingly though, while the

overt rhetoric seemed to undergo a profound transformation, the power techniques established by the previous majority remained in place. From an Urban Politics perspective, the continuity between the former and the current municipality's construction of citizenship may appear as something of a strange anomaly. From a Foucauldian perspective, however, we have been able to distinguish between the rhetoric displayed by those in power, and the actual techniques deployed to regulate citizenship in practice. Focussing on 'how' citizenship—and thereby, ethnicity—is regulated serves as an enriching complement to existing studies of urban politics. As it turns out, to become one of Antwerp's true citizens, substantially more is required than simply being granted the right legal status. As both mayors have taught their citizens, it is at least as important to behave and live up to the city's standards.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Outsiders Within: Framing and Regulation of Headscarves in France, Germany and The Netherlands

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Abstract

While women in Europe who wear the Islamic headscarf are generally seen as outsiders who do not belong to the nation, some countries are more tolerant towards the wearing of headscarves than others. France, Germany and the Netherlands have developed different policies regarding veiling. In this paper we describe how headscarves became regulated in each of these countries and discuss the ways in which French, Dutch and German politicians have deliberated the issue. The paper is based on a content analysis of parliamentary debates on veiling in France (1989–2007), Germany (1997–2007) and the Netherlands (1985–2007). Our aim is to discuss what these national political debates reveal about the way in which the social inclusion of Islamic women in (or rather exclusion from) the nation is perceived in these three countries. Our claim is that veiling arouses opposition because it challenges national self-understandings. Yet, because nations have different histories of nation building, these self-understandings are challenged in various ways and hence, governments have responded to headscarves with diverse regulation. While we did find national differences, we also discovered that the political debates in the three countries are converging over time. The trend is towards increasingly gendered debates and more restrictive headscarf policies. This, we hypothesize, is explained by international polarization around Islam and the strength of the populist anti-immigrant parties across Europe.

Keywords

citizenship; gender relations; headscarf; Islam; migration; multiculturalism; state-church relations; veil

Issue

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1. Introduction

The Islamic headscarf has become a contested issue in Europe.¹ Yet while some countries have issued bans, others explicitly grant women the right to wear a head-

¹ There exist many forms of Muslim women’s covering. The main distinctions are between the headscarf and the burqa and niqab. The burqa covers the face including the eyes, while the niqab leaves free the eyes. In the time-period we studied the debates focused mainly on the headscarf.

scarf, and still others have no regulation at all. In this paper we discuss the framing and regulation of the headscarf in three countries: the Netherlands, Germany and France. These countries are believed to represent different citizenship and state-church models. We did find national differences in the framing and regulation of the headscarf and wanted to discover whether these can be attributed to these models. Yet across countries, headscarves increasingly became framed as contravening dominant gender notions. Therefore we considered also the role of the (institutionalized) wom-

en's movement in the national debates. We found in all three countries that occasionally there were actors who contested the dominant framing and who proposed a more inclusive idea of national identity.

We followed an inductive approach: as laws are made in parliament we made a content analysis of parliamentary debates on the headscarf in France (1989–2007), Germany (1997–2007) and the Netherlands (1985–2007). In 1985 the issue of the headscarf appeared for the first time on the political agenda in the Netherlands. We extended the period to 2007 to be able to trace possible effects of watershed political events like 9/11. The debates after 2007 were analyzed less systematically.² We looked at the arguments that were given by actors in Parliament for the regulation or non-regulation of the headscarf, and what these arguments tell us about the way that the social inclusion of Islamic women in (or rather exclusion from) the nation was conceived. We also traced the influence of important legal court rulings or legal advice on the framing and regulating of the headscarf.

We will first explain the notion of national citizenship and state-church models. Then we explain our methodology and present per country the way the headscarf is regulated and how this was argued in Parliament. In the conclusion we come back to the question of whether or not national models of citizenship and state-church relations explain the regulation of the headscarf in each of the three countries, and what this framing tells us about the social inclusion of Islamic women.

2. National Models of Citizenship and State-Church Relations

The idea of national citizenship models impacting the social inclusion of immigrants can be traced back to Rogers Brubaker's study on citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany (Brubaker, 1992). The thrust of his argument is that when in the 19th century the French and German state was formed, there evolved in both countries a nation-specific understanding of nationhood. Once established, these understandings proved to have path-dependent effects on these countries' present-day immigration and citizenship policies. Several authors (e.g. Castles, 1995; Koopmans et al., 2005) followed up this idea and suggested that it is these very traditions of citizenship that explain why countries differ in the extent to which they are open to accommodate cultural difference. France, Germany and the Netherlands would represent respectively a *republican*, an *ethno-cultural* and *multicultural* model.

In order to explain country responses to the integration of Muslim immigrants in particular, several theorists have also included state-church relations as

an explanatory variable (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Foblets & Alidadi, 2013; Koenig, 2007; Modood & Kastoryano, 2006). In this literature, France is seen as a prototypical example of a strict church-state *separation* model. State neutrality is assumed to be best achieved through a hands-off approach to religion: the state should not identify with any religion nor prioritize any religious group over another, and abstain from recognizing and funding religious groups. The Netherlands figures as an ideal-typical example of a *pluralist* model. Here state neutrality is achieved not by banning religion from public life, but by treating all religious and secular worldviews in an evenhanded way. Germany is typically characterized as a pluralistic *corporatist* model. Based on agreements (concordats) between the state and the church the two officially cooperate. In this paper, we understand state-church relations to serve as key parts of countries' conceptions of nationhood, because the legal and political status of religion is inherently intertwined with a nation's social organization and construction (Asad, 2006; Koenig, 2007).

In the republican-secularist model the nation is conceived of as an undivided community of citizens that share common political principles. The state is a strong, centralized body that stands above its citizens. In order to secure common citizenship, citizens are asked to abstract from their particularistic identities and exist in the public sphere as citizens only. Anyone who is willing to subscribe to the nation's principles can in theory become a citizen. This model is therefore open to accept immigrants as citizens, but they are expected to assimilate in one uniform nation and to avoid public expressions of their personal religious affiliations. And indeed in France immigrants have easy access to citizenship, yet assimilation to 'French' universal values like equality and liberty is required. While the state takes a hands-off approach to religious doctrine, it simultaneously officially recognizes Islam as 'cultes' (organised religions, not communities) similar to Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist religions. Since 2002 it has recognised the French Muslim Council ('Conseil Français du Culte Musulman', CFCM) as an official interlocutor comparable to the Catholic, Jewish and Protestant religious councils (Laborde, 2008).

An ethno-cultural corporatist model conceives of the nation as a culturally homogeneous community. The nation is considered as the political extension of an already existing ethnic community based on a common history, culture and language. Because of its cultural monism, it has difficulty both in accepting cultural aliens as citizens and in allowing for any other than the dominant majority's culture in public life. Indeed Germany long excluded non-ethnically German migrants from citizenship and did not grant them cultural rights. Germany's church-state relations still institutionally favour historically dominant Christian churches with whom the state cooperates in sectors such as educa-

² A major change is that after 2007 the emphasis shifted to face-veiling. See Ferrari and Pastorelli (2013).

tion, health and social welfare. Only the three main historical religious communities (Catholic, Evangelical and Jewish) are granted legal status as public corporations, which yields them specific privileges. Länder Governments have thus far refused to grant Islam the status of an officially recognised religion and public body.

Lastly, in a multicultural pluralist model, the nation is united by a thin core of common values, which goes together with the co-existence of groups that have their distinctive group identities. A multicultural model is open to accept immigrants as citizens and is open to cultural diversity. The Netherlands used to combine easy access to citizenship with a policy of integration based on the preservation of cultural group identities, and its state-church model ensures equal treatment of all religious groups, including Muslim groups, and equal access to the public sphere. Unlike France, the state does not attempt to secularise the public sphere; unlike Germany, it does not grant any public status to and cuts all financial ties with organised religions.

From these models one would expect France and Germany, yet for different reasons, to be less open to cultural and religious manifestations of migrants and to restrict the wearing of the headscarf, and the Netherlands to have accommodative regulation. Although German state-church relations offer favourable opportunities for the public expression of religion, the lack of public status of Islam in Germany makes us expect that Muslim communities benefit less from these opportunities than in the Netherlands.

However, the idea of national citizenship models explaining modes of integration has become contested.³ European policies on immigrant integration appear according to Christian Joppke (2007) to converge. Comparing civic integration tests in five countries, including our three countries, Ines Michalowski (2011) and Saskia Bonjour (2010) find national differences that do not correspond with the national citizenship models. Noticing a widespread backlash against multiculturalism, Stephen Castles and Mark Miller doubt whether the multicultural model still exists in Europe (Castles & Miller, 2011). In sum, critics maintain that citizenship models are too deterministic and too static, as they cannot explain changes over time within a country or convergences between countries. Are national models indeed passé? After explaining our methodology, we turn to the regulation of the headscarf and the debates that accompanied the introduction of the rules.

3. Methodology

The main documents that were studied for this article consist of all parliamentary debates about headscarves in Germany, France and the Netherlands, from the mo-

ment the first public controversy arose (that was in the Netherlands in 1985) until 2007. All documents were found in the parliamentary databases of each country by means of keywords such as 'foulard', 'hidjeb', 'voile islamique', 'hoofddoek', 'Kopftuch', 'Schleier'.⁴ As Germany has a federal system and the issue was hardly discussed at the federal level (the 'Bundesrat'), we turned to the regional level. As it was not possible to study the debates in all sixteen states, documents were retrieved from the parliamentary databases of four federal states: Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate. In total 192 law proposals, motions, parliamentary discussion, questions and policy documents were found, which were completed by other policy documents such as research reports of (extra) parliamentary committees, as well as a study of important court verdicts and decisions of (quasi) judicial bodies on individual headscarf conflicts.

We used frame-analysis to analyze the documents, which builds upon the social constructionist tradition in the social sciences that assumes that people construct realities by the way they think and talk about phenomena (Schön & Rein, 1995; Verloo, 2005). Frames are thus symbolic-interpretive constructs used to make sense of a multifaceted issue such as the headscarf conflict, which at the same time shape reality by inscribing meaning to it. In order to identify the frames, we employed an analytical framework that exists of sensitizing questions focused on four elements (Verloo, 2005): voice (who speaks), diagnosis (what is seen as a problem), prognosis (what is seen as the solution) and a call for action (who is called upon to act upon the problem). All documents were coded according to these four elements of the matrix. Based on a comparison of these matrixes, three major frame-categories were found that were further divided in sub-frames: frames that addressed headscarves in relation to state-church relations, frames that discuss headscarves in relation to social cohesion and/or public order and frames that discuss headscarves in relation to gender (see Lettinga 2011 for more on the methodology used).

⁴ The Dutch databases were: www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl and www.parlando.sdu.nl. For France we visited: www.assemblee-nationale.fr (from 1993). Documents from before 1993 were collected manually in the archives of the Parliament in Paris. Documents from the French Senate were retrieved from www.senat.fr. For Germany we visited www.dip.bundestag.de. The federal states have their own online databases; documents that were not online we collected from the archives. An explanatory note on the references: TK 59 = Tweede Kamer (Dutch Second Chamber), Parliamentary Report nr. 59. JO 15577 = Journal Officiel de la République Française, Parliamentary Report nr. 15577. BW 13/62 = digital archive of the Parliament of Baden Württemberg, Parliamentary Report nr. 13/62. RP = Rhineland Palatinate. B = Berlin. All documents are followed by the date and when necessary the page number.

³ See for an early critique Silverman (1992).

4. France: Framing and Regulation of the Headscarf

As widely reported elsewhere (Bowen, 2007; Rochefort, 2002; Scott, 2007) the debate in France started in 1989 when three schoolgirls in the city of Creil were not allowed to wear a headscarf at school. The school principal argued that the headscarf could yield pressure on others to cover against their will. After seeking advice of the State Council (*Conseil d'Etat*), the highest administrative court of France, the Socialist Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin, ruled that students wearing signs of religious affiliation in public schools was not necessarily in conflict with public neutrality (*laïcité*), as long as they did not disturb the educational order in schools or seek to proselytize their religion.⁵ Three weeks later, the Socialist government issued a Directive to schools encouraging them to take a case-by-case approach in assessing whether the religious manifestation in question was expressed within the confines of this neutrality, and to discuss the issue before expelling pupils.⁶

Not all parties felt comfortable with the Minister's decision. Among them was the *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR), which framed the headscarf as an act of provocation of the French Republican pact, signifying a segregation from the rest of society (a '*repli communautaire*') and a politicized symbol of religious fundamentalism ('*intégrisme*') challenging the secular and democratic state.⁷ From the onset of the debate, both the Left and the Right agreed that the headscarf conflicted with principles of gender equality. Both viewed the Republican school as a motor for girls' emancipation by providing them with the tools to break with their patriarchal community and to integrate into 'French' society. As RPR-member Michèle Barzach argued: 'The integration of the Muslim population passes through its women, and the integration of women passes through schools'.⁸ Yet, while the RPR concluded that headscarves should therefore be banned from public schools, prominent members of the Socialist party argued that a ban was counterproductive. Prime-minister Michel Rocard (PS) explained: 'The aim of our public and laic school is to welcome, to persuade, to integrate, that means, to realize the goals of education in another way than through a politics of a priori exclusion'.⁹ Therefore a ban on headscarves was unwarranted.

After the turn of the century the Socialist party (PS) changed its position. Instead of the gradual assimilation they had expected, headscarf conflicts kept emerging in public schools throughout the 1990s. In 2003, some PS members submitted a proposal to ban all religious, political and philosophic symbols from school, framing the

headscarf as a 'contestation of French values and culture', and 'a rejection, often imposed on young girls, of the Republican and laic model of integration'.¹⁰ Also the Right submitted (again) several proposals to ban religious dress in public schools. In July 2003, President Jacques Chirac installed the Commission of Reflection on the Application of the Principle of *Laïcité* in the Republic' ('*Commission de réflexion sur l'application du principe de laïcité dans la République*') to study the status of secularism in present-day France. This commission, known as the Commission Stasi, concluded that a ban was needed (Stasi, 2003). On 10 February 2004, a large majority in parliament voted in favour of a government law-proposal for a ban on 'ostentatious' religious symbols in the public school. On 15 March 2004, the French government passed the law that came into effect the subsequent school year. The Ministry of Education sent a Directive to all public schools that explained that headscarves, kippahs and large Christian crosses are considered as conspicuous signs of religious affiliation, and are prohibited.

This change went together with a change in diagnosis. Before, girls who wore a headscarf were seen as girls who needed to be emancipated; now attention focused on girls who did *not* wear the headscarf and who needed to be protected against their communities. The actions of the new feminist movement, *Neither Whores nor Submissives* ('*Ni Putes Ni Soumises*', NPNS), may have contributed to this change in framing. The chair of NPNS, Fadela Amara, who later became a Socialist Junior Minister, spoke out in favor of legislation banning headscarves in schools. Together with other prominent Republican feminists, among others Elisabeth Badinter, Anne Zelensky (the chair of the League of Women's Rights, LDF) and former Minister of Emancipation Yvette Roudy, NPNS signed a petition in *Elle magazine* in 2003 to encourage French President Jacques Chirac to impose a ban. Amara was also invited by the Stasi commission to testify, and the commission literally copied in its report her testimony that many young girls were called 'whores' if they did not cover (Stasi, 2003, p. 46). The commission concluded that a 'great silent majority' of young girls of immigrant origin needed protection against Islamist groups forcing them to cover (Stasi, 2003, p. 58). The struggle for gender equality subsequently became a struggle for national values, as is illustrated by the speech of President Chirac, who stated that 'our struggle for Republican values must go hand in hand with a struggle for women's rights and their equality to men. This struggle will determine the France of tomorrow. The degree of civilization of a society is measured (...) by the status of women in that society' (Chirac, 2003).

The lack of headscarf-wearing girls' own voices in French public and policy debates triggered the mobili-

⁵ JO 346 893, 27 November 1989.

⁶ JO 15577, 15 November 1989.

⁷ JO 4756-4757, 8 November 1989.

⁸ JO 4756-4757, 8 November 1989.

⁹ JO 4751-4752, 8 November 1989.

¹⁰ JO law proposal 2096, 2003.

sation of new feminist coalitions seeking to break the hegemonic frame that headscarf-wearing girls were oppressed, for example Feminists For Equality ('Collectif des Féministes pour l'Égalité', CFE) that published a book in 2008 named 'Veiled girls speak' (Chouder, Latreche, & Tévanian, 2008). Others were the Parisian group, Neither Pimps nor Machos ('Ni Proxos Ni Machos, NPNM) that challenged the view that Muslim men were violent, and the 'Movement of Indigenous of the Republic' ('Mouvement des Indigènes de la République', MIR) that argued that the 2003 law was a new form of post-colonialism, racism and sexism of a Republic which subjugated migrants to secondary subjects (Bouteldja, 2007). Yet, not being invited to official policy consultations and unable to forge alliances except for a few among the far left, they did not have the power to change the dominant discourse.

The French debate on the headscarf did not carry over to other realms such as to the civil service or the judiciary. This is not indicative of a general tolerance of religious dress in other public domains. Rather, deputies never challenged the State Council's opinion of May 3, 2000, that civil servants, including school teachers and school inspectors, may not manifest their religious beliefs during work.¹¹ Since 2009 the debate has shifted to the Islamic face veil, which was primarily framed as symbolising a radical Islamic practice that discriminated against women. On 22 June 2009 President Nicolas Sarkozy concurred with this view, arguing in a speech to the Senate and the Assembly at the Congress of Versailles: 'The burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome on the territory of the French republic' (Sarkozy, 2009). One year later, in September 2010, the Parliament adopted a law that bans all kinds of face covers in public spaces, which took effect in April 2011.¹² The face veil was seen as an attack on the French Republican social pact of living together and human dignity, including gender equality and liberty. The law was passed despite the advice of the State Council and a parliamentary Commission of Inquiry that had both argued that there is no legal ground to oblige citizens to always show their faces (Joppke, 2001).

5. The Netherlands: Framing and Regulation of the Headscarf

In the Netherlands a national controversy arose in 1985 when a public school prohibited a pupil from wearing a headscarf. Members of Parliament chal-

lenged this decision, and the Christian Democratic Minister of Education, Wim Deetman, announced that headscarves are allowed at public schools in the Netherlands.¹³ More than a decade later, in 1998, the issue re-emerged on the political agenda, this time because a teacher trainee was prohibited from wearing a headscarf in a public primary school. Again, the government decided, thereby following the legal advice of the Committee of Equal Treatment,¹⁴ that a ban on religious dress for public school teachers constitutes a form of discrimination on grounds of religion. Later again, two MP's of the Green Party brought up the issue of a woman who was not allowed to wear her headscarf while working as the clerk of a court. The Green party disputed the idea that headscarves in court were at odds with public neutrality. The Dutch understanding of the separation between church and state was, according to the Greens, not 'to exclude clergymen and religious traditions or signs from public life. (...) It means exactly the opposite: the state has no right to interfere with the religious beliefs of its subjects'.¹⁵ The Liberal Minister of Justice Korthals disagreed that personnel in court could wear a headscarf and the court case eventually led to the policy report, Fundamental Rights in a Pluriform Society ('Grondrechten in een pluriforme samenleving').¹⁶ In this document the government recognized that a ban infringes upon the principle of individual choice, which the Dutch state holds in high esteem (and thus went a long way towards the position of the Greens): 'The freedom of choice and right to self-determination that women in the Netherlands conquered holds equally for them (i.e. Muslim women). (...) A general ban on such cloths conflicts with this conquered freedom. (...) Also women with headscarves have the right to unlimited participation in Dutch society.'¹⁷ While the government confirmed the right of women to wear a headscarf, it made two exceptions. It did consider it legitimate to restrict this right for the police force and for the judiciary because these jobs require, according to the government, that all appearance of partiality is avoided.¹⁸ Again in 2008 when a new debate about headscarves in the police force flared up, this policy was re-confirmed.¹⁹

Hence, even in the Netherlands the wearing of the headscarf became bound to some restrictions. This coincided with the rise of the new populist party, List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF). The LPF became the second largest party in the elections of 2002 and had started a campaign against the 'Islamization of Dutch

¹¹ JO 217.017, 3 May 2000.

¹² Veiled women will be consulted by organisations with the aim to convince them to reconsider their choice within six months after their first arrest, and can be fined if they repeatedly ignore warnings of the police to unveil in public. People found guilty of forcing others to cover are penalised with fines up to €30.000 and a year in prison.

¹³ TK 700, 8 February 1985.

¹⁴ Equal Treatment Committee Judgement 18 (1999).

¹⁵ TK 59, 17 March 2004: 3887.

¹⁶ TK 29614, no. 2, 7 June 2004.

¹⁷ TK 29614, no. 2, 7 June 2004: 14-15.

¹⁸ TK 29614, no. 2, 7 June 2004.

¹⁹ TK 29628, no. 109, 14 November 2008.

society'. The framing of Islam as a threat began resonating particularly when the debate shifted to face covers (burqas and niqabs). In a debate about terrorism in 2005, right-wing politician Geert Wilders introduced a motion to ban the burqa in public space.²⁰ A majority in parliament adopted Wilders' motion.^{21,22} Face covering was framed mainly as a security and integration issue. Liberal (VVD) MP Weekers argued, for instance: 'When people cover their face in public, whether this is with a burqa or with a balaclava, this seriously affects other people's feelings of safety, and the care for a civil public order implies that we do not tolerate such face covers'.²³ Parallel to this new emphasis on public order and security, gender equality became a more prominent frame. Both conservative Liberal and populist right-wing deputies argued that 'the burqa is a symbol of submission. This does not fit into our value-system' (VVD).²⁴ Left-wing parties and the Liberal Democrats (D'66) agreed that face covers are incompatible with an 'open and emancipated society'.²⁵ Yet, instead of a ban they favoured to 'emancipate the burqa away'.²⁶

The gendering of the debate was not a result of a greater involvement of the women's movement in the policy debates. The platform for black, migrant and refugee women, Tiye International, as well as the Dutch Women's Council (NVR) never addressed the issue of headscarves, which they generally perceive to be women's own choice. Only Chief Editor Ciska Dresselhuys of the feminist monthly *Opzij* agitated against the headscarf as a sign of female oppression. Even feminist Ayaan Hirsi Ali who entered Parliament in 2003 and who was very critical about Islam, never politicised headscarves in Parliament. Dutch feminists never mobilised for restrictive legislation on the headscarf or the face-veil. Even though there was more discontent with the gendered nature of the face-veil within the Dutch women's movement, feminists scholars in advisory committees and the Ministry argued that a full ban would possibly increase the isolation of women who wore a face-veil rather than contribute to their emancipation.²⁷

²⁰ TK 29754, no. 53, 13 October 2005.

²¹ TK 36, 10 December 2005.

²² TK 16, 24 October 2006.

²³ TK 15, 19 October 2006: 1073.

²⁴ TK 15, 19 October 2006: 1073.

²⁵ TK 31 700 VII, 25 December 2008.

²⁶ TK 16, 24 October 2006.

²⁷ See e.g. the advice of a committee that was installed by then Minister of Integration to study the feasibility and desirability of a ban on burqas (Vermeulen et al., 2006). The then State Secretary responsible for emancipation (and current Minister of Education) Jet Bussemaker (PvdA) answered in a reply to members of the PVV in 2008 that the burqini (a bathing suit that covers the legs, arms and hair of women) is not necessarily oppressive and can even enable women to partake in public life and gain independence. TK 1938, 11 April 2008.

6. Germany: Framing and Regulation of the Headscarf

The first parliamentary debates in Germany occurred in the southern federal state of Baden-Württemberg in 1997, but only in 2003 the headscarf controversy became a national affair when it spread to other federal states. The debate primarily focused on teachers' rights to cover. In contrast to France and similar to the Netherlands, pupils' headscarves have never been controversial.

The case that triggered the first debate concerned Fereshta Ludin, a German teacher of Afghani origin. She had already worn a headscarf during her traineeship without any complaints from parents, but when she applied for a job as a teacher in 1998 in the city of Stuttgart, the Upper School Authority in Baden-Württemberg refused to hire her because of her headscarf. The argument was that the headscarf was a sign of 'cultural limitation' and that she therefore lacked the personal qualifications ('Eignung') for the status of a civil servant, who needs to respect state neutrality (Altinordu, 2004).

The Minister of Education of Baden-Württemberg, Annette Schavan of the Christian Democrats (CDU), backed the decision of the Upper School Authority. As a teacher, Ludin was expected to distance herself from political ideologies that are in conflict with the state's constitutional values; Schavan did not consider the headscarf as a religious obligation.²⁸ Ludin's headscarf would also undermine the school's mission to promote integration, as the headscarf 'functioned as a sign of cultural and civilizational segregation and thus encourages disintegration'.²⁹ Most parties in the Land's legislature, including the oppositional Greens and Social Democrat party, supported the Minister's decision.

Five years later, on 24 September 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled over Ludin's case after a tardy legal battle through various lower courts and the Federal Administrative Court. The Federal Constitutional Court judged that a ban on teachers wearing the headscarf in school does not find enough legal ground in the standing law of the federal state of Baden-Württemberg. Allowing teachers to wear headscarves did not contradict Germany's tradition of neutrality, seen as 'open and comprehensive neutrality' ('offene und übergreifende Neutralität'). Therefore the law did not contain sufficient provisions to justify the restriction (Henkes & Kneip, 2008, p. 13). The Court recognized however that given the religious diversity of present-day society, a teacher's headscarf could yield conflicts and thus endanger educational peace. It ruled therefore that the growing religious diversity in society 'can be a cause for the legislature to redefine the allowed range of religious relations in the school' and to interpret the duty of public neutrality in a

²⁸ Pressemitteilung no. 119/98 of Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth, 13 July 1998.

²⁹ BW 12/51, 15 July 1998: 3984.

‘stricter and more distanced way’.³⁰

Since then eight of Germany’s sixteen federal states have passed laws forbidding public school teachers to wear religious symbols and clothing in school (Table 1). In two states the ban was extended to public servants in the field of justice, police and law-enforcement (Berlin and Hessen). In Baden-Württemberg and Berlin, legislation exists also for kindergarten personnel. The other eight states have no regulation and continue their case-by-case approach (Lettinga, 2011). Following Berghahn and Rostock (2009) we differentiate between three types of policy regimes that now exist in Germany: the Christian-Occidental model, the laic model and the case-by-case model.

6.1. Christian Occidental Model

Baden-Württemberg was the first state to enact legislation of the ‘Christian-Occidental’ type on 1 April 2004. Saarland, Hessen, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia followed suit. These states’ laws do not ban religious symbols for teachers per se, but symbols or clothing that endanger the peace at school or the neutrality of the state, or else conflict with the basic rights of parents and/or pupils, or with the ‘free, democratic order’ (or a combination of these).³¹ All five states have formulated exception clauses for symbols of ‘Christian-Occidental’ values. As the socialist party (SPD) fraction leader Peter Wintruff explained: ‘Different from the

³⁰ *Urteil BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02*. 2003, quoted in Saharso (2007).

³¹ *BW 13/3091, Gesetz zur Änderung des Schulgesetzes*, 14 April 2004.

headscarf, the crucifix belongs to our Western culture, to our tradition and has here a high standing as a religious evidence of brotherly love, tolerance and human dignity [...]. We acknowledge the mandate of our federal constitution to educate our children according to Christian and Western cultural values. The state neutrality in our public schools may, unlike a Laic state, recognise religious expression, but only those that don’t contravene the embedded human rights’.³²

Attempts to dispute the Christian-Occidental legislation of the five federal states failed (Henkes & Kneip, 2008). Federal courts have argued that teacher-nuns, who are few, should be considered ‘historical exceptions’ that do not constitute a systematic discrimination of Islamic religious communities (Berghahn & Rostock, 2009).

6.2. Laic Model

Berlin is a paradigmatic example of the ‘laic’ legislation, which has also been passed in Lower Saxony and Bremen. Their laws ban all personal expressions of political, religious and philosophical beliefs for reasons of public neutrality (Bremen and Berlin) or in light of the state’s educational mandate (Lower Saxony).

In Berlin, deputies of the governing parties SPD and PDS/Die Linke, as well as the oppositional parties the FDP and Greens, all argued that the privatisation of all personal religious affiliations by teachers was the best guarantee to safeguard religious freedom and religious peace. Concerns about Islamic radicalism also shaped the debate.

³² *BW 13/62*, 4 February 2004.

Table 1. Policy regimes on headscarves in Germany (from: Lettinga, 2011).

Laic	Christian Occidental	Case by case	Case by case
Neutrally formulated ban	Specific ban: exemption for Christian –Occidental cultural traditions	Specific ban rejected: context specific approach	No ban proposed: context specific approach
Bremen 2005 CDU-SPD*	Baden-Württemberg 2004 CDU-FDP	Rhineland-Palatinate 2005 SPD-FDP	Saxony
Lower-Saxony 2004 CDU-FDP	Bavaria 2004 CSU	Schleswig-Holstein 2004 SPD-Greens	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Berlin 2005 SPD-PDS/Die Linke	Hessen 2004 CDU	Hamburg 2004 CDU-FDP-PRO	Thuringia
	North Rhine Westphalia 2006 CDU-FDP	Brandenburg 2003 SPD-CDU	Saxony-Anhalt
	Saarland 2004 CDU		

Notes: * Parties denote government; The neutrality law of Hessen concerns both teachers and regular civil servants. The neutrality law of Berlin concerns teachers and civil servants, as well as other public functions in the judiciary and the police. In Berlin, Baden-Württemberg and Hessen teacher-trainees may, ‘in principle’, express personal religious affiliations. The law of Baden-Württemberg also forbids the wearing of headscarves for personnel working in kindergartens. The law of Berlin allows this ‘in principle’, unless parents complain.

The SPD, Greens and FDP agreed that the state had to prevent the intrusion of Islamism in public institutions by banning politicized signs and symbols.³³ Most parties also considered a ban necessary to liberate young Muslim girls from patriarchal pressure³⁴, but believed a ban on religious signs for teachers only was enough.³⁵

6.3. Non-Regulation

Finally, eight states continue a case-by-case approach. In Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland Palatinate and Hamburg teachers are allowed to express their personal religious beliefs unless there is evidence that they disrespect the religious views of pupils or parents, or if the school's peace is endangered (e.g. when parents object). Jochen Hartloff of the SPD faction argued: 'We have a separation between state and church. This is traditionally regulated differently than in France. We too have a separation, but the boundaries are much more blurred in light of our Occidental-Christian background.'³⁶ The CDU proposed to ban headscarves for schoolteachers, but the SPD and FDP rejected the CDU's proposal.³⁷ Five of the 'tolerant' states are former Eastern German states. In these states there is no regulation, because there were no headscarf conflicts as Muslim migrants form a small minority whose presence has not (yet) stirred debates about the nation's multicultural outlook.

In Germany women's organisations were not invited to any policy debate, turning headscarves into a migrant problem. Several women of Turkish origin were invited as authorities on Islam. Seyran Ateş (SPD) was invited to a public hearing in Baden-Württemberg³⁸ and (the Kurdish) Necla Kelek and (the Alevi) Serap Cileli to a hearing in Rhineland Palatinate.³⁹ These women are well-known critics of Islam. In their view the headscarf is not a religious duty, but a patriarchal tradition used by Islamic fundamentalists. They found support from, amongst others, well-known feminist Alice Schwarzer who compared the headscarf to the yellow star that Jews were forced to wear during the Nazi regime. Women who wore the headscarf were largely excluded from the debate. Lacking institutional venues,

in January 2004 various Muslim women went demonstrating in Berlin against the ban in civil service.⁴⁰ New Muslim women's associations emerged, like the Initiative for self-determination ('Initiative für Selbstbestimmung'), which critiqued the stereotypical image of veiled women as oppressed victims or fundamentalists.⁴¹ In 2007, several women created the first national Muslim women's organisation, the Action Alliance ('Aktionsbündnis') (Oestreich, 2004). The Green and the Social Democrat parties supported the Alliance and organised a conference on Islam and feminism.⁴² Women wearing headscarves found allies in Commissioners of Integration, such as former Berlin Commissioner for Foreigners Barbara John (CDU), who argued in a hearing on headscarves for the parliament in Rhineland Palatinate that a ban hampers Muslim women's emancipation because it restricts their access to the labour market. She also argued that a ban would pressure women to choose the side of their communities and to surrender to gender-oppressive community norms rather than criticize these.⁴³ Together with Berlin Integration Officer Marieluise Beck (Greens) and the CDU politician Rita Süßmuth,⁴⁴ John launched a petition in 2003 to argue against bans on headscarves and for solidarity with all those who fight Islamism, including those with headscarves (BPB, 2003). The appeal was signed by more than seventy publicly known women.

Similar to France and the Netherlands, some German deputies in the Federal Parliament have started to ask for a full ban on the Islamic face cover in public, such as Lale Akgün of the SPD fraction did in 2010. Her party, however, objected to legislation. SPD expert on interior affairs Dieter Wiefelspütz argued that soft measures are a better way to develop an 'Enlightenment Islam'. The Greens also objected, labelling such laws as symbolic politics that do not target the heart of the problem. The FDP and CDU argued that a ban on headscarves offered already sufficient grounds to expel pupils with face veils (Deutsche Welle, 2010). So far, no legislation has been proposed.

³³ B. 15/36, 25 September 2003; B. 17/58, 28 October 2004; B.15/45, 19 February 2004.

³⁴ B. 15/45, 19 February 2004; B. 15/62, 20 January 2005.

³⁵ Eventually, Berlin established a working group 'Islam und der Schule' (Islam and the School) to engage with communities, families and 'Islam experts' (such as outspoken anti-headscarf protagonists Necla Kelek and Seyran Ateş) on conflicts related to gender and Islam. B. 16/11258, 28 September 2007.

³⁶ B. 15/53, 17 January 2005.

³⁷ RP 14/91 17 March 2005: 6094.

³⁸ Protokoll der 26. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Schule, Jugend und Sport vom 12. März 2004.

³⁹ 32. Sitzung des Ausschuss für Bildung und Jugend. 29. Sitzung des Rechtsausschusses am 11 Juli 2005 Gemeinsame öffentliche Sitzung.

⁴⁰ The demonstration took place on January 17, 2004. It was organised by IMbus (Initiative Berliner Muslims).

⁴¹ The Initiative für Selbstbestimmung ('Initiative for Self-determination') wrote various open letters, amongst others to Ekin Deligöz, Lale Akgün and Mehmet Daimagüler, who had asked Muslim women to remove their headscarves in the weekly 'Bild am Sonntag' (14 October 2006).

⁴² The conference 'Frauen Power im Islam' took place in Cologne in 2008. See Naggar (2008).

⁴³ 32. Sitzung des Ausschuss für Bildung und Jugend/29. Sitzung des Rechtsausschusses, Gemeinsame öffentliche Sitzung, 11 July 2005.

⁴⁴ Rita Süßmuth was Minister of Family Affairs from 1985 to 1988. Barbara John was the Commissioner for foreigners ('Ausländerbeauftragte') to the Berlin Government from 1981 to 2003.

7. Gender and Nation

Since about the turn of the century, in all three countries the headscarf became more often associated with Islamic fundamentalism and interpreted as a symbol of gender inequality within Islam. How to explain this convergence?

While several headscarf cases have been brought to the European Court of Human rights (ECtHR) the convergence is not explained by a growing European influence. In fact, the ECtHR grants member states a broad discretionary scope to interpret the protection of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the light of their national traditions (Berghahn, 2011). Legislators in France and Germany explicitly referred to this so-called 'margin of appreciation' to adjust the scope of religious freedom to these historical traditions (Bowen, 2007; Lettinga, 2011). The ECtHR thus paradoxically creates opportunities for politicians to reaffirm and extend institutional logics of historical state-church relations (in France) or change these in a direction that actually restricts religious freedom (in Germany).

We considered whether this focus on gender inequality could be attributed to an increasing influence of the (institutionalized) women's movement on the parliamentary debates. In France indeed parts of the women's movement organized to demand a ban but their statements were in line with the majority of politicians' views. It may be that they got a voice because of a selective invitation policy on the part of the hearing committees. There were alternative feminist voices, but they were not invited and unlike Germany, there were no women's voices within the country's gender machinery or migration departments that opposed a ban from a female autonomy frame. In the Netherlands the headscarf was so broadly accepted that the women's movement felt no need to mobilize pro or contra and thus did not raise its voice. Therefore we want to suggest that the change in framing is explained by a different development.

Wearing a headscarf became associated with a radical political Islam threatening European values at a time when Islamic violence manifested itself (inter) nationally. In France and the Netherlands populist anti-immigrant right wing parties became strong political forces. In the Netherlands, the LPF became in 2002, hence one year after 9/11, in one blow the second largest party in the country. These parties framed the headscarf not as an isolated religious issue, but as symbolic for Islamic immigrants living in 'parallel societies' unwilling to integrate and respect the basic values of the national communities. The headscarf was a vehicle to express concerns about immigration and national identity. We interpret the salience that gender equality gained as a diagnostic frame in this period as part and parcel of this symbolic politics. The gender card was drawn to demarcate the boundary between the civilized Westerner and the uncivilized and illiberal Islamic

outsider. Yet, in 2004, the year that France adopted a law to ban ostentatious religious symbols, the Netherlands adopted a rule granting women the right to wear a headscarf. In Germany several states adopted laws in that period, but there is no consistent pattern (see Table 1). Despite populist rhetoric shaping the saliency and (converging) diagnostic framing of the debate, the actual regulation of the headscarf thus appears to be more determined by established national citizenship and state-religion relations (Hadj-Abdou et al., 2011).

8. Conclusion

We expected France and Germany to have more restrictive regulation than the Netherlands. France and the Netherlands kept to our expectations, but Germany only to a certain extent. While France prohibits religious dress in public schools and public functions, the Netherlands and Germany tolerate headscarves for pupils. Public school teachers' headscarves are forbidden in eight German states, but (conditionally) allowed in eight other states and also allowed in the Netherlands. In the latter country all civil servants have a right to wear a headscarf except for court personnel and uniformed police officers. In Germany two states have passed bans on religious expressions for not only teachers but also civil servants. France clearly has the most restrictive regulation, then follows Germany, and the Netherlands has the most tolerant regulation.

Our data shows that national histories of nation building and old political cleavages are resounding in the framing of the headscarf. We do not think therefore that citizenship and state-church models are but an invention of scholars or politicians. These national traditions are however internally more diversified than the idea of national models might suggest. Against their supposed aversion to religion in the public sphere, the French for a while allowed headscarves in public schools. This diversification also offers an explanation for the German case. The German state has a tradition of openness to religion, but prioritizes Christianity over minority religions, except Judaism that is now conceived as part of the Germany's Western heritage. The southern German states focused on Germany's exclusionary tradition and defined the nation as a Christian-Occidental nation. Other states stressed the nation's traditional openness to religion and some other leftwing states reacted against the idea of the nation being defined by Christianity and opted for a strict separation of state and church. The cases thus illustrate that politicians may select certain aspects of their national institutional traditions, thereby affirming or combating them, but even if they oppose them they do not stand outside of them. Yet national models suggest too much rigidity. It is better perhaps to speak as John Bowen suggests in terms of schemas: 'categories, images, propositions, often deeply psychologically embedded in actors' minds, that may coexist without nec-

essarily being consistent and that may be weighed differently from one moment to another' (Bowen, 2012, p. 354). Power constellations and the coalitions' different actors enter into matter for how this discursive battle plays out in actual policy formation processes.

Lastly, what does the framing of the headscarf tell us about the social inclusion of Islamic women? In France, Islamic women can be full citizens of the Republic, and increasingly so, only if they take off their headscarf. Otherwise they are paradoxically perceived as both victims and aggressors of a segregationist Islamic community, which is unwilling to blend in with the broad French political community. In the Netherlands the discourse on headscarves became more intolerant over the years, but regulation is comparatively tolerant and in that sense Islamic women can be members of society with inclusion of their headscarves. In the southern German states, women wearing headscarves are excluded from the nation that is defined as a Christian-Occidental nation. In the other German states that follow either a laic or a case-by-case approach, women wearing a headscarf are seen by politicians as victims of their communities, but more often as representatives of a political Islam who must constantly prove their loyalty to the German nation. In all three countries the framing of headscarves as a symbol of gender inequality within Islam gained in strength when polarization around Islam increased and anti-immigrant populist parties came up. Coalition framing emerged between feminist and populist politicians, but also frame cooptation by populists acting as champions of women's right. Some feminists have started to organize across religious and secular boundaries to oppose the instrumentalization of women's rights against Islam. But until these alliances become stronger and more influential, headscarf-wearing and particularly veiled women are still largely excluded from the European national imaginary.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Bouncers, Policing and the (In)visibility of Ethnicity in Nightlife Security Governance

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Abstract

This article explores the reproduction of ethnified urban spaces and inequalities in an ostensibly cosmopolitan city. It does so by means of a case study of bouncers' policing practices in the nightlife of the Danish city, Aarhus. In recent years, a substantial body of research has explored the regulatory practices of bouncers operating in the urban night-time economy. This article contributes to the study of nightlife policing by paying special attention to the ethnic governance of bouncers. More specifically, the article investigates how ethnicity is produced in bouncers' administration of nightlife accessibility; how inclusion and exclusion are negotiated in encounters between bouncers and ethnic minority youth; and how bouncers struggle to avoid allegations of discrimination and to uphold notions of colorblind good governance, while ethnified notions of troublesome individuals continue to inform bouncers' production of nightlife safety.

Keywords

bouncers; cosmopolitanism; ethnicity; (in)visibility; neoliberalism; night-time economy; security governance

Issue

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1. Introduction

Over the last few decades, urban revitalization and the rhetoric of the safe, attractive and cosmopolitan city have become central to how Western cities seek to create a new image attuned to both the post-industrial consumer society and inter-urban competition for mobile tourists, laborers, consumers and capital (Cronin & Hetherington, 2008). As in other western cities, visions of cultural diversity and rhetoric of the open and cosmopolitan city have long figured centrally in city-branding campaigns and in representations of the nightlife in the Danish city of Aarhus (Alt om Aarhus, 2011; Aarhus Kommune, 2012, 2013; Ravn, 2013). While nightlife "drinkertainment" (Jayne, Valentine, & Holloway, 2008) is integral to contemporary urban life, experience and economy, the urban nightlife also constitutes a contradictory domain. On one hand Aarhus nightlife

is often described in branding campaigns with the notions of openness, play and diversity because it is an arena for the creation of hybrid identities and inter-ethnic exchange. On the other hand, such representations are regularly challenged by local media accounts (TV2 News, 2011; Tagarira, 2013), activist groups and scholarly research (Sjøgaard, 2013) describing how bouncers or "doormen" (*dørmænd*) as they are known in Denmark, regularly engage in systematic policing and exclusion of ethnic minorities.

The significance of the situation in Aarhus lies in the fact that it reflects a more general tension in the narratives of urban renaissance in Western cities, where night-time consumer spaces are contradictorily represented as open and cosmopolitan domains but characterized by excessive ethnic, racial and class-based exclusion. These tensions give rise to a number of important questions such as: what can we learn from

the contradictory and seemingly incompatible trends of inclusion, cosmopolitanism and exclusion characterizing night-time consumer spaces? What mechanisms allow these trends to co-exist, coincide and sometimes even reinforce each other? And why does the spatial policing of new consumerist urban domains tend to affirm racial and ethnic distinctions and hierarchies, even while local authorities struggle to render the progressive 24-hour city more inclusive? In recent years there has been much scholarly debate around abstract notions of cosmopolitanism. While some take cosmopolitanism merely to mean tolerance of social difference, others take it to mean an active engagement with and celebration of cultural and social difference (Skrbis & Woodward, 2007). Cosmopolitanism in this sense implies openness, respect and appropriation of human and cultural diversity (Hannerz, 1996). While cosmopolitanism is often associated with abstract values such as freedom, tolerance and equality, Castro (2013) asserts that a critical approach to cosmopolitanism must engage with questions of unequal distribution of resources and privilege, and investigate how openness and fairness unfold in practice. Engaging with the above questions is important because this can give rise to new insights on how notions of cosmopolitanism are grounded and contested in particular contexts; how neoliberal “spatial governmentality” (Merry, 2001) today shapes the boundaries of acceptable difference in the cosmopolitan city; and how ethnic, racial and class-based identities and inequalities are (re)produced in liberal democracies. In this article, I engage with these questions by exploring the relationship between urban neoliberal governance and bouncers’ spatial policing of ethnicities in the nightlife domain in Aarhus. Focusing on frontline private policing agents such as bouncers is important due to the central role played by security and private property regimes in the organization of urban spaces. Furthermore bouncers’ administration of nightlife accessibility can bring insights into the day-to-day workings of simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion in the cosmopolitan city.

Based on a one-year of ethnographic fieldwork among bouncers in Aarhus, this article contributes to the study of night-time urban governance (Talbot, 2007; Talbot & Böse, 2007; Measham & Hadfield, 2009), which has thus far not paid sufficient attention to the micro-governance of bouncers in the construction of race and ethnicity in nightlife domains. Moreover, the article contributes to existing studies on bouncers which, with a few exceptions such as Rigakos (2008), have failed to pay systematic attention to how ethnicity and race are constructed and negotiated in encounters between bouncers and nightlife patrons (see Winlow, 2001; Monaghan, 2002, 2003; Hobbs, Hadfield, Lister, & Winlow, 2003). In the article I give special attention to the “ethnic governance” of bouncers. Inspired by Samara’s notion of “racial governance”

(Samara, 2010, p. 640), I take ethnic governance to mean the processes of governance of which the production and reproduction of ethnic boundaries and ethnically exclusive spaces is the effect. In the article I propose that one productive way to explore how ethnicity, inclusion and exclusion are played out in night-life policing is to make use of the concepts of visibility and invisibility. Rather than taking (in)visibility to exist naturally, this analysis follows Brighenti’s (2007) suggestion that visibility and invisibility are best understood as socially constituted, dynamic, shaped by relational processes of power, and involving processes of objectification, subjectification and negotiation.

In different ways, the article makes use of the concept (in)visibility to explore how ethnicity is constructed, regulated and negotiated in nightlife. Informed by Foucault’s writing on the intertwined nature of knowledge, power and vision (Foucault, 1995), the first part the analysis investigates how ‘troublesome’ individuals are made visible to the “security gaze” of bouncers and how this coincides with ethnicity. Aside from exploring how ethnicity is constructed through the objectifying “security gaze” and exclusionary practices of bouncers, the article makes use of an interactive approach to explore how ethnicity, inclusion and exclusion are negotiated in encounters between bouncers and marginalized minority youth. Rather than seeing racial or ethnic minority youth as the passive subjects of processes to ethnic governance, as has been the case in much research on nightlife governance (see Measham & Hadfield, 2009; Hadfield, 2008), I show how minority men, in their interaction with bouncers, make use of several different tactics of (in)visibilization to negotiate access to nightlife, as well as their ascribed status as potential others. Lastly I turn my attention to what I call the micro-politics of representations of ethnic (in)visibility. While existing studies in this field have described bouncers’ use of techniques of neutralization to manage the legally tentative nature of the use of physical force (Lister, Hobbs, Hall, & Winlow, 2000; Hobbs et al., 2003; Monaghan, 2004), this article explores how bouncers seek to avoid allegations of discrimination by engaging in a performative de-visibilization of ethnicity in the enforcement of door policies. In this way, this section engages with the issue of how differential treatment and discrimination of subjects and citizens in liberal democracies often work through the performative production of legal and “fictional legal” subjects and orders (Carr, Brown, & Herbert, 2009, p. 1965).

2. Methods, Data and the Organization of Ethnicity within Bouncer Companies

The article is based on material collected during 13 months of ethnographic fieldwork among bouncers working in the nightclub scene in Aarhus, Denmark.

The research was conducted as part of a PhD research project exploring the interconnection between the masculinity embodied by security workers and the political economy of security in the Danish night-time economy (Søgaard, 2013). Aarhus, which is the second-largest city in Denmark, was chosen as the location for the study because local authorities there have invested much energy and resources into regenerating and securitizing the inner-city nightlife scene over the last decades. This has been reflected in branding campaigns promoting Aarhus nightlife as a vibrant, attractive and culturally diverse party scene; and in the physical transformation of one of city's most central streets—the riverside Aaboulevard (*Aboulevarden*)—from a motorized thoroughfare into a pedestrian street, dominated by 23 cafés, restaurants, bars and nightclubs. Central to the effort to create attractive nightlife has also been the establishment of a formal Safe Nightlife Partnership called the *Bar Owner Network* between local municipal authorities, the police and local bar/nightclub owners, as well as the formation of an informal *police-bouncer network*.

From the outset, data collection was guided by an interest in the social, gendered and bodily dynamics of night-time security governance. To explore these issues, 74 qualitative interviews were conducted with bouncers, bar/nightclub owners, police commissioners and relevant local authorities. I participated in 5 meetings of the Bar Owners' Network and in 4 meetings of the police-bouncer network. Furthermore, I conducted 163 full nights' observation of the bouncers' work. In total, I recruited 75 bouncers employed in 6 different bouncer companies as informants. 24 of these became my core informant group with whom I went boxing, spent time at cafés and observed their occasional legal trials in court. During the fieldwork, I regularly observed the work of about 55 bouncers of which 16 were of ethnic minority background. A few remarks need to be made about the internal ethnic organization of bouncer companies in Aarhus; at the time of my fieldwork, four large bouncer companies provided security for about 90% of the venues in Aarhus. All the bouncer company owners and most of the head bouncers working at these venues were ethnic Danes. While ethnicity was key to the structure of organizational hierarchies, ethnic minority bouncers were often valued by their colleagues. Not only were many seen as trustworthy and capable in cases of violent conflict, they were also valued for their professed intimate knowledge of local minority troublemakers and criminals. Similar to the point made by Monaghan (2002), the threat of violence seemed to lead bouncers to form in-group solidarities across ethnic boundaries that would otherwise divide them. Based on my nightly observations and to the best of my judgment, there is almost no difference between the door policies enforced by ethnic Danish and ethnic minority bouncers. There

are several reasons for this. The first is that among bouncers, regardless of ethnic background, and certainly among bouncer company owners, it is generally agreed that ethnic minority men are more likely to engage in anti-social or violent behavior. The consequence of this is not only that the occupational culture of bouncers seems to a large extent to reproduce the negative stereotypes of ethnic minority men which have long dominated the Danish media (Laursen, 2001; Andreassen, 2005), but also that many bouncers' notions of occupational competence is intimately linked to the individual's ability to deny access to ethnic minority men who, due to their cultural displays, are defined as "gangstas". As a consequence, I found that ethnic minority bouncers sometimes felt compelled to enforce strict door policies on minority youth in order to demonstrate their occupational competence. In interviews I conducted with three ethnic minority bouncers, all three reported that their ethnic Danish bosses and colleagues often suspected that they would be likely to enforce too lenient a door policy on local minority youngsters. Furthermore, the three informants described how they felt they had to prove that this was not the case. This of course does not mean that all bouncers agree on the door policies enforced. During my fieldwork four of my informants—two ethnic Danes and two of ethnic minority background—quit their jobs because they felt their colleagues or the bar/nightclub owners were racists.

Though this article draws on insights acquired from observations at 15 different venues, it is based primarily on nightly observations, interviews and informal conversations with bouncers working at *The Blue Palm* nightclub in Aarhus. At this nightclub all of the bouncers were native Danes, like myself. In the article, I use *The Blue Palm* as a case study to outline more general patterns of how politicized discourses of nightlife consumer safety interact with bouncers' regulation of access. Unlike some other researchers who have studied bouncers, I did not myself "become a bouncer in order to study their world" (Monaghan, 2003, p. 13). Rather, throughout my fieldwork, I was ascribed the role as "the researcher" by bouncers. Maybe due to my physical body size—almost two meters tall and weighing 103 kilos—and my active participation in boxing, mixed martial arts and bodybuilding with informants, I was able to establish close relations of trust and confidentiality with informants of various ethnic backgrounds. On weekend nights, my research techniques included observations of bouncers working the door, listening and engaging in informal conversations about shared experiences. Since bouncers in Denmark spend most of their time regulating access "in the door", as the Danish expression goes, I would position myself at the side of venue entrances, right next to the bouncers. Insights and questions emerging from the nightly observations were supplemented with data derived from 54 qualita-

tive interviews with bouncers. In order to get further insights into how ethnicity is experienced and negotiated in encounters between bouncers and minority youth, I conducted 12 qualitative interviews with local minority youngsters who frequented the local nightlife scene.

3. Inclusion and Exclusion in the Nightlife: An International Perspective

For a long time, research on urban nightlife was dominated by club studies and post-modernist approaches depicting nightlife by use of tropes such as hedonism, freedom, play and fluidity (Muggleton, 2000; Bennett, 2000). While post-modernist approaches led scholars to appreciate nightlife as a domain where identities and boundaries are fragile, this approach left more political dimensions such as struggles over accessibility and the construction of social divisions and hierarchies unexplored (Chatterton & Hollands, 2003).

More recently, club studies and studies of the night-time economy shifted their attention from hedonism, play and inclusion, to the formation of social divisions, inequalities and nightlife exclusion (Chatterton & Hollands, 2003; Talbot, 2007; Talbot & Böse, 2007; Boogaarts, 2008; Measham & Hadfield, 2009; Schwanen, van Aalst, Brands, & Timan, 2012). One key achievement of these studies has been to highlight the key paradox that urban regeneration and cosmopolitanism as political projects are often coupled with intensified policing and exclusion of “differences” categorized as disturbing otherness. This research has also explored different processes of ethnic and racial marginalization and exclusion structuring nightlife domains. Talbot (2007) for instance describes how nightlife exclusion of racial and ethnic minorities is related to a general structural transformation of the nightlife scene. Central to this process has been the increased city-center influence of corporatized mainstream venues and culture which, by targeting primarily riskless and cash-rich middle-class consumers, has led to the spatial marginalization of venues and music styles desired by racial and ethnic minority youth (see also Talbot & Böse, 2007; Boogaarts, 2008). Aside from such structural factors, Schwanen et al. (2012) have outlined how ethnic/racial exclusion stems from localized developments such as drink and entry prices; the use of members-only strategies; the banning of “black” music and events; and the temporal-rhythmic organization of nightlife. Finally, research has pointed out that nightlife exclusion is the result of bar/nightclub owners’ and door staff’s enforcement of door policies (Talbot & Böse, 2007; May & Chaplin, 2008; Measham & Hadfield, 2009; Grazian, 2009; Schwanen et al., 2012).

Over the last decade, much scholarly work has been done on the physical work and social implications of bouncers’ security provision in the night-time economy (see Winlow, 2001; Monaghan, 2002, 2003; Hobbs et

al., 2003; Rigakos, 2008; Sjøgaard, 2013). A substantial number of these studies have focused on bouncers’ regulation of access to licensed premises. While patrons often perceive bars and nightclubs as public spaces accessible to all, they are in fact privately owned with restricted access. A key aspect of the work conducted by bouncers is to regulate access to these privately owned party scenes. Research showed that bouncers regulate access on the basis of different criteria ranging from age, style of clothing, physical appearance (Hadfield, 2008), patrons’ behavior, level of drunkenness and physical display of violent potential (Monaghan, 2003), formal and informal house rules, and patrons’ history of violence (Hobbs et al., 2003). While Hobbs and his colleagues have focused on bouncers’ policing of women, Hadfield (2008) and Rivera (2010) have described how class markers, race, accent and dress are central to bouncers’ sorting practices at elite and prestigious venues. A central point put forward in this work is that bouncers regularly exclude ethnic or racial minorities, and that this is done either because ethnic or racial minorities are seen as less desirable consumers (Hadfield, 2008), or because they are seen as a threat to the ambience of more valued and affluent crowds (Measham & Hadfield, 2009). Importantly however, studies on bouncers have too often been content with mapping out how bouncers’ sorting practices have racial or ethnic (marginalizing) effects. With a few exceptions such as Rikagos (2008), little systematic attention has been accorded to how bouncers translate commercial orders into concrete categorizations and distinctions between ethnic minority and ethnic majority patrons. Furthermore, little work has been done on how ethnicity, inclusion and exclusion are negotiated in bouncer-patron encounters (the exception being May & Chaplin, 2008), or on how bouncers strive to uphold official policies of colorblind door policies, while at the same time engaging in systematic or disproportionate exclusion of ethnic minority youth. By exploring these neglected areas, this article contributes to the study of how nightlife private policing interacts with the (re)production of ethnic hierarchies and inequalities.

4. Perspectives on Ethnicity and Exclusionism in Danish Nightlife

In comparison to other European countries such as the UK and France, Danish society is rather ethnically homogenous (Andreassen, 2005). Over the last four decades several processes have however led Danish society to become increasingly multicultural. These processes include labor migration in the 1960s and 1970s, primarily from Pakistan and Turkey. Later on, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Danish government accepted relatively large numbers of refugees from war-torn countries in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Horn of Africa (Rytter, 2009). More recently, the Danish government’s

acceptance of EU open-border policies has led significant numbers of Eastern European migrant laborers to settle in the country either permanently or temporarily. In addition to this, Danish high-tech industries, educational institutions and tourist agencies have worked hard in recent years to attract international knowledge workers, students, researchers and tourists.

As a consequence of these various immigration flows, Danish nightlife is increasingly becoming an inter-ethnic contact zone for individuals of different social, national and cultural backgrounds. While increasingly globalized, Danish nightlife is, however, also the offsetting for divisions and exclusion of ethnic minorities. Since the late 1980s exclusion of ethnic minorities from nightlife has been a topic of regular public and political debates. These debates have often been spurred on by TV programs, newspaper articles, or youngsters using hidden cameras to expose bouncers' use of racist language or unequal exclusion of ethnic minority men (Rye, 2003; Tagarira, 2013). More than three decades of regular media reports of bouncers' questionable policing practices have led to the impression that the exclusion of ethnic minority men from nightlife participation is common and at times rather systematized. This impression is supported by several national surveys documenting how ethnic minority men feel they are discriminated against in the Danish nightlife. In 1999, Møller and Tøgeby (1999) conducted a survey which showed that 25% of youngsters of Lebanese/Palestinian background, 38% of Somali background and 41% of Turkish background reported that they had been denied access to bars or nightclubs at least once within the last year. In 2008 another national survey (Catinet, 2008) showed that 32% of respondents designated as "Danish" and 29% of those designated as "immigrants" reported that they frequented bars and nightclubs. While a relatively large proportion men of Somali (79%), Lebanese/Palestinian (59%) and Turkish background (54%) reported that they had been denied access, only 17% of the respondents, categorized as "Danish", reported that they had experienced being denied access to bars and nightclubs.

In public debates and in the small body of scholarly work on nightlife exclusionism in Denmark two models have been put forward most often to explain bouncers' exclusion of ethnic minority men. In the first model, exclusionary policing of minority men is claimed to be the result of prejudicial beliefs presumed to be held by bouncers. In recent years, an alternative rational-choice model emphasizing individualized calculation and economically motivated risk-management has gained increased prominence (Nørregård-Nielsen & Rosenmeier, 2007; Bech & Necef, 2012). However, with their emphasis on the individualized actor, either as a rational calculator or as the holder of prejudicial beliefs, neither of these perspectives gives sufficient attention to how bouncers' policing of minority men is

related to broader systems of power, security governance and urban regeneration.

5. Colorblind Policing in Safe Nightlife

Over the last decade two governmental visions have particularly influenced the development of Aarhus nightlife. One is the public branding of inner-city nightlife as an open, democratic and cosmopolitan domain. The other is the promotion of nightlife safety, centered on exclusionary spatial governmentality. Both of these projects have been fuelled by market mechanisms, as it is assumed that the marketing of cultural diversity and the creation of orderly nightlife spaces are crucial to attracting consumers, tourists and mobile capital.

At the heart of the project to create a safe, attractive and open nightlife has been the establishment of neoliberal governmental partnerships—the Bar Owners' Network and the police-bouncer network. Importantly, these parallel but overlapping networks function today as platforms for local authorities' responsabilization of bouncers and bar/nightclub owners. For example, local authorities have issued "security certificates" to local bars and nightclubs which have adopted anti-discrimination policies. As the following account from a meeting of the police-bouncers network illustrates, representatives of the police now also play an active role in promoting anti-discrimination agendas to bouncers.

"Things are going really well in Aarhus now. Keep up the good work, and don't let the troublemakers inside. It is you who are hosting the party, and you can decide who you want inside, as long as you remember not to exclude people because of religion or because they are Negroes, immigrants or communists. You can't do that of course." (Police Inspector).

Subjecting bouncers to principles of colorblind good governance, whether this is done on official training courses or at police-bouncer meetings, generally serves the purpose of making a taboo out of race and ethnicity as organizing principles in the regulation of nightlife accessibility. In Aarhus, actual police supervision and control of door policies at "security certified" venues is very rare. The reason for this is that local authorities believe that persuasion and guidance are more effective ways of influencing local door policies. Furthermore, the municipal chairman of the Bar Owners' Network confessed to me in a conversation that he had no intention of initiating any type of direct control over "security certified" venues' practical compliance with anti-discrimination policies. Since participation in the Bar Owners' Network is voluntary, he feared that such an initiative might compromise bar/nightclub owners' willingness to participate in other projects aimed at making nightlife safer. While the formation of public-private partnerships can function as a platform for the

proliferation of anti-discrimination agendas, the very same governmental alliances might, paradoxically, also influence and limit public authorities' and policing agencies' will to actively control private partners.

In Aarhus, the two partnership networks also function as platforms for the promotion and coordination of nightlife safety projects. While the primary and, one might say, sole function of bouncers has historically been to protect the commercial interests of their clients, nowadays the local police in Aarhus invest a large amount of energy in persuading bouncers to become active participants in making *Aarhus nightlife safe*. In Aarhus, the formation of the informal police-bouncer network has not only enabled the development of closer cooperative relationships between the police and local bouncers; more importantly it has meant that many bouncer companies are today eager to become recognized as responsible partners in enhancing nightlife safety (Søgaard, 2013).

In recent years, public authorities have used both the Bar Owners' Network and the police-bouncer network to promote the conception that the most effective way to ensure nightlife safety is for bar/nightclub owners and bouncers to make increased use of the private property right to exclude criminals, potential troublemakers and individuals who undermine customers' security and feelings of safety. This has been done by use of a rhetoric urging bar/nightclub owners and bouncers to enforce a strategy of "closed doors" (*lukkede døre*) on nightlife troublemakers (Søgaard, 2013). The consequence of this has been that, across company boundaries, bouncers' modes of security provision has gradually changed over the last ten years. Whereas the regulatory approaches of Aarhus-based bouncers was previously dominated by reactive approaches, over the last decade they have become increasingly centered on proactive exclusionary measures reflected in the idealization of what the bouncers call "the strong door". It is argued that such security arrangements are necessary to ensure that Aarhus nightlife will remain "open" and have "room for everybody", rather than being "taken over" by violent criminals or intimidating troublemakers.

Below, I will show how responsabilized bouncers' efforts to enhance nightlife citizen/consumer safety through the regulation of access interacts both with the commercial interests of their clients and with bouncers' street-level regulation of ethnic minorities. This will bring insights into how cosmopolitanism is actualized under the condition of neoliberal urban regeneration. Furthermore it will show how discourses of nightlife cosmopolitanism and colorblind policing today co-exist with new market-driven forms of ethnic governance and exclusion.

6. The Bouncer Security Gaze: Ethnic Governance in the Safe Nightlife Network

Since many bar/nightclub owners are now involved in

Safe Nightlife networks, bars and nightclubs are increasingly branded as safe places to party. Most bouncers are today formally hired by bouncer companies which contract with bars and nightclubs. Most often, bouncer companies are hired on a week-to-week basis, which means that if bar/nightclub owners feel that either the bouncer company or an individual bouncer is doing a poor job, they are easily replaceable. As a consequence the owners of many bouncer companies are keen to provide a service that will satisfy their client. As safety has become the new mark of the ideal and successful venue, bar/nightclub owners regularly instruct bouncers to deny access to individuals who undermine other customers' feeling of safety and comfort. Though many venues today have official anti-discrimination policies, the bouncers I got to know reported that bar/nightclub owners or managers nonetheless sometimes instructed them not to let in too many men of ethnic minority background because this would negatively affect the venue's 'safety image'. Below, I will show how ethnic and class distinctions play an important role in the construction of bouncers' security gaze and their governance of safety at venues.

In the Danish media, young ethnic minority men have long been represented as being prone to crime and violence (Laursen, 2001; Andreassen, 2005). In the safe nightlife domain, the representation of ethnic minority men as threats to security takes on particular salience. Individuals, categorized by bouncers as "immigrants" (*indvandrere*) or "foreigners" (*udlændinge*), are generally assumed to be more likely than other customers to engage in violence or intimidating behavior. In particular, ethnic minority men classified as "gangstas", but also working-class ethnic Danes labelled as "Brians", are seen as a threat to middle-class customers' feeling of safety and comfort. Below, I will describe a number of episodes from my field work that illustrate how ethnicity and class inform bouncers' security gaze and how cosmopolitan nightlife spaces are produced through simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion.

In the autumn of 2010, *The Blue Palm* nightclub was "security certified" at a public ceremony in Aarhus town hall. In the months after the ceremony, the owner of *The Blue Palm* was eager to improve the general image of his nightclub in accordance with the dominant discourses of consumer safety because he believed that this would attract more customers. As part of this project, the nightclub owner fired his bouncers. In an interview, he explained that his motivation for doing so was that he believed that the former bouncers had let in too many troublemakers and "immigrants", which was why some Danish customers now hesitated to frequent his venue. In order to improve the image of his venue, the nightclub owner hired a new bouncer company and instructed them to exclude all "troublemakers" and "gangstas". In a conversation, the head bouncer Lars further explained how the nightclub owner had al-

so instructed the bouncers not to let in “too many immigrants”. For five months I observed the bouncers Lars and Bent working and struggling to regulate access at *The Blue Palm*. During this time Lars and Bent were the primary bouncers at *The Blue Palm*. In Denmark, the number of bouncers employed at venues is relatively low. Even on busy nights with 500-600 guests inside, Bent and Lars were often the only bouncers. When regulating access, Lars and Bent rarely paid much attention to middle-class ethnic Danes who they described as “schoolboys” since these were presumed to be enrolled in one of the local educational institutions. Together with female patrons, schoolboys were generally seen as the preferred clientele. Most of the time, these people were given access with no problems, and only very rarely they were subjected to intensified surveillance. In contrast to the middle-class Danish consumers and elite internationals who were more or less invisible to the security gaze, Lars and Bent frequently denied access to individuals whom they categorized as “Somalis” and “Eastern Europeans”. One night, when I asked Bent to explain why he had denied access to two young men in nice shirts and jeans, he explained:

“Somalis don’t buy anything, or not much, at least. In their culture you are not allowed to drink. Often they just stand and stare at the women. Of course they [the women] don’t like that” (from field notes).

Bent and Lars furthermore identified “Eastern Europeans” as particularly problematic. Contrary to “Somalis” who were depicted as cultural others and reluctant to engage in the alcohol economy, Bent and Lars saw “Eastern Europeans” as problematic as they presumed these were prone to theft. Most importantly however, Lars and Bent were concerned with excluding “Brians” and “gangstas” who threatened other customers’ feeling of safety. Below, I will describe an episode that illustrates this:

One night at *The Blue Palm*, three minority men wearing jeans, trainers and tight t-shirts which revealed their muscular arms approached the door.

Lars: “Sorry guys, it’s not your night.”

Man: “Why not.”

Lars: “Because of security.”

When the three men walked on, Lars explained to me: “We can’t let gangstas like them inside. They have too domineering an attitude. The owner wants this to be a nice place where people feel welcome. But immigrants like them - they frighten the other customers, right” (from field notes).

Roughly equivalent to the American term “white trash”, the name-cum-general-noun “Brian” has long been used in Denmark to signify ethnic Danish work-

ing- or “underclass” individuals and troublemakers (Andreassen, 2005). The term “gangstas” is more recent and mostly used to describe socially marginalized minority men who show a preference for sub-cultural styles associated with African-American hip-hop, R’n’B or rap music. In the “safe” nightlife of Aarhus, working-class Danes, and especially ethnic minority men labelled as “gangstas”, are hyper-visible to the bouncers’ security gaze. Such individuals are routinely denied access to venues because bouncers presume that their cultural display of hyper-masculinity will make middle-class customers feel uncomfortable and insecure.

7. Making Troublesome Bodies Invisible

If the cosmopolitan city is characterized by the celebration of cultural diversity and difference, in Aarhus’s safe nightlife, the ethnic minority “gangsta” marks the boundary of acceptable difference. As indicated above, spatial exclusion, as a form of invisibilisation of particular ethnified bodies and troublesome masculinities, plays an important role in the attempt to enhance middle-class consumers and international elites’ feeling of safety, comfort and freedom. These findings correlate with other studies of urban regeneration, which describe how governmental creation of attractive and safe consumer spaces in western cities is often coupled with the spatial exclusion of certain behaviors, bodies and signs of disorder (Hadfield, 2008; Boogaats, 2008; Measham & Hadfield, 2009; Samara, 2010; Rivera, 2010; Castro, 2013). At *The Blue Palm*, minority men were, however, not only rendered invisible through spatial exclusion; they were also rendered less socially visible to ethnic Danish consumers by being subjected to policies of compulsive integration designed to avoid ethnic enclavisation inside the venue.

While the bouncers at *The Blue Palm* worked hard to exclude gangstas, individuals referred to as “good immigrants” were generally allowed access. Among the bouncers, the term “[a] good immigrant” was often used to describe minority men who resembled middle-class ethnic Danish youngsters (described by bouncers as “schoolboys”) in their physical display, style of clothing and attitude. Though the bouncers at *The Blue Palm* frequently allowed access to minority men categorized as “good immigrants” or at times “schoolboys”, they were keen on avoiding ethnic enclaves inside the premises. To this end, the bouncers often reminded minority men that their admission of access was conditioned on them *not* partying in bigger groups.

One Saturday night at *The Blue Palm*, the bouncer Mikkel was keeping watch of the dance-floor. I asked Mikkel if everything was all right and he said: “I am keeping an eye on the group over there.”

Mikkel pointed toward a group of five minority men who were standing at one end of the bar, clearly

having a good time.

I asked Mikkel: "Why are you keeping an eye on them?"

Mikkel: "I told them that if they were to get inside, they shouldn't stand together in a group, and see now."

After some time watching Mikkel approached the group men and said something to them. Two of the men nodded, and Mikkel headed for the door.

When we got outside Mikkel explained: "I told them to split up or else it's out." (from field notes)

During my fieldwork, I never recorded incidents where individuals resembling those normally categorized by bouncers as "Danish" were explicitly subjected to the demand 'blend in, or you are out!' Compulsory integration can be seen as a governing tactic used to reduce the social visibility of ethnic minority men in the eyes of middle-class ethnic Danish consumers and international elites. Although today minority men constitute part of the normal social ecology of Danish bars and nightclubs, the above analysis suggests that market-driven governance of safety in the nightlife domain can function as a form of ethnic governance contributing to the reproduction of ethnified marginalization and exclusionary nightlife spaces.

8. Belonging, Performance and Tactics of (In)visibility

Over the last decade, researchers have given considerable attention to racial or ethnic effects of bouncers' security governance (see Hadfield, 2008; Measham & Hadfield, 2009; Grazian, 2009; Rivera, 2010; Schwanen et al., 2012). However, with a few exceptions, such as May and Chaplin (2008), very little attention has been given to how access, belonging and ethnicity are dynamic processes negotiated in encounters between bouncers and racial or ethnic minority youth. The consequence of this is that marginalized youth too often come to be represented as passive subjects to processes of ethnic governance. Based on interviews with minority party-goers in Aarhus, as well as on observations of bouncer-youth encounters, I find it reasonable to conclude that marginalized ethnic minority youth are not merely passively accepting bouncers' security gaze. Rather, the security gaze produces creative responses. Below, I will describe how minority men in Aarhus make reflexive and tactical use of cultural performances of (in)visibility to negotiate access, to disrupt bouncers' negative reading of them, and to create a status of belonging in the nightlife party-scene.

In Aarhus nightlife, minority men frequently have to cope with the threat of being seen as being out of place by bouncers, nightclub owners or bar staff. This impression was confirmed in 12 interviews which I conducted with 14 local minority men who regularly

frequented Aarhus's nightlife scene. In one interview, Abdal, whose parents had arrived in Denmark some 20 years ago, described how he felt he was constantly being evaluated by bouncers and bar-staff. In their attempts to negotiate access and the threat of being labelled as being out of place, the young men I interviewed described different tactics they were able to use. Analytically, these tactics can be seen as different methods of visibilisation and de-visibilisation.

In the interview, Abdal described how he and his friends used to have a hard time getting into most of the nightclubs in the city center. This changed, however, when Abdal discovered that a bouncer had a day-time job as security guard in a mall close to where he lived.

Abdal: "We started saying hello, talking to him and joking with him in the mall. We always behaved really well an' stuff. Guess he figured that we were all right, so after some time he asked us: 'Do you guys go out?' We said: 'Yeah, but we can't get in'. Then he said: 'Come to my place. I'll let you in'. The next weekend we went down there and he let us in. When we were inside, we spent money, money...a lot of money on alcohol."

Interviewer: "Why did you do that?"

Abdal: "We didn't want them to have a reason to kick us out again".

Being known by or getting to know a particular bouncer can be useful for minority youth eager to get access to bars and nightclubs. In the above case, Abdal and his friends' deliberate attempt to establish a friendly relationship with a bouncer can be seen as a micro-level tactic of visibilisation, which enables them to negotiate access by "being known", that is by standing out as individuals, rather than being seen as members of generalized categories, such as troublesome "immigrant" or "gangsta". The usefulness of such tactics was also reflected in the fact that during my fieldwork I was struck by how often minority men in particular would shake hands with bouncers or take their time to joke with them. Similarly to the reflexive use of cultural stylization such as "dressing nicely" and avoiding "immigrant haircuts", establishing familiar relations can be used by minority men both to dissociate themselves from stigmatized categories of the ethnic other and to create their own identity as respectable and orderly individuals.

For minority youth, gaining access is often dependent on convincing bouncers that they are not troublemakers. One way minority youth do this is by behaving "(...) really well an' stuff" as Abdal mentioned above, thereby invisibilising themselves from the bouncers' security gaze. Another important way that minority youth can negotiate access is by submitting to the authority of the bouncers. A bouncer's decision to deny access to guests is rarely left uncontested. Often guests will try to persuade them to change their mind. When

this is done in a polite or humorous way, most bouncers will take this with a smile while they reiterate their decision. If excluded guests act agitatedly or aggressively, however, bouncers see this as evidence that their initial decision to deny access was correct. During my fieldwork, I recorded several incidents where bouncers decided “to give a chance” to minority men who, as the bouncers saw it, had accepted being denied access on several earlier occasions without much of a quarrel.

The minority men I interviewed were well aware that some bouncers and bar/nightclub owners’ reluctance to grant access to “immigrants” was based on the assumption that ethnic minority men were flawed consumers due to their cultural or religious backgrounds. In this context, Abdal’s account of how he and his friends spent “a lot of money” when frequenting venues, can be seen as an attempt to negotiate the status of belonging in the nightlife scene, by making themselves visible as huge spenders, and thereby destabilizing established ethnified distinctions between good and flawed consumers. Interestingly, ethnic minority men’s struggle to negotiate nightlife accessibility by increasing their value as market assets in the alcohol-based night-time economy might at times give rise to new and hybrid forms of cultural identities and hyper-consumer practices.

9. Neutralization and the Micro-Politics of (De-)ethnified Door Policies

In Denmark, public debates about nightlife exclusionism have in recent years been centered on two questions in particular: What role does ethnicity play in bouncers’ regulatory practices? And is the exclusion of minority men from nightlife participation by bouncers’ discrimination in a legal sense? (Bech & Necef, 2012). It is, however, not only in public debates that such questions are frequently discussed and contested. Rather, questions about the legal legitimacy of bouncers’ governance are raised each weekend in front of most bars and nightclubs in Aarhus. In this last section, I will turn my attention to how the legal legitimacy of bouncers’ (ethnic) governance is constructed, contested and interlinked with what might be called the micro-politics of ethnic (in)visibility.

Like other policing agents, bouncers engage in selective representations of their activities. In their studies of the British night-time economy, Monaghan (2004) and Hobbs et al. (Lister et al., 2000; Hobbs et al., 2003) elegantly described how bouncers frequently make use of different techniques of neutralization in order to avoid allegations of violent assault. Hobbs et al. describe how bouncers’ techniques of neutralization include the destruction of CCTV recordings, the representation of customer injuries as accidents, and scapegoating, pushing the responsibility for the violent ac-

tion onto the customer. Neutralization techniques are, however, not only used by bouncers to manage the risk of allegations of violent assault; they are also integral to bouncers’ attempts to avoid allegations of discrimination. In their study, Hobbs et al. (2003) found that bouncers manage the risk of allegations of violent assault by using strategic post-event narratives forwarded to police investigators. This is also the case in relation to discrimination. Maybe more so than in the case of violence, techniques of neutralization are also integral to bouncers’ everyday interaction with ethnic minority customers.

On weekend nights, the risk of being charged with discrimination is common when minority men accuse bouncers of being racist or of enforcing discriminatory door policies. While such accusations might reflect the belief among some minority men that bouncers are in fact motivated by ethnic prejudicial beliefs, their use of discourses of ethnicity—to ethnify themselves and to discredit the bouncers’ decision to deny them access—is also one of the few legal possibilities available to them when trying to negotiate access to privately owned bars and clubs. Whereas minority men sometimes make tactical use of discourses of ethnification or ethnic visibilisation to negotiate access, the bouncers I studied were actively engaged in what might be called discursive de-ethnification of door policies and practices.

In encounters with minority men, bouncers are often faced with the demand that they should explain and legitimize their denial of access. Such situations, as the bouncer Michael explained in an interview, involves considerable risks.

“You have to take care not to screw up. That you don’t say something stupid because that’s when you get the headline in the news. You never know if they’ve got a recorder or something. That’s why I say it’s better just to say: ‘You can’t get in because of security reasons’”.

In recent years, the general availability of private high-tech cameras and video technology has rendered bouncers’ practices increasingly visible to the wider public and to legal authorities. In this context, the bouncers included in this study had become increasingly reflexive about how their practices become visible to others. This reflexivity was revealed in practical concerns about developing “good explanations” that would both satisfy the excluded minority men and not render the bouncer vulnerable to legal sanctions. While a few bouncers still make use of explanations such as “you got the wrong kind of shoes”, most found such explanations to be silly, clichéd and potentially problematic. The problem with such explanations was that if excluded minority men chose to wait by the entrance, they would often be able point out ethnic Danish men who,

through wearing the same kind of shoes, had been allowed access. In such situations, arguments between bouncers and excluded individuals were likely. Like Michael in the case described above, many bouncers agreed that the explanation “you cannot get in because of security reasons” was better. One reason for this was that the rhetoric of security fits in with politicized discourses about nightlife safety in Aarhus, so bouncers felt confident that judges would be likely to sympathize with them in a legal trial. Furthermore, the notion of “security” is so vague, in part because bouncers refuse to define what was actually meant by this, that it would be virtually impossible for minority men to argue against it in a potential trial.

In the winter of 2011, bouncers’ frequent use of this security rhetoric led two minority youngsters in Aarhus to form the Facebook group “For all of those who cannot party because of security reasons” as a response to what they saw as the most recent development in bad excuses used by bouncers to justify unfair exclusion of ethnic minorities. Though the bouncers I came to know generally agreed that “security reasons” (*sikkerhedsmæssige årsager*) was an effective explanation, some also felt that other bouncer companies’ systematic use of the notion of security when denying access to ethnic minority men had turned into a parody; an empty signifier applicable to almost all situations. Hence, the bouncer Per gloated when he heard that, one Saturday morning after finishing his night shift, Lars, head bouncer at *The Blue Palm* was refused a taxi ride home by a taxi-driver of ethnic minority background because of “security reasons”.

10. Conclusion

This article has focused on how the contradictory and seemingly incompatible trends of inclusion, cosmopolitanism and exclusion structure the neoliberal city of today. By presenting a case study of bouncers’ regulation of access in Aarhus’s regenerated and securitized nightlife scene, the article has looked into some of the key mechanisms which allow visions of urban cosmopolitanism and the practical (re)production of ethnic boundaries and inequalities to co-exist and coincide. Following recent calls within the field of urban studies to “ground” cosmopolitanism (Keith, 2005; Young, Martina, & Drabble, 2006), this article has shown how politicized agendas to promote nightlife consumer spaces as “open for all”, orderly and risk-free has given renewed strength to the exclusion of ethnic minority men and rough types of masculinities from nightlife consumer spaces by responsibilised bouncers. The ostensibly cosmopolitan city and urban nightlife, therefore, are not simply places of unproblematic intercultural encounters; instead, they are better understood as specific areas, produced by neoliberal political and economic projects, leading to the simultaneous pres-

ence of processes of inclusion and exclusion.

Bouncers’ regulation of access pushes us to take seriously the argument that urban regeneration projects and everyday policing based around the protection of middle-class customers’ feeling of safety can come to function as legitimate forms of ethnic and racial exclusion in neoliberal democracies where private property regimes seem to be playing an ever greater role. By investigating neoliberal and market-driven forms of ethnic governance, we might also be able to better understand the paradox that, although private security actors are increasingly subjected to reformist governmental programs of good governance and anti-discrimination agendas, these often continue to disproportionately target (marginalized) racial or ethnic groups. While this article in many ways parallels the existing academic interest in how urban political economies interact with the everyday policing of spaces to produce racial or ethnic effects, it should also be read as a call for scholars to give more attention to how racial and ethnic minority youngsters actively engage with and negotiate local power structures of security governance, which in turn might give rise to new ethnicities, identifications and social practices.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Review

Racial Profiling as Collective Definition

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Abstract

Economists and other interested academics have committed significant time and effort to developing a set of circumstances under which an intelligent and circumspect form of racial profiling can serve as an effective tool in *crime finding—the specific objective of finding criminal activity afoot*. In turn, anti-profiling advocates tend to focus on the immediate efficacy of the practice, the morality of the practice, and/or the legality of the practice. However, the tenor of this opposition invites racial profiling proponents to develop more surgical profiling techniques to employ in crime finding. In the article, I review the literature on group distinction to discern its relevance to the practice and study of racial profiling. I argue that the costs of racial profiling extend beyond inefficient policing and the humiliation of law-abiding minority pedestrians and drivers. Racial profiling is simultaneously a process of perception *and* articulation of relative human characteristics (both positive and negative); it binds and reifies the concepts of *race* and *criminality*, fixing them into the subconscious of the profiled, the profiler, and society at large.

Keywords

African-American; criminality; criminal propensity; group boundary; group formation; racial profiling; sociology; social closure

Issue

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1. Introduction

The body of feelings which scholars, today, are so inclined to regard as constituting the substance of prejudice is actually a resultant of the way in which given racial groups conceive of themselves and of others. A basic understanding of race prejudice must be sought in the process by which racial groups form images of themselves and others. This process...is fundamentally *a collective process*. (Herbert Blumer, 1958, p. 3)

Contemporary analysis of racial profiling by criminologists and economists tends to focus narrowly on questions addressing the utility of profiling for *crime finding* and the presence or absence of racial animus among

profiling officers (Engel, Calnon, & Bernard, 2002; Engle, 2008; Knowles, Persico, & Todd, 2001; Skolnick & Caplovitz, 2001; Gross & Livingston, 2002; Dominitz & Knowles, 2006) to the exclusion of less immediate yet profound sociological implications. As a result of the limited scope of the racial profiling debate, profiling scholars increasingly miss the proverbial forest for the trees. In the forthcoming discussion, I pivot from the issue of racial profiling efficacy to that of the social construction of race in the context of racial profiling. I argue that when police engage in racial profiling race and criminality take shape as co-constituted social constructs that inform a sense of racial hierarchy.

In the context of police work, the *racial profile* should be understood as distinct from a *witness description*. A *profile*, for the purposes of the my analysis,

is a police conception of a hypothesized, criminally active person while a *witness description* (which may include race or ethnicity in combination with other descriptors) is witness generated and used to capture suspects only after a criminal allegation has been reported. Thus, police receive the witness description from a first-hand observer of a criminal action, whereas the profile is constructed and deployed by the police officer and/or the police institution based on the anticipated social location of a crime for which there is no witness or direct evidence. Unlike the *witness description*, which is offered by a witness to a crime that has allegedly transpired, police employ the *racial profile* without direct knowledge of criminal activity afoot. The profile informs the police officer's expectation of precisely where to find criminal activity. In developing the profile, the profiler anticipates the characteristics of the perpetrator, who is an abstraction rather than a real person.

My project in this paper is to use sociological investigations into the social construction of social groups—both subordinate and superordinate—to illuminate the co-construction of race and criminality through the tactic of racial profiling. By drawing theories regarding group formation and group distinction into a racial profiling literature dominated by quantitative assessment, I hope to initiate and encourage an analysis of the impact of racial profiling that extends beyond the objective effectiveness of the practice in locating criminal activity afoot. I look instead to the potential for racial profiling to instill in the minds of the profiler, the profiled, and society at large the essential characteristics of those individuals affiliated with the targeted racial category.

The remainder of the paper is broken into three sections. In Section 2, I present a brief overview of the literature assessing the utility of racial profiling via statistical analysis. While offering an informative debate on the immediate effectiveness of racial profiling, quantitative studies have failed to consider many of the sociological costs of the practice. I review sociological studies regarding the social production of social groups and social group boundaries in Section 3 as part of an effort to clearly articulate these costs. In Section 4, I delineate the process by which racial profiling establishes racial characteristics in a three-part schematic. I conclude that racial profiling by police fortifies and conflates racial and criminal group classifications, and that this negative distinction is in effect a state-sponsored project in collective definition.

2. The Efficacy Question

Criminal law scholars in conjunction with a number of economists have turned to the question of the *efficacy* of racial profiling, specifically, the extent to which the targeting of members of a racial group reduces criminal activity (Knowles et al., 2001; Hernández-Murillo &

Knowles, 2004; Harcourt, 2004; Harcourt, 2006; Bo-rooah, 2001). Many of the scholars writing in this school argue that police may engage in racial profiling absent racial animus and, likewise, use racial profiling as a benign and effective tool for identifying criminal activity (Engle et al., 2002). The logic of such argumentation holds that racial profiling stemming from racial animus should show a criminal activity “hit rate” (i.e., a positive finding of criminal conduct per stop/investigation) among the profiled group that is lower than that of individuals outside the profiled group. If the hit rate of the targeted racial group is equal to or greater than that of the rest of the population despite heightened police scrutiny, the profiling practice is thought to be based on rational grounds rather than irrational racial bias. This latter outcome, in theory, affirms the efficacy of the practice and serves as *prima facie* evidence that the police use race in a benign fashion rather than in a manner intended to harm or subjugate the profiled racial group (Harcourt, 2004, p. 1293).

Scholars have critiqued statistical models constructed to test for “benign” racial profiling, primarily by evaluating their effectiveness in revealing criminal activity and criminal actors. For instance, alternative statistical analyses exploring the “elasticity” of racial profiling show that racial profiling efficacy has less of a deterrent effect on African-Americans than on other groups given the challenges African-Americans face in finding alternative income streams. Associated findings suggest that racial profiling may ultimately increase the total amount of criminal activity in a given setting given that non-profiled groups are likely to recognize when police attention is narrowly focused elsewhere (Harcourt, 2004).

A few academic treatments of racial profiling have challenged the practice from a more sociological point of view, conveying the racializing elements inherent to the act as an important outcome to be considered. UCLA Law Professor Devon Carbado begins his critique of Supreme Court decisions regarding the practice of racial profiling with an account of the first few years after his immigration to the United States (Carbado, 2002). Carbado, a British national, found himself subject to racial profiling soon after he arrived in the U.S., and while he initially expressed anger during each incident of perceived police abuse, he eventually concluded that his claims of racial bias only served to complicate already precarious police encounters. Carbado writes that he soon adopted the role of the passive African American male, intent on letting each momentary police intrusion end without further incident. These experiences collectively served as a “naturalization ceremony within which our submission to authority reflected and reproduced black racial subjectivity” (Carbado, 2002, p. 957). Carbado states plainly, “We were growing into our American profile” (p. 958).

I wish to link Carbado's anecdotal illustration of the

impact of racial profiling on the transformation of his own subjectivity to sociological knowledge regarding the utility of race in establishing group distinction, group hierarchy and collective subjectivity in a given social setting. This orientation toward the study of racial profiling shifts the outcome analysis from “crime finding” to the less immediate issue of the dissemination of social meaning by way of a specific form of state-sponsored group distinction. When applied to the subject of racial profiling, the sociological study of the production of group distinction reveals that role-play in the profiling moment produces a specific understanding of social hierarchy for the profiled, and the profiler. Through similar scripts played out countless times each day, citizens and police alike come to naturalize racial categories and racial role-play based on subordinate and superordinate racial group status.

3. The Dynamic Process of Group Distinction

Despite its role as a pervasive and daunting force in American society, “race” exists largely as a social construct and as a product of public definition (Omi & Winant, 1994; Brubaker, 2004; Wacquant, 2004; Lopez, 2006; Davis, 2010). That is to say that race does not exist outside of collective understanding of the concept and acquiescence to its predetermined logics. Scholars of racial group formation and racial prejudice have thoroughly examined and theorized the social process of creating artificial, bounded categories to which individuals are assigned (Hacking, 1996). Though categorization serves a natural and necessary way of understanding the social world, the process itself establishes distinctions that can immediately transform collective perception of social reality (Hacking, 1996). The categorized subject often arises within and through the dynamic process of categorization.

The claim of dynamic nominalism is not that there was a kind of person who became increasingly to be recognized by bureaucrats or by students of human nature but rather that a kind of person came into being at the same time as the kind itself was being invented. In some cases, that is, classifications and our classes conspire to emerge hand in hand, each egging on the other (p. 228).

The *institutionalization* of categories and labels often impacts the extent to which a social group is assigned meaning within the public consciousness. The institutional mobilization of social group categories through institutional practices such as racial profiling set a path for new societal perspectives on the social world and thus new social realities. Institutional classifications shape public understandings.

Scholars have identified the “dramatization of evil” in the context of the criminal processing of the crimi-

nally accused within similar conceptual parameters (Tannenbaum, 1957). For instance, the moment when a young person is first placed in contact with the criminal justice system serves as a pivotal point in the youth’s relationship with the state and the community and, likewise, in the development of her perception of self. To the extent that the criminal act results in the state’s application of a criminal identity, the youth—now categorized as “deviant” and “defendant”—falls into a binary with the community (Tannenbaum, 1957). If, alternatively, the community frames the youth’s contact with the judicial system in cooperative terms, all invested parties might be more likely to continue to view that child as a part of (rather than alien to) the community. In the application of criminal labels, the act rather than the child’s life circumstance or constitution comes to represent the child to the state forum and to society. The conceptualization of the child as criminal—a “dramatization of evil” in the institutional context of criminal procedure—is understood to have a powerful normative effect. It shapes a new subjectivity for the child in which the child plays the role of a deviant suffering from a dysfunctional disposition rather than the role of a child having committed a single deviant act.

The expanded role of police in school discipline is another telling example of the impact of dramatization. As school administrators employ full time on-site police forces, the school as an institution often “dramatizes” and criminalizes behavior that has been found in every schoolyard for centuries past (Fine et al., 2003). This is not to discount the destructive impact incidents of violence can have on a school community. It is instead to highlight how particular penal responses—locked exits, on-site police, and routine criminal charging—establish penal norms and penal identities in the minds of student, teacher, and administrator alike (Fine et al., 2003). These norms are not benign. They inform group distinctions by way of conceptualization—here, between bad behavior in school and criminal deviance. If a child recognizes that she is being regulated in a manner similar to a prison, she accepts that stage and script and is thus to some degree conditioned to play the role appropriate for the setting.

Goffman’s idea of “stigma symbols” provides another frame by which to conceptualize the manner in which social cues come to characterize social groups (Goffman, 1963). Through symbols, social information is conveyed to the social actors in a given setting. Children attending school under lock and key in the name of their own security are not *per se* criminals, but develop criminal perspectives of themselves by way of the signals embedded in the school setting (Goffman, 1963, p. 46). “The normal and the stigmatized are not persons but rather perspectives. These are generated in social situations during mixed contacts by virtue of the unrealized norms that are likely to play upon the

encounter" (1963, p. 138).

Race theorists have similarly argued race conceptualization and the cultivation of racial stigma to be a "fundamentally collective process" (Blumer, 1958). In this line of analysis, racial prejudice stems from the identification one's own racial group relative to another, and requires a clear and functional understanding of how each group is defined to the exclusion of the other. Thus, in order to conceive of two races, both must be defined in terms of particular group characteristics. Racial prejudice cannot exist unless the social position and character of each group is apparent to the social actor. Moreover, such prejudice requires racial corollaries, namely a specific conceptualization of a subjugated and dominant group (Blumer, 1958). In taking the constitution of racial groups for granted rather than accounting for their dynamic social production, social actors and institutions ignore the tacit ways in which specific conceptualizations of race inform human thought, perception, action, and speech and likewise group division in social life. Through these diverse social processes our minds structure and come to perceive and act upon the social world (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004).

People around the world trade in "common sense" (yet variable) racial categories based on the notion that race and ethnicity exist as fixed and essential qualities (Brubaker, 2002). The institutionalization of race has been a significant subject of sociological study in part because it sheds light on the classification processes that can establish racial distinction (2002, p. 167). Critical analysis of such processes can pinpoint fundamental elements of racial conflict and perception of racial threat.

This [analytical orientation] means thinking of ethnicity, race, and nation not in terms of substantial groups or entities but in terms of practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events. It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization, as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes. And it means taking as a basic analytical category not 'the group' as an entity but groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable. (p. 167)

Symbolic power, which manifests in various processes of group distinction, can serve as an essential cog in the process of collective understanding (Bourdieu, 1973). Through symbols, society coalesces to create shared meaning. Symbols are at the core of the process of public definition and the achievement of shared meaning, as well as the vehicle by which meaning is imposed on the public; they are fundamental to the reification of the social order. But more than organizing a collective reality, the symbolism underlying human

taxonomy holds the potential to commit "symbolic violence" in its facilitation of group domination. The term "racial stereotype," for instance, is central to this discussion, but its common understanding fails to capture the dynamic, collective, and variable quality of racial group distinction. The stereotype is a basic conceptualization of the symbolic power that facilitates the production and dissemination of racial distinction (Bourdieu, 1973, p. 169). Rather than being the product of arbitrary mental processes, racial stereotypes are triggered by symbols and are borne of symbolic power. They are thought to arise from natural inclinations, but survive by way of systems of classification and corresponding mental structures that adhere to a larger and implicit race orthodoxy (Bourdieu, 1973).

In shaping social groups and establishing group boundaries, we use established categories as readily accessible packets of information that help us comprehend the social world. Micro, person-to-person interactions inform racial categories and racial distinctions, as do the meso-level actions of institutions, particularly public institutions, which are recognized as representing affiliated publics and as operating in accordance with the public will. To understand both how racial meaning is produced and how it is digested in a given social moment, one must critically assess the role of the state in fostering and reifying racial distinction. This analytical orientation has yet to be applied to the case of racial profiling by police.

4. Racial Profiling and Racial Group Distinction

To characterize another racial group is, by opposition, to define one's own group. This is equivalent to placing the two groups in relation to each other, or defining their positions *vis-a-vis* each other. It is this *sense of social position* emerging from this collective process of characterization which provides the basis for prejudice. (Herbert Blumer, 1958, p. 4)

The practice of racial profiling begins with a process of racial distinction that takes place in the mind of the police officer or in the formulation of policing policy. The profiling act itself informs the collective definition of race by articulating racial group characteristics and, by logical extension, racial group relations and relative racial group standing.

4.1. Constructing Race in Criminal Justice

In the following discussion I look to establish a basic framework for the manner in which racial profiling policy and practice convey group distinction to various segments of society within the distinct levels of formulation and execution. In the three hypothesized "theaters" of racial profiling presented in the framework, specific segments of society witness or participate in

racial profiling, or in some way come to understand racial profiling as a state-sponsored security project. As a result, criminal characteristics attach to the targeted racial classification. The three theaters are not mutually exclusive as one or all may manifest in the racial profiling moment.

Theater I: Lone Officer Construction of Racial Meaning: *The individual officer makes an independent and autonomous decision to profile a targeted racial group member on the street in the context of a cursory investigation.* Consider the following example. Patrol officers in a squad car stop a group of African-American men driving late in the evening in a predominantly white neighborhood and ask for identification and inquire as to their ultimate destination. The encounter escalates to the point where the officers place the men in handcuffs and sit them on the curb while conducting a search of the vehicle. In this scenario, an association between criminal propensity and African-American racial classification is conveyed to the profiling officer, the profiled subject, and witnesses to the profiling event.

Theater II: Institutional Construction of Racial Meaning—Internal: *The police institution adopts an internal policy naming race as one of a litany of indicia of criminality.* Race is defined to all members of the police institution and all other employees privy to the policy. The profiling act by the lone officer in *Theater I* is not predicated on racial profiling policy, as in *Theater II*. However, if the police institution formally establishes that officers should associate a racial classification with criminal propensity, the conceptual association becomes ingrained within the police institution. Institutional construction of racial meaning in *Theater II* facilitates, endorses, and encourages profiling by officers in the field and informs the quality of their engagement with those associated with the targeted racial category. In *Theater II*, the conflation of race and criminality is no longer limited to the autonomous mind of an individual officer. The conflation is instead explicit within the institution and legitimated by the institutional authority. In *Theater II*, profiling loses its secretive character and some of its accompanying stigma, and extends the co-construction of race and criminality from the calculation of a single individual in a private sphere to the institutional consciousness encompassing the police collective.

Theater III: Institutional Construction of Racial Meaning—External: *The judicial, legislative, or executive branch of the local, state, or federal government publicly endorses profiling.* Here, the public institution endorsing racial profiling validates the practice in the “collective consciousness.” Racial profiling appears to be the product of careful deliberation by elected leaders and/or ostensibly democratic institutions. The conflation of racial classifications and criminal propensity finds public acceptance. For the sake of pragmatism, deliberations about public safety include the contem-

plation of race, perhaps even regretfully. In advancing from Theater I to Theater II, the construction of racial meaning advances from the individual to the institutional, from the implicit to the explicit, from a function of culture to an element of structure.¹ In the move from Theater II to Theater III, the construction of racial meaning comes to serve as an element of societal or public knowledge, informing the collective understanding of race rather than merely the institutional understanding.

4.2. Racial Meaning in Washington, D.C.

An incident in Washington, D.C., in 2006 helps to illustrate the relationship between the three theaters of racial profiling and racial group distinction. After a high-profile murder in the city’s wealthy and largely white Georgetown area, Andy Solberg, a white police commander for the city district that included Georgetown, addressed a meeting of concerned local residents at a neighborhood church. In reference to the homicide, Solberg offered the group what he likely understood to be common-sense tips on neighborhood safety.

I would think that at 2 o’clock in the morning on the streets of Georgetown, a group of three people, one of whom is 15 years old, one of whom is a bald chunky fat guy, are going to stand out...They were black. This is not a racial thing to say that black people are unusual in Georgetown. This is a fact of life (The Washington Times, 2006).

When Solberg’s comments became a top local news story, Charles Ramsey, the city’s African-American police chief, initially offered public support for the 19-year department veteran, saying that Solberg was a “very, very good guy” and had done great work in the area of city in which he served as commander (Klein, 2006). An African-American store owner in Georgetown interviewed by *The Washington Post* seemed startled at the controversy saying, “How come people don’t know that? These people live in a box? It is highly, highly unusual to see three young black males roaming around up there in the residential neighborhoods.” Charles Lawrence, an African-American, a former D.C. School Board Council member and a friend of Solberg

¹ An example can be found in an FBI policy proposed by the Justice Department (DOJ) in 2008. In July of 2008, the *Associated Press* reported that DOJ had formulated a policy that would allow the FBI to investigate Americans absent a report of wrongdoing. Under the policy, the FBI would construct a “terrorist profile” that included race and ethnicity, and use data mining techniques to formulate a list of subjects to be investigated. Attorney General Mukasey denied that Americans would be investigated solely because of race, but left the door open to race and ethnicity being used to construct a basis of suspicion (Jordan, 2008).

said that he regretted the public criticism. In describing the commander he pointed out that Solberg sent his children to a public school that was 95% African-American and coached a local soccer team that was nearly entirely African-American. “What we really need is more white folks who are not going to run and hide but are committed to living here like Andy. I don’t know any white person in the city who is less afraid of or more fair about race” (Fisher, 2006). Ramsey reinstated Solberg to his original position two weeks after assigning him to another district (Klein, 2006).

This account of racial profiling in Washington, D.C. (a city fondly referred to in some circles as “Chocolate City”) seems remarkable in a number of other respects. First, and most relevant to the “theaters” framework, it demonstrates the external pressure police officials face in advancing racial profiling from *Theaters I and II* to *Theater III*. The narrative suggests that Commander Solberg, in advising Georgetown residents to racially profile, had relayed a tactic considered unexceptional in police circles. Solberg, acting in an advisory role to the Georgetown neighborhood community, prescribed racial profiling, and implicitly suggested that racial profiling among police was standard practice and “common sense.” For the presumably largely white audience in attendance, he advised a particular understanding of African-American presence in Georgetown. Though the media reporting of Solberg’s statement included backlash over the comments, the ensuing dialogue was a sincere public exploration of the extent to which race and criminality could legitimately be associated. Local media coverage of the incident does not show a single police official denouncing Solberg’s statements or even disagreeing with his proposition to the Georgetown neighborhood group. In fact, the media record shows sparse dissent from Solberg’s statements relative to the number of affirmations. Individual and internal bureaucratic assessments of the link between conceptions of race and criminality were ultimately disseminated to public forums and local and national media without direct challenge from the police institution.

Racial profiling conveys an *implicit* racial logic when it is an ad hoc, individual practice or insulated within the police institution. However, when adopted or inferred as institutional policy and publicized as either sound policy or a sensible neighborhood safety precaution, the societal impact of racial profiling grows substantially. Explicit approval of racial profiling policy by police, national security institutions, city councils, state legislatures, or Congress, publicly defines the profiled to the collective. It openly casts racial characteristics as fixed in a social context that is understood to be democratic and subject to the will of the people. At which point, the covert quality of racial profiling practice by an individual or within a closed institutional system yields to an advertised notion of criminality borne out of democratic deliberations rather than hidden hunch-

es. Racial profiling in the theater of the public amounts to more than a moment of individual shame for targeted racial group members. It functions more broadly as a constructive enterprise that builds collective understanding of both race and criminality and reinforces this understanding through subsequent, innumerable police-public contacts.

4.3. Race, Group Distinction, and Social Closure

Sociologists have insisted that the process of racial distinction not be studied in a vacuum, but instead assessed as part of larger system of group boundary construction and maintenance (i.e., in relation to its co-dependence with social classifications such as class and criminal record) (Schwartzmann, 2007). Mara Loveman writes that, “[s]uch a framework could permit identification of the *patterns of relations* between particular social processes and particular structural conditions that trigger certain boundary dynamics; consequently, it could improve social scientific understanding, explanation, and theorization” (Loveman, 1997) (my emphasis).

The investigation of *interdependent forms of social closure* is significant to the development of a comprehensive understanding of the social consequences of racial profiling. The embrace of racial profiling functions as a form of social closure as it marks, stigmatizes, and isolates by disseminating theories of racial group distinction. The moment police choose to profile a racial group or a single group member, the characteristic of criminality is freshly assigned to the group in at least one of the three profiling theaters, typecasting the group, and calling for the anticipation of criminal conduct by other group members.

Police conflation of racial and criminal classification in the project of racial profiling ultimately aligns with a larger structural system of group subjugation. As the “black” racial classification becomes a proxy for criminality and dangerousness and state actors orient penal infrastructure to this predetermined racial target, the group draws closer to civic death (Wacquant, 2005). In the U.S., offenders are increasingly barred from college loans, welfare benefits, public housing, and the right to vote (Wacquant, 2005). Moreover, the ex-felon is unlikely to be hired as an employee in the public or private sector, or to secure funds for job training. The pattern of physical and symbolic exclusion produced through racial profiling policy and practice aligns with these collective penal effects to shape a robust racial-meaning making system that undergirds racial hierarchy.

5. Conclusion

Race and criminality are malleable social constructs subject to public definition. The meaning of the terms takes shape through rhetoric, policy, and implicit and

explicit symbolism and role-play. A narrow focus on questions of racial profiling's utility in *crime finding* renders innocuous its important contributions to racial meaning. The racial profiling endeavor, as practice and policy, signals to society the loci of criminality. *To find criminal activity, look there. To identify criminal propensity, look here.* In contrast to the *description* given by a witness reporting a crime, racial profiling conveys instructions on how to anticipate crime. It primes the public to expect criminal acts from a specific category of persons, and in the process informs and exacerbates a form of social marginalization that has burdened the U.S. since its very inception.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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About the Author



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Article

Meanings and Motives before Measures: The ‘What’ and ‘Why’ of Diversity within the Mossos d’Esquadra and the Politie Utrecht

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Abstract

This article proposes the definition of and motivation for diversity (policy) as an important research topic that should be studied before focusing on diversity policy measures. As such, it strives to demonstrate the academic potential of an analytical framework that outlines fundamental choices made in these respects. What types of diversity do organizations focus on? And what do they want to achieve with (increased) diversity? In this article the discourses underlying the diversity policies in two regional European police forces—the Mossos d’Esquadra and the Politie Utrecht—are analyzed. The main observation is that the results are surprisingly similar in spite of contextual factors that may lead observers to expect otherwise: they both focus on gender and migrant background, identifying these types of diversity as collective in nature, while striving for equal opportunities for individuals despite these collective differences. This article also explores possibilities for further theory building by formulating possible explanations for the similarities and differences which have been identified, suggesting a possible hierarchy in diversity within European organizations, and describing how the motivation for diversity might influence the effectiveness of diversity policies.

Keywords

diversity; police; Catalonia, Netherlands

Issue

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1. Introduction

Awareness has grown in both the professional and the academic worlds of the importance for organizations of adapting to their diverse surroundings. Public and private organizations alike have adopted specific policies in order to facilitate diversity within. The main goal is often the diversification of the employee base. In Europe, this tendency is reinforced by the European Union’s adoption of diversity as a central political priority (Shaw, 2005).

However, there seems to be considerable theoretical ambiguity and controversy with respect to the concept of diversity and diversity policy. Ambiguity results from a lack of articulation of or reflection on the actual meaning of diversity. Controversy arises from the con-

siderable disagreement about how to interpret the assumptions, intentions and methods of diversity policies. This is not surprising as the concept ‘diversity’ is a social construction. To avoid misunderstandings, scholars and applied researchers in the field of diversity studies would do well to make their definitions of diversity explicit to the reader and to reflect beforehand on the implications of such definitions on the scope of their conclusions, observations or results.

One of the observations of Yang and Konrad (2011) is that many, if not most, analyses of diversity policy in the field of organizational studies focus on causal relationships. For example, Roberson and Park (2007) explore how diversity reputation and minority leadership impact firms’ performance; Stewart and Johnson (2009)

discuss how the quality of leader-member interactions moderates the relationship between gender diversity and team performance; Chi, Huang and Lin (2009) show how HRM is an intermediate factor in the relationship between tenure diversity and innovation; and so forth. However, the definition of diversity and diversity policy is an interesting research topic by and of itself (Van Ewijk, 2011). The way in which diversity issues are framed is critical to policies and/or organizational approaches to the topic, determining, for example, how public budgets are distributed to schools, or which development practices receive company funding (Smith, 1995). Similarly, it might affect a person's social status, financial situation, juridical rights, and so on.

Still, academic research into the definition of diversity is scarce and some notable gaps remain. First, the few studies there are employ almost exclusively quantitative methods (Carrell & Mann, 1995; Point & Singh, 2003), relying on the face validity of key terms such as 'ethnic' or 'black' or 'age', while differences in the practical interpretation of those key terms by respondents are not at all improbable and may considerably affect the reliability and validity of the research's results (Van Ewijk, 2011). This calls for more qualitative studies. Secondly, most studies on diversity and diversity policy were undertaken in the United States, Canada, or Australia, countries with a very specific experience of diversity because of their cultural, social, and historical context (Mor Barak, 2005). When contexts are different, it is important to refrain from universalizing ideas and knowledge, and instead to focus on the context at hand in order to gain more insight into the matter (Carens, 2000; Modood, Triandafyllidou, & Zapata, 2006). This calls for more European studies. Third, all studies carried out on the definition of diversity and diversity policy in Europe have been based on analyses of private organizations (Point & Singh, 2003; Liff, 1999; Wrench, 2007; Van Ewijk, 2012). Public organizations are also important to study, maybe even more than private ones, because of their enormous scope; all citizens are their 'potential customers'. This calls for more empirical studies of public organizations.

In this regard, the police are particularly intriguing because of their almost paradoxical relationship with diversity. On the one hand, the potential impact on society of diversity within the police is large (the police have a highly symbolic role and interact with a broad range of the population in many spheres of life) and the potential for vertical mobility is high (in theory, every police officer can become chief). On the other hand, empirical data on police forces in Europe shows that the level of diversity is low among new recruits and further diminishes as the ranks get higher (Van Ewijk, 2012).

Although there are a considerable number of academic studies on diversity (policies) within police forces, there are also some considerable gaps in the research. There are few comprehensive analyses which take into

account recruitment, promotion and retention, and few comparative studies. One barrier to the latter is that key definitions often vary between countries and are not always easily identified or controlled (Mawby, 1999), making comparisons problematic. This seems to be especially the case concerning diversity within police forces. Diversity is always implicitly defined, simply by focusing exclusively on a certain group or groups. These groups are distinguished by gender (Dick & Cassell, 2002; Dudek, 2007; Metz & Kulik, 2008; Zhao, He & Lovrich, 2006), sexual orientation (Blackbourne, 2006; Miller, Forest, & Jurik, 2003), ethnicity, race or skin colour (Cashmore, 2002; Jaeger & Vitalis, 2005; Jain & Agocs, 2008; Johnston, 2006; Holdaway, 1998; Holdaway & O'Neill, 2004; Phillips, 2005; Walker & O'Connor, 1999), and religion (Armitage, 2006). Making this variance explicit would significantly lower this barrier. This calls for studies on the definition of diversity in the context of diversity policies in police forces.

Therefore, this article offers a comparative case study of two European police forces: the Mossos d'Esquadra (the police force of the autonomous region of Catalonia, Spain) and the Politie Utrecht (the police force in the province of Utrecht, Netherlands). These police forces were analyzed using an analytical framework that identifies the fundamental choices that can be made as regards the definition of diversity (the 'what', i.e. the ontological dimension) and the arguments for diversity within organizations (the 'why', i.e. the deontological dimension). Both refer to what Tatli (2011) calls 'diversity discourse'. This analytical framework, which elaborates on what is meant by diversity in this article (see Section 2), has been formulated elsewhere (Van Ewijk, 2011), but has not been applied in empirical research so far.

The goal of this article is twofold. First, it aims to show the academic potential of the analytical framework by applying it to two empirical contexts and outlining the possibilities for academic theory building that are generated by this comparative analysis. In the process, it also aims to offer a deeper understanding of the way in which diversity is conceived and operationalized in the policies of these two police forces.

The article consists of five sections. Following the introduction, the criteria used for case-selection and for the cases themselves is introduced, and the methods used for data collection and analysis are outlined in the second section. The third section analyzes what definition of diversity is used in each context, while the fourth section focuses on all the reasons why diversity within the organization is deemed important. The fifth and final section demonstrates the possibilities for further theory building generated by the empirical application of the analytical framework in these particular contexts.

2. Methodology

It was decided that the research should take the form of a case study as data on diversity within European

police forces is limited (Van Ewijk, 2012). The general advantage of case studies is that they allow for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) and the possibility of identifying new variables and hypotheses during the course of field-work. A second case study was chosen to reinforce the academic potential of the analytical framework, as the comparison of two cases demonstrates how the framework can be applied equally well in considerably different contexts, and enhances the possibility of gaining new theoretical insights. This section describes the criteria used to select the two cases, and the main strategies employed for data collection and data analysis.

2.1. Case Selection

The premise of the contextual approach is that the characteristics of the context are significantly intertwined with what happens within an organization. This coincides with Yanow’s (1996) approach of examining the relationship between the meanings given within the organization and those given within the context of this organization (George & Bennet, 2005). The epistemological base of this type of study is the constructionist perspective: meanings are negotiated as a product of history and of social structure (Sapsford & Jupp, 1996). In line with this approach, the contexts of both cases had to be similar in areas that are likely to provide a strong incentive for adapting the organization to diversity, yet different in areas likely to coincide with variation in fundamental choices concerning the definition of and the motivation for diversity within the organization. These similarities and differences increase the likelihood of reaching a deeper understanding of how diversity can be conceived within police forces, while at the same time demonstrating how the empirical application of the analytical framework leads to new possibilities for theory building.

The Mossos d’Esquadra are the police of the Catalan autonomous community in Spain. They first appeared in

1719, and have since then existed in various forms with different mandates. In 1983, they were established as a modern democratic police force. Initially, their tasks were limited and it was not until 1994 that the force became an integral police force for the whole of Catalonia. This expansion was completed by November 2008, by which time the number of police officers had grown to 14,143, up from 5,000 in 1999.

The Politie Utrecht are the police in the province of Utrecht in the Netherlands. From 1945 to 1993, the Dutch police service consisted of numerous municipal police forces, in addition to a national police force. In 1993, the Dutch police service was divided into 25 regional forces and the National Police Services Agency (KLPD), which has various specialist and support departments. The Politie Utrecht is a medium sized police force, which counted 3,852 employees in 2009. This was all still the case when this study was conducted. Afterwards, in 2013, the Dutch police entered a major reorganization process, transforming it from 23 regional forces into a single force with 10 regional units. This reorganization process remains unfinished as of June 2014. Figure 1 displays the areas of jurisdiction of both police forces.

The first similarity that might provide a strong impetus for the development of a diverse police force is the demographical diversity of their area of jurisdiction, which is high in both cases. Previous studies confirm that immigration is one of the main carriers of diversity, and this diversity tends to multiply and consolidate itself mostly in urban areas (Castles, 2002; Penninx et al., 2004; Ireland, 2004). In this sense, the areas of jurisdiction of both police forces can be categorised as highly diverse. To illustrate this, the area of jurisdiction of the Mossos d’Esquadra includes the city of Barcelona (Spain’s second largest city) and 13.7% of its residents were born outside of Spain (INE, n.d.), while Politie Utrecht’s area of jurisdiction includes the city of Utrecht (The Netherlands’ fourth largest city) and 20% of its residents have a non-western background (Atzema et al., 2008).




Figure 1. The areas of jurisdiction of the Politie Utrecht and the Mossos d’Esquadra in 2011.

Second, the police force is not only an instrument of the state, used to impose order where necessary; it also presents itself as a public service for citizens. This combination of responsibilities maximizes the number of potential arguments for a more diverse police force (Van Ewijk, 2012). Both the Mossos d'Esquadra and the Politie Utrecht manifest this twofold orientation. According to the Mossos d'Esquadra, their mission is to protect the freedom and safety of the citizenry, in accordance with the law, and this is why their tasks range from the protection of persons and goods to maintaining public order (Mossos d'Esquadra, n.d.). According to the Politie Utrecht, meanwhile, their mission is to be 'vigilant and servient', and maintain public order, fight crime, and offer help in order to ensure the safety of citizens and create/maintain their confidence in the police (Politie Utrecht, n.d.).

Third, both police forces engage in largely generic policing tasks. Generic police forces have the most daily contact with the broadest selection of the population. This might increase the imperative to adapt, when the population becomes more diverse. Therefore, police forces that only have specialized functions, such as traffic, narcotics, or internet crime, were excluded from selection.

The first difference between the two forces which might coincide with variation in the findings, is the history of immigration in their areas of jurisdiction. Immigration in Catalonia has been sudden and explosive since the 1990's, while the Netherlands, including the urban province of Utrecht, has experienced a steady flow of immigration since the 1950s.

Second, earlier studies have identified diverging governmental policies on diversity and integration. Dutch public policies have long been described as multicultural (Penninx, 2005), although some commentators have detected a shift towards more individual integration (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2009) or even assimilation under the name of 'new realism' (Prins & Saharso, 2008). Spanish and Catalan public policies, meanwhile, are said to display a practical philosophy, a way of managing diversity which is not based on established and preconceived ideas, but rather on questions and answers generated by the practice of governance of diversity (Zapata-Barrero, 2010).

Third, the governance structure for the two police forces is different, and the decision-making power on organizational policies, such as HRM, lies with different actors. The Mossos d'Esquadra are directed by the Secretary of Security, part of the Department of Interior Affairs. This public organ is responsible for the selection and recruitment of new police officers, together with the public administrators from the Catalan police academy, the Institut de Seguretat Pública de Catalunya (ISPC), and involving police officers of the Mossos d'Esquadra. The same public organ also formulates, supervises and controls financial planning and staff

management, leaving the Mossos d'Esquadra with exclusively operative management responsibilities. As such, the Mossos d'Esquadra are wholly composed of operative personnel, not administrative staff. The Politie Utrecht, on the other hand, is overseen by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Every four years the Minister of Justice draws up a policy plan detailing national policing priorities, national policing objectives, and the contribution expected from each police force. All forces must provide information on how they spend their grants. Additionally, the regulation of communication systems, uniforms and police pay is managed at central government level. The Politie Utrecht decides on its own staff requirements and applications). It also has its own career development policies, although the most senior officers are appointed by the Crown. Sixty-five percent of the Politie Utrecht's staff are sworn police officers, while 35 percent are administrative employees. It should be noted that all the above was valid at the time of the study, but this may change due to the reorganization which the Dutch police is currently in the process of realizing.

2.2. Data Collection and Content Analysis

It is important to make a clear distinction between units of data collection and units of analysis. In this article, the units of data collection are people and documents, while the units of analysis are the two dimensions of the analytical framework (the 'what' and the 'why').

2.2.1. Data Collection

This research obtains data from two types of sources: documents and people. Two data collection methods were employed. First, a search through the websites of the police forces and related organizations identified several relevant documents and individuals to include. Second, interviews provided information and access to other relevant documents, including those meant for internal use only.

When applying Prior's (2003) distinction between the content, the production, and the consumption of documents to this research, several observations can be made. First, with respect to the content, this article focuses mainly on the text. Second, documents from four different sources were included to multiply perspectives and diminish bias: the police force itself, the police academy, NGO's and associations of/for police officers, and the Ministry or Department of Interior Affairs. Third, the audience the author had in mind when producing the document may affect its content. Therefore, both public and internal documents were included to ensure that conclusions would be representative of the organization as a whole. When references are made to specific documents in Sections 3 and 4, they are included as footnotes.

Sixteen individuals were interviewed regarding the Mossos d'Esquadra (October 2008 to January 2010), and another 16 were interviewed regarding the Politie Utrecht (May 2009 to May 2010). The interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire, lasting between 60 and 90 minutes, generally conducted individually and face-to-face. Respondents were selected from four different backgrounds: the police force itself, the police academy, NGOs and associations of/for police officers, and the Ministry or Department of Interior Affairs. Respondents were selected for interview only if they occupied a position that allowed them to play an influential role in the process of policy-making and/or the implementation of policies related to diversity in the areas of recruitment, retention and promotion.

2.2.2. Content Analysis

A qualitative content analysis was used to interpret documents and interview reports with respect to the two units of analysis of Van Ewijk's analytical framework (Van Ewijk, 2011). These two dimensions are operationalized in Table 1.

Earlier interpretations were revised in the light of later readings and the results were interpreted for the whole body of literature and interview reports (Krippendorf, 2004), instead of evaluating each information source individually.

To make valid inferences, it is important that the classification procedure is reliable in the sense that it is consistent (Weber, 1990). By making the so-called qualitative areas in the research process recognizable, possibilities of objectifying individual case studies are opened up (Bos & Tarnai, 1999). Here, a discursive dialogue with four experts (two for each case) took place in order to critically evaluate the questionnaire and the operationalization of the analytical framework, which led to some modifications. As the content of the sources cannot be deduced independently of the reader's interpretation (Krippendorf, 2004), triangulation also took place during the data collection process, whereby preliminary conclusions were shared with fellow researchers, and after the empirical material had been analyzed and the results presented in this article, two experts were asked whether they agreed with the author's interpretation of the texts.



3. What Does Diversity Mean?

Table 2 offers a visual summary of the definitions of diversity used in the contexts of the Mossos d'Esquadra and the Politie Utrecht. As can be observed, these definitions are strikingly similar, and the difference lies in the nuances. Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 elaborate on the analyses that led to this conclusion.

Table 1. Operationalizing the 'What' and 'Why' of Diversity.

Unit of analysis (dimension)	Fundamental choice to be identified	Operationalization (level of documents and interview reports)
1. Definition of diversity (ontological dimension: the 'what')	A. Selection of modes of differentiation	Existence and frequency of references to specific 'forms of diversity', such as gender, religion, views, migrant background, age, etc.
	B. Interpretation of modes of differentiation	Practical meaning of key terms related to these forms of diversity in specific contexts, such as 'immigrants', 'old', 'extrovert', etc.
	C. Categorization of modes of differentiation: hard or soft, old or new, collective or individual	Hard-soft: practically unchangeable/permanent versus changeable/less permanent. Old-new: historical references to this form of diversity in the context versus no historical references. Collective-individual: where the mode of differentiation is linked to specific characteristics which are seen as constituting a group identity versus where it is linked to characteristics that are randomly distributed among individuals and no group identity is indicated.
2. Motivation for diversity within the organization (deontological dimension: the 'why')	A. Type of arguments: moral or practical	Key concepts related to moral arguments: justice, social (in)equality, (in)equality, rights, (anti)discrimination, human agency, representativeness, symbolic (dis)advantages, responsibility, etc. Key concepts related to practical arguments: effectiveness, efficiency, results, practical (dis)advantages related to goal achievement, such as productivity, creativity / innovation, absenteeism, staff turnover, etc.
	B. Desired base of difference: individual or collective	Individual-collective: end goal is to support individuals (ensuring equal opportunities) versus end goal is to support groups (ensuring collective characteristics are recognised and positively valued).

Table 2. Similarities and Differences in Definitions of Diversity (Mossos d’Esquadra, Politie Utrecht).

Fundamental choice in the definition of diversity	 <p>Selection (3.1)</p>	 <p>Interpretation (3.2)</p>	<p>SOFT ↔ HARD OLD ↔ NEW INDIVIDUAL ↔ COLLECTIVE</p> <p>Categorization (3.3)</p>
Both police forces <u>Mossos d’Esquadra</u> <u>Politie Utrecht</u>	Gender Migrant background	Physical differences between man and woman (one of the parents <u>or</u> <u>grandparents</u>) born outside of the EU	Hard, Old/New, Collective <u>Soft, New</u> <u>Hard, Old/New</u> Collective

3.1. Selection of Modes of Differentiation

Although other modes of differentiation (such as age, religion, colour, physical validity, sexual orientation, educational background) also come to the fore¹, the modes of differentiation that are most dominant in both contexts are gender and migrant background.

In terms of recruitment, for instance, specific attention has been paid to gender diversity in the the *Politie Utrecht*’s recruitment communications since the 1980’s and 40% of vacancies are reserved for suitable female candidates until the last possible moment, after which these openings are filled with other suitable candidates². Also, there has been specific attention paid to diversity in terms of migrant background. Since the 1990’s 30% of vacancies have been reserved for suitable candidates with a migrant background until the last possible moment³, and several programmes from the *Politie Utrecht* (IOOV, 2009) and a programme of the Police Academy (Politie Utrecht, 2008a) have been designed to reach possible candidates with a migrant background. Finally, the national recruitment website displays photos of female police officers and police officers with a migrant background more often than expected based on the proportion of police officers they represent within the police. The only other mode of differentiation that occasionally comes to the fore in recruitment communication is sexual orientation: the *Politie Utrecht* participates in Gay Pride Parades, and the 2009 national recruitment campaign included a famous openly gay Dutch magician, Hans Klok. These conclusions are illustrated in Figure 2.



Figure 2. Diversity within the police force on the Dutch national recruitment website.

No target groups have been officially defined to be recruited for the *Mossos d’Esquadra*. Even so, photos of female police officers are usually included in the general leaflets that the Catalan government produces and distributes⁴, and in 2008 and 2009 the Gender Equity Program of the Department of Interior Affairs launched campaigns specifically aimed at women. Efforts to connect with the gay community, such as participation in the 2009 Gay Pride Parade, have been initiated exclusively by the gay police officer association, Gaylespol (Gaylespol, n.d.). Finally, there was a separate publicity campaign to recruit candidates from migrant backgrounds for the Social Diversification Programme, designed to help these candidates prepare for the official selection procedure in 2007 and 2008. Figure 3 displays a general call for candidates (basic education in 1997 and 2009), a call for female candidates (basic education in 2008) and a call for candidates with a migrant background (Social Diversification Programme in 2007).

¹ Interview with the commanding officer responsible for the RECD (*Politie Utrecht*): 11 August 2009, Utrecht.

² Double interview with the administrator and police officer responsible for facilitating and monitoring diversity within the organization (HRM department of the *Politie Utrecht*): 19 June 2009, Utrecht.

³ Double interview with the administrator and police officer responsible for facilitating and monitoring diversity within the organization (HRM department of the *Politie Utrecht*): 19 June 2009, Utrecht.

⁴ Interview with the Head of the Cabinet of Selection Processes (General Subdirection HRM of the Department of Interior Affairs): 3 October 2009, Barcelona.




Figure 3. Diversity in publicity for the Mossos d'Esquadra.

In 2011, the Dutch Ministry of Interior Affairs formulated gender and migrant background targets, with financial consequences for the *Politie Utrecht*. In 2008, the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Police Commanders founded the 'PolitieTop Divers' working group in order to stimulate and monitor these objectives (Politietop Divers, n.d.). Also, the Dutch Police Academy's basic and advanced education on diversity focuses almost exclusively on migrant backgrounds, both within and outside the organization (SPL, n.d.)⁵, just as the 'knowledge lectorate' founded in 2008 focused on multicultural professionalism (LECD, 2008a). The Regional Expertise Centre of Diversity (RECD) of the *Politie Utrecht* (with 3.4 FTE and a budget of 100,000 Euros in 2009) focuses heavily on diversity in terms of background, immediately followed by gender, and some attention is also paid to age and sexual orientation (RECD, 2007). Finally, the *Politie Utrecht* has various police officers' associations, such as the Kleurrijk Politie Netwerk Utrecht (KPNU), which supports police officers from migrant backgrounds (KPNU, 2007) and the Homo Informatie Punt (HIP)⁶, which supports gay and lesbian police officers and seeks contact with the gay and lesbian communities (Politie Utrecht, n.d.). Furthermore, female police officers of the *Politie Utrecht* participate in national female networks⁷. Other associations mentioned are national police unions, which also provide specific counselling for certain categories of police officers, for example young, female, gay, ethnic minority, or senior officers (ACP, n.d.; ANPV, n.d.; NPB, n.d.).

⁵ Interview with the coordinator of the teaching programme, all basic levels (Department of Basic Education, Dutch Police Academy): 20 August 2009, Apeldoorn; interview with the content expert on diversity in research and education (LECD, Police Academy): 20 August 2009, Utrecht.

⁶ The HIP changed its name to 'HomonetwerkZichtbaarJezelf' in the autumn of 2010.

⁷ Interview with LECD member responsible for gender diversity (20 August 2009).

The *Mossos d'Esquadra* are provided with basic and advanced education on diversity at the Catalan Police Academy (ISPC). This focuses mostly on the diversity of migrant backgrounds in Catalan society⁸, although there are also some short courses on gender diversity⁹ and diversity in sexual orientation¹⁰. UNESCOCAT offers sessions on diversity of background in society outside of the organization on request¹¹. AIL-MED (AIL-MED, n.d.), an association that strives to improve the position of police officers that have become handicapped in the line of duty, has also received some juridical attention (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2008). Gaylespol is an association for gay, lesbian and transsexual police officers in Catalonia, which also has members from other (local and national) police forces in Catalonia. Its activities have no formal place within the organization of the *Mossos d'Esquadra*, in contrast with the *Comissió de les Dones Polícies* (Female Police Officers Commission), which was founded in 1999 on the request of the police commissioner of Girona (Gubianes, 2000) and, after a few years of minimal attention, was formally reinstated in 2010¹². Finally, some female police officers from both the *Mossos d'Esquadra* and the *Politie Utrecht* have or have had contact with the European Network for Policewomen, the ENP (ENP, n.d.).

Finally, as regards promotion, statistics concerning recruitment and membership of both police forces could only be found on the inflow, outflow, and through-flow of female police officers and officers with a migrant background.

In sum, the first choice made by both police forces with respect to the definition of diversity is that the same two modes of differentiation are selected: gender and migrant background.

3.2. Interpretation of Modes of Differentiation

'Gender' has the same practical meaning in both contexts: it refers to the biological distinction between male and female. 'Migrant background' is also interpreted in a similar way: it refers to people who have

⁸ Additional course information (basic + advanced levels): internal documents of the ISPC.

⁹ Voluntary seminar on gender within the police force (6h, place for 30): internal document of the ISPC.

¹⁰ Voluntary seminar on sexual diversity and human rights (6h, place for 15): internal document of the ISPC.

¹¹ Interview with the coordinator of the diversity courses for the police (UNESCOCAT): 5 November 2008, Barcelona. Presentation at the conference of UNESCOCAT on police and diversity on the 17th of December 2009 by Lola Vallès, research and international cooperation coordinator of the ISPC.

¹² Interview with the representative of the Female Police Officers Commission, author of the proposal for a new commission, and Head of the Section for Missing Persons (*Mossos d'Esquadra*): 9 July 2009, Sabadell.

been 'born abroad' or who have one or two parents that were born abroad, where in both contexts 'born abroad' usually refers to 'born outside of the European Union'¹³. However, there are some small differences between the two contexts.

The *Politie Utrecht* use the term 'allochtoon' in relation to diversity in terms of migrant background: a person with at least one parent who was born abroad (CBS, n.d.). Afterwards, a distinction is made between those who were born abroad themselves ('first generation'), those who were born in the Netherlands but whose parents were born abroad ('second generation'), and those whose grandparents were born abroad ('third generation'). Registration of the category 'allochtoon' versus 'autochtoon' is voluntary for police officers, which has led to a significant third category of 'registration denied' in HRM statistics.

The most dominant term in the context of the *Mossos d'Esquadra* is 'immigrants' (ADN, 2007; Publico, 2009). The ISPC registers only 'students who were born abroad, or have parents who were born abroad'¹⁴. In contrast, no reference is made to diversity in terms of migrant background in internal documents, such as HRM statistics.

In sum, the second choice made with respect to the definition of diversity is that in both contexts gender is interpreted as the physical differences between male and female, and migrant background is interpreted as being born abroad (i.e. outside of the European Union) or being a descendent of those born abroad. The only difference is that more differentiation in terms of generations are included in the interpretation of the *Politie Utrecht*.

3.3. Categorization of Modes of Differentiation

3.3.1. Hard versus Soft

In the contexts of both the *Mossos d'Esquadra* and the *Politie Utrecht*, gender is considered a relatively hard mode of differentiation: a human difference that is inborn and/or exerts an important impact on early socialisation and has an ongoing impact throughout life (Griggs, 1995). For example, the message of the Program for Gender Equity of the Department of Interior Affairs in Catalonia is that 'women are equal, but not the same' (Gender Equity Programme, unpublished)¹⁵. In both contexts, this is seen as a consequence of an influential mix of physical difference (women as child bearers), combined with socio-cultural convictions about

the difference in gender roles, especially for families with young children (women as caretakers), resulting in gendered preferences and ambitions, and gendered evaluations of capacities (Kop & Van der Wal, 2008)¹⁶.

In the context of the *Politie Utrecht*, migrant background is also considered as a hard mode of differentiation. It is not considered temporary, as often the second and even the third generation of immigrants are included in the concept of 'allochtoon' in policy documents (*Politie Utrecht*, 2011; RECD, 2007).

In the context of the *Mossos d'Esquadra* migrant background is seen as a soft mode of differentiation: a human difference that helps to distinguish the self from the other but is seen as less permanent and hence adaptable (Litvin, 1997). It is considered temporal, until some administrative (ie. obtaining Spanish nationality) and practical (ie. learning Catalan) differences associated with this mode of differentiation disappear. For example, a UNESCOCAT¹⁷ spokesperson stated that the entrance of those with a migrant background into the *Mossos d'Esquadra* was 'just a matter of time', while the director of the ISPC¹⁸ stated that it was a 'matter of time and critical mass'.

3.3.2. Old versus New

It is complicated to characterize gender as either an old or a new mode of differentiation. On the one hand, respondents tend to consider it as old, for gender has almost always constituted an important difference in human societies. On the other hand, only since the Police Emancipation Plan was published in 1990 have policies been formulated to enhance the position of female police officers within Dutch police forces, resulting in the foundation of the Association for Police and Emancipation (SPE) in 1991 and the official establishment under Dutch law of the European Network for Policewomen (ENP) in 1994. Gender only became an issue within the police after national, external developments on the topic¹⁹. Also, attention to issues of gender in the context of the *Mossos d'Esquadra* did not result in institutional action until the Female Police Officer Commission was founded in 1999. The issue received attention once again in 2007 with the establishment of the Program for Gender Equity, and only in

¹³ Various interviews: 2009, Catalonia.

¹⁴ ISPC internal documents on inflow, outflow and through-flow of recruits.

¹⁵ Interview with work group representative of the Gender Equity Programme (Department of Interior Affairs): 21 April 2009, Barcelona.

¹⁶ Interview with the Secretary of Security (Department of Interior Affairs): 13 January 2010, Barcelona.

¹⁷ Interview with the coordinator of the diversity courses for the police (UNESCOCAT): 5 November 2008, Barcelona.

¹⁸ Interview with the director of the Catalan Police Academy (ISPC): 19 January 2010, Mollet del Vallès.

¹⁹ Double interview with the administrator and police officer responsible for facilitating and monitoring diversity within the organization (HRM department of the *Politie Utrecht*): 19 June 2009, Utrecht.

2009 did this lead to a request by a few female *Mossos d'Esquadra* for an independent internal team, which was approved in 2010²⁰.

It is also less clear whether migrant background is perceived as old or new by the *Politie Utrecht*. On the one hand, migrant background has been a prominent form of diversity since the 1960s and was already on the agenda of the *Politie Utrecht* in the 1980s. On the other hand, this attention only resulted in institutional action in 1998, with the foundation of Expertisecentrum Politie & Allochtonen (EXPA), focusing on the interaction between the *Politie Utrecht* and persons with a migrant background (Initiatives for Change Nederland, n.d.). EXPA's focus changed to include the integration of officers with a migrant background when it was transformed into the Regional Centre of Diversity Expertise in 2005 (RECD, 2007).

Migrant background in the Catalan context is considered as new in the sense that the presence of minorities with a migrant background from outside of Europe is relatively new in Catalonia (Ajenjo, 2008), but it is considered as old in the sense that Catalonia has been presented as a nation of immigration throughout its history, and new immigrants are expected to integrate with the society that already exists, just as, for example, immigrants coming from the south of Spain have done.

3.3.3. Individual versus Collective

In both contexts, gender is perceived as a mode of differentiation that is essentially collective. It is linked to a collective whose members are generally considered to have some specific characteristics (that imply meaningful difference) in common because of their gender, and these characteristics are believed to create common experiences that contribute to a group identity. In this study, sources refer to the physical capacity to bear children, preferences or ambitions with respect to work, and 'feminine' capabilities.

Migrant background is also perceived as a collective mode of differentiation in both contexts. Being born abroad or having (grand)parents who were born abroad is linked to the observation that, in general, almost all candidates in this group lack specific requisites (for example, mastery of the Dutch or Catalan language²¹, or Spanish nationality) or experience in specific capacities (for example, assertiveness (*Politie Utrecht*, 2011)). Also, it is linked to a specific value that members of this col-

lective can offer the police force: inside knowledge of other habits, religions, languages, etc.

In sum, the third choice with respect to the definition of diversity is that, on the one hand, gender is seen as a hard, old, and collective mode of differentiation in both contexts. Migrant background, on the other hand, is considered as a collective mode of differentiation in both contexts, but soft and new in the case of the *Mossos d'Esquadra* and hard and old in the case of the *Politie Utrecht*.

4. What Is the Motivation for Increased Diversity?

Figure 4 offers a visual summary of the *Mossos d'Esquadra* and *Politie Utrecht*'s motivations for diversity. As described in Table 1 (in Section 2), a distinction is made between moral and practical arguments on the one hand and a desired base of difference that is either individual or collective on the other hand. As with their definitions of diversity, also the two police forces' motivations for diversity are strikingly similar. This section elaborates on the analyses that led to this conclusion.




Figure 4. Motivation for diversity within the organization (*Mossos d'Esquadra*, *Politie Utrecht*).

4.1. *Mossos d'Esquadra*

In general, the end goal of diversity policies for the *Mossos d'Esquadra* is more often related to supporting individuals and ensuring equal opportunities in spite of collective differences than to supporting collectives and recognizing their value. In terms of the analytical framework, the desired base of difference is individual. For example, the end goal of the Social Diversification Programme is to level the playing field by educating candidates in areas they have more problems with because of their migrant background, such as the Catalan language (Miró, 2007). Also, the Gender Equity Programme confirms that the Department of Interior Affairs wants to use its human capital to the maximum, and it can only do that when all employees work under equal conditions, and differences such as gender do

²⁰ Interview with the representative of the Female Police Officers Commission, author of the proposal for a new commission, and Head of the Section for Missing Persons (*Mossos d'Esquadra*): 9 July 2009, Sabadell.

²¹ Curriculum Programa de Diversificació Social (300h), internal document of the ISPC: September 2008.

not create inequalities (Gender Equity Programme, 2010). Finally, Gaylespol strives for a working environment without discrimination, in which everyone can be open about their sexual orientation and is treated with respect regardless (Sneijder, 2006).

Both moral and practical arguments are employed in favour of diversity in the police force. On the one hand, diversity within the police force is linked to: representing the society it serves, combating stereotypes among police officers and ensuring they value colleagues with a diverse profile, and ensuring respectful behaviour towards the population^{22,23}. On the other hand, the same sources refer to the added practical value of increasing the quality of the police service by responding more adequately: offering a more diverse repertoire of reactions, more knowledge of and sensitivity towards different cultures (related to gender, class, migrant background, sexual orientation, etc.), and increasing the willingness of the population to cooperate by increasing their trust and sense of proximity to the police (UXXS, 2008).

Finally, it is interesting that moral arguments appear to be more dominant with respect to gender diversity (related to equality, (social) justice, and non-discrimination) (Gender Equity Programme, 2010; Gubianes, 2000)²⁴, while diversity in terms of migrant background is almost exclusively called for on the basis of practical arguments (to be more effective against gangs with foreign origins (ADN, 2007), to teach colleagues how new communities think and act (García, 2007), because of foreign language skills, and to solve conflicts, prevent riots and solve crimes²⁵).

4.2. *Politie Utrecht*

According to various sources (LECD, 2008b), the case for diversity used to be almost exclusively made with moral arguments (as stated literally by one of the respondents: “something fun and politically correct for poor target groups”), but has been presented as a business issue (‘a strategic theme related to multicultural skills’) since 2005. However, when analyzing the sources with the analytical framework a more nuanced image appears.

²² Presentation at the conference of UNESOCAT on police and diversity on the 17th of December 2009 by the research and international cooperation coordinator of the ISPC; Interview with the director of the Catalan Police Academy (ISPC): 19 January 2010, Mollet del Vallès; Interview with the Secretary of Security (Department of Interior Affairs): 13 January 2010, Barcelona.

²³ Double interview with the president and vice-president of Gaylespol: 12 May 2009, Mollet del Vallès.

²⁴ Interview with the work group representative of the Gender Equity Programme (Department of Interior Affairs): 21 April 2009, Barcelona.

²⁵ Interview with the Secretary of Security (Department of Interior Affairs): 13 January 2010, Barcelona.

First of all, the end goal of the *Politie Utrecht*'s diversity policies is more often related to supporting individuals and ensuring equal opportunities regardless of collective differences, than to supporting collectives and recognizing their value. In terms of the analytical framework, the desired base of difference is individual. For example, the *Politie Utrecht* claims that their mission is to be a police force for everyone, which implies proactive efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion mechanisms outside as well as inside the organization. As such, the goal of diversity management is meant to contribute to equality so that all members of the *Politie Utrecht* can develop their own talents and qualities (RECD, 2007). In this context, equal opportunities for all are emphasized (*Politie Utrecht*, n.d.), and contribute to a safe working environment that allows everyone to develop themselves and apply for promotions (LHP, n.d.).

Second, arguments for diversity within the police force are both moral and practical, although practical arguments are more dominant. On the one hand, it is said that the police force should be representative of society in order to symbolize that the police is there for everyone, and to show that the organization is open and accessible and offers an equal working environment for all (KPNU, 2007; Snijder, 2008)²⁶. On the other hand, diversity within the organization is said to enable the police to do their work better because the cooperation of the population will increase, and because the quality of the police service will rise, which produces better results (Kop & Van der Wal, 2008; LECD, 2005; LHP, n.d.; Ministry of Interior Affairs, 2006; National HRM Programme, 2008; *Politie Utrecht*, n.d.; *Politie Utrecht*, 2008b)²⁷; a more diverse police force is more innovative and will be able to use more variation in techniques and procedures in different situations; diversity within the police force will make it an attractive employer for talented candidates—even when there is competition on the labour market; and police officers with a diverse profile bring specific capacities with them which increases professionalism. For example, female police officers bring feminine leadership qualities, which might stimulate creativity in their teams. They are also said to have potential added value in cases of domestic violence or a de-escalating effect in cases of potential riots. Police officers with a migrant background might go undetected when performing surveillance duties in diverse neighborhoods. They can

²⁶ Interview with the commanding officer responsible for the RECD (*Politie Utrecht*): 11 August 2009, Utrecht; Interview with the board member and representative of the Colourful Police Network Utrecht (KNPU) of the *Politie Utrecht*: 11 August 2009, Utrecht.

²⁷ Interview with the commanding officer responsible for the RECD (*Politie Utrecht*): 11 August 2009, Utrecht.

also teach their colleagues about their communities. Gay police officers have a similar effect.

5. Opportunities for Further Theory Building

Assertions on causality are outside the scope of this article. However, the empirical application of the analytical framework does provide input for various hypotheses that might be tested and confirmed through further research, which demonstrates its potential to contribute to academic theory building.

5.1. Exploring Explanations

The two cases were surprisingly similar in their definition of diversity and their motivation for encouraging diversity within the organization, regardless of differences in contextual factors (outlined in Section 2.1) that would lead one to expect otherwise. This implies a causal relation between the contextual factors that were similar on the one hand and the uniformity of the conception of diversity on the other. Sound confirmation and explanations of this causality, however, require additional research. In this regard, institutional isomorphism, as introduced by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) could be a plausible direction to explore: police organizations might either emulate the governments they work for (coercive isomorphism) or copy each other's practices (mimetic processes). The fact that gender only became an issue within the *Politie Utrecht* due to external developments on a national level, and it only gained attention within the *Mossos d'Esquadra* in 2007 with the initiation of the Catalan Program for Gender Equity corroborates this line of thought. Another interesting factor to explore would be the influence of the European Union in both cases.

Again, it is surprising that similarities are more dominant than differences, when one considers the amount of publications in political theory dedicated to what Castles (2002) referred to as 'national integration models' and Penninx et al. (2004) as 'policy discourse on diversity', which was also mentioned in section 2.1 as a contextual factor that differs for both cases. Even so, this factor could be related to specific findings. For example, national discourse on diversity and integration in the Netherlands could have influenced the definition of diversity in terms of migrant background as a hard mode of differentiation. According to Ghorashi (2006) the experience of *pillarization* and the specific Dutch implementation of the welfare state led to Dutch policies regarding (ethnic) minorities that have a strong categorical base. Also, regional discourse on diversity and integration in Catalonia—which is a practical philosophy, according to Zapata-Barrero (2007)—could have influenced the definition of and motivation for diversity within the *Mossos d'Esquadra*, even more so because the authority concerning HRM policies re-

sides mostly within the Department of Interior Affairs.

The second discrepancy between the two police forces (migrant background as an old and hard mode of differentiation for the *Politie Utrecht* versus a new and soft mode of differentiation for the *Mossos d'Esquadra*) might be explained by differences in the two regions' histories of immigration. Over the past few decades, Catalonia has mostly received small numbers of immigrants from countries in Latin-America with similar cultures and a shared history, and has experienced a sudden increase in immigration from other cultures first from the early 1990's. The Netherlands, meanwhile, experienced the arrival of relatively more immigrants with relatively more diverse cultural origins several decades earlier, and the presence of their second and third generation descendents since then.

Further research is necessary to test the above-mentioned causal relations. Also, it would be enlightening to examine the relative impact of all factors on the variation in definitions of and motivations for diversity within police organizations. Another option is to conduct a longitudinal study and compare one of the regional units in the future Dutch police force (as soon as the reorganization is finalized) with the former *Politie Utrecht*. Finally, the same causal relations could be explored in other public service sectors, such as health or education, or in the private sector.

5.2. The Influence of Definition and Motive on Effectiveness

One of the preconditions for effective policies is that all involved actors have the same goal in mind, they understand it in the same way, and they share the motives for that goal (Dunn, 1994; Kotter, 1996). As such, the definition of and motivation for diversity are expected to have a significant influence on the effectiveness of diversity policies. For example, differences in the definition of and motivation for diversity between those in command and those on the front line could create resistance against these policies, which would obstruct their implementation. Following the thinking of Paoline (2003), who argues that organizational style, rank and individual officer style create variation in the cultural homogeneity of officers, this would not be unlikely. Liff (1999) also mentions this potential pitfall.

Both the *Politie Utrecht* and the *Mossos d'Esquadra* seem still to be looking for a narrative for diversity within the police force that includes both moral and practical arguments. The *Politie Utrecht* have gone from one side of the spectrum to the other (from mostly moral to mostly practical), while the *Mossos d'Esquadra* display a simultaneous dichotomous perspective (gender is linked to moral and migrant background to practical arguments).

However, a mix of moral and practical arguments for each selected mode of differentiation is more con-

vincing than an exclusive focus on one type of argument. By using only moral arguments, an organization runs the risk of creating a feeling of charity, rather than a necessity which is high on the list of priorities, especially in times of economic decline. By using only practical arguments, an organization becomes very dependent on studies that demonstrate the direct relationship between diversity and better results, while in many cases this relationship has not yet been conclusively demonstrated by empirical research (Wise & Tschirhart, 2000). The hypothesis, then, would be that future effectiveness of the police force will be positively influenced by a balanced, multi-layered motivation (i.e. including both practical and moral arguments). This will need to be confirmed by comparing outcomes of diversity policies between organizations with singular and multiple-type motivations.

6. Conclusions

The first goal of this article was to demonstrate the research potential of the analytical framework on diversity (policies) as defined elsewhere by Van Ewijk and briefly outlined in Section 2.2.2. Applying this framework to two empirical cases, the *Politie Utrecht* and the *Mossos d'Esquadra*, has confirmed that diversity policy is, in effect, a multi-layered concept both in theory and in practice: the distinction between the definition of diversity and the motivation for diversity within the organization is not merely theoretical, but one that can be observed empirically. Further, the application of the analytical framework has generated possibilities for academic theory building. This article formulates (new) hypotheses on the determinants of variation in the conception of diversity, on a possible hierarchy in modes of differentiation in the European Union, and on the impact of the type of motivation for diversity on the effectiveness of diversity policies.

Second, in the process of applying the analytical framework, this article has provided a deeper understanding of the conception of diversity in the context of the *Mossos d'Esquadra* and the *Politie Utrecht*. This has in turn enabled the formulation of clear observations from a multitude of raw empirical data. The most important observation is that the findings were in general surprisingly similar. For example, both police forces focus on the same modes of differentiation (gender and migrant background) and both attribute similar practical meanings to these modes of differentiation. The only minor difference in their definitions of diversity is that migrant background is considered to be a soft mode of differentiation in the context of the *Mossos d'Esquadra* and a hard mode of differentiation in the context of the *Politie Utrecht*. While in both cases gender and migrant background are mainly identified as collective modes of differentiation in nature (which is an ontological observation), both the police forces

strive for an organization in which individuals have equal opportunities regardless of collective differences (which implies a deontological choice for diversity as an individual concept). Both moral and practical arguments are employed to call for diversity within the police organization, although practical arguments seem far more dominant in the case of the *Politie Utrecht*.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Diversity Policing–Policing Diversity: Performing Ethnicity in Police and Private-Security Work in Sweden

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Abstract

This article draws upon two separate studies on policing in Sweden, both investigating “ethnic diversity” as a discourse and a practice in the performance of policing functions: one interview study with minority police officers from a county police authority and one ethnographic study of private security officers. To examine how “diversity policing” and the “policing of diversity” are performed by policing actors, their strategic reliance on an ethnically diverse workforce is examined. The official discourse in both contexts stressed “diversity policing” as a valuable resource for the effective execution of policing tasks and the legitimation of policing functions. There was, however, also another, more unofficial discourse on ethnicity that heavily influenced the policing agents’ day-to-day work. The resulting practice of “policing diversity” involved situated activities on the ground through which “foreign elements” in the population were policed using ethnicized stereotypes. Diversity in the policing workforce promoted the practice of ethnic matching, which, ironically, in turn perpetuated stereotypical thinking about Swedish “others”. A conceptual framework is developed for understanding the policing strategies involved and the disjuncture found between the widely accepted rationalities for recruiting an ethnically diverse workforce and the realities for that workforce’s effective deployment at the street level.

Keywords

diversity policing; ethnic matching; policing; policing diversity; stereotypes

Issue

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1. Introduction

Drawing on two separate studies on policing in Sweden, this article examines how “ethnic diversity” is used by two different kinds of policing actors in the performance of their policing functions, as both a discourse and a practical strategy influencing the daily work of public police officers and private security providers. We look at the discourses on diversity among policing agents as something providing the norms regulating their thinking, interpreting, understanding, and

acting in society (de los Reyes, 2000). More specifically, what we explore are the phenomena of *diversity policing* and, especially, *policing diversity* among Swedish policing agents as two increasingly important instances of “doing ethnicity”.

The term ‘diversity policing’ refers to the efforts by both the police and security service operators to *recruit and retain* a heterogenous, or ethnically diverse, workforce. One underlying rationale in these efforts in Sweden has been the need to better mirror the heterogeneity of the country’s general population. This has

been seen as necessary for the policing agents' ability to legitimate their actions, activities, and purposes, provide higher-quality services, and perform their policing tasks more effectively.

The phenomenon of 'policing diversity' refers to *the utilization* of an ethnically diverse workforce to facilitate police and private security officers' concrete everyday work in an ethnically diverse public. Previous research has shown how police work (Bowling & Phillips, 2007; Rowe, 2002; Young, 1994), the "police gaze" (Finstad, 2000), and the work and "gaze" of private security providers (Gabbidon, 2003; Hutchinson & O'Connor, 2005; McCahill, 2002) all entail the practice of policing stereotypes (Holmberg, 2003). In it, the attention of policing agents is directed at individuals perceived as standing out from the crowd, resulting in, for instance, those of a certain skin colour, or those driving a certain type of vehicle, becoming targeted more often or more readily than others. Such discriminatory profiling by policing agents typically affects young men from minority backgrounds (e.g., Antonopoulos, 2003; Kempa & Singh, 2008; O'Dougherty, 2006; Sollund, 2006; Wakefield, 2003). In the Swedish context, one has witnessed the ethnicized stereotyping of the construct "foreigner" and the application of the term to set apart those perceived as belonging to ethnic minorities. As will be shown, the study participants not only policed stereotypes, but also themselves made use of ethnicized stereotypes when performing work tasks, policing *through* stereotypes. In this actual, concrete policing work, however, 'ethnicity' as a notion was transformed, becoming a question of skin colour, general appearance, and language proficiency, with the new conceptualization then put to use to aid one's work in interactions with the public.

In looking at the situated activities that the practice of policing diversity involved on the ground—the policing of "foreign" elements in the population through the use of ethnicized stereotypes—the main questions guiding our investigation were: Why, how, and with what consequences is the strategy of policing through stereotypes made use of by public and private policing agents? What kind of overall impact is the emergence of the practice of diversity policing and policing diversity likely to have from the perspective of societal inclusion and exclusion? In pursuing some answers to these questions below, our objective is to contribute to an improved conceptual understanding of, on the one hand, these policing strategies as such and, on the other hand, the disjuncture prevailing between the widely accepted rationalities for diversity recruiting in Sweden and the realities for the effective deployment of an ethnically diverse workforce on the ground in its interactions with the public. In doing so, we focus on features and characteristics that are common to the policing efforts of both the public police and private security providers rather than on what separates them. In a

modern multi-ethnic society, this focus usefully narrows down on discourses on ethnic diversity among policing agents and the question of how the norms that these discourses provide for the policing agents' thinking and interpreting in concrete work situations are translated into situated activities resorted to on the ground.

2. Policing through Stereotypes: Towards an Analysis of Policing in a Multi-Ethnic Society

For the purposes of this article, we define 'policing' as the exercise of a particular form of social control encompassing purposeful activities to maintain security within a given social order (cf. Button, 2002; Crawford, 2008; Loader, 2000). The distinction made in the literature between private and public policing, where the former stands for the policing activities of private security companies and the latter for the activities of the public police authority, has been criticized as an overly simplified dichotomy not particularly useful for analytical purposes (Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Crawford & Lister, 2006; Hutchinson & O'Connor, 2005; Kempa et al., 1999; Rigakos, 2002; Stenning, 2009; Williams, 2008). In this article, we adopt this criticism as a point of departure in our effort to focus more on general commonalities between different modes of policing, regardless of the type of organization (public or private), power, and authority and the kind of regulatory framework involved. In particular, four such commonalities can be identified that, while of interest in themselves, pose specific challenges to both public police and private security actors engaged in policing work in modern multi-ethnic societies and thus form the background of our analysis presented in this article.

First of all, the importance of diversity in the workforce has been stressed for both types of policing organizations. In consequence, just as in many places elsewhere in Europe (see, e.g., Jones & Williams, 2013; van Ewijk, 2011), the Swedish police authorities have in recent years introduced various programmes to encourage ethnic minority officers to apply to the police academies (see, e.g., Gunnmo, 2004; Lander, 2013). Within the country's private security industry, individual companies have recently begun to actively promote diversity in the workforce, as part of a branding strategy to attract both customers and potential employees. These efforts have paralleled a trend where public entities and institutions in the country are increasingly contracting private security companies, which thereby come to more and more perform public functions.

Secondly, despite the efforts invested in promoting ethnic diversity within the two types of policing organizations in Sweden investigated here, the number of those foreign-born in the country's police force and private security services has not increased in proportion to population changes in society. Currently, no

more than three per cent of all the police officers and 13 per cent of the private security officers employed in the country are foreign-born. The proportion of those in the country's total population with an 'ethnic minority background' has continued to go up, being currently at 21 per cent (Statistics Sweden, 2012a, 2013).¹ In major urban and metropolitan areas, the difference is significantly larger still: in the metropolitan municipality where the two studies reported on in this article were conducted, for example, the share of ethnic minority residents at the time of the study was 32 per cent. The two types of policing organizations in Sweden investigated here, in other words, face an increasing need to have their workforce composition better mirror the increasing ethnic diversity of the population.

Thirdly, the specific mode of policing diversity discussed in this article was mainly made use of in relation to members of the public encountered in, or otherwise associated with, the socio-economically and ethnically segregated suburbs of the city. Among the inhabitants of these suburbs, the share of those coming from an ethnic minority background ranged from 55 to 71 per cent (Statistics Sweden, 2012b). In the municipality, these suburbs were perceived by the broader public as being heavily "non-white" (Werner, 2014), "dangerous", and infested with crime (cf. Hallsworth, 2006; Sernhede, 2006, 2009). Policing agents, for their part, commonly viewed them as "resentful environments" (Hansen Löfstrand, 2013b; cf. Pettersson, 2013). In such environments, those policing the streets typically expect, try to avoid, and have to manage being subjected to accusations of discrimination, while at the same time needing to establish and maintain legitimacy for their actions.

Lastly, what the different policing actors in society have in common is their orientation towards preventing crime and other illegitimate behaviours through risk management. This entails focus on the management of individuals and groups perceived as more likely than others to threaten or disturb the social order and to commit crime (see Garland, 1996; Johnston, 1999; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Loader, 2000). This kind of policing is premised on stereotypical generalizations, in turn based on experience, perception, and beliefs

¹ Those with an 'ethnic minority background' in the official Swedish statistics are defined as individuals who were *either* themselves born outside of Sweden *or* have both parents born abroad (Statistics Sweden, 2012b). According to the Swedish Police Authority's own statistics, approximately 6 per cent of the police officers working in Sweden currently have an 'ethnic minority background' (The Swedish National Police Board, 2014), however, only three per cent of the police officers working in Sweden are *themselves* born outside of Sweden. Among all private security officers working in Sweden 13 per cent are born abroad. There is, however, no data available on the share of private security officers with an 'ethnic minority background' currently working in the country.

regarding risk groups (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Finstad, 2000; Hydén & Lundberg, 2004; Rose, 2000; Zedner, 2003, pp. 166-167).

3. Materials and Methods

The research reported on in this article drew on two separate studies of policing in Sweden: an interview study with minority police officers and an ethnographic study of the work of private security officers. The interviews with the police workers investigated the situation of ethnic minority employees working for a county police authority (Uhnöo & Peterson, 2011). Interviews were carried out with 21 current and former employees of the Swedish Police who identified their background as "foreign", nine of whom were women and 11 men. Seven of the study participants worked for the police as civilian staff and 13 as uniformed officers. In addition, one woman participant joined the project at a later stage. The "foreignness" for them designated anything from having been born outside of Sweden to having been adopted from abroad by Swedish-born parents.

In the ethnographic study on the work of private security officers, the data was collected through fieldwork, which entailed accompanying security officers engaged in their daily work. The private security officers were both female and male, and they came from both ethnically "Swedish" and "non-Swedish" backgrounds. Observations and informal field-based interviews were carried out on 27 different occasions, for four to 13 contiguous hours each time (most commonly seven). In addition, one formal interview was conducted with the managing director of the security company in question (Hansen Löfstrand, 2013a, 2013b). The security officers' were only allowed to use force in self-defence, and were commonly carrying nothing more than a baton and handcuffs on duty. Their work of patrolling frequently entailed interactions with members of the general public encountered on the sites within their patrol area.

4. Diversity Policing: The Official Discourse

The current public rhetoric and politics in Sweden stress "difference" and "diversity" in society as something worth striving for: they are held to constitute an asset especially in a variety of employment-related contexts (de los Reyes & Martinsson, 2005, p. 9). This forms an important discursive environment for both the police authorities and private security service providers in the country. In it, however, diversity is viewed in essentially ethnic terms and directly linked to qualities such as "foreignness" or "non-Swedishness." To recruit a diverse workforce accordingly means recruiting individuals from ethnic backgrounds other than the native "Swedish" one, based, in particular, on what seems to be a widespread notion in Sweden of Swe-

dishness, as something reflected in one's appearance (see, e.g., Mattson, 2005). According to some research, being "Swedish" tends today to increasingly imply having a blond hair, blue eyes, and a white skin, rather than referring to particular customs, clothing, or language (Werner, 2014).

In the Swedish Police Service, diversity policing was initiated in a top-down fashion, following the introduction of national policies that provided for the implementation and management of diversity in all governmental organizations. Within the police authority, the terms of the official discourse on diversity were set in a national policy and action plan, which defined the advantages that diversity was seen to offer as follows:

Diversity shall be an integrated and natural part of the Swedish Police's operations and shall contribute to a more representative, efficient and attractive organization...Diversity shall provide the Swedish Police improved prerequisites to solve their tasks. Interactive differences shall be an asset to the Swedish Police. (The Swedish National Police Board, 2010, p. 3)

Diversity was thus proposed to constitute a resource that would clearly contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the police in carrying out its mandate. In addition, the symbolic importance of ethnic diversity in the workforce was stressed at policy level: "The Swedish Police must clearly show what a democratic society stands for. This means that we shall...be good role models in the multicultural society" and "representative" as an organization (The Swedish National Police Board, 2010, p. 3). A more diverse workforce, in other words, would result in an appearance of greater representativeness and legitimacy (cf. Ward, 2006, p. 69). Nothing, however, was stated about what the valuable resource that the incorporation of ethnic-minority officers into the police force offered consisted of, exactly, or about how this resource should, or could, be made use of in the police's day-to-day work (see also Lander, 2013).

The private security company included in this study, on the other hand, stated diversity policing to form an important part of a successful business concept for it: it was something that would allow the company to deliver better service to its customers—indeed, better than that of its competitors. Furthermore, both those representing the company's management and its employees working on the street talked about the "diversity of ethnicities" in their company's workforce as a source of "pride". In its promotional material, the company claimed to value diversity highly, stating that it strove to serve as "a role model and an inspiration" for other actors in the country's private-sector security industry. As one of its security officers explained it, "the point is to provide good services, treat the public nicely, and thus get a good reputation." This image projected by

the company was, furthermore, linked to its strategy of employing security officers from several different ethnic backgrounds representing a variety of nationalities, "looks", and mother tongues. In an interview, the firm's managing director depicted the company as a rare example within the industry, as an actor "thinking a bit more broadly" than its competitors in the country's private security sector: "We have something we call the multicultural Sweden, and that's how we recruit." Recruiting an ethnically diverse workforce was one way for the company to show its conscience, its corporate social responsibility.

Thus, in both the county police authority and the private security company in this study, ethnic diversity in the workforce was deemed important from the point of view of one's ability, as a policing actor, to mirror the ethnic heterogeneity of the general population in one's own organization—something that, in turn, was seen as necessary for one's ability to claim, achieve, and maintain legitimacy in the context of a modern multi-ethnic and democratic society. Just like the public police, also private security providers need to achieve and maintain a certain legitimacy in the eyes of the public (e.g., Hansen Löffstrand, 2013b; Thumala, Gool, & Loader, 2011). One way of gaining the needed legitimacy is then to appeal to public values generally taken to stand for something positive in and for the society (such as a sense of social responsibility and diversity). Furthermore, both the management-level personnel and individual security officers working for that company compared their work to the diversity policy of the police authority, which may be interpreted as an instance of "symbolic borrowing", an attempt to secure legitimacy by associating oneself with the public police with the hope of appearing as as competent and respectable as it (cf. Thumala, Gool, & Loader, 2011, p. 294).

Diversity within the workforce can promote the goal to build and maintain a certain legitimacy in two ways: on the one hand, it, in at least potentially increasing fairness and justice in society by promoting equality and non-discrimination in the treatment of its members (policing becomes more fair and egalitarian when minorities police minorities), can have *substantive* outcomes that appeal to established public values, while, on the other hand, it may serve as a *symbolic* tool that helps to promote a mere appearance of legitimacy (cf. Ward, 2006, p. 69). The notion that diversity promotes fairness and justice is based on an assumption that policing agents from ethnic minority backgrounds bring unique skills and perspectives to policing organizations, resources that can help offset their colleagues' counterproductive biases and tendencies such as to develop and use ethnic profiles. Irrespective of any such actual impact that ethnic workforce diversity might have on the work and situated actions of the policing agents on the street, however, such diversity also "bolsters the *perceived* legitimacy" of the organization

and its purposes and actions (Ward, 2006, p. 70; emphasis added).

According to the public police and private security officers included in this study, diversity policing, which here meant mostly diversity recruiting, would result in both a substantial increase of fairness and justice and serve a symbolic function in lending the work of the policing agents the appearance of legitimacy, credibility, and respectability in the eyes of the public. In addition, diversity policing was claimed to contribute to more effective work and more efficient organizations. All of these claims, however, are left unsubstantiated and vague; how diversity policing can supposedly achieve all this is nowhere explained or even touched upon. In the section that follows, we therefore examine the concrete ways in which ethnic workforce diversity is drawn upon in actual policing practice in and through the situated activities and interactions in which police and private security officers become involved as part of their day-to-day work, to clarify how, in the concrete thinking of those performing the policing activities, diversity policing was going to contribute to more efficient organizations, more effective policing work, and more (perceived or real) legitimacy for the policing agents.

5. Policing Diversity: The Unofficial Discourse and the Practice of Policing through Stereotypes

The alternative discourse on ethnic diversity that could be seen as available to the police and security officers in this study, rather more unofficial in nature, depicted workforce diversity as something *strategically* desirable and highly useful, motivated by the need, in especial, to facilitate one's work on the streets and make it produce better results. A closer look at how ethnic diversity in the workforce was put to work, strategically, in the actual practice of police and private security officers on the street through organizational and situational deployment of techniques like *ethnic matching* reveals that it was, in fact, this alternative, more unofficial discourse that provided the policing agents' norms for accepted thinking, interpreting, understanding, and indeed acting in the situations they encountered in the course of their everyday work. Depicting "foreigners" as a category overrepresented among the "criminals" in the country, it called for policing agents to incorporate these elements in their workforce composition and that way perform their policing tasks more effectively and gain better access to the "criminal environments" in their concern.

The implicit assumption behind practices like ethnic matching is that those sharing certain "ethnic markers" such as physical appearance (skin colour, bodily conduct, emotive expressions, etc.) are more closely related and thus understand one another and interact better and more readily than those who differ from one

another in these respects. All this then makes ethnic matching appear as a rational choice in policing: police employees or security staff coming from ethnic-minority ("foreign") backgrounds, the thinking suggests, should then be the ones to police ethnic minorities in the public, producing as they would better outcomes than their ethnically "Swedish" colleagues attempting the same (cf. Hansen Löfstrand, 2013b; Wästerfors & Burcar, 2014). Underlying this distinction between "foreigners" and "Swedes" in the workforce of the policing agents, just as in the population at large, is a specific notion of "Swedishness", one that is linked to appearance: in it, a "Swedish" appearance is "equated with being blond and having blue eyes, which involves a direct and clear link between Swedishness and whiteness" (Mattson, 2005, p. 150). By extension, dark skin, hair, and eyes are then taken to signify "foreignness" implying deviation and difference (Mattson, 2005, pp. 151-152).

5.1. Organizational Ethnic Matching

The policing of diversity, or the way in which an ethnically diverse workforce is made use of in the concrete everyday work of police and private security officers through the application of techniques like ethnic matching, can be carried out at both an organizational and a situational level. By 'organizational ethnic matching', we refer to the practice of planning and staffing entire sections or units of a policing organization or particular work tasks or assignments in such a way as to ensure ethnic diversity in the staff dedicated to these. In the organizations we studied, this was done to facilitate the strategic use of the "Swedishness" or "foreignness" of the employees in their actual performance of policing tasks in concrete situated actions and interactions. Planning and staffing sections and units as well as individual work tasks or special assignment to ensure ethnic diversity in them is what then *enabled*—but is distinct from—situational ethnic matching.

Organizational ethnic matching in the county police authority in this study took a somewhat different form than in the security company investigated, mainly as a consequence of differences in the organizational size and tasks between the two. The mission of the Swedish Police is a broad one and is not limited to simply reducing crime; it also involves the provision of certain services to the public and the protection of public safety more broadly. According to the police officers interviewed for this study, for some functions of the country's overall police service—mainly the border police (controlling whether those travelling into the country have valid travel documents and may stay in it, and looking for wanted persons), the juvenile police (dealing especially with youths), the passport offices, and covert policing (e.g., the narcotics division)—special efforts had been made to recruit from ethnic minorities

and staff the services so as to ensure, or at least enable, ethnic matching on the ground. Staff representing the country's ethnic minorities were, according to the interviewed officers, in these sections considered as a particularly valuable asset since they are considered to be able to better manage the interactions with them than their "Swedish" colleagues.

The private security company studied for this article was smaller than the county police authority, and it was not divided into different sections or divisions assigned their own kinds of policing tasks, patrolling areas, or types of criminality. The organizational ethnic matching relied on by the company was rather a strategy used to determine which company employees were sent out on which kinds of security assignments and on behalf of which customers. The staffing of each patrolling assignment was planned thoroughly with the aim of most effectively managing the reactions and impressions of the public expected to be encountered on the street, in order to facilitate the delivery of security services on the ground. These decisions were made based on what was known about the neighbourhood or the area in which the work was to be carried out (the city centre or a suburb), who the purchaser of the services was, what type of event, occasion, or function it was that was perhaps involved, and what kinds of individuals or groups of people were expected to be encountered on the assignment. If the assignment was at a hip hop concert in one of the suburbs, for example, it would be staffed by "dark-skinned security officers", as one company employee in charge of planning and staffing security missions described it (while officers with a lighter skin colour would be sent to a rock concert in the city centre). This was done to ensure that the employees to carry out the work on site would *not* correspond to the public's stereotypical image of "the security officer" as a "big blond guy with an attitude", an image seen as tainting the business and hampering the work of individual officers on the streets. During particularly turbulent periods in the city's ethnically and socio-economically segregated suburbs, the company had also begun to rely on organizational ethnic matching through what it referred to as "double staffing", which involved security personnel working in pairs composed of, as one security officer described it, "a mixture" of staff, "with one fair-skinned and one dark-skinned" security officer going on the assignment together (Hansen Löfstrand, 2013b).

Organizational ethnic matching, or attempts to create favourable work conditions by planning and staffing particular assignments so that they ensured a diversity of appearances and backgrounds among the officers sent to the street, was also practiced by the county police authority studied. Units engaged in covert policing selected the personnel for the assignments based on the nature of the operation in question, matching the officers to the perceived character and

type of the area, neighbourhood, place, or social situation involved. Assignments were staffed and planned so that the personnel to carry them out would *not* correspond to the stereotypical image of police officers as distinctly "Swedish-looking" and uniformed. A common opinion among the interviewed police employees was that certain of their police's tasks and assignments required officers looking or appearing as *opolisiära* ("non-police-like") as possible. As one police officer reported during his interview, there was a dark-skinned co-worker of his who was frequently selected for undercover policing assignments at rave parties "because he didn't look like a police officer"; he "was picked because he was so dark." Police officers with that kind of "foreign appearance" were assumed to blend in more readily with the people expected to be encountered at the scene or location. Some work assignments, such as surveillance operations preceding planned drug raids and crackdowns in some of the city's immigrant-dominated suburbs, were seen as being more efficiently carried out when handled by police officers who were *opolisiära* in their appearance, such as women officers or officers with "non-Swedish" or generally "foreign" looks.² Only they, the interviewed police officers opined, were able to move around relatively freely in the ethnically and socio-economically segregated urban areas where the operations were carried out, not having their presence there stand out and become questioned. For this reason, the officers explained, they were commonly selected as "the first scouts", as those sent out first at the very outset of a surveillance and sting operation, since "they are the best suited for this job".

5.2. Situational Ethnic Matching

Situational ethnic matching, as we use the term in this article, was used by the policing agents in their particular and concrete interactions on the street. It involved situated activities and interactions where the police or security officers for strategic reasons omitted to specifically allude to their identity as policing agents, drawing on and performing ethnicity to avoid attracting attention to it. Situational ethnic matching was thus attempted using the technique of impression manage-

² As this indicates, not only ethnic minority representatives but also women were seen as highly valuable and useful to the organization. The same held for the private security company in this study. In this article, however, we limit our consideration of diversity to the issue of ethnicity. Both public and private policing organizations in Sweden have succeeded in hiring women better than they have ethnic minorities: 31 per cent of the all the police officers and 28 per cent of the private security officers working in the country are women, while, as already mentioned, only 3 per cent of all the country's police officers and 13 per cent of its private security officers are foreign-born (Statistics Sweden, 2012a).

ment (Goffman, 1959), consisting of a particular performance of ethnicity to help them better manage their counterparties' impressions. This entailed drawing on symbolic resources such as similarity or closeness of appearance (skin colour), mother tongue, style/bodily conduct, and emotive expressions (cf. Hansen Löfstrand, 2013a, 2013b). When practicing situational ethnic matching, the policing agents thus not only policed stereotypes, but also policed *through* stereotypes: they expressly drew upon and operationalized ethnicized stereotypes. Situational ethnic matching was mainly utilized towards two main ends: either to control situated actions in direct face-to-face interactions with individuals or groups encountered on assignments, through the use of soft rather than coercive powers, or to pass as a civilian, which required policing agents not to wear a uniform.

5.2.1. Policing through Ethnic Stereotypes to Control Situated Actions

In the county police authority and the private security company included in this study, situational ethnic matching in the form of policing through ethnic stereotypes tended to be used in particular socio-economic contexts: in the socio-economically and ethnically segregated suburbs of the city. An image of “threatening youths’ in the dangerous suburbs” (Sernhede, 2006, p. 102) seems to be imprinted in the consciousness of many Swedes, stamping also the discursive environment in which both public police officers and security company operatives move. Drawing on the work of Waquant (e.g., Waquant, 2007; also Sernhede, 2009), this image can be seen as a product of processes of territorial stigmatization, denoting a general tendency to criminalize the socio-economic problems of marginalized populations. (This phenomenon is familiar in Sweden as well: see, e.g., Forkby & Liljeholm Hansson, 2011; Hansen Löfstrand, 2013b; Sernhede, 2006, 2009; Uhnöo, 2013). Indeed, policing efforts overall have been observed to have a tendency to grow spatially focused, with policing through ethnic matching becoming taken up as an option and applied in the case of certain areas or spaces in the urban landscape only (Fyfe, 1991; Lowman, 1986).

When the police and private security officers studied for this article were asked about why, in their opinion, ethnic diversity of policing staff was worth pursuing, and in exactly which ways they thought it was beneficial to their work, they almost always referred to “the dangerous suburbs” in their responses. According to them, it facilitated their work in those suburbs, by helping them to avoid accusations of discrimination, calm down situations, and manage antagonistic and/or resentful emotions from the public. For all these reasons, they explained, police and security officers with “non-Swedish looks” were ideal for assignments involv-

ing, in particular, suburban immigrant youths: they could make productive use of the perceived social distance between “foreigners” and the controlling bodies representing the country’s rule-of-law institutions like the police and private security actors. If, for example, police officers differed in their appearance and manners from the stereotypical “white” police officers and were instead perceived of as “fellow foreigners”, the explanation went, they had an opportunity to connect with immigrants, and immigrant youth in especial, in a positive way. One of the police officers in this study described how, when police officers with a “non-Swedish” appearance like him arrived in the suburbs, they were more often met with a degree of personal acceptance and trust, and perhaps even interest, compared to how it would have been had the officers on assignment been his ethnically Swedish-looking colleagues.

The interviewed police officers from minority backgrounds, however, also described a pressure to live up to their role as representatives of the Swedish police before the youngsters they met on the streets. Very often, this had to do with a simultaneous need they felt to act as a role model for the latter, owing to their shared social status and ethnic background. Also one of the security officers in this study pointed out how “you’re supposed to act as a role model for the suburban kids”. For one thing, this meant encouraging the young men encountered on duty to think along the lines of “If he can do it, so can we”, by giving an impression that they both shared some basic experiences as “immigrants”. Responding to a question about the exact respects in which he considered himself as representing a role model, this security officer explained that in the Swedish society in general, being “an immigrant” was associated with criminality and a certain style of manners (acting like one who “owned the streets”), and when he, as a security officer coming himself from an immigrant background, went out into the suburbs to interact with young men, he became a role model for these as they believed him to share their experiences. One public police officer, for his part, considered that, since suburban youths from minority backgrounds are often subjected to stop and search, “many of them really believe the police to have prejudices [against them]”, and that it was therefore important for them to “see foreigners working within the police department”.

In the interviews with police and security officers, many examples were brought up of how accusations of discrimination and racism coming from juveniles in the suburbs were managed with the help of situational ethnic matching. One way for police officers to avoid accusations of discrimination and racism altogether, and manage such accusations when they nevertheless did occur, was to make use of situational ethnic matching by performing the role of “the immigrant police”. More than one interviewed police officer claimed that

when some among them looked sufficiently “non-Swedish”, it was often enough that these officers simply got out of their patrol car for a situation to calm down. Sometimes they could also go one step further and address those gathering on the scene in their native tongue. One security officer, hailing from the former Yugoslavia, told that when being accused, or expecting to soon be accused, of ethnic discrimination, “I play the ace up my sleeve: I start talking in Bosnian”, thus appealing to (presumed) similarities between himself and his audience at the site. This, the security officer claimed, often took the sting out of the accusations.

Situational ethnic matching—policing through stereotypes—thus appeared to offer a means for public police and private security officers to increase the chances that the members of the public otherwise most likely to show resentful attitudes towards policing agents will co-operate and view the actions of the policing agents as legitimate; it was, in other words, an effective tool for them with which to manage reputation and resent. For security officers of ethnic Swedish origin, while they all agreed that it was “a good idea to talk to the kids”, it was, in contrast, very often “difficult to talk to the immigrant youth”, because “all they say back is ‘You are only talking to us because you think that we will do something’”. As one of these officers reported, his co-worker who came from a non-Swedish ethnic background was met entirely differently in these situations, becoming addressed as “a brother right away” and possibly greeted with “Damn, how cool, you have a baton?” or something similar. His own chances of succeeding in his work this security officer felt to be “much bigger when dealing with middle-class brats in the wealthy suburbs.” The strategy of situational ethnic matching, as a tool the officers used to gain control over situated actions by claiming likeness in terms of a shared “foreignness”, could, however, also sometimes fail to produce this intended effect (cf. Hansen Löfstrand, 2013a; Uhnoo & Peterson, 2011).

5.2.2. Policing through Ethnic Stereotypes to Pass as a Civilian

At other times, situational ethnic matching in the form of policing through stereotypes, or the policing agents’ efforts to draw upon and perform ethnicity by claiming likeness to their interlocutors in terms of a shared ethnic background, was instead resorted to purposefully conceal, or at least not deliberately bring to the other persons’ notice, one’s identity and status as a police or security officer. In police work, this type of policing was most commonly practiced in connection with operations falling under covert policing activity: during them, ethnicity was performed by police officers to produce the appearance of being a civilian or, at any rate, to create an as non-police-like impression of oneself as

possible. According to one interviewed police officer, those in the departmental workforce who were “foreign” and had “a foreign name and perhaps a foreign appearance” were the ones best suited for surveillance and reconnaissance tasks, involving as these often did engaging in activities in ethnic minority-dominated areas:

And then I’m a bit darker [than my co-workers], too, which is an advantage when you have to go out on a scouting mission...The archetypical image of a policeman working under cover in this country is that it’s an ethnically Swedish male, aged about 30 to 35—but in me you can at least see some “Eastern” influence, if you wish...So for me it’s easier to blend in, for example, in the suburbs, and mingle with people in those types of environments. It tends to take them a bit longer before they start suspecting me for being a police officer, if you compare it to a situation where one of my blond-haired co-workers goes into those places.

In other words, when police officers practiced policing through stereotypes in covert policing, this was by taking advantage of what they took to be stereotypical notions of themselves as held by the public: that those exercising control in society, be they police or security officers, were all ethnically “Swedish”. What was then concealed or downplayed during covert policing operations was this “Swedishness” of the officer on the street. In contrast to situations where police and security officers had to actively engage in interaction with young people in the city’s suburbs, this type of situational ethnic matching did not in the main entail appeals to ethnic “likeness” in direct face-to-face interactions to minimize resistance, confrontation, and the need for applying coercive control measures. Rather, in general, it involved actively performing and staging a “foreign” ethnicity in order to better blend in with certain social environments, without engaging in direct interactions where one’s identity might become questioned. While “foreign” looks were the main resource or asset police and security officers could draw upon in these connections, the policing through stereotypes they practiced to hide their identity as policing agents also called for an ability to convincingly move around and act as someone part and parcel of the social environment in which the policing operation was unfolding.

The interviewed minority police officers frequently brought up the advantage they had over their “Swedish-looking” co-workers in these regards and how effortless and “natural” it was for them to partake in covert police operations in the city’s ethnically non-Swedish suburbs (see also Loftus, Goold, & Macgiollabhui, 2014). In this same vein, one private security officer coming from an ethnic minority background spoke about how he, personally, was never afraid of going in-

to the city's ethnic minority-dominated suburbs and neighbourhoods wearing plainclothes, while entering such areas in a security officer's uniform made the situation altogether different: then one represented the Swedish rule-of-law institutions and was met accordingly. When working in the ethnic-minority areas and neighbourhoods, it was beneficial to have a "non-Swedish" background and not wear a uniform, and thus, when contracted to carry out crime prevention and safety work in the city's suburbs, the security company in this study sent its employees out into the streets wearing a uniform quite different from their usual one: a T-shirt in bright colors.

A police officer, coming from a Finnish background—but with a "Swedish" appearance (white skin, blonde hair)—described a situation unfolding in a marketplace in an immigrant-heavy suburb in which he, in the absence of other alternatives, found himself having to enact the role of a "Swedish criminal":

I was about to do some recce over there, like we usually do in preparation for certain types of operations, and I took a look around me and I was, like, "Jesus Christ!" Nothing but immigrants out there, basically...So I thought, "How the fuck"—sorry—"am I going to solve this situation?" Luckily, it was warm outside, and I've got some tattoos here and there, so I took off my shirt and walked around out there having nothing but my shorts on me...It was the only way for me to be able to do any work out there. An incredible place.

To be able blend in with his particular social environment, the officer concealed his identity as a policing agent by removing his shirt to show off his tattooed upper body, acting in a way that, he expected, would in that environment attract no one's attention to what he took to be his stereotypical "Swedish criminal" appearance. In doing so, he drew on his knowledge of the stereotype that "Swedishness" in a policing context, as a characteristic of a policing agent, not only implied being white-skinned and blond-haired, but also meant acting and behaving in the manner of a good and respectable, law-abiding citizen of the country.

A comparable situation was described by one of the interviewed security officers coming from an ethnic-minority background. One night, when busy driving from one site to another, he suddenly had to respond to a burglary alarm. Arriving at the scene and preparing to board up the broken window he found in a building there, a few men—"Serbs," according to the officer—showed up and started yelling, "There he is, the bastard; get him!" Realizing he was in danger, the security officer, to borrow his own words, "enacted the crazy Yugoslavian", or, as he phrased it on another occasion, "went for the crazy-Yugoslav style". In this case, this meant talking loudly (in Serbo-Croatian) and behaving

"cockily", using the body language and gestures of someone who "owned the streets", was at home in the neighbourhood, and demanded respect. The security officer yelled back to the men, "What the fuck do you want!", causing them to eventually back off, startled by his attitude. This, the security officer concluded, was because they realized that "Hey, he's one of us". He then went on to elaborate that, in doing so, his addressees assumed that he, too, was a fellow immigrant with brushes with the law at some point in his life:

You yourself don't have to have been a crook, but, really, what you do is you take advantage of people's prejudices. This is where "the crazy-Yugoslav" thing comes in: it's an enactment, a performance that I can use to my advantage; but of course they don't know that.

In order to downplay his status as a security officer and a representative of the Swedish rule-of-law institutions (clearly visible through his uniform), he enacted a performance as a stereotypical "Yugoslav crook", a not only ethnicized but also criminalized stereotype. In general, the purpose of this type of situational ethnic matching was to pass as a civilian person able to move around in a particular social environment without having one's presence become subject to questioning. If one's presence failed to go unnoticed, when one felt oneself to probably be in danger, or if one's cover risked being blown, additional measures became necessary and were made use of. On such occasions, not only ethnicized but also criminalized stereotypes were performed. All in all, these performances of ethnicity, as strategies of situational ethnic matching, were all premised on the reproduction of the stereotypical image of "Swedes" as people who are white, blonde-haired, law-abiding, and a little "square" in the behaviour, and of "foreigners" as individuals who are non-white, dark-haired, and badly-behaving "crooks".

6. Diversity Policing and the Policing of Diversity: Inclusionary Rationale and Exclusionary Practices

Our main objective has been to contribute to an improved conceptual understanding of the strategic use of ethnicity—or ethnicized stereotypes—in policing. Two distinct types of discourses and ways of "doing ethnicity" emerged as characteristic of the Swedish policing organizations studied. These we termed as 'diversity policing' and the 'policing of diversity'.

In the official discourse in Sweden, diversity policing, or the efforts by the police and security service operators to recruit and retain an ethnically diverse workforce, has been presented as an inclusive measure, with diversity typically framed as indicative of the organization's sense of social responsibility. This holds for both the public and private sector policing actors.

More specifically, the proposal has been that diversity policing improves the policing actors' ability to mirror the ethnic heterogeneity of the population they serve, seen as critical for the public legitimacy of their purposes and actions in a democratic society.

Within the more unofficial discourse on ethnic diversity, one we have above linked to the strategy of policing diversity, workplace diversity was understood to refer to a workforce composition that mirrors the presence of "foreign elements" in society, with "foreigners" depicted as overrepresented among the "criminals" in the country. According to the logic of this second discourse, an ethnically diverse workforce is *strategically necessary* for the organization's operational ability and effectiveness. As our examination indicates, it was this latter, more unofficial discourse that provided the dominant norms for accepted thinking among the policing agents in this study, functioning as a model for them for interpreting, understanding, and also acting in their concrete work situations.

In discussing these two discourses and policing practices, we have highlighted the disjuncture that prevails between the widely accepted rationalities for diversity recruitment (diversity policing) and the realities for effective deployment of an ethnically diverse workforce at the street level (policing diversity). Paradoxically, while diversity policing is based on an inclusive rationale, our investigation of the strategic use of ethnic diversity among policing personnel shows the resulting policing practices to be exclusionary in their consequences. The achievement of diversity in hiring, ironically, facilitates ethnic matching, which in turn helps to perpetuate stereotypical thinking about Swedish "others".

Using the term 'organizational ethnic matching', we considered the practice of planning and staffing entire sections of a policing organization, or particular work tasks and assignments, in such a way as to ensure ethnic diversity in the staff dedicated to these. Organizational ethnic matching provided the policing actors studied with a tool enabling the strategic use of "Swedishness" and "foreignness" by their employees when carrying out their work tasks on the street. To address the particular kind of interactions involved when public police and private security officers for strategic purposes avoided calling attention to their status as policing agents, we employed the term 'situational ethnic matching'. In these interactions, the policing agents instead thematized and performed ethnicity, claiming likeness between themselves and their interlocutors in terms of a shared "foreignness". Policing through stereotypes in these cases involved drawing on symbolic resources such as physical appearance (like skin colour, colour of hair and eyes, and general physical appearance), mother tongue, behavioural style/bodily conduct, and emotive expressions. This strategy relied on stereotypical images, held by the public and the polic-

ing agents alike, that depicted certain groups in society, namely "foreigners" (those with "dark" or otherwise "non-Swedish" features), as being particularly crime prone and residing in specific areas and social environments, in especial the ethnically and socio-economically segregated major-city suburbs.

In Sweden, the term 'race' is only rarely if ever (publicly) used by those representing the country's government and rule-of-law institutions and those taking part in public debates. In its stead, the terminology of 'ethnicity', strongly associated with "foreign immigrant cultures" (Ålund, 1999, p. 107), and 'culture' is heavily favoured. In the discourses on ethnic diversity within the two policing organizations studied, the meaning of 'ethnicity', however, changed, with the term coming to be defined as denoting a certain kind of skin colour, general physical appearance, behaviour, language use, and language proficiency. This finding is in line with the tendency, noted in the Swedish context by Ålund (1999, p. 108), of notions such as 'ethnicity' and 'culture' to function as a smokescreen, as a means by which social inequalities, segregation, and instances of racialization are covered up. As a strategy, policing through stereotypes by our study participants relied on, and in turn reproduced, existing patterns of inequalities in society, a society in which being "Swedish" means being "white" (a blond, well-behaving, and law-abiding good citizen) while being "foreign" means being "dark" (dark-featured, badly behaving, and law-despising if not outright criminal).

Both the public police and private security officers included in this study frequently referred to the socio-economically and ethnically segregated suburbs in which they operated as high-crime environments that at least potentially were "dangerous". This image can be seen as a product of processes of territorial stigmatization, denoting a general tendency to criminalize the socio-economic problems of marginalized populations (e.g., Waquant, 2007; see also Sernhede, 2009). While ethnic minority groups indeed are overrepresented in official crime statistics in Sweden, most of this imbalance can, as suggested by previous research, be explained by indicators of socio-economic resources and neighbourhood segregation during childhood, showing this overrepresentation to be "in fact to a large extent economic and social inequality in disguise" (Hällsten, Szulkin, & Sarnecki, 2013, p. 469).

As a strategy, the practice of policing through stereotypes can thus be said to both rely on and reproduce existing patterns of inequality in society. While there are practical considerations that limit the range of possible recommendations that could be made for policing practice based on this observation (can policing actors be asked to forgo a proven tool for public safety maintenance in the interest of achieving the [elusive] goal of stereotype change/eradication? etc.), it is nevertheless worth reflecting on its implications. A

question for future research is whether the two discourses on ethnic diversity—diversity policing and policing diversity—run parallel to, and mirror, a racialized class-based hierarchy within policing organizations. Although not much research exists as yet even on the career paths of ethnic minority police officers (see, e.g., Fielding, 1999), previous studies nevertheless suggest such hierarchies to be at least potentially common across countries (e.g., Singh & Kempa, 2007; van Ewijk, 2011). Although it seemed evident such hierarchies existed also in the two policing organizations studied for this article, it was not possible to empirically verify the accuracy of this impression or the possible existence of such hierarchies in other policing organizations in Sweden. Future studies should, therefore, be conducted to examine whether there indeed might be two broad cultures sustaining their own, different discourses in policing contexts. To the extent that this may turn out to be so, it would then also be pertinent to ask whether any official, higher-level discourse stressing the need to recruit and retain an ethnically diverse workforce might be promoted and reproduced by superior, “native” (“white”), and well-paid managements, while a more unofficial, lower-level discourse and its attendant strategy of policing through stereotypes to control and, sometimes, survey specific parts of the public (“foreigners”) would then be enacted and reproduced by subordinate ethnic-minority officers. In such cases, ethnic-minority officers, through their use of situational ethnic matching, would, paradoxically, themselves be contributing to exclusionary practices towards groups already marginalized in society, thereby helping to perpetuate existing patterns of inequality and subordination. Instead of producing its intended results (substantive legitimacy acquired through more fair and just treatment of certain parts of the public), the policing strategy of situational ethnic matching would then only be able to serve as a means by which to repair and maintain mere symbolic legitimacy for policing actions and operations.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Safety Work with an Ethnic Slant

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Abstract

Ethnic discrimination in the criminal justice system is a well-researched topic, but the significance of ethnicity in policing activities at more mundane levels has attracted less attention. This article analyzes ethnographic data on municipal 'safety work' in a Swedish city troubled with robberies, vandalism, and violence. It shows how the efforts of different safety workers, operating to curb crime and promote security, came to focus on the 'soft' policing of young men with various immigrant backgrounds. A set of street-level safety practices, performed within spatial demarcations, was found to represent a more-or-less silent orientation towards local minorities; a focus on non-Swedish ethnicities was embedded in the policing activity. This article points out the importance of implied ethnicities in the contemporary landscape of plural policing.

Keywords

crime; ethnicity; media; plural policing; safety work; security; urban space

Issue

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1. Introduction

Contemporary public security is not exclusively a task for the police. The fact that a plethora of public, commercial, and voluntary agencies aim to protect people and property (Loader, 1997, p. 377) has given rise to issues regarding 'plural policing' (Loader, 2000; Jones & Newburn, 2006) or an 'extended police family' (Crawford, 1997). The criminological interest in ethnic minorities, their statistical over-representation in arrests and prisons (Tonry, 1996; Bosworth, 2004), and the ethnically discriminatory mechanisms within the criminal justice system (Ekman, 1999; Granér, 2004; Petterson, 2005; Diesen, 2006) have attracted attention to the policing of ethnic minorities. It is not always clear whether ethnic minorities should be seen as categories that are substantially more involved in crime than others or as

categories that are discriminated against by the police and the justice process, or both. In any case, the policing of various ethnic groups has turned into a burning issue.

In this context it is relatively unknown by what mechanism more mundane police activities can subtly draw on ethnicity as a tool in control interactions. What social circumstances make mundane policing practices ethnically oriented? When analyzing policing practices, ethnicity is typically treated as an abstract category; therefore, we should ask how it could become similarly relevant as a more everyday, interactional accomplishment.

This article aims to specify the practices through which non-governmental policing may come to involve and reproduce an underlying orientation toward ethnic minorities through a set of spatially demarcated street-level interactions. In doing this, we intend to show that

policing practices do not need to be either ethnically neutral or intentionally discriminatory. Ethnicity can also become relevant implicitly, by way of circumstances and recurrent interactional events. Detailed data on individual interactions, accounts, and contexts are required to detect these processes; discursive or structural analyses are insufficient.

This study draws on ethnographic data from a case of municipal safety work in Landskrona, a small Swedish city with relatively high frequencies of robbery, vandalism, violence, and ethnic tension. Although the municipality focused its safety work on a specific downtown area, the context encountered and the responses that were implemented turned the focus toward young male immigrants. This case demonstrates how ‘policing’, in a broad but downplayed sense (not carried out by the police, but by various ‘city patrolers’) can be designed, delimited, and accomplished in such a way that ethnic minorities implicitly become its major concern. The case also shows how local crime news can sustain these processes by providing a symbolic context, where the major population sector (Swedes) is typified as victims, and immigrants are typified as perpetrators. The context described by the local media created heightened sensitivity, which sometimes made it difficult for safety workers to openly speak about ethnicities (some articles were perceived as portraying attitudes on the verge of racism), but the context also made it necessary for safety workers to make ethnic references.

Ethnicity typically proved to be an unspoken or ‘half spoken’ matter in our data. Instructions for safety workers did not include phrases like ‘keep a special eye on immigrants’, and the corrections safety workers imposed on youth in the street did not seem to include overt racial discrimination. Instead, as a whole, the project was impregnated with ethnically-oriented concerns, due to the particular areas under surveillance, the safety workers’ everyday interactions with each other and with youth, and through the rhetorical motivation of the local press. Safety workers’ ways of constructing knowledge, their use of ‘talks’ in the street as a control strategy, their visibility in downtown Landskrona, and their efforts to keep youth conventionally ‘active’ were subtly underpinned by ethnic considerations and simultaneously reproduced some ethnic categories.

Several of our findings are consistent with those of other studies, particularly regarding the disciplinary functions of youth work and policing. Ilan (2010) uses ethnographic data in a youth justice project in Dublin to show how youth workers propagated certain idealized behavioral expectations towards youth that were normally regarded “at risk”; for instance, youth behavior in indoor and outdoor leisure activities. In that study, the youth workers’ “pedagogic intervention” was meant to transform youth, but they disregarded

the fact that engaging in an offense may be a “creative and viscerally satisfying response to the marginality generated by the confluence of their biographies, class, gender, and youth” (Ilan, 2010, p. 37). Ilan points out that youth resistance may very well represent a refusal to acquiesce to pedagogy in general, which laid the ground for social tensions. In Landskrona, an equivalent pedagogic intervention is recognizable in the safety workers’ efforts to “motivate” street youth. However, we would like to add that, although tension was expected when trying to convince youths to exchange the street style of “doing nothing” for the conventional activities suggested by the safety workers, it was hoped that a bridge could be formed by identification with some of the safety workers that had immigrant backgrounds. Thus, here, shared ethnicities are given a special, crime-preventive meaning. Hansen Löfstrand (2013, p. 233) found a similar meaning in her study on a private security company in Sweden, aiming at ethnic diversity (*mångfald*, in Swedish); it was considered a great advantage to hire guards with another ethnic background than a Swedish one when working in Swedish suburbs. The idea is that staff ‘differences’ match the ‘differences’ in the field, so that efforts to enforce discipline are made easier. The chances of ‘ethnic matching’ in work encounters turned greater, and if the guard was the one that invoked an ethnic identification (rather than the youth) it was defined as helpful in producing safety, Hansen Löfstrand (2013, pp. 245-246) argues.

Standard police work also tries to enforce social discipline (Choongh, 1998). In fact, one of the “core police functions” in the 19th and 20th centuries has been to intervene against the “dangerous” element of the lower classes (McAra & McVie, 2005, pp. 6-7). Currently, males that have an active “street life” and a lower-class or less-affluent background are generally over-policed, and consequently they are particularly targeted for discipline. In an analysis of self-report data from youth in Edinburgh, McAra and McVie (2005) showed that “unrespectable” street life was the normal focus of the police. Once identified as a trouble-maker, a youth appeared to be “sucked into a spiral of amplified [police] contact” (McAra & McVie, 2005, p. 9), regardless of whether they continued to commit criminal offenses; thus, the police contributes to the perpetration of the very behavior they are trying to contain. Previous police contact proved to be the most powerful predictor of later adversarial contact in McAra and McVie’s study.

With the Landskrona data, we may argue that policing tended to recreate a certain category of “usual suspects”, but the difference between this study and previous studies is that we are investigating preventive work that use a much “softer” approach than “adversarial police contact”. Safety workers in Landskrona seldom act as confrontational as the police, and when a serious confrontation emerges, their responsibility is

to call (rather than replace) the police. Also we highlight ethnicity rather than class, and we are doing so not in terms of a statistical category, but in terms of an active accomplishment in social interactions. So-called ethnic profiling may be included in a patrolling policemen's 'silent knowledge' and activated through spatial demarcations, such as immigrant-dominated suburbs (Östlund, 2013, p. 119), and a similar but implicit 'profiling' seem to exist in the case of safety work. Here, though, we are inspired by ethnomethodology as an analytic approach to ethnographic data (Pollner & Emerson, 2001, p. 125; cf. Garfinkel, 1999; Heritage, 1984). We employ this approach to capture how ethnicities can be interactionally produced and sustained in the "soft" versions of policing. Ethnicity is considered a continuous social construction, an aspect of social relations (Eriksen, 2004) that is continuously created and recreated, in this case by safety workers.

But despite the fact that we do not understand ethnicity as 'an element in the world' but as 'a way of seeing the world' (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004, p. 47), we cannot avoid "doing" ethnicities ourselves, as analysts. We inevitably risk reproducing ethnic categorizations the moment we start describing them; for instance, when we use the terms "Swedes", "Albanians", "Turks", "immigrants", "immigrant background", "minorities", etc., we are recreating an ethnicity with each label.

The situation in this study is equivalent to that of Becker in his study of marijuana smokers: he felt that he had to use the term "marijuana smokers", despite the fact that he was interested in how actors (interactively and interpretatively) *became* marijuana smokers by engaging in certain activities. Similar to Becker (1998, pp. 44-46), we treat ethnic categories not as specific kinds of people, but as activities (for instance the activity of calling something Bosnian, Turkish or Swedish, implying a shared ethnicity or using a certain language, describing people in ethnic terms, etc.). Nevertheless, we do use categories now and then, in Becker's way: as a kind of descriptive shorthand.

2. Settings and Methods

This study began when the local official in charge of organizing crime prevention in Landskrona asked us to write a report on their latest project, 'A Safe Downtown'. The purpose was to collect data on this project as a whole and to describe how it had unfolded. We used ethnographic methods to understand the project's social practices and to capture the local opinion in Landskrona.

2.1 Landskrona and Its 'Unsafe' City Center

Landskrona's official safety work stemmed from the efforts of local politicians to deal with 'the youth prob-

lem' in the downtown area, which started in 2005. The number of reported assaults and robberies involving young men, as both perpetrators and victims, was increasing at that time, and according to municipal surveys, many citizens felt insecure in the streets and in public places. In 2004, over 20% of respondents said that they had abstained from an activity (going to the movies, engaging in sport activities, etc.) due to perceived insecurity (Polisen 2004). Around 54% of reported assaults in Landskrona were located within the so-called 'critical area', a triangle identified by the police in the central and eastern district, which included shops, pubs, squares, pedestrian walkways, schools, parks, parking lots, and sight-seeing spots (Kriminalunderrättelsetjänsten 2006).

In response to the perceived insecurity, local authorities launched a variety of efforts to curb crime. First, they recruited security guards, called 'yellow jackets' (until they changed uniform), and gave them extensive authority. These guards act under the often-mentioned Paragraph 3 in the Swedish law on security guards, which states that they can patrol a generous triangle of the city center; i.e., they are not limited to standing outside pubs and clubs or supervising specific public events. Also, two variants of 'safety workers' were employed to patrol the city center; the 'blue jackets', who belong to the local municipal crime prevention crew, and the 'red jackets', who belong to the local social services. The security guards and the red jackets work evenings and weekend nights; the blue jackets walk the city on weekday afternoons and evenings. All these safety workers act under different formal conditions; e.g., the security guards have power to intervene; the red jackets work outreach (i.e., making contact and offering encouragement and support); and the blue jackets serve as adult role models or 'city hosts' (serving as assets in the city, cooperating with shop assistants and communicating with youth). However, in practice, these three types of workers often share and describe the same approach.

Additional crime prevention strategies include offering youth in Landskrona a cell phone registry, where stolen phones could be disabled by a phone call from the rightful owner; some street sections were closed to curb a black market taxi business; and social efforts were directed toward youth deemed 'troublesome' and potentially criminal. Some years prior, camera surveillance was installed in and around a popular parking lot within the critical area (Wästerfors (2006) conducted a separate study on the cameras). In other words, the new safety work was implemented in addition to other related crime preventive efforts.

The blue jackets occasionally visit places outside central Landskrona; for instance, the railway station and, during summer, the neighborhood of Borstahusen, a camping area, and the beaches. However, the patrols of all the safety workers are focused on the

downtown area. Many other Swedish cities have a high proportion of residents with an immigrant background in the suburbs, but in Landskrona, many immigrants live in the central parts of the city. Currently, around 20% of Landskrona's 42,000 inhabitants live in the administrative district studied (called 'Centrum och Öster' or Central-Eastern), and 42% of these inhabitants have a 'foreign background' (*Centrum- och Österlyftet. Strategisk stadsdelsplan 2007*, p. 5). In a tabloid, a local official gave an account for this: "in Landskrona, those who can afford it get out of the city center as soon as they can, but in other cities, it is usually the other way around" (Olsson 2007). Officials involved in 'safety work' told us that these circumstances made it difficult to compare their work with other crime prevention projects in other cities or areas; for instance, in suburbs stigmatized by "ghetto" areas located on the outskirts of large cities. They felt that Landskrona required a special kind of presentation in inter-municipal meetings and collaborations. In that sense, Landskrona might be considered a mini-version of Burgess's model of a city from the Chicago school in the 1920s; it has high-priced residential areas in the 'outer zones' and a socially 'disorganized' zone in transition in the center (Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 2007, p. 37; Burgess, 1967, p. 55). At night, the downtown area do not primarily feature adult, middle-class Swedes going to clubs, theatres, or restaurants, as would be common in many other Swedish towns of similar size. Instead, the area is populated by youth, who gather outside schools or pubs, within and outside an Internet café, next to a youth recreation club, on benches, in squares, around schools, etc. Many are immigrants or children of immigrants; they describe themselves in this way and other people involved in our study use the same terminology; for example, they are referred to as Kosovo-Albanians, Turks, Croats, Bosnians, Arabs, etc., even though they may simultaneously feel and call themselves Swedes.

When the 'Safe Downtown' project started, local officials employed eight people to become blue jackets (the municipal city wanderers), and it was no coincidence that all eight had immigrant backgrounds. This ethnic mix guaranteed a 'broad language competence', claimed the organizer, implicitly referring to those that were targeted for control; youth of non-Swedish ethnicity (cf. Löfstrand, 2013). The organizer and her closest colleagues, however, were Swedes. One of the arguments for evaluating the project was that the crime trends in Landskrona had elements of what the police called 'Europeanized crime', a description that implied foreign, relatively severe, and somewhat 'un-Swedish' crimes.

Alongside the intensified safety efforts, crime was a recurring theme in the local press. This was not particularly remarkable, until it was put into perspective; compared to the nearby, larger town Helsingborg, Landskrona was much more frequently mentioned in

crime associated reports in the local media (Burcar and Wästerfors, 2007). When discussed in the national media, Landskrona is still repeatedly associated with crime and insecurity.

Landskrona as a whole is also distinguished for its relatively strong support of *Sverigedemokraterna* ('The Sweden Democrats'), a nationalist party that stands against 'mass immigration'; this party often rhetorically link immigrants to criminality and social problems. In the election of 2006, the party received one fifth of the votes of Landskrona (in the next election of 2010, the party lost some of its support). This party affiliation attracted a lot of attention in Sweden. National media tended to report on Landskrona for its criminality, ethnic tensions, and youth problems, and now the city was also associated with an extremist party. In Växjö, another small city in southern Sweden, a local politician said 'We do not want to become like Landskrona in a couple of years', when referring to a series of news reports in the local papers *Smålandsposten* and *Landskronaposten* in 2007. Feelings of an insecure city center most likely contributed to the strong support for *Sverigedemokraterna* in Landskrona.¹

2.2 Methods

First, we organized 'go-alongs' (Kusenbach, 2003), where we followed security guards, workers known as 'red jackets', and workers known as 'blue jackets' to get a picture of their work and its practicalities. During the go-alongs, we performed field-based interviews (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995) with safety workers and the local people they met. Second, we conducted field-based interviews with social workers, leisure workers, policemen, security guards, shop owners and their assistants, youth, and 'people in the street'. Third, we visited a locally, well-known youth club, called Nova, in downtown Landskrona and two schools, where we conducted focus group interviews with four girls and two boys aged 15. Fourth, we studied statistics

¹ The impact of the local media on fear and its part in the party's success were much debated, both locally and nationally. On the radio program 'Vår grundade mening' ('Our grounded meaning') (Sveriges radio P1 2006-10-26; also Sveriges radio Ekot 2009-09-24), the host invited people living in Landskrona, media researchers, police, and representatives from the local newspaper, *Landskronaposten*, to discuss news articles about gangs in Landskrona and what impact they had on the party's success in the election. In an article published in *Landskrona Posten/Helsingborgs Dagblad* (2006-11-12), the media researcher Ylva Brune discussed 'The paper, the juvenile gangs, and the opinion'. Brune said 'I would say that the newspaper has made an important contribution in creating a right-populist climate of opinion, not only by a special kind of news coverage, but also by actively orchestrating an opinion that advocates enforcing a get-tough police' (Ibid., our translation).

from the police and the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, and additionally, we studied local newspaper articles on crime and safety.² We could quite easily contact people through our networks and knowledge from a previous study on camera surveillance in a central parking place in Landskrona (Wästerfors 2006).

To talk to people in the street, various professionals, and safety workers provided insights into the symbolic context that became the frame of reference for the crime prevention project. Newspaper articles also added to our understanding of this context; in the news and in informal talks, immigrants were mentioned more often than in conversations with officials. Although we could localize this context to downtown Landskrona, we could not identify it with a particular setting, organization, or group. Rather, the local reception of the unfolding safety work in Landskrona was talked about in various places and in various social settings. Because one of us (Veronika Burcar) lived in downtown Landskrona at the time, it was easy to follow the daily discourse. These circumstances prompted us to shift sites repeatedly, and engage in a broad variety of situations and gatherings. Thus, our material is not ethnographic in the classic sense, which requires a careful portrayal of a single setting or culture and its members. Rather, this material provides glimpses of several settings and diverse sets of members. The ethnographic purpose of this study lay in our aim to describe how the local safety work came to be implemented and to portray those involved in it.

We personally heard people invoke ethnicities when referring to Landskrona in general, and crime prevention in particular. At a youth club, Nova, boys and girls greeted us by quickly asking whether we were 'svenne' or 'blatte', colloquial expressions for 'Swede' and 'immigrant' typically used by youth. The blue jackets that had immigrant backgrounds also asked us about our backgrounds, but in a more adult way (after some time) and with more polite expressions (e.g., 'where are you from?'). We gradually learned that, although the safety work was focused on an urban area (downtown Landskrona), people sometimes interpret-

² We gathered most of the qualitative data from the summer of 2006 to the spring of 2007. In sum, this original material included: four 'go-alongs' with safety workers; a set of field-based interviews with social workers, leisure workers, policemen, youth, and shop and pub employees or owners; visits to the youth club Nova; two focus group interviews with four girls and two boys at Gustav Adolfsskolan and Dammhagskolan (two schools); two interviews with representatives of the police and social services in Landskrona; 24 interviews with people working in downtown Landskrona; 19 short interviews with people in the street. In 2014, David Wästerfors performed more field-based interviews with safety workers and an additional 'go-along', to gather sufficient data to finalize this article.

ed it in terms of a focus on ethnicity. During a city walk, one of the blue jackets described how some young individuals had indicated that they felt 'singled out as immigrants' because only immigrants wore blue jackets. That safety worker also questioned this arrangement, and wished that non-immigrants would be included in the work group to discourage the impression that immigrants were selected to control other immigrants.

We also learned that people saw local media as significant; several times during our fieldwork, we were asked whether we were local reporters, a profession that did not seem popular among the ethnically-mixed blue jackets and youth in downtown Landskrona. Some blue jackets said that reporters 'campaigned against' immigrants, that their articles lacked 'hard facts', and that repeated reports on immigrant crimes had supported the nationalist party *Sverigedemokraterna*. Michail (one of the blue jackets) was indignant about a journalist who made Landskrona look "too divided" by highly contrasting opinions in the local newspaper (*Landskrona Posten*). "That journalist incites anti-immigration", said Michail. He argued that an Albanian man, depicted by a journalist in an article about 'the violence in his blood', did not exist in reality.

Our learning process was probably facilitated by the use of loosely-structured interviews and our interest in informal talks and 'go-alongs'. One might even say that the process was generated by our ethnographic method, because people's tendency to associate crime and crime prevention in Landskrona with young men of immigrant backgrounds was typical of informal interactions. An ethnographic approach made it possible to detect and address 'implicit ethnicities' in a more down-to-earth manner than would have been possible with, for instance, structured interviews or questionnaires.

3. Implied Ethnicities in Policing Downtown Landskrona

3.1 Subtle Concerns in Intelligence Gathering

One of the safety workers' methods consisted of constructing knowledge about youth activity in downtown Landskrona. The blue jackets and red jackets continually exchanged information with each other and with the security guards concerning the city's youth—where they could be found on a particular day or night, their purpose, their companions, and how long they might stay there. For instance, safety workers might discuss a big party or club, where boys and girls were expected to gather; they might discuss whether a particular place (a school yard, a square, a café) would continue to attract a fair amount of people on a given Friday or Saturday night, and whether they should continue surveillance there. Some safety workers communicated

this information to colleagues, even when they were not on duty, to let them ‘know roughly where the kids are’, as one of the red jackets put it.

We start our city walk. One of the ‘red jackets’ says that you have to love this work (to be able to do it), but a colleague interrupts and starts explaining what areas need to be checked extra carefully this night. The colleague seems a little stressed out. Apparently, there will be a wedding party at the People’s House and some kind of ‘fire show’ outside Madde’s Café and Restaurant, in addition to other events. Because this will attract a lot of people, the safety workers argue, these places must be carefully watched. (fieldnotes)

Typically, safety workers go to what Goffman (1967, p. 149) calls ‘where the action is’: in the excerpt above, a wedding party, a fire show (artists playing with fire and fireworks), and other expected gatherings. Where there is ‘action’, there are individuals that take chances and display their character; this type of situation, as Peterson argues, concerning policemen and criminal youth (2008, pp. 114-115), is attractive for both supporters and disrupters of social order. Safety workers aim to follow youth in their local endeavors to find fun, exciting spots in Landskrona’s urban area, to ensure that ‘safety’ could be upheld where they assume it can be challenged. When the streets happened to be relatively empty one night, they explained this in terms of their previously constructed youth knowledge. For instance, when nobody seemed to be hanging out at the local DVD and Video rental shop (Videomix) one night, one of the blue jackets told us that there was a Bosnian event going on in nearby Helsingborg: ‘Everybody’s probably there.’

The latter example is indicative of how ethnicities were implied within this intelligence gathering. Safety workers did not explicitly say that their main object was to watch young men with immigrant backgrounds; however, the things they mentioned and the wording they used during our ‘go-alongs’—a Bosnian party, an Albanian party, a wedding party, a set of schools with a high proportion of immigrants—made it clear that this was the object. Knowing the whereabouts of youth with an ethnic background other than Swedish turned out to be a central task, because this category dominated the downtown area assigned to the safety workers. When, as in this example, Bosnian or Albanian festivities were taking place elsewhere, the safety workers’ area became a bit empty, and their tasks were consequently less demanding; they assumed that ‘everybody’ would probably be there.

A similar logic was implied in a campaign against young people’s careless use of fireworks (for instance around Christmas and New Year’s Eve), which had caused some turbulence and injuries in downtown

Landskrona. In that case, the blue jackets turned to the local classrooms that taught Swedish for Immigrants (SFI). The principal of the school gave the schedule to the blue jackets, and they were given time during language lessons to inform the students about the dangers of their kids using fireworks in the streets; simultaneously, they gathered information about the parents’ attitudes. “There were three of us”, one of the blue jackets explained, “to cover several languages: Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian...”

As we sit in the blue jacket’s office and talk about the fireworks information campaign, I (David, one of the researchers) ask “Why SFI?” One of the blue jackets raises his eyebrows and says “we know that they are there”; that is where the parents “spend their days”. He goes on proudly describing the procedure: two days, three blue jackets, and 20 groups of SFI students. Later, when I talk with another blue-jacket on the same topic, he responds that also the local Islamic association was informed and the mosque. When I ask how the “Swedish parents” got the fireworks information, they respond that they just sent a brochure through ordinary mail. (fieldnotes)

Such instances indicate how an interest in ethnically defined concerns and attitudes were subtly implicated in safety workers’ intelligence gathering. In the blue jacket’s answer “we know that they are there”, ‘they’ denotes the parents of troublesome kids, and “they” can be found at courses for SFI. Underlying ethnic orientations made the choice of addressing SFI courses seem reasonable.

If we consider ethnicity as a practical, interactional accomplishment (Moerman, 1974; Pollner & Emerson, 2001, 2010, p. 125), ethnographers must look for actual occasions of ethnic identification, rather than merely presuming ethnic categories or characteristics. Thus, rather than treating ethnicity as a fixed attribute, it turns more fruitful to treat it as an ongoing accomplishment of local practices (Moerman, 1974). However, in this case, the accomplishment of ethnicities did not consist of safety workers explicitly saying “our main troublemakers are at their Bosnian festivity”, or “this Albanian wedding will be a place for quarrels”, or “all these kids with immigrant parents must stop using fireworks in the streets”; instead, they pointed out indirectly that those events and circumstances are highly relevant, because they facilitated situations or people that were associated with potential disruptions of social order; and consequently, this was something they should include in their safety work. Thus, the practice and object of intelligence operations were discreetly or indirectly clothed in ethnic terms.

There are two possible counter-arguments to our explanations. First, one could say that implicating eth-

nicity in the above sense is insignificant and banal, given the diverse population in Landskrona. To ignore ethnicity might lead to ignoring the specific needs and characteristics of the respective groups. Second, if one could argue that implicit ethnic profiling were as significant as we suggest, what would stop safety workers from explicitly implicating ethnicity to a greater extent? They could, after all, have talked and acted more directly and openly about ethnic groups and differences.

Our data as a whole, however, argue against these objections. It is true that safety workers' practices of implicating ethnicity typically revolved around banal events and circumstances, but this does not necessarily make them irrelevant (cf. Billig, 1995, on banal nationalism). Basically, intelligence gathering could have been shaped according to Swedish festivities or typical meeting points for youths with a Swedish background, or the orientation of the work could have been expressed in non-ethnic terms. Moreover, the safety work as a whole could have been defined and delimited in other ways, including or focusing on typical 'Swedish' events or housing areas. It is noteworthy that safety workers never seemed to talk about a Swedish party in the same ways they talked about Bosnian or Albanian festivities; the Landskrona majority was simply not ethnicized.

To address the second point mentioned above, one argument is that ethnic attitudes could have been expressed more explicitly and dealt with more openly, but the terminology was influenced by the symbolic context provided by the local media and *Sverigedemokraterna*. For instance, in interviews with policemen and other officials connected to the 'Safe Downtown' project, if we asked about immigrants in a more overt way, such as: is it true that 'immigrant kids' often make trouble in the center?, our words were immediately associated with the contemporary, quite outspoken local journalists, which the interviewees referred to and often complained about.

Safety workers, in addition to the people we met in downtown Landskrona, often regretted that immigrants and ethnically defined "gangs" had been identified in the local newspaper; they pointed out that the journalists had exaggerated, dramatized, polarized, and contributed to hostility against immigrants or a racist atmosphere. A series of four articles about immigrant "youth gangs", published in the local *Landskronaposten* in March 2006, particularly caught the attention of many field-members, and those we met during our fieldwork referred to them frequently. For instance, a man called 'Anders' (a common Swedish name) explained why he and others were victimized: 'Because we are Swedes—reverse racism is what it is...' Victims were said to be called 'Swedish bastards' ('svennejävel') in downtown Landskrona, and Swedish victims were said to sometimes believe that 'all immigrants are criminals'.

This environment meant that publicly speaking

about safety work in ethnic terms was associated with a deplorable development in the local media; thus, it was not always possible to talk explicitly about ethnicities without simultaneously referring to and regretting local news reports. In that sense, the symbolic context provided by journalists became an obstacle that barred open references to ethnicities. However, at the same time, this context influenced the entire safety project by providing an account for its directive toward troublesome ethnic minorities. The media also motivated people to discuss these issues and it became a resource in conversations. The participants in the study constantly seemed almost obliged to comment on the local news coverage.

Youth, on the other hand, can speak more openly, but also in a more easy-going way; they talk about 'svennar' and 'blattar' (Swedes and immigrants) as two distinct groups, and they sometimes also use these words as adjectives ("svennigt", "blatte-") when mentioning gatherings and events, telling jokes and anecdotes, describing themselves, etc. This style of talking is not commonplace among safety workers, who treated ethnically-loaded categories more indirectly.

Intelligence gathering could also manifest itself in fairly precise terms, like knowledge of particular individuals. Safety workers were proud to be familiar with the names and faces of individuals. "You recognize the kids", one of the blue jackets said, "and most of them respect us." "Even though you cannot remember all of them", he continued, "you know them 'as figures' in the street", which meant that he was able to identify their faces and behavior.

Blue jackets greet a lot of people, identify them, and chat with them. Sometimes they exchange greetings with a boy waving from a window or a group of kids playing basketball. People in the street recognize them, call for them, say hello, etc. Safety workers' knowledge construction seems dependent on these brief but significant interactions. For long stretches of time, nothing seem to happen during their strolls through the city, and to make use of this time safety workers talk with the adults and youth they met: a librarian, a doorman, a hamburger salesman, a receptionist at the local swimming pool, a group of kids outside a school, or a newsstand employee. They pick up knowledge about youth and 'where the action is' (or will be) in a sort of mix between small talk and work-related talk. In our 'go-alongs', we understood that they saw this personal knowledge as background for their interactions with young men in the street:

We—two 'yellow jackets' and two researchers—are now getting closer to a group of immigrant boys, sitting and standing around a car on a parking lot and along a low railing, not far from a school. You can tell that they see us coming and that the guards see them. One of the guards says to the other one,

in a low voice and without turning his face to him, so that the kids will not notice that he is speaking: 'are there any celebrities?' The other guard responds in a similar fashion: 'No, it's a mix I think...' (fieldnotes)

By asking his colleague in a discreet way, and by using the word 'celebrities', the security guard is underlining both the value of knowing the young men's identities in the street and the value of not being perceived as ignorant. Had he asked more openly and with a normal voice, he would have risked being seen as lacking knowledge.

It took considerable communication for the safety workers to get glimpses of young people's actions and locations. Shop staff often call the blue jackets on their cell phones; security guards call the police and the pub doormen; red jackets call each other during their fieldwork; and all safety workers recognize each other in the street, talk in formal and informal meetings, and exchange information. In all this activity, an interest in ethnic minorities is implicated, because the young people hanging around downtown Landskrona often have immigrant backgrounds, like the boys in the above cited fieldnote. No interest in ethnicity was mentioned in the project's official documents; nevertheless, the more or less unspoken circumstances made ethnicity relevant. Boys with a Swedish background, mostly hanging around other places (for instance, involved in organized sports and leisure activities), were not targeted for policing to the same extent. Even though local officials pointed out that some areas in the relatively affluent suburbs were momentarily troublesome, the safety activities "never reached the same level" as in the city center, one official said. When asked whether this meant that more 'safety work' was directed towards immigrants than other groups, the official said "yes, as long as they are young", because the people present in potentially crime-generating contexts in downtown Landskrona are mainly youths. This topic was also touched upon during our go-alongs:

As we wander through a schoolyard, a blue jacket estimates that the proportional mixture of kids in "their" streets was 80-20; i.e., 80% youth with immigrant backgrounds, 20% with Swedish backgrounds. "Most are immigrants", the blue jacket says (he also has an immigrant background), "but they don't divide themselves internally as clearly as in Malmö (a nearby, bigger city): Albanians in one group, Arabs in another, etc." Immigrant youth "hang out together in Landskrona", he says. As we pass a soccer field outside a school, the blue jacket makes a gesture towards a group of boys playing, with whom we had talked before (more have joined the group now), saying "there's a Kosovo-Albanian and a Pole and an Iraqi; they don't care about it,

like they would in Malmö; here it doesn't matter where you come from; don't you agree, Arta?" Arta, another blue jacket behind us, nods. Later on, they both talk about the fact that they personally know many of these kids' families; for instance, their parents and older siblings. That makes it easier to know whom to call if the boys in the street do not behave. (fieldnotes)

The above excerpt shows a situation where it did not become too sensitive to talk in terms of ethnicities. Tolerance and peaceful interactions were the main points, not disturbances, conflicts, or crime. Nevertheless, it was clear that the knowledge construction within this safety work had focused in on some inhabitants of Landskrona more than others, and that safety workers made use of their own ethnically-based contacts to gather information for their job.

3.2. Subtle Resources in Chatting

Talking with people in the streets serves the dual purposes of constructing knowledge and providing safety. For instance, a quite extensive discussion with a shop assistant about shoplifters or thieves and exchanging words with a moped rider in a crossing is not about surveillance, one of the red jackets told us, but about 'keeping it (the city center) calm'. 'We have no authority', one of the blue jackets said, 'our weapon is to talk'. 'Sure, one might need to call the police sometimes', he added, referring to troublesome young men that had delivered threats, 'but first and foremost, we try to talk them out of it'.

During our fieldwork, it became clear that these talks were aimed at establishing relationships with youths hanging around downtown Landskrona, typically immigrant youths. The fieldnotes above, in which two security guards approached a group of boys with immigrant backgrounds outside a school one night, continues like this:

The boys greet the guards, and the guards get closer and start talking with them. One boy is especially interested, shakes hands with one of the guards, and talks with him for quite a long time. It turns out that he is a former trainee at the youth club, Nova, who knows the guard from that period (the club is situated within the guards' patrol area). Another of the boys also joins the talk and wants to shake hands too; he wants to 'say hello to the guards', he says. He exchanges glances with us, as if to underline that being a guard is a little exciting. Most of the boys, however, remain standing or sitting as they were before, although they take notice of the guards and observe them while talking with each other. (fieldnotes)

Safety workers see this exchange as a preventive measure; to start talking with youths hanging around downtown Landskrona at night, before any trouble emerges. They argue that relationships established in and through these talks may have a moderating effect if a conflict would arise, either that night or on another occasion. Also, they present themselves in a downplayed, quasi-informal manner. They would probably have made much more of a stiff, police-like impression if the guards had passed the boys without a word. The fact that they spend time to talk with the boys indicates that the youths in the street are a central concern in their work.

In this context there is a fine line between small talk and corrective activities. There was no doubt that, no matter how much they talked with guards and other patrollers, the youths did not regard safety workers as equals or vice versa. Safety workers embedded moral reminders and orders into their small talk, for instance by discreetly, in passing, telling a boy sitting on a car to get down. One guard told us about the importance of discretion in these cases, since one does not want the other to lose face in front of friends. Therefore, corrections should be conveyed subtly and in private. This control style goes hand in hand with the behavior of staff at the youth club, Nova; there, staff separate kids that must be corrected from the rest of the group to avoid provocation. The difference is that safety workers do this in the street, without a separate room or other type of 'shield' (Goffman, 1963), which means that the way they talk must be fashioned to form a 'separate' communication.

Ethnicities were sometimes employed in this corrective talk, for example:

We are talking with some blue jackets outside Madde's Café at night when a boy throws a bike in the street; it is done as a protest or provocation, it seems, in response to something another youngster close to him must have said or done. Maybe they are going to start a fight? A lot of people around us look at him, as if expecting the boy to start doing worse things. One of the blue jackets goes over and talks with him. After a while, the boy takes his bike and disappears. The blue jacket returns and says that he 'threatened' to speak with the boy's dad about the scene he was making here, if he did not stop. He knows who the boy was and his father. The blue jacket adds that they are not supposed to 'threaten to tell parents', but, when they can (when they are able to identify the boys in question), they typically at least mention the parents, because it often works. The youths do not want their parents to know what they are up to. We later learn that the blue jacket and the boy that threw the bike had the same (non-Swedish) ethnic background, and that the corrective speech was spoken in their language. (fieldnotes)

Here, the safety workers' knowledge of the youth and their use of talk as a social control mechanism are interconnected. The blue jacket saw the boy throwing his bike as the potential beginning of an escalating argument that might lead to a fight with someone nearby, and he employed his knowledge about the youth by talking to him on the spot. The episode took place in front of an audience, but the boy did not lose face. The blue jacket did not shout at the boy, which would tempt the boy to shout back or take action; instead, he got close to the boy and reminded him discreetly (looking him in the eyes) that he knew his father. The fact that we were told about this method later did not interfere with its application; rather, the account seemed to be embedded into the practice. The blue jacket did not disclose to the boy in question, or to anyone in the street, that he 'threatened to tell the parents'; he only told us.

Ethnomethodology suggests that the ethnographer pays attention to the way that a 'natural fact' is interactionally produced and sustained (Pollner & Emerson, 2001, 2010, p. 125). Therefore, we ask ourselves how ethnicity, as a 'natural fact', is taken for granted, identified with, and shared between the blue jacket and the boy in question, and how this is done without drawing too much attention in the public place. First, we should note that the above episode demonstrates why the safety work organizers in Landskrona emphasize the importance of employing patrollers that comprised a non-Swedish, ethnic mixture. Given the ethnic divisions in the city center, the probability that a blue jacket would personally know a potentially troublesome boy in the street (and being able to deliver corrections without causing him to lose face) turns out to be much higher when they shared an ethnic identification. People tend to know each other within ethnic categories in the small city of Landskrona. This policing-facilitating circumstance seems to be seen as an advantage; the ethnic minorities in downtown Landskrona are easier to control with the help of enrolled representatives of (some of) these minorities. However, we could also see it from another viewpoint; when the controlling staff is filled with such representatives, the youth that belongs to these ethnic minorities probably receives increased policing. For instance, a blue jacket praised a colleague for being an excellent safety worker, because he "knows the languages", "knows the immigrant mentality", and therefore, he could "speak with the parents" (cf. Löfstrand, 2013, p. 237); the relevant parents were quickly and implicitly defined as adults with immigrant backgrounds, and the safety worker's similar background was recognized as preventive capital. Thus, ethnic identities and ethnically defined interests were crafted in and through policing practices, because the situated safety work included a continuous accomplishment of ethnicity. And belonging to an ethnic minority in the first place came to mean that you were targeted for plural policing.

Second, these inbuilt conditions for and execution

of inter-ethnic control were subtle and implicit. The ethnic mix among patrollers was not described in terms of more efficient control, but in terms of representation, communication, and identification (e.g., a brochure stated “they know many languages, so they can reach many”). The youth in downtown Landskrona should not feel that safety workers were ‘outsiders’. Cases like the one above, where safety is produced with the help of shared ethnicity, are not described in official documents or presentations; therefore, “doing” ethnicity remains quite silent. Also the fact that schools in the central-eastern part of the city are focused more on safety work than the other schools (as officials confirmed) implicates certain ethnicities, because everybody knows that those schools have relatively more students of ethnic minority backgrounds.

3.3. Subtle Concerns in Patrolling and Youth Activation

Apart from knowledge construction and talks, visibility through expressive patrolling is an established method among the safety workers. By merely displaying themselves in downtown Landskrona, safety workers are convinced that they sustain other people’s composure and calmness. ‘Our point is to show that we are there’, one of the blue jackets said, ‘that ensures that potentially troublesome youth do not dare to do anything.’

Visibility is evident in several ways. The blue jackets wear special blue clothes that are recognized by people in Landskrona, and the security guards are similarly easy to identify (first they wore yellow jackets, later, they wore dark blue uniforms). The social service fieldworkers wear red jackets, and they are also quite well known, although not as well-known as the blue jackets. The blue jackets drive a quite conspicuous car, with the text ‘Blue Jackets—For Your Safety’ printed on the sides, and they sometimes receive a lot of publicity in the local press. Above all, safety workers patrol almost all the time; anyone doing errands in the city center would sooner or later come across them. The fact that safety work was mainly associated with patrolling was firmly established, to the extent that youth in Landskrona sometimes made fun of it:

We walk towards *Grenden*, a restaurant, and we pass a couple of boys and girls standing in a little parking lot along the street. They see the guards approaching, and one says, in a joking manner, ‘couldn’t we swap jobs?’ Then he pretends to be a guard. He straightens himself up, takes a few steps in a slow pace, and pushes his chest out. Another guy joins in; he comes up on bike, quite close to us, and says the same thing, ‘couldn’t we swap jobs?’ One of the guards starts joking too, and offers the boy on the bike his badge, normally fastened with Velcro on the guards’ shirts, but the boy said ‘no thanks’. (fieldnotes)

When these kids made fun of the guards (and the guards made fun of themselves), they imitated the most emblematic features of the guards: their style of walking and their badges. Visibility is central in defining this kind of safety work; to wear a badge and to patrol in a particular style are clear ways to display oneself in urban areas.³

As we have already shown, it would be a simplification to argue that people of one ethnicity tried to control those of another: the fact that the blue jackets consisted of an ethnic mixture complicates that picture. However, it would not be a simplification to argue that the objects of control consist mainly of young men with immigrant backgrounds, because these inhabitants and city users are very prevalent in the area being watched. In our conversations with youth of various ethnic identities, it was also evident that other young people ‘drove around’ or ‘took a walk’ to check things out, particularly at nights and on weekends. For example, two ninth-graders said ‘Our friends (or siblings) drive us around to check things out’, ‘we look around to see what’s up’, and ‘nobody wants to miss anything’. This was part of the young people’s established activities: to move around downtown Landskrona without any particular mission, except to gather information about people’s behavior and find out ‘where the action is’. This activity provides safety in numbers and demonstrates adolescent independence (McAra & McVie, 2005, p. 6). Against this background, one could say that safety workers merely formalize and strengthen a way to use the urban area that already exists among city youth and, not least, immigrant youth.

Thus, ethnicity was implicated spatially. The acts of living and walking around in the designated area signified, to patrolling safety workers, that a person belongs to a category that deeply concerns safety workers. Moreover, because this area in Landskrona is not considered completely “Swedish” (when it came to housing), all non-Swedish ethnicities are lumped together and problematized. Indirectly, an encounter with safety workers meant that a non-Swedish ethnicity was interactionally underlined and loaded with potential

³ During our ‘go-alongs’, we noticed that this ‘visibility work’ could be quite exhausting. After a couple of hours of displaying themselves as safety producers, the patrollers tended to withdraw for a while, for instance, to a café or a bench, to relax. However, any withdrawal from patrol was a bit controversial, because this visibility served both to create conditions for executing control and to turn safety workers into objects of control. For instance, people might complain (in letters to the press or when engaging in small talk) that blue jackets too often drove their car instead of walking; in response, blue jackets sighed over the fact that people claimed they should be on the move all the time, not resting for a single moment.

crime-and/or-victim identities. This observation does not refute the argument that those encounters could be quite welcome, given the crime rate within the 'critical area'; nevertheless, a particular type of social production was carried out.

In addition to patrolling as a safety-producing method, we found youth motivation projects. Thus, alongside the project 'A Safe Downtown', there were several examples of municipal efforts to occupy the Landskrona youth. For example, the 'Open Square' in nearby Häljarp, the youth club Nova, and 'Open Dammhag' were all events that offered a range of leisure activities, sports, games, competitions, cultural events, etc. aimed to attract teenagers and stimulate them to create new social ties. The link between non-Swedish youth with 'nothing to do' and criminality or gang activities were also recurrent themes in newspaper articles, like the article on the basketball club called 'Bosna basket'.⁴

Safety workers sometimes apply this approach. As they construct knowledge about youth, talk to them, correct them, and demonstrate their downtown presence, they also encourage certain activities. They might, for instance, try to encourage boys and girls to visit a youth club by referring to what is happening there right now, or what is going to happen quite soon; they might also promote playing football or other sports by becoming participants. When passing a football game involving some immigrant boys outside a school, a blue jacket that shared ethnicity with some of the players may playfully throw himself into the game, shout some cheers, and pass the ball to some other player; then, he returns to his normal duties. In a similar manner, the security guards might joke or dance a few steps in the street with an intensely chatting pub guest, as if to strengthen a morally preferred activity (dancing, partying), and deflect interpersonal conflicts.

The ideal outcome seems to be to redirect potentially troublesome youth, not only by controlling behavior, but by sculpting it. Fights or disputes could be exchanged for more constructive (and conventional) activities, such as sports, games, music, dance etc. The annual report of the municipal Unit for Preventive Work stated that 'problems and restlessness in pedestrian areas' have been responded to by 'regular meetings [with youth] at the youth club, Nova' and by 'establishing re-

⁴ The preamble to this article (Landskronaposten 2006-03-14) read 'What is being done about juvenile crime in Landskrona?' One part of a solution to juvenile crime, discussed in the article, was formulated in terms of 'integration'. One might expect that integration would concern both immigrants and Swedes, but the article's focus was on immigrant boys. The journalist wrote, more or less implicitly, about keeping immigrant kids off the street. 'Bosna basket' seemed to provide an example of how this could be done; i.e., immigrant kids are kept out of trouble by playing basketball.

lations' with youth. Thus, the unit was said to have promoted 'activities other than vandalizing or destroying' (*Versamhetsberättelse, Enheten för förebyggande arbete*, 2006, p. 2, our translation).

The formal title for blue jackets is somewhat telling in this respect; in employment documents they are not called crime preventers, but 'recreation assistants'. This title reflects a distinct meaning of their work and work area. Metaphorically, downtown Landskrona becomes a sort of open youth recreation center, and the blue jackets its staff. Thus, their roles of redirecting behavior and motivating youth, rather than solely preventing crime and producing 'safety', do not seem out of place.

Nevertheless, among the ethnically-mixed youth we met, the lack of activities sometimes seems to be significant. Landskrona had become 'so boring', some ninth-graders told us, and the youth club Nova was not appreciated by all. Two minor shopping malls were empty; their shops were considered dull. The blue jackets complained about the same things. Our patrols in downtown Landskrona could inspire gloomy reflections on empty stores and the lack of local investments. Despite all the municipal projects, there remained an enduring flavor of lifelessness. An official told us that many Swedish middle class youngsters in the more affluent suburbs were engaged in organizations for sports, culture, or other leisure activities; but youth in the central-eastern part of the city were more freely "wandering around in the center". This more or less implicit ethnic division explained the motivation efforts.

In a survey of 70 pupils, ages 17 and 18, at *Gullstrandsskolan*, around 60% said that they lacked leisure activity centers, like youth recreation centers, cafés, and discos in Landskrona, and only 16% said that they were able to influence their own leisure time (Said et al., 2006). In our interviews, the youth talked a lot about the need for cultural activities in downtown Landskrona (not just sports, but music and other performances); however, social workers said that those types of activities were not always popular among older Swedes, and therefore, they were not always carried out; thus, the boys started making trouble instead.

Consequently, it was a specific version of 'activity' that the safety workers wanted; they did not want any activity for youth (e.g., fighting, disturbing the peace, or vandalizing are also activities), but 'motivated' activity (e.g., dancing, playing sports, watching performances, etc., that is motivated in conventional terms). When we met adults in Landskrona that were afraid of being in the city center at night, they associated their emotions with a particular image: an 'empty' center; that is, empty, apart from boys hanging around in 'gangs'. Between the lines, and with the contemporary media coverage in mind, they seemed to refer to youth with immigrant backgrounds that had nothing conventional or morally legitimate to do.

4. Conclusion

In this article, we analyzed a case of community safety work and its implementation in Landskrona, a small town in southern Sweden, where municipal officials launched a crime prevention project. The project did not formally address ethnic minorities but focused on a 'critical area' in the city center. However, this spatially demarcated design provided a crucial condition for the continuous reproduction of ethnicities in "soft" policing. Safety workers were tied to a particular urban zone with a large proportion of individuals that had immigrant backgrounds. Subtle ethnic concerns and ethnic resources were embedded in their activities, including intelligence gathering, the use of 'talks' in the streets, patrolling, and motivations, through which they became more or less silently orientated to local minorities. Safety workers searched downtown Landskrona for 'where the action is' (Goffman, 1967, p. 149; Peterson, 2008, pp. 114-115) but they also saw the entire downtown as a place of 'action'. This spatially-based effort aimed to control an area that contains a particularly large number of immigrant families, who reside there and use the streets (42% have a 'foreign background'). The control effort reinforced an image of norm violation as typically 'un-Swedish'.

Generally, plural policing constitutes an altered environment for maintaining order and security. When a network of providers replaces a single provider, it seems logical that concepts of regulation and accountability must change, although it is far from clear how (Loader, 2000). An important aspect of the scientific interest in plural policing appears to be an aspiration to gain an overall picture of this new landscape of control, to be able to understand and evaluate it. Before Loader (2000, p. 323) tries to 'tease out' implications for the democratic legitimacy of plural policing, he begins by documenting 'the network of providers that constitute the policing field locally, nationally, and transnationally.' We found an equivalent aspiration in the municipal organizer, who wished to get an overall picture of all the safety efforts in Landskrona. She and her colleagues sometimes seemed a bit confused by the same fragmentation and diversification that scholars currently wrestle with.

Our point is that there *was* a device in the 'A Safe Downtown' project and its associated activities that organized all safety workers' efforts, namely the downtown area and its ethnic implications. In interviews and in small talk with the organizer, we found no particular ideological or methodological bias, but instead there was a broad interest in any concrete crime preventive strategy that might work. If we consider Landskrona's safety work as a form of power without a center, or a governmentality, we might say that the fear of crime and crime-related conduct instigated by Landskrona's youth was regarded as a technical matter—a matter of

creating a 'safe downtown'—that could become a 'governmental' directive (Rose & Miller, 2008, p. 15). The unquestionable axiom was the troublesome city center; all concern revolved around this 'critical area'. As we have shown, this axiom implied ethnicities, or more specifically, it implied that ethnic minorities were the target of safety work, and simultaneously a resource for carrying it out. Without explicitly stating it, this means that the project both responded to and reflected the picture depicted by local journalists of Landskrona's crime and security problems. To seek to govern is to subscribe to a specific 'problematizing activity', Rose and Miller (2008, p. 61) argues; here, we may say that it is a matter of negotiating such an activity.

Many studies of stigmatized neighborhoods or urban marginality are dressed in much more dramatic terms than our study. However, there are certainly similarities; for example, Landskrona could be seen as a "depressed" district in southern Sweden (relative to nearby Helsingborg, Lund, and Malmö), similar to the description that Wacquant (2008, 2013, p. 4) gives of La Courneuve outside Paris. Also in Landskrona there seem to be "a feeling of insecurity rooted in the ecology and demography of the neighborhood and fuelled by petty youth delinquency" (Wacquant, 2008, 2013, p. 205). Nevertheless, the policing activity in Landskrona is not identical to the policing of "symbolically spoiled zones" or a former "dumping ground" for the lower fractions of the working class (Wacquant, 2008, 2013, pp. 197, 202). The targets of the safety work in Landskrona are not as marginal, the streets are not as shabby, the inhabitants' future prospects are not as limited as those described by Wacquant; his terminology is too radical to apply to Landskrona. Rather, we argue that ethnicizations of a policing project and its urban space can be found in subtle, implicit forms within more affluent settings that extend beyond the *banlieus* of Paris or the "hyper-ghettos" of the U.S. This point is demonstrated by our ethnographic data and our eye for the possibility that ethnicities may come to constitute both the target of policing and a resource for the policing process. In any setting that defines safety and fear of crime in spatial or territorial terms, ethnicities may be implicated along these lines, given that the urban space continues to be ethnically segregated and that crime prevention continues to be situationally conceived. Since both these trends are salient in today's society, the results of our study of safety work with an ethnic slant are probably transferrable to many settings.

In future studies, it would be interesting to investigate further whether and how other spatially-defined versions of plural policing might include diversified efforts that "do" ethnicities, particularly because the so-called 'situational' crime prevention methods have become much more popular than 'social' methods (e.g., improving schools and other socializing institutions,

Sahlin, 2000). If policing organizers understand crime spatially and locally, and if ethnic segregation continues to characterize housing patterns, we might expect to see more examples of security devices that are implicitly underpinned by ethnic concerns and resources. 'Doing' ethnicity may turn into an implicit organizing device, despite an otherwise diverse, multi-centered, or sporadic organization, as if it knitting together a broad set of technologies within an otherwise relatively mixed, varied effort to 'conduct conduct', or establish a 'governmentality' (Rose & Miller, 2008). Future studies could also investigate how safety work might be organized in other ways, for instance translocally, institutionally, or with alternative demarcations, which may, perhaps, implicitly or explicitly undo ethnicity.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Complaints as Opportunity for Change in Encounters between Youths and Police Officers

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Abstract

The presence of distrust in the police and how they perform their work among ethnic minority youths in socially underprivileged areas is well established. Experiences of, or beliefs about, unfair treatment from the police can be viewed both as an indicator and a consequence of exclusion. It is well-known that negative experiences of the police are more significant for trust in the police and their legitimacy than positive ones, with some even suggesting that positive experiences do not matter at all. However, from a procedural justice perspective it has been suggested that *some* positive experience do matter, particularly if the police are considered to perform their work in line with procedural fairness. On the basis of a participant observation study, this article discusses situations in which youths express complaints about the police in different ways. In response to such situations, the police can act in both exclusionary and inclusive ways. It is argued that youths' complaints can be used as an opportunity for change if the police treat the youths concerned with fairness and in inclusive rather than exclusionary ways.

Keywords

ethnic minorities; police; procedural justice; youths

Issue

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1. Introduction

The work of policing is powerfully shaped by the dimensions of gender and geography. This means, amongst other things, that policing often takes the form of exercising controls in relation to young men from ethnic minorities in areas with social problems (Bowling & Weber, 2011; Brunson, 2007). One consequence of this is an increased level of distrust in the police in these areas, perhaps primarily on the part of young men from ethnic minorities (Brunson & Miller, 2006; Brunson, 2007). Research on what influences perceptions of the police has shown that the issue is a complex one, but having negative experiences of the police oneself, or hearing about others' negative experiences, have shown themselves to be important fac-

tors (Brunson, 2007; Brunson & Miller 2006; Skogan, 2012), as have perceptions of ethnic discrimination on the part of the police (Brunson & Miller, 2006; Brunson, 2007; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002) and of discrimination in society at large (Brunson & Miller, 2006; Sharp & Atherton, 2007; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002). Skogan (2012) found that negative behavior from police officers is strongly related to distrust in the police, whereas positive behavior is much less associated with a corresponding trust in or positive opinion of the police. However, this view has been contradicted by research focused on a procedural justice perspective, which has found that when the behavior of police officers follows the demands of procedural fairness, this is associated with improving opinions of the police (Murphy & Chorney, 2012; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Brad-

ford, Jackson, & Stanko, 2009; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2014; Bradford, 2014).

Much of the research that has been conducted in this area is either quantitative, with the limitations of quantitative research regarding a more nuanced understanding of the meaning of perceptions and experiences, or based solely on interviews (Brunson, 2007). This article contributes by using data from interactions between police officers and youths. The purpose of the article is to analyse situations where youths complain about police treatment, either in the situation itself or in general. The article analyses both the youths' reactions and the police officers' responses to these reactions. It contributes to the procedural justice perspective by focusing on processes within encounters and on the importance of non-verbal interaction, both of which are rare within the field.

2. Previous Research

Existing research on the relationship between police officers and ethnic minorities is extensive. Studies of discrimination have focused both on attitudes and on disproportionalities in the focus police activity, showing that ethnic minorities are subject to disproportionately high levels of police attention (Brunson & Miller, 2006; Chan, 1997; Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003; Quinton, 2013; Reiner, 2000; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002; Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2013). It is first and foremost young males from ethnic minorities who are subject to discrimination on the part of the police (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998; Reitzel & Piquero, 2006). This study looks beyond ethnic discrimination per se, and focuses on interactions between youths and police officers in which the youths express complaints about the police.¹ However, issues of discrimination may still be central to these experiences, since the youths in the study are mostly from areas where opinions about the police are often coloured by experiences and feelings of exposure to unfair treatment due to e.g. the youths' ethnicity and the area in which they live (Hallin et al., 2010; Sernhede, 2007; Bowling & Weber, 2011).

Studies examining ethnic minorities' perceptions of the police have often focused on adults, but there are some exceptions, such as Hurst, Frank, and Browning (2000), Brunson and Miller (2006), Carr, Napolitano, and Keating (2007), Dirix, Gelders, and Parmentier (2012), and Sharp and Atherton (2007). Findings suggest that the police enjoy less legitimacy among ethnic minority youths than among other categories. An exception to this is the study by Carr et al. (2007) which found substantial similarities among the youths who were interviewed, irrespective of their backgrounds.

¹ Either to the police themselves or, sometimes, to me in my role as a field researcher.

However, all of the youths included in the current study came from socially disadvantaged areas, which may be a reason for the similarities, since dissatisfaction with the police is also correlated with neighbourhood characteristics (Brunson, 2007, p. 74).

Carr et al. (2007) note that despite the fact that many of the youths whom they interviewed harboured negative perceptions about the police, they nonetheless stated at a general level that the police had a very important role to fill in relation to the control of crime. Carr et al. emphasise that there is a substantial potential for cooperation between youths and the police, provided that the youths in question perceive the police as professional, dedicated and honest (see also Bradford, 2014). This is similar to other studies, where feelings of not being met with respect are identified as one of the most important reasons for negative opinions of the police (Brunson & Miller, 2006; Sharp & Atherton, 2007; Wahlström, 2008).

One perspective that highlights the importance of the way people are treated by the authorities, in this case the police, is the procedural justice perspective (Bradford et al., 2009; Bradford, 2014; Hough et al., 2010; Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Sargeant et al., 2014), and this will therefore guide my analysis.

The procedural justice model focuses on the legitimacy of legal authorities and on whether the public are willing to cooperate with them. Trust in the police is important in relation to both of these issues. Cooperation is not, as the concept might suggest, about doing what you are told by the police, but is rather about whether you would call the police to report a crime, help the police to find a suspect or provide them with information about a crime, or be willing to assist the police if asked (Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). The police are highly dependent on the public in these matters in relation to their ability to conduct their work. The hypothesis, which has found support in several studies, is that "public perceptions of the *fairness* of the justice system [...] are more significant in shaping its legitimacy than perceptions that it is *effective*" (Hough et al., 2010, p. 205). An important distinction is made between justice based on *process* or *outcome*, with the process being more important than the outcome; that is, being given fair and respectful treatment that 'follow the rules' (the quality of treatment) seems to be more important for public opinions about the legitimacy of the police (whether the *policed* view the *police* as legitimate) than the outcome of the police's work.²

² This finding runs contrary to the central assumptions of a more 'crime control'- oriented perspective, where ideas of people as rational-economic calculators have led to a focus on the deterrent threat and the extension of enforcement strategies (Hough et al., 2010).

The procedural justice model has found support in empirical studies (e.g. Bradford et al., 2009; Bradford, 2014; Hough et al., 2010; Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Sargeant et al., 2014). However, Murphy and Cherney (2012) found that procedural justice actually had a *counterproductive* effect on the willingness to cooperate with the police among ethnic minorities who questioned the legitimacy of the law. To explain this, Murphy and Cherney discuss *social distancing* in relation to authorities, arguing that people who feel distant are more likely to display resistance towards authorities, and at the extreme level to disengage themselves from interaction with authorities. Murphy and Cherney (2012, p. 197) note, however, that this does *not* imply that the police should use harsher methods in order to achieve cooperation. Rather, the police have to acknowledge situations that may be experienced as exclusionary and unfair from the perspective of the people living in the area they work in, since procedural justice may be counterproductive partly because of a distrust towards the motives of the police resulting from past experiences and encounters.

Hirschman (1970) describes the concepts of “exit” and “voice” as two different strategies for handling dissatisfaction. As the word implies, “exit” is about leaving when you are not satisfied, while the strategy “voice” is instead about staying but trying to produce change from within (for example an organization). Although his discussion proceeds from an economic point of departure (and not at all from a procedural justice perspective) Hirschman (1970), along with others, has employed the exit and voice concepts in relation to many different situations (Agevall & Olofsson, 2008). In this study, the youths’ reactions to dissatisfaction may be seen as exit or voice strategies. These strategies may be important for how the interactions develop and, by extension, also for the experience of procedural (un)fairness.

Although the procedural justice perspective primarily focuses on the public’s compliance with the law and cooperation with the police (Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006) police legitimacy is a central factor in relation to these outcomes. I would therefore argue that in relation to issues involving tense relations between those living in marginalized areas and the police who work in such areas, it is essential to focus attention on the importance of fairness and the lack of fairness for views of police legitimacy. My analysis will therefore proceed from the procedural justice perspective and look at what the youths’ dissatisfaction is about in relation to these issues (e.g. is it about fairness or outcome?) and at how the police respond to this. Since the model also implies that it is the process that is important, and since the data are well suited to looking at processes, I will also analyze how the encounters evolve in relation to the police’s responses to the youths’ complaints.

3. The Study

Community policing and what has been labelled *reassurance policing* have both constituted ways of attempting to deal with problems of police legitimacy in socially disadvantaged areas (Adams, Roth, & Arcury, 2002; Craig, Marnoch, & Topping, 2010; Hawdon, Ryan, & Griffin, 2003; Myhill & Quinton, 2012; Sharp & Atherton, 2007; Peterson, 2010; Wycoff & Skogan, 1998). The fundamental elements of the policing tactic involved are visibility, accessibility and familiarity. In order to improve relations between the police and residents of socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods, and thus to increase police legitimacy, so-called *local police offices* have been established in Stockholm. The use of this approach differs somewhat from *reassurance policing* but the basic ideas are the same (Peterson, 2010). One of the principal tasks of the police offices is to establish contacts with youths in the area surrounding the respective offices. This article is based on a study in which the work of such police offices has been followed on a day-to-day basis, with a special focus on the work directed at youths.

The study material is comprised of participant observations. The officers have been followed throughout their shifts. Two different police districts in the county of Stockholm have been included in the study, and eight different police offices. I have participated in a total of 52 work-shifts, totalling 450 hours. I have accompanied the officers both during the day and the evening, but the vast majority of the shifts were in the evening and stretched into the night (until midnight or a few hours after midnight). The fieldwork was conducted during the spring and early summer of 2009 in one police district and during the spring and early summer of 2010 in the other. On most of the shifts in which I participated, I accompanied uniformed police officers, but I did on occasion accompany plain-clothes officers.

There are both similarities and differences between the areas covered by the police offices. By comparison with the population of Stockholm in general, a relatively large number of the residents of these areas are unemployed and have low average incomes, although this varies somewhat from one area to another. There are also differences in the areas’ ethnic composition. There are both areas with a large proportion of residents with a foreign (primarily non-European) background, and areas with a relatively large proportion of residents who do not have this kind of background. Common to the majority of the areas are that they have relatively extensive crime-related problems, and that the relations between the residents and police who work there are characterised by some level of tension, which is also one of the reasons that police offices have been established in these areas. In this respect too, however, there are fairly substantial variations between the different areas. Some of the areas are among those re-

garded as the most problematic in the Stockholm region. At the same time, it should be noted that the level of problems in these areas is substantially lower than that found in corresponding areas in the USA, for example.

In the context of ethnographic studies, the question of the researcher's effect on those who are being studied is an important one. Are these individuals presenting a facade or is the researcher able to observe how they would be behaving even if they were not being studied? It is likely that the presence of a researcher will influence what happens in the field (Holmberg, 2003; Sollund, 2007; Loftus, 2009). How much, and in what ways, will depend on a number of factors. When it comes to what police officers themselves choose to show or conceal, the issue of police behaviours that may cause problems for the police service itself is an important one. Experience from previous studies of the police shows that police officers have manifested such behaviours in the presence of researchers (Granér, 2004; Holmberg, 2003; Loftus, 2009; Sollund, 2007), but that it is likely that they conceal a great deal. It is therefore reasonable to assume that what I have been able to witness constitutes what might be termed "the most benevolent case scenario" on the part of the police. Having said this, it is important to remember that developing a certain degree of intimacy with the group under study is a precondition for successful ethnographic fieldwork. This means that an approach which involved endeavouring to avoid having any influence and to stay completely out of the way might, paradoxically, also result in worse data, i.e. in observations that provide less information about the situations of interest and the work of the police (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011; Holmberg, 2003; Sollund, 2006).

Another important issue, both for the possibility of conducting the study and for the quality of the data, is that of obtaining access to the field. Several police researchers have described mistrust on the part of the police and initiation rituals that the researcher has to go through in order to be accepted (Loftus, 2009; Holmberg, 2003; Finstad, 2000). With the exception of having been refused permission to conduct the research in certain of the police districts in Stockholm, the treatment I received from the police was far from antagonistic. The management were interested in the study and thought the research topic was important, as did the rank and file officers whom I followed. In obtaining access from the police management, I was allowed to freely select which police groups to follow, which areas to be in and which work shifts I wanted to attend. Nor was I "tested" prior to being accepted in any obvious way, at least as far as I could observe. This does not of course mean that the police officers were not aware of my presence and that they did not adjust their behaviour as a result, nor that I was not tested by them. I am quite sure that if I had failed to obtain the

officers' approval, this would have influenced my possibilities for conducting the study.

All of the names used in the article have been invented and have been chosen to signify the sex and visible minority background (or not) of the individuals concerned (Mattsson, 2005), since these factors are assumed to have significance both for the form taken by the interactions and for how they should be interpreted. The names of police officers begin with P and the youths' with other letters. The use of a name signifying that an individual appears to belong to an ethnic minority does *not* however mean that the individual was born outside Sweden. It is likely that the majority of the youths and police I have interacted with were born in Sweden. *Nor should* the names employed be associated with any particular part of the world or religious background.

In this article I focus on encounters in which youths confronted police officers and expressed their dissatisfaction with the latter's work, and situations in which youths have told me about such things. However, this does not include encounters in which someone is more or less unwilling about being subject to a police control, unless this was also accompanied by some form of accusation of wrongdoing or criticism of the police. These situations are excluded since such unwillingness is more about a wish to avoid control, rather than being a criticism of the police. During the time I spent following the police, just over 40 situations occurred during the 52 work-shifts in which youths expressed dissatisfaction with the police and their work in this way. These are the situations in focus here, but they are analyzed against the backdrop of the context of encounters between youths and police officers as a whole.

4. "Even When We Haven't Done Anything!" Youth Dissatisfaction with the Police

In most of the situations, the youths discuss their dissatisfaction with the police officers directly, but in some cases they have just told me about it when we have had the possibility to speak on our own. It is boys or young men that express complaints to the police in almost all of the situations. Based on the results of earlier research, this dominance of boys is not surprising. However, the almost *complete* dominance of boys is perhaps at least a little remarkable. On some of the occasions, it has not been possible (for me) to understand what the youths' dissatisfaction is about. It may be that the interaction was simply too brief, providing almost no information other than the manifestation of dissatisfaction, or that the youth simply pronounced that he did not like the police and then did not want to say any more when the police officers asked why. "I just don't, it's as simple as that" as one of them said. In some of the cases the youths merely express uneasiness at the

police presence, not for any special reason, but rather because you never know what might happen if the police are present; they might just search you or check you out even if there is no reason for doing so, according to the youths. Such declarations suggest distrust in the police, even if no clear reason for this was expressed. Some of the situations involved complaints about the outcome of the police's work, e.g. that the police in general are incompetent, or more general accusations about the police just "harassing" people or conducting unnecessary controls. The reason for my not interpreting these last two types of situations as constituting unfair treatment is that there was no implication that this had been done in a selective way or to the youths themselves.

However, the situations described so far are exceptions, since almost three quarters of the encounters focused on some form of unfair treatment—of the youths themselves, people they know, or as a result of some more general group membership, such as accusations of the police being racist but not in relation to a specific person. From a procedural justice perspective, this focus is not surprising, and these also constitute the most important accusations for the police to deal with if they want to change others' opinions of them in a more positive direction. The remainder of this article will therefore concentrate on these situations.

5. Experiences of Unfair Treatment and the Police Officers Responses

A more general pronounced dissatisfaction in some of the areas is that the youths feel that the police focus particular, and too much, attention on their specific group of friends in relation to other youths in the area. This feeling is sometimes linked to the youths' ethnic minority background. One of the boys who told me about this, did so when we talked with each other alone and expressed it the following way.

Ali says, 'I don't like the police. We don't like the police here.' Tove: 'Ok, why is that?' Ali answers, 'No, but they are no good', and continues, 'But actually, it is like this,' and smiles, 'If you want their help, then you like them. So it is a bit of double standard,' laughing. Ali: 'If you understand?' I answer that I understand and smile back at him. Ali continues, 'But my dad would say that if you just behave lawfully, then you don't have any problems with the police. But it isn't as simple as that.' I ask him what he thinks about that, and what he thinks is problematic. Ali answers, 'We think that even when we haven't done anything, like up there, when I passed, then they started to ask me, just because I passed,' [talking about an earlier situation at which I was present]. Tove: 'Ok so you feel that they keep an eye on you, or?' Ali: 'Yes we do. It's a

group here [the local police officers]; they have formed an opinion about certain of us, so to speak, about some of us.' (Field notes)

His feeling that his group of friends received special attention from the police was in my opinion well-founded, since the police spoke about this group as one that they paid special attention to, and they also did so during my observations. All of the boys in the group had visible minority background as far as I could tell. This was of course not described by the police officers as constituting unfair treatment, but rather as strategic police work, which might motivate paying special attention to certain groups (Holmberg, 2003). Still, whatever the reasons, well-founded or not, this created a feeling of unfair treatment, at least for Ali. He also expressed this frustration directly to the police officers on a number of occasions by questioning why they were asking him, and not the others who were present, about a crime and a public order disturbance that had occurred during my observations. In one of these situations, the police officer simply motivated his actions, in a quite authoritarian and condescending manner, by saying that he knew Ali by name. On one of the other occasions, the police officer answered by asking Ali a rhetorical question: "But Ali, what is my job?" in a somewhat annoyed tone of voice. In the first situation, Ali responded with irritation, telling the police officer that he *unfortunately* (in an ironic tone of voice) wasn't the one who had thrown a stone. In the latter case he simply answered, "Yeah, yeah," and then let it go. It is clear that the police in these encounters do not work in line with ideas of procedural justice, since they, for example, do not take the time to explain why they are doing things the way they are. Further, the non-verbal communication between the parties involved was of significance for these situations, and served to emphasize the antagonism between Ali and the police officers.

Youths also questioned why they personally were given so much attention, and expressed feelings of unfairness in relation to this. Similarly, some of the youths also remarked on threatening behavior on the part of police officers, and on how police officers joked about the possibility of misusing their powers against the youths in question. There were also different types of accusations about the police working in a racist manner, or being racists. I won't describe these situations here since I have written about them elsewhere (Pettersson, 2013).³ But even though such situations were relatively unusual, allegations of this kind are serious and may be of substantial importance for feelings of unfair treatment.

³ Although such situations naturally constitute part of the analysis, I have chosen to present other examples here since these have already been described elsewhere.

One situation that can illustrate several of the issues of unfair treatment that the youths confronted the police with in many encounters took place in a shopping mall. Since the situation is eventful, and also illustrates what some of the processes that take place in these encounters can look like, I will describe it quite thoroughly. The police officers had spent quite some time conducting a control focused on a migration case in a store. During the control, a group of boys had been banging on the windows and making a lot of noise outside. The police officers tell me that these are some of the youths in the area that they have an ongoing conflict with. I ask Pia what she thinks will happen when they come out and meet them (we have to pass the boys on the way to the police car). Pia smiles and says that they will probably shout words like 'police cunt' and 'police whore' after them, but will wait until after the police officers have passed so that they will not know who is shouting. When we enter the shopping mall, the boys are there, standing in small clusters. Paulinho and Pia stop a short distance from the youths and immediately someone quietly says something like 'police cunt'. The police officers (there were four officers present on this occasion) decide to talk to the youths. I listen to the conversation between Pia and Mahmoud, a 16–17 year old boy with visible minority background.

Pia starts talking about what someone in the group was shouting and also that they used to shout 'police whores', 'police cunts' and 'pigs' after them. Mahmoud argues that they [the youths] only want to be left alone. He returns to this several times. They are harassed by the police, he says. They want to be in the shopping mall but are not allowed to by the police. Pia argues that they are allowed to be there, as long as they don't do anything wrong. Pia also says that of course they should be left alone as long as they aren't doing anything. But when they do, like when they shout 'police cunt' and such, they aren't left alone. Mahmoud returns several times to a situation that had occurred two days previously, when he was turned away from the shopping mall by the police, specifically because he wasn't allowed to be there, not because of something he had done. (Field note)

Mahmoud talks quickly and agitatedly with a loud voice and the words gush out of his mouth. Pia talks more slowly and appears less agitated. Mahmoud expresses the feeling that the police harass the youths, and that this is not related to the actions of the youths themselves. It is clear that Mahmoud feels that he and his friends are treated unfairly by the police officers. But I also sense feelings of limited autonomy. According to Mahmoud, the youths are not responsible for what happens and it does not matter what they do, the po-

lice will still turn them out of the shopping mall. Instead of discussing Mahmoud's accusations, Pia mostly focuses on what has just happened, i.e. calling the police ugly names. The encounter continues:

Mahmoud also speaks very agitatedly about Pelle having called him a 'baby's butt'⁴ when they met earlier [not clear to me when]. Pia objects that if Pelle did so, then it may have been unnecessary, but Mahmoud has to forget about it some time. Mahmoud then argues that it wasn't only that Pelle called him a 'baby's butt', but it was also how he acted. He was stopped and searched by Pelle, and held up against a wall right in front of people from his family.

The feeling of insult associated with being subjected to controls in front of others, particularly people known to the youths, is something that has also been noted in several other studies, and is something that is problematic from a procedural justice perspective. Mahmoud also refers to this incident repeatedly in the encounter with Pia. A number of the police officers I have followed have also been aware of the importance of avoiding this kind of control, and instead focus their attention on using strategies that allow the youths to 'save face' (Pettersson, 2012; see also Peterson, 2008). However, the situation that Mahmoud was talking about was described as quite the opposite. I had not been present when it happened; however, one of the police officers in the group spoke to me about this situation later that evening, when we were discussing the conflicts between the police officers and the youths in the area. We were having a conversation about the difficulties of knowing how to act in conflicts, whether the police should back off or go in more resolutely. In an earlier situation, they had let the youths go following some disturbances in a shopping mall, and just a few minutes later, the same youths had burned down a shop. He had thought a lot about whether they had acted in a good way or had been too lax, and whether they could have done things differently. This time (the situation Mahmoud had been talking about) the police had decided not to let the youths off. Instead they had put all of them up against the wall, and the police officer felt that this had been a better way to act. However, it is obvious from the discussion between Pia and Mahmoud that Mahmoud is of a different opinion. The police actions seem rather to have escalated the conflict between the police officers and the youths, as might have been expected from a procedural justice perspective. Once again, the non-verbal communications (e.g. putting them up against the wall) are important for the outcome. Returning to the encounter between Pia and Mahmoud, Mahmoud continues talk-

⁴ A relatively mild term of derision meaning "childish".

ing about how much he hates Pelle, and also states that some of the other police officers that work in the group with Pelle now act in the same way, even though they had previously been ok.

Mahmoud argues that those who work with Pelle become like him. He also tells Pia that 'I have nothing against you, you are ok,' 'but I hate him,' pointing at Paulinho, 'and her,' pointing at Perla. 'But he [identifying Pascal's overseas background] is ok. He has always been alright.' 'But her,' pointing at Perla, 'I could kill her if she wasn't a police officer, I hate her that much. You get it?' 'She was ok before, but then she started working with Pelle and became like him. They [Paulinho and Perla] play tough just like Pelle.'

Pia tries to say that he can't lump all of them together, but Mahmoud turns it around and says that that is the way the police treat the youths. If someone shouts something, all of them get the blame. 'You're ok, and him [points at Pascal], but as long as you're working with Pelle or him [Paulinho] or her [Perla], you will also get the blame.' (Field notes)

This illustrates how negative experiences of one police officer may be important for the opinion of other police officers. This is also in line with earlier research about opinions of the police, and is clearly related to feelings of unfair treatment. The encounter also shows the strength of feeling these experiences might evoke in the youths. After this, Pia starts discussing forgiveness between the youths and the police officers, and argues that both of them must draw a line under the things that have happened. Mahmoud has by this time quietened down a little, and when Pia asks him if they should keep going on like this forever he says, quite calmly, that he hopes not. After this Pia once again talks about the words the youths used against the police officers.

Pia: "but if you want to be left alone, I would just stand still and not say anything. You know that if you start shouting, you won't be left alone. If you want to be left alone keep quiet." Mahmoud also says that he knows that they do wrong; you shouldn't shout things after the police. "I know it's wrong and that we have also done wrong." He also says that this was the reason why they didn't come to the meeting⁵, because they know they have done wrong: "We have done almost as wrong as you have, I know that." Pia explains that nobody is forcing the youths to go to the meeting, Pia: "But I think

⁵ A meeting was arranged between youths and the police in order to discuss the situation, but none of the youths wanted to attend. The meeting took place later on during my time in the area.

it would be better for everyone if the meeting could take place." (Field note)

Now there is more of a mutual understanding than a conflict between Mahmoud and Pia. He is calm, talks slowly without raising his voice, and the same is true of Pia. Mahmoud is even able to admit to some wrongdoing on the part of the youths. After this, the conversation ebbs out and after a while Mahmoud leaves. I then switch to the discussion between Paulinho and Perla and some other youths. These youths also articulate feelings of being treated unfairly. They talk about a boy in the area (not present at the moment) who is subject to controls time after time by the same officer, and they argue that this is because it has turned into a personal conflict for the police officer. However, Paulinho and Perla argue that this is because the youth in question has been in possession of narcotics, and that this makes it reasonable for the police officer to check him again. They try to explain why the police work as they do, without acknowledging that they may have acted incorrectly. The conversation is now calm and the impression is that the youths and police officers are listening to each other, even if they do not always agree. At about this point, two security guards show up in the shopping mall since it is closing time. One of the youths shouts that the guards want to close up and go home, and my field notes end as follows.

Everybody starts moving slowly out of the mall. Smiles on the faces of both youths and police officers. The feeling is one of mutual understanding and the atmosphere is quite pleasant. (Field note)

The non-verbal communication is significant for this long encounter between the youths and the police officers. For example: *how* the youths speak when they are annoyed at the beginning (e.g. fast, high pitched voice), how the youths bang on the window, how they move around during the interaction, how the police are quite calm and still in their movements, signaling that they are staying and listening. Finally, the smiles at the end signal something very different from the beginning of the interaction, and smiling *together* is an important part of how both parties define how the situation ends.

I observed several encounters that, like the one described above, started with antagonism and with expressions of complaints, and that then, following discussions between the police officers and the youths ended in a similar way to this one, in quite pleasant and friendly "chatting" (sometimes even with a sense of admiration towards the police officers). After the above encounter, I discussed it with Pia. She was quite content about how the situation had evolved, but she also thought that the youths got stuck on things that are actually non-essential. She thinks that they can tend to rehash the same thing interminably. The question that

arises here is, essential to whom? What is considered essential is not a neutral judgment, but depends on who defines it. The youths' complaint is defined as trivial from the police point of view, but it is obviously *not* trivial for Mahmoud and the other youths involved in the conflict. From a procedural justice perspective too, this would not be regarded as an unimportant question. It is rather one of the core questions for trust in the police and their legitimacy, since it is obvious that the youths identify themselves as being unfairly treated. It is also worth noting the amount of time and effort that the youths invest in trying to actually get along with the police officers and resolve the conflict. This was also the case in several other situations of this kind, and is something I will discuss in the concluding remarks.

Finally, I will provide an example of expressed dissatisfaction with the police in the absence of any discussion between the police officers and the youths. On this particular evening the police are plain-clothes officers and are patrolling in the vicinity of a block of flats when they pass a group of youths.

A group of youths are standing at the entry to the blocks and are kicking a soccer ball among themselves. When we turn up, one of the youths kicks the ball high in the air right at us. Patrik: "Look out!" Pauline has to move to avoid the ball hitting her. She does not attempt to kick it back, and just leaves it on the ground and continues walking. Nobody says or remarks upon anything, neither the police officers nor the youths. Patrik explains to me, after we have passed, that the boy kicking the ball was Enzo, a boy they have a lot of problems with. He belongs to the group of youths in the area who hate the police and he is one of those that refused to go to a meeting I attended between the police and youths in the area. I ask whether he understood that they were police officers and Patrik answers that all of them understood that straight away.

We start walking by a walkway along the center of the housing area. Suddenly there is a rustle in the bushes beside us. Some of the youths are standing in the center and have thrown something after us. It sounds like a stone or something. Patrik says, "Look out 'cos here they come," in a calm, almost unaffected tone of voice. All of them continue at a slow pace as if nothing has happened. Nobody even looks at the youths as far as I can see, except for me. (Field notes)

It almost goes without saying that the non-verbal communication, from both sides, constitutes a central part of this communication. The youths' dissatisfaction is expressed only via non-verbal communication; but the opinion is still loud and clear. Similarly, the police officers' communication with the youths, since they ig-

nore both them and the things they are doing, is also non-verbal, even though it might be less easy to interpret. These youths might be described as what Murphey and Cherney (2012) have referred to as disengaged, at least Enzo. The police officers describe him as the one who is part of the group of youths in the area who refuse to even talk to the police officers. From a procedural justice perspective this would suggest that trying to respond to him with procedural fairness may involve a risk of being counterproductive. However, I am quite sure that this was *not* the reason why the police officers did not stop and talk to the youths in this situation; instead they tried to appear unaffected by both the football incident and the things that were thrown after them. Later that night, when the incident was discussed with other police officers, who were not present at the situation itself but who work in the same area, it emerged that the police officers deliberately avoid acting in response to these kind of incidents, since they think it would serve to escalate the conflict with the youths in the area. This might imply that the only conceivable action is confrontation rather than discussion. One of the police officers also pointed out that this strategy can only be maintained as long as the youths do not hit a police officer with a stone because 'then it will be war'.

6. Concluding Remarks

The encounters between the police and the youths, in which the youths express complaints, are to a large extent about unfair treatment in one or another way, in line with the procedural justice perspective. The expressed unfairness may either be focused at a more general level towards the police as an institution or organization, or may be related to meetings with police officers. The encounters include examples of both. The complaints may of course sometimes be part of a jargon, but they mostly appear to reflect honest feelings of having received unfair treatment from the police in different ways. When it comes to the police officers' responses to the complaints, these include examples of both ignoring and avoiding a discussion of the complaints, and of acknowledging the youths' experiences and taking time to discuss them. Finally, the process that emerges from the complaints, via the police officers' reactions and the youths' responds to these reactions, can look quite different. In some of the encounters, the situations get stuck in antagonism (sometimes from both sides), in others they end in a relatively friendly state of getting along and understanding. Some of the keys to the latter kind of processes appear to be an acknowledgement of the youths' feelings, taking time to discuss matters that the youths are complaining about and discussing why the police work in the way they do. This is in line with the procedural justice perspective. The procedural justice perspective has

been tested and supported empirically using quantitative data, and the qualitative data presented in the current study show that the perspective's central ideas also seem to be reflected in the processes that occur during encounters between police officers and (often) ethnic minority youths in marginalized areas.

The study also contributes by highlighting how significant non-verbal communication is for the experience of procedural fair treatment. Non-verbal communication is important to the way in which the encounters evolve, e.g. through the types of signals that the police officers communicate to the youths about their willingness to treat them with fairness and to acknowledge the youths' feelings and opinions. This is something that has been shown to be central for the possibility of turning an antagonistic situation into a less antagonistic one, but it also might be central for not *making* a situation antagonistic.

Some of the youths in the study have made serious allegations about experiences of unfair treatment, e.g. about ethnic discrimination, about being harassed time after time or about harsh and degrading treatment in front of others. In spite of this, the youths have often devoted much of their time and energy to attempting to get along with the police in their neighborhoods. The responses of youths in this study may be described as strategies of exit or voice. There are examples of exit strategies, such as the youths throwing things at the police or the ones who chose not to attend a meeting with the police. It should be noted that in a study such as this one, which involved accompanying the police, it is difficult to know how usual this is, since a successful exit strategy may make you "invisible" to the police. However, it is obvious that several of the youths whom I met in the study were choosing the voice strategy. They enter into a discussion with the police, they try to explain how they experience things, even very unpleasant experiences, and they do end up listening to the police when they in turn try to explain their point of view. The youths even get along with the police officers quite well afterwards, if they have been treated respectfully. This means that the youths, by choosing voice, actually provide the police with opportunities to produce change.

This suggests that it is quite possible to produce change, something that Myhill and Quinton (2012) also note. The youths' willingness to get along with the police in these areas should not be underestimated (see also Carr et. al 2007; Barrett, Fletcher, & Patel, 2014). But this will not happen by itself. It requires a police force that takes youths' feelings of unfair treatment seriously and that is interested in including these youths instead of excluding them. I have also shown elsewhere that it requires a police force that recognizes the youths' situations and feelings of exclusion from society at large (Pettersson, 2013; see also Murphy & Cherneny, 2012).

Agevall and Olofsson (2008) suggest that Hirschman's analyses should be extended to include the dimension *dependency*. In this study I would argue that both the youths and the police officers, in different ways, are dependent on "getting along". The youths since their everyday life can otherwise be made quite troublesome by the police (see Pettersson, 2012), the police officers since they are dependent on cooperation from the policed in order to conduct their work. When the youths choose voice as strategy, this is more easily achievable, if the police just "catch the ball" by using the opportunities given to them.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Policing the Borders of the 'Centaur State': Deportation, Detention, and Neoliberal Transformation Processes—The Case of Austria

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Abstract

Excessive policing of borders and mobilities is one of the key features of current migration regimes in the global North and West. Using Austria as example, this article examines some of the links between the recent development of deportation policies and broad societal transformations—namely neoliberal restructuring. The main argument is that the new model of policing borders and mobilities can be meaningfully characterised as neoliberal in three respects: (i) its structure corresponds to a neoliberal political rationality, (ii) it is functional for current politico-economic relations, and (iii) it is promoted by the very social relations it contributes to. The paper builds on recent studies of how deportation regimes structure labour relations, but moves the focus from the economic *function* to the *form* and *formation* of deportation policies. Concerning the form of regulation, a comparison of current legal frameworks with those of the Cold-War era unveils some crucial features of newly emergent border regimes. First, policing has been massively extended and intensified; second, the criteria for differentiating the vulnerability to policing have grown in number and complexity; third, it is more and more mobility itself that is being policed; and, finally, the punitive turn affects mainly the margins of current global mobility, while the top and center enjoy increased security of residence and mobility rights. Regarding the formation of these new deportation policies, this article uses salient shifts in political discourse as a starting point to illustrate the complexity and context-dependency of the political processes involved.

Keywords

asylum; deportation; labour migration; neoliberalism; precarisation; societal transformation

Issue

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1. Introduction

This article examines the turn towards increasingly harsh forms of policing borders and mobilities against the background of changing political-economic constellations. Using the Austrian migration regime as example, I argue that these newly emergent regimes should be understood as integral element of neoliberal transformation: their structure corresponds to what Wacquant has termed the 'neoliberal Centaur state'—liberal at the top, punitive at the bottom (Wacquant, 2009); they fulfill important economic functions; and their emer-

gence is enabled by the very societal transformations to which they contribute.

Recent research has pointed to how deportation and detention policies have triggered precarious labour relations. This article builds on these analyses (discussed in Section 2), but moves the focus from the socio-economic *function* of deportation regimes to the *forms* of political regulation and the political dynamics involved in their *formation*. I argue that the current regime can be meaningfully characterised as 'neoliberal' in all these regards. The concept of 'neoliberalism' as it is used in this article is presented in Section 3.

The epochal change under way in the field of border policing is best captured in comparison with former periods. Therefore, the empirical discussion of the new forms of regulation starts with a comparison of current legal frameworks with policies of the Cold-War era. The post-WWII model is distinctly different from today's constellation in a number of respects. Among others, the new regime operates with far more differentiating criteria and increasingly polices mobility itself. One of the crucial, but hardly discussed features of the new regime is that it allows to promote freedom of mobility at the top while producing extreme forms of exclusion and forced immobilisation at the bottom. The concluding part of Section 5 briefly discusses how politico-economic shifts have allowed to establish such a differentiated political framework. I concentrate on developments on the level of political discourse—the securitisation of migration and the linking of deportation and asylum issues—to illustrate how the political processes involved are themselves complexly structured by ongoing societal transformations. In the concluding discussion, I argue that further research should focus on the variegated forms in which neoliberal political projects materialise in given contexts, i.e. on the processes of formation of neoliberal border regimes.

2. Deportation Regimes and Changing Orders of Social Exclusion

The excessive policing of borders and mobilities is among the salient features of current migration regimes in the global North and West (De Genova & Peutz, 2010; Anderson, Gibney, & Paoletti, 2013). Among the features of these 'deportation machines' (Fekete, 2005) that have received scholarly attention over the past years are the political instruments and the processes of policy development involved (Bloch & Schuster, 2005), the human rights violations effected by new control policies (Fekete, 2005), the relations between deportation and the constitution of citizenship (Walters, 2010; Anderson, Gibney, & Paoletti, 2011), and the emergence of new border zones, especially in and around the European Union (Karakayali & Rigo, 2010).

Mirroring developments in political discourse, these scholarly contributions concentrate on forced and undocumented migration. Recently, however, the analytic focus has moved to the question of how new forms of border policing are linked to labour migration as well as to patterns of social inequalities in general. The emphasis of these recent studies is on how deportation and detention policies contribute to the precarisation of (migrant) workers and thus to the production of a disposable and cheap workforce.

De Giorgi (2010) argues that the current punitive turn in Western migration regimes leads to the increased socio-economic marginalisation of (migrant) workers on a global scale. Comparing current deporta-

tion and detention practices to control policies during the transition from feudalism to capitalism, he argues that what we are witnessing is the establishment of a 'global regime of less eligibility'—the forced immobilisation of populations of the global South due to inhibiting costs and risks of moving to the North and West.

Anderson (2010) uses developments in the British labour market to show how immigration controls contribute to the precarisation of labour relations in receiving labour markets. She argues that control policies do not only work as tap to turn migration flows on or off, but effectively create 'hyperflexible labour, working under many types of arrangements (not always "employment"), available when required, undemanding when not' (Anderson, 2010, p. 300). De Genova (2002) uses the notion of deportability to capture how this condition of insecurity is produced by the permanent threat of deportation. The 'disposability of ever deportable migrant labor' (De Genova & Peutz, 2010, p. 9) is an important element of new global regimes of production. Undocumented migrants mark the extreme of this development (Ahmad, 2008), but deportability permeates labour markets—there are shades of insecurity and precarisation linked to the policing of borders and mobilities.

These studies point to the *function* deportation policies fulfill for current global politico-economic orders. My analysis builds on these contributions, but shifts the discussion to the *form* of political regulations and the processes of their *formation*. The aim is to further our understanding of how deportation and detention policies are embedded in ongoing societal transformations. Borrowing from Braudel, the historical scale of this endeavour is not on the level of the *événement* (short-term developments and events in deportation politics) or of the *longue durée* (the general role of deportation in capitalist nation-states), but on the level of the *conjuncture* (Lee, 2012): the concrete forms deportation regimes take in period-specific political-economic constellations (cf. Jessop, 2002). Therefore, the discussion of the Austrian case will be organised around a comparison of the current configuration with the post-WWII period. The concept of 'neoliberalism' offers an adequate framework for making sense of the ruptures and continuities between these two phases. The following section presents this concept as it is understood in this article.

3. Neoliberalism as Analytical Framework

This article shares an understanding that sees neoliberalism primarily as a political project. Following Foucault (Foucault, 2007, 2008), neoliberalism is, in the first place, understood as a political rationality that leads to specific forms of problematising social phenomena and suggests specific forms of dealing with them. The political rationality of neoliberalism is organised around the

concepts of market and competition. In contrast to classical liberalism, neoliberal thought proclaims (i) that the market and competition need to be actively produced and secured by the state and (ii) that the state itself should be organised according to market principles.

The general neoliberal principle is to govern as little as possible. Governmental interventions are refused not on moral but on utilitarian grounds, not because they are wrong but because they are not useful. The main governmental task is to produce and secure free market exchange without distorting it. Neoliberal government, therefore, mainly manipulates the conditions of free market agency, without intervening directly. Cost-benefit calculations and security considerations are the main modes of policy making, other political logics (e.g. humanitarian reasonings) move to the back.

Sharing Foucault's understanding of neoliberal thought, other authors have moved the focus from the political rationality of neoliberalism to the political projects it organises (Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2013). As a political project, neoliberalism entails a set of typical measures (deregulation, privatisation, monetarism, workfare rather than welfare...) and leads to the re-organisation of social relations (with precarisation and social polarisation being among the central phenomena). However, the neoliberal project does not take the same form in every context (Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2012). Jessop (2013) identifies four distinct types: the radical Anglo-Saxon variant commonly referred to as Thatcherism and Reaganomics, the mostly also extreme forms of neoliberal transformation in the post-Soviet world, externally enforced programmes of structural adjustment in the global South, and more tempered and partial versions especially in Central and Western European countries such as Germany and Austria.

Understood in this way, neoliberalism is a useful scheme to characterise and analyse the development of new border policies. It links the discussion of political developments to the ongoing societal transformation from Keynesian Fordism to post-Fordist globalisation. And it provides a basis to understand the simultaneity of *punitive deportation politics* and *policies of increasing freedom of mobility* that mark current migration regimes.

The link between neoliberalism and punitive policies may seem counterintuitive at first glance. After all, the central aim of neoliberalism is believed to be to diminish the state and increase individual freedom. A number of authors have, however, diagnosed structural links between neoliberal transformation and the rise of penal states (e.g. De Giorgi, 2010). The general line of argument is that the simultaneous reduction of welfare policies and increasing precarisation of poorer parts of the population require punitive counter-measures in order to secure public order and property rights. Wacquant's notion of the Centaur state aims at this double-faced character of neoliberal policies: the

neoliberal state promotes freedom and security at the top and fosters punishment and insecurity at the bottom (Wacquant, 2009).

Whether the link between neoliberalism and punitive policies is a necessary one has been the matter of some debate. For example, neoliberal reforms in African nation-states are often neither connected to workfare policies nor to the rise of a penal state (Hilgers, 2012). Though crucial for our general understanding of neoliberal restructuring, this discussion is less relevant for the following analysis. In the concrete Western European context—post-Keynes, post-Fordist, post-guestwork—the general pattern of retreating welfare and increasing punitive policies is largely undisputed.

4. Methodological Notes

Perhaps due to the complexity of the developments involved, most studies on recent deportation and detention policies focus on single case countries, the UK and the US being the most popular examples (e.g. Anderson, Gibney, & Paoletti, 2013; Bloch & Schuster, 2005). The main drawbacks of this strategy are that we cannot take developments beyond the nation-state level into account and that we cannot compare the relative relevance of single factors as would be possible in a multi-case design. On the other side, the focus on a single case allows for a more profound analysis over time—and this diachronic perspective defines the main dimension of comparison for this text. The nation-state level has the further advantage of offering comprehensive material for analysing the development of legislative frameworks and political discourses over time. Therefore, this article also focuses on a single case country: Austria. A number of factors make Austria a very interesting example for the context of this article, both regarding its migration regime and its political-economic configuration.

With regards to the political-economic configuration and, more specifically, the implementation of neoliberal policies, Austria corresponds to the pattern described by Jessop (2013) as typical for 'Rheinian capitalism': the tempered and selective adoption of neoliberal policies¹. Concerning its migration regime, Austria has gone through the same post-WWII phases of guestworker recruitment (Castles & Kosack, 1973; Wimmer, 1986), emergence of new ethnic minorities (Castles, Booth & Wallace, 1984), and profound re-

¹ A recent example shows the ambiguity of neoliberal reform agendas in such a setting. In 2013, the Austrian Ministry of Science was abolished. Science, research, and technology issues are now covered by the Ministry of Economics. This move does not correspond well to the idea of "unideological", evidence-based policy-making or to the self-imagination of a knowledge society. On the other hand, the measure mirrors austerity principles and the extension of market rule to diverse policy areas.

organisation (Messina, 2007; Kraller, 2011) as most Western European countries. The general architecture of the Austrian migration regime is similar to the German one; Castles (1995) subsumes both countries under the category of differential exclusionary regimes, characterised by restrictive citizenship policies, an ethnic understanding of national belonging, and strong marginalisation of migrant workers (Sainsbury, 2006). At the same time, some analytically relevant aspects are more pronounced than in other countries, above all the presence of an extreme-rightwing populist party with broad electoral support (the Freedom Party, FPÖ) and Austria's geopolitical position at the former Iron Curtain.

The findings presented in the following build on research done for my PhD (Horvath 2014a; 2014b). Two kinds of data on the Austrian deportation regime are used. First, a comprehensive overview of the development of the legal framework (legal regulations, amendments...) is used to discuss how the form of political regulation has evolved against the background of changing migration patterns and political-economic contexts (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). Second, a corpus of more than 3,000 parliamentary documents dealing with migration issues was collected. For my PhD, this corpus was analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively, combining a dictionary approach and lexicometric methods with interpretive analyses of the argumentative logics structuring the political problematisation of migration. The quantitative and the qualitative analyses can be seen as complementary and, by and large, converge. For the context of this article, some (mostly quantitative) findings are presented to illustrate the complex processes involved in the formation of a neoliberal deportation regime in Austria (Section 5.3).

5. The Becoming of a Neoliberal Deportation State

We can roughly distinguish two phases in the development of the Austrian migration regime after WWII: the guestworker epoch and the post-1989 period. There are overlaps and continuities as well as ruptures and discontinuities between these phases. The periodisation nonetheless allows for systematic comparisons between different constellations of politico-economic contexts, migration practices, labour market relations, and the policing of borders. I first discuss the Austrian deportation regime during the post-WWII era, then give an overview of the measures taken after 1989, and finally briefly discuss how the emergence of punitive deportation policies was itself linked to neoliberal restructuring.

5.1. Deportation and Detention in the Austrian Guestworker Regime

Migration patterns to Austria after WWII correspond to those in other Western European countries. Migration from the semi-periphery of the world economy into

lower segments of the labour market (Gächter, 1992; Parnreiter, 1994) and the emergence of new ethnic minorities (Castles, Booth, & Wallace, 1984) are the crucial features of this development. The Austrian guestworker regime drew mainly on Yugoslavian and Turkish labour resources. Migrant labour was overwhelmingly used in industrial mass production which was backed by Fordist-Keynesian welfare policies (Wimmer, 1986; Gächter, 1992). The political context was marked by conservative corporatism and strong 'social partnership' on the one hand and the Cold War on the other (Bauböck, 1996).

As elsewhere, deportation and detention were no salient issues during this period. Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti (2011) argue that—due to their difficulty and unpopularity—deportation policies were only applied in cases of criminal conviction. Nonetheless, deportation and detention did exist as political technologies—but they differed in important regards from the constellation we see today.

First, the whole migration regime was marked by the Cold War and Austria's self-presentation as humanitarian toehold to the West. In 1954, the not-yet-independent Austrian government abolished the general need for a residence permit. Foreign citizens were thus generally allowed to stay on Austrian territory, unless state authorities had reason to explicitly prohibit their entry or residence. The rhetoric formula was *in dubito pro humanitate*, and this was, on the surface, interpreted liberally. Missing educational opportunities, economic disadvantage, or a lack of artistic freedom were considered legitimate causes for asylum (Volf, 1995; Heiss & Rathkolb, 1995). Of course, these symbolic politics were an easy game to play, since the borders were strictly controlled from the other side and most refugees considered Austria only as a transit country (Stanek, 1985). In political discourse, border policing appeared almost exclusively in connection with construals of ideological dangers. Potential spies and intellectuals were the key adversaries.

In spite of its low political salience, deportation did happen. More importantly, it *could* happen. Deportation had been established in Austria as a political technology back in the 1860s (parallel to social relief policies, cf. Walters, 2010). After WWII, the political instruments were well developed and established, we just know little about how (often) they were put to use. In other words, deportation was present, even if mainly as a possibility.

This leads to the second point: In practice, the resulting deportability was mostly tied to labour migration, not asylum politics. In fact, deportation and labour relations were linked rather directly in legal and administrative regulations. Loss of employment was one of the central grounds for forced expulsion, and some of the sector-specific guestworker agreements included provisions regarding who had to bear the

costs of a possible forced return. Labour market authorities and social partners were not only key players in migration politics in general (Bauböck, 1996; Wollner, 1996), but also directly involved in the business of forced removal. In practice, deportation might have mainly been applied in cases of criminal conviction—as argued by Anderson et al. (2011)—but as a permanent threat it constituted a specific regime of deportability that was directly linked to labour market developments.

Thirdly, deportation was a rather crude technology compared to today's regimes. The main criterion for security of residence—or, in turn, for being faced with the possibility of deportation—was nationality. This arrangement corresponded to the Fordist national welfare regime. The main dividing line was between migrant and national labour, conforming to the patterns of labour market segmentation (Gächter, 1992; Parnreiter, 1994). Nationality as a criterion was not contested, and there was no apparent need for a more sophisticated system of differentiation. This configuration was first actively challenged by migrants themselves. Former guestworkers successfully went through all legal instances to achieve that their length of residence and their family situation be considered grounds for security of residence—thus introducing new differentiating criteria (Kraler, 2011; Horvath, 2014a). This was only a soft prelude to the changes that were to come.

5.2. Policing of Borders and Mobilities in Austria After 1989

From 1991 to 1999, more than 85,000 migrants were forcefully expelled from Austria—around 26 deportations a day (Winkler, 2011, pp. 4-5). The aim of this subsection is to give a rough overview of the changes to the regulatory frameworks of the Austrian migration regime after 1989 that allowed for this massive number of deportations. I will first discuss the measures and amendments in detail before linking them to the article's main theme—neoliberal restructuring. Due to the complexity and speed of these developments the depiction will necessarily remain incomplete (for a comprehensive discussion see Horvath 2014a).

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Austrian border regime was thoroughly reorganised. Table 1 gives a few examples of the measures taken in three areas: labour migration, deportation policies, and general integration policies. These policy areas need to be understood in their interplay. The table shows, first, the dynamisation of migration politics over the past decades. Second, it clearly mirrors the post-1989 punitive turn. Among others, all five aspects identified by Bloch and Schuster (2005) as crucial elements of current forms of policing borders and mobilities have been either introduced or expanded: deportation, detention, incarceration, zoning, and dispersal policies.

One of the first measures was the reintroduction of

the residence permit that had been abolished in 1954. This step may seem negligible, but it turns the logic of legitimating entry and residence around. No longer does the state need reasons to end a migrant's stay in the country, but the migrant herself needs to justify her residence and becomes self-responsible for retaining a legal status. This turn in the logic of forbidding/allowing was a prerequisite for what followed: an abundance of different entry and residence statuses linked to numerous routes into illegalisation.

From the beginning, the upscaling of deportation was one of the key elements of this development. In part, this happened by criminalising certain practices. For example, trafficking and bogus marriage were first declared major administrative and later criminal offenses. In addition, non-compliance with administrative procedures became a possible reason for expulsion. Undocumented entry or the loss of one's residence status can today lead to forced removal. At the same time, removal procedures have been accelerated and the possibilities to legally challenge decisions of deportation authorities have been severely limited.

Similar developments are evident for detention and incarceration. The possible duration of detention has been extended to a maximum of ten months (within every 18 month period), up from two months in the post-WWII decades. Reasons for detention nowadays include smaller offenses and non-compliance with administrative rules. Conditions during detention have been made even harsher. Many measures stand in obvious conflict to common understandings of human and fundamental rights (Fekete, 2005). Children can now be separated from their parents and detainees on hunger-strike can in principle be force-fed. Migrants can today be detained without any offense—even without any identifiable construed threat.

Deportation and detention measures were combined with dispersal and zoning techniques. Today, asylum seekers are kept in reception camps at the beginning of the asylum procedure. They are then dispersed across the country, sometimes to remote areas, and (i) obliged to report regularly to the authorities and (ii) allowed to travel only in the area of their residence. Failing to follow these rules may have serious repercussions for their status or asylum application.

A number of features of the new constellation stand out in comparison to the Fordist constellation. First, it is increasingly mobility itself that is being policed—not criminal behaviour or alleged threats to social security. This is achieved by emphasising compliance with established rules. Depending on their migration channel, migrants may have to follow regulations from before their travel to Austria starts (including passing language tests), and any failure to do so may result in illegalisation and possible expulsion. This turn to policing mobility itself goes hand in hand with a change in the construed threats that presumably justify

deportation measures. In contrast to the personified ideological dangers of the Cold War era, current threats are imagined as mobile and fluid networks, of-

ten linked to criminal activities and sometimes potential terrorism (Waever, Buzan, & de Wilde, 1993; Huysmans, 2006).

Table 1. Selection of changes to the Austrian migration regime over time.

Year	Labour migration	Policing, deportation, and detention	Integration and citizenship
2011	RWR-Card, permant seasonal worker status	"Compulsory attendance" for asylum seekers, detention possible up to 10 months, separation of children from parents during detention	Tightening of language requirements
2009		Zoning measures, reporting obligation, time for appeal reduced to one week, "subsequent asylum applications" abolished,...	
2005	Visum requirement for seasonal workers abolished	Reasons and possible duration of detention extended, forced feeding of detainees on hunger strike,...	Citizenship test, uninterrupted legal residence required for citizenship, tightening of language requirements
2003		Screening system at reception centre, abolition of suspensive effect of appeals against asylum decisions	
2002	Simplified: seasonal work and high-skilled migration		"Integration contract" with obligatory language and "integration" courses
2000	Seasonal work extended to all economic sectors, new status of harvest worker	Trafficking becomes criminal offense	
1998			Language requirements for citizenship acquisition
1997		Measures against "asylum abuse", ratification Dublin convention	
1992	Seasonal workers programme and quota system		
1991		Third country regulation introduced	
1990		Re-introduction of residence permit, trafficking (administrative) offense	
1987		Length of residence and family life acknowledged as reasons for protection against deportation	
1975	New 'alien workers law'		
1968		Introduction of an own, secure residence status for refugees	
1954		Residence permit abolished	

Second, there is a complex differentiation of mobility and residence rights. The mechanisms by which 'privileged' legal statuses are assigned are complex and often indirect. While for some their country of origin suffices, others attain relative security by entering under special quota regulations or the recently established Red-White-Red Card, a points-based system for so-called highly skilled migrants. Once in the country, migrants can step-by-step increase their security of residence provided they have a secure income and comply with legal regulations. If any of these conditions do not apply (not entering with a secure residence/employment permit, losing employment, not obtaining sufficient language skills...), the migrant risks dropping out of this system of interlinked entry–residence–employment–integration regulations. 'Integration tests' and language requirements are today among the key criteria for securing one's mobility and residence rights; the effects of these requirements are not the same for different 'kinds' of migrants: those employed in ethnicised labour market segments or lacking formal education are relatively disadvantaged.

Third, the relation between deportation and labour migration has become more indirect. The status of seasonal worker introduced in 1992 serves as an example (Horvath, 2014b). Seasonal workers are employed in other economic segments than former guestworkers, mainly construction, agriculture, and tourism (Horvath, 2012). Above all, they are confronted with a far more precarious legal situation. They never obtain any right to settlement, even after years of employment; they do not enjoy unemployment benefits; and they cannot extend their labour market mobility over time. This radical precarisation was achieved by a minor passage in the Residence Law. The deportability of guestworkers was in the first place defined in the Alien Workers Law and only backed by general regulations on entry and residence of aliens, the precarity of seasonal workers is mainly established in general residence provisions and only linked to the work permit system in a second step.

Fourth, deportation has become a highly salient political issue. The relevance of this point for our understanding of the whole process will be discussed in the following subsection.

How are these developments linked to neoliberal transformation processes? Starting from Wacquant's notion of the neoliberal Centaur state, the hierarchical differentiation of deportation policies stands out as a first crucial characteristic of the current regime. At the top, the migration regime ensures and promotes mobility and security of residence. At the bottom, a mobility-related punitive turn results in immobilisation, marginalisation, and precarisation. This first feature leads directly back to the economic function of deportation policies (Anderson, 2010; De Genova & Peutz, 2010; de Giorgi, 2010). The Austrian seasonal workers scheme is

a good example for the kind of deportability-backed precarisation usually discussed in this context. At the same time, the extended freedom of mobility and the increased security of residence at the top also fulfill important functions. They are prerequisites for other forms of mobility linked to international investment and trading and the establishment of a regime of transnational elite mobility.

Further and corresponding to the principle of self-reliance and workfare, the punitive deportation policies at the bottom of the mobility hierarchy fulfill social control functions and have strong disciplining effects by punishing non-compliance with rules, making migrants themselves responsible for managing the complex interplay of employment and residence policies, and establishing the permanent threat of increased deportability to those who do not enjoy comparably favourable mobility and residence rights.

The shift towards less direct intervention in labour relations—establishing deportability in other than directly labour-market related regulations—mirrors the idea of not intervening directly in the free market exchange of individuals. Instead, governmental activity concentrates on manipulating the background conditions of market agency. Following De Giorgi (2010), we may interpret the direct policing of mobility rather than of labour relations as a new form of immobilisation and forced localisation of the very populations that are uprooted by the dynamics of global capitalism—or in Foucault's terms as an instance of biopolitical regulation of populations and their mobility.

In addition, the punitive turn mirrors a general move in the political architecture of the Austrian migration regime that is in line with the neoliberal reshaping of the political arena. Decision-making powers and responsibilities have moved from social partners to the central government, and within the state bureaucracy from the field of social policy to the Ministry for the Interior. This political architecture does not only correspond to neoliberal principles, it also conforms to changing labour market relations which are less and less covered by the post-WWII forms of social partnership.

Current deportation policies do not only prove functional for highly segmented post-Fordist labour markets, their architecture and logic also mirror a neoliberal political agenda. But how can we explain the emergence of these new policies without resorting to a teleological argument (that they are there because they are functional)? What processes have allowed for the formation of the new deportation regime? In the following subsection, I argue that the formation of these policies is itself best understood against the background of neoliberal restructuring. However, the involved processes are heavily context-dependent. The list of factors and actors that structure the concrete formation of neoliberal border regimes includes, among others, political parties and security profession-

als, welfare institutions and their path-dependencies, labour-market developments, and geo-political constellations. Due to this complexity, the following discussion remains sketchy and aims mainly at laying the ground for further research.

5.3. Reflections on the Formation of Neoliberal Deportation Policies in Austria

The establishment of the kind of measures described above is not a trivial affair. They stand in opposition to fundamental principles of liberal market economies (equality and freedom) and thus require legitimisation. In light of the obvious tensions and contradictions, how can we explain the development of such a functional arrangement, if not by some form of teleological or conspiracy-theoretic approach? The following brief discussion offers a few initial reflections. I choose two decisive discursive shifts as a starting point to illustrate how the emergence of neoliberal deportation policies is complexly linked to societal transformations as well as to concrete contexts.

The first crucial discursive shift is the securitisation of migration over the past decades (Waever et al., 1993; Bigo, 2001, 2002; Huysmans, 2006). From the mid-1980s onwards, migration issues became dramatically politicised throughout Western Europe (Hammar, 2007; Messina, 2007). This politicisation was primarily linked to construals of migration as a threat to public order, cultural identity, and/or social security. Figure 1 illustrates this development.

The second decisive discursive shift is the linking of deportation to asylum issues. After 1989, asylum became the central field in which deportation policies were discussed (and developed). Table 2 shows the factor by which certain indicator terms were over- or underrepresented in parliamentary contributions dealing with asylum before and after 1989. Before 1989, the policy field focused on equality, integration, and labour rights. These egalitarian issues move to the background after 1989, while the formerly underrepresented issues of detention and illegality are now heavily overrepresented.




Figure 1. Politicisation and securitisation of migration, 1945–2012; number of references to indicator terms in the Austrian parliament; grey line in each graph: references to "economy".

Table 2. Re-embedding of asylum issues. The table lists the relative frequency of indicator terms in contributions dealing with asylum as compared to other contributions.

Year	Term	Factor of over-/under-occurrence
1945–1989	equality/equalitisation	8,74
	integration	12,23
	labour laws	7,80
	illegal	0,27
	detention	0,24
1990–2011	equality/equalitisation	0,14
	integration	0,59
	labour laws	0,20
	illegal	1,04
	detention	3,06
	detention center	32,17

A few preliminary reflections on how these two discursive shifts (i) structured the development of neoliberal deportation policies and (ii) were themselves structured by a complex interplay of political, social, and economic processes illustrate how the formation of new border regimes hinges on concrete constellations and contexts.

Concerning its structuring role for the development of new policies, the changed discursive context was a necessary condition for establishing neoliberal deportability in Austria. The establishment of the seasonal worker status in the early 1990s provides an example (Horvath, 2014a, 2014b). The demand for such a status was not new—but for decades it had been opposed for humanitarian as well as socio-political reasons. The securitised context created a window of opportunity for employer organisations who made use of the emergency atmosphere to push their agenda. This was possible because the new status could be interpreted as a security measure (and hence part of the new deportation regime) itself—it promised to bring practices of labour mobility under state control that had existed in Austrian border regions for decades, but mostly in undocumented forms (Horvath, 2012). Construed existential threats served as pretext for 'exceptional' political measures. A number of other measures that had been planned for years were pushed through in a similar vein, partly bypassing normal parliamentary procedures.

Linking deportation and detention to the ambiguous, symbolically charged, and contested concepts of 'asylum' and 'refugee' further facilitated the adaptation of the regularity framework. Actual deportation practices still concern mainly migrants with other than asylum-related legal titles (Winkler, 2011). Discursively decoupling them from labour migration shifted public attention away from how migrants and refugees are affected by them *as workers*—and hence from how labour market relations and patterns of social exclusion

are structured by deportation and detention policies. As a means of directly regulating labour relations, deportation had become highly contested over the 1980s. Only by linking it to the image of floods of bogus asylum seekers and transnational criminal networks was it possible to forge new deportation policies.

The securitisation of migration was not only a necessary condition for adapting the migration regime to changing politico-economic contexts, it was also fostered by these transformations. From the 1980s onwards, increasing social insecurity in combination with a post-guestwork constellation seemed to threaten the established 'order of honour'. This constellation contributed to the rise of the far-right Freedom Party—one of the key players in securitising migration in Austria. In this context, demands for harsh deportation policies were also symbolic politics meant to re-constitute citizenship (Walters, 2010; Anderson et al., 2011). Even though the dominant imagination of the general public as being overwhelmingly opposed to immigration is too simplistic (Lefkofridi & Horvath, 2012), political parties tended to play the anti-migrant card in this context, thus contributing to the general securitisation of migration. The simultaneous strengthening of the 'right arm of the state' (Wacquant, 2009)—security professionals and penal systems—made alternative, more social policy oriented approaches of dealing with the tensions that resulted from post-Fordist and neoliberal restructuring less likely.

These developments had started well before the 1990s. The described adaptations in the migration and border regime therefore may seem to have been 'overdue'. In the case of Austria, the Cold War had to end before the restructuring of the deportation regime could start. The abruptness of the developments in Austria—both on the level of political discourse and of legal frameworks—illustrates how the formation of neoliberal projects hinges on local contexts. Before 1989, securitised discussions especially of asylum were untenable for ideological reasons. At the same time, the strategic agency of state institutions was organised in accordance with the geopolitical constellation. For example, security professionals who had been concentrating on Cold-War style spying of enemy states for decades now had to re-define their role and struggle for influence in new areas (Bigo, 2001, 2002). Migration—staged as massive networked mobility closely tied to international crime—was a logical choice. Due to their general strengthening as part of the 'right arm' of the state in comparison to other state actors (itself part of the neoliberal reform agenda), their strategic agency proved highly effective.

To sum up, the combination of these two discursive shifts—the securitisation of migration and the coupling of deportation and asylum—gives a first indication of the complex ways in which the development of neoliberal deportation policies is itself mediated by politico-economic shifts, political discourses, geopolitical con-

stellations, and strategic agency. Discursive developments have played an enabling role in this process, but they are themselves shaped in various ways by the very developments they contribute to.

6. Conclusion

I have argued that current deportation regimes can be meaningfully characterised as neoliberal in three regards. First, the form of these policies corresponds to neoliberal principles. Chief among these correspondences is the simultaneity of extended mobility and residence rights at the top and punitive measures at the bottom of the global hierarchy of mobility rights that matches the Centaur-form of the neoliberal state. Second, the effects of the new deportation regime are economically functional for segmented labour markets. Third, the very mechanisms to which deportation contributes—the polarisation of social orders, social exclusion, and social insecurity—promote its further development.

Deportability today works within a system of highly differentiated migration and border regimes—the rather rudimentary differentiation between national and migrant labour that organised the guestworker systems has long given way to a complex hierarchisation of mobility rights. Recent developments in the EU underscore the relevance of enquiring into these developments. Contrary to the mantra of free mobility, we are currently witnessing different forms of making fundamental rights conditional—be it the transitional provisions for members of new EU-member states or the expulsion of EU citizens who do not fit the image of the ever-profitable and self-reliant neoliberal subject. Belgium issued more than 2,700 expulsion letters to EU citizens in 2013 alone, following the example of the French state and its offensive against Roma migrants that was started in 2010.

The picture drawn in this article is, of course, incomplete. Most importantly, the paths that lead to the neoliberalisation of migration politics vary considerably depending on, for example, geopolitical factors or national welfare regimes. More research is needed to develop our understanding of the complex political processes involved, their contested nature as well as their links to social inequalities and existing power relations. Parallels in the general form and functioning of neoliberal border regimes notwithstanding, the Austrian example shows how the formation of these policies cannot be understood without reference to the concrete constellation of actors, institutions, and structural settings. Recent protest movements of refugees in different countries across Europe may serve as a starting point for reflecting these interdependencies.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Aboriginal Agency and Marginalisation in Australian Society

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Abstract

It is often argued that while state rhetoric may be inclusionary, policies and practices may be exclusionary. This can imply that the power to include rests only with the state. In some ways, the implication is valid in respect of Aboriginal Australians. For instance, the Australian state has gained control of Aboriginal inclusion via a singular, bounded category and Aboriginal ideal type. However, the implication is also limited in their respect. Aborigines are abject but also agents in their relationship with the wider society. Their politics contributes to the construction of the very category and type that governs them, and presses individuals to resist state inclusionary efforts. Aboriginal political elites police the performance of an Aboriginality dominated by notions of difference and resistance. The combined processes of governance act to deny Aborigines the potential of being both Aboriginal and Australian, being different and belonging. They maintain Aborigines' marginality.

Keywords

Aboriginal Australians; difference; discourse; identity politics; performative; social inclusion

Issue

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1. Introduction

It is widely agreed that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are the most disadvantaged population category in Australia. They are excluded in their limited capacity to participate in the decision making of the wider society and control their own and the mainstream social and cultural environment. They are disadvantaged in terms of educational achievement, health, employment, and quality and adequacy of housing, amongst other dimensions. Their marginality was established in the first 100 years of settlement, with the dislocation, segregation, neglect and structural marginalisation of the colonial period. It was confirmed in the 'indifferent' inclusion and assimilation of the early national period (McGregor, 2011).

Since the late 1960s though, Australia sought to include diverse cultural minorities in the national commu-

nity while retaining their cultural particularity. This is the multicultural accommodation. In the Aboriginal case the accommodation has been complicated by postcolonial sensitivities, most importantly the attempt to overcome the historic legacy and facilitate the capacity for self-determination. Australian governments have put much rhetorical and material effort into this project, with good success. Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders are empowered in their capacity to make local decisions and have greater agency than before in the affairs of the wider community, and are included as citizens.

The ongoing success of the approach is though, in doubt. An inclusionary ceiling may have been reached in the early part of the twenty-first century. It is argued here that the ceiling is the result of the inadequate conceptualisations of Aboriginality on which the policies of the multiculturalist inclusion are based. A conceptual framework has centred on a stereotypically fixed, dis-

crete and bounded Aboriginal culture, thoroughly different from that of White Australia, and notions of a unitary self and imposed victimhood. When embedded in policy, this framework has made it in the interests of Aboriginal political elites to discursively heighten the differences and exaggerate the oppositions, and in the process generate a resistance to inclusion.

This political work has not been easy in the face of significant actual cultural, subjective and material changes that have meant that Aboriginal lives depart significantly from the way they are represented in the framework. It has required a great deal of energy in the production of discourse and the control of the performance of a normative Aboriginality. This has been necessary to obfuscate the reality and so maintain the political leverage to be had from apparent compliance with the conceptual framework.

2. The Historical Context

Through the nineteenth century, the attitudes of the wider population towards Aborigines were largely of indifference and condescension on the basis of their supposed childlike inability to participate in the modern world as equals. They were conceived as inferior, excluded from legal and administrative institutions and subject to special laws. They could not belong to wider society as equals and had limited agency in shaping their lives. They often could not find work, and were rejected from schools on complaint and provided with second-rate health care. Though these attitudes and discriminations were contested by humanitarians, the period did begin the discursive constitution of Australia's diverse indigenous people as a singular, bounded, radically different, inferior and maligned population, and their comprehensive marginalisation. This exclusion was also integral to the 'constitution of [Australian] social identity' (Morris, 2001, p. 247).

At the 1901 deliberations over the constitution of the federation, and in the document itself, 'Aboriginal people [continued to be] outside the community of the Australian nation' (McGregor, 2011, p. xx). Their exclusion was such that the many living on reserves were 'impoverished, [their] housing was rudimentary, education was basic or non-existent, health status was low, and employment was forced and unremunerated' (Sullivan, 2011, p. 3).

In the years between the First and Second World Wars, policy was driven by an ethnic sense of nationalism, and Aborigines continued to be marginalised as 'citizens without rights' (Chesterman & Galligan, 1997). Governments addressed the issue of a growing number of 'half-castes' with ambivalence. A horror of miscegenation meant that it was 'highly stigmatised and much was done officially to...prevent it' (Merlan, 2009, p. 308). Governments sought to segregate 'full bloods' on reserves on the basis that they were incapable of sur-

living in the modern world and would die out. At the same time, they sought to 'absorb' the half-castes by 'breeding out' their colour in order that they might fit in. Though never fully implemented, the intent was to remove them to institutions, provide them with basic training and leave them to merge into the wider community. Many contemporaries thought of this as progressive in 'relation to the prevailing racism' of the times (Flood, 2006, p. 224). Aboriginal activists sought citizenship and accepted that it was possible if traditional culture (not identity) was abandoned.

During this period, a nostalgic regard for Aboriginal 'spirituality, sociality and environmental sensitivity' emerged, contrasted favourably with the 'materialism, alienation and anomie of the West' (McGregor, 2011, p. 17). Many began to imagine such Aboriginal attributes as a source of a more authentic Australian-ness. In 1939 the Commonwealth officially conceived citizenship as 'the final objective of Aboriginal policy' (McGregor, 2011, p. 34).

In the aftermath of the Second World War and into the late 1950s, the ethnic sense of nationalism gave way to a more civic sense of a culturally plural nation based on shared civic values and way of life. Attempts were made to include Aborigines, at the expense of their social and cultural particularity. Particularly the lighter-skinned could be included as citizens with equal rights and responsibilities to the extent that they inculcated White norms and values, and adopted White codes of conduct and manner of living. Lighter-skinned children were removed to orphanages and adopted into white homes. This was coercive inclusion, compromised by a lack of civil rights. Many Aboriginal peoples' freedoms to marry, move, gain work and vote were limited, and even returned Aboriginal soldiers were treated unequally. This larger narrative was complicated by the urge to incorporate Aboriginal art forms, motifs and aesthetics into Australian heritage, by the complexity of the factors involved, and by some individuals' recognition of the benefits of their removal (Flood, 2006, pp. 227-233).

3. The Multiculturalist Inclusion

From the 1960s, efforts were made in Australia to develop a more pluralist concept of nation and include Aboriginal people within it, as citizens-with-a-difference. The approach responded to global developments such as wartime ethnic cleansing, human rights revolution, decolonisation, migration, US civil rights agitation, and recognition of the ethnic particularity of the national public sphere (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 100). The attempt has been to include people whose ethnic, religious and/or national background is different from the dominant Anglo heritage, without making assimilation to the dominant cultural norms the price of equal respect (Fraser, 1996). The attempt has been to respect diverse

cultures within an inclusive national identity and a common civic culture as sources of social cohesion. In Australia this has been:

a highly integrative policy encouraging interaction between different people and full participation in mainstream society...It has involved very little cultural relativism, and has been primarily liberal in character, focused on individual rights to free enjoyment and expression of culture, rather than group rights (Moran, 2011, p. 2162).

The multicultural inclusion has been framed by liberal democratic values. It is dominated by the intent to facilitate migrant participation and engagement as equals in the wider society, by building supportive social networks within which migrants might participate, and institutions with which they felt at home. Kymlicka sees it as a process of 'democratic citizenisation', of:

turning the earlier...hierarchical relations [between minority and state and between the different sectors of the minority population] into relations of liberal democratic citizenship, both in terms of the vertical relations [with] the state and the horizontal relations amongst the members of different groups (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 100).

The key for Kymlicka is that the differential claims of different groups that arise can be managed by their 'filter[ing] and fram[ing] through the language of human rights, civil liberties and democratic accountability' (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 100).

This general approach to the accommodation of difference has underpinned the approach towards Aboriginal Australians. Their inclusion has been complicated by postcolonial sensitivities over their historic dispossession and homogenising assimilation, and by their insistence on sovereignty, group rights and separate status (Hunter, 2008; Maddison, 2009). In their case as a result, the usual tensions of including diverse cultural groups and maintaining a cohesive national society are heightened. Aboriginal inclusion has constituted a 'wicked problem' for policy, in part because Aborigines are wary of the potential for inclusion to be a neo-colonialism (Hunter, 2008, p. 7). The aim has been more to build Aboriginal capacities for self-determination in respect of their own affairs, and personal resilience, than the more integrative general approach. It has included the intent to enhance participation in the wider community, but been sensitive to the problem of homogenisation, and more geared toward the empowerment of difference.

The approach is built on a conceptual framework largely consistent with that which has dominated governmental thought since the colonial era and been used to gain control of a population regarded as 'unru-

ly' (Foucault, 1979). The framework has featured a bounded, monolithic originary culture. The culture is primitive in being highly integrated, with each element critical to the health of the whole and each individual thought to unitarily represent the culture. The framework assumes a single, pan-Aboriginal culture very different from a similarly monolithic White Australian culture. This conceptualisation reprises the radical difference that justified colonisation and the collective identity that developed with colonialism.

The framework differs from its antecedents in reversing the colonial inferiority. The framework adopts the romantic view of precolonial Aboriginal culture and critique of Western individuality and materialism of the interwar years. It reverses the older hierarchy to valorise what was denigrated. In the framework, Aboriginality is more authentic as it approximates the originary precolonial or classical. In it too, Aborigines are victims to colonisation.

This framework has been central to the success and stalling of efforts to include Indigenous Australians. Those efforts began with the repeal of discriminatory legislation that had restricted access to social security (for unemployment, maternity allowance, family allowance, sickness benefits, the old age pension). They extended civil and political rights to Aborigines, including the right to consume alcohol and be paid equal wages, and recognised group rights such as to land.

The recognition of specific rights and attempt to ameliorate the legacies of colonisation influenced the formation of an 'Indigenous Sector' made up of 'thousands of publicly funded organisations' that facilitate the capacity for self-determination (Rowse, 2002; Sullivan, 2011). These organisations include remote Community Councils and urban community organisations providing legal aid and health services; Land Councils; Native Title Representative Bodies; the now-disbanded national representative body Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC); peak policy-making bodies at state and national levels; and cooperatives providing housing and other services. The Indigenous Sector has allowed Indigenous people greater choice, control of policy and capacity to control their own affairs.

The inclusion has also put enormous effort into adapting mainstream institutional structures and practices in order that they better cater to Indigenous needs. Institutions have addressed institutional racism and ethnocentric assumptions to remove barriers to Aboriginal participation and outcome. They have provided among other things, cultural competence training to staff, trained and employed Indigenous staff, implemented positive discrimination measures (e.g. dedicated positions and special entry provisions), and developed 'two-way' approaches that incorporate culturally-specific knowledge and processes in normal practice. This effort has been undertaken in accord with the conceptual framework above.

Governments have facilitated the retention, recovery and revitalisation of cultural heritage. They have provided for museums, art galleries and 'keeping places' to research, preserve and display indigenous material culture, funded national celebrations and festivals, and promoted special days. Efforts have been especially marked in terms of symbolic recognition, like those of Prime Ministers Whitlam (who poured sand into the hands of a Gurindji elder to celebrate their ownership of their land (1975), Keating (who acknowledged dispossession and violence in the Redfern speech of 1992) and Rudd (who apologised in parliament in 2008 for past government actions). The national currency features Aboriginal figures from the national story, the national carrier flies a plane painted in an Aboriginal design, the forecourt of the parliament building features a large Aboriginal mosaic, and it may be becoming standard for Commonwealth Parliaments to open with a 'Welcome to Country' ceremony that indicates respect for original ownership.

These measures have helped Aboriginal capacity to engage with the wider society. The capacity is reflected in their political and discursive power (evident in the changes above and noting the successes in the 2012 Northern Territory election; see Rolls, 2014). There has also been some success in a redistributive sense. More equitable access has been provided to the social goods of education, health, housing and employment, there is a growing urban middle-class (Lane & Lane, 2008), more young people in universities (Pechenkina & Anderson, 2014) and a reduction in the life expectancy gap (Thomson et al., 2011).

These measures have resulted in a revaluing of Indigenous culture and cultural products. Though some Aborigines report institutional and individual racism, they are increasingly included as a matter of course in everyday social interaction, either as remarkable Aboriginal individuals or as unremarkable Australian citizens. The Australia Day Council and the national newspaper have for instance, named several Aborigines their 'Australian of the Year'. Widespread acceptance is evident in the largely supportive nature of the mainstream national and capital city newspapers, and television, the thousands who marched in solidarity with Aborigines in the Walks for Reconciliation of 2000, and the public support of a number of prominent Australians, including the head of the largest bank and a mining billionaire.

Relatedly, evidence points to the vast majority of Aborigines feeling a belongingness to the nation, of being Australian, while also belonging to their Aboriginal families and communities. This is indicated by the 4000 Indigenous people who enlisted in the Second World War (Reissman, 2012, 2014) and the majority of Aboriginal marriages, especially in the cities and among the better-educated, that are mixed (Heard, Khoo, & Birrell, 2009). Most Aborigines now live as natives of the same liberal-democratic and human rights culture

as their settler Australian compatriots, neighbours and partners, and are reasonably comfortable interacting with state institutions. There is little doubt that most would agree with the core values and democratic rights, liberties and responsibilities in the Australian Value Statement (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). As the Aboriginal sprinter Cathy Freeman did when she celebrated her win in a 1994 Commonwealth Games race by draping herself in both Australian and Aboriginal flags, they enjoy multiple affinities.

4. An Inclusion Ceiling

The previous section characterised later twentieth-century efforts to include Aborigines as successful. Morris (2001, p. 245) suggests that Aborigines 'have come to see themselves as indigenous subjects in their own right and not simply the objects of assimilation to be acted for or acted upon'. Self-confidence is one measure of the success of the multiculturalist approach taken to Aboriginal inclusion. The indicators of social advancement, political voice, citizen participation, popular acceptance and belongingness are others.

At the same time, there is evidence of persisting inequality and social separation that suggest that that inclusion is limited. Significant gaps remain in Aboriginal educational participation and attainment, health status, extent of home ownership and housing quality and overcrowding, unemployment and representation in the justice system (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013; de Bortoli & Thomson, 2009). The gaps are more extreme in remote communities than urban. In some dimensions, such as the rate of smoking or deaths in custody, early improvements are stalled. In others, such as sexual violence, youth suicide, imprisonment, substance abuse, and literacy and numeracy, the gaps may be worsening.

These remaining gaps appear to be indicators of a ceiling to social inclusion. They are often cited as evidence of continuing governmental racism, indifference or other failure. And informal discrimination does continue alongside formal anti-discriminatory measures in the delivery of service (Cunneen, 2006; Moore, 2009). Over the past decade or so there has been a retreat from multiculturalism around the world, based on the claim that it is divisive and separatist (Barry, 2001; Sowell, 2004). A retreat has occurred in respect of the Aboriginal inclusion in Australia (e.g. Johns, 2008), and the Howard government (1996–2007) took a more normalising and individualising approach (Austin-Broos, 2012; Sullivan, 2011).

The ceiling to inclusion is explained here in terms of a compromised Aboriginal engagement with the nation that is an unintended consequence of the attempts to include them. Depending as it has on the limited understandings institutionalised in public policy, the multiculturalist inclusion has invited Aboriginal political in-

terests to adopt the same emphases on cultural recognition and internal bonding social capital, and to neglect the socio-economic equality and outward-looking bridging capital that are equally necessary for inclusion as different-equals. In some cases, like claiming rights to land, policy has made it necessary to adopt those emphases. This explanation takes seriously the potential danger ethnic separatism may pose for wider social cohesion (Moran, 2011, pp. 2156-2166) especially, given its bias to cultural recognition, in the Aboriginal case. The other concern developed in the essay is that the multiculturalist inclusion is having negative outcomes for Aborigines themselves and may be contributing to their socio-cultural isolation and socio-economic marginalisation.

There are some signs of a possibly increasing Aboriginal sense of separateness and disengagement from the wider society that suggest the conclusion above. There is for instance, a continuing disengagement from standard schooling, reluctance to adopt public health messages and recent propositions for separate structures predicated on the idea of a distinct Indigenous epistemology and research methodology. It is to the ambivalence of Aboriginal desire to 'be included' that this essay turns. The essay explains the limits to further social inclusion as the result of the dynamics that have flowed from the multiculturalist inclusion and its inadequacy to increasingly diverse Aboriginal realities.

4.1. The Discursive Aboriginal Reality

The successes of the measures taken by Australian governments in their approach to the inclusion of Aboriginal people have been won largely on the back of the limited understandings of Aboriginality noted above and their institutionalisation in national policies, programs and practices. The same concepts and policies are also though, responsible for at least some of the waning of those successes. The concepts were always inadequate to the reality of Aboriginality and so less than fully effective in their implementation. Even in primitive cultures for instance, individuals do not replicate every facet of their culture, and stereotypes necessarily miss individual needs. In contemporary times, the approach to Aboriginal policy is increasingly inadequate to the more complex realities that are emerging, in part out of the very successes of the inclusion. More importantly, the approach is actively constraining that success.

Some Aboriginal activists have used the terms and conditions of the discourse and taken the political opportunities it has presented. Among them are the heads of bigger clans and those who are better educated in remote communities, many of whom serve as chairs of their community councils and can become 'big men' (Langton, 2008). Though the boundaries are not clear-cut, the focus in this essay is on the elites of the cities and towns of the southern and coastal regions of the

country. These are the leaders of relevant Indigenous Sector organisations, Indigenous sections in mainstream agencies and peak bodies, and academics. They have gained control of the interface with government and its funding, and appointments to and promotions within the many 'identified' positions (Pholi, 2012a). As 'interlocutors of government' (Rowse, 2005, p. 91), they have strategically taken up the invitation presented by policy discourse and participated in the dialogical creation of a mythological Aboriginality.

Activated by the privileged access to resources granted the Aboriginal subject of policy, notably in its authentic 'traditional' and disadvantaged forms, the urban elites are driven to approximate that subject in their politics. In order to secure their groups' access, they have 'seize[d] upon the minor differences' that distinguish them from those others with whom they nevertheless share their lives, and 'expand[ed] the identity gap between them' (see Kolsto, 2007, p. 161). They magnify the differences in the competition for access. This impulse to a 'narcissistic' focus on minor differences is strongest among groups whose differences from the wider society appear to outsiders to be relatively minor, though to insiders they may be affectively highly significant, indeed defining characteristics, as Ignatieff (1997) noted of the Yugoslav war.

There is clearly potential in this dynamic for social division, as in comparable situations in various parts of the world (Blok, 1998; Ignatieff, 1997; McCall, 2011). It is notable though, that in this case, Aboriginal urban elites direct much of their political entrepreneurship at the elaboration of a categoric difference that is in large part imagined by the state as a key means of their government. The elites mythicise the imagined ordinary culture and seek to take on its credentials. They amplify the differences between Aboriginality and a similarly monolithic Whiteness, making non- and anti-Whiteness additional signs of authenticity. And they stigmatise Whiteness and take on the status of innocent victim to Whiteness, and hence disadvantage. In this and what follows in the section, no judgement is made as to the validity of claims or the rightness or wrongness of positions taken; the intent is to indicate the political discourse and the Aboriginality being constituted (for relevant research literature see Moore, 2009, pp. 23-39, and for a Tasmanian case study pp. 166-195).

Via a constant stream of written and spoken word, visual art and other symbolic language, and in an infinite range of contexts—local and national cultural ceremonies and events; art openings; protest actions; public debates; election rallies; television, radio and newspaper reports and interviews; academic literature; government and consultancy reports; in autobiographies and political texts—the political elites signal the cultural authenticity of their constituencies. They assert their continuing kinship networks, communal structures and spiritual affiliation with, and responsibility to, their Country. They al-

lude to their ancient ancestors and respected Elders. They cloak their people in these credentials of authorised authenticity. Those in the southern states seek the credentials of those in the north and centre, adopting skin names and artistic styles (while those in more remote areas use their more traditional-looking members to win land claims). In peak bodies' national policy statements these credentials are established as applying to all. In international fora, Aboriginal representatives mimetically assert their oneness with landed and oppressed others in the third world (Harrison, 2003; Merlan, 2009; Niezen, 2005). In these ways, the elites build a discourse of bounded, solidary and monolithic cultural authenticity, one that is now continually refreshed on a new national Indigenous television station.

These urban elites exaggerate their small differences in part by Othering (Barth, 1969; Cohen, 1991) White Australia, establishing the properties of their Aboriginality/Blackness by what it is not: a similarly monolithic Whiteness. Adopting White self-criticism, they exploit the colonial history to represent Whiteness in negative terms, as characterised by selfish individualism, greedy competitiveness and bourgeois concern for success, health, stability, status and material comfort. This differentiation can be accompanied by explicit rejection of sameness with others, as Pat Dodson did when he rejected the suggestion that Aborigines are reasonably well-integrated in the wider society. His grounds were that the suggestion 'really denies the uniqueness of who the indigenous people are' (Alcorn, 2008). This constitutes neat Aboriginal difference and non-Whiteness.

4.2. The Discrepancies with Lived Reality

The dialectic of state and Aboriginal discursive effort has constituted a hyperreal (Eco, 1986) Aboriginality that has become real in its consequences (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Thomas & Thomas, 1928) and established strong claims on the state on the basis of indigeneity, difference and discrimination. It is routinely represented in government policies and programs and operationalised in the delivery of services (in schooling, health care, welfare, housing, justice, etc.) around the country. It is a factor of significant but variable power in Aboriginal self-perception, core to their affective and ontological security, and conditioner of their behaviour, around the country. It is also largely taken for granted by White Australians, and it contributes by ascription to Aboriginal identity. Aboriginal political leaders are deeply invested in it too, since state concessions rest on it. For all this, it is at odds with the realities of the Aboriginal everyday.

With globalisation and the inclusive reforms of the past forty years, cultural particularity is not as it seems and difference is less clear-cut than it was. Today's Aboriginal cultures are very different from those of earlier times and that of the pan-Aboriginal hyperreal, neither

impermeably bounded nor internally homogeneous (Moore, 2009, pp. 34-36). The culture in each locale differs from that in every other, according to the nature of the precolonial culture, the particular colonial history and its impacts on the earlier culture, and its contemporary geographic location vis-à-vis the rest of the population. Those cultures are changing in remote and urban locales as they intersect with global flows, electronic media, and with national society as transport improves and mining and tourism grow. They are deeply intersected by and incorporate much of the political and popular cultures of the West, with one of their few commonalities (of varying intensity) being the hyperreal Aboriginality and sense of self it produces.

Today's Aborigines are also very different from those of earlier times. The small urban middle class exemplifies their embeddedness in myriad social networks outside their notional Aboriginal community. They do not live by hunting and gathering, nor are they dominated by obligation to kin, community and traditional law. They are connected and intersubjectively share much with the non-Aboriginal others of their workplaces, social class, neighbourhoods, generations, sexual cultures and the like (Langton, 1993, pp. 28-32; Moore, 2011, pp. 428-429). Just as their daily lives are interconnected, so they are subjectively multiple and grow far beyond the assumed primitive metonym of the hypereal subject. They are simultaneously Aborigines and Australians, and the differences from other Australians are subtle rather than absolute.

The mis-match between the discursively imagined Aboriginality and everyday lived Aboriginalities makes the former constantly vulnerable to exposure. In Goffmanian terms, the unruffled Aboriginality of the discursive front stage is liable to descreditation by the messy lived back stage. The disjunctures are becoming increasingly evident, and leading to questioning and gradual erosion of the liberal consensus (Sutton, 2009). Why for instance, students in my courses quietly ask, ought an Aboriginal family whose children go to expensive schools, have extensive free access to tutoring? How, they wonder, can an urban Aboriginal community claim to run sustainable forestry on the basis of deep knowledge of the land? Why is it, trainee teachers ask tentatively, that they must learn how to teach Aboriginal students in culturally sensitive ways but not African refugees whose physical, social, linguistic and cultural differences are more clear-cut and whose needs are more urgent? The minor actual differences are troubling to many.

4.3. Disciplined Performance of Normative Aboriginality

The ever-present threat of the discrepancies to undermine wider faith, and with it the access to government resources, influences Aboriginal leaders to constantly refurbish the discourse and to rouse among

their constituencies a performative Aboriginality. Leaders press their constituencies to enact that Aboriginality: its originary authenticity, clear difference and imposed disadvantage. With occasional input they nudge what becomes a self-sustaining social dynamic that presses individuals to behaviourally enact that Aboriginality and so to obfuscate their actual immersion in multiple worlds and subjective growth beyond it.

In the southern state of Tasmania, the attributes of authenticity—body type, skin colour, native language, landedness, ancient social arrangements and the like—are virtually absent, though much effort has gone into symbolically recreating them. There is little other than minor differences to enact, and their comprehensive performance can cloak the actor in the mythic Aboriginality. Attendance at community events (funerals, festivals and other meetings), drinking at certain pubs and political activism can indicate one's loyalty. Speaking Aboriginal English can work similarly, as the otherwise urbane mainland Aboriginal actor Aaron Pedersen did when he used Aboriginal English as host of the 2012 NAIDOC Ball in Hobart. Asserting one's landedness too, as a recently-identifying student at my university did when he asked, on meeting a visiting Aboriginal presenter, 'What country you from bro?' (personal observation). Arguably for the similar purpose of establishing her credentials, an urban Aboriginal lecturer told her students that 'I go at least once a year to [my] Country, where I can feel my ancestors' (Walter & Tomlins-Jahnke, 2013).

Such enactment can assert one's sameness with Aboriginal insiders and difference from settler Australian outsiders. In accord with the political discourse, individuals can do the same by avoiding behaviours labelled as White. Not using Standard Australian English can indicate that the speaker is not guilty of wanting to be White or better than others. Non-Whiteness can also be demonstrated by routinely prioritising community events and family needs over work obligations, thereby demonstrating that White concern for career is a second priority.

Behaviours consistent with the discourse can convince the settler population, given the mythic (Barthes, 2000) character of the Aboriginality being enacted. The behaviours are necessary, but still may not win acceptance as insiders, since as Louis (2005) noted of the African American context, the politics mobilises minor differences to also exclude others who lay claim to belong. In Tasmania in the 1990s, a small group known as the Lia Pootah emerged who had recently discovered Aboriginal heritage and sought acceptance within the wider Aboriginal community. They undertook orthodox performances of Aboriginality—including the claim to be able to smell snakes in the bush as proof of their closeness to country—and gained some acceptance as Aborigines among the settler population. They however, lacked a recorded history of colonial subjugation,

and were actively marginalised by the dominant sector of the Aboriginal population as inauthentic 'pop-ups' and 'paper blacks' (Moore, 2009, pp. 209-213).

The dynamics here, including the potential of discrepant realities to endanger the politics, contestations over authenticity, policing of others' behaviour, and performative Aboriginality, are national, as some examples suggest. In a seminar at the University of Queensland, a female Aboriginal academic told participants who were not confident about their Aboriginality that it was innate (personal communication). Aboriginal author Leah Purcell admonished a Tasmanian Aboriginal woman in print for accepting the half-caste/full-blood classification schema (Purcell, 2002, p. 213). In a dispute in Victoria, a number of 'fair-skinned' Aboriginal people brought a Federal Court challenge to claims made by a journalist that they chose to identify as Aborigines for dubious material ends (Bodey, 2011; Federal Court of Australia, 2011). In another dispute, a remote Aboriginal woman and Member of the Northern Territory Parliament rejected an urban Aboriginal academic's claims to shared culture and understanding of remote peoples' lives (Rolls, 2014, pp. 139-141).

Other Aborigines confirm the national character of the dynamic. Because disadvantage is discursively equated with the Aboriginal sense of self, Aboriginality and belongingness can be actualised by the display of disadvantage. Aboriginal woman Kerryn Pholi (2012b) says that to do so, she might:

recount my family's experiences of deprivation, perhaps with anecdotes of unpleasant experiences from my childhood. I may describe my extended family's ongoing disadvantage, complete with examples of my various relatives' health, legal and financial woes. I may reveal my personal experience of racism...or conversely, if I am paler in complexion I can describe the emotional pain I feel when my Aboriginal identity is unrecognised...If all else fails I can talk about my personal grief over the suffering of "my people".

She argues that this is a feature of urban Aboriginality, as it is easier to mobilise this Aboriginality in the absence of classic cultural distinctiveness.

Deviant Aboriginality, appearing as compliance with mainstream values and norms, may take myriad forms. It may show in the adoption of public health messages like taking care with diet, alcohol and lifestyle, or full engagement with education or career. As Pholi (2012b) says, for an Aborigine:

to pursue opportunities to move away from disadvantage is to reject one's Aboriginal identity and one's own family and community ... the benefits of education, employment and a middle class lifestyle [are] anathema to those who treasure their disadvantaged "Aboriginal" identity.

Those who deviate can be pressured to normalise their behaviour. They may be characterised as wanting to be better than others, labelled an ‘Uncle Tom’, ‘coconut’, ‘blackfella for nothing’ or ‘up-town nigger’, names that challenge their Aboriginality and/or membership of the community (Morton, 1998). ‘Flash’ people, who put themselves outside the ‘Indigenous domestic moral economy’ to accumulate property, run the risk of being humiliated by rejection when they find themselves in need (Barwick, in Peterson & Taylor, 2003, p. 114). A person who declines a drink may be accused of ‘acting like a white man’ (Brady, in Peterson & Taylor, 2003, p. 113). This labelling can make it costly to transgress the norms.

Some individuals refuse the attractions of the model Aboriginality *and* the pressures to conform to it, and leave on display their aberrant interculturality, mixed loyalties, subjective multiplicity and capacity to negotiate the associated complexities. They suffer the challenges to their identity and belongingness that those behaviours attract. Torres Strait Islander, Professor Martin Nakata says (2006, p. 266) that when he and other Indigenous academics:

stray into perceived intellectualisms or activity that does not at first sight appear to have a direct relation to community interests, we can be called into question by our communities as to the relevance of our work and whether we are leaving community interests behind and becoming too immersed in the ways and thinking of the ‘White’ world...[We are pushed to consider] ‘are we members of the Indigenous community or the academic community? The choice is sometimes that stark.

This hints at the threat of exclusion from the Indigenous community. It is, he says, to ‘seek to regulate not just our thinking and intellectual activity, but also our identity’ (Nakata, 2006, p. 266). This is in line with Pearson’s statement that ‘political or identity strait-jackets...are imposed on’ Aboriginal children to bind them to his community (Pearson, 2000, p. 63). Nakata and others have the personal capabilities to blur the boundaries and soften the hard edges of the notionally exclusive alternatives, and find ways of negotiating being both Indigenous and academic, but many do not.

A number of individuals persist in their individualised Aboriginalities and publicly question the politics, and then the regulatory pressure can increase. Pholi (2012b) says that:

the silencing of Aboriginal dissenters is centred on the “legitimacy and “authenticity” of the Aboriginal speaker, rather than the quality of the speaker’s reasoning or expression. Silencing arguments also point to the speakers unsavoury character, which is evident through the offensive nature of his or her

ideas, as well as through his or her apparent pandering to a “racist” enemy force.

Following her own critique of the politics, she was told ‘you should not be proud of your disloyalty to your people’ (2012b). Aboriginal intellectuals Noel Pearson and Marcia Langton have both trenchantly critiqued the politics, and been the targets of a good deal of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal condemnation (Langton, 2007; Rothwell, 2008, p. 16).

4.4. *White Australian Contribution*

Identity is a product of self-assertion and others’ ascription (Jenkins, 1998), and the contemporary Aboriginal self is the product of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal actions outlined above. Indeed, many White Australians work with and for Aboriginal people as teachers, nurses, social and other community workers. In the main, they accept the hyperreal Aboriginality and apply it in their relationships with Aboriginal people (see Kowal, 2010; Lea, 2008), and so contribute to those peoples’ sense of self. They appreciate the need for ‘culturally appropriate’ service, accept the resentment directed at White Australia as justified, and feel they should neither intervene in self-determining Aboriginal pursuits nor assume that wider social norms are relevant.

These workers may worry about damaging culture, so neglect literacy and numeracy (Nakata, 2002, pp. 15-16), or excuse truancy as legitimate agency (Petray, 2013). They may wish to support Aboriginal family structures, so privilege potentially dangerous Aboriginal fostering arrangements over nurturing White alternatives (Moore, 2009, p. 313, note 38), or perpetrate racism by accepting without criticism Aboriginal behaviour that would not otherwise be accepted (Langton, see Zwartz 2008). In doing so, they contribute to the constitution of the Aboriginal hyperreality, and its compound effects.

It can be expected that these choices are made out of genuine belief, perhaps moral vanity (Pearson, 2007, p. 30), but also in the knowledge of the consequences of taking a more critical approach. Critics of the status quo are subject to a politics of embarrassment (Moore, 2009, pp. 201-205) that manipulates the notion that all critique is ‘ignorant, paternalistic or racist’ (Pholi, 2012b). Pholi says that as an Aborigine she ‘had the power to ruin a career with an accusation of insensitivity’, and as Rolls (2014, p. 145) says, her ‘experiences are typical’. The complexity ensures that those with whom Pholi worked would have faced formidable obstacles in defending themselves, which goes some way to explaining why so few do so. In any case, when issues do arise, institutions are often ‘out of [their] depth’ (Rolls, 2014, note 68), and do ‘nothing, or when [they do] seek appeasement rather than address’ (Rolls, 2014, p. 145). Individuals are on their own, liable

to the 'mau-mauing' that Peter Sutton expected when he argued that classical culture is part of the problem of Aboriginal health (Sutton, 2001, p. 151).

4.5. *The Inclusion Ceiling*

The elaborate discursive, performative and policing machinery (Foucault, 1972, p. 220) sketched above appears to be disturbing many Aborigines (Moore, 2009, pp. 32, 233-240) and compromising their engagement in national society (Moore, 2009, pp. 240-244, 296-297). The machinery regulates non-Aboriginal people in ways suggested by the timidity of the questions asked about the discrepancies between the discursive and lived realities. For Aborigines, the machinery impacts in urban and remote locations. In the latter it contributes to the choice of 'classical' behaviours like violence in dispute resolution, or fatalism about life's circumstances that negatively affect health and longevity (Sutton, 2001). The machinery can also lead some to demonstrate their non-Whiteness and Aboriginality by resisting inclusionary efforts. They may choose for instance, to disengage from school, not worry overly about diet (Gibson & Pearson, 1987), continue smoking when pregnant (Ivers, 2011) or be ambivalent about the kind of house cleaning or parenting needed for child health (McDonald et al., 2009, p. 346). In these and other behaviours, the pressures are leading individuals to withdraw from 'being included', and so securing their own multidimensional social exclusion.

At the root of this effect is the heightening by the machinery of the tensions that attend inclusion. Initially in the abstract and ultimately in the everyday, the machinery turns manageable tensions into irreconcilable oppositions. It makes inclusion apparently co-opted, Aboriginality antithetical to Whiteness and that which is shared with other humans, cultural change equivalent to cultural loss, and subjective multiplicity incompatible with Aboriginality. It has recognition become primary and inclusion secondary. These outcomes suggest that while the multiculturalist inclusion in the Aboriginal case may have initially rendered differential Aboriginal claims manageable through the language of human rights and civil liberties, as Kymlicka (2010) thinks, it has ultimately not done so. Instead, that very language has incited some claims-making based on exaggerated and mythic difference, and rendered them less manageable than they might otherwise be.

The approach has not adapted to take account of the social changes occurring with globalisation, and to which it has contributed. In Australia now, an unknown part of the problem of Aboriginal social exclusion and material disadvantage is the Aboriginality invented and defended for the governing purposes of the state and Aboriginal political elites.

5. **Through the Inclusion Ceiling?**

To this point, analysis has centred on the progressive approach taken by the Australian state to include Indigenous people in the wider society. The approach has sought to respect their cultural heritage and provide for their equality. In implementation the goal of recognition has prevailed over that of equality, and so constituted a ceiling to social inclusion. The analysis has suggested that the ceiling is ultimately an unintended consequence of the inadequate conceptualisation of Aboriginality that grounds the approach. Though abetted by strategic and unselfconscious Aboriginal agency, the conceptualisation and policy discourse have activated the generation of an exaggerated and unreal cultural difference, and a brittle, defensive strength.

The analysis suggests that the conceptualisation of Aboriginality must be refined if the inclusion ceiling is to be breached. The current conception in terms of an ordinary cultural authenticity, singular categoric identity and victimhood, makes all other forms less legitimate and drives the urge to difference. More sophisticated conceptions of cultural variability and change, simultaneous sameness and difference, identity multiplicity and mobility, and agentic capability, are critical if the tensions are to be made more manageable. In this, the everyday realities are instructive.

Some prominent Aboriginal leaders, amongst them Noel Pearson, Marcia Langton and Warren Mundine, demonstrate their subjective complexity, agency in transcending the oppositions, and embrace of some cultural change. They integrate in multiple networks of bonding and bridging type. They live and work within their local communities and the imagined national Aboriginal community. They also actively participate in social networks beyond those communities as Australian citizens. They negotiate the social interactions within and between those networks to become complex, expansive Aboriginal Australian selves. They respect classical Aboriginal cultures and the modern global, and demonstrate that it is possible to be culturally different from, and at the same time part of, the wider society in some respects and contexts.

These individuals and many others confirm the relationality and interculturality of contemporary Aboriginality and undermine the exclusive choice of Aboriginality or Australianness. Structural acknowledgement of these realities is necessary to further inclusion, insofar as it allows for the complexity that is actually so. The challenge is to develop policy that can foster expansive Aboriginalities. These individuals promote a 'constellation of challenging policy ideas' aimed at a 'radical centre' (Pearson, 2007) that avoids the shortcomings of the progressive left and neoliberal right. The policies of Pearson's Cape York Reform Agenda include:

a transition from 'passive welfare' to conditional welfare; re-engagement with the 'real economy' through local economic development and orbiting; a return to high quality/high expectation secondary boarding schools; direct confrontation of 'addiction epidemics' and neglectful parents; and training of a new indigenous leadership, which would take responsibility for the necessary changes (Burke, 2013, p. 307).

Critical analysis suggests that substantive culture in remote areas will limit the success of policies such as these. Martin (2001) found that the demand to resist relations of dependence runs up against cultural traditions that validate such relations, and that loyalties to immediate kin limit the capacity for autonomous individuality. Moreover, the fractured nature of the communities involved limits the moral and political legitimacy to lead social change. Burke found that orbiting between the Warlpiri home in central Australia and their diaspora (mostly Northern Territory and South Australian towns) did not build external social networks or the 'rooted cosmopolitan' mix of the traditional and modern envisaged by Pearson (Burke, 2013; also Pearson, 2009, pp. 292-295).

It appears then, that policies like those of the Cape York Reform Agenda may work only partially in remote areas. And they are also not sufficiently nuanced to account for the subtle differences in urban locations. They are useful however, in providing direction for policy development aimed at further inclusion. The idea of the 'radical centre' rejects the focus on colonisation, racism and trauma as sole cause of disadvantage, and highlights the necessity of structural adjustment *and* Aboriginal responsibility for inclusion. Also, while the notion of the 'bicultural' orbiting person may not capture the simultaneous sameness and difference of interculturality, it can contribute to the development of policies more appropriate to expansive Aboriginality. And the focus on localised policy development and governance will be helpful in accounting for the differences between remote and urban Aboriginal needs.

6. Conclusion

Australia has struggled for twenty years with the realisation that the progressive policy framework aimed at including Aborigines is beginning to fail. In this paper I have made a case for a policy response at Pearson's 'radical centre'. I have argued that the progressive approach has led to the continuing marginalisation of Indigenous people, paradoxically as a result of the culturally sensitive attempts to accommodate them and their differences. The very attempt has provoked an exaggeration of differences and with that, eventual limits to inclusion. I have argued that the way to further inclusion is to better approximate the subtle mix

of sameness and difference that most realise in their everyday lives. I conclude with two questions: 'How is contemporary Aboriginality to be conceived?', and 'How can policy provide for the real complexity of that Aboriginality?'. Resolutions to the dilemmas in both are required for greater Aboriginal inclusion as equals in Australian society and for the social cohesion of that society.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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