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Editors

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The Elements of Effective Program Design: A Two-Level Analysis

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Abstract
Policy and program design is a major theme of contemporary policy research, aimed at improving the understanding of how the processes, methods and tools of policy-making are employed to better formulate effective policies and programs, and to understand the reasons why such designs are not forthcoming. However while many efforts have been made to evaluate policy design, less work has focused on program designs. This article sets out to fill this gap in knowledge of design practices in policy-making. It outlines the nature of the study of policy design with a particular focus on the nature of programs and the lessons derived from empirical experience regarding the conditions that enhance program effectiveness.

1. Introduction: Understanding the Relationship between Policy Design and Program Design

Program design is part of a general effort on the part of governments to systematically develop and implement efficient and effective policies (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987; Bobrow, 2006). Policy design is typically done through the application of knowledge about policy means gained from experience and reason to the development and adoption of courses of action expected to attain desired goals or aims (Howlett & Rayner, 2013).

Not all policies and programs are designed in this sense, and some programs and policies emerge from processes such as patronage, clientelism, bargaining or log-rolling in which the quality of the causal or logical linkages between different components of a program may be less significant than other values, such as politi-cal or electoral gain or loss avoidance. However many do result from more deliberate efforts on the part of governments to forge a clear relationship between policy goals and the means used to address them (Dorst, 2011).

Policy design is thus a major theme of contemporary policy research, aimed at improving the understanding of how the processes, methods and tools of policy-making are employed to better formulate effective policies and programs, or to understand the reasons why such designs are not forthcoming (Howlett, Mukherjee, & Woo, 2014). However, while many efforts have been made to evaluate policy design (Howlett & Lejano, 2013), less work has focused on program design (Barnett and Shore 2009). This article sets out to fill this gap in our knowledge of design practices in government. It outlines the nature of the study of policy design with a particular focus on the design of programs and

the lessons derived from empirical experience regarding the conditions that enhance program effectiveness.

In doing so, the article is organized as follows. The main segment distills and presents existing knowledge about effective practice in program design. By illustrating programs as an intermediary level of policymaking situated between broad policy goals on one hand and specific settings of policy instrument combinations on the other, this section provides a brief elaboration of the evolution of modern principles defining effective design. Research findings and evidence about effective practice are then used to identify the various design needs that must be addressed for effective policy programs to emerge from a design process. In particular, this section derives lessons about maximizing complementarity between policy components, enhancing the goodness of fit between program elements and governance contexts and understanding the design constraints that limit the degrees of freedom available for program design.

2. The Components of Public Policy and Effective Program Design

In one sense of the term, program 'design' is a verb describing the manner in which the policy formulation process creates a program that is sensitive to context-specific constraints. However, "design" is also a noun describing the resulting policy product that emerges from the formulation process.

What is it that is 'designed' in program design? Here it is important to recognize (see Table 1) that policies are composed of several elements, distinguishing between abstract or theoretical/conceptual goals, specific program content or objectives and operational settings or calibrations (Hall, 1993; Howlett & Cashore,

2007; Howlett & Cashore, 2009). A policy design consists of specific types of policy tools or instruments that are bundled or combined in a principled manner into policy 'portfolios' or 'packages' in an effort to attain often multiple policy goals and aims. Programs are one component or level at which such designs emerge.

Each of these component elements is conceived and created by policy-makers in the course of the policy-making process. Some components of a policy are very abstract and exist at the level of general ideas and concepts about policy goals and appropriate types of policy tools which can be used to achieve them. Others are more concrete and specific and directly affect administrative practice on the ground. Programs exist between these two levels, operationalizing abstract goals and means and encompassing specific on-the-ground measures and instrument calibrations.

Seen in this larger context, a policy 'program' is a distinctive part of a policy portfolio comprised of a combination of policy instruments or program mechanisms, arranged to meet operationalizable policy objectives (Howlett, 2011). Policy programs thus occupy a central position translating high-level goals and instrument logics and aspirations into operationalizable measures which can be implemented on the ground in specific policy circumstances (Guy et al., 2006).

That is, as presented in Table 1, the elements occupying these different levels of policy design are related to one another in a nested fashion. Program design thus requires an integrated view of different levels of policy goals and means in order to ensure that the elements which compose a program reinforce rather than contradict or conflict with either general, abstract principles or specific on-the-ground measures and mechanisms (Meijers & Stead, 2004; Briassoulis, 2005).

Table 1. Components of a Policy Mix and the Position of Policy Programs Therein.

	Policy Content		
Policy Content	**High Level Abstraction (Policy-Level)**	**Operationalization (Program-Level)**	**On-the-Ground Specification (Measures-Level)**
Policy Ends or Aims	**POLICY GOALS** **What General Types of Ideas Govern Policy Development?** (e.g. environmental protection, economic development)	**PROGRAM OBJECTIVES** **What Does Policy Formally Aim to Address?** (e.g. saving wilderness or species habitat, increasing harvesting levels to create processing jobs)	**OPERATIONAL SETTINGS** **What are the Specific On-the-ground Requirements of Policy** (e.g. considerations about sustainable levels of harvesting)
Policy Means or Tools	**INSTRUMENT LOGIC** **What General Norms Guide Implementation Preferences?** (e.g. preferences for the use of coercive instruments, or moral suasion)	**PROGRAM MECHANISMS** **What Specific Types of Instruments are Utilized?** (e.g. the use of different tools such as tax incentives, or public enterprises)	**TOOL CALIBRATIONS** **What are the Specific Ways in Which the Instrument is used?** (e.g. designations of higher levels of subsidies, the use of mandatory vs voluntary regulatory guidelines or standards)

Source: Howlett & Rayner, 2013, p. 8.

2.1. An Example: U.S. Conservation Policy and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Therein

Exactly how different abstract and concrete policy elements should be combined to create effective and efficient programs is the central question and problem facing program designers. To illustrate the above conceptualization further, examples from United States land conservation policy and a constituent Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) program are presented here. The U.S. government through the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) currently makes payments of about US$1.8 billion per year through contracts with almost 700,000 farmers and landowners, who agree to withhold agricultural activity on 26.8 million acres of ecologically sensitive land (USDA, 2013). Instead of farming on sensitive areas of their land, these farmers agree to "remove environmentally sensitive land from agricultural production and plant grassers or trees that will improve water quality and improve waterfowl and wildlife habitat" (USDA, 2013). The largest PES program globally is the United States Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).

In implementing the CRP, the high-level abstraction of the policy-level (Table 2) includes the general policy *goals* and *instrument logics* which inform the general contours and content of both policy and program design, as well as mechanism, design. The main *goal* of overall land conservation policy in the U.S. in this sense recognizes that most of the benefits obtained from ecosystem services, such as water quality, carbon sequestration, climate regulation, recreation, nutrient cycling, erosion prevention and soil creation occur as positive externalities or benefits that are unaccounted for by the economy. In addition, these services emerge out of the preservation of natural systems and their conservation is often conflicting with extractive economic activities, such as intensive agriculture. In this example the conception of ecosystem services and their provision is a main general idea that governs policy development. The idea that payments can be made for the loss of ecosystem services is the instrument logic, or the body of norms that guide implementation preferences at the policy-level. This embodies the understanding that that since the economy will always undermine the provision of these non-market positive externalities, government mandated compensation can be used to link the interests of landowners and external actors to the conservation of ecosystems (Wunder, 2007).

Supporting operationalization at the program-level is the formulation of policy *objectives* and the related *mechanisms* that are used to meet them within this general policy goal and instrument logic (Table 2). The formal *objective* of the CRP program is the conservation of a specific set of ecologically vital land areas that ameliorate water quality, mitigate soil erosion and diminish the depletion of wildlife habitat (USDA, 2013).

Table 2. Components of the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program.

	Policy Content		
	High Level Abstraction (Policy-Level)	**Operationalization (Program-Level)**	**On-the-Ground Specification (Measures-Level)**
Policy Ends or Aims	**GOALS** **What General Types of Ideas Govern Policy Development?** Ecosystem services, or the benefits that people derive from natural systems, need to be secured since they are not accounted for and therefore undercut by the economy.	**OBJECTIVES** **What Does Policy Formally Aim to Address?** Conserving, re-establishing valuable land cover to help improve water quality, prevent soil erosion and reduce loss of wildlife habitat.	**SETTINGS** **What are the Specific On-the-ground Requirements of Policy** (e.g). Considerations about which land area types are a priority for the program, mechanisms for setting up payment-transfers through local agencies.
Policy Means or Tools	**INSTRUMENT LOGIC** **What General Norms Guide Implementation Preferences?** Payments for Ecosystem Services or the logic that the use of financial instruments or creating markets are effective ways to secure ecosystem services by transforming the conservation of positive externalities into financial benefits for local providers.	**MECHANISMS** **What Specific Types of Instruments are Utilized?** Conditional cash transfers or payment contracts with landowners to conserve instead of develop ecologically sensitive areas.	**CALIBRATIONS** **What are the Specific Ways in Which the Instrument is used?** (e.g) Rate of yearly payments, length (years) that contracts are valid, enrollment eligibility, , adjusting for ecological sensitivity land over time.

The *mechanisms* or the specific types of instruments adopted by the CRP program take the form of conditional cash transfers or payment contracts with landowners to conserve ecologically sensitive acres on their land. Supplementary instruments in the 'package' symbolized by the CRP, include cost-sharing schemes by the implementing agency, in this case the Farm Service Agency (FSA) active in each state. Specific on-the-ground measures then involve adjustments to policy settings and the calibration of policy tools and tool mixes. In the CRP example (Table 2), the specific policy *settings* are the requirements related to the classification of land-use, land-cover types (such as wetland or riparian buffer zones or wildlife corridors) and the conservation priorities assigned to each, as well as other components such as how land parcels should be valued as well as choosing and setting up necessary payment arrangements through local land agencies. These on-the-ground settings then relate to the specific *calibrations* of the instruments contained within the CRP, including such features as the regular adjustments and fine-tuning of payment amounts, contract lengths and eligibility criteria based on economic indicators such as national budgets and inflation.

3. Policy Programs and Policy Design: A Short History

The main emphasis of recent policy design research has been on the importance of utilizing the full range of policy components available when putting together a program while avoiding unnecessary duplication and conflicts between program components (Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998). Contemporary design thinking additionally recognizes the limitations placed on the adoption of program elements by their situation within an overall policy framework, and the need to match the more technical aspects of government financial and human resource availability and capabilities with existing levels of administrative capacity, budgeting and personnel resources, and other similar requirements of policy implementation.

Over time, researchers have articulated a series of principles to help promote better and more effective policy designs. Maxims for effective design developed in the late 1950s, for example, focused on efficiency concerns and urged the parsimonious use of policy tools. An oft-cited rule proposed by the Nobel Prize winning economist Jan Tinbergen in 1952, for instance, suggested that optimal designs emerged when the number of policy tools was directly proportional to the number of goals a policy was expected to achieve (Tinbergen, 1952; del Rio & Howlett, 2013). This research obtained a dynamic component in the 1970s when scholars began to deal with questions about the proper 'sequencing' or phasing of policy efforts over time

(Taeihagh, 2013). Studies by Doern and his colleagues, for example, promoted the idea that effective program design involved the initial use of the least-coercive instrument expected to be able to address a problem, with governments moving up 'the scale of coercion' to use more intrusive instruments to achieve their policy goals only in response to the failure of less coercive tools to achieve policy goals and objectives (Doern & Phidd, 1983; Doern & Wilson, 1974; Woodside, 1986).

In recent years program design thinking has refined and expanded upon these insights. The articulation of principles of what constitutes a "good" design has evolved from thinking about relatively simple 'one goal—one instrument' situations to address issues related to the use of more complex policy mixes or bundles of tools that aim to unite multiple interconnected goals and the means to achieve them across multiple levels of government (Howlett & del Rio, 2014). Daugbjerg and Sonderskov (2012) in their review of organic food policies in Denmark, Sweden, UK and the US, for example, noted that "significant growth in green markets is most likely to result where a combination of policy instruments directed at the supply side and demand side of the market is simultaneously implemented" (p. 415).

In pursuing research into the question of how to best formulate deliberate packaging of policy elements into programs targeted to meet certain policy goals, scholars and practitioners have focused on 'balancing' two aspects of the policy relationships set out in Table 1. These are the 'policy-program' linkages and the 'program-measures' ones highlighted in that table (see Table 3).

Dealing with 'policy-program linkages' involves the need to set program objectives and mechanisms that fit overall, broader policy goals and instrument logics. In the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program case set out above, for example, the policy-program linkages establish the program's objective of preventing soil erosion, improving water quality and preserving wildlife habitat as needed to uphold the overall policy aim of conserving ecosystem services through the use of financial incentives encouraging conservation. 'Program-measure linkages', on the other hand, establish the need to fit program mechanisms to specific on-the-ground policy measures. In the CRP case, this involves ensuring payment agreements between the Government and landowners reflect the priorities given to the conservation of different land types and to monitor how successfully these agreements are implemented in practice through the fair assessment of yearly payments and contract lengths, for example.

Principles and practices of program design related to these two general areas of concern are set out in more detail below.

Table 3. Program Level "Needs" for Effective Design.

Policy Content					
High-Level Abstraction (Policy-Level)		**Operationalization (Program-Level)**		**On-the-Ground Specification (Measures-Level)**	
POLICY GOALS *What ideas govern policy development?*	**Policy–Program Linkages (I)**	OBJECTIVES *What does the policy formally aim to address?*	**Program–Measure Linkages (II)**	SETTINGS *What are the specific aims of policy?*	
INSTRUMENT LOGIC *What norms guide implementation preferences?*		MECHANISMS *What are the specific types of policy instruments or elements are how are they utilized?*		CALIBRATIONS *What are the specific ways for using the instruments?*	

4. Principles for Designing Programs: Policy-Program Linkages (I)

Studies over the past two decades exploring 'smart regulation' in environment policy and in land use management and planning (Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998; Rayner & Howlett, 2009; Ben-Zadok, 2013) have helped underline the significance and effectiveness of program designs that are compatible with existing governance conditions. Borne out of such studies, several principles have emerged to illustrate and instruct how effective policy-program linkages can be designed.

4.1. Goodness of Fit: Matching Governance Mode and Policy Capacities

One such principle is the notion of 'goodness of fit". That is, as set out above, effective program designs need to reflect and respond to the specific contextual features of the particular policy sector(s) that they involve. How well a program is able to align itself with context-dependent policy realities determines its "goodness of fit" within an existing governance structure and the various other policy regime elements at the international, national, sub-national and local levels of governments within which it is embedded (Howlett, 2011). Different governance styles and preferences at each level require and influence specific types of state and social actor capacities and capabilities and these limitations and strengths inform judgments about the *feasibility* of program-level options and alternative arrangements of objectives and mechanisms.

Questions of goodness of fit thus connect program design with a central concern of policy analysis, the *ex ante* feasibility of instruments and their settings in a larger political context (Meltsner, 1972; Majone, 1989). While it is true that program designs that might appear infeasible in terms of goodness of fit can subsequently turn out to be effective (or else policy innovation would be an even more rare occurrence than it actually

is), judgments about feasibility are an established feature of policy advice. For example, studies of governance modes and 'policy styles', mostly stemming from Europe and North America throughout the 1980s–1990s (see for example, Richardson, Gustafsson, & Jordan, 1982; Freeman, 1985; Kiss & Neij, 2011) described several common patterns of governance arrangements that need to be reflected in policy program designs in order for these designs to be considered feasible and thus improve their chances of adoption. While many possible permutations and combinations of such governance arrangements exist, recent policy and administrative studies have focused on four basic types or "governance modes" found in many jurisdictions (see Table 4).

Each mode of governance listed in Table 1 broadly displays a different focus, form of control, aim and preferred service delivery mechanism and procedural policy orientation which affect and inform design practices and contents. Government actions through legal and network governance, for example, can change many aspects of policy behaviour but do so indirectly through the alteration of the relationships existing between different kinds of social actors. This is unlike corporate and market governance, each of which involves a preference for more overt state direction. The program elements of policy designs must incorporate knowledge about these particular characteristics and preferences if they are to be considered feasible or appropriate.

Claims and counterclaims about feasibility have a strongly rhetorical character and disputes over these claims is a characteristic feature of many design processes. A key insight of contemporary research into the design of programs that successfully address policy aims is that designing involves thinking about and coordinating aspects of policy arrangements which occur over multiple levels of policy activity (Howlett & del Rio, 2014). Activities at all of these levels, along with the details of implementation, must be coordinated and integrated if optimal results are to be attained.

Table 4. Different Governance Modes and Policy Capacity Considerations.

Mode of Governance	Central Focus of Governance Activity	Form of State Control of Governance Relationships	Overall Governance Aim	Prime Service Delivery Mechanism	Key Procedural Tool for Policy Implementation
Legal Governance	Legality - Promotion of law and order in social relationships	Legislation, Law and Rules	Legitimacy - Voluntary Compliance	Rights - Property, Civil, Human	Courts and Litigation
Corporate Governance	Management - of Major Organized Social Actors	Plans	Controlled and Balanced Rates of Socio-economic Development	Targets - Operational Objectives	Specialized and Privileged Advisory Committees
Market Governance	Competition - Promotion of Small and Medium sized Enterprises	Contracts and Regulations	Resource/Cost Efficiency and Control	Prices - Controlling for Externalities, Supply and Demand	Regulatory Boards, Tribunals and Commissions
Network Governance	Promotion of Inter-actor organizational Activity	Collaboration	Co-Optation of Dissent and Self-Organization of Social Actors	Networks of Governmental, and Non-Government Organizations	Subsides and Expenditures on Network Brokerage Activities

Source: Considine & Lewis, 2003.

Not surprisingly, while the level of concern for matching governance context and program elements is always high it becomes even more complex and charged when the policy or program area extends beyond the jurisdiction of a single level of government to incorporate such multi-level governance (MLG) considerations.

This is well illustrated by the case of environmental policy-making and program design across the nations of the European Union (EU) after 1960. In many of these countries a previous penchant for the use of regulatory and command-and-control instruments aligned with more active forms of state governance have given way to more market-based tools as governance arrangements in general at the EU level have shifted in this direction (Jordan, 2005). However within this general tendency a great variety now exists today in the EU with respect to the *type* of market or economic-based tools preferred in each individual member country (Jordan, 2005). For example, evaluations of environmental policy program arrangements have highlighted that moves towards planning and 'steering' in such contexts involve indirect co-ordination of key actors by governments, requiring "a high level of government policy capacity to identify and utilize specific policy tools capable of successful moving policy targets in a required direction" (Howlett & Rayner, 2013; Arts, Leroy, & van Tatenhove, 2006). Nordic nations which have corporatist governance conditions and fiscal and other capacities that allow a better fit with 'second-generation' market based instruments (MBIs) such as emissions trading, whereas less-wealthy European countries "are still employing first-generation MBIs

such as simple effluent taxes and user charges" (Jordan, 2005, p. 486). "Goodness of fit" involving judgments about the feasibility of program elements within overall governance arrangements thus plays a key role in designing effective programs both in state-level jurisdictions and at the EU level. Better program designs ensure programs content and pre-requisite conditions match governance contexts.

4.2. Degrees of Freedom: The Impact of Layering

However, as the EU case also shows, even with a high capacity for action, not all possible program options may be available to designers. A second design consideration is thus one directed at the relative ease or difficulty with which policy designers can change the status quo given the embeddedness or tractability of past policy and program choices. Conceptually, if unlimited 'degrees of freedom' are available to policy-makers then any combination of policy tools and program objectives might be possible in any circumstance (Howlett & Rayner, 2013). However, practical experience with large-scale institutional changes has suggested that the existence of this amount of 'elbow-room' for mixing or designing policy elements is uncommon and many program design contexts are, rather, heavily 'path dependent' (Pierson, 2000; David, 2005).

Other than in completely new areas of policy, or in cases where political punctuations have led to a full re-think or overhaul of old policy, most policy and program designers typically work with restricted 'degrees of freedom' or within constraints created by layers of

already existing policy mixes that cannot be easily altered (Thelen, 2003; van der Heijden, 2011). As corroborated by evidence from studies of the evolution of sectors such as welfare policy and natural resources over long periods of time, many existing policy combinations developed incrementally through a gradual historical process of the piecemeal addition or alteration of elements of policies and programmes (Lindblom, 1959; Howlett & Migone, 2011). Such mixes may be 'disorganized (Bode, 2006) and cry out for rationalization but are nevertheless difficult to change (Hacker, 2005).

Many sustainability strategies, for example, have suffered from incremental adjustment through *layering*, or the process whereby new elements are simply added to an existing regime without abandoning previous ones (van der Heijden, 2011; Thelen, 2003). Many efforts at the integration of various resource management regimes, for instance, have failed when powerful interests are able to keep favourable goals, instruments and settings, such as unsustainable fishing or timber cutting quotas that support an industry, and limit the impact of new policy initiatives (Rayner & Howlett, 2009).

The temporality of these policy development processes place constraints on contemporary designers and like the governance contexts cited above, is a key issue in program design. The deadweight of the past necessitates the examination of the pre-existing historical organization of policy components in order to gauge the feasibility of moving specific design options forward (Christensen, Laegreid, & Wise, 2002). Effective program design must take these temporal contexts into account in proposing new remedies; often leading to an emphasis on "patching" policy rather than 're-packaging' it altogether (Howlett, Mukherjee, & Woo, 2014; Howlett & Rayner, 2013).

5. Principles for Designing Programs: Program-Measure Linkages (II)

Effective program design must address both policy-program level and the program-measure level of interactions among program elements (see Table 3). On the ground program elements often involve aspects of what Elinor Ostrom (2011; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011) designated as the 'rules' of institutional design and analysis. These include designing program components which cover aspects such as:

- *Boundary rules*: Who is covered by this program? Is participation and coverage automatic or is a new participant allowed to join paying some kind of entry charge, fee or tax?
- *Position rules*: How does an actor move from being a target of a program activities to one with a specialized task in program implementation, such as the chair of a management committee?

- *Scope rules*: What activities are covered by the program?
- *Choice rules*: What choices do various types of actors have in relation to the actions they can or are expected to take in the program?
- *Aggregation rules*: What understandings exist concerning how actors can affect or alter the rules affecting their actions. Do certain actions require prior permission from, or agreement of, others?
- *Information rules*: What information about the program or relevant to it is held secret, and what information is made public?
- *Payoff rules*: How large are the sanctions that can be imposed for breaking any of the rules identified above? How is conformance to rules monitored? Who is responsible for sanctioning nonconformers? How reliably are sanctions imposed? Are any positive rewards offered? (Ostrom, 2011, pp. 20-21).

Achieving effectiveness with respect to deploying program mechanisms at this level relies upon ensuring mechanisms, calibrations, objectives and settings display 'coherence', 'consistency' and 'congruence' with each other (Howlett & Rayner, 2007). Within this general rubric, however, several specific principles of effective program design also exist. Two of these—maximizing complementary effects and the need to balance the attainment of equity, efficiency, economy and environmental concerns—are discussed below.

5.1. Maximizing Complementary Effects

Policy design studies have pointed out that many existing policy mixes are not comprised exclusively of tools or elements that complement and enhance each other (Grabosky, 1995). Grabosky (1995) and other scholars investigating policy combinations throughout the latter half of the 1990s, for example, noted that policy packages and programs combining command-and-control regulation with modes of voluntary compliance can be internally contradictory and should be avoided in effective design.

One key principle at this level of design analysis and practice, therefore, is to maximize complementary relationships while mitigating incompatibility between policy elements in the formulation of policy portfolios (Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998). Evidence from the drive for renewable energy and energy efficiency as a consequence of climate change and energy security concerns in the last two decade, for example, has shown that internally conflicting elements of policy mixes often elicit contradictory responses from those who are the targets of a program (Del Rio, Silvosa, & Gomez, 2011; Boonekamp, 2006). This finding is common in many sectors where using both regulation and voluntary compliance measures in the same program

at the same time undermined the realization of an intended program objective. While some programs can contain duplicative elements and the redundancy or resiliency inherent in them may actually help to ensure that the stated policy goals are achieved, in most cases this is not the result (Grabosky, 1995; Braathen, 2005; Braathen, 2007). Rather, as Hou and Brewer (2011) have noted, programs composed of tools that complement or supplement each other—for example, the use of command and control regulation to prevent undesirable behaviour while simultaneously providing financial incentives to encourage desirable behaviour—will normally achieve more effective policy responses.

5.2. Balancing Equity, Efficiency, Economy and Environmental Concerns

A second concern centers less on policy tools and their calibrations and more on program 'settings' or the operationalization of specific program objectives. Numerous case studies of programs, including social policy experience in Australia and United States, have suggested that attaining four general principles in program design at the program-measure interface is critical for program effectiveness: namely achieving "equity, efficiency, economy and environment" in program design (Stanton & Herscovitch, 2013).

In the context of programs such as those involving progressive taxation, social security benefits, health insurance and retirement incomes, for example, equity is understood to have both a proportional (based on different resource endowments of policy targets) and equal (equal treatment of targets with similar endowments) component and a superior program design takes both aspects into account. For example, proposals for national disability insurance programs in Australia involved a setting of 'proportionality' or unequal treatment of policy targets based on different degrees of disabilities. However it also included an equity component in fostering equal treatment of the same disability across the nation (Stanton & Herscovitch, 2013). Addressing 'efficiency' as part of a policy program also often takes the shape of meeting larger economic goals while also attaining environmental goals such as sustained growth. Returning to the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) example cited above, one of the main critiques of the scheme was that once the contracts were signed, farmers were locked in to contracts without any scope for regular inflation adjustments. Designing inflation adjustment mechanisms into the CRP could address this shortcoming in the program's efficiency and enhance its environmental effectiveness.

The principle of 'economy' relates to matching the cost of program initiatives and elements to budgetary and personnel resources and balancing these two aspects. But as Justen, Schippl, Lenz, & Fleischer (2014)

and Justen, Fearnley, Givoni, & Macmillen (2014) note, participation is a key component in policy and program design, not just for legitimation purposes, but because it can bring new information to the design process which formal analyses can miss. Meeting the need for participatory and inclusive collaboration in policy program design can be attained by managing the coexistence of demand-side and supply-side policies and their constituent policy actors (Daugbjerg & Sonderskov, 2012). This is especially the case in programs pertaining to the deployment of new technologies such as renewable energy and energy efficiency which require the coordinated participation of both producers and consumers. Along the same vein, encouraging collaborative ties between different types of policy actors can make programs more effective by strengthening knowledge linkages and fostering innovation.

Several design techniques exist which can help promote effective program designs meeting these goals and their combination. As Sovacool (2012) noted in his assessment of ten renewable energy programs in developing countries, mutually supportive combinations can be encouraged while others are discouraged or changed on a pilot or experimental basis. That is, "effective programs typically begin with pilot programs or with feasibility assessments before installing systems and scaling up to larger production or distribution volumes" (p. 9159). Such pilot programs need to be carefully protected from political pressure to evaluate them prematurely, causing adoption of program elements that subsequently prove problematic or rejection of those with latent value, a problem recognized early on in the literature on program evaluation (Weiss, 1970).

6. Summary: Towards Effective Program Design

Policy design is an activity conducted by a range of policy actors at different levels of policy-making in the hope of improving policy-making and policy outcomes through the accurate anticipation of the consequences of government actions and the articulation of specific courses of action to be followed to achieve different levels of policy goals and ambitions. In a program design perspective this is to be accomplished by improving assessments of both the theoretical effectiveness as well as the feasibility of policy alternatives at both the policy-program level and the program-measures interface.

That is, each "policy" or program is a complex 're-gime' or arrangement of abstract, operationalized and on-the-ground ends and means-related content which exists in a specific governance setting and which change over time. In contrast to an older tradition of program design and evaluation which tended to treat programs in isolation from the larger policy context, the discussion here has located program design firmly within the context of designing complete policy pack-

ages. In this perspective the central concerns in the design of programs are related to answering questions about how mixes of policy components are constructed, which methods yield superior results in developing these mixes and what is the likely result of their (re)design.

Contemporary design discussions at the policy-program level center on the articulation of principles such as "goodness of fit" in policy formulation, governance and steering, and the 'degrees of freedom' which formulators or designers have in carrying out their work both over space and over time. These complement and advance notions at the program-mechanism level promoting parsimony in program designs and the need for coherence, consistency and congruence in design relationships and components. At this level efforts have been made to articulate various methods through which designs can meet concerns for equity, efficiency, economy and environmental quality while maximizing complementary interactive effects and minimizing negative or counter-productive ones.

Table 5 summarizes the design principles set out above which can help ensure better policy and program integration through improved linkages between different policy components at the two levels cited above.

What this article has highlighted is that by understanding the nesting of effective program design at the two levels of policy-program and program-measures, program designers can improve or optimize their designs in given historical and institutional contexts. Understanding governance arrangements and how past policy processes have created and modified the elements of existing programs is critical to evaluating the chances of success of policy rules and on-the-ground measures in accomplishing higher level goals and objectives. This realization is helping contemporary program designers in their efforts to deal with policy problems that increasingly demand complex governmental responses.

Table 5. Balancing Policy Elements for Effective Program Design.

Policy Content				
High-Level Abstraction (Policy-Level)	**Policy-Program Linkages**	**Operationalization (Program-Level)**	**Program – Measures Linkages**	**On-the-Ground Specification (Measures-Level))**
GOALS *What ideas govern policy development?* LOGIC *What norms guide implementation preferences?*	*Goodness of Fit* with • Governance styles (legal, corporate, market or network); • Existing state capacities and social capabilities • Multi-level policy-making *Degrees of Freedom* • Working within constraints and existing layers of policy component mixes • Accounting for temporality and historical arrangements of policies	OBJECTIVES *What does the policy formally aim to address?* MECHANISMS *What are the specific types of policy instruments or elements are how are they utilized?*	*Maximizing Complementary Effects* • Assessing interactions between multiple policy components • Reducing internally conflicting elements and attaining coherence, consistency and congruence between program elements and measures *Balancing the '4 Es' in policy settings* • Equity (both proportionality and equality) • Efficiency (alignment with economic goals such as employment and growth) • Economy (managing budgetary costs) • Environmental Concerns (maintaining sustainability of programs)	SETTINGS *What are the specific aims of policy?* CALIBRATIONS *What are the specific ways for using the instrument?*

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Linkages of Electoral Accountability: Empirical Results and Methodological Lessons

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Abstract
A basic theory of electoral accountability is widely accepted by academic opinion: voters cause politicians to gain or lose office through periodic elections, thereby influencing policy through the threat of electoral sanction. Empirical studies run the gamut from findings of strong support for this theory, to mixed or conditional support, to weak or negative results. When electoral processes are analyzed in terms of two distinct causal linkages within a three-part chain of accountability, however, positive findings are revealed as weaker than they appear while a compelling trend emerges toward findings ranging from conditional to negative in the last two decades. This trend is visible in three topical areas—economic voting, political corruption, and ideological congruence—and it holds for both presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as for a variety of electoral systems. The new electoral skepticism's unsettling results and insightful methods may help to improve future research and reform efforts alike.

Issue
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1. Introduction

Widespread concern about "democratic deficits" in late-modern politics often responds to the power of *unelected and unaccountable* agents, whether governmental, social, or economic. But what about *elected but unaccountable* agents? According to a sizeable body of research in political science, such a phenomenon is no Frankenstein of the imagination but rather a normal feature of the democratic landscape. Increasing numbers of empirical studies in the last two decades, as well as theoretical reflections over a considerably longer period, suggest that periodic elections are poor vehicles of democratic accountability. How much truth is there in this suggestion?

A deeply entrenched conventional wisdom, popular and scholarly alike, places an "electoral connection" (see Mayhew, 1974) between citizens and governors at the heart of democracy: the former are supposed to control the latter by rewarding them with electoral victory or punishing them with electoral defeat. On the

other hand, the development of what might be called "electoral skepticism" over the last two decades has presented a broad front. Studies in the history of ideas have established that elections were understood in the formative years of republican and constitutional thought as supplanting popular power more than enabling it, and that other, non-electoral procedures of accountability have traditionally been preferred by democrats (Manin, 1997; Maloy, 2008, 2011; McCormick, 2011). Analysis of the empirical realities of modern elections has suggested that the conditions under which they could be interpreted as vehicles of accountability are rarely present, leading to a perceived need to substitute specialized "accountability agencies" (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999, pp. 50-51) or "horizontal accountability" (Schedler, 1999, pp. 23-25).

Recent efforts to assess the state of our knowledge about electoral accountability, however, have overlooked the trend toward electoral skepticism (Carson & Jenkins, 2011; Pande, 2011; Ashworth, 2012), or else have engaged it in relatively narrow institutional con-

texts (Maravall, 2010). A cognitive gap seems to separate optimists who ignore the grounds for skepticism and skeptics who take accountability deficits for granted and see little potential contribution from further study. My analysis attempts to bridge this gap by bringing optimistic and skeptical studies into direct engagement. Based on evidence from democracies around the world, including both presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as both pluralitarian and proportional electoral systems, I conclude in favor of electoral skepticism across the board. Elections as we know them cannot provide immunity against serious deficits of democratic accountability, though they might remain socially valuable in other respects.

Section 2 outlines an original conceptual framework for assessing electoral accountability empirically, based on the crucial distinction between two halves of a causal chain: the vote-sanction linkage and the sanction-policy linkage. Section 3 reviews recent empirical studies in three key areas of research: economic voting, political corruption, and ideological congruence. I then address in Section 4 specific problems with common methodological choices in studies of electoral accountability. My concluding section explains how better practices in designing empirical studies and interpreting their results can improve our understanding of where and how far electoral accountability can and does obtain.

2. Conceptual Structure of Electoral Accountability

The empirical realities of electoral processes, as of many political phenomena, are baroque, complex, and multidimensional—in a word, messy. Scholarly studies of elections are legion and necessarily reflect the messiness of their subject, frequently framing their findings by using terms like "accountability," "responsiveness," and "representation" in rough-and-ready fashion. Knowing or saying everything there is to know or say is impossible, but imposing conceptual parameters on the field of study can at least enable us to aspire to consistency in and clarity about the terms of analysis.

The basic idea behind electoral accountability is that periodic elections should allow voters to reward and punish politicians for governmental conduct, thereby inducing politicians to engage in anticipatory behavior that is responsive to voters' interests (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999, p. 29). This idea must be distinguished from three related concepts: discursive accountability, intrastate checks, and responsiveness. First, the kind of accountability which is supposed to reflect the special role of elections in a democratic state involves more than discursive exchange or the circulation of information; it also involves sanctions. Elections serve this purpose because they are valued not only as an occasion for public debate ("accountability" in the minimal, etymological sense) but also as a sanctioning mechanism (Mainwaring, 2003, pp. 12-14).

Second, periodic elections are supposed to respect the concept of popular sovereignty by giving power to one set of people, voters, over another, politicians. In formal terms, a hierarchic or "vertical" relation is set up between principal and agent (Moreno, Crisp, & Shugart, 2003, p. 80), a relation that may overlap with but is nonetheless different from "horizontal" or "intrastate" checks between agencies of government (Kenney, 2003, p. 50; Mainwaring, 2003, pp. 20-22). Third, responsive behavior by governmental agents may be considered the end, and accountability (i.e. vertical sanction) the means, of democratic elections. Electoral accountability is therefore not equivalent to democratic responsiveness but rather is meant to describe institutionalized relations of power that cause responsiveness (Ferejohn, 1999, p. 131).

The distinction between accountability and responsiveness is particularly elusive. Because both are pieces of the broader puzzle of political representation, these two concepts are often tacitly conflated in the design and interpretation of empirical research (e.g. Kassow & Finocchiaro, 2011, pp. 1019-1023). Yet electoral sanction and responsive government are distinct phenomena, and either one may exist in the absence of the other. Thus voters may actually reward some politicians with electoral victory and punish others with electoral defeat without actually seeing public policy steered in responsive ways, while politicians may actually serve voters' real or imagined interests without their political careers' actually depending on that fact. Indeed some advocates of the "political economy" approach to electoral studies now believe that elected politicians' propensity to deliver responsive policy may be an independent function of their "types" (i.e. responsive or otherwise) rather than of any pressures exerted on them while in office (see Ashworth, 2012). This is called a "selection" (or prospective) model as opposed to a "sanction" (or retrospective) model of electoral control.

It helps to think of electoral accountability, then, as part of a chain of causal processes (cf. Powell, 2004, pp. 97-99) within the larger phenomenon of political representation, revolving around sanction as the distincitve middle term. In a formula, (a) *periodic elections* are supposed to lead to (b) *effective sanctions*, which are in turn supposed to lead to (c) *responsive government* (see Figure 1). The vote-sanction linkage refers to accountability in the narrowest sense, while the sanction-policy linkage (ending in responsiveness) refers to the most significant causal ramification of electoral accountability.

To be sure, it is helpful to avoid conflating the terms "accountability" and "responsiveness," as the metaphor of a chain illustrates. Yet it would be odd to study one half of this causal chain without regard to the other. After all, ordinary citizens have common-sense reasons for caring about policy outcomes and about their votes' ability to affect those outcomes, and political scientists do in fact attempt to study both linkages in

tandem. As long as we bear in mind that these two distinct but related causal processes (or linkages) may present distinctive challenges for research, we can benefit from a critical review of recent empirical studies that address either or both of these linkages in the chain.

VOTE – periodic elections are illuminated
by studies of: voting behavior
public opinion
political psychology

↓

SANCTION – effective sanctions are illuminated
by studies of: electoral outcomes
electoral systems

↓

POLICY – responsive government is illuminated
by studies of: policy outcomes
official behavior
ideological congruence

Figure 1. The Causal Chain of Electoral Accountability.

3. Empirical Tests of Electoral Accountability

This section will review findings in three major fields of study which typically address core questions of electoral accountability: economic voting, corruption, and congruence. The review is not meant to be comprehensive, since not every study within each field is designed to shed light specifically on the problem of electoral accountability, but it does capture the wide range of accountability results which actually exists in each literature, from positive to mixed to negative. Section 4 will then develop a more systematic analysis of the conceptual and methodological strengths and weaknesses of empirical studies that substantially address electoral accountability through distinctive choices about data (see Tables 1 and 2).

3.1. Economic Voting

The literature on economic voting has tended to take the causal chain of electoral accountability whole, purporting to measure not only the vote-sanction linkage but also the sanction-policy linkage. Typically some measure of electoral performance is used as the dependent variable, with various measures of economic performance as independent variables. If good and bad economies lead to good and bad electoral results, respectively, for incumbents or their parties, the quanti-

tative analysis is interpreted as confirmation that voters use elections to reward governments for good economic times and to punish them for bad. In turn, elections may then be said to induce all politicians to devote themselves to pursuing the voters' more or less unanimous desire for prosperity.

Before reviewing the empirical findings of this literature, it is important to notice the structure and limitations of the typical research design. While electoral performance is used to measure sanctions in the middle of the causal chain, economic measures are used as proxies at the front and back ends. Good economic indicators are assumed to represent both satisfied voters at the front end and responsive government at the back end, leaving good electoral results for incumbents as the only logical connection in the middle. The possibility that voters may be unhappy in good economic times or happy in bad economic times, or that economic performance may be unrelated to governmental conduct, is not contemplated in the basic research design. More precise studies of public opinion on the front end, and of economic policy-making on the back end, would therefore be needed for a tight causal explanation to emerge from the quantitative results.

Even under the simplistic assumptions of the basic research design, the collective verdict of economic-voting studies has been mixed. Inconsistent early results (see Anderson, 2007, p. 274) led to a pivotal study (Powell & Whitten, 1993) which attempted to distinguish cases in which economic voting does and does not succeed at holding governments accountable through measures of "clarity of responsibility", a concept designed to capture institutional structures that allow voters to gather good information about the performance of particular governmental actors. In the two decades since, Powell and Whitten's finding that electoral accountability obtains only under certain institutional conditions has been followed by several studies reaching similarly restricted conclusions (Samuels, 2004; Zielinski, Slomczynski, & Shabad, 2005; Ebeid & Rodden, 2006; Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Hellwig & Samuels, 2008). Conditional findings have also emerged from studies focusing on voter psychology rather than institutions (Gomez & Wilson, 2006; Singer, 2010; Holbrook, Clouse, & Weinschenk, 2012).

At the same time, studies claiming to confirm the efficacy of retrospective economic voting (Kelly, 2003; Rudolph, 2003; Bengtsson, 2004; Barreiro, 2007; Gelineau, 2007; Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, & Rose, 2011) are far from insignificant either in number or in the geographic coverage of their datasets. These must be balanced against studies drawing conclusions of a skeptical character (Maravall, 2010; Alcaniz & Hellwig, 2011; Hellwig, 2012). Reviews of the literature range from the optimistic (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000) to the pessimistic (Anderson, 2007). The most recent review, covering both institutional and psychological facets of

the empirical literature, tends toward electoral skepticism with its conclusion that "economic voting does not function as envisioned by advocates of democratic accountability" (Anderson, 2007, p. 271). Where does the balance of good evidence and sound interpretation lie? Both sides deserve a hearing.

One of the earliest examples of electoral skepticism is an ambitious analysis of economic voting in all democracies between 1950 and 1990 (Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999). Using the survival of a government as the dependent variable, Cheibub and Przeworski found that a wide range of economic variables had no significant effect. Only one variable related to unemployment had a modest positive effect on incumbent governments' likelihood of staying in power. On the whole, what this statistical analysis suggests is that plenty of governments with bad economic records survive while plenty with good records do not. The original "clarity of responsibility" study (Powell & Whitten, 1993) is then replicated with new and expanded data to determine whether that variable could explain away such unaccountable cases. But the results were not positive even when isolating disciplined parliamentary regimes with high levels of clarity, operationalized by majority control over government and high levels of party unity. In other words, despite the intuition that rational citizens judge politicians on past economic performance, the likelihood that an incumbent government survived a re-election bid did not show up as systematically determined by economic conditions during its tenure.

The key to Cheibub and Przeworski's analysis is twofold: its unusually broad geographic and chronologic scope and its use of the survival of a government in office as the dependent variable (Maravall, 2010, p. 91). Few analyses of economic voting as a process of accountability appear to have used a similar operationalization of the dependent variable (i.e. electoral survival rather than vote-share, vote-choice, or approval rating) since 1999. One uses a similarly large dataset and reports a generally negative accountability result (Maravall, 2010), while another conducts a single-country, single-decade study and reports a conditional result (Zielinski, Slomczynski, & Shabad, 2005). Of the remaining seventeen studies cited above which have appeared in the same period, two (Samuels, 2004; Barreiro, 2007) explicitly criticize the choice of survival of government as the dependent variable. Since there is a wide variety of measurement options that bear not only on economic voting but also on other types of study yet to be considered, a fuller consideration of the methodological issues must be postponed until Section 4.

Table 1. Illustrative results for electoral accountability by topical area.

	POSITIVE	MIXED	NEGATIVE
ECONOMIC VOTING	Rudolph 2003, Alt et al. 2011	Bengtsson 2004,* Samuels 2004, Duch & Stevenson 2008	Maravall 2010, Hellwig 2012
CORRUPTION	Ferraz & Finan 2008	Lederman et al. 2005, Tavits 2007a, Chang et al. 2010	Pereira et al. 2009
CONGRUENCE	Erikson et al. 2002, Jones 2011	Canes-Wrone & Shotts 2004, Tavits 2007b	Lee et al. 2004, Gilens 2012

Table 2. Illustrative results for electoral accountability by choice of dependent variable.

	POSITIVE	MIXED	NEGATIVE
OPINION DATA	Rudolph 2003, Ansolabehere & Jones 2010	Gelineau 2007,* Singer 2010*	Alcaniz & Hellwig 2011
VOTE-CHOICE	Ansolabehere & Jones 2010, Jones 2011	Gomez & Wilson 2006,* Gelineau 2007,* Holbrook et al. 2012	
VOTE-SHARE	Barreiro 2007, Jones 2010	Bengtsson 2004,* Hellwig & Samuels 2008, Kassow & Finocchiaro 2011	Hellwig 2012
ELECTORAL SURVIVAL	Ferraz & Finan 2008	Zielinski et al. 2005, Chang et al. 2010	Pereira et al. 2009, Maravall 2010
ANTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR	Erikson et al. 2002, Alt et al. 2011	Snyder & Stromberg 2010, Ferraz & Finnan 2011, Gasper & Reeves 2011	Lee et al. 2004, Gilens 2012

NOTE: For the purposes of Tables 1 and 2, I have relied primarily on authors' own introductory and concluding remarks to characterize their findings about accountability as "positive," "mixed," or "negative." However, in several cases where introductory or concluding remarks suggest a positive finding while remarks within the body of the analysis suggest significant conditions or weaknesses in the results, I have classified that finding as "mixed"; such cases are marked by an asterisk in both tables.

The most direct challenge to Cheibub and Przeworski's pessimistic conclusions has found a conditional accountability result in a single-country study using a similar dependent variable (Zielinski, Slomczynski, & Shabad, 2005). Poland's legislative elections feature multi-member districts with open candidate lists. Unlike Cheibub and Przeworski, Zielinski and colleagues focus on purely electoral dynamics and do not include non-electoral losses of office through term limits or cabinet reorganization in their analysis. Over four successive elections in the 1990's, they found that members of a governing coalition with poor economic performance (as measured by rising unemployment) were systematically less likely to win re-election (2005, pp. 380-384). But there is a striking condition attached to this result: electoral accountability was effective only with respect to those politicians who failed to wash their hands of the situation by switching parties before the next election (2005, pp. 385-390). On average, one out of every three incumbents running for re-election did so under a different party label from the previous election (2005, pp. 376-379). Politicians' ability to exploit misleading partisan cues to avoid electoral sanction may be less of a hindrance to accountability in strong-party systems.

The most general problem with economic-voting studies as efforts to confirm electoral accountability empirically is that they are often theoretically hampered by the use of economic proxies both for public opinion on the front end of the causal chain (good times mean happy citizens) and for responsive policy on the back end (good times mean deserving incumbents). This kind of research design is more suggestive than rigorous. Precise, separate analyses of the vote-sanction and sanction-policy linkages would be necessary to confirm the causal story of accountability and thereby rule out non-economic explanations.

As it happens, the most thorough recent analysis of economic voting (Duch & Stevenson, 2008) redresses this limitation of the classic research design by directly measuring citizens' economic perceptions rather than letting economic outcomes stand as a proxy for them, promising a more precise picture of the beginning of the causal chain of accountability. The trade-off is that the vote-sanction linkage is the object of study here, with no effort to measure the sanction-policy linkage, making this a limited yet worthwhile perspective on accountability. Results from this multi-national analysis indicate that voters' economic perceptions are more strongly associated with changes in parties' vote-share in "closed" economies than "open" ones. The authors' conclusion is that voters are rational, and that their relative inability to sanction policy-makers in open economies is the fault of complex structures of economic decision-making rather than of elections themselves. This might be read as a qualified defense of electoral accountability, except that the authors themselves explicitly dismiss a sanction model for explaining electoral behavior in favor of a selection model in which voters are uninterested in rewarding or punishing past performance (Duch & Stevenson, 2008, pp. 10-14, 28).

Even when considered apart from such interpretive ambiguities, Duch and Stevenson's finding of conditional results for the existence of economic voting itself—the word "condition" even appears in the subtitle of the book—must be considered in light of a nearly simultaneous review of the economic-voting literature (Anderson, 2007). One concern there is that partisanship may contaminate voters' economic judgments (Anderson, 2007, 279-281; see also Marsh & Tilley, 2010); another is that institutional "clarity of responsibility" may prove too formidable a prerequisite for accountability, given voters' informational deficits (Anderson, 2007, 282-285). Thus, the finding of conditional results even when voters are assumed to have perfect information (Duch & Stevenson, 2008, pp. 227-228) actually bears the logical implication of further restricting the real-world scope of accountability. I will address additional concerns about the choice of vote-share as the dependent variable in Section 4.

Economic performance would seem to hold unique promise as an issue on which voters should have a relatively easy time of gathering information and uniting around stable criteria of judgment. This psychological assumption about economic issues has sometimes been qualified or called into question (Singer, 2010; Alcaniz & Hellwig, 2011; Holbrook, Clouse, & Weinschenk, 2012), but few other political issues hold as much promise for yielding to widely shared norms of electoral judgment. Whether economic voting exists is a question that must be decoupled from how it functions—as a vehicle of accountability, or not (see Anderson, 2007, pp. 289-290). Therefore the relative weakness, or strong conditionality, of the empirical results in this area remains a cornerstone of the case for electoral skepticism.

3.2. Corruption

Pecuniary malfeasance by governmental agents is similar to economic hardship in its presumed ability to unite voters around common evaluative standards. Despite the possibility that some voters may benefit from corruption, the issue in general does not seem to suffer from complexities of identifying means-ends relationships and assigning responsibility to the extent that issues of economic policy-making do. These intuitions, at any rate, make studies of political corruption enticing to scholars interested in observing how far electoral accountability obtains when cognitive obstacles among voters can be overcome. If they cannot turn thieves out of office, after all, what else could elections be good for?

The standard research design for corruption studies differs from that for economic-voting studies. Instead

of analyzing electoral outcomes over time as the dependent variable, corruption studies tend to use political institutions (including electoral processes) as independent variables in order to test their influence cross-sectionally on corruption-related outcomes (Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 2003; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005; Tavits, 2007a). The consistent finding has been that electoral democracies systematically have lower levels of corruption, and electoral accountability serves as one of the assumed causal mechanisms: voters don't like corruption, and periodic elections enable them to prevent it. More specifically, parliamentary regimes have been found to have systematically less corruption than presidential regimes (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005). At the same time, single-seat elections tend to do better than proportional representation, and open-list tends to do better than closed-list proportional representation (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005). Significant results for press freedom (Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005) and newspaper circulation (Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 2003) suggest the importance of good information for reducing corruption. Within European states, certain institutional factors of "clarity of responsibility" (i.e. governments controlled by a single party over a relatively long period of time, with little or no influence over policy by opposition parties) make a significant difference in reducing corruption (Tavits, 2007a).

The central difficulty with such studies is the weakness or absence, sometimes freely admitted (e.g. Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 598), of a causal story to explain the statistical results. It is a challenge to disentangle the myriad of institutions (e.g. federalism) which may influence corruption-related outcomes. The fact that corruption seems to exist in inverse proportion to the degree of the "personal vote," falling from closed lists to open lists to single-member districts, is suggestive of the "electoral connection" between constituents and uniquely identifiable representatives. On the other hand, no significant effect on corruption has been found with the imposition of term limits, which render some incumbents ineligible to run for re-election and thereby preclude the personal vote (Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005).

The bearing of corruption studies on electoral accountability must remain highly speculative unless electoral outcomes can be factored into the middle of the causal story, as economic-voting studies sometimes do. A few corruption studies have in fact taken this approach. An analysis of corruption trials in Italy and their effects on re-election bids, for example, has found that charges of corruption against incumbents made them less likely to win (Chang, Golden, & Hill, 2010). But this result has been interpreted by its authors as dependent on the "massive and thorough" media blitz that happened to accompany corruption scandals in Italy in the early

1990's (2010, pp. 215-216). In short, unusual circumstances of intense exposure seem to have been necessary to activate the accountability function of elections.

A similar approach has been taken with mayoral elections in Brazil, where a nationwide system of fiscal audits of municipal governments was introduced in the early 2000's. Analysis of the actual re-election rates of incumbent mayors has showed that, compared to an average rate of 40%, the re-election chances of mayors who were charged with no violations rose to over 50% while those with three or more violations were only about half as successful (Ferraz & Finan, 2008).

Since actual re-election is used as the dependent variable, with findings of corruption as an independent variable, the conceptual structure of this research design is similar to that of many economic-voting studies, at least for the vote-sanction linkage. Outcomes variables are used as a proxy for public opinion, and the main item of analysis is whether elections actually apportion rewards and sanctions to incumbents according to voters' presumed will. Since the Brazilian audits were only announced in 2003, and the selection of targets was random, there was probably not enough notice to justify testing responsiveness via anticipatory behavior by incumbents. In an effort to address the sanction-policy linkage, however, the same authors have found that in an earlier period re-eligible mayors were guilty of 27% less corruption than term-limited mayors in cities lacking locally based media (radio and newspapers) or active public prosecutors (Ferraz & Finan, 2011). There was no significant difference between re-eligible and ineligible mayors in cities enjoying these informational advantages or, rather puzzlingly, in those lacking a competitive political environment. Taken together, the two studies by Ferraz and Finan seem to complete the causal chain of electoral accountability, from votes to sanctions to responsiveness. Some exponents of the "political economy" approach to electoral accountability have sanguinely cited these results as confirmation that repeated elections can be vehicles of democratic accountability if only the central problem of voter information can be overcome (Pande, 2011, pp. 227, 234; Ashworth, 2012, p. 195).

One problem with the Brazilian-audit studies, however, is familiar from the economic-voting literature: using variables for policy outcomes as a proxy for public opinion is inferior, in terms of causal-explanatory power, to studying the vote-sanction linkage more directly. The importance of assessing Brazilian voters' attitudes toward municipal corruption is heightened by the fact (unnoticed by some reviewers) that a replication of the earlier of the two Brazilian studies has found contrary results. When the vote-sanction linkage was examined on the basis of a different portion of the vast audit data, incumbent mayors charged with fiscal improprieties appeared systematically *more* likely both to run for re-election and to win (Pereira, Melo, &

Figueiredo, 2009). The replication data differed in several respects: it came from audits of all cities in a single state rather than a random sample from around the country; was based on comprehensive audits of municipal budgets rather than partial audits of municipal spending of federal funds only; and was analyzed with control variables for campaign spending, pork-barrel projects (as distinct from illegal expenses), and partisan affiliation (2009, p. 742). These technical discrepancies do not obviously favor one or the other study, on the whole. Thus the possibility that some combination of politicians' skills and voters' preferences may have defied the expectations of rational-choice theory calls for more focussed analysis.

Even if we ignore the negative accountability findings of the Brazilian replication, the Italian study offers a skeptical hint about how to interpret the results of the original Brazilian study in terms of the broader empirical regularities of democratic elections. Chang and colleagues' quantitative results are broadly similar to Ferraz and Finan's: incumbents suspected of corruption are significantly but not overwhelmingly less likely (slightly under 10% in Italy, somewhat over 10% in Brazil) to win re-election. Yet the Italian study's conclusion is that the informational circumstances leading to a statistically significant finding of electoral sanction were exceptional and rare (Chang, Golden, & Hill, 2010, p. 216: "if our interpretation is correct, it does not bode well for political accountability in established democracies"), whereas the Brazilian study's conclusion is more categorical, theoretical, and optimistic (Ferraz & Finan, 2008, p. 706: "our paper lends strong support to the value of information and the importance of local media in promoting political accountability").

Is there something magical about the 10% threshold (in likelihood of re-election) crossed by the Brazilian study? More likely, both interpretations are correct at the same time: a *modest* measure of electoral accountability is possible under conditions of *exceptionally* good information. If evidence like this is considered "strong support" for the principal-agent theory of electoral accountability (Ashworth, 2012, p. 198), the reason may be that this theory already predicts a highly restricted range of circumstances under which accountability could in principle obtain in the real world. The most thorough of recent explorations of the principal-agent perspective on electoral accountability concludes, in conspicuously diplomatic fashion, that "it is less than clear whether the weight attached to the importance of elections in modern representative democracies would emerge from this approach" (Besley, 2006, p. 99).

3.3. Congruence

Studies of economic voting and political corruption typically aspire to cover the entire length of the chain of electoral accountability by focusing on issue areas in which outcomes variables can simultaneously serve as proxies for public opinion, by dint of the presumption of voters' homogeneous orientations toward those outcomes. In other issue areas, scholars have attempted to establish correlations between public opinion and policy outcomes through more precise and subtle measures of responsiveness, or "congruence" with voters. These measures typically involve comparing constituents' survey responses with representatives' behavior on various policy domains after both are aggregated on a common ideological (usually left-right) scale.

A great deal of research of this kind has been conducted in American politics, often with very positive conclusions about representatives' congruence (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002). Yet there is considerable disagreement about the basic relationship between voters and policies, even before we reach the causal question about electoral sanctions in between. On one hand, several recent studies have reported positive results for electoral accountability by demonstrating congruence under circumstances favorable to imputing periodic elections as a cause. Historical studies of the U.S. Senate have found that senators became more closely aligned with ordinary voters after direct popular elections replaced selection by state legislatures (Meinke, 2008; Gailmard & Jenkins, 2009), using a broad-gauged conception of congruence which spans multiple issue areas. A narrower study of U.S. presidents' budget policies has found them to become systematically congruent with public opinion under two conditions: the president must be in the last two years of his first term and must have approval ratings that are neither unusually high nor unusually low (Canes-Wrone & Shotts, 2004). Data collected outside the U.S. have shown varying but appreciable levels of left-right congruence, more convincingly in the long run than when seen election by election (McDonald, Mendes, & Budge, 2004; Budge, Keman, McDonald, & Pennings, 2012), as well as reciprocal responsiveness between public policy and public opinion on highly salient fiscal issues (Wlezien & Soroka, 2012).

Elsewhere within the congruence literature, some studies have turned up more limited or partial forms of congruence and have harbored doubts about the presumed efficacy of electoral processes as causative of ideological or policy outcomes. A recent analysis of American national politics, disaggregated into several different policy areas, has found little systematic congruence with the vast majority of citizens who do not belong to economic or interest-group elites (Gilens, 2012, pp. 70-123). Another recent assessment found only "mixed evidence" for the linkage between electoral sanctions and responsive policy in the American context (Grimmer, 2013, p. 624). Comparative research on responsiveness could also explore this causal issue directly.

Some elections scholars have responded to these mixed results by scaling back the causal-interpretive ambitions of their studies, retreating from the sanction-policy linkage and isolating the vote-sanction linkage. One study of this type has found that congruence between voters' policy preferences and their perceptions of candidates' policy preferences bears a stronger systematic relation to individual vote-choice than do actual policy outcomes (Jones, 2011). For politicians, position-taking is more important to re-election than actual policy (2011, pp. 779-780). If voters are not getting the kind of responsive policy that the theory of electoral accountability (at its most ambitious) aspires to, they at least believe themselves to be rewarding politicians for similar preferences and punishing them for discrepant preferences (Ansolabehere & Jones, 2010, p. 589). As we will see below (in Section 4), this kind of analysis must be evaluated in terms of the suitability of its variables for capturing the vote-sanction linkage.

Congruence studies face a number of challenges as contributions to research on electoral accountability. Despite their generally positive quantitative results in studies of the United States, there is still a problem of causal relevance: congruence may have non-electoral causes, after all. For instance, politicians may be inducing voters to become congruent rather than vice versa (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000, pp. 44-70), as even electorally optimistic studies recognize (Ansolabehere & Jones, 2010, p. 593). A related problem is the empirical reality of widespread voter ignorance about public affairs, even in relatively affluent and educated societies (Hardin, 2000). An important methodological lesson immediately follows from this fact: researchers investigating congruence between voters and politicians (e.g. Ansolabehere & Jones, 2010; Jones, 2011) should avoid using opinion data from opt-in surveys, which tend to have a selection bias toward better informed members of society. A further methodological problem is that a focus on roll-call position-taking (e.g. Bovitz & Carson, 2006; Gailmard & Jenkins, 2009) can make it difficult to detect the influence of special interests on policy between one election and the next, since many important policy benefits are actually distributed in less visible ways, such as legislative amendments and regulatory directives (Fellowes & Wolf, 2004).

Congruence studies can be an important adjunct to studies of electoral accountability in the narrow sense, since the former tend to investigate the responsiveness of policy at the end of the chain of representation. But optimistic results for that end of the chain can reveal little about the rest of the chain in the absence of additional study or careful causal analysis.

4. Conceptual and Measurement Issues

Part of the difficulty in evaluating empirical tests of electoral accountability lies in the variety of operational schemes used to measure the dependent variable. Among the numerous studies that have appeared to vindicate electoral accountability, relatively few have directly challenged the most skeptical economic-voting studies (Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999; Maravall, 2010) by using measures similar to electoral survival. Scholars of electoral accountability must be careful to distinguish the stronger from the weaker operational methods, and above all to ensure that interpretations of their results bear a reasonable relation to the conceptual rationale behind their variables of choice. I will now review, in ascending order of plausibility, the main options for operationalizing the dependent variable.

4.1. Approval Ratings and Vote-Choice

The least plausible option in empirical analyses of electoral accountability is to use approval ratings of parties or politicians as the dependent variable. Numerous studies of public opinion appear to rest on the assumption that studying the background conditions of voter psychology is as good as studying the entire causal chain of electoral accountability. Their implicit logic is that, if public opinion can be shown to vary in rational and expected ways with changes in certain policies or policy outcomes, that systematic relation is proof of accountability. Of course this logic is incomplete without further empirical investigation of the vote-sanction linkage between public opinion and electoral outcomes. Despite the fact that this methodological problem has long been recognized (see Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000, p. 188; Powell, 2004, p. 103), studies continue to be published purporting to test the existence of electoral accountability by way of approval ratings (Kelly, 2003; Rudolph, 2003; Singer, 2010). The value of such analyses hinges on their role of illuminating a single node (i.e. voter psychology) of a single linkage in the chain of accountability (e.g. Alcaniz & Hellwig, 2011; Holbrook, Clouse, & Weinschenk, 2012).

A similar caution applies to other types of data from opinion surveys, such as self-reported voting. Vote-choice at the individual level is better than approval ratings because it at least takes a step toward electoral behavior, and several studies have used this as the dependent variable in order to test the existence of electoral accountability (Gomez & Wilson, 2006; Gelineau, 2007; Ansolabehere & Jones, 2010; Jones, 2011). But the well-known perils of relying on voters' self-reported behavior (see Burden, 2000) leave considerable room for error. Data collected before an election about whom an individual voter plans to support seem little better than approval ratings, and data collected after an election about whom an individual reportedly supported are subject to bias and rationalization. Scholars have been at loggerheads over which form of reported vote-choice, ex ante or ex post, is less bad (see Gomez & Wilson, 2007, p. 57; Godbout & Belanger, 2007). Yet

some consensus may be possible: both should be equally avoided when the vote-sanction linkage is at issue.

4.2. Vote-Share

A more justifiable approach is to use changes in the share of votes earned by a party or candidate from one election to the next as the dependent variable. As long as a given election can be verified as free from error and fraud, voting tallies have better validity as a measure of electoral behavior than reported vote-choice. Numerous studies investigating electoral accountability have used vote-share as the dependent variable (e.g. Bengtsson, 2004; Samuels, 2004; Ebeid & Rodden, 2006; Barreiro, 2007; Jones, 2010; Hellwig, 2012; see also Pande, 2011, pp. 227-228), including the most notable book-length treatment of economic voting in recent years (Duch & Stevenson, 2008), and this practice has been called the "standard approach" (Hobolt & Hoyland, 2011, p. 488) to operationalizing electoral accountability. Yet scholars rarely consider the validity of vote-share data, and the paucity of mechanisms for verifying electoral processes (and the voting tallies to which they give rise) is a critical defect for not only political but also scholarly practice.

Even if we could always verify the accuracy of electoral results, the use of vote-share data would still force a conceptual mismatch onto electoral accountability. The problem, simply, is that losing votes is necessary but not sufficient for electoral failure (or not even necessary, for coalition governments in parliamentary systems). If the economy is bad, for instance, even an incumbent politician's grandmother could predict that *some* voters will desert her favored candidate (hence the insistence that political scientists strive to pass "the grandmother test"; see Shapiro, 2005, ch. 2). The relevant questions for politicians are, *how many* deserters are likely and how might they be *off-set*? The answers may vary considerably according to circumstances, as college instructors who are subject to course evaluations by students are aware. We can guess which policies or actions in the classroom may produce a noticeable increase or decrease in evaluation scores at the end of the semester, yet we do not necessarily act as though any incremental change amounts to an effective sanction—it depends on our departments' or universities' particular institutions and personalities. By a similar logic, researchers are not entitled to infer the existence of electoral accountability from vote-share analysis alone. What matters is the sanction, which comes from actual electoral victory or defeat. After all, the selective pressures of competitive elections place a premium on deft and less than risk-averse politicians who can convert a hemorrhaging of votes due to bad policy outcomes into an electorally inconsequential trickle (Maravall, 1999, pp. 172-191).

It is emblematic of what is at stake in the choice of dependent variable that a less pessimistic account of electoral accountability than the analysis of Cheibub and Przeworski (1999), but appearing in the same edited collection, opts for vote-share (Stokes, 1999). This study of Latin American presidential elections from 1982 to 1995 found that incumbents who flagrantly betrayed major campaign pledges could compensate expected losses through good economic performance. In one sense, it should be good news for electoral accountability that presidents who switched to their opponents' economic policies normally cost their party around 9% of vote-share at the next election, or that good economic results from such switches normally reversed that loss and produced a more than 2% gain in vote-share (1999, 115-116). But the very fact that politicians can neutralize one voting bloc with another, through policy outcomes over which they may or may not have control, illustrates the general principle that vote-share analysis cannot capture the existence of an effective sanction. Politicians operate in specific contexts with an eye toward ultimate victory or defeat, and that dichotomous result is where any sanction must come from.

4.3. Electoral Survival

The next step, then, would be to use actual re-election or loss of office as the dependent variable. This is related to the concept of "survival in office" or, in time-series analysis, "hazard rate" (Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999). Only a few studies have taken this methodological option, and most of them have sounded a pessimistic note about electoral accountability. On the subject of economic voting, the most recent example of a long-range, cross-national study has found that several economic variables are related to survival in office either weakly or not at all (Maravall, 2010), while a single-decade, single-country study has found that members of an incumbent governing coalition were less likely to win re-election during hard times unless they switched parties before the election (Zielinski, Slomczynski, & Shabad, 2005). On the subject of political corruption, a single-election study of Brazilian mayors has found a modest level of accountability by using electoral survival as the dependent variable (Ferraz & Finan, 2008), though these results have been disputed (Pereira, Melo, & Figueiredo, 2009), while a long-range study of Italian parliamentary elections has found significant results with similar measures only during two years of unusually intensive media coverage of corruption (Chang, Golden, & Hill, 2010). All in all, the use of actual re-election as the dependent variable has been rather rare and has tended toward the conclusion that periodic elections are weak or exceptional as political mechanisms of reward and punishment.

The logic behind using survival in office as the de-

pendent variable, that the actual loss of power is what motivates incumbent representatives and parties to govern responsively, has been directly challenged. The twofold criticism includes (a) the observation that using incremental changes in vote-share is more apt to show significant results in statistical analysis, coupled with (b) the assertion that politicians should be responsive to vote-share regardless of electoral outcomes (Samuels, 2004, pp. 425-426). The first point carries the implication that variables are to be chosen according to their propensity to yield statistically significant coefficients rather than conceptually coherent interpretations thereof. The second point only begs the underlying conceptual question about how the electoral sanction is supposed to work on politicians.

There is scope, nonetheless, for legitimate criticism of survival in office as a measure of electoral accountability. For one thing, the expiration of a coalition government in a parliamentary system is often not a result of electoral processes, as in cases where elected representatives reshuffle a cabinet or form a new governing coalition (Maravall, 2010, pp. 82-83). Though the next elections would seem likely to figure in the calculations of the key players, the linking proposition necessary to the logic of accountability—that elite machinations in coalition formation are systematically responsive to anticipated voter behavior—would require separate analysis to establish the relevance of survival in office to the theory of electoral accountability in such cases. Empirical data so far suggest that partisan elites' motives for making or unmaking governments are not closely aligned with voters' (2010, pp. 93-98). Using survival in office as the dependent variable may sensitize us to the important fact that loss of office may happen through non-electoral means, but for that very reason this operational technique offers limited purchase on the workings of elections themselves. Electoral survival, narrowly speaking, is therefore preferable.

A second problem involves term limits, which may function to limit electoral accountability in presidential regimes (or in single-seat elections generally) in a manner similar to party-elite machinations in parliamentary regimes (or in multi-seat elections). Indeed Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) acknowledged that their negative findings for economic voting may be in part explained by the fact that term-limited presidents may lose office despite excellent economic conditions and widespread voter approval. The classic theoretic argument is that any incumbent who is not running for re-election cannot in principle be motivated by sanctions at the hands of voters (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999, p. 34n; Fearon, 1999, pp. 61-62). This logic about term limits is analytically straightforward; the empirical evidence is less robust, though generally supportive (Canes-Wrone & Shotts, 2004; Gelineau, 2007). Yet it is possible for voters to hold incumbent parties responsible for the conduct of individually term-limited mem-

bers of government who care about their party's future prospects (Samuels, 2004, pp. 426, 429-430). In single-seat elections, then, term limits should not be considered a reason to dispense with survival in office as a measure of electoral accountability without first considering the effects of partisan succession.

Finally, the use of a dichotomous variable like electoral survival presents certain difficulties for statistical analysis which might be ameliorated by substituting continuous data such as vote-share. Yet technical considerations must be subordinate to the conceptual cogency of operational choices with respect to the research question at hand, not the other way around. While vote-share data may be useful for a variety of electoral studies, they fall short of capturing the logic of sanction which lies at the heart of studies of accountability. Thus survival in office is a better measure of accountability in terms of conceptual fit than approval ratings, reports of individual vote-choice, and changes in vote-share. If construed narrowly to mean success or failure at re-election, to the exclusion of inter-electoral shuffling among party leaders, electoral survival is better still.

4.3. Anticipatory Behavior

A key limitation remains for studies using electoral survival as the dependent variable: it covers the vote-sanction linkage but not the sanction-policy linkage. To cover the second half of the causal chain, which requires that elections induce responsiveness in representatives, we must find ways to measure anticipatory behavior by elected officers which would be hard to explain in the absence of an effective institutionalized sanction.

A number of studies have taken this sort of approach to electoral accountability, but there is an important distinction to be made between representatives' behavior and policy outcomes. The classic research design of economic-voting studies, for instance, takes economic outcomes as proxies for responsive behavior. Given the danger that policy outcomes may have little to do with the actions of elected officers, this is an unsafe conceptual bet. Thus studies that focus on measuring policy outcomes, only in the service of a tacit attribution of responsiveness as the causal mechanism behind them (e.g. Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, & Rose, 2011), are not in fact shedding much light on the process of electoral accountability. At the same time, there is conceptual danger at the other extreme of measuring representatives' behavior independently of outcomes. It is well known that position-taking can be a good strategy for concealing actual policy-making from imperfectly informed voters (Arnold, 1990, pp. 119-120). In studies of legislative representation, for instance, analyzing roll-call voting (Meinke, 2008; Jones, 2011) can be a fool's errand if actual policies and

policy outcomes are being shaped elsewhere. Representatives may even work behind the scenes to subvert policies that their roll-call records show support for, or to promote policies that their roll-call records show opposition to (Hussey & Zaller, 2011, p. 337). Position-taking, then, may be proof of elected officers' belief in the power of publicity more than of their electorally enforced responsiveness—surely not a useless result, but one that falls well short of establishing the empirical existence of accountability.

Researchers must therefore try to steer a middle course between representatives' conduct and policy outcomes when analyzing the sanction-policy linkage. A recent example is provided by a study of the effects of variations in newspaper readership across districts of the U.S. House of Representatives which examined a range of official behaviors, the policy outcome of federal dollars spent within each district, and variables relating to public opinion (Snyder & Stromberg, 2010). This analysis has found that districts with lower newspaper readership have systematically less knowledgeable constituents, less active and independent representatives, and lower federal spending within the district. In short, the effect of political information on the front end of public opinion and the back end of responsive policy is thoroughly covered, leaving only a closer study of the assumed causal mechanism of the electoral sanction to be examined in the middle of the chain.

Research on disaster relief is another promising avenue for studying responsive government, for several reasons. Like promoting prosperity and reducing corruption, ameliorating the effects of natural disasters can serve as a fairly reliable proxy for public opinion: almost everyone likes it, barring principled libertarians or anarchists. Moreover, by operationalizing responsive policy as moneys spent, the interpretive traps of position-taking and of autonomous or unintended policy outcomes may be avoided. One study of this kind among regional governments in India has found that disaster relief is systematically boosted by voter turnout, partisan electoral competition, and newspaper readership (Besley & Burgess, 2002). A study of American states has found that the generally negative effects (on vote-share) of natural disasters for incumbents can be compensated by gains for U.S. presidents and state governors who launch or support conspicuous relief efforts (Gasper & Reeves, 2011). Again, all that is missing from such studies is careful analysis of the electoral sanction itself (for instance, by abandoning vote-share as the dependent variable) to ensure that the intervening causal mechanism between public opinion and responsive policy is actually completing the chain.

Another strategy for measuring responsive behavior, with similar difficulties in specifying electoral sanctions as a causal mechanism, uses indicators of ideological or policy congruence between constituents and representatives. As we have seen above, there is disa-

greement in the American context over the causal relation between voters and policies, and one study found "little evidence that members of the U.S. House alter their positions" for the sake of "the probability of winning election" (Lee, Moretti, & Butler, 2004, p. 848). An aspect of the question which seems well settled, however, involves variation in responsiveness in different phases of the electoral cycle. In other words, responsiveness kicks in when an elected officer is anticipating a close contest for re-election in the near future. The eleventh-hour nature of responsiveness is long established and amply documented. A study of elected judges in American states has found a similar end-of-term effect (Huber & Gordon, 2004) in which harsher sentences for convicted criminals are handed down, presumably in the expectation that American voters will reward such conduct if they can remember it on election day. As the disaster-relief study has noted, voters are generally inattentive except in the run-up to an election (Gasper & Reeves, 2011). Difficulty of recall leads voters to weight recent information much more heavily than information about earlier periods of a representative's term (Huber, Hill, & Lenz, 2012), which may explain why politicians often wait until just prior to election day to engage in deviant behavior resembling responsiveness (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000, pp. 43-44).

The end-of-term effect authorizes a strong presumption that representatives are behaving responsively because of the imminent possibility of electoral sanction, since it would be difficult to explain in the absence of such a sanction. Yet studies of last-minute responsiveness also imply that the sanction is less than fully operative most of the time, supporting the theory of electoral accountability only with the addition of a significant proviso: "just before election day." If "only the threat of imminent elections produces a temporary rise in responsiveness to public opinion" (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000, p. xviii), responsiveness is abnormal. This empirical regularity suggests that electoral accountability requires terms of office short enough to keep voters constantly on the watch. This consideration does not invalidate the empirical results of the eleventh-hour studies, but it does qualify how we interpret those results in terms of electoral accountability as an empirical phenomenon.

Analysis of anticipatory behavior is the best bet for investigating the sanction-policy linkage, but researchers must not forget the sanctioning node of the linkage and the need for causal analysis to make the chain hold. Responsiveness, at least under American conditions, has been found to be deviant and temporary. This fact seems to reflect the importance of statecraft, of the ability of politicians to control rather than be controlled. Elections are a key part of the institutional environment and therefore an important tool in politicians' quest for control.

5. Conclusions

How well do periodic elections perform as vehicles of democratic accountability? Based on my analysis of key empirical literatures in political science in the last couple of decades, set within a precise conceptual framework that distinguishes two sections of the causal chain of accountability, the answer to this important question is rather pessimistic. The most rigorous methods have tended to yield more skeptical results in recent years (see Table 2). Elections perform a variety of functions in modern constitutional republics, but their accountability anemia means that they cannot be a solution to "democratic deficits" in such republics without major alterations in institutional forms or practical circumstances. Though institutional variations have been theorized to make a large difference in electoral accountability (e.g. Powell, 2000), the skeptical trend in empirical studies reviewed above encompasses both presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as both pluralitarian and proportional electoral systems, making this key theoretic issue ripe for further study.

My conclusions are difficult to square with some powerful and long-standing assumptions in political research. The "electoral connection" (see Mayhew, 1974) between voters and politicians is a stock idea of both popular and scholarly discourse. It often serves as an implicit, untested assumption in constructing causal stories about, for example, why democratic states rarely go to war with one another (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999), tend to exhibit relatively low levels of political corruption (e.g. Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005), or yield any of a variety of other positive policy outcomes (e.g. Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, & Rose, 2011). Scholarly efforts at improving or "deepening" democracy usually revolve around electoral institutions (e.g. Gerken, 2009). Even attempts to reconceive democratic accountability in explicitly non-electoral terms continue to pay homage to the conventional wisdom that repeated elections remain, nonetheless, accountability's primary vehicle (e.g. Grant & Keohane, 2005, p. 41; Rubenstein, 2007, pp. 618-619). All these branches of political research could profit from a greater sense of realism about what elections have achieved in terms of popular control or democratic power. One normative implication is that non-electoral options for empowering ordinary citizens vis-a-vis political elites (see Maloy, 2008; McCormick, 2011) should be high on the menu of institutional-design responses to democratic deficits.

Progress in empirical analysis may depend on heeding two key lessons. First, we should observe the key distinction between the vote-sanction linkage and the sanction-policy linkage in pursuit of the kind of plausible causal explanations to which political research naturally aspires. This distinction helps to clarify the contributions of narrow-gauged studies of voter psychology and policy outcomes within the scholarly division of labor, since they illuminate the far ends of the causal chain of accountability, while accentuating the importance of more direct analysis of two kinds of causal process in the middle regions of the chain. Second, we should avoid operationalizing electoral accountability as a dependent variable in terms of approval ratings, individual vote-choice, or changes in vote-share—though such variables may be useful in other types of research design, or in studies that are ancillary to electoral accountability. When considering the vote-sanction linkage we should favor actual electoral survival, and for the sanction-policy linkage we should emphasize anticipatory behavior. It may be that the forces that weaken or sever these linkages are not, on further inspection, as daunting as the scholarly trend of electoral skepticism suggests. But only a concerted effort to match an explicit conceptual framework with precise operational techniques could in principle contribute to the progress of knowledge on these topics.

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Article

The AK Party's Islamic Realist Political Vision: Theory and Practice

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Abstract

The currently governing Turkish AK Party's reformist agenda at home and its increasingly assertive policies abroad, like the "soft" and "hard" power elements of its foreign policy, reflect a remarkable coherence and continuity in the political vision of the party leadership. That vision—a contemporary manifestation (sometimes described as "neo-Ottomanism") of an older tradition of Islamic realism—is explicated through a detailed analysis of the speeches and writings of the main AK Party leaders, as well as of their opponents within the Islamist movement, and correlated with actual policy practice. It is further suggested that the AK Party's preoccupation with its traditional secular-nationalist (Kemalist) adversaries has left it unprepared to confront an even more formidable looming challenge: liberalism.

1. Introduction

This article seeks to uncover the ideational underpinnings of AK Party foreign policy, on the grounds that this is a time of extraordinary flux in Near Eastern politics, and that at times of such flux the will and intent of political actors gains particular salience. It is clearly the case—as the growing body of theoretically sophisticated literature on the subject recognizes—that as a democratically elected government, the AK Party leadership has had to craft its foreign policies within the context of an interplay between several sets of structural frameworks. Externally, it has naturally been subject to the opportunities and constraints imposed by the regional and global distribution of power. Internally, it has needed to be responsive to popular opinion—including the growing assertion of diverse identities among an increasingly politically mobilized population—as well as the demands of emergent interest groups and social classes associated with the transition

from a statist import-substituting to a neoliberal export-oriented economy. It has also had to deal with an institutional framework (especially the security and judicial bureaucracies) in which its ideological adversaries have long been entrenched.

A focus on systemic constraints, accordingly, can usefully highlight strategic continuities that transcend the varying political and ideological inclinations of particular governments (Gözen, 2010; Oğuzlu, 2010; Özek & Oğuzlu, 2013). When the Soviet Union assumed a dramatically more aggressive posture in 1945, for example, the magnitude of the geopolitical threat eclipsed the inward-looking and neutralist inclinations of the governing Republican People's Party (CHP), and prompted a rapid alliance with the Western powers. If Russia were to adopt a similarly aggressive posture today, one would expect the AK Party leadership to react in parallel fashion, aligning its policies much more closely in line with those of the United States and NATO than it might currently prefer. By the same to-

ken, however, such a focus will be less useful in situations where long-standing continuities break down, where the configuration of threats is not as clear, and where there is therefore no consensus on what constitutes an optimal response—such as the impasse reached on the Iraqi Kurdish issue by 2008, or the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011—so that it does matter which particular leadership, with its distinct values and outlooks, is in office. In both cases, it seems likely that a CHP government, for example, would have adopted significantly different policies. For this reason, while the imbalance between Turkish and Russian geopolitical power obviously goes a long way towards explaining the AK Party government's muted response to challenges such as the 2008 Russian-Georgian war (Kardaş, 2013, pp. 648, 654-655) or the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea, and its preference for non-confrontational trade-oriented relations instead (İşeri & Dilek, 2011), in a world in which even the most stable dynamics are occasionally upended there is value in knowing how a particular leadership would act if freed from its usual constraints.

Similarly, analyses that focus on Turkey's neoliberal turn—whether positively (Keyman, 2009, 2010; Kirişci, 2009, 2012; Kutlay, 2011) or critically (Uzgel, 2009; Yalvaç, 2012)—do much to explicate the apparently desecuritized, economistic and integrationist features of Turkish behavior, encapsulated in Ahmet Davutoğlu's concept of a "zero problems" foreign policy, and generated (it is argued) by socioeconomic dynamics that transcend the role of the AK Party. Here as well, however, there is a danger of unduly reified theories getting mugged by rapidly changing realities (Kirişci, 2011, p. 46), as evidenced by the recent proliferation of problems between Turkey and many of its neighbors. Davutoğlu, himself, after all, has warned that those "who narrowly focus on the 'zero problems' principle miss Turkey's greater foreign-policy vision", pointing out that it has less to do with "advancing economic and security interests" than with bringing about "Turkey's reintegration with its neighbors" (Davutoğlu, 2013, March 21).

This article's concern with the AK Party's "greater foreign-policy vision" aligns it with those analyses, finally, that hone in on the ideational dimension in the interplay of Turkish foreign policy determinants (Aras & Fidan, 2009; Balcı, 2010; Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008; Mufti, 2009; Yanık, 2011). Here again, the challenge is to avoid assigning normative or cultural structures such determinative power that they obscure consequential variations in outlook that grow especially salient at critical transitional junctures. One study that does rise to this challenge is by Bilgin and Bilgiç, who point out that while the AK Party is not the first Turkish leadership to utilize geopolitical discourse in justifying its foreign policies, it is the first to do so by casting Turkey as the leader of its own distinct Islamic "civilizational basin" (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2011, p. 191). Published just as the

2011 Arab upheavals were getting underway, however, their article does not have the opportunity to explore the more hegemonistic implications of AK Party geopolitics. Two years later, Duran's equally nuanced analysis likewise recognizes the distinctiveness of the AK Party's "civilizational discourse", and goes on to note the shift from an emphasis on "Europeanization" in its first half-decade in office, to the growing prominence of "Islamic themes" especially after the outbreak of the Arab Spring. Even in this second phase, however, its foreign policy is still described as aiming to avoid polarization and conflict, and continuing to privilege trade relations instead (Duran, 2013, pp. 93, 95).

The objective of this study, accordingly, is to show that AK Party leaders have long maintained a distinctive hegemonistic vision wherein Turkey takes the lead in constructing a reintegrated regional political community—the precise features of which remain unclear—with a shared normative (Islamic) and historical (Ottoman) identity, organized to provide political representation in line with contemporary criteria of legitimacy and consent, and eschewing idealism in favor of realpolitik in order to aim for a position of "greatness" in the international system. This objective will be pursued first of all through a survey of the relevant speeches and writings of key AK Party figures since the early 1990s. Because their ideological vision, like that of any government, is subject to the usual structural and political constraints outlined above, however, the second element of the methodology employed will be to correlate the degree of the AK Party's relative autonomy domestically with the various phases of its foreign policy. By demonstrating that the more freedom of action the AK Party leaders have enjoyed since coming to power, the more their foreign policy rhetoric and practice have conformed to their early 1990s discourse, this approach will confirm the accuracy of the "Islamic realist" neo-Ottoman vision ascribed to them here, while at the same time still giving proper due to the ongoing constraining effects of structural factors.

Such an approach can thus explain the apparent incongruity between the pre- and post-2008 phases of AK Party governance, and provide a response to the liberal call for a renewed focus on domestic reform—illustrated by Nathalie Tocci's proposition that "rather than being blinded by ambitions of grandeur, Turkey must realize that its value added in the neighborhood largely hinges on its ongoing domestic transformation" (Tocci, 2012, p. 212)—by showing that far from contradicting each other, the AK Party's reformist agenda at home and its increasingly assertive policies abroad, like the "soft" and "hard" power elements of its foreign policy, actually go hand in hand. In the process, it will become possible to identify the real theoretical and practical pitfalls confronting its attempt to grapple with the pressures of globalized liberalism—the broader ideational/normative framework in which Western

democracy is grounded, and from which (as will be detailed in the next section) the AK Party leaders have tried to distinguish their own general outlook.

2. Origins

Speaking at a conference in 1992, Abdullah Gül, a member of parliament for the Islamist *Refah* (Welfare) Party, delivered a succinct articulation of the vision that would eventually lead him and some colleagues to break away and found the AK Party, and propel him to the presidency of the republic. He began by asserting that Turkey was undergoing a "systemic crisis" brought about by the incompatibility between Islam and the existing political regime (Gül, 1993, p. 117). Islam provides the basis of "our moral values" and hence of the shared "identity" of the peoples who had been peacefully "integrated" under its banner for centuries (Gül, 1993, pp. 116-117, 119). For the last seventy years, however, he added, Turkey has been ruled by an authoritarian regime—similar in many ways to its counterparts in Iraq, Syria and Libya—whose values are contrary to the values of, and consequently maintains a posture of "enmity" toward, its own people. Gül focused on the two principles of this regime's "official ideology" impinging most directly on political identity: on Secularism, described as an "enmity" toward religion that naturally "alienates" a populace "kneaded together" by Islamic beliefs and values; and on Nationalism, which alienates people still further by promoting a Turkishness that takes the form of "racism" (*ırkçılık*) and fails to reflect their actual diversity (Gül, 1993, pp. 118, 119-120). He did not go into the factors that catalyzed Turkey's "systemic crisis" at this precise point in time, but for whatever reasons the authoritarian secular-nationalist ideology had apparently run its course. The most obvious sign was the fact that a part of the population which had long lived harmoniously as part of this community (*millet*), had now embarked on a "separatist struggle". The Kurdish uprising signals that the Kemalist regime is no longer capable of providing for the moral and material well-being of its citizens, or "even of preserving their unity" (Gül, 1993, p. 118).

This last point led Gül to introduce a new theme, alongside Islamic unity and political representation: greatness. He lambasted Turkey's dominant elites for clinging to a defunct ideology and a bankrupt regime even at the cost of dividing and "diminishing" the country. Abandoning that ideology and regime could not only preserve existing unity, it could bring into being "a new conception" based on Islamic values that would extend to embrace our kinfolk "from Bosnia…all the way to China". For this reason, Gül concluded, the recent emergence of "neo-Ottoman" arguments was a "very healthy" development (Gül, 1993, pp. 124, 125). He elaborated on this theme eight years later:

There are two conceptions in Turkey. The first is an inward-looking conception that considers Turkey exclusively within its borders...that has severed all links to its history...[t]hat might have been appropriate at a certain juncture…but not to current realpolitik conditions…The second conception argues that there are certain realities. Turkey governed this region for so many centuries. It has great potential…History, geography, current events, all oblige us not to ignore [what is happening with] the Turks in Russia, the Circassians, Bulgarians, even in China. I am among those who subscribe to this second conception. (Gül, 2000)

Gül's advocacy of an expansive outlook as a corollary of Islamic identity and representation—all part of the "neo-Ottoman" idea introduced by Turgut Özal during his tenure as Turkey's prime minister and then president between 1983 and 1993 (Mufti, 2009, especially pp. 49-84)—found an echo in another young reformist within the Welfare Party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In an interview published in 1993, one year after Gül's conference speech, Erdoğan defined democracy as the manifestation of the people's will. While as such it is obviously "a fine thing", it is not an end (*amaç*) in itself but "merely a means" (*araç*)—a mechanism for instituting any kind of regime the people want (Erdoğan, 1993, p. 419). This statement has since repeatedly been condemned as an expression of Erdoğan's opportunistic use of democratic means for undemocratic ends. The distinction between political means and ends, however, is hardly novel. Political thinkers extending back to the medieval period and beyond have categorized regimes on the basis of their different ends. Al-Farabi (d. 950 CE), for example, following Aristotle, identified domination as the characteristic end of tyrannical regimes; wealth as the characteristic end of oligarchic regimes; honor as the characteristic end of timocratic regimes; and freedom as the principle of democratic regimes, reflecting the multiplicity of character types and their various different ends accommodated by democracies.

Erdoğan was and is a politician, not a philosopher, so it is unreasonable to extrapolate a political theory from his public statements. Even in this short interview, for example, he seems to contradict himself on the subject of majoritarianism, suggesting at one point that if the people decide democratically in favor of a "totalitarian regime, we must respect that" (but quickly adding that if they want to overthrow such a regime, they must be able to do that as well), then at another point insisting that whereas democracy allows 51% of the population to dominate the other 49%, "in our opinion, even 99% have no right to dominate 1%" (Erdoğan, 1993, pp. 420, 432). Nevertheless, it is evident that he is here trying to balance an affirmation of representation with a concern about the higher ends to

be promoted in a democracy. So what might those higher ends be? Some clues may be gleaned from Erdoğan's critique of one particular regime which takes up the bulk of his interview.

Erdoğan described the ideology of this regime as a "rigid unitarist conception" with "Kemalism as its religion". Its stunted and repressive outlook had plunged the Turkish economy into continuous decline, "from sixth place in the world in 1923, to 46th today"; induced moral collapse; stifled intellectual progress; and compromised both internal and external security (Erdoğan, 1993, pp. 421-422). Echoing Gül, Erdoğan explained that national unity could never be secured by a "racist official ideology" which insisted that "Turkey is for the Turks" and failed to recognize the "27 ethnic groups currently living in the Turkish Republic". The regime that governed on the basis of such an ideology had, as a result, "reached a dead end, had begun to decompose, and was emitting disturbing odors…There is no question of Kemalism rejuvenating itself" (Erdoğan, 1993, p. 425). Pressed by the interviewer on whether he therefore believed that the Kurds had a right to break away and form their own state, Erdoğan argued that Kurdish rights could be secured within a framework of "shared faith" and "something resembling the Ottoman states system" (Erdoğan, 1993, p. 422).

Like Gül before him, then, Erdoğan's alternative to what he described as the defunct authoritarian secular-nationalist order of Kemalism was a polity held together by the shared moral values and overarching identity of Islam. In distinguishing his understanding of Islamic politics from more liberal concepts of "transformation" and democratization, moreover, he criticized the latter as impositions of "American imperialism" appealing only to those enamored by the "Westernization process", and expressed his resentment at the paternalism of the "Christian" powers which "insistently promote instability and incapacity in Muslim countries" (Erdoğan, 1993, pp. 427, 428-429, 431). The driving animus of his argument, in other words, the higher end at which it aims, is the status of his proposed Islamic polity relative to the existing powers of the world, and it is this concern with status or greatness that led him, as it led Abdullah Gül, to look back to Islam's imperial glory days in search of an alternative to the narrow, Western-inspired, Kemalist nation-state: "Turkey has the power to sustain an imperial vision. In fact, if Turkey wants to take its place as a prestigious member of the global community in the 2000s (and it should), then it is obliged to adopt an imperial vision. The rationales for this obligation lie in its history, its geography, its ethnic composition" (Erdoğan, 1993, p. 430).

Islamic political thought has always accommodated a wide variety of perspectives, and one of the most prominent dichotomies within it has been between what may be called an "idealist" outlook—focusing on Islamic law as an easily comprehensible and imple-mentable blueprint for human perfectibility, whether on an individual or communal level, here on earth—and a more "realist" conception which is much more dubious about the capacity of fallible and contentious human beings to reach consensus on the interpretation of divine law, which therefore accords much greater importance to human reasoning and political skill, and which is consequently much more interested in relatively successful, albeit still necessarily imperfect, actually existing political regimes. This dichotomy remains in evidence today. Whereas virtually all Muslims view the earliest years of Islam as a period of divinely-inspired virtuous governance, for example (though they may disagree on how long that pristine age lasted), few Islamists today—whether conservative or militantly revolutionary—look to the subsequent imperial era, from the rise of the Umayyads to the fall of the Ottomans, for political models. Even the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been moving toward increasingly pragmatic positions on political governance, draws little inspiration from the imperial age that constitutes the vast bulk of Islamic history. Herein lies the distinctive realism of AK Party leaders such as Gül and Erdoğan. Their energies focused more on mundane questions—such as how to aggregate the interests of Turks, Kurds, and others within a unified political structure—than on abstract considerations of human perfectibility in preparation for the afterlife, they are accordingly much more open to the lessons and legacies of human history in all its imperfections.

A similar concern with politics as it is actually practiced informs the thought of Ahmet Davutoğlu, a political scientist who became chief adviser to the prime minister after the AK Party's first electoral victory in November 2002, was then appointed foreign minister in May 2009, and became prime minister himself after Erdoğan's election to the presidency in August 2014. At around the same time of the Gül speech and Erdoğan interview outlined above, Davutoğlu published a book entitled *Alternative Paradigms* asserting the "irreconcilability" of Islamic and Western political worldviews. In the dominant (and especially liberal) currents of the Western tradition, he argued, the "deification of man" reaches such an extent that it alienates the individual both from the rest of society and from the state, so that interpersonal relations take the form of a struggle for individual, primarily material, self-aggrandizement. The Islamic worldview, by contrast, is characterized by the "subordination of economics to politics", a preference for stability and order as opposed to what Davutoğlu considered the West's Machiavellian inclination toward a more competitive or "dynamic" politics, an "equalitarian-solidarist" view of social relations based on "cooperation" rather than "socio-economic stratification", and a "concentration of power through institutional centralization" as opposed to an "institutional pluralism based on the socio-economic disper-

sion of material power" (Davutoğlu, 1994a, pp. 12, 39, 153; see also p. 103).

Davutoğlu acknowledged that "the pressure of new world forces and the political experience of European nations" have helped in "impressing on the mind of modern Islam" that a "republican spirit" and government through representative "legislative assemblies" are "the only possible form" that the old Islamic ideal of consensus (*ijma`*) "can take in modern times" (Davutoğlu, 1994a, p. 133). While insisting that Islam's distinctive features rule out any automatic "transfer of…Western procedural means of political legitimation" (Davutoğlu, 1994a, p. 198), therefore, Davutoğlu—like Erdoğan—was clearly trying to articulate what he viewed as an Islamically-grounded concept of representative government that avoids the shortcomings of Western liberalism. This effort came at a critical juncture in a broader evolution of Turkish Islamist ideas about democracy and the role of religion in governance.

The evolution itself began in the 1960s when a wave of Turkish translations of books on Islam from all across the world sparked a revival in Islamic political thought (Çalışlar, 1995, p. 76). This was followed by the founding in January 1970 of Turkey's first explicitly Islamist party, the National Order Party, which already in its founding charter called for a "synthesis" of Islamic moral values and a "democratic" political system (Sarıbay, 1985, p. 101). It quickly became clear, however, that serious ambiguities remained between label and content. Thus a 1975 book by the new party's leader, Necmettin Erbakan, called for further populist reforms such as adoption of a presidential system with the president chosen by the people, abolition of the Senate, public referenda on important political issues, and a jury system in the courts (Erbakan, 1975, pp. 30, 44-45). At the same time, Erbakan contrasted his notion of democracy with liberalism, which he described as inspired by an exploitative capitalism that sacrifices the interests of the community to individual greed. He also underscored his illiberalism by attacking the European Union for seeking to turn Turkey into a "colony" as part of a "Zionist" conspiracy, rooted in the Torah, for global control (Erbakan, 1975, pp. 25, 28, 43, 238, 249, 250-251). For Erbakan, then, the attraction of democracy lay primarily in its utility at mobilizing religious populism against Turkey's Kemalist establishment.

Even so, already at this early stage concerns were raised about such an embrace of democracy, no matter how opportunistic. Selahaddin E. Çakırgil, a writer close to Erbakan's party, warned in 1976: "There is an Islamist movement in Turkey today. This movement…is seeking, and finding, legal avenues for its emergence…but the question of whether it will be the principles of democracy, or the principles of our worldview, which will be used as the method for solving our problems, is now confronting us as a serious internal contradiction…Otherwise, while we're saying 'let's use democracy', democracy will transform us in its image" (Sarıbay, 1985, pp. 222-223). Such concerns led to a split during the mid-1980s. Some Islamists repudiated democracy altogether, but the dominant current—responding to contemporary realities, just as Çakırgil had warned—came to see themselves as "Muslim democrats" (Çakır, 1994, pp. 112, 113, 115). As one of the participants in these debates, Bahri Zengin, later remembered, those who balked at defending freedom of opinion—because it would mean defending the rights of communists as well—ended up outnumbered by those accepting that they should "defend this not as a tactic" but as a genuine "component of our values" (Çalışlar, 1995, pp. 80-81).

An instructive example of this evolution can be seen in the writings of the Islamist intellectual Ali Bulaç. Looking for a model in the "Medina Constitution" implemented by the Prophet Muhammad and ratified by the various communities of that multi-religious first capital of Islam, Bulaç in 1992 affirmed the principles of pluralism, legal and cultural autonomy for every religious and ethnic group, and a participatory politics in which the executive authority acts more as "referee" than "ruler". He accordingly argued that the Constitution stood "above" the Qur'an, Torah, and various local customs because the Islamic community (*ümmet*) of that time was a "political union" in which Muslims, Jews and polytheists coexisted (Bulaç, 1992). At the same time, like Davutoğlu, Bulaç resisted identifying this Islamic model with Western liberalism. In a 1993 book, he described the latter as unwieldy, characterized by an inordinate "competitiveness" that is a product of the West's distinctive history, and ineffective at achieving justice and distribution of rights (Bulaç, 1993, pp. 22, 33, 39, 63-65). Eight year later, however, Bulaç had come around to a much more positive view. While still maintaining "our fundamental objection" to the Western Enlightenment's excessive individualism, he called for a reconciliation between Islam as a religion and democracy as a "political regime", asserting that it was indeed possible to speak of "Islamic democracy" (Bulaç, 2001, pp. 9, 34, 111). This was because the inevitable multiplicity of interpretations ruled out any undisputed application of divine law. The "fundamental question", Bulaç concluded, was:

> In whose name do those who govern us govern? In the name of God? No. Because the governors are not God's representatives. In whose name does the president of the republic or the mayor of Istanbul, for example, govern us? In our name. Who gave this authority to the president or the mayor? We gave them the authority to govern us. In that case we can say: in a proper political arrangement, the right to practice sovereignty and to transfer authority belongs to the community (*ümmet*), to the people. (Bulaç, 2011, pp. 41, 60)

As will be shown presently, this accommodation of democracy would prove about as far as Bulaç would go in reconciling his ideals with the imperatives of realpolitik.

It was at such a juncture in the evolution of Islamist views on democracy, at any rate, that Ahmet Davutoğlu's 1994 book appeared. In line with the emerging consensus, he was prepared to accept the institutional mechanisms of representation developed by the Western democracies. Again in line with that consensus, however, he saw little tension between the rights of the individual and the requirements of the state: "The aim of the state is the fulfillment of justice on behalf of Allah on earth…The perfection of the individual is connected to the fulfillment of this mission by an ideal state in the writings of several Muslim scholars" (Davutoğlu, 1994a, p. 107). Beyond assigning the state a higher and more central role in human self-realization than it plays in liberal Western political thought, moreover, Davutoğlu also defined it differently, rejecting the "nation-state" as "a purely Western artifact" in favor of an overarching, multicultural "Islamic polity" capable of serving "as an alternative world-system" (Davutoğlu, 1994a, pp. 165, 202). In a second book published in 1994, he elaborated on this distinctive Islamic state system: "This will encourage Muslims to revitalize traditional concepts such as the Ummah universal brotherhood, *Dâr al-Islâm* as a world order and the Caliphate as the political institutionalization of this world order. It is not necessary to have the traditional forms of these institutions" (Davutoğlu, 1994b, p. 113).

Davutoğlu's greatest impact, however, came with his third book, *Strategic Depth*, published in 2001. Although he would later shy away from the label "neo-Ottomanism" because of its expansionist connotations, Davutoğlu made it clear here that his objection to "Özal's neo-Ottomanist line" lay primarily in the "journalistic level" at which it remained due to its "theoretical underdevelopment" (Davutoğlu, 2007, p. 90). Instead, he proposed to expose, rigorously and systematically, the "most fundamental contradiction" in Turkish foreign policy: the "historic break" between Turkey's imperial past as the "political center of its civilizational environment" and its current structure as a "nation-state". The reason for this break was the desire of the post-Ottoman "political elite" to attach itself to "another civilizational environment", the West (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 81-83). Under the guidance of these "identity-lacking elites" (*kimliksiz seçkinler*), Turkish foreign policy had acquired a "defensive", "reactive", "cowardly", and "timid" outlook that completely disengaged from all "the lands over which sovereignty had been lost", and anxiously sought only to preserve the "new lines" of the Republic's borders (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 33, 47, 53). Because such a stance ignored—"arhythmically" and "aharmoniously"—the political-cultural resonances between the republican and imperial environments, Davutoğlu concluded (echoing Erdoğan and Gül), it

would ultimately fail even to secure the existing status quo (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 117, 555).

Instead, Turkey should adopt a strategic posture more in harmony with its historical legacy: one capable of transmuting its liabilities into power assets by "venturing outwards with confidence and assertiveness" rather than closing in on itself; one that could enable its people to "write" rather than merely "read" their own "history" (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 11, 555, 560). Such a strategy would necessarily utilize a wide range of mechanisms, and Davutoğlu devoted considerable space in his book to the types of institutions through which Turkey could reengage with its geopolitical environment. This institutional focus, coupled with Davutoğlu's care—here, as well as subsequently in his career—to maintain a cooperative tone, has misled many readers into seeing him as an exponent of the liberal "post-security" school of international relations theory. A closer look at his treatment of the three main arenas of Turkish foreign policy, however, reveals a more complex picture.

Toward the north, Davutoğlu called for a more "dynamic" and "audacious" (*atak*) stance, informed by one massive underlying reality: "the historic Ottoman/Turkish—Russian/Soviet/Russian rivalry". Such a stance need not be unduly provocative; indeed, it should recognize that there can periodically be periods of cooperation with Russia for common benefit or against a common threat (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 56, 240). But its overall thrust should aim at "balancing Russia's influence over Central Asia and the Caucasus", and even at "strengthening by stages the status of the North Caucasus republics inside the Russian Federation". Davutoğlu left no doubts about the fundamentally conflictual nature of this agenda by noting that "the greatest element in breaking Slavic and Russian influence in these regions is the counter-cultural resistance power provided by Islam" (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 181, 250).

If its borders with the Russian sphere of influence formed Turkey's primary geopolitical front line, the Middle East constituted its "indispensable hinterland" (Davutoğlu, 2007, p. 129). Turkey would need to build up this hinterland by neutralizing its rivals there, old (Iran) and new (Israel), and by restoring its traditional alliances—above all, with the Kurds and Arabs. In the case of the former, this would require the adoption of "a new cultural approach that encompasses all peoples", so that the Kurdish issue could go from being a liability that rendered Turkey "vulnerable to external pressures" to a power-projection asset in its own right (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 442, 448). In the case of the latter, it meant reversing the "alienation" from the Arab world caused by "indexing" Turkey's policies to Israeli interests (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 57, 415-416).

As for the European arena, Davutoğlu advocated "actively" supporting formerly Ottoman Muslim communities in the Balkans such as the Albanians and Bos-

nians; safeguarding Turkey's vital interests in Cyprus and the Aegean islands (where the prospect of war loomed largest because of the "unforgiveable errors" of the Kemalists in failing to formulate a "coherent naval strategy"); and playing the competing ambitions of the Russians, Germans, and Americans off against each other (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 122-123, 154, 235, 293-294, 315-316, 528). A similar realpolitik logic characterized Davutoğlu's discussion of the European Union, which is described as an element balancing both American and Russian power, so that the primary purpose of accession would be to maximize Turkey's own room for strategic maneuver (Davutoğlu, 2007, pp. 520, 550).

It becomes apparent, then, that Davutoğlu's utilization of language and concepts characteristic of liberal international relations theory obscures an underlying logic much more in line with realist—indeed, imperial—conceptions. That this is true of his and his colleagues' political worldview more generally, will become clearer when we turn to the AK Party's actual practice after it came to power in 2002.

3. Consolidation Phase (2002–2008)

In a book written after the AK Party assumed power, Ali Bulaç noted its apparently fully internalized espousal of democracy and—in line with the evolution of his own thought outlined above—agreed with it to some extent (Bulaç, 2010, pp. 350-351, 442). He worried, however, that by embracing designations such as "conservative" and "reformist" rather than "Islamic", the new party intended to "set Islamism aside" in order to accommodate the "civilian-military bureaucracy, big capital…the United States and the European Union" (Bulaç, 2010, pp. 17-18, 50-51). Just three years after taking office, he complained, its materialistic policies had already created a corrupt environment that allowed certain coteries to "loot" public resources. If this was the model of reconciling "Islam and democracy" that the AK Party hoped to "market" to other countries, then it would be exporting "the empty and purposeless life style of a nihilistic culture" and thus "dragging…the Middle East and neighboring regions to suicide alongside Turkey" (Bulaç, 2010, pp. 208, 441-442).

Bulaç found the AK Party's foreign policy equally objectionable—especially its support for the "savage…unjust and illegal" American war on Iraq, its cooperation with the American military campaign "against the Muslim Afghan people", and its unwillingness to suspend "at least a few" of Turkey's bilateral agreements with Israel (Bulaç, 2010, pp. 126, 312, 407). Here as well, the AK Party was in danger of losing its moral grounding. All this, Bulaç argued, grew out of a "realist" outlook evident throughout the history of Islam—a "Real-Islam" (*Reel İslam*) that effaces the religion's "life-giving values" (Bulaç, 2010, p. 52). An "excessive emphasis on realpolitik paves the way for the surren-

der of principle and justice to security, of the ideal to [contingent] conditions". This is what had happened to the erstwhile Islamists of the AK Party, for whom "everything became politicized": "Muslim intellectuals suddenly became state bureaucrats, and they all began to concern themselves with strategies for Turkey's regional leadership…[They] lost their autonomous and civilian character and came to resemble the Ottoman official clergy (*ulema*)…This is the first of the greatest disasters to befall the Islamist movement" (Bulaç, 2010, pp. 24, 450, 448).

The AK Party's early public discourse certainly appeared to confirm such observations. Even before taking office as prime minister, Erdoğan told an audience in Washington that his party was "realistic and reformist" and, while it "represents the common values" of Turkey's "moderate Muslim population", was not itself "based on religion". He stressed that "democracy represents my belief in what type of government there should be" and that: "We favor free market economy. We are against state oriented approaches". As for foreign policy, "a government under AK Party will make the Turkey–U.S. alliance stronger" (Erdoğan, 2002). Action followed words, with AK Party parliamentarians voting on 1 March 2003 to cooperate with the United States in opening a northern front against Iraq—a resolution that nevertheless failed due to opposition parliamentarians backed by Kemalist circles in the military—and on 30 July 2003 to pass a landmark legal package that advanced democratization by curtailing the authority of the military-dominated National Security Council. Another milestone came on 12 August 2005 when Erdoğan capped a series of measures enhancing minority cultural rights by going to Diyarbakır, the main city of Turkey's Kurdish region, where he acknowledged Turkey's "Kurdish problem" and said it could only be solved through more democracy.

As this brief overview indicates, Erdoğan and his colleagues focused their energies at this stage on domestic reforms—deploying their electoral mandate as well as the EU's accession criteria in order to consolidate civilian authority, to jumpstart a moribund economy that in 2000–2001 had experienced the worst financial crisis since World War II, and to lay the groundwork for a resolution to the long-simmering Kurdish uprising. The most sensitive foreign policy issues (above all Iraq) remained largely in the hands of the military, while the diplomats pursued Davutoğlu's "zero-problems" approach, centered on containing regional crises and pushing ahead with the EU accession process, in order to create a stable environment for the domestic political transition and economic recovery. Davutoğlu himself emphasized the "continuity" in Turkey's foreign policy, for example in maintaining its "red lines" against Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq, explaining in 2004 that the overall priority was "to minimize external threats as much as possible so that

sound reforms can be implemented at home" (Davutoğlu, 2013, pp. 90, 162).

This combination of reform at home and crisis control abroad proved remarkably successful. Real Gross Domestic Product rose by an average of 6.8% annually between 2002 and 2007, leading the *Financial Times* to describe the five-year cumulative expansion as the "longest and most stable stretch of uninterrupted growth since at least 1970" and making Turkey the 17th largest economy in the world (Boland, 2007, April 2; Macovei, 2009, p. 10). A series of legal and administrative reforms expanded freedoms for both individuals (for example through the establishment of a Bureau for Review of Allegations of Human Rights Violations in 2004) and for communal groups (for example with the initiation of news broadcasts in Kurdish and other minority languages on state television in 2004). As national elections in 2007 approached, however, Turkey's Kemalist establishment moved to try to reverse the AK Party's fortunes.

Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt fired a major salvo in mid-February 2007, warning that the "Turkish Republic had not confronted as great risks, dangers and difficulties since 1923" (Hürriyet Newspaper, 2007, February 14). Speaking at the Istanbul War Academies two months later, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer elaborated, saying that "foreign forces" and "systemic powers"—annoyed that Turkey was maintaining its "Atatürkist structure" and resisting full incorporation into the "hegemony of the global system"—sought to destroy Turkey's sovereignty by engineering its transformation from a "secular republic" to a "democratic republic" and finally to a "moderate Islamic republic". Sezer described his duty and that of the Constitutional Court as being to "balance and put the brakes on" the elected government's "dictatorship of the majority" (Radikal Newspaper, 2007, April 14). The following day, a series of coordinated mass demonstrations, with chants of "No to America, no to the EU, down with the government", got underway in Turkey's largest cities. When the AK Party nominated Abdullah Gül later in April for president (to succeed Sezer), the General Staff posted a statement on its website asserting the Turkish Armed Forces' determination to act as the defender of secularism. But the campaign failed, and the AK Party scored a crushing victory in the 22 July 2007 national elections, winning 47% of the popular vote (compared to 34% in 2002) and 341 of 550 parliamentary seats. Gül for his part overcame a series of legal challenges and was elected president by the new parliament in August.

Turkey's hardliners suffered a second setback seven months later, this time in foreign policy. Throughout 2007, General Büyükanıt had been arguing for a military incursion into northern Iraq in order to destroy the PKK and its Iraqi Kurdish backers once and for all. Erdoğan, by contrast, voiced reservations: "It is said

that there are 500 terrorists in northern Iraq. There are 5000 terrorists in Turkey's mountains. Has the struggle against these 5000 terrorists inside Turkey been completed…that we should move to contending with the 500 persons in northern Iraq?" (Radikal Newspaper, 2007, June 13). Undeterred by Erdoğan's evident desire to have the military assume full responsibility for the proposed operation, and despite repeated warnings by American officials against the idea, a series of artillery and air strikes across the border gave way to a full-scale land invasion on 21 February 2008. On 27 February, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said: "It's very important that the Turks make this operation as short as possible and then leave…I measure quick in terms of days…not months" (Oppel & Al-Ansary, 2008). On 29 February, Turkish troops completed their withdrawal.

The incursion weakened the AK Party's opponents in two ways. First, the practical results—240 PKK fighters and 27 Turkish soldiers killed according to Turkish officials; 5 Kurdish fighters and 130 soldiers killed according to the PKK—fell so far short of expectations that it prompted expressions of disappointment and recrimination even from parties normally aligned with the military. Second, the failure of the operation revealed the bankruptcy of the Kemalist approach to the Kurdish question, and opened the way for alternatives. In early March, Admiral William J. Fallon, the head of US Central Command, called on "the Turks" to reach "some kind of accommodation" with "this group" and "not just try to eliminate them militarily" (Reuters, 2008, March 10). Secretary Gates reiterated the need "to try and address some of the civilian concerns among the Kurdish population...I think the real objective is to peel away from the hard-core terrorists those who might be reconciled and brought back into the political fold" (US Embassy in Ankara, 2008).

Together the national elections of July 2007 and the Iraq debacle of February 2008 constituted a turning point that shifted the balance of power decisively between the AK Party and the Kemalist establishment. Already in late January 2008, following unprecedented leaks of documents detailing alleged coup plots by top military officers, a series of arrests and prosecutions got underway which would eventually put some 10% of all serving generals and about half of all admirals, as well as hundreds of civilian alleged co-conspirators, behind bars. Further leaks and revelations—variously blamed on more democratic elements in the Turkish Armed Forces seeking to purge their hard-liner colleagues, or on sympathizers of Fethullah Gülen's Islamist Hizmet movement within the police and judiciary—leading to further arrests, forced retirements and resignations, appeared to signal the effective defeat of the authoritarian secular-nationalist power structure. With the domestic consolidation phase successfully completed, then, Erdoğan and his colleagues could pursue their own priorities more freely, and in the process to

answer the questions raised by Ali Bulaç and many others about the true character of their political agenda.

4. Transition Phase (2008–2011)

Domestically, the further strengthened AK Party moved quickly toward reconciliation with the Kurds—the obvious and indispensable first step for any meaningful reform agenda. On 11 March 2008, President Gül met with the leader of the Kurdish-based Democratic Society Party (DTP), and later declared that no one, including the military, believed any longer that "this thing can be solved by arms" (Cemal, 2008, March 14). A few days later, a DTP parliamentarian reciprocated with an article defending the AK Party against a final (and abortive) party closure case launched by the State Prosecutor, and calling for an alliance against the "anti-pluralistic, coup d'état ist, fascistic, neo-Unionist forces" (Tuğluk, 2008, March 17). On 29 July 2009, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay unveiled a major initiative that came to be known as the "Kurdish Opening" entailing an array of further human rights and cultural reforms—prompting denunciations by the two main opposition parties, the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP).

Externally, the most important development of this phase also aimed at Kurds. In the immediate aftermath of the failed military incursion of February 2008, the AK Party government undertook one of the most dramatic turnarounds in the history of Turkish foreign policy. After decades of attempting to suppress Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, Turkey initiated a rapprochement that bore the potential of upending the entire regional balance of power. A meeting between Turkey's Special Envoy to Iraq Murat Özçelik and Nechirvan Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), on 2 May 2008 led to an announcement that Turkey would open a formal dialogue with the KRG. Several high-level meetings between the two sides ensued, culminating in an unprecedented meeting in Baghdad on 24 March 2009 between President Gül and Prime Minister Barzani, at which Gül declared that once the PKK issue was resolved, "there are no bounds to what is possible: you are our neighbours and kinsmen" (De Bendern, 2009, March 25). The full import of Gül's comments began to emerge in early 2010, with the reopening of the Gaziantep-Mosul rail line, the opening of a Turkish consulate in Erbil, and the announcement by the KRG that it sought to export 100,000 barrels of oil per day through Turkey.

Just as the AK Party's domestic Kurdish opening could easily be explained as part of a broader liberalizing political agenda, its moves in northern Iraq could also be justified in functionalist, liberal terms—for example in Ahmet Davutoğlu's repeated insistence that his government's approach rested more on "economic interdependence" and "cultural influence" than on power or "deterrent superiority and threat" (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 302). The same could be said for other aspects of Turkey's external relations during this period: the steady growth in the share of external trade in GDP from 43% in 2000 to 52% in 2008 to 58% in 2012 (World Bank, n.d.); a proliferation of free-trade agreements (from just 4 before 2002 to 11 by 2007 and 18 by 2012) (Turkish Ministry of Economy, n.d.); infrastructural integration with neighboring countries exemplified by intensified transportation links (the Gaziantep-Mosul line as well as plans for a Gaziantep-Aleppo fast train service and for reopening long-disused links along the old Hijaz Railway; a dramatic increase in Turkish Airlines flights, especially to the Middle East and the former Soviet Union) and by plans for a regional seven-country electricity grid (International Crisis Group, 2010, pp. 11-12); and: "Since 2009…a systematic policy of visa liberalization…[through] a series of bilateral visa-free agreements with countries in its neighborhood" (Evin et al, 2010, p. 19). Finally, further reinforcing this apparent embrace of regional interdependence and integration, of soft rather than hard power, was Turkey's pacific ("zero-problems") stance during this period toward old rivals such as Russia, as reflected by its subdued response to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, and by the establishment of a bilateral "High-Level Cooperation Council" in May 2010.

No wonder, then, that many observers believed a decisive shift from realpolitik to liberal integrationism had taken place in Turkish foreign policy. For some, this was cause for concern: one Turkish analyst complained that the AK Party government's adherence to "liberal dogmas" and its "allergy" to "the use of force" had produced an "excessive optimism" that reached "Pollyannaish" levels (Koç, 2010, pp. 3, 6). Foreign interpretations were generally more favorable. The International Crisis Group noted the "win-win attitude which has become a catchphrase of Turkish diplomacy, by contrast with the zero-sum equation that traditionally has dominated the region" (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 13). Several Western authors in a 2012 edited volume welcomed the "sharp contrast" with earlier Turkish foreign policy (Tolay & Linden, 2012, p. 2), arguing that whereas in the 1990s it had been "largely framed within a realist understanding", now it sought "to promote peace and regional integration" (Tocci & Walker, 2012, pp. 35-36), and concluding that as "Turkey has become more democratic and Europeanized", its external policies have grown "far more cooperative and constructive" (Tocci, 2012, p. 206).

At the same time, however, other observers had begun to evince disquiet. An early indication came with the three-week Israeli assault on Gaza in December 2008. Prime Minister Erdoğan, who had heretofore balanced his criticisms of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians with ongoing Turkish-Israeli economic and se-

curity cooperation, adopted a much sharper tone, denouncing Israel's "inhumane actions" and, on 29 January 2009, engaging in his famous outburst against Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos conference. Tensions reached a new peak on 31 May 2010 when Israeli troops attacked a Turkish flotilla seeking to break Israel's blockade of Gaza, killing nine activists. With anti-Israeli sentiment at a peak in Turkey, the AK Party government's downgrading of bilateral relations enhanced its popularity domestically as well as among the Arab masses. It was a different story on the governmental level, however. The same 2010 ICG report referenced above also cited Syrian officials who worried that northern Syria "may slip into a Turkish sphere of influence"; an Egyptian official who complained that Erdoğan "seemed to get drunk on the response to Gaza statements"; a Saudi official who said: "They forget themselves. If this influence is going to spread again, this is very dangerous to me as an Arab"; and another Syrian official who warned: "We hear they have Ottoman ambitions, or that they want to take this region under their umbrella. Who will let this happen? Nobody" (International Crisis Group, 2010, pp. 11, 21).

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu continued to deny any "neo-Ottoman agenda" and to insist that the "key word defining Turkey's relations with the Arab countries is not 'hegemony', but 'mutual cooperation'" (MacLeod, 2012). As an unnamed Arab diplomat in Ankara put it, however: "Turkey talks about everything, solving problems, multilateral economic cooperation, interdependence. The only problem is that they are the main beneficiary. They have the industries, the skilled labourers. We have only oil and gas in our favour" (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 11). The diplomat's words suggest an alternative, less liberal, interpretation of AK Party foreign policy in which economic and cultural openness reflect economic and cultural dynamism, and political engagement reflects political confidence. As students of politics have long been aware, after all, hard and soft power go hand in hand, and—pace Davutoğlu—openness is a natural characteristic of hegemony. Still, the full extent of the AK Party's ambitions would not become clear until after its next major milestone.

5. Implementation Phase (2011–)

The AK Party won its third straight national election on 12 June 2011, once again raising its share of the total vote (from 34% in 2002, and 47% in 2007, to 50%). In his victory speech that night, Erdoğan declared the outcome "Sarajevo's victory as much as Istanbul's; Beirut's victory as much as Izmir's; Damascus' victory as much as Ankara's; Ramallah's, the West Bank's, Jerusalem's, Gaza's victory as much as Diyarbakır's…Turkey has now attained a democratic freedom that is an example for its region and the world" (Hürriyet Newspaper, 2011, June 12). Speaking at a gathering of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo three months later, Erdoğan hailed the Arab revolutions, called for "more freedom, democracy and human rights", and added:

> We are elements of the same body and the same soul, for we constitute one great and noble family. Within a family, when joys are shared they increase, and when sorrows are shared they decrease. Now we are at a historical turning point where we share our joys and sorrows at the highest level…The time has come for us, who with all our different languages share the same conceptual geography and destiny, to take charge of our shared future…The people of this region, who for centuries have inaugurated new epochs in human history and authored new innovations from science to literature, from art to philosophy, are not—I am sorry to say—where they should be today. But we possess more than sufficient potential to turn this around, and we view the developments taking place today from this perspective. (Turkish Prime Ministry, 2011, 13 September)

Erdoğan's comments highlight not just the growing assertiveness of AK Party discourse in this latest phase, but also the accelerating convergence between the party's domestic and foreign agendas. Domestically, the elections were soon followed by the resignations of the chief of staff and three force commanders (unhappy about the ongoing coup plot investigations), and their replacement by a new military leadership that appeared intent on avoiding interference in political affairs. Erdoğan then initiated a new round of dialogue with the PKK that included a meeting between his intelligence chief Hakan Fidan and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in December 2012. These talks seem to have yielded significant results, as the PKK implemented a ceasefire in March 2013, and began withdrawing its fighters from Turkey into northern Iraq. Erdoğan for his part convened a "Wise Men" commission in March to begin educating the public about the peace initiative, unveiled a new round of cultural reforms in September, and on 16 November 2013 met with the Iraqi KRG leader Mas`ud Barzani in Diyarbakır.

At each key juncture, the two sides cast their reconciliation efforts as part of a broader reassessment of the regional disposition drawn up by the colonial powers during World War I, and exemplified by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement carving the Middle East into Western zones of influence. Speaking in Diyarbakır during his meeting with Barzani, for example, Erdoğan declared: "A century ago borders were drawn on this land with rulers, but they cannot draw borders on our affection. They cannot draw borders on our shared history, our shared civilization, our shared future" (CNN Türk, 2013, November 16). Öcalan—somewhat startlingly for

a Kurdish nationalist—made the same point in his speech announcing the ceasefire, when he lambasted "Western imperialism" for dividing the "Arab, Turkish, Persian and Kurdish communities" into "nation-states and artificial borders", recalled their "common life under the banner of Islam for almost a 1000 years", and declared that "it is time to restore to the concept of 'us' its old spirit and practice" (CNN Türk, 2013, March 21).

The centerpiece of the AK Party's democratizing reforms from the very beginning—a Kurdish initiative that sought to replace monocultural secular nationalism with a more expansive communal identity based on Islam—thus inevitably had external ramifications as well. First, it provoked unease in neighboring states which viewed it as a threat to their own sovereignty. Tensions with Iraq, for example, came to the fore in 2011 as growing Turkish-KRG political and economic ties bypassed the Iraqi central government, with Turkish officials increasingly prone to visit Iraqi Kurdistan without stopping in Baghdad first, and with plans moving ahead for direct oil exports from the KRG region to Turkey. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused Turkey of meddling in Iraqi affairs in December 2011, and of acting like a "hostile" state the following April. KRG leaders, by contrast, now called Turkey a "strategic partner" (Bozkurt, 2012, May 7). By mid-2012, Turkey's traditional policy of propping up Baghdad against Iraq's Kurds had undergone a total reversal: "Privately, Turkish officials relate that if Baghdad strays far enough from Turkish interests, Ankara may decide to 'take Kurdistan under its wings'. The KRG agrees—[Mas`ud] Barzani himself has reportedly suggested this sort of adoptive relationship...Both Kurdish and Turkish officials suggest that Ankara would be ready to defend the KRG if Baghdad moves with force to challenge Kurdish autonomy" (Çağaptay & Evans, 2012, p. 9).

A second connection between the AK Party's domestic and foreign agendas emerged with the Arab upheavals of 2011. After a brief period of uncertainty, Erdoğan's government aligned decisively with the popular uprisings against authoritarian secular nationalist regimes: Tunisia's and Egypt's almost immediately, then Libya's, and finally—after a brief mediation attempt—Syria's as well. On 26 April 2012, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu made the connection explicit in a speech to the Turkish parliament in which he noted "fundamental changes" in "regional conceptions of statehood, governance, and human geography". Turkey's resources, including its government's credentials as architect of the "most important democratizing drive in the Turkish Republic's history", empowered it "to determine the future; to be the vanguard of a new idea, a new regional order". While acknowledging that Turkey's secular-nationalist opposition, preferring as it did a "Ba'thist political conception", could not be "expected to understand us", Davutoğlu declared that his government nevertheless intended "to direct the great transformation wave in the Middle East" (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, April 26). Speaking less than a year later, on the same day as Abdullah Öcalan's cease-fire speech, AK Party Deputy General-Secretary Süleyman Soylu made the link between his government's domestic and regional ambitions still more explicit when he said: "The third wave of democracy is very important for Turkey...We have been in a phase of retreat since 1699 [when the Treaty of Karlowitz marked the onset of Ottoman territorial decline]...[A]fter 300 years we are rising once again. There is now a Turkey that can lay claim to the lands which we dominated in the past" (Milliyet Newspaper, 2013, March 21).

The parallelism AK Party leaders drew between new conceptions of identity and representation at home on the one hand, and a new territorial order in the region on the other, drew precisely the responses Davutoğlu anticipated. At home, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu denounced the government's support for Syria's rebels as "a framework that approaches treason...We do not want our children's blood to be spilled in the Arab deserts" (CNN Türk, 2012, October 9). Abroad, President Assad of Syria opined that Erdoğan "thinks he is the new sultan of the Ottoman [sic] and he can control the region as it was during the Ottoman Empire under a new umbrella. In his heart he thinks he is a caliph" (RT Television, 2012, November 9). The Egyptian government installed by a military coup that ousted President Muhammad Morsi, and strongly backed by Saudi Arabia, for its part reacted to Turkish criticisms of its takeover and subsequent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood by expelling Turkey's ambassador in November 2013.

Davutoğlu's argument illuminates the fundamental dichotomy he—and his colleagues—see between their worldview and the one they ascribe to their primary opponents, foreign and domestic alike. Speaking in Diyarbakır on 15 March 2013, he elaborated on his side's alternative to the CHP's "Ba'thist conception", rejecting the "nationalist ideologies" with which the colonial powers had tried "to dismember us" and calling for a "new regional order" based on the restoration of an "older conception" of community (*millet*)—one that didn't differentiate between "Turk and Kurd, Albanian and Bosnian". Working together, "Turks, Kurds, Albanians, Bosnians, [and] Arabs" would erase "artificially drawn maps" and "break the mold that Sykes-Picot drew for us" (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, March 15). This is a vision that has been propounded consistently by Davutoğlu, Erdoğan and Gül since the early 1990s, as this article has sought to demonstrate, and as confirmed by recent content analyses of AK Party discourse revealing a quest for "great power identity" and a "politics of grandeur" (Demirtaş-Bagdonas, 2014) even in cases where public opinion was not supportive (Panayırcı & İşeri, 2014, pp. 67-68; see also Gürcan, 2013, pp. 361-364, on the pro-AK Party me-

dia). It is a vision that extends, as Davutoğlu's words indicate, well beyond the Middle East to Turkey's western and northern frontiers as well: Erdoğan's declaration in Prizren in October 2013 that "Turkey is Kosovo, Kosovo is Turkey", for example, provoked angry demonstrations in Serbia (Baydar, 2013, October 28). It is a vision, in short, that was always bound to generate serious problems with the adherents of secular nationalism in all the countries that fall within its purview, as well as with external forces—such as Russia, Israel and Iran—which have their own geopolitical reasons to oppose the consolidation of regional power it threatens to bring about.

5. Conclusion

The preceding analysis has sought to reveal the parallelism between the AK Party's drive against authoritarian secular nationalism at home, and its attempt to utilize both soft and hard power in pursuit of a new post-nationalist regional order abroad, and thereby to indicate the inaptness of calls—primarily from Turkish and Western liberals—that it abandon "neo-Ottomanism" and concentrate on its domestic reform agenda instead. The same can be said of another line of criticism from an entirely different direction. In a series of columns published in January 2014, in a newspaper reflecting the views of Fethullah Gülen's Hizmet movement, Ali Bulaç argued that the AK Party leaders' "over-confident" and aggressive pursuit of their "neo-Ottoman delusions" is "un-Islamic" because it is predicated on Turkish leadership (Bulaç, 2014, January 2, 2014, January 4). In Islam, Bulaç asserted, leadership is assigned not to a particular nation but to the Islamic community (*ümmet*) as a whole, so considerations of power, history or geography are irrelevant: even the most humble Muslim may be appointed ruler (Bulaç, 2014, January 6).

This is one perspective in Islam, but it is not the only one. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), for example, a leading representative of the "Islamic realist" tradition Bulaç had denounced in his 2010 book, identified two criteria for effective leadership. The first is legitimacy, meaning adherence to the prevailing normative ethos (Islam, obviously, but increasingly in today's context democracy as well). The other is power—a point Ibn Khaldun illustrated by arguing, contrary to conventional opinion, that Quraysh, the Prophet's clan, forfeited their claim to rule when they "became too weak to fulfill the duties of the caliphate" (*Muqaddima*, 3.24). For Muslim realists, neither criterion can suffice without the other.

From this perspective, the AK Party leaders' appeal to Turkey's hard and soft power resources is not only legitimate, but mandatory. As for legitimacy, their adherence to Islam—and their consistent rejection of ethnic chauvinism—are evident. The question is, can they also maintain their democratic credentials? Erdoğan's responses to the two unexpected challenges

that confronted him in 2013—the protests that broke out in May following the proposed closing of a park in Istanbul, and the crisis with Fethullah Gülen's movement that got underway in December—are noteworthy. In both cases, Erdoğan and his allies interpreted the crises as the work of their traditional adversaries: foreign actors fearful of Turkey's growing power and domestic secular-nationalist hardliners, now joined by Gülen's rival Islamist movement. Their heavy-handed responses have prompted questions about whether the AK Party can sustain its role as a democratic "dominant party" in the mode of Sweden's Social Democrats or Italy's and Japan's Liberal Democrats, or whether it may yet succumb to the authoritarian current in Turkish political culture (Keyman, 2014, pp. 24-25, 31; Çağla, 2012, p. 570).

While it is indeed the case, as the more fair-minded among those who raise such questions acknowledge, that much of the recent anti-government activism has constituted a "reactionary response" by the AK Party's traditional illiberal adversaries (Yel & Nas, 2013, pp. 177, 178), Erdoğan and his allies do appear to have missed an important dimension of the emerging opposition: the genuine Western-style liberals who have heretofore remained marginal, but who are destined eventually to eclipse the authoritarian secular-nationalists on both the political and normative levels. This point was vividly illustrated to me by a conversation with an old-school Kemalist who drove many students to the Gezi Park protests in the summer of 2013. He said that when he encouraged the students to give no quarter as they battled the police, they looked at him as if he was crazy—they just wanted to defend the park, not kill policemen.

The immediate challenge posed by such crises to the AK Party leaders will be to test their ability to distinguish between their old opponents and these new liberals, and to recognize that each requires a different response. Counter-attacking by politicizing the judiciary and law-enforcement agencies, or censoring news outlets and social media sites, can only undermine the AK Party's democratic credentials, and hence its legitimacy, and hence its effectiveness at spearheading a new regional order. How artfully it deals with the looming flood tide of liberalism—philosophically and morally as well as politically—may well prove the ultimate challenge for the AK Party and for its attempt to formulate a credible Islamic-realist alternative.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

The Problem of Mismatch in Successful Cross-Sectoral Collaboration

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Abstract
When facing the challenge of new global employment dynamics and the demand for the creation of economic growth and new jobs, joint cross-sectoral efforts to pool market and public sector resources promise to make the most of the complementary strengths, competencies and perspectives of different actors. The topic addressed here is the impact that management rationale—bureaucratic and entrepreneurial—has on cross-sectoral collaboration, and in particular how a mismatch in goals and norms between sectoral actors and the overall management rationale may affect joint efforts in terms of the capacity to recruit relevant actors and establish sustainable collaboration. The empirical findings, which are based on two cases of cross-sectoral co-operation—the EU programme EQUAL and the Swedish VINNVÄXT programme—suggest that management rationale is an important factor in accounting for success of cross-sectoral initiatives and that a mismatch risks undermining smooth co-operation and thereby policy delivery.

1. Cross-Sectoral Collaboration for Economic Growth and the Creation of New Jobs

In globalised labour markets, the creation of new jobs is a pressing issue that calls for new ways of formulating employment policies. Not only does globalisation entail redistribution of employment opportunities when national labour markets become part of transnational and regional job markets, but governments also find their powers limited in regulating employment. Public sector experiences alone and hierarchical "one size fits all" policies do not appear to be sufficient for meeting these challenges. The failure of a market solution is equally obvious. In fact, the dysfunctions of supposedly self-regulating markets seem to have caused the rapid job losses of past decades. When public-private and global interdependencies appear as all the more salient, new forms of pooling resources and

"know how" from the market and the public sector are a logical response to labour market complexity.

There are particularly high expectations among policymakers and politicians with regard to cross-sectoral policy making. Making the most of the complementary strengths of sectoral actors is expected to guarantee innovative and sustainable solutions to problems. Paradoxically, however, some research findings indicate that same-sector collaboration may be far more successful than working with actors from different sectors. For example, same-sector partners cooperate in a more effective way, leading to successful policy outcomes—they simply seem to get along better with each other (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010, p. 689). Managing the differences between actors with divergent sectoral backgrounds is, therefore, not only a challenge for the individual organisations involved in participation, but also for the overall management of the joint effort.

The question that this paper addresses is the role of the management rationale in facilitating and impeding cross-sectoral collaboration, and, more precisely, how the mismatch between the management rationale and the sectoral orientations of the actors affects vital conditions for collaboration. This mismatch is defined as a situation where the overall management rationale and an actor's orientation are guided by different sector logics.

The aim of the discussion below is to advance the scholarly debate about conditions for successful cross-sectoral policy co-operation. The first section of the paper contextualises the research question of management rationale and mismatch in current scholarly debates on management/administrative styles. This is followed by a description of the empirical cases and data. The third part of the paper consists of the presentation of two case studies, mapping working processes in two instances of cross-sectoral collaboration. The fourth section summaries and analyses the main empirical findings.

2. Cross-Sectoral Collaboration for Employment Creation

Research shows that the use of solutions inspired by the private sector, such as outsourcing, contracting out and quasi-market models for employment creation in Australia, Holland and Denmark, have not resulted in higher efficiency and innovation or less bureaucracy, in comparison with public sector solutions (Bredgaard & Larsen, 2011). Instead, an increasingly popular alternative, which is exemplified by the EU employment strategy, Boston's workforce system in the U.S. (Herranz, 2007) and the Swedish policy for economic growth and jobs, involves various hybrid forms of joint public-private co-operation. These are seen as a promising approach to employment creation, workforce development and integration of socio-economically marginalised groups in the labour market.

In theory, cross-sectoral partnerships not only "enable public agencies to tackle social problems more effectively by unlocking the benefits of comparative advantage" (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010, p. 680), but by enhancing reciprocity and mutual learning, they also build future cross-sectoral problem solving capacity (Innes & Booher, 2003). Pooling resources helps to enhance innovation potential by making the most of complementary strengths and synergy effects of diverse competencies and knowledge on the part of different sectoral actors. Sometimes this form of new public governance (NPG) is also labelled "good governance", since it involves using networks and partnerships between governments, business corporations and civil society associations to govern society in a more effective and legitimate way by including a wide range of societal stakeholders in policymaking and implementation (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, pp. 21-22).

For an individual stakeholder, the incentive for par-

ticipation in a joint project can be the potential gains and costs related to participation, and the action is "a result of choices based on calculated self-interest" (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 734). Collaboration is used instrumentally, for example as a way of acquiring new competencies or of gaining access to new economic resources. Alternatively, beyond the realm of the rational intentions, a stakeholder may be driven primarily by role expectations and shared norms in its organisational milieu, i.e. by what is understood as an 'appropriate' way of acting (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 289). This might, for example, involve living up to expectations of market efficiency or allowing actions to be guided by public sector rule of accountability.

Several factors may nevertheless undermine the benefits of cross-sectoral collaboration aiming at innovative and cost-efficient approaches to job creation. Fear on the part of an actor of being co-opted and losing legitimacy may effectively prevent it from getting involved in joint action (Hendriks, 2009), as may the prospect of losing rather than winning economic and human resources (Sörensen & Torfing, 2007). In addition, participation may be felt to be somehow inappropriate if it goes against the role expectations and norms that the actor follows.

In addition, the very mix of divergent sector backgrounds of participating actors constitutes a specific challenge for cross-sectoral co-operation, sometimes creating conditions that can jeopardise expected positive outcomes. Since criteria of success differ among corporate, government and civil society organisations, it may even be a challenge to establish shared outcome criteria for successful collaboration (Selsky & Parker, 2005, p. 864).

It is, then, reasonable to argue that the overall management of a cross-sectoral initiative appears to be a key factor in facilitating a collaborative process. Therefore, the research question here addresses the role of management rationale in cross-sectoral policy-making, and especially the possible effects of a mismatch between the public/private sector orientations of participating organisations, with their respective values, norms and prescribed administrative processes on the one hand, and the overall management rationale of the joint cross-collaboration on the other.

Indeed, network management research has been criticised for not fully recognising the importance of sectoral differences and instead tending to assume that organisations behave in a similar manner within a network, regardless of whether they are governmental, non-profit or business organisations (Herranz, 2007, p. 26). One possible explanation may be found in the widely shared prescriptive and descriptive understandings of recent organisational developments.

When organisations are conceptualised as open systems in continuous interaction with other organisations in order to exchange resources, personnel and

ideas (DiMaggio, 1988; Scott, 1995, 2003), the increased popularity of NPM during past decades, together with opting out and privatisation of public sector competencies and tasks, can be seen as resulting in a situation where business companies and public sector bodies become increasingly "multiply embedded", as they adopt a "role or function traditionally associated with another sector" (Selsky & Parker, 2005, pp. 851-853). Since learning and borrowing from organisations in sectors other than one´s own becomes essential, this eventually gives rise to blurred roles and functions. The idea of converting sector logics, however, easily overshadows the fact that public and private sectors still display fundamental differences as different organisational fields and that when actors with different sector backgrounds focus on an issue, they "are likely to think about it differently, to be motivated by different goals, and to use different approaches" (Selsky & Parker 2005, p. 851). Even though all organisations are "public" in a sense that they are to a varying extent influenced by political authority (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994), it is still useful to make an analytical distinction between the public and private sectors.

As organisational fields, the public and market sectors each display their own rationale and ideas of what is an appropriate way to act, what are reasonable solutions, and how success should be measured (cp. March & Olsen, 1984, 2006). Private companies operating in the market sector are traditionally associated with the entrepreneurial orientation embodied in the main goal of profit maximising and vales of customer and market focus. The public sector, represented by governments and public sector agencies but also including such public bodies as state-owned universities and research institutes, normally operates instead through hierarchically organised processes so as to follow accountability rules in implementing government policies.

Given the differences between the public and private sectors in what constitute their main goals and organisational processes (Herranz, 2010), it is not surprising that cross-sectoral collaboration, while at best generating new innovative products and solutions to societal problems, also faces greater challenges than, for example, same-sector public-public partnerships. According to a study of effectiveness, efficiency and equity in a large number of UK partnerships, public-public partnerships perform best on effectiveness, while cross-sectoral public-private partnerships are less effective (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010, p. 689). What, then, explains this result? Researchers argue that "public-public partnerships may work on a more promising agenda or else just get along better than the alternatives" (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010, p. 694). Sharing sector-specific norms and understandings of appropriate ways of acting seems to make it easier for the organisations to succeed in their collaboration.

To meet these challenges of divergent appropriate-

ness logics, knowledge and experiences, which are conducive to cross-sectoral co-operation and the very reason it appears so attractive in terms of high potential for innovation, the overall management plays a central role in facilitating smooth administrative processes. As research shows, sector rationales—bureaucratic and entrepreneurial, respectively—are not only embodied at the organisational level but also inform the management approach at the level of collaboration (Herranz, 2007, 2010). Herranz notes knowledge of "how different types of managerial co-ordination relate to network outcomes is still relatively limited" (Herranz, 2010, p. 447).

At present, the bulk of scholarly debate on public sector reforms focuses on three main models for public sector management/administration: New Public Governance (NPG) as a distinctly different model from New Public Management (NPM) and what is labelled the Neo-Weberian State (NWS) (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, pp. 21-22). At the heart of the debate is an intense dispute over the term "bureaucracy", which supporters of NPM tend to associate with the defects of public sector management, while promoting as a solution the entrepreneurial management ideal inspired by market sector values and ideology, and which is often defined in opposition to what is seen as "impersonal, procedural, hierarchical and technical organization of the Weberian bureau" (du Gay, 2000, p. 6). Critics see a risk for simplistic descriptions of bureaucratic forms of organisation. In contrast to picturing bureaucracy as a static model, "a single, universal bureaucratic regime of public administration", it is instead a "many-sided, evolving, diversified organizational device" (du Gay, 2005, p. 3), varying as a result of divergent constitutional solutions.

While keeping in the mind the real-life complexity and variation in different administrative solutions, it will still be necessary, in order to examine the effects of the mismatch between participants' sector orientations and the management rationale, to identity the core characteristics of the two main ways of managing cross-sectoral collaboration: the bureaucratic management rationale and the entrepreneurial one.

According to Goodsell, although bureaux/state administrations vary in make-up, they still most likely share the "classic Weberian characteristics of graded hierarchy, formal rules, specialized tasks, written files, and full-time, trained salaried, career employees" and embody a vertical line of authority in order to assure external control and accountability (Goodsell, 2005, p. 18). In other words, these traits can be said to describe the classical Weberian bureaucratic management style. Following Pollitt and Bouckaert, we identity central traits for the "market-type mechanism", i.e., the use of performance indicators, targets, competitive contracts, "quasi-markets", which also define the entrepreneurial management rationale as a distinct form, separate from the co-ordination mechanism of the Weberian bureaucratic style that exercises authority through a

state-centred, disciplined hierarchy (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 22).

Guided by the preceding ideas of administrative/management solutions and Herranz's distinction between the bureaucratic management style that emphases "formalised inter-organisational relations based on contracts or standardised procedures and the entrepreneurial management style", inspired the by ideals of a private sector organisation, in his model of Strategic Orientation Values Sets (Herranz, 2007, p. 10), we summarise the central elements of each management rationale in Table 1.

While the ideology of bureaucratic management is based on legislative order, the entrepreneurial style is recognised by its efficiency and market focus, with economic value maximisation as its vital goal. For the bureaucratic rationale, embodying the Weberian ideal, the main objective is instead to implement government policies and to be accountable for that.

How, then, should the control of cross-sectoral collaboration ideally be formed? Here, the two models offer different solutions: the bureaucratic rationale prescribes centralised rule-based control, while the entrepreneurial one favours quasi-centralised control, thus providing more leeway to the collaborators. Structure, one of the two remaining parameters, is closely related to control and refers either to a hierarchical process or to a process relying on the delegation of powers to those participating in the joint action. Finally, decision-making tends, in the case of bureaucratic management rationale, to follow a top-down process as the entrepreneurial co-ordination exhibits a flexible and ad hoc-based way of taking decisions, ultimately dictated by the incentives of value maximisation. Thus, the entrepreneurial rationale places the emphasis on management by incentives related to performance goals and grants the cross-sectoral collaboration and the sectoral actors involved broad powers in designing the joint activities. The bureaucratic rationale largely entails a different form of management praxis, with its top-down co-ordination based on formalised procedures, written contracts and systems for accountability reports in relation to the implementation of policy objectives (Herranz, 2007, 2010).

Herranz's empirical findings show that the choice of management style makes a difference: bureaucratic style is associated with low performance, both at the level of the participating actor and at the level of multi-sectoral collaboration, while entrepreneurial management correlates with moderate to high performance. A main conclusion is that more attention needs to be paid to the multi-sectoral mix of collaborators in relation to the co-ordination style when explaining collaborative outcomes (Herranz, 2010, pp. 456-457). Given that management rationale appears to be such an important factor in explaining successful cross-sectoral collaboration, it is not surprising that the topic has, ac-

cording to critics, received too little attention (Selsky & Parker, 2005, p. 866).

We address, more precisely, the question of what impact the mismatch between management rationale and the different sector orientations of participating and potentially participating actors has on the performance of cross-sectoral collaboration in terms of its capacity to recruit relevant actors and create sustainable and successful working processes.

To conclude the theory section, Table 2 illustrates the hypotheses of mismatch between alternative management rationales and sector actor orientations representing divergent values, processes and strategic goals. In the context of this paper, we use the term mismatch to describe a situation where the overall management rationale and an actor's orientation are guided by different sector logics.

Previous research shows that a same-sector public-public background of actors has a positive impact on effectiveness in terms of "getting along better". Our questions is whether this result of the positive effects of matching backgrounds—and the negative effects of non-matching orientations—is also valid for the relationship between management rationale and individual sectoral actors and, if so, whether this correlation holds regardless of the kind of management rationale—bureaucratic or entrepreneurial.

Table 1. Two management rationales.

	Bureaucratic	Entrepreneurial
Goals	Implementing government policies, accountability	Value/profit maximisation
Ideology	Legislative order/state focus	Market/efficiency focus
Control	Centralised/rule-based	Quasi-centralised/incentives related to performance goals
Structure	Hierarchical	Quasi-autonomous/delegation
Decision-process	Top-down in accordance with government policies	Ad-hoc dictated by value maximisation

Table 2. Management rationale and sector orientation.

		Bureaucratic	Entrepreneurial
Sector orientation	Public body	Match	Mismatch
	Private company	Mismatch	Match

3. Method and Data

In order to examine empirically the question of mismatch and it effects, we have conducted qualitative case studies of two instances of cross-sectoral collaboration by scrutinising their structures, processes and goals. The case selection is designed so that the two cases—the EU programme EQUAL and the Swedish triple helix programme VINNVÄXT, together include the two different management rationales—bureaucratic and entrepreneurial—thereby enabling us to explore the impact of mismatch, regardless of type of management rationale. These two instances of collaboration are not viewed here as two equivalent sets of observations but rather as two complex configurations of events and structures (Ragin, 1997). By relating management rationale to how they perform in terms of recruiting relevant sectoral actors to appropriate joint action, we can shed further light on the broader puzzle of how the in-built mismatch between the management rationale and sector orientations of actors influences performance in joint collaboration.

The EU programme EQUAL and the Swedish triple helix programme VINNVÄXT are in many ways distinctly different: the first one operating within the multi-level EU context, the second one within the Swedish regional context. This gives us the advantage of being able to empirically explore the effects of mismatch in vastly different contexts of governance. At the EU level, the EQUAL programme is a component of the European Employment Strategy (EES), while VINNVÄXT, which is a part of the Swedish Regional Development and Economic Growth Policy, is a government initiative. Both programmes enjoy strong political support. The EU, with a limited legislative mandate, needs to apply new forms of policy making such as allocating structural funds to support public-private partnerships in the development of new ways of implementing employment policies (European Commission, 2009):

> …the top challenge for the EU today must be to prevent high levels of unemployment, to boost job creation (…) This will only be achieved with strong co-operation between all the stakeholders, better policy coordination and mutual learning…

In the Swedish case, long-standing corporatist policy making, in particular in labour market policy, paves the way for novel measures in innovation and employment creation. This legacy supports consultation between politicians, the public administration and organised interests at the local level, involving a broad range of local business and public interests in decision making (Hall & Montin, 2007, p. 2ll). The fundamental notion of the Swedish triple helix programme that aims to create new jobs by enhancing co-operation horizontally between public sector and business actors, is defined as (Westerberg, 2009, p. 51):

> A very decisive interaction is taking place in the innovation system between three groups of actors—industry, academia and the public sector.

The empirical materials consist of evaluation reports, which offer detailed descriptions of collaboration and provide rich and focused accounts of processes and objectives in each case. For the EQUAL programme, the EU has commissioned a number of evaluations conducted by major international consultancy companies, such as Bernard Brunhes International and ECONOMIX Research & Consulting. In the case of the Swedish triple helix VINNVÄXT, the government has produced several evaluation reports. Relying on these secondary sources—in many cases comprehensive investigations—for the empirical analyses is to some extent a methodological limitation, as these investigations were originally conducted for purposes other than to examine the question of the mismatch. However, the choice of material provides access to empirical data that would otherwise be very costly and, to some extent, perhaps even very difficult to gain access to. The evaluation reports not only offer critical descriptions of these two empirical cases. They are also based on reliable, high quality empirical research.

The final "EU-Wide Evaluation Report" covers activities of EQUAL between 2001 and 2006 and is based on national evaluation reports, case studies of transnational partnerships, interviews with managing authorities in member states, participant observation and surveys among participants. The 335-page report covers the strategies in EQUAL as well as "management and implementation systems" (Bernard Bruhnes International, 2006, xii). Similarly, the two others evaluations, Synthesis/EU10 Member States, and Synthesis/EUR-15 Member States are each based on national evaluations studies and additional interviews with national evaluators and representatives of managing authorities. The aim of the EU Commission is to use of this documentation in the "preparation, management, monitoring and evaluation of future programmes, and to facilitate the post-evaluation of the programme" (Economix, Research & Consulting, 2009, vii). The empirical data for the Swedish case consists of a study VR 2009:19 and VR 2008:08 conducted by VINNOVA (Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems), based on 52 interviews with participants in eight VINNVÄXT processes. In addition, the empirical materials include a research report R 2004:10 by NUTEK (Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth) on how small companies collaborate with other actors, based on a survey including 5,000 firms.

4. Tools for Developing European Employment Strategy

Enforcement, management and persuasion are three

central implementation strategies in the EU Social Policy, (Hartlapp, 2007), while common guidelines and systems of standards and indicators are employed to create shared "EU knowledge" (Mosher & Trubek, 2003) and even a "hegemonic discourse" (Haahr, 2004). Voluntary policy co-ordination through public-private collaboration, albeit under the "shadow of the hierarchy" of the Commission (Smismans, 2008), is a well-established method.

In its directive C2000 853 *Establishing the guidelines for the Community Initiative EQUAL,* the Commission establishes the key principles of EQUAL cross-sectoral collaboration: in order for the European Employment Strategy (EES) to be fully effective, it must be translated into action at the local and regional levels, in urban and rural districts—i.e., in contexts that are able to generate local co-operation (European Commission, 2000). Therefore, the EU allocates structural funds to support cross-sectoral partnership, the goal of which is to promote policy learning across sectors and levels of governance. The main goal of EQUAL is to provide a "testing ground for the development and dissemination of new ways of delivering employment policies" (European Commission, 2000), and thereby helping to implement the main goals of the EES (Ramboll, Euréval, & SEOR, 2010): to create conditions for a socially inclusive labour market and high levels of employment. For the period 2000–2006, the EU funded EQUAL with 3.2 billion euros, which was supplemented with national co-funding of over 2.2 billion euros. During the period 2007–2013, the European Social Fund disseminated the lessons learned from EQUAL by using approximately 3 billion euros for transnational cross-sectoral co-operation.

EQUAL guidelines state that public-private partnerships have a good potential for promoting "joint efforts" and "transfer of experience and good practice" in the main areas of the EES. Thus, innovation, mainstreaming, empowerment and transnationality are the principles that inform the workings of the development partnerships. In order to qualify for funding, a partnership needs to bring together relevant and central actors on a geographical or sectoral level, including public bodies, business actors, social partners and civil society organisations. The role of public bodies in the collaboration is to ensure a good correspondence between the work that is carried out through partnerships and the development needs of the territory, so that the innovative employment measures can be disseminated horizontally to organisations in the same field and vertically to regional and national policy makers and mainstreamed in regular employment policies (European Commission, 2000).

Our first question here is how the EQUAL programme performs in terms of organising the working process. What kind of management rationale characterised the programme, and which values, principles and processes constitute the framework for managing the partnerships?

4.1. Management Processes—Experiences of Bureaucratic Rationale

During 2000–2006, EQUAL funded 1,352 cross-sector partnerships. The evaluation reports offer detailed descriptions of the ideology of the programme, its goals in terms of accountability or value maximisation, and its structure in terms of being hierarchical or quasi-autonomous.

Following the two leading programme ideas—innovation and empowerment—the EQUAL guidelines recommend "democratic", or at least participatory governance, mechanisms and also that "those involved in the implementation of activities should also take part in decision making" (Bernard Bruhnes International, 2006, p. 57), which suggests inclusive and perhaps even empowering decision making processes for public and private sectoral actors in the partnerships. During the first round of the partnerships, however, such "fully participative mechanisms" were criticised for being cumbersome and less sustainable (Bernard Bruhnes International, 2006, pp. 65-68) and were successively replaced with processes of increased streamlining, centralisation and specialisation in decision making. The decision making processes came to resemble a classic hierarchical model.

How did the actors involved experience the EQUAL management rationale? Indeed, several sectoral actors and, in particular, the beneficiaries of measures, found it difficult to follow the intricacies of project management, which, according to evaluators, may have had "a disempowering rather than an empowering effect" (Bernard Bruhnes International, 2006, p. 67). The programme terminology was criticised for being highly complex and difficult to grasp. Sometimes it required conscious efforts on the part of lead partners to explain it, and participants that were more familiar with EU programmes helped the less experienced ones. Several evaluation reports brought up the problem of what could be labelled "bureaucratic overload" (Economix, Research & Consulting, 2009, p. 7):

> During the interviews with the Managing Authorities and the National Support Structures it became clear that a heavy administrative system represented a major problem for many new Member States. Not only was the reporting time consuming for DPs, but also for Managing Authorities and National Support Structures as they concentrated their resources on checking financial claims for compliance and eligibility, and formal completeness of monitoring reports.

Further (Economix, Research & Consulting, 2009, p. 10):

> Evaluators as well as Managing Authorities themselves perceived the administrative processes as be-

ing not efficient from the Programme's implementation view point...Administrative requirements at DP level (including technical and financial reporting, application of public procurement rules) were consuming important time and human resources.

However, there was some improvement in the EQUAL management routines later in the programme period (Bernard Brunhes Internacional, 2009, p. 34):

> Monitoring systems used by Member States evolved throughout the life-cycle of EQUAL. While in round 1 they were classified as "highly bureaucratic" and "with too much focus on financial data", in round 2, monitoring systems were simplified and improved.

In short, EQUAL represents many of the traits that signify cross-sector collaboration with a bureaucratic management rationale. There was intense use of formalised procedures for rule following involving written contracts, standardised information collection and a comprehensive system for reporting. The evaluations reveal that ESF and its national and regional bodies emphasise formalised inter-organisational relations for EQUAL partnerships, based on contracts covering planned activities and use of economic resources. The regular monitoring activities include documented procedures for controlling partnership activities and their results, economic transactions and daily log/time reports for those working in a partnership, under the supervision of the representatives for regional and local ESF bodies.

In order to receive continuous funding during its lifetime, a partnership needed to produce approved accountability reports on a regular basis that followed a detailed and standardised model. In brief, it is possible to conclude that the question of accountability appears to be a more central goal for the Commission than value maximisation. What was initially based on ideas of innovative and voluntary policy learning and co-ordination between business actors and public bodies in the EQUAL partnerships was transformed by means of contracts, specific project terminology and regularly monitoring of activities with the help of fiscal and activity reports into a process that was criticised for its lack of effectiveness.

With the comprehensive system of accountability reports follows a structure that is relatively hierarchical, with only limited leeway for activities other than those planned, budgeted and approved in advance. Control over the activities was centralised, with little, if any, ad hoc decision-making. To sum up, several of these factors indicate that the EQUAL management represented a hierarchical management rationale. Peters identifies as one of the four possible problems of bureaucracy "an excessive action" on part of the institution (Peters, 2010, p. 267). In the case of the EQUAL's

management rationale, the critics would probably agree on such a verdict.

4.2. Mismatch—Quest for Business Actors

The success of cross-sector collaboration depends on its capacity to attract and recruit relevant public and private organisations. When assessing the outcome of EQUAL, an important question is whether the partnerships, in accordance with the programme guidelines, succeed in engaging smaller and larger organisations as well as public bodies and private sectoral actors.

First, which actors have qualified for EQUAL membership? The results (Bernard Bruhnes International, 2006) show that public authorities and education and training organisations are the most frequent lead partners, 46 per cent in total, while business actors and social partners participate more often merely as "regular" partners. All in all, private enterprises comprise only 12 per cent of the sectoral actors involved, and their share is even lower among lead partners: only 9 per cent. It is, thus, hardly surprising that several national evaluators expressed criticism concerning the low level of involvement of business actors in EQUAL (Bernard Brunhes Internacional, 2009, p. 8):

> National evaluators often criticized the weak involvement of private companies. A higher involvement would have been useful, as it would have created a deeper understanding of the problem as well as it would have helped searching for possible solutions, as argued for instance by the LV evaluator. The EU-wide final evaluation report of 2006 showed that also in the old Member States the involvement of the private sector was considered as low and difficulties in attracting the private sector to engage in projects dealing with inequalities and discrimination were named.

In addition, it became apparent that it was difficult for companies to maintain participation throughout a partnership life cycle (Bernard Bruhnes International, 2006, pp. 57-59). More often, they terminated participation in the middle of the partnership period. In sum, the picture is very much one of public sector bodies being the relevant and strategic key players. When scrutinising "partnership composition and inclusiveness", the evaluation report expresses concerns over whether the partnerships in reality meet the requirements of "large institutional representation" and "professionalism and expertise", thereby "ensuring the coverage of the full range of required skills".

The evaluation reports do not provide any information about the motives behind the participation of business companies nor about their reasons for not joining. However, the management rationale of EQUAL, with its normative framework, is far from an entrepreneurial market rationale stressing values of efficiency

and cost-effectiveness. This may explain the limited participation of private companies.

Whether we try to account for the choice to participate or not on the part of a company based on rational actor explanations in terms of interest maximisation or based on a picture of business actors as guided by norms and values embedded in the market sector orientation, it is not difficult to see why EQUAL failed to attract them. If companies are conceptualised as being maximisers of their economic utilities, we can assume that they would be very careful about how they invest their limited resources and thus be reluctant to deal with the extensive and time consuming administrative routines of EQUAL. Importantly, the programme did not promise any immediate measurable outcomes, only long-term deliverables in terms of "developing innovative measures for inclusive labour marker policies".

The alternative explanation focuses on differences in appropriateness norms between the management rationale of EQUAL and the sector orientation of the business companies. There is obviously a gap between EQUAL's ideal of empowering participatory democratic process, though later implemented as a top-down command and control process, and the private sector understanding of what an appropriate way of implementing a project is as follows: measurable economic feedback on time and human resources invested in collaboration. The explanation for the reluctance on part of the companies to participate in EQUAL would then be the difference between the norms the EQUAL management rationale prescribes and the role expectations and norms that business actors embody.

Public sector organisations will likely find it easier to conform to the EQUAL management routines. The time consuming administrative procedures, requiring continuous documenting of activities and finances, are simply more familiar to them, as they coincide with public sector logic. So too, EQUAL's top-down decision-making process is easier for public sectoral actors to identify with and to perceive as reasonable and appropriate. However, this time the management rationale is not state-focused but EU-centred. While the EQUAL objectives stressed innovation and creativity and the programme aimed at policy learning across sectors and development, as well as dissemination of new ways of delivering employment policies, its management rationale, paradoxically, expressed values of hierarchical and detailed management to bring about this creativity.

5. Triple Helix for Swedish Regional Development for Economic Growth

The Swedish Regional Development and Economic Growth Policy is based on collaboration between public agencies, business actors and interest organisations. The Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems,

VINNOVA, and the Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, Tillväxtverket, are a result of the Swedish legacy of supporting close co-operation between market actors and public bodies. VINNOVA's main task is to promote sustainable economic growth by funding needs-driven research and the development of effective innovation systems. It initiates, stimulates and manages joint activities between public and private actors in order to increase economic growth and to "work to achieve more enterprises, growing enterprises and sustainable, competitive business and industry throughout Sweden" (Westerberg, 2009). Historically, Swedish governments have been supportive of larger export industries, while the situation for small business is somewhat different. The role of companies has also changed and in globalised markets, the traditional corporate responsibility for local employment has been replaced by more general concerns for national and global issues.

According to VINNOVA, in a modern society aiming at economic development and job creation, other alliances must come about to replace the old bonds that held together the local factory areas (Westerberg, 2009), now building on regional enlargement, as well as on geographical and professional mobility. Demands for cost-effective but flexible ways of offering the markets new products, new services and new jobs thus put pressure on business companies to develop alliances so that they can share investments that open up access to new markets.

5.1. Management Rationale of the Triple Helix VINNVÄXT Programme

The VINNOVA programme VINNVÄXT, Regional Growth through Dynamic Innovation Systems, aims to promote sustainable growth by developing globally competitive research and innovation environments in specific growth fields (Westerberg, 2009, p. 7). This triple helix programme is based on mutual dependence between actors from the public and private sectors. Private companies need the public sector for infrastructure in terms of regulation and service, and research institutes/universities for training and research. The public sector is dependent on a competitive industry and research in order to be able to secure an economically sustainable society.

How is VINNVÄXT managed? Under the auspices of the government agency, the corner stone of the programme is voluntary regional co-operation between research institutes, private sectoral actors and public agencies, based on mutual agreements. As regards the structure of the programme, it takes the form of competition between regional initiatives which guarantees a quasi-autonomous position for the competing units. The winning projects receive funding up to one million euro per year for a period of ten years. In addition, they are offered so-called process support, which takes

the form of seminars, training and experience-sharing (Westerberg, 2009, p. 12). One of the most central criteria is that a collaboration is considered to have growth potential and can be expected to be internationally competitive in its field within ten years (Westerberg, 2009). From its inception in 2001 until 2012, there have been 12 winners. While some of the joint projects test new ideas and create arenas for supporting learning, others are oriented towards commercial goals.

Value maximisation is seen as the main objective of VINNVÄXT, and incentives are directly related to performance goals. In sum, the management rationale of VINNVÄXT represents a highly entrepreneurial orientation. Evaluation results show that there is good support in regions for triple helix partnerships. The report also notes that different actor categories may have distinctly different goals and that mutual understanding is required (Westerberg, 2009). It, therefore, recommends learning by "fighting" as a method for increasing reciprocity between the partners. In short, cross-sectoral co-operation is not expected to be without difficulties.

5.2. What Makes Small Companies Seek Collaboration?

A central question is whether business actors are interested in the triple helix government initiative. What characterises those business actors that participate in cross-sectoral collaboration: is it a last desperate resort for a business company that is struggling to survive? Or, is it rather good economic growth in a company that encourages it to expand the opportunity structure through engagement in triple helix? Is partnering a component in a company's entrepreneurial agenda of risk taking? Or, is the wish to rely on other actors motivated by a lack of other entrepreneurial initiatives? And furthermore, do companies collaborate as a part of general investment in competence development, accompanied by spending on the education of employees? Or, is it a way out for market actors that cannot afford a development budget of their own?

A survey by NUTEK (Ylinenpää & Westerberg, 2004, p. 10) of 5,000 Swedish firms with 5–50 employees, complemented with their annual economic reports, on how Swedish companies collaborate in general, and with public partners in particular, provides some answers to these questions. Understanding small companies as isolated from rest of society turns out to give a false picture of the private sector, according to the report. While 8 per cent of companies collaborate with all three triple helix actor categories, i.e., business actors, public actors and academic research institutes/universities, around 15 per cent are engaged in a more regular entrepreneurial manner in co-operation with other companies, as well as public bodies. The largest proportion of small Swedish companies, 37 per cent, only cooperates with other market sector actors. Finally, 27 per cent of business actors do not co-

operate at all. In short, although co-operation with other market actors is the most popular form, collaboration with organisations representing alternate sector ideologies and norms—either the public sector or the research/academic world—was not that unusual.

The most often cited reason for cooperating was the search for new knowledge (Ylinenpää & Westerberg, 2004, p. 10). This openness was also demonstrated by the correlation between "entrepreneurial behaviour"—operationalised as a company's degree of innovativeness, pro-activeness and risk propensity—and degree of co-operation with actors from other sectors: the higher a company's score on entrepreneurial behaviour, the more likely that it cooperates with both public agencies and research institutes. In brief, business actors that are willing to take risks and are innovative often actively seek new cross-sectoral collaboration opportunities.

A company's propensity to co-operate with other organisations is also positively correlated with its tendency to invest in internal competence development, either by providing employees with further education or by employing more academics. A factor that appears to be particularly important was the share of academics among the employees. In companies that have no partners, the share of employees with a university degree is around 11 per cent. That number is three times higher—33 per cent—for those businesses that collaborate with all three triple-helix actor categories.

Although only a minority of companies are involved in triple helix, these companies are at the same time among the most successful. Co-operation is thus far from being the last desperate way for a market actor to survive. There is a strong correlation between a company's economic growth and its involvement in triple helix co-operation. To conclude, the VINNVÄXT programme attracts successful companies with a high entrepreneurial profile. We can assume that at least part of the explanation is the good fit between the entrepreneurial management rationale of the programme and the sector orientation of the private companies. The way VINNVÄXT is run—placing emphasis on market focus and economic value maximisation and offering the competing regional partnerships a quasi-autonomous position, in stark contrast to hierarchical decision-making processes and requirements on accountability reports—is clearly an attractive management solution for business companies.

5.3. Public Sector Bodies Acting in a Vacuum

Our next question is whether VINNVÄXT creates attractive conditions for public sector bodies and research institutes as well. Since triple helix co-operation is initiated and funded by the government, and managed by a government agency, VINNOVA, we may assume that the participation of public sectoral actors would be least problematic in comparison with other triple helix

actors. Surprisingly, however, politicians and public agencies appear to meet serious obstacles in finding a proper way to contribute to the programme (Westerberg, 2009, p. 38). As a result, the role of regional government agencies, municipal councils and county governors is limited in triple helix collaborations. Politicians are also more active in the initial stages of the cooperation than during the later phases. The explanation the evaluation report offers is that the main competence of politicians is on a general level, concerning structural and financial questions, and that a lack of time and expertise results in a successively declining involvement in concrete triple helix project activities. In addition, not only politicians, but even civil servants, have too little knowledge about commerce and the conditions applicable to industry, which makes it hard for them to contribute to partnerships.

Is the source of the problem to be found in the mismatch between the highly entrepreneurial management rationale of the programme and the alternate value orientation of public sectoral actors? It is not immediately clear that this is the case. The lack of required knowledge in the area of expertise is not a direct consequence of the choice of management rationale. Yet, it is possible to argue that it is the responsibility of the overall collaboration management to create the working conditions, in terms of structure and decision-making processes, that enable all of the participating actors to contribute to the joint project, regardless of their sector backgrounds.

What about the third partner: research institutes and universities? In triple helix, research partners are expected to bring in the necessary knowledge for development of new products, innovations and technology. As we have seen, a high share of academics among the staff is positively correlated with a company's willingness to get involved in a cross-sectoral triple helix project. If the share of academics is a key factor, then hypothetically research institutes should be highly interested in joining triple helix. However, the report shows that their participation is severely hampered by the logics of the academic world. The meritocratic public sector principles of non-profit making do not travel well with the idea of triple helix: state-owned research institutes are not allowed to make economic profits on new market/industrial products. This is obviously an impediment to their participation in triple helix. Taken together, these results indicate that there is a mismatch between the entrepreneurial management rationale, with its market focus and possibilities to value maximisation, and the sector orientations of participants representing the public sector norms, values and working processes.

6. Mismatch–Collaboration with Benefits and Barriers

Today, great emphasis is placed on policy co-ordination

that relies primarily on shared learning and socialisation. Pooling resources, capacities and competencies from both the business sector and public bodies in cross-sectoral collaboration, such as in the EQUAL programme and the Swedish triple helix initiative, is expected to bring about beneficial synergy effects, economic growth and innovative job creation. Joint action promises to make the most of diverse sector competencies.

We have highlighted empirically the effects of management rationale on cross-sectoral collaboration in these two very different programmes: the first involving the EU multilevel process, aiming at implementing the European Employment Strategy (EES); the latter involving the implementing of Swedish regional policy. As shown in the summary of the empirical findings in Table 3, the triple helix initiative VINNVÄXT, the main objective of which is to put into practice a government policy for regional economic growth, closely follows the entrepreneurial management rationale. EQUAL, in contrast, is in many regards strongly guided by a bureaucratic rationale.

VINNVÄXT, although a state initiative, is keen on the idea of profit maximisation—wishing to accomplish this at the national level by means of enhancing competition at the regional level by finding the best ways to maximise value on their own. With regards to its ideology, it could hardly resemble the entrepreneurial principles more than it does: efficiency is to be brought about by relying on competition as a central market mechanism. As concerns government control, this is limited since the cross-sectoral projects operate autonomously within the limits of existing legislation. Moreover, the entrepreneurial logic is manifested, as the initial participation in the joint effort in itself is not rewarded. Instead, economic incentives are linked to performance goals.

EQUAL, on the other hand, operates under the EU's centralised and rule-based control. EU regulation takes the form of binding contracts and related funding of cross-sectoral activities. In terms of ideological position, the programme is explicitly based on the centrality of the EU directive, instead of state legislation, as would normally be the case. The system of regular activity reports is a central control mechanism, which stresses that partnerships are accountable for how they implement the EU programme directive.

The evaluation reports provide a more detailed picture of the structure and decision-making processes in EQUAL than in VINNVÄXT. Even though this might at first seem to be a methodological problem, it is also an essential empirical result: it tells us about important differences between these two programmes. Not only is it the case that the EU strictly regulates and monitors the working processes in EQUAL; it also provides rich public documentation covering the programme and its structure and decisions-making processes. We learn, for example, that the participatory forms of decision-

Table 3. Management rationales of EQUAL and VINNVÄXT.

	Bureaucratic	Entrepreneurial
Goals	Implementing government policies, accountability	Value/profit maximisation
	EQUAL: implementing EU programme/EES policy VINNVÄXT: Swedish government policy	VINNVÄXT: regional profit maximisation
Ideology	Legislative order/state focus	Market/efficiency focus
	EQUAL: EU directive focus	VINNVÄXT: efficiency by means of competition
Control	Centralised/rule-based	Quasi-centralised/incentives related to performance goals
	EQUAL: EU-centred, contract-based	VINNVÄXT: the winning collaboration receives a prize
Structure	Hierarchical	Quasi-autonomous/delegation
	EQUAL: regulated, top-down	VINNVÄXT: autonomous regional collaborating units
Decision-process	Top-down in accordance with government policies	Ad-hoc dictated by value maximisation
	EQUAL: top-down, centralised regulated and monitored	VINNVÄXT: to identify the yearly prize winner

making initially used at the partnership level were later abandoned in favour of more centralised processes. In contrast, the most central decision in VINNVÄXT was the selection of the annual winner. Other than this, cross-sectoral collaborations operated autonomously from the government, with working processes being neither regulated nor monitored or documented in detail.

What, then, can we say about the effects of the mismatch, according to Table 4? How did EQUAL and VINNVÄXT perform in terms of recruiting relevant actors and guaranteeing sustainability of collaboration, given their divergent management rationales?

First, public bodies found it easier to adapt to the coercive top-down regulations and control in the EQUAL programme, which even involved a specific EU project terminology that was difficult to cope with for those who were not already used to it. This very rationale, however, deterred business companies from getting involved in the programme, and, moreover, the ones that participated found it difficult to maintain their participation throughout the contracted programme period. These results are well in line with research findings, according to which business actors with manifest economic interests sometimes tend not to make better partners, since their need to prioritise short-term returns on investments may conflict with a long-term perspective that is required to realise public policy targets (Koppenjan & Enserink, 2009, p. 284). In brief, the mismatch had consequences for the performance of EQUAL, with it failing to recruit relevant actors or to guarantee sustainability in the collaboration.

The highly entrepreneurial management rationale of the Swedish government initiative VINNVÄXT, which is based on the legacy of co-operation between market actors and public bodies and which sees joint public-private action as necessary for opening access to new markets and new products, was, by contrast, attractive to business companies. In addition, the matching dispositions of market actors and the triple helix programme's entrepreneurial management rationale was also manifested in primarily attracting companies that are successful, have a strong entrepreneurial profile, have a propensity for risk taking and are provided with good resources. Companies that instead tend to abstain from cross-sectoral collaboration are often those with weaker entrepreneurial behaviour and lower economic growth.

There is also evidence of a mismatch between the entrepreneurial rationale and the orientation of public sector actors in VINNVÄXT: the public sector actors had difficulties in contributing to joint action after the initial stages of the collaboration as their limited knowledge of the conditions for the business sector and industry made it difficult for them to fully participate. An interesting question is, then, whether it is reasonable to re-

Table 4. Management rationale and mismatch in EQUAL and VINNVÄXT.

Management rationale			
		Bureaucratic	Entrepreneurial
Sector orientation	Public body	Match	Mismatch VINNVÄXT
	Private company	Mismatch EQUAL	Match

quire public agencies and politicians to possess that kind of knowledge and, if so, in how much detail? Is it possible to argue why should they? Indeed, in a neo-Weberian state professionalisation of public services implies that a "bureaucrat" not only masters existing legislation in a given area of expertise but that he/she is also professional in terms of being able to meet the concrete needs of the users of public service (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 119). To the extent that business companies and industry are considered to be users of public service, the answer is affirmative.

The participation of state-run research institutes is central to the Swedish triple helix initiatives. However, it also appeared to be somewhat problematic. The entrepreneurial management rationale, in that it stresses economic value maximisation, is not very compatible with meritocratic principles of state-owned research institutes/universities: being public sector bodies, their incentive structure does not allow economic gains, and nor does it encourage collaboration with private companies for that purpose.

7. Concluding Discussion—Closing the Gap?

In conclusion, while acknowledging the methodological limitations of the empirical study as it relies on secondary sources, the main findings suggest that the management rationale for cross-sectoral collaboration—bureaucratic or entrepreneurial—is an important factor in the construction of successful and sustainable joint action. The present results lend some support to previous research, which indicate that an entrepreneurially oriented approach is associated with better performance, in terms of the capacity to recruit relevant actors and establish sustainable collaboration. In comparison with VINNVÄXT, EQUAL experienced more severe problems in attempting to engage relevant collaborators.

Diversity in cross-sectoral collaboration, while being not only constitutive of, but also associated with high innovation potential, can also become a constraining factor in terms of the mismatch between the overall management rationale and the sector orientations of the participants. This holds true, regardless of the management rationale—bureaucratic or entrepreneurial. In EQUAL, the mismatch occurs between the bureaucratic rationale and the orientation of the business actors, and in the Swedish VINNVÄXT programme, between the entrepreneurial rationale and public sector orientation of civil servants, politicians and state-run research institutes. In both cases the mismatch reduces the opportunities for some of the participants to fully contribute to the joint project. The opposite also holds true, i.e., when the management rationale coincides with the same-sector logic of a collaborator, the latter is more likely to make a positive contribution.

Differences in underlying sector appropriateness norms still play an important role. Not only do same-sector public-public collaborations perform better in terms of effectiveness than cross-sectoral ones, as earlier research indicates, the theory that same sector background has a positive effect is also valid on the next level, i.e., for the relationship between the management rationale and the sector background of the actor.

Finally, the empirical results raise an interesting question about whether it would be possible to overcome, or at least to regulate, the negative effects of mismatch and thereby secure the positive synergy effects of bringing together different sector competences, perspectives and knowledge. The question of how to close the mismatch gap is especially vital for practitioners and policy-makers.

What could management do about the mismatch? If the cause of the problem is defined as a lack of incentives for rational actors, calculating possible costs and benefits, to contribute, then one solution could be to adjust the incentive structure so that it more strongly favours co-operation. Conversely, if the organisational norms shaping the actions of participants and potential participants are seen as being be the main source of the problem, the solution is to influence the norms and role expectations of the actors. In VINNVÄXT, a solution for entrepreneurially oriented management could be to show special concern for public sector participants, perhaps by using economic incentives to empower them so that they become more knowledgeable about the workings of the private sector and could thereby more fully contribute to the collaboration. An alternative would be to alter their norms and role perceptions so that they see it as a legitimate requirement for modern public sector representatives, if not to be experts on, at least to be well informed about the conditions of business companies and industry. If the participation of research institutes is regarded as so crucial, a solution might be to stress the norm of social responsibility in the same manner that business companies adopt the imperative of corporate social responsibility. An alternative is to modify the incentive structure so that it better rewards them for collaboration with market actors.

The situation is somewhat different in the case of EQUAL. Since collaborators are already initially funded for their participation, it is less plausible that additional economic benefits, used as a means of changing the incentive structure for utility-maximising actors, would make any substantial difference in the willingness of business companies to participate. Here, the management could choose an alternative approach and see the problem as primarily caused by misperceptions on the part of business actors of proper role expectations. In this case, investing in norm building, by stressing the norm of corporate social responsibility and thereby creating greater acceptance for EQUAL's management rationale, for example, might be a possible direction which could be pursued.

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Article

Policy Design and Non-Design: Towards a Spectrum of Policy Formulation Types

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Abstract

Public policies are the result of efforts made by governments to alter aspects of behaviour—both that of their own agents and of society at large—in order to carry out some end or purpose. They are comprised of arrangements of policy goals and policy means matched through some decision-making process. These policy-making efforts can be more, or less, systematic in attempting to match ends and means in a logical fashion or can result from much less systematic processes. "Policy design" implies a knowledge-based process in which the choice of means or mechanisms through which policy goals are given effect follows a logical process of inference from known or learned relationships between means and outcomes. This includes both design in which means are selected in accordance with experience and knowledge and that in which principles and relationships are incorrectly or only partially articulated or understood. Policy decisions can be careful and deliberate in attempting to best resolve a problem or can be highly contingent and driven by situational logics. Decisions stemming from bargaining or opportunism can also be distinguished from those which result from careful analysis and assessment. This article considers both modes and formulates a spectrum of policy formulation types between "design" and "non-design" which helps clarify the nature of each type and the likelihood of each unfolding.

Keywords

non-design; policy design; public policy

Issue

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1. Introduction: Policy Design Studies Past and Future

A roadmap for a new "policy design orientation" exists in studies undertaken in recent years into the formulation of complex policy mixes in fields such as energy and environmental policy, among others (Howlett, 2014a; 2014b; Howlett & Lejano, 2013; Howlett, Mukherjee, & Woo, 2014). This new design orientation focuses attention on the construction of policy packages operating in complex multi-policy and multi-level design contexts which are expected to address multiple goals and ob-

jectives (del Rio & Howlett, 2013). It seeks to better describe the nature of the bundles or portfolios of tools which can be used to address policy problems and to help understand the interactive effects which occur when multiple tools are used over time (Doremus, 2003; Howlett, 2014b; Howlett, Mukherjee, & Woo, 2014; Jordan, Benson, Wurzel, & Zito, 2011; Jordan, Benson, Zito, & Wurzel, 2012; Yi & Feiock, 2012).

The research agenda of this new design orientation is focused on questions which an earlier literature on the subject largely neglected, such as the trade-offs ex-

isting between different tools in complex policy mixes and how to deal with the synergies and conflicts which result from tool interactions; as well as the different means and patterns—such as layering—through which policy mixes evolve over time (Tan, Migone, Wellstead, & Evans, 2014; Thelen, 2004).

This temporal orientation highlights the processes through which policies emerge and raises the issues of how to distinguish between design and other formulation and decision-making processes and the frequency or likelihood of occurrence of each. Many formulation situations, for example, involve information and knowledge limits or imultiple actors whose relationships may be more adversarial or competitive than is typically associated with a "design" process and outcome (Gero, 1990; Schön, 1988). That is, not all policy-making is logic or knowledge driven and it is debatable how closely policy-makers approximate the instrumental reasoning which is generally thought to characterize this field (Howlett et al., 2009).

This paper addresses the differences between more, and less, analytical and instrumental policy formulation and decision processes and the likelihood of each occurring. By engaging in a discussion of the intention to engage in policy design—whether towards public interest or more politically driven opportunism—and of the capacity of governments to undertake such design efforts, the paper develops a continuum of several formulation processes that can exist between ideal instrumental and problem-solution driven policy design and other more contingent and less intentional processes.

2. What Is Policy Design?

Within the policy sciences, "design" has been linked both to policy instruments and implementation (May, 2003) and to the impact of policy ideas and advice on policy formulation (Linder & Peters, 1990a). It is usually thought to involve the deliberate and conscious attempt to define policy goals and connect them in an instrumental fashion to instruments or tools expected to realize those objectives (Gilabert & Lawford-Smith, 2012; Majone, 1975; May, 2003). Policy design, in this sense, is a specific form of policy formulation based on the gathering of knowledge about the effects of policy tool use on policy targets and the application of that knowledge to the development and implementation of policies aimed at the attainment of specifically desired public policy outcomes and ambitions (Bobrow, 2006; Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987; Montpetit, 2003; Weaver, 2009, 2010).

In this sense, policy designs can be seen to contain both a substantive component—a set of alternative arrangements thought potentially capable of resolving or addressing some aspect of a policy problem, one or more of which is ultimately put into practice—as well as a procedural component—a set of activities related to securing some level of agreement among those

charged with formulating, deciding upon, and administering that alternative vis-à-vis other alternatives (Howlett, 2011). Design thus overlaps and straddles both policy formulation, decision-making and policy implementation and involves actors, ideas and interests active at each of these stages of the policy process (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009). However it also posits a very specific form of interaction among these elements, driven by knowledge and evidence of alternatives' merits and demerits in achieving policy goals rather than by other processes such as bargaining or electioneering among key policy actors.

Conceptually, a policy design process begins with the analysis of the abilities of different kinds of policy tools to affect policy outputs and outcomes and the kinds of resources required to allow them to operate as intended (Hood, 1986; Salamon, 2002). This instrumental knowledge is contextual in the sense that it requires a special understanding of how the use of specific kinds of instruments affects target group behaviour and compliance with government aims. It thus includes knowledge and consideration of many constraints on tool use originating in the limits of existing knowledge, prevailing governance structures, and other arrangements and behaviours which may preclude consideration of certain options and promote others (Howlett, 2009a, 2011). It requires both government analytical and evidentiary capacity as well as the intention to exercise it.

Such a means-ends understanding of policy-making permeates the policy design orientation but, of course, is only one possible orientation or set of practices which can be followed in policy formulation and result in policy-outputs (Colebatch, 1998; Tribe, 1972). In the design case, policy formulators are expected as much as possible to base their analyses on logic, knowledge and experience rather than, for example, purely political calculations and forms of satisficing behaviour which also can serve to generate alternatives (Bendor, Kumar, & Siegel, 2009; Sidney, 2007).

Policy design studies, of course, acknowledge that not all policy work is rational in this instrumental sense and often deals with alternative forms of policy formulation by separating out two dimensions of the design experience: on the one hand the exploration of the procedural aspects of design—the specific types of policy formulation activities which lead to design rather than some other form of policy generation—and on the other the substantive components—that is, the substance or content of a design in terms of the instruments and instrument settings of which it is composed. This is the policy-relevant articulation of the well-known distinction in design studies generally between "design-as-verb" ("policy formulation") and "design-as-noun" (policy tool and instrument combinations).[1]

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[1] This is similar to the general orientation towards design found in other fields such as architecture, urban planning or

The idea is that even when policy processes are less rational or information-driven and more political or interest-driven, the design of a policy, conceptually at least, can be divorced from the processes involved in its enactment. Thus regardless of the nature of the actual alternative formulation process which exists in a specific context, it is still possible to imagine a more instrumental world and hence consider or promote design alternatives "in-themselves" as ideal-type artifacts. These can then be developed and studied in preparation for decision-making circumstances which might be propitious to their adoption either in "pure" form or with some minor adjustments or amendments. This is the bread-and-butter of policy analytical work undertaken by think tanks, policy institutes and policy schools which generally criticize existing arrangements and propose more "rational" alternatives; that is, new or revised solutions to old or redefined problems felt more likely to achieve their goals in theory and practice or to do so more effectively.

Again, however, this does not preclude, but rather is built upon the recognition and acceptance of the fact that in some policy decisions and formulation processes "design" considerations may be more or less absent and the quality of the logical or empirical relations between policy components as solutions to problems may be incorrect or ignored (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1979; Dryzek, 1983; Eijlander, 2005; Franchino & Hoyland, 2009; Kingdon, 1984; Sager & Rielle, 2013). This includes a variety of contexts in which formulators or decision-makers, for example, may engage in interest-driven trade-offs or log-rolling between different values or resource uses or, more extremely, might engage in venal or corrupt behaviour in which personal gain from a decision may trump other evaluative criteria.

These "non-design" situations are well known in political science but have not been well studied in the policy sciences and the extent to which such considerations as political gain or blame avoidance calculations outweigh instrumental factors in policy formulation is a key question (Hood, 2010). As Junginger (2013) recently argued, at the present time we continue to know too little about many important aspects of design work, especially about the nature of the kinds of policy formulation activities which bring about either a design or a non-design process. As she put it, we know very little about "the actual activities of designing that bring policies into being—of how people involved in the creation of policies go about identifying design problems and design criteria, about the methods they employ in their design process" (p. 3). This highlights the continued need to distinguish more carefully between design and non-design processes and to better understand the mechanics of policy formulation involved in developing

industrial design. See Hillier, Musgrove and O'Sullivan (1972), Hillier and Leaman (1974), and Gero (1990).

policy alternatives (Linder & Peters, 1988; Wintges, 2007).

3. What Is Policy Design?

In contrast to those who view policy-making as intentional and instrumentally rational, many commentators, pundits and jaded or more cynical members of the public assume that all policy-making, as the output of a political system and decision-making process, is inherently interest-driven, ideological and hence irrational in a design sense. However policy scholars have noted many instances in which processes of policy formulation and decision-making are governed less by considerations of self-interest, interest accommodation, bargaining or ideology than by concerns about criteria such as the practical efficiency and effectiveness of policy alternatives. These latter efforts involve policy actors in the process of thinking more systematically and analytically about the merits and demerits of policy options and alternatives from a functional or instrumental perspective (Bobrow, 2006; Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987).

Studies of policy design with this general instrumental orientation towards policy formulation began at the very origins of the policy sciences when many pivotal early works contained within them the idea of improving policy outcomes through more systematic application of knowledge to policy formulation activities (Lasswell & Lerner, 1951; May, 2003; Wildavsky, 1979).[2] In his foundational work on the policy sciences, for example, Harold Lasswell argued for the separation of the processes of policy formulation from decision-making and implementation, highlighting the centrality and significance of policy instruments and instrument choices made in the formulation process for policy outcomes and arguing for the need to bring interdisciplinary knowledge to bear on the development of the appropriate means to resolve public problems and issues (Lasswell, 1954).

For the "old" policy design studies which emerged from this foundational work, the historical and institutional context of policy-making was seen to bear significant weight in policy formulation, and this was often argued to be determinant of both the content and activities of designs and designing (Clemens & Cook, 1999). In this view, as policy contexts and conditions changed and evolved, so too did the set of policy means or alternatives which were deemed acceptable

[2] Policy design studies have been undertaken since at least the 1950s (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953; Kirschen et al., 1964; Tinbergen, 1952). Most of the early studies focused on policy tools and had a strong focus on policy implementation issues and processes; paying much less attention to policy development or formulation issues which are the hallmark of current studies with a design orientation (Hood, 1986; Hood & Margetts, 2007).

or feasible by an evolving set of policy actors involved in policy-making, themselves informed by shifting ideas and calculations of the appropriateness of a particular design and its consequences (Goldmann, 2005; Majone, 1975, 1976; March & Olsen, 2004; Howlett, 2011). While this context might contain irrational elements such as ideological or partisan pre-dispositions towards certain kinds of instruments—such as a general pro-market orientation among the public or elites—the choice of tool within this context remained an intentional, rational act.

This highly contextual orientation in early policy studies (Torgerson, 1985, 1990) led some policy scholars in the 1970s to argue policy decisions were by nature the result of processes so highly contingent and fraught with uncertainty that decision-making would invariably be informed more by the opportunistic behaviour of decision-makers within fluid policy-making contexts than by careful deliberation and "design" thinking about the logical or functional merits and demerits of specific alternative arrangements of policy goals and means (Cohen et al., 1979; Dryzek, 1983; Kingdon, 1984; Lindblom, 1959).[3] This led some to express serious doubts that policy could truly be "designed" in the way that proponents of a more instrumental policy design orientation advocated (deLeon, 1988; Dryzek & Ripley, 1988).

Many other scholars, however, questioned the extent of this emphasis on contextuality and contingency (Dror, 1964). The academic enquiry of policy design—that is, self-consciously dealing with both policy processes and substance under a knowledge-driven, instrumental rubric—emerged and flourished throughout the 1970s and 1980s in trying to clarify what a design process involved and when it was likely to occur (see for example, Salamon 1981, 1989, 2002). In a series of path-breaking articles in the 1980s and early 1990s authors such as Linder and Peters (1984, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1990d, 1991) sought to re-orient policy studies in a design direction by arguing that the process of policy designing as a type of formulation activity was conceptually distinct from a policy design itself, in the same way that an analytical distinction can be made between the development of an abstract concept or plan in architecture and the manifestation of that conception through engineering and construction practices followed on the ground (Schön, 1988, 1992).

Incorporating this distinction between design-as-formulation-process and design-as-policy-content, design studies in the 1980s shifted back from the study of "designing" to the study of "designs" themselves, with a specific focus on better understanding how individual implementation-related policy tools and instruments such as taxes and subsidies or regulation and public

ownership operated in theory and practice (Mayntz, 1979; Sterner, 2003; Woodside, 1986).[4]

By the early 1980s, this tools literature had merged with the policy design orientation and emerged as a body of policy design literature in its own right. Students of policy design consequently embarked upon theory building, developing more and better typologies of policy instruments that sought to aid the conceptualization of these instruments and their similarities and differences, and attempting to provide a greater understanding of the motivations and reasons underlying their use (Bressers & Honigh, 1986; Bressers & Klok, 1988; Hood, 1986; Salamon, 1981; Trebilcock & Hartle, 1982; Tupper & Doern, 1981). Other scholarly work during this period continued to further elucidate the nature and use of specific policy tools, especially tools such as "command-and-control" regulations and financial inducements such as tax incentives but also many others (Hood, 1986; Howlett, 1991; Landry, Varone, & Goggin, 1998; Tupper & Doern, 1981; Vedung, Bemelmans-Videc, & Rist, 1997).

This tools orientation sparked interest in a range of related subjects, such as the study of target group behaviour, of implementation failures and their role in policy success, and of the linkages connecting the two; with policy scholars turning their attention to the description and classification of alternative implementation instruments and the factors which conditioned their effective use and deployment (Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O'Toole, 1990; Mayntz, 1979; O'Toole, 2000; Schneider & Ingram, 1990a, 1990b, 1994). These works provided a deeper understanding of the social and behavioural factors underpinning the use of specific kinds of policy designs in practice.[5] In general it was believed

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[3] Of course this is a view some continue to hold. See for example Eijlander (2005), Franchino and Hoyland (2009).

[4] Students of public policy making were joined in this effort by scholars of economics and law who studied the evaluation of policy outputs in terms of their impacts on outcomes as well as the role of law and legislation in effecting policy tool choices and designs (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987; Keyes, 1996; Stokey & Zeckhauser, 1978). And studies in management and administration at the time also sought to explore the linkages between politics, administration and implementation in the effort to better understand policy tool choices and patterns of use (Trebilcock & Hartle, 1982). Researchers also looked at how policy instrument choices tended to shift over time (Lowi, 1966, 1972, 1985), examples of which during this period included the rise of privatization and deregulation (Howlett & Ramesh, 1993) and the first wave of governance thinking advocating the use of network management or non-governmental tools (Peters & Pierre, 1998).

[5] Subsequent contributions would further advance the study of the behavioural aspects of the design process and raised the issue of the difference between design and non-design to the fore (Hood, 2007; Ingram & Schneider, 1990a; Mondou & Montpetit, 2010; Schneider & Ingram, 1997; Timmermans, Rothmayr, Serduelt, &Varone, 1998). At this time, for example, Bardach (1980) and Salamon (1981) went so far as to argue that the definition of policy in terms of "issues" or "prob-

a greater understanding of implementation instruments and the factors underlying instrument choice would benefit policy design both as a practice and a theoretical body of knowledge, contributing to more positive policy outcomes (Linder & Peters, 1984; Mayntz, 1979; Woodside, 1986). Studies on pollution prevention and professional regulation conducted at the time, for example, benefited from advances in the systematic study of policy instruments which influenced the design and creation of new alternative instruments in these and other fields (Hippes, 1988; Trebilcock & Prichard, 1983).

Most of this work focused on implementation and tool design-as-a-noun, however, and ignored or failed to examine in detail the issues involved in policy-design-as-formulation-process.[6] Understanding the difference between "non-design" and design processes thus remains very much a part of the outstanding research agenda in contemporary policy design studies. As shall be argued below, however, some progress in this area can be made by illustrating these different formulation processes as a continuum ranging from intentional ones informed by an instrumental logic of best matching public policy goals and means ("design"), to those that are more contingent and more susceptible to purely interest-driven or political motivations and logics ("non-design").

3.1. Modeling Non-Design: Revisiting the Pre-Conditions of Policy Design

The design end of the spectrum has already been discussed. With respect to non-design, it bears repeating that the modern policy studies movement did begin with the recognition that public policy-making results from the interactions of policy-makers in the exercise

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lems" originally made by scholars at the outset of the policy studies movement (Mintrom, 2007) was misguided and that policy should instead have been defined from the start in terms of the "instruments" used in policy-making. They advocated shifting the focus of policy studies squarely towards the study of the design and operation of such tools, later defined to include both traditional "substantive" tools such as regulation and public ownership and more "procedural" ones such as the use of advisory commissions and public participation exercises (Howlett, 2000).

[6] Of course, not all work on policy instruments has restricted itself to implementation issues. Work on the exploration of "instrumentation" for example, has considered larger issues about feedback processes from instrument choices to the politics of policy formation, as has some work on instruments and network governance (see de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1997; Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007). However these can still be distinguished from the new design studies, given the latter's almost exclusive emphasis on formulation and its resulting concern for understanding the inherent nuances involved in developing mechanisms for meeting policy goals, couched within contextual realities, which the former studies still lack.

of power, legitimate or otherwise (Arts & van Tatenhove, 2004; Lasswell, 1958; Stone, 1988). Although some of these efforts were noted to be arbitrary or capricious, most were viewed as representing the concerted efforts of governments to intentionally act in an instrumental way; that is, to attempt to achieve a particular policy goal or end through the use of a relatively well known set of policy means developed over many years of state-building experience (Lasswell & Lerner, 1951). As discussed above, it was acknowledged the goals pursued were wide-ranging and often posed no small amount of difficulty and complexity in both their definition and diagnosis, with the implication that the formulation of solutions likely to succeed in addressing them necessitated the systematic consideration of the impact and feasibility of the use of specific kinds of policy means or instruments as well as a clear understanding of the contexts of their use (Parsons, 1995, 2001).

This work thus depicted instrumental policy-making as a specific kind of policy activity which occurred in specific circumstances in which knowledge of the general impact of specific policy tools was combined with the practical capacity of governments to identify and implement suitable technical means in the effort to achieve a specific policy aim. This activity was expected to occur *ex ante* and independently of other considerations such as political or personal gain which might also affect decision-making and implementation processes but which should be removed from the deliberations of formulation.

Significantly for considerations of design and non-design processes, as noted above, this "design" activity was recognized as being inherently context bound, that is, requiring a situation where there was support for knowledge-based policy analysis on the part of policy-makers and where the demand for such analysis was met by a ready supply (Howlett et al., 2014). Favorable design circumstances hence required not only the presence of high quality information on the range and impacts of policy alternatives but also the presence of a high level of technical capacity and expertise on the part of policy analysts if knowledge was to be mobilized effectively so that policy instruments were effectively and efficiently matched to policy goals and targets (Dunlop, 2009; Howlett, 2009a, 2010; Howlett & Rayner, 2014; Radaelli & Dunlop, 2013). Secondly, it was also recognized that not only "spatial" but also "temporal" aspects of policy formulation contexts such as policy legacies or prior commitments on the part of policy-makers limited consideration of alternatives. Where there was a relatively high policy "lock-in" on existing tool arrangements, this could preclude consideration or adoption of potentially superior alternatives (Howlett & Rayner, 2013).

When propitious conditions were present, however, purposive design activity resulting in good alterna-

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tive generation and assessment was thought to be possible, much as is expected in the current era with recent efforts at improving knowledge mobilization in policy-making in the form of an emphasis upon enhanced "evidence-based policy-making" (Bhatta, 2002; Locke, 2009; Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2007). When conditions are not ripe, however, either poor designs would ensue from incomplete knowledge and information even with the best government intent, or less technical and more overtly political forms of policy-making would be more likely to ensue (Davies, 2004; Howlett, 2009b; Moseley & Tierney, 2004). The fervent wish of proponents of design orientation is generally to reduce instances of poor and non-design to as few as possible by promoting the kinds of orientations and dedication of resources required for better design processes to occur. This, is expected to result in policies more likely to solve pressing problems, correct social ills and better serve the public good through the improved mobilization of knowledge in the service of policy (Azuela & Barroso, 2012; Bobrow, 2006; Wildavsky, 1979).

Table 1 presents a schematic illustrating how these two different aspects of policy-making—a design intention and the capacity to carry it out—create different policy formulation spaces which enable very different policy design processes. This sets out a set of formulation processes lying between the intention and ability to undertake purposive, instrumental policy design and the intention to meet more political goals coupled with the presence of significant policy resource constraints or tool lock-in affects.

As this table shows, both policy and political formulation processes can be capable or poor depending on the context of policy-making and the intention of government in enacting policy. This suggests that a spectrum of design and non-design formulation processes exists between capable policy processes informed by instrumental motivations and "poor" political ones driven by other logics but also unlikely to attain them. In between the poles lie other spaces and formulation types such as poor design and capable non-design, alternatives often mooted but rarely examined in the policy sciences.

4. Developing a Spectrum of Design and Non-Design Activities: The Significance of Layering and Temporality

While the distinction between policy-driven and politically-driven processes is clear, in order to be more precise about variations within these general types and their frequency of occurrence, it is necessary to examine in more detail the nature of the constraints on government intentions which can result in poor outcomes.

As set out above, one key factor is the extent to which an existing policy regime is settled in place. That is, very few design processes begin *de novo*. Examples of new policy "packages" in many areas, from welfare policy to natural resource ones exist only historically, reflecting times before which there was no previous history of a policy response to a perceived policy problem. For example, the United States (US) Clean Air Act (CAA) (first enacted in 1970) was the first major federal air pollution legislation in the US that established the very first national benchmark for ambient sulfur dioxide (SO_2) (Libecap, 2005; Schmalensee, Joskow, Ellerman, Montero, & Bailey, 1998).

Such examples of new policy designs are understandably few. Most policy initiatives rather deal with already created policies that are limited by historical legacies, and can be hampered due to internal inconsistencies which reforms and revisions (re-designs) attempt to address and correct. In this case legacies from earlier rounds of decision-making affect the introduction of new elements which may conflict with pre-existing policy components. Although other policy instrument groupings could theoretically be more successful in creating an internally supportive combination (Grabosky, 1994; Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998; Hou & Brewer, 2010; Howlett, 2004; Howlett & Rayner, 2007; del Rio, 2010; Barnett & Shore, 2009; Blonz, Vajjhala, & Safirova, 2008; Buckman & Diesendorf, 2010; Roch, Pitts, & Navarro, 2010) it may be very difficult to accomplish or even propose such changes, and designs instead often focus on reform rather than replacement of an existing arrangement.

Table 1. Types of policy formulation spaces: Situating design and non-design processes.

		Level of Government Knowledge and Other Resources	
		High	Low
Government Formulation Intention	**More Instrumental**	***Capable Policy Design Space*** *Relatively unconstrained formulation via design is possible*	***Poor Policy Design Space*** *Only partially informed or restricted design is possible*
	Less Instrumental	***Capable Political Non-Design Space*** *Relatively unconstrained non-design processes are possible*	***Poor Political Non-Design Space*** *Only poorly informed non-design is possible*

Policy development strongly marked by layering in this way is typically one where new elements are added to the policy mix without the removal of older ones and existing elements are stretched to try to fit new goals and changing circumstances (van der Heijden, 2011).[7] That is, policy arrangements are often the result of transformation pathways that can easily lead to internal contradictions emerging between tools and goals within policy mixes (Hacker, 2004), and mixes of policy elements can emerge over long stretches of time as a result of successive policy decisions which are not necessarily congruent. An example of such incongruence within a policy mix can be found in the CAA, the development of which has been heavily analyzed since the 1970s (Ackerman, 1981; Greenstone, 2001; among others). The 1977 amendments to the Act created a "new source bias" as all new coal-powered plants were required to install scrubbers even if they used low-sulfur coal. This rule undermined the comparative advantage of "cleaner" coal as the amendments raised the cost of shifting to new, less polluting plants and extended the economic lives of older, more polluting plants that did not have to shoulder the added cost of scrubbers (Libecap, 2005).

This is only one small example of a general situation where the initial logic of each decision matching policy tool and target may have been clear, but through multiple layering processes they can gradually transform over time into incongruent mixes (Bode, 2006; Hacker, 2004; Howlett & Rayner, 1995; Orren & Skowronek, 1998; Rayner, Howlett, Wilson, Cashore, & Hoberg, 2001; Torenvlied & Akkerman, 2004; van der Heijden, 2011). This can create policy portfolios or mixes that contain various incompatibilities, tending to frustrate the achievement of policy goals.

The contextual "lock in" that leads to layering impacts the formulation process by restricting a government's ability to evaluate alternatives and plan or design in a purely optimal instrumental manner (Howlett, 2009a; Oliphant & Howlett, 2010; Williams, 2012). Layering typically results in processes of (re)design which alters only some aspects of a pre-existing arrangement and can thus be distinguished from processes of new policy packaging or complete replacement. Distinguishing between different types of layering allows us to further separate and identify different kinds of design and non-design processes from each other.

While earlier work on design processes tended to suggest that design would always occur in spaces where policy packages could be designed "*en bloc*", it is now recognized that most design circumstances involve building on the foundations created in another era, working within already sub-optimal design spaces (Howlett & Rayner, 2013). Optimizing the choice of instruments when a pre-existing mix exists thus requires an additional level of knowledge of instrument-goal interactions and usually leads to design through "patching" rather than "packaging" (Howlett & Rayner, 2013). That is, in situations with significant policy legacies, designers often attempt to "patch" or restructure existing policy elements rather than propose completely new alternative arrangements even if the situation might require the latter for the sake of optimally enhancing coherence and consistency in the reformed policy mix (Eliadis, Hill, & Howlett, 2005; Howlett & Rayner, 2013; Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999a, 1999b; Thelen, 2004; Thelen et al., 2003). Hence even where the intention to systematically design may be high it may only be partial in the sense that only patching and not replacement is on the table.

A key first distinction among design formulation processes thus concerns whether they involve "packaging" a new policy mix or "patching" an old one. Policy design scholars are very interested in the processes through which policy formulators, like software designers, can issue such "patches" to correct flaws in existing mixes or allow them to adapt to changing circumstances (Howlett, 2013; Howlett & Rayner, 2013; Rayner, 2013).[8] Such patching or "smart layering" has often been thought to be inherently sub-optimal but patching in itself should be seen not as "non-design", but rather as constrained (re)design as a new layer is formulated in an effort to overcome anomalies or problems existing with earlier arrangements (Howlett & Rayner, 2013).

Patching can be done well if governments possess the capacity to do so but can also be done poorly if they do not. An example of poor patching is policy "stretching" (Feindt & Flynn, 2009). This is where, operating over periods of decades or more, elements of a mix are simply extended to cover areas they were not intended to at the outset. "Stretching" is especially problematic as small changes in the mixture of policy elements over such a time period can create a situation where the elements can fail to be mutually supportive, incorporating contradictory goals or instruments

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[7] Layering, of course is a concept developed in the neo-institutional sociological literature by some of its leading figures, namely Beland (2007), Beland and Hacker (2004), Hacker (2004), Stead and Meijers (2004) and Thelen (2004) to explain the pattern through which social and political institutions have evolved over long-periods of time. As applied to policy-making, "layering" connotes a process in which new elements are simply added to an existing regime often without abandoning previous ones so that polices accrete in a palimpsest-like fashion (Carter, 2012).

[8] And they are also interested in related subjects such as how policy experiments can help reveal the possibilities of re-design (Hoffman, 2011) or how building temporal properties into tool mixes—"adaptive policy-making" (Swanson et al., 2010)—can make designs more flexible or resistant to shifting conditions (Haasnoot, Kwakkel, Walker, & ter Maat, 2013; Walker, Marchau, & Swanson, 2010).

whose combination create perverse incentives that frustrate initial policy goals. These problems when identified set the stage for further rounds of tinkering and layering that may make them even worse (Feindt & Flynn, 2009).

Both stretching and poor patching efforts hence can create a particular form of "tense layering" (Kay, 2007) which occurs when repeated bouts of layering lead to incoherence amongst goals and inconsistency with respect to the instruments and settings used in a policy area. Inconsistencies arise where the means work at cross-purposes, "providing simultaneous incentives and disincentives towards the attainment of stated goals" (Kern & Howlett, 2009, p. 6). And incongruence occurs when an otherwise consistent mix of instruments fails to support the goals. Stretching is problematic as a design process since the addition of new goals or objectives increases the risk of incoherence, while the introduction of policy instruments through poor patching, for example, when a market orientation is introduced into an instrument set that has been based on a regulatory approach (Howlett & Rayner, 2007) is also unlikely to work well.

Using the case of British food policy, Feindt and Flynn (2009), for example, describe a situation of institutional stretching where "concerns about food supply and high productivity have been overlaid with policies addressing food safety, the environment, quality foods, obesity and climate change" (p. 386). As a result, they argue, "the resulting tensions…create opportunities for more new ideas and actors to move in, fuelled by a plurality of social constructions of food. Also, each new layer re-adjusts the power balance and necessitates re-interpretations of older policies" (p. 386).

Layering and patching thus have two sides. On the one hand negative stretching or destructive layering exacerbates tensions between regime elements and more politicized or less instrumental forms of policy-making and outcomes. However layering can also have a positive side and help ameliorate or reduce tensions through "smart" patching. Stretching and poor patching are thus design practices which exist at the break-point between design and non-design activities of government. Both these processes fall between the "pure" design and "pure" non-design ends of the spectrum of design processes suggested in Table 1.

As Figure 1 shows, these forms of policy-oriented formulation processes move from highly intentional and instrumental replacement efforts to those which are more partial and less intentional such as "smart" patching and ultimately to those which involve poor design such as "stretching" and poor or tense layering. In cases such as these layering introduces progressively more severe inconsistencies and incongruences and tensions between layers and policy-making and formulation may begin to take on an increasingly political complexion as the original logic and causality of a mix recedes into dim memory.

Non-design types also vary in the same way as partisan and ideological, religious or other criteria cloud, crowd out or replace instrumental design intentionality. Non-design mechanisms, as highlighted above, include activities such as alternative generation by bargaining or log-rolling, through corruption or co-optation efforts or through other faith-based or purely electoral calculations which are not instrumental in the same sense as are design efforts. In such contexts the ability of policy goals to be met or the ability of means to achieve them are of secondary concern to other concerns such as ideological purity or the need to retain or augment legislative or electoral support or other similar kinds of coalition behaviour.

These too, however, can also be done well or poorly and are affected by contextual barriers but are not "design" activities in the intentional instrumental public problem-solving sense set out above. That is, maximizing the return from a bargain or the returns from corruption, for example, also depends on the context, situation and expertise of actors but does not involve the same kinds of appraisal activities and competences or intentions on the part of governments as does policy design work.

Non-design processes have been studied extensively in the political science literature but less systematically in the policy sciences (Frye, Reuter, & Szakonyi, 2012; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, & Nichter, 2014; Goodin, 1980; Saward, 1992) despite their prevalence and importance in many areas. While it is not necessary to include them in a spectrum of design work, they can be appended to a spectrum of formulation types by moving from those types of non-design work which are compatible with at least some aspects of instrumental design activities—such as bargaining among affected interests over elements of otherwise carefully designed policy alternatives—to those—such as pure electoral opportunism or corruption—where party, leader or individual self-interest replace policy instrumentalism altogether (see Figure 2).


Figure 1. A spectrum of design processes.

Figure 2. A spectrum of design and non-design processes.

5. Conclusion: Distinguishing Design from Non-Design-Based Formulation

Transforming policy ambitions into practice is a complex process and intentionally creating the best possible arrangement of policy elements is not always the first item on a government's mind, nor necessarily within its reach. Many noble efforts of policy formulators have failed due to poor design capacity or the inability or lack of desire on the part of decision-makers to alter elements of existing policies or create new ones in a logical, instrumental, fashion (Cohn, 2004; Howlett, 2012). These experiences have led to a greater awareness of the various obstacles that can present themselves to policy design efforts and have gradually fueled a desire for better understanding the unique characteristics of policy formulation processes and the spaces and contexts in which design efforts are embedded.

As the discussion here has shown, both design and non-design processes vary along several important dimensions. For design situations—that is those characterized by a government desire to systematically match ends and means in the attainment of public policy goals, the processes vary according to the nature of the resources available for design purposes and the constraints imposed by policy legacies. The former often determine the quality of the design effort and impact the design itself while the latter generate contexts in which processes such as patching and stretching unfold. In a more non-design world where the intention to instrumentally design is lacking, constraints on outcomes also exist as do different processes which vary in their distance from the design ideal of public value and

service and improving the public good through better information and knowledge utilization and improved management efforts (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012; Rotberg, 2014).

Students of policy design must be aware of these different formulation contexts, processes and outcomes and be able to properly and accurately assess the situations governments are in or want to be in while developing policy options and when making recommendations and providing advice to governments. More systematic study of the formulation contexts and processes set out above can help move this area of policy design studies forward.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Book Review

Book Review: Devolution and Localism in England. By David M. Smith and Enid Wistrich. Farnham: Ashgate, 2014, 122 pp.; ISBN: 978-1-14724-3079-3.

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Abstract
Book Review: Devolution and Localism in England. By David M. Smith and Enid Wistrich. Farnham: Ashgate, 2014, 122 pp.; ISBN: 978-1-14724-3079-3.

Issue
This book review is part of a regular issue of Politics and Governance, edited by Professor Andrej J. Zwitter (University of Groningen, The Netherlands) and Professor Amelia Hadfield (Canterbury Christ Church University, UK).

The territorial structures of the UK have been the source of a wide and growing literature over the decade and a half since the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly were created. Its strands have been diverse. Some contributions have considered the constitutional implications for London, others have dealt specifically with the emerging politics in Scotland and Wales while yet another strand has addressed British devolution against a wider European backdrop. Here, Spain, Belgium and to a lesser extent Italy have been important comparative cases of regionalisation.

Considered against the backdrop of this literature, *Devolution and Localism in England*, develops its own frontier in dealing specifically with developments in England. The focus is a timely one, since there is an ongoing debate on the "English question" following the Scottish independence referendum and the preceding vow from the three dominant UK party leaders to devolve more powers to the Scots. Professors Smith and Wistrich also wish to go beyond the discussion about England's role within the UK to look at sub-state structures more broadly—that is, the broader set of territorial structures that have come and gone since the mid-1990s at the local, city and regional level.

In England, the prelude for territorial reforms after 1997 was a patchwork of different territorial denominations used by public administration. Amazingly for a modern state of its size, Britain has not been supplied with any uniform regional structures. Civil servants, whether dealing with energy supply, infrastructure or food security have conventionally had a patchwork of unofficial regional entities to relate to. John Major's Conservative government made the first step to unify the patchwork in creating the Government Offices for the Regions in 1994, establishing nine English regions (adding to existing offices in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) and co-locating the regional outposts of various government agencies. These regions would also be the entities for EU funding of regional development, a crucial driving factor in the urge towards a regional level of administration in England.

The Labour Party's plan when entering government in 1997 was to expand on and democratise these structures. The leap towards regionalism joined together several of its overarching ambitions. English regions would enhance the coordinating capacity of central government and strengthen democratic accountability. Moreover (and highly significant in light of later devel-

opments), a regional structure for England was seen as an appropriate response to the creation of a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly, without treating the English colossus as a whole. The creation of Regional Development Agencies was symptomatic of the late-1990s pursuit of "joined-up government". Here was a tying together of business, local government and civil society, all under the tutelage of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills and with strategic funding from London. The democratic element would be added through the creation of Regional Assemblies, initially based on indirect election from local authorities.

A few years later, the government's attempt at making Regional Assemblies directly electable was abruptly halted by the resounding rejection at the first referendum held over the issue, in the North East in 2004. Thereafter, the ambition of elected Assemblies was quietly put to rest, the Assemblies themselves then dismantled under Gordon Brown's government. Instead, the appointed Regional Development Agencies were given an injection of democratic accountability through regional ministers and regional select committees in the House of Commons. To conclude the saga, with the change of government in 2010, all these structures were put to a grinding halt and replaced by a set of voluntary arrangements, among them the so-called local enterprise partnerships that unite local authorities and businesses. Meanwhile, a wide range of substate structures are on the table in what has historically been one of Europe's most centralised polities. Elected mayors? City regions? Or another version of elected assemblies at the regional level? If so, what powers will be vested in them, and how will they relate to the levels above and below?

These topics are all addressed by Smith and Wistrich's volume, which thus starts from a promising point of departure. Given the richness of the British experience and its amenability to relevant public administration theory, it is however arguable that the topic at hand should have been better exploited. There are three basic criticism to be raised here: one substantial, one theoretical and one methodological.

Substantially, it is never clear how the analysis of the book holds together—beyond the evident observation that England is served by a heavily inconsistent structure of territorial government and that it is impossible to agree on a model that serves all the desired purposes. *Devolution and Localism in England* manages to give a fairly encompassing picture of the thorny process of territorial reform, but without a cure, let alone a precise diagnosis, to the current predicament. On page 26, it paraphrases from interviews with regional elites about the post-1997 structures for England: "Although most are critical in detail of the then-existing regional institutional set-up…there was near unanimous agreement that there was a necessity for a regional level when it came to strategic planning". This exempli-

fies a trap that the book too often walks into: general questions are asked about what political decision-makers want to accomplish, only to observe that these goals are not accomplished. Where the politicians have failed to grasp the dynamic set in train, the authors re-tell the dilemmas rather than addressing the "whys" and the "wheretos".

This problem could have been overcome or at least mitigated by a clear engagement with relevant theoretical schools of thought. Smith and Wistrich list a number of concepts and theories, but rarely go in depth. Thereby they also fall short of putting the English conundrum into perspective or pinpointing its shortcomings in a language that can travel beyond the British Isles. The multi-level governance literature is intended not only to describe but also to compare, explain and assess changes in territorial government. Arend Lijphart's ideal types of "consensus" and "Westminster" models of democracy are but one conceptualisation of fundamentally different organisation of democracies and how they tend to cluster. And institutional theory could have enlightened the analysis of how established institutions generate a path dependence of ideas and vested interests which may lead to stagnation and frustration for ambitious reformers.

By leaning upon any of these schools of thought, the analysis could have been more refined and also reached a wider audience. Notably, this is not a call for scholarly abstraction to replace an analysis close to developments on the ground. Rather, it is a call for stringency in order to distinguish crossroads on the muddy trajectory of repeated and confused territorial reforms that has characterised Britain post-1997.

Methodologically, the book would have benefitted from a more transparent and stringent use of data. Smith and Wistrich draw on an admirable multitude of sources, yet when and how they feed into the analysis is not always clear. According to the preface, the authors "make use of library research, policy analysis and our own empirical material", the latter consisting of a large set of interviews with regional elites from the political parties, business and civil society. Findings from the interviews reach the surface on numerous occasions, but without it being entirely clear why and with what authority they speak.

Despite these perceived shortcomings, *Devolution and Localism in England* has a lot to offer. It takes the reader through parallel, complex processes unfolding since 1997 and presents some of the key dilemmas. And empirically, we get to hear a selection of voices from the regional level, precisely those stakeholders that have been closest to the processes on the ground, having seen structures be raised and vanish, just as they have learned to make the best of them.

The future of territorial government in Britain is uncertain, and much of the uncertainty relates to the big constitutional questions, such as whether Scotland will

remain, whether Wales should be considered on par with the Scots within the Union, and whether there should be English votes for English laws to compensate for the absence of English devolution. Beyond these wider issues are the intra-English ones, related to democratic accountability and revitalisation of civil society. Moreover, aspirations to change the balance of the British economy, enhance social mobility etc. are also typically related to the argument that structures of territorial government must change. Towards all these noble aims, territorial structures will play an essential role. But as Smith and Wistrich point out, there is little reason for immediate optimism. In a short but succinct chapter 7 they sum up the findings and point towards likely developments for the future. "While central government talk is of empowering and permissive decen-

tralisation, it is unclear what this could mean in practice", the authors note (p. 107) and observe that even the concept of "region" has now been attached to so different territorial entities as to be rendered if not meaningless, then at least inadequate. While the Labour Party is guilty of excessive top-downisn in its pursuit of reforms, the Coalition government is so geared towards competition that other concerns (such as a consistent structure) may be neglected or opposed. The British building site is likely to remain an interesting venue for researchers on territorial reform for some time.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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