Trade-Offs in the Political Realm:
How Important Are Trade-Offs
in Politics?

Editors

Todd Landman and Hans-Joachim Lauth

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Todd Landman (University of Nottingham, UK)
Hans-Joachim Lauth (University of Wuerzburg, Germany)

Table of Contents

Editorial

Political Trade-Offs: Democracy and Governance in a Changing World

Todd Landman [1,*] and Hans-Joachim Lauth [2]

[1] School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK;
E-Mail: todd.landman@nottingham.ac.uk
[2] Chair of Comparative Politics and German Government, University of Wuerzburg, 97074 Wuerzburg, Germany;
E-Mail: hans-joachim.lauth@uni-wuerzburg.de

* Corresponding author

Abstract

The investigation of trade-offs in political science receives only limited attention, although many scholars acknowledge the importance of trade-offs across a variety of different areas. A systematic and comprehensive examination of the topic is missing. This thematic issue of *Politics and Governance* sheds light on this research deficit by providing a holistic but also an integrative view on trade-offs in the political realm for the first time. Researchers of trade-offs from different political areas present and discuss their findings, and promote a fruitful exchange, which overcomes the current isolation of the approaches. They consider the theoretical and methodological questions as well as the identification of empirical trade-offs. Furthermore, they provide insights into the possibility to balance trade-offs and strategies, which could help actors to find such compromises.

Keywords

balancing trade-offs; constructed trade-offs; logical trade-offs; trade-offs

Issue

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> Trade-offs are central to economics, as they are to life. They are at the heart of economics because neither the decision-maker nor society can have everything it wants. We look at the trade-offs that must be made when the criteria that are used to govern social decisions cannot all be fully satisfied. (Campbell & Kelly, 1994, p. 422)

1. Introduction

Trade-offs play an important role not only in the economy, but also in politics and society. Many scholars acknowledge the importance of trade-offs across a variety of different areas: (1) ecology vs. economy (Inglehart, 1977); (2) democratic functions (responsibility vs. responsiveness) and the quality of democracy (Campbell, 2019; Diamond & Morlino, 2004; Lauth, 2016); (3) efficiency of electoral systems and representative government (Nohlen, 1996); (4) majoritarian and consensus democracy and the representation of interests (Ganghof, 2018; Lijphart, 2012); (5) freedom and security in times of terrorism (Brysk & Shafir, 2007; Hidalgo, 2009); (6) economic abundance and political freedom (Landman, 2013); (7) truth and justice (Landman, 2013); (8) the "dilemma" (Smilov, 2008) between libertarian and egalitarian political finance models; and (9) the many trade-offs evident in the Brexit negotiations between the EU and the UK since the 2016 Referendum.

Such an enumeration could be extended *ad nauseam*; however, these examples highlight that perfect solutions are likely not to be available, and that the choices made by societies and/or political actors have consequences in the form of serious and unavoidable opportunity costs. Given the ubiquity and relevance of trade-offs in the political realm, the understanding of the phenomenon of trade-offs remains undertheorized and is

particularly thin empirically, which reveals a significant gap in research. In addition, often the concept of trade-offs remains unclear: Is it a logical trade-off between two goals such that each cannot be realized at the same time under any circumstances, or is the trade-off simply constructed? The trade-off between effectiveness and participation in democracy (Dahl, 1994), which processes of deliberation might resolve may be such a case of a constructed trade-off. Other authors discuss in a similar way the relationship between input and output legitimacy (Lindgren & Persson, 2011).

This thematic issue of *Politics and Governance* sheds new light on this deficit in research by providing an integrative view on trade-offs in the political realm. The collection of articles brings together researchers of trade-offs from different political areas to promote a fruitful set of exchanges, which we believe overcome the current isolation of many different approaches. The contributions deal with trade-offs in politics across three different perspectives:

1. Conceptually: What are the specific trade-offs in the political area, how can we conceptualize and identify them? How can we distinguish between a logical trade-off and relationship between two things that merely appear to be a trade-off?
2. Methodologically: How can we assess trade-offs and their mutual and interdependent relationships?
3. Empirically: Which research findings exist and how relevant are trade-offs in the political realm? How possible is it to balance trade-offs? Which strategies help actors find such compromises? How do empirical findings differ from logical trade-offs?

The majority of the contributions address empirical questions and look for improvement in balancing these kinds of trade-offs. Ganghof (2019) analyses the trade-offs involved in the design of different democratic institutions with a particular focus on simple and complex majoritarian systems. He shows how mixed parliamentary systems with some degree of separation of powers are superior to pure parliamentary systems for reaching the compromises needed for effective democratic governance. Ganghof (2019) argues further that presidential systems are less able to navigate the challenges of majoritarianism and avoid inter-branch deadlock than parliamentary systems. Nilsson and Weitz (2019) consider the implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and offer a program that ensures more coherent, relevant, and effective policy outputs. The 2030 Agenda does not fundamentally change the dynamic of trade-offs in politics, but with its wide scope, many interactions, and guiding principles of universality, integration and transformative change, it provides for greater challenge and a more difficult landscape of trade-offs than in the past. The authors thus look for some form of standard that can inform or induce the design of poli-

cies to identify, address, and mitigate trade-offs far as possible. Nilsson and Weitz (2019) discuss the treatment of trade-offs in the input, process and output stages of policy-making to improve the governance infrastructure, which not only generates the much needed a priori understanding for policy-makers around the character of trade-offs, but also paves the way for more effective approaches in the latter two stages.

Swe and Lim (2019) analyze the quality of public services in Myanmar as a function of different modes of governance. They compare the trade-offs between and among three public service values of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity, which cannot all be achieved at the same time. Their different modes of governance at the local level include hierarchy, market, and network, the combination of which affect the delivery of public services in the area of agriculture. For them, the initial contradictions among efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in systems of network governance are overcome as the network matures, while market governance systems see a reverse in this logic, leading to greater contradictions over time.

Landman and Silverman (2019) investigate the trade-offs between globalization and modern slavery. They compare the positive and negative arguments surrounding the economic and political dimensions of globalisation with respect to their possible effect on the prevalence of modern slavery. Using a cross-national data set covering 70 countries, they show that countries with higher degrees of economic globalisation and better democratic and legal institutions tend to have lower levels of slavery prevalence. These findings are upheld even after taking into account other explanatory variables such as violent conflict and regional differentiation. In similar fashion, Wiesner (2019) addresses the trilemma associated with globalisation and the EU: (1) free trade; (2) democratic and social standards; and (3) national sovereignty. Wiesner (2019) argues that it is not possible to achieve all three in the context of the EU, while her solution is to strengthen democratic and social standards while maintaining liberal trade orientation and reducing national sovereignty.

Kraus et al. (2019) examine peacemaking with a particular focus on third party interventions and the trade-offs between human rights and the need to find agreement between contending political actors. Their conceptual framework seeks to transcend this binary trade-off through focussing on problem perception and strategy appraisals using the cases of peacemaking in Myanmar, Thailand, and Ukraine. The framework includes existing problem-solving strategies (e.g., sequencing and instrumentalization) and lesser known strategies (e.g., compartmentalization and utilization) to provide meaningful ways to synthesise creative thinking and benefits for third party peace interventions.

Hidalgo (2019) offers a strongly theoretical and conceptually grounded contribution. He uses the concept of trade-offs as an approach for political discussion and demonstrates to what extent the conceptualisation of

democratic antinomies and the notion of value trade-offs could be seen as 'communicating vessels.' His argument is that democracy is defined by several antinomies that are irreducible in theory and therefore require trade-offs in political practice (e.g., freedom and security, economic growth and sustainability, and democracy and populism). Hidalgo (2019) argues that the success of democratic institutions depends on the balance of the necessarily conflicting principles of democracy.

Schlenkrich (2019) provides a methodological contribution on measuring trade-offs in democracy research. Like Hidalgo (2019), he understands democracy as a multidimensional concept whose central dimensions—political freedom, political equality and political and legal control—cannot all be developed comprehensively at the same time. With the help of a reformulated data set from the Varieties of Democracy project, Schlenkrich (2019) shows that trade-offs that are assumed theoretically appear in empirical findings that demonstrate corresponding profiles of democracy.

2. Conception and Identification of Trade-Offs

The contributions in this issue explore different themes relating to the idea of trade-offs in varying degrees, where their different understandings reveal similarities and significant differences. It is thus appropriate to deepen conceptual considerations. It is often not possible to accomplish all beneficial political goals at the same time. Trade-offs are inevitable: Achieving the benefit of one political goal comes necessarily at the expense of another political goal, challenging the rather simple and linear views of 'the more the better' or 'all good things go together.' Societies and/or political actors must restrict themselves and decide which political aims they value higher: "choices must be made, sometimes tragic losses accepted in the pursuit of some preferred ultimate end" (Berlin, 2000, p. 23). Even though it is possible to balance these different objectives in a compromise, the idea of seeking a maximum benefit for all options is abandoned.

Hidalgo (2019) uses many terms that appear analogous to trade-offs (e.g., dilemmas, significant paradoxes, aporias, and antinomies), but he proposes a useful definition of trade-offs:

> A trade-off is popularly known as a situational decision that involves the gaining or growing of one quality or quantity concerning a certain set or amount in return for simultaneously losing or diminishing qualities or quantities in different aspects. Similar to the figure of a reciprocal or inverse proportionality, a trade-off is often compared with a zero-sum game, in which each gain or loss of one actor's or group's utility is balanced or compensated by the gains or losses of other actors or groups. Thus, in simple terms, a trade-off is commonly observed, whenever the increasing of one thing is accompanied by the decreasing of another. (p. 267)

This definition is similar to that offered by Lauth and Schlenkrich (2018, p. 82) in their consideration of democracy: "a trade-off is an irresolvable connectedness between two inverse effects of one institution regarding two dimensions. This trade-off expresses two contrasting but normative equally weighted democracy conceptions to which the selected institutions belong." As Hidalgo points out, the authors assume that the dimensions of liberty and equality belong to the core understanding of democracy and that a limitation of one of them would lead to a deficient form of democracy. Equally, Diamond and Morlino (2004, p. 21) describe the idea of trade-offs within the realm of democracies: "it is impossible to maximize all [dimensions] at once. [Every] democratic country must make an inherently value-laden choice about what kind of democracy it wishes to be." For a supporter of a libertarian understanding of democracy, however, there would be no trade-off situation. In contrast, and more generally but focused on freedom and equality as well, Berlin's value pluralism claims that the "world...is one which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others" (Berlin, 1969, p. 168).

Kraus et al. (2019) specify their ideas of trade-offs in demarcation from dilemmas:

> We understand a dilemma as a *standoff* between two or more imperatives (A vs. B) that are perceived as equally compulsory but not attainable at the same time, leaving only *either-or* options. A trade-off is understood as a *balancing* of two or more imperatives (A vs. B) that are perceived as similarly compulsory and opposed, but *partly satisfiable* at the same time by exchanging one thing in return for another. Both, dilemma and trade-off, can arise from normative and pragmatic claims. (p. 333)

The distinction is based on the fact that dilemmas describe a situation in which one is forced to choose between two equally unpleasant things (e.g., prisoner's dilemma: betrayal of the accomplice or high prison sentence). There is no possibility of a gradual mediation. Thus, decision situations that are binomial (yes vs. no) are addressed. Trade-offs are decision situations (also unavoidable) that allow gradual decision making and are therefore capable of compromise. Balancing is possible. This probably includes most of the points of contention in political disputes, but not cases that make normative claims to truth.

A central question arises in the clarification of the ontological status of trade-offs. Are these essential—as in the pointed understanding of freedom and equality—or are they constructed conflicts? The latter claims, for example, the idea of a green economy, in which the contradiction between economy and sustainability is eliminated and the trade-off situation would be thus resolved. Inglehart (1977) has maintained the idea of a trade-off

between materialist and postmaterialist values by incorporation it into the methodological conception of value change research. In his empirical studies, he compiled the catalogue of questions on the ranking, which requires 'either or decisions.' Critics, however, called for the use of rating, which allows different preferences to be weighted equally. Thus, unsolvable trade-offs should be referred as solvable or dissolvable trade-offs. For a further and deeper discussion of ranking and rating, see Hino and Imai (2019).

In addition to a theoretical debate, the empirical investigation is a good test of whether a trade-off exists or not (e.g., Landman & Silverman, 2019). This makes it possible to answer the question of whether there is only an apparent trade-off. Landman and Silverman (2019) show that critics argue that modern slavery is the 'dark underbelly' of globalisation, and yet their empirical analysis demonstrates that more open societies have lower levels of slavery prevalence.

The constructivist perspective allows a different approach to understanding of trade-offs. These depend on the perception of the participants whether a trade-off situation exists or not. An almost classic case is the already mentioned tension between economy vs. sustainability (preservation and protection of the environment). This is understood both as an insurmountable contradiction or as a mediable conflict of interests (green economy). In this example, some aspects can be clarified by including scientific facts (such as the human contribution to global warming). However, the connection between these two huge concepts is extremely complex and can only be determined definitively in this way to a limited extent.

The research situation changes when not only facts, but their interpretation is decisive for the understanding of the relationship of tension. In this case, the question arises whether the interpretation can be changed or how Kraus et al. (2019) formulate in their contribution can be re-framed. They comprehend this reframing from a cognitive constructivist point of view:

> Holding a cognitive constructivist point of view, we consider dilemmas and trade-offs as perception patterns created by reference frames such as ideas, practices, narratives, goals, values, emotions, and beliefs (Goffman, 1986; Lakoff & Wehling, 2016). Frames are key codes for making sense of the world and thus tend to resist change; when their premises are incommensurable, compete, or collide, a dilemma or trade-off is the result. Like the frames themselves, the perception patterns of dilemmas are contingent: Some people see dilemmas and trade-offs where others—with other contexts and histories—do not (Acharya, 2004; Harding, 2017). (Kraus et al., 2019, p. 334)

For example, the relationship between France and Germany from 1914 to 1945 was often seen as antagonistic, leaving little room for reconciliation. This friend–enemy thinking, however, changed in the reconciliation process after the Second World War, which succeeded in decisively changing the hostile narrative. Such strategies make sense when it comes to conflict resolution, as in this case. However, they do not cover all possible trade-off constellations especially when it comes to the clarification of facts. Thus, such a reframing strategy would ultimately lead to a postfactual view of facts that does not solve any problems. Finally, Kraus et al. (2019) emphasise likewise the difficulty to change frames, which are inescapably linked to unconscious thinking habits, worldviews, existential experiences, and social identity.

Such a constructivist view can, however, also lead to the obscuring of conflicting interests and conflicting goals, as McShane et al. (2011), in their critical contribution to problems of win–win rhetoric, point out. They describe, how a 'win–win language' has become common among important international organizations to characterise the simultaneous achievement of positive conservation and development outcomes. The use of this language can be observed also in other policy discourse, for example regarding the link between the environment and poverty reduction. In their research on the relationship between conservation and development, however, they cannot discover a win-win situation. On the other hand, they argue for the opposite to be named accordingly:

> In our experience, the real power of the trade-off concept comes in its ability to bring diverse actors to the common recognition—one not forthcoming when problems are framed as win–win—that hard choices are being faced. Choices, because there are different options, each with their own suite of possible outcomes with respect to human well-being as well as the diversity, functioning and services provided by ecosystems over space and time (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Hard, because each choice—even the best or "optimal" one—involves loss in some way; a loss that for at least some of those affected is likely to be a significant one. Hard choices in the conservation-development nexus are due to a variety of reasons. (McShane et al., 2011, p. 968)

The authors see emerging a new challenge and task for research; conservationists have to find ways to identify and explicitly acknowledge the trade-offs and hard choices that are involved. The discussion of the constructivist research perspective shows a surprising ambivalence. While on the one hand reframing can help to balance trade-offs and defuse conflicts, on the other it leads to the concealment of opposites and also to fake news or postfactual news, in which real contradictions are obscured.

3. Conclusion

Across a wide range of different political arenas and policy area, this collection of contributions shows that trade-

offs are alive and well. They also show, however, that many can be transcended logically, or can be shown to be falsely constructed empirically. We agree that fundamentally a real trade-off involves the sacrifice of one political goal to achieve another, where any notion of compromise is not possible. So we define a trade-off as a decision-making situation about two goals, which according to the perception of the decision-makers cannot be comprehensively realized at the same time. Two basic forms can be distinguished: On the one hand, trade-offs are logically constituted and cannot be cancelled; on the other hand, if they are identified as constructed, they can ultimately be transferred. Even if a comprehensive simultaneous realization of goals is not possible, they can still be balanced if both goals are to be maintained. There are three tasks for research: The first is to clarify what type of trade-off exists. This identification requires both theoretical and empirical research. On the other hand, there is the normative task of determining which goal should be pursued if a hard choice situation exists. If a mediation or balancing of the goals is possible, appropriate solution strategies would have to be formulated.

The ability of scientific contributions to solve or balance different kinds of trade-offs has been well demonstrated by the various contributions in this thematic issue. We hope that the thematic issue as a whole has also been able to outline research strategies to deal productively with the sketched problems.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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About the Authors

Todd Landman (FRSA) is Professor of Political Science in the School of Politics and International Relations, Pro Vice Chancellor of the Faculty of Social Sciences, and Executive Director of the Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham. He is author of numerous research monographs, articles, and reports on the systematic analysis of development, democracy, and human rights. He has carried out a large number of international consultancy projects for governmental and non-governmental organisations.

Hans-Joachim Lauth is Professor for Comparative Politics and German Government at the Institute for Political Science and Sociology, University of Wuerzburg, since 2008. He received his PhD at the University of Mainz in 1991. In 2002 he finished his second book (*Habilitation*) about democratic theory and measuring democracy. His current topics of research concern democracy, informal institutions, rule of law and separation of powers (accountability), civil society, local self-regulation, and comparative methods.

Article

Designing Democratic Constitutions: The Search for Optimality

Steffen Ganghof

Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, 14482 Potsdam, Germany;
E-Mail: ganghof@uni-potsdam.de

Abstract

This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.

Keywords

electoral systems; parliamentary government; presidential government; semi-parliamentary government

1. Introduction

Political scientists have long analyzed the trade-offs involved in the design of democratic institutions and asked which design, if any, is best. Some have focused on electoral systems (e.g., Carey & Hix, 2011; Shugart, 2001), others on executive formats (e.g., Cheibub, 2007; Linz, 1990) and still others on broader models or visions of democracy (e.g., Lijphart, 2012; Powell, 2000). The goal of the present article is to survey and advance this literature from a particular theoretical perspective. I re-conceptualize the core difference between different models of democracy in order to highlight the crucial importance of whether or not there is a separation of powers between the executive and the legislature.

Much of the existing literature distinguishes between "majoritarian" democracy, on the one hand, and "consensus" (Lijphart, 2012) or "proportional" democracy (Powell, 2000) on the other. In contrast, I propose a

distinction between simple and complex majoritarianism (Ganghof, 2015). What it shares with the more established ones is its focus on differences in electoral and party systems: Simple majoritarianism tries to reduce the number of parties and politicized conflict dimensions; complex majoritarianism embraces multiple parties, the easy entrance of new parties and a multidimensional structure of partisan conflict. Where my conceptualization differs, however, is that it also contrasts different styles of coalition-formation. Complex majoritarianism is not about reaching consensus or the proportional influence of all parliamentary parties, but about the possibility of governing with shifting, issue-specific coalitions. Powell (2000, p. 256, note 259) noted this possibility in his seminal study, but did not investigate it systematically.

If we do so, the difference between executive formats becomes much more salient. The reason is that a pattern of issue-specific coalition-making in the leg-

islature is rather difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. Since the cabinet can be voted out of office at any time and for purely political reasons by some parliamentary majority, there is a greater imperative to build fixed, multi-party coalitions in which each party agrees to support the cabinet in return for veto power over all or most pieces of legislation (Tsebelis, 2002). In contrast, a separation of powers between executive and the legislature can facilitate the formation of issue-specific legislative coalitions.

The article also compares different variants of the separation of powers. While the political science literature tends to associate this separation closely with the notion of presidential government, I emphasize that this association is historical rather than logical. Because the invention of presidential government was strongly influenced by monarchical ideas, the justification of the separation of powers became closely linked to the justification of concentrating executive power in a single human being. However, alternatives to presidential government exist, most notably "semi-parliamentary government" (Ganghof, 2018), which can achieve the benefits of the separation of powers without the dangers of personalizing power in the executive. These benefits include the potential to achieve a particular balance between the goals of simple and complex majoritarianism.

Section 2 elaborates on the distinction between simple and complex majoritarianism. On this basis, Section 3 discusses prominent strategies for optimizing the design of parliamentary systems of government. It shows how these strategies are able to reconcile some elements of simple and complex majoritarianism but not others. Sections 4 and 5 discuss how the presidential and "semi-parliamentary" variants of the separation of powers can achieve a different form of reconciliation between the two models of democracy. Section 6 discusses deadlock, one of the main dangers of the separation of powers, and suggests that it might be easier to avoid under the semi-parliamentary variant. Section 7 is a brief conclusion.

2. Simple versus Complex Majoritarianism

The distinction between simple and complex majoritarianism builds on the seminal works of Powell (2000) and Lijphart (2012) but departs from them in important ways. I have discussed the differences in some detail elsewhere (Ganghof, 2015; Ganghof & Eppner, 2019). Here I try to summarize the distinction succinctly.

Simple majoritarianism is similar to what Powell and Lijphart call "majoritarian democracy." The core ideal is to limit the number of parliamentary parties to only two, so that one party gains a legislative majority. I focus on three goals associated with this model of democratic majority formation. First, voters ought to be able to choose more or less directly between two alternatives for government. This is often called "identifiability". Second, one-party majority cabinets are generally seen to achieve maximal "clarity of responsibility." Third, a low

number of parties in parliament and cabinet is conducive to "cabinet stability." As the name suggests, simple majoritarianism tries to simplify as much as possible—at least in the eyes of the voters—the process of democratic majority formation.

Complex majoritarianism, in contrast, embraces the complexity that results from having multiple parties competing on multiple, partly cross-cutting, political issues. Again, we can highlight three goals in particular. The first is the "mechanical proportionality" of the electoral system. This goal is often seen as an expression of citizens' democratic equality and it requires that x percent of the votes of any party—real and hypothetical—is translated into x percent of seats (McGann, 2013). Mechanical proportionality also makes it easier for new parties to enter the competition. The second related goal is an "unconstrained multidimensionality" of partisan preferences. If some parties take "left" positions on some issues and "right" positions on others, more voters are likely to find a party they feel represented by. There is also some evidence to suggest that unconstrained multidimensionality is beneficial for how citizens actually perceive the quality of democracy (Reinermann & Barbet, 2019; Rosset & Stecker, 2019; Stecker & Tausendpfund, 2016).

The third goal of complex majoritarianism is that coalition-building on legislation is issue-specific, so that different majorities can form on different pieces of legislation. It is with respect to this goal that the concept of complex majoritarianism differs most strongly from Lijphart's (2012) consensus democracy or Powell's (2000) proportional democracy. There is nothing inherently consensual about issue-specific decision-making, as the majority on each issue might be minimal-winning (i.e., it includes only as many parties as are needed for a majority). Similarly, issue-specific decision-making does not imply the proportional influence of all parties but might rather give disproportionate influence to the median party on the respective issues. Authors like Ward and Weale (2010; see also Weale, 2019) prefer issue-specific coalition-building for precisely this reason. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that in his seminal study, Powell was well aware of the potential attractiveness of issue-specific coalition-building and saw it as one variant of his proportional democracy. He wrote:

A third argument in favor of proportionalism is that policymakers should choose the policy desired by the citizen majority on each issue. Because many issues will be considered by the national government between every election and different sets of citizens will form the majority on different issues, it is important that the policy-making coalition not be locked into place by the immediate election outcome....Although this is potentially an important argument for proportional approaches, it is not one that I am able to see how to explore empirically with available data. (Powell, 2000, p. 256, note 259)

Table 1. Two polar models of democratic majority formation.

Simple Majoritarianism	Complex Majoritarianism
Identifiability	Mechanical Proportionality
Clarity of Responsibility	Unconstrained Multidimensionality of Representation
Cabinet Stability	Issue-Specific Coalition-Building

Source: Author's.

In sum, we can characterize each of the two polar models of democratic majority formation in terms of three goals, as summarized in Table 1. The respective goals are at odds with one another, as those of simple majoritarianism are facilitated by having few parliamentary parties, whereas those of complex majoritarianism tend to encourage or require the existence of many parties. In the next section, I will discuss how the resulting trade-offs play out in a pure parliamentary system and to what degree influential optimization strategies can achieve a sort of compromise between the two models.

3. Trade-Offs and Their Optimization in Parliamentary Systems

Efforts to balance the goals of simple and complex majoritarianism are severely constrained by a parliamentary system of government, in two main ways. First, this system implies a single chain of delegation from voters to the cabinet: Voters elect a parliament, which selects a cabinet (e.g., Strøm, 2003). Due to this chain, the competing demands that the ideals of simple and complex majoritarianism put on the party system must thus be balanced in the design of the electoral system for the legislature. Second, by definition, a parliamentary system implies that the cabinet can at any time be dismissed by some parliamentary majority for purely political reasons in a no-confidence vote. As a result, the precise rules of cabinet selection and removals must balance the competing goals of cabinet stability and issue-specific majority formation. I discuss both constraints in turn.

3.1. Optimizing the Electoral System

There are two prominent ideas about how to optimize the design of the electoral system, which are particularly relevant for parliamentary systems of government. Both of them try to reconcile at least one of the two first goals of simple majoritarianism—identifiability and clarity of responsibility—with some degree of proportional representation. The first idea focuses on pre-electoral coalitions. If we can design the electoral system to be proportional but also to induce multiple parties to group into two competing blocs, we might be able to reconcile proportionality with identifiability (Shugart, 2001). Voters can vote for a party and, simultaneously, for one of two competing coalitions. Hence, they can be fairly represented and directly select the government, rather than leaving this to politicians in post-electoral coalition nego-

tiations. Germany's mixed-member proportional system was regarded as an example for this kind of optimization, at least for some time. In the 1980s and 1990s German elections were often characterized by a competition between two pre-electoral coalitions: Christian Democrats and Liberals versus Social Democrats and Greens.

While this is a plausible path towards optimization, it can reconcile the goals of complex majoritarianism only to a rather limited extent. One reason is that two competing blocs are more likely to emerge when parties compete along one dominant conflict dimension (Ganghof, Eppner, & Heeß, 2015). Since electoral systems with a high mechanical proportionality facilitate multiple dimensions of competition, it is probably not enough that the electoral system encourages the formation of competing pre-electoral blocs—it must also reduce the mechanical proportionality of the electoral system and constrain dimensionality. Hence these two basic goals of complex majoritarianism must be substantially compromised.

The second prominent optimization approach explicitly embraces the need for reducing mechanical proportionality. It assumes that what we should really care about is "behavioral" proportionality, that is, how proportionally actual votes are translated into seats (cf. Best & Zhirnov, 2015): If some degree of mechanical disproportionality keeps some voters from voting for small parties, and some would-be parties or candidates to enter the competition, this is as it should be. Carey and Hix (2011) take this view and note that the trade-off between behavioral proportionality and the number of parties in parliament and government is non-linear. That is, electoral systems with a moderate degree of mechanical disproportionality might substantially reduce the number of parties in parliament and government, thereby substantially boosting clarity of responsibility, but without increasing behavioral disproportionality very much. These systems might be optimal in that there is much to gain at low costs; there is a sort of sweet spot of mechanical disproportionality. Spain is an example of a country that seemed to hit Carey and Hix's (2011) sweet spot.

Of course, the plausibility of this argument depends not only on how we feel about the importance of mechanical vis-à-vis behavioral proportionality, but also on how much non-linearity there actually is in the relationship between behavioral proportionality and party fragmentation. A number of authors worry that the potential for optimization might not be that great after all, and that our efforts at finding the sweet spot might also lead

us to the worst of both worlds: substantial disproportionality and many parties (McGann, 2013; Raabe & Linhart, 2018; St-Vincent, Blais, & Pilet, 2016). In any case, the second optimization approach also accepts significant institutional constrains on the two basic goals of complex majoritarianism: mechanical proportionality and the dimensionality of party preferences.

3.2. Optimizing Executive–Legislative Relations

Let us now turn to the design of the precise rules for cabinet selection and removal. These matter for the trade-off between cabinet stability, on the one hand, and issue-specific majority formation in the legislature on the other. From the perspective of complex majoritarianism, single-party minority cabinets that seek issue-specific support seem attractive (Ward & Weale, 2010; Weale, 2019). They could be quite powerful (Tsebelis, 2002, pp. 97–99) but would also have to be attentive to the preferences of potential support parties. In contrast, when parties enter fixed coalitions, either portfolio coalitions or support agreements, they tend to establish each other as "veto players," so that legislation requires unanimity within the coalition (Tsebelis, 2002). Empirical evidence suggests that when minority cabinets form, it is more likely that opposition parties can represent their voters not only in parliamentary debate but also in actual policy-making (e.g., Angelova, Bäck, Müller, & Strobl, 2018; Ganghof, Eppner, Stecker, Heeß, & Schukraft, 2019; Klüver & Zubek, 2018). The problem is that institutional efforts to stabilize cabinets in fragmented parliaments may discourage the formation of minority cabinets, especially single-party minority cabinets that seek issue-specific support.

One way to stabilize cabinets in fragmented parliaments is to make it institutionally more difficult for a parliamentary majority to dismiss the cabinet. The most drastic way to do so is to require the no-confidence vote to be "constructive." This means that an (absolute) parliamentary majority can only dismiss the prime minister if it simultaneously elects a new one. The constructive no-confidence vote can be used to balance permissive electoral rules with highly restrictive rules of cabinet removal (Lijphart, 2012, p. 298). It was first implemented in Germany's Basic Law of 1949 and later also adopted, e.g., by Spain, Belgium and Israel. A constructive vote of no-confidence is likely to work against the formation of (single-party) minority cabinets without stable support in parliament, for several reasons.

One reason is institutional consistency. Since the constructive vote of no-confidence implies an investiture vote, consistency seems to require an investiture vote also after an election. Sieberer (2015) has shown that cabinet selection and removal rules are correlated in this way. Yet when the cabinet has to be voted into office by a majority in parliament, or at least when this majority must be absolute, the formation of minority cabinets becomes more difficult (Bergman, 1993; Cheibub, Martin,

& Rasch, 2019). When simple majorities are ultimately sufficient in an investiture vote, the formation of (single-party) minority cabinets becomes relatively easier, Spain being a case in point (Field, 2016).

However, more recent developments in Spain might also exemplify a second, more strategic reason why a constructive no-confidence vote works against the formation of (single-party) minority cabinets. Since the constructive no-confidence vote stabilizes a minority cabinet after it takes office, opposition parties might be less willing to let it take office. These parties may thus be discouraged from supporting a single party in an investiture vote (by abstaining or voting for it). This logic would help to explain the severe problem of cabinet formation after the Spanish elections in April 2019 (Field, 2019). The conditions for a single-party minority cabinet were in many ways very favorable: The Socialist Party was the largest party by some margin (holding 35.1 percent of the seats), it was the central (median) party on the dominant axes of political conflict, and it could have profited from the Spanish governments' strong institutional powers to set the agenda as well as the constructive no-confidence vote. Anticipating this institutional strength, however, the left-wing Unidas Podemos demanded inclusion into the government and was unwilling to support a Socialist minority cabinet in the investiture procedure. As a result, Spain is headed for yet another general election in November 2019.

Finally, there is the problem of legitimizing the government. We can imagine an institutional configuration in which the constructive no-confidence vote is combined with the absence of any investiture vote after an election. The problem with this combination is that it would greatly reduce the power of parliament over the cabinet (cf. Sieberer, 2015) and thus its ability to democratically authorize a cabinet. It might simply remain unclear which parliamentary party has the right to form a government. The underlying reason for this legitimacy problem is that parliamentary elections only register voters' first preferences. As a result, the plurality party—the party with the most votes or seats—is not necessarily the party that has the greatest voter support overall. It is not necessarily the party that has a legitimate claim to form a single-party minority cabinet. The formation of a fixed majority coalition is one way to create legitimacy on the basis of voters' first preferences. It is the coalition parties' ability to form a majority that creates a legitimate claim to govern. Hence, if we wanted to clearly legitimize a single cabinet party without a majority, we would have to allow voters to express more than their first preference. Yet this is difficult to do in a parliamentary system of government.

3.3. An Empirical Visualization

The arguments presented above imply that, within a parliamentary system of government, it is impossible to get the "best of both worlds." While some goals of simple majoritarianism can be reconciled, to a certain de-

gree, with some goals of complex majoritarianism, the underlying tension between the two models of democratic majority formation remains. Ganghof, Eppner, and Pörschke (2018) visualize this fact in a descriptive data analysis for the period from 1995–2015, which is partially reproduced in Figure 1. The two dimensions in the figure measure simple and complex majoritarianism respectively. Each dimension averages normalized measures of the three goals associated with each model (see Table 1). Normalization implies that one unit corresponds to one standard deviation, while the average value is zero. The detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.

Figure 1 reveals a linear trade-off between the broader bundles of goals. All countries are fairly close to the estimated regression line. At one end of this line is the United Kingdom, which approximates the ideal type of simple majoritarianism. At the other end is Denmark, which exemplifies many elements of complex majoritarianism. Cases with "optimized" electoral systems such as Germany or Spain have less extreme positions and are above the trade-off line, but they cannot escape the underlying goal conflicts. In both countries the formation and stabilization of cabinets has also become more difficult after the period considered here. All in all, Figure 1 suggest that parliamentary systems can be designed to take intermediate positions on the trade-off line, but they can hardly transcend the overall trade-off structure. Can separation of power-systems do better?

4. Presidentialism as Optimization

The best-known version of the separation of powers is presidential government. It requires that the chief executive (the president) is elected independently from the legislature—usually in direct elections—and that he or she serves a fixed term. A legislative majority cannot remove the president in a political no-confidence procedure, but only in an impeachment procedure.

Since the elections of the executive (president) and legislature are institutionally separated, efforts at optimization can focus on designing them differently (Cheibub, 2006, 2007; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Shugart & Carey, 1992). In particular, the legislature can be elected proportionally and without constraining the dimensionality of party competition. Legislative coalitions can form in an issue-specific manner, as the legislature is liberated from the need to maintain the executive in office. At the same time, presidential elections allow voters to make a clear choice between alternative governments (thus achieving identifiability) and the elected government is stabilized by the president's fixed terms. Moreover, if presidential elections use absolute majority rule (two-round systems), voters have a chance to make more than their first preferences count. If their preferred candidate in the first round does qualify for the runoff election, they still have a vote. The elected president can thus be clearly legitimized by an electoral majority, even if his or her party is far away from a majority in legislative

Figure 1. Trade-offs in 20 non-presidential democracies. Notes: For detailed variable definitions, see the Appendix. For data sources, see Ganghof et al. (2018, pp. 232–233). Switzerland is included as a non-parliamentary system because there is only a single chain of delegation from votes to representatives. In the semi-presidential systems, the president does not affect the values for "simple majoritarianism." Semi-parliamentary systems are excluded. Source: Adapted from Ganghof et al. (2018).

elections. In short, the separation of powers may help to mitigate some of the relevant trade-offs. In particular, it can reconcile identifiable and stable governments with issue-specific decision-making in a multi-party and multi-dimensional legislature. In terms of Figure 1, a well-designed presidential system could probably achieve a position in the upper right quadrant.

The separation of powers cannot optimize all trade-offs, though. The clarity of responsibility for policies is likely to be compromised when the president's party does not have a majority in the proportionally elected assembly. After all, a minority president needs to find legislative support and thus make concessions. Clarity of responsibility might be higher if the president has strong institutional powers—agenda, veto and decree powers—so that he or she does not need to make large concessions (Cheibub, 2006). In this case, though, the proportional representation of parties in the legislature and the possibility of issue-specific legislative coalitions become less consequential for the substance of decisions. The tension between fair representation and clear responsibility does not disappear under the separation of powers.

Yet presidential government also opens up new trade-offs. It achieves the separation of powers by concentrating much executive power in a single human being. This is to some extent a historical overhang from monarchy (Colomer, 2013; DiClerico, 1987, p. 304; Nelson, 2014; Scheuerman, 2005) and it tends to weaken the programmatic capacities and voting discipline of political parties (Carey, 2007; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Furthermore, when presidential constitutions try to limit the power of the president it often leads to further trade-offs. For example, term limits for presidents eliminate (personal) electoral accountability in the presidents' last term and make it impossible to re-elect well-performing incumbents. To reduce the institutional dominance of a fixed-term president, presidential constitutions typically disallow the dissolution of the assembly, thereby removing a way to resolve a deadlock between the executive and the legislature. A number of studies suggest that presidential systems increase the risk that democratically elected governments subvert democracy once they are in office (Maeda, 2010; Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt, & Vairo, 2019; Svolik, 2015).

All of this raises the question whether the optimization potential of presidential systems could not also be achieved differently. Some might see semi-presidentialism as desirable, but this hybrid between parliamentarism and presidentialism might just as well lead to the worst of both worlds. After all, a semi-presidential system is most commonly defined by having a directly elected president and a prime minister who can be dismissed in a no-confidence vote of the assembly (Elgie, 2011). Hence to the extent that the president is powerful, these systems also suffer from the problems associated with the institutionalized personalization of the executive (Åberg & Sedelius, 2018; Samuels & Shugart, 2010).

And since the parliament is not liberated from keeping the prime minister and his or her cabinet in office, issue-specific majority formation is just as difficult as under pure parliamentarism.

5. Semi-Parliamentarism as Optimization

Is there another form of the separation of powers that has the same optimization potential as presidential government, but avoids institutionalized personalism in the executive? Ganghof (2018) argues that "semi-parliamentary" government is a candidate. Its trick, as it were, is to move the locus of the separation of powers into the legislature. Semi-parliamentary systems divide the legislature into two parts, both of which are directly elected but only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. They thus separate power between one part of the legislature that is fused with the executive and another part that is not.

Existing semi-parliamentary systems are essentially a special form of bicameralism. They include the Australian Commonwealth and Japan as well as the Australian states of New South Wales (NSW), South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia (Smith, 2018; Taflaga, 2018). These systems are special because upper houses in otherwise parliamentary systems are typically either not directly elected (like the German Bundesrat) or, if they are, they also possess the right to a no-confidence vote (like the Italian Senate).

Ganghof (2018) argues that semi-parliamentary systems have the same optimization potential as presidential systems because the electoral systems of the two parts of the legislature can also be designed differently. The first, "confidence," chamber can construct two-party systems and one-party majority cabinets, whereas the second, "legislative," chamber can allow for multidimensional, multiparty competition. Hence voters can clearly authorize a party and its prospective prime minister to form the government, which is stabilized by a clear majority in the first chamber. Executive power is not as personalized as in a presidential system, because the prime minister can be replaced at any time by the majority party or the first chamber majority. However, this party cannot govern alone but has to seek issue-specific majority support in the more proportionally elected second chamber. Ganghof et al. (2018) show that well-designed semi-parliamentary systems can achieve a position in the upper right quadrant of Figure 1. That is, they can achieve identifiable and stable one-party cabinets, governing with issue-specific multi-party coalitions in a multidimensional space.

Consider the Australian state of Victoria as an example. After the 2018 election of both chambers, the Labor party governs with a large majority in the first chamber (62.5 percent of all seats). In the second chamber, however, the government is in a minority position (45 percent). The balance of power is held by eight (!) minor parties, only one of which (the Greens) also gained seats in

the first chamber (Victorian Electoral Commission, n.d.). Victorian governments seek issue-specific support in the second chamber, which allows all opposition parties to become members of legislative coalitions. Yet since the government can choose between different coalitions, it does not necessarily have to make many large concessions (cf. Tsebelis, 2002).

While all existing semi-parliamentary systems are bicameral, Ganghof (2016, 2018) suggests that this is no necessity. The confidence chamber could also be turned into a two-party confidence committee embedded in a proportionally elected parliament. Consider, e.g., a mixed-member proportional electoral system as it is used in Germany and New Zealand, in which part of parliament is elected in single-member districts, but the overall composition of parliament is proportional. A semi-parliamentary system could be created by restricting the right to participate in the no-confidence procedure to the members elected in single-member districts. Smaller parties would thus be fairly represented in the legislative process but denied power over the government—just as in Victoria and other bicameral forms of semi-parliamentarism.

A question to ask about semi-parliamentarism, and presidentialism for that matter, is whether the optimization achieved by having two elected agents of voters may not lead to new trade-offs elsewhere in the system. Most notably, the question is whether the separation of powers does not lead to a massive problem of legislative deadlock.

6. The Problem of Deadlock

The problem of deadlock has played a central role in the political science debate about presidentialism following the famous work of Juan Linz (1990). This literature has shown, however, that the problem can easily be exaggerated (Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2018; Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004). In this section, I discuss some potential institutional remedies for the problem of deadlock. I also suggest that this problem is more difficult to solve in presidential systems because some remedies might reinforce the concentration of power in a single human being.

First, assembly dissolution and early elections can resolve deadlock (Bulmer, 2017). Presidential government is often associated with the impossibility of assembly dissolution, but there are presidential constitutions that allow dissolution under certain circumstances (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2014). As noted above, however, if the president is given the power to dissolve the legislature, this may strengthen the personalist concentration of power in the executive. Dissolution power has been identified as an important component of authoritarian forms of presidential supremacy (Stykow, 2019).

The possibility of assembly dissolution might be more compatible with the semi-parliamentary variant of the separation of powers, especially when it requires

a double dissolution of both houses. More than half of the existing semi-parliamentary constitutions allow for a double dissolution of (parts of) both houses under certain circumstances (Australian Commonwealth, NSW, South Australia and Victoria). In Victoria, for example, the terms of the second chamber are tied to the first chamber. Hence whenever the first chamber is dissolved—either because of a "deadlocked bill" or after a successful no-confidence vote—the entire second chamber is dissolved too (Taylor, 2006, Articles 6A and 65E(2) in combination with Article 28(2) of the Constitution of Victoria). This dissolution-option for resolving deadlock does not give up on the separation of powers entirely, because the government or the first chamber majority can never dissolve the second chamber without standing for re-election themselves.

Second, a possible way to reduce the likelihood of deadlock is to deny one of the two "branches" absolute veto power. Some presidential systems allow the assembly to override the president's veto with a simple or absolute majority, rather than a supermajority (Colomer & Negretto, 2005, p. 85). In bicameral systems, the common approach is to weaken the veto power of the second chamber. In a semi-parliamentary system, however, it might also be plausible—in analogy to presidents with weak veto powers in presidential systems—to weaken the veto power of the first chamber. If we see the first chamber mainly as a way for voters to directly choose a non-personalized (single-party) minority cabinet, it might not necessarily require absolute legislative veto power. After all, minority cabinets in parliamentary systems have no legislative veto power either. To be able to govern, however, the government and/or its majority in the first chamber would probably need strong agenda-setting powers vis-à-vis the second chamber, such as the double dissolution threat or institutional privileges in the initiation and amendment of (certain types of) legislation.

Third, another way to resolve deadlock in a separation of powers-system could be to let the voters decide. Early elections do this as well, but rather bluntly. A complementary and issue-specific resolution mechanism is a popular referendum on a deadlocked bill. In NSW, a popular referendum, initiated by the first chamber, is the only way to resolve bicameral deadlock on a particular bill (Art. 5B of the Constitution of NSW). While the rules in NSW privilege the first chamber as the agenda setter, it might be desirable to allow both chambers to initiate a referendum on a deadlocked proposal. This would tend to give greater bargaining strength to whichever chamber's position is deemed closer to the preferences of the voters. Moreover, given the inherent uncertainty of a referendum, both chambers would probably have strong incentives to compromise and thus avoid the referendum.

7. Conclusion

The constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the legislature is often understood as

a way to limit and diffuse power or as a particular approach to controlling voters' representative "agents" (e.g., Strøm, 2003). Here I have adopted a somewhat different, complementary, perspective. This separation can also be understood as an effort to balance competing goals in the constitutional design of democracy. My point has not been that the resulting balance is better, all things considered, than that achievable under parliamentary government. It might be, but I don't think we have enough evidence to support such a claim. My point is rather that the separation of powers allows for a type of balance that is unavailable under pure parliamentarism. In particular, parliamentary government makes it extremely difficult to reconcile the goals of identifiability and cabinet stability with the goal of issue-specific decision-making in a multidimensional space. Presidential and semi-parliamentary government can reconcile these goals to some extent because the executive can be designed to emerge and survive independently from a multi-party legislature. It is either elected by the people (presidentialism) or emerges from a separated part of the legislature, in which the effective number of parties is low (Australian-style semi-parliamentarism).

What I did suggest, at least tentatively, is that the semi-parliamentary version of the separation of powers is superior to the presidential version. While more theoretical and empirical analysis is needed to substantiate this suggestion, it might serve as a reminder that democratic constitutions resulted from a path-dependent process that was strongly influenced by the self-interest of powerful actors, as well as by their limited foresight (e.g., about the emergence of political parties). Hence there is no reason to assume that the constitutional designs that dominate the democratic world today, such as presidential government, could not be improved upon. The frequent tendency to equate the notion of the separation of powers with presidential government might to some extent be justified historically, but it is not justified logically. The search for more optimal democratic constitutions should certainly continue.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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About the Author

Steffen Ganghof is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Potsdam. His research focuses on democratic theory and political institutions. He has recently published (in German) a monograph on research design in political science (*Forschungsdesign in der Politikwissenschaft. Eine theorieorientierte Perspektive mit Anwendungsbeispielen*, Springer, 2019). His research articles have appeared in journals such as the *British Journal of Political Science*, *Comparative Political Studies* and the *European Journal of Political Research*.

Appendix

1. Measurement of Simple and Complex Majoritarianism (see Figure 1)

1.1. Simple Majoritarianism

1.1.1. Identifiability
Average of Blocvote and Linkage
Blocvote = Share of votes of the two biggest blocs (a bloc being a party or a pre-electoral coalition of parties)
Linkage = Average of Pecgov and a majority status (dummy)
Pecgov = Dummy that is 1 for each cabinet that consists of a bloc

1.1.2. Clarity of Responsibility
Duration-weighted average of cabinet types, based on the following ranking:
1 = Single-party with majority in all directly elected houses
.85 = Single-party with majority in lower house only
.66 = Multi-party with majority in all directly elected houses
.50 = Multi-party with majority in lower house only
.33 = Single-party minority
0 = Multi-party minority

1.1.3. Cabinet Stability
Average duration of cabinets. The average duration of cabinets is calculated for each legislative term and divided by the constitutionally maximal term length. Those durations are then averaged (weighted by the term length). A new cabinet begins when elections take place or the party composition of the cabinet changes.

1.2. Complex Majoritarianism

1.2.1. Mechanical Proportionality
Log of effective district magnitude (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989)
M = (50/T), with M being the effective district magnitude and T the legal threshold. In countries with directly elected upper houses, values are for the house with the greater proportionality.

1.2.2. Unconstrained Multidimensionality of Representation
Effective number of dimensions (END) based on the results of principal component analyses that use party positions on several items as variables and parties as cases. Cases are weighted with seat shares.

$$END = \frac{1}{\sum P_i^2},$$

with *i* components and *p* being a component's share of explained variance (the relative size of the Eigenvalue). In countries with directly elected upper houses, values are for the house with higher dimensionality.

1.2.3. Issue-Specificity in Legislative Coalition-Building
Duration-weighted average of cabinet types, based on the following ranking:
0 = Majority cabinet
.5 = Formal minority cabinet
1 = Substantial minority cabinet
In countries with directly elected upper houses, the values are for the house with the greater potential for issue-specific coalition-building.

Reference:

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Article

Governing Trade-Offs and Building Coherence in Policy-Making for the 2030 Agenda

Måns Nilsson [1,2,]* and Nina Weitz [1]

[1] Stockholm Environment Institute, 104 51 Stockholm, Sweden, E-Mails: mans.nilsson@sei.org (M.N.), nina.weitz@sei.org (N.W.)
[2] Department of Sustainable Development, Environmental Science and Engineering, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden

* Corresponding author

Abstract
This article introduces a suggested comprehensive framework for identifying, assessing and governing trade-offs and enhancing coherence in public policy decision-making. The framework is based on a simple three-stage model of policy-making: understanding policy interactions (input), integrating policy-making (process), and assessing *ex ante* policy decisions (output). The first stage is tackled with an interactions assessment framework, identifying how different sectors or ministries relate to each other in terms of their respective objectives, and on what topics negotiations are required to manage trade-offs. The second stage draws on approaches and experiences in environmental policy integration. It focuses on institutional procedures, structures and rules that enable integrated policy-making processes. The third stage draws on the longer-standing policy-analytical field of impact assessment applied to sustainable development. The article discusses the conceptual and theoretical foundations of each stage, as well as practical policy experiences. Discussing this in the context of 2030 Agenda implementation, the article suggests how trade-offs and policy coherence can be better governed using adapted policy-analytic methods and approaches.

Keywords
2030 agenda; cross-impact analysis; decision-making; environmental policy integration; impact assessment; policy analysis; policy coherence; sustainable development goals

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1. Introduction

When the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015, it signified a new level of international political agreement regarding the interdependency between economic and social development and environmental sustainability. It is true that the Millennium Development Goals included an environmental goal, and that the earlier Rio Declaration on Environment and Development articulated the three pillars of sustainable development. What was new in 2015 was, first, that the environmental, social, economic and institutional dimensions of development were so intertwined; for example, the food security goal (Sustainable Development Goal [SDG] 2) mainstreamed all three dimensions across its targets. Second, the 2030 Agenda forcefully emphasized that the goals framework is "integrated and indivisible" and that "the interlinkages and integrated nature of the Sustainable Development Goals are of crucial importance" to its implementation (UN, 2015).

What exactly these interlinkages are differ in different contexts, but they exist along several dimensions: between economic, social and environmental interests;

between different sectoral interests; between domestic and international objectives; and between short-and long-term priorities (for empirical examples of trade-offs pertaining to SDG implementation see e.g., Hutton et al., 2018; Pradhan, Costa, Rybski, Lucht, & Kropp, 2017; Scherer et al., 2018). For national implementation this means that synergies and trade-offs between targets that address different policy areas must be captured or reconciled at the domestic level, reconciled with internationally agreed objectives, and any negative spillovers on other countries addressed (Nilsson, Griggs, & Visbeck, 2016; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2018; Weitz, Carlsen, Nilsson, & Skånberg, 2018).

Although dealing with trade-offs and promoting integrated policy-making have been long-standing agenda items in public policy and management, at least since the 1980s, the establishment of the 2030 Agenda—with its wide scope and principles of universality, integration and transformative change—marked a whole new level of ambition. Progress on the SDGs requires cross-sectoral, cross-scale and long-term policy approaches. However, the international and national public policy agencies mandated to deliver such integrated approaches have struggled to do so in practice, and while enhancing policy coherence is one of the targets of the 2030 Agenda, many countries have said that this is one of the most difficult challenges in implementation (Koch, 2017; OECD, 2018).

As any political declaration would, the 2030 Agenda put focus on the positive interactions: The synergies and co-benefits that can be harnessed when one development achievement triggers or contributes to another. It is noteworthy that most official public policy tends, for political reasons, to avoid acknowledging trade-offs altogether. At the global level, the 2030 Agenda makes references to "win–win cooperation" but not to trade-offs or conflicts between goals (UN, 2015). At the EU level, for example, synergies between energy and climate policies, as well as between different environmental policy objectives, are often taken for granted, while underlying trade-offs and goal conflicts are hidden from the discourse or ignored. On the other hand, the realities of policy-making have always been more about the other side of the "integration" coin: the many trade-offs and conflicts between policy priorities in different areas. Managing these trade-offs and conflicts, and finding paths to progress, are to a great extent the heart of political decision-making.

This article aims to unpack the mechanisms available for political decision-makers to manage trade-offs, from the input stage of policy-making, through the process, to ensuring that adopted public policies are as coherent as possible. The purpose is to discuss available mechanisms in the context of the 2030 Agenda, but it is not to provide an empirical study of how trade-offs are dealt with in 2030 Agenda implementation. Our view is that such a study would be premature and there is not yet enough experience and data across jurisdictions.

Managing trade-offs in policy-making is not limited to the novel field of 2030 Agenda implementation. In practice it has been a key part of the concept of policy coherence for development pushed by the OECD for more than a decade (OECD, 2018; OECD/Development Assistance Committee, 2008). More "joined-up" government was a top priority in the UK government in the 1990s, and around that time also became an important agenda item in the EU, which has since actively contributed to the concept of policy coherence (Carbone, 2013; Ling, 2002). In the EU, the impact assessment instrument became a primary mechanism for identifying and mitigating trade-offs when European directives are being prepared. But, the 2030 Agenda establishes a new level of complexity, a significant widening of the challenge of dealing with trade-offs and expectations to establish a policy-making system that can deliver coherent decisions.

In this article we connect this challenge to the question of how best to organize decision-making in public policy when it comes to complex problems. This field of policy analysis and research has been occupied in particular with the question of how to foster participation and engagement in, as well as technical expert input to, the policy process, in order to make decisions both more democratic and legitimate, and more effective in terms of problem solving (Stern & Fineberg, 2003). It is a well-established question in the policy sciences how to balance or combine these different processes and inputs, through what has been called an "analytical-deliberative process of decision making" (Renn, 1999). We postulate that technical expertise is necessary but not sufficient for dealing prudently with trade-offs in policy-making. As part of pluralist societies, we must also account for the diverse values, world views and legitimate interests of different stakeholders. These will influence how issues and knowledge are interpreted and used in political processes.

The perspective taken here on policy coherence is that the knowledge, entry points (e.g., ideological, cultural) and information base available to decision-makers is pertinent to governing trade-offs in a legitimate and effective way. In any representative political system, this is what will be drawn on to motivate a decision—internally as standpoints are negotiated within government, and externally as government relates to the preference of those who are affected by the decision and the actions that follow.

Since the late 1990s there has been a push to enhance the scientific input to policy, making it more evidence-based. Many barriers persist, on the supply as well as the demand sides, including mismatched timelines, lack of consensus on research findings, failure to communicate research in an understandable way, and challenges to effectively engaging researchers in the policy process. Pragmatic approaches are needed that balance the requirements of policy-makers with the imperative of scientific rigour, in order to address these barriers and make the connection between science and pol-

icy credible, relevant and legitimate (Gavine et al., 2018; Sarkki et al., 2014). As Gro Harlem Brundtland put it, "politics that disregard science and knowledge will not stand the test of time" (Brundtland, 1997).

Another push has been for deepening participation in political decision-making processes and institutions that are genuinely deliberative (Pogrebinschi & Ryan, 2018). In practice this might make e.g., public hearings, consultations, seminars and online portals for public debate more common as a source of input to policy-making. These institutions must also be representative enough. This is important in relation to the 2030 Agenda, given its emphasis on inclusiveness with regard both to the adoption of the Agenda (which was the result of over two years of public consultation; UN, 2015) and to its guiding principles of "leaving no one behind" and universality. It is also, more generally and normatively, important in a world of increasing mistrust in public institutions—although more research is needed into the circumstances under which increased participation actually improves development outcomes and enhances the legitimacy of and trust in decisions.

2. Approach

This article is only of limited empirical value, but instead takes a policy-prescriptive approach to the governance of trade-offs. As argued above, we take as a starting point that governing trade-offs will require an analytic-deliberative approach to policy-making, where both participatory elements and technical expertise are required at different stages.

In this, we use a policy-analytic model based on simple input-process-output stage logic (Dunn, 2004). In reality, the public policy process is far from linear, and is a much more dynamic, chaotic and porous process involving diverse actors, interests, ideas, institutions and constantly perturbed by short-term disruptions or shocks as well as changes in slower-moving variables. However, a more realistic representation of actual policy-making—deploying, say, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), new institutionalism (March & Olsen, 1983) or the policy streams/garbage can model (Kingdon, 1984)—would risk limiting the prescriptive value of the study, since the solutions would be so strongly tied to a particular theoretical lens on the process. We use this over-simplistic model in order to provide clarity and focus on the solutions and prescriptions offered.

The approach taken is to first identify the problem in terms of trade-off governance in each stage, then to describe the mechanisms available for decision-makers to tackle this problem, and finally to describe how the mechanisms have been applied in practice.

A comprehensive approach to achieve policy coherence should start with a problem definition (Kurze & Lenschow, 2018; Nilsson et al., 2012). Therefore, a mapping of interactions between different objectives forms a necessary step at the input stage (Nilsson et al., 2016; Weitz et al., 2018). The input stage involves the entry points and knowledge base that goes into the policy-making process, including the preunderstanding of the societal context that actors in the policy-making have, and the information that they can draw on to enhance this understanding. An interactions assessment framework helps to define the problem by allowing different sectors or departments in government to come together and jointly identify how they relate to each other in terms of their respective priorities, and on what topics negotiations are required to manage trade-offs.

The second process stage involves the procedures and rules of decision-making that constitute the core of the policy-making in the government offices. This is for example features of the organizational set-up, standard operating procedures as well as additional measures taken to amplify or induce more integrated perspectives in the process. This stage is informed by adapting institutional lessons drawn from environmental policy integration.

The output stage involves the mechanisms available for policy-makers, and other actors, to look ahead at the resulting impacts, not only on the target policy domain but across all relevant domains, should the policy decisions be implemented. This stage is informed by adapting different forms of impact assessment and foresight methods.

Each of the three stages is discussed below in terms of:

1. How the policy literature and policy applications have dealt with the question of coherence and trade-offs in that particular stage in recent years or decades;
2. In what ways the 2030 Agenda provides a new challenge and set of implications for the governance of trade-offs in that particular stage;
3. Our outline of a potential approach to tackle this new and reinforced challenge of governing trade-offs in the era of the 2030 Agenda.

3. Addressing Trade-Offs and Building Coherence in Policy Inputs

A basic principle for governance to be effective in achieving the intended results of the 2030 Agenda is that public policies should be "coherent with one another and founded on true or well-established grounds" (UN Economic and Social Council & Center for European Policy Analysis, 2018). Without a solid knowledge base that considers how different objectives or sectors interact, policies risk continuing to reinforce unsustainable patterns of interaction. The 2030 Agenda is meant to break such patterns. For example, achieving both SDG 8 and SDG 15 (and several other goals that interact with them) requires decoupling economic growth from environmental degradation. While these interac-

tions existed before the UN member states agreed on the 2030 Agenda, the declaration marks an elevated ambition to clarify them at global, national and sub-national levels and for policy and actions to respond to them. As stated in paragraph 18 of the declaration, "never before have world leaders pledged common action and endeavour across such a broad and universal policy agenda" (UN, 2015). Attaining the SDGs will largely depend on whether policy can tackle trade-offs and leverage synergies within this broad agenda (Pradhan et al., 2017). For the input stage of policy-making this implies a need for approaches that can single out actionable information among complex interdependencies within and between economical, political, social and technological systems.

While the need for policy integration and coherence has been recognized for decades, progress in practice has been limited. One reason is a technocratic approach assuming that once information on cross-sectoral interactions is available, policy can swiftly be adjusted to resolve or optimize them. The academic literature related to policy coherence and integration, however, suggests that political and cognitive factors such as trust, ownership and learning are essential in order for inputs on policy interactions to make a difference in actual decision-making (Weitz, Strambo, Kemp-Benedict, & Nilsson, 2017). Decision-makers' understanding of relations and interactions shapes their views on what challenges and opportunities trade-offs and co-benefits pose, and what policy options there are for mitigating or capturing them. Policies thus result from a weighting of different options that are derived from institutions' value systems and the perceptions of decision-makers (Nilsson, 2005; Persson, 2007). Tackling trade-offs from the input stage is largely about working with these perceptions and understandings. With policy changes following from changes to the way decision-makers understand and perceive of different phenomena, strengthening the information basis and knowledge about interactions at the input stage becomes crucial for policy to more effectively govern trade-offs.

Information about policy interactions is often scattered and fragmented, and views on their implications diverge (Bosch, King, Herbohn, Russell, & Smith, 2007). In the context of the 2030 Agenda this is particularly challenging given the large number of interacting targets and their often complex relationships. The Delphi method is one of the most frequently used by decision-makers to aggregate large amounts of information and support consensus. It emerged in the 1950s and is used in foresight exercises to generate scenarios (Bañuls & Turoff, 2011), which is a widely used tool in long-term planning (Weimer-Jehle, 2006). Though systematic and interactive, the Delphi method in its original form does not account for how the different events that comprise a scenario influence each other, and it therefore does not provide decision-makers with the systemic thinking needed to support policy coherence.

In the context of the 2030 Agenda, systemic thinking means taking a holistic view to explore how all the targets work together and what the emergent effects of their interaction are, and understanding what this means for goal attainment in different geographies and for different groups of people. As an approach, Systems Thinking has shifted its focus since it first emerged in the 1950s, away from goal seeking and towards learning (Bañuls & Turoff, 2011). Reflecting this, Quade (1969) concluded, in the context of future studies, that a systemic approach is useful to governments if it is integrated into the policy-making process. Such integration would facilitate proper consideration of results and the learning needed for policy change to happen.

Cross-impact analysis emerged in response to the lack of systemic thinking in future studies—and the Delphi method in particular. Exploring whether the occurrence of an event changes the probability of other events occurring, it sought to reduce uncertainty about the future by analysing multidisciplinary interactions (Gordon & Hayward, 1968). Given the complex environments that decision-makers face—multiple objectives, long time horizons, a large number of diverse impacted groups, and risk and uncertainty, to name just a few—cross-impact analysis is not intended to identify "optimal solutions," just to generate insights that help decision-makers reach better decisions (Keeney, 1982).

The first step in cross-impact analysis is to define the events (variables) to be included. For the 2030 Agenda this would be the SDGs or a subset of their 169 targets. In the next step, the interactions between these events are assessed. In the original form of cross-impact analysis the assessment was focused on the probability of each event occurring under the influence of all the other events, or checking the coherence of such probability assessments. Today, many variants of cross-impact analysis exist and it belongs to a whole family of methods for analysing and modeling systems that sit between empirical data-driven computational models and argumentative systems analysis (Mariconda & Lurati, 2015; Panula-Ontto et al., 2018). The exact question in focus has been modified to meet different needs and not all cross-impact analyses use a probabilistic approach (Weimer-Jehle, 2006).

With our perspective on policy coherence, a key strength of cross-impact analysis in the context of 2030 Agenda implementation is how it pragmatically strikes a balance between argumentative/verbal analysis that is important for the cognitive aspects of policy change, and computational support that allows for assessment of multiple interactions that would be too complex for most human minds (Panula-Ontto et al., 2018; Weimer-Jehle, 2006). Commonly, a group of experts representing the different sectors of the included events estimate the interactions in the assessment (Gordon, 1994). While these experts can focus on just parts of the system and on its conceptual and argumentative foundations, their input provides all the data needed for calculating dynamics of the system that may not be obvious at first. This

way it effectively breaks down system aspects in a way that avoids decision-makers being overwhelmed by complexity and yet goes far in terms of systemic analysis (Panula-Ontto et al., 2018).

By generating a level of consensus among decision-makers on complex policy questions, while also moving beyond argumentative analysis in a decision situation where empirical data is lacking and quantification difficult (Panula-Ontto et al., 2018), the approach is valuable in the input stage of policy-making for 2030 Agenda implementation where there is no scientific consensus on how targets interact in a particular context and several targets still lack appropriate indicators.

One example of applying cross-impact analysis to 2030 Agenda implementation (see Weitz et al., 2018) combines a qualitative interactions assessment facilitated through cross-sectoral dialogues and quantitative network analysis in order to single out the most important information for strategic decision-making with regard to target interactions and achieving the SDGs. This includes identification of critical trade-offs and synergies in progress towards the different SDG targets, how they interact and what are leverage points for progressing on the whole set of targets. Based on this, policy can focus on those leverage points that create synergies, and on mitigating the trade-offs. The cross-sectoral dialogues involving experts from e.g., different ministries, specialized agencies, government coordination bodies and interest groups, are central to the approach and bring value in terms of the cognitive factors of policy change discussed earlier, including influencing the knowledge and perception of decision-makers. For example, the approach provides structure and a common language about interactions that can support a collective understanding about how they can be understood conceptually and what they imply in a specific context. This can help to facilitate greater understanding for the perspectives of other stakeholders, build consensus, and strengthen acceptance and ownership of policy outputs and outcomes.

Systems thinking and cross-impact analysis have the potential to strengthen the input stage of policy-making in a way that is needed to respond to the reinforced challenge of governing trade-offs in the era of the 2030 Agenda—both in terms of improving the information base but also in equipping policy-makers with the understanding, knowledge and social relations that can pave the way for better governance of trade-offs throughout all stages of policy-making.

4. Addressing Trade-Offs and Building Coherence in the Policy Process

Moving to the treatment of trade-offs in the process stage of policy-making, ensuring more integrated policy processes has been a recurring theme, in particular in European policy-making, since at least the late 1980s. With provisions made in the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and of Maastricht (1992), it is fair to say that "in-tegrated policy-making" even has constitutional backing in the EU. The motivation was the insight that environmental problems can only be effectively addressed by the sectors that drive and cause them. The process of ensuring such integration then became complicated because those sectors, such as energy, industry and agriculture, are not causing environmental damages for the hell of it, but because they usually consider it a trade-off worth tolerating—in the name of e.g., productivity, competitiveness, growth or jobs. The inevitable backlash was then that the pursuit of integration in order to better deal with those trade-offs could lead to dilution of environmental objectives instead of sectors taking ownership and integrating them into their strategic orientations (Nilsson & Persson, 2003)

It is possible to distinguish between two different ambition levels—one which seeks coherence in terms of merely avoiding trade-offs, or in other words ensuring policy consistency (Den Hertog & Stroß, 2011); and a more ambitious level which looks for policy coherence that allows synergistic solutions that drive towards common objectives across different policy domains. In an earlier branch of policy-analytic literature, on policy coordination, this differentiation was also known as negative coordination vs positive coordination (Scharpf, 1994).

Different perspectives—and associated integration strategies—can be applied. The political perspective characterizes a political system predominantly in terms of conflict, competition for resources, and struggles between different interest groups, and whereby political actors mediate by taking into account lobbying input from different sectors and interests. With a political perspective, coherence and integration require interventions into the incentives and power balances between actors in the system.

The institutional perspective characterizes policy-making as a governance machinery that contains separated entities ("siloes"), and that organizational instruments, procedural arrangements and institutional reforms can be applied towards increasing the connectivity—at both strategic and operational levels of government.

The cognitive perspective characterizes policy-making processes as being embedded in cognitive "frames," i.e., cognitive structures or sets of ideas about how the world works, which structure thinking in the processes. The presence of alternative frames in different sectors which compete with each other is indeed a powerful part of the political science understanding of policy-making (Schön & Rein, 1994). With the cognitive perspective, integration and coherence efforts turn to strategies to connect different frames and to promote learning and evolution of them, either through sudden or gradual external shocks, or through accumulation of evidence and knowledge pertinent to the issue at hand (Nilsson, 2005)

In reality, instruments for enhancing integration in the process have been tested, building on all three

perspectives, and government bureaucracies now have more than two decades of experience in terms of such efforts. They entail things like national plans and strategies (such as policy coherence for development); obligations to develop strategies and report on cross-cutting priorities and mainstreaming; internal think-tank functions within central government; amalgamation of government ministries; coherence units at the "centre of government" (the Office of the Prime Minister or President); and interdepartmental working groups (Jacob & Volkery, 2004).

While these types of institutional fix can have some positive effect, ultimately, dealing with trade-offs between sectors remains a fundamentally political process which requires negotiation among actors with different goals. Such negotiations often lead to biased or unexpected results due to unequal distribution of power, voice, access to information, and resources and capacities between different actors (Perrone & Hornberger, 2014).

In the era of the 2030 Agenda, the coherence and trade-off challenge in the process stage takes on a new form. Lessons from institutional arrangements amenable to promoting environmental policy integration appear relevant also for governing trade-offs in the 2030 Agenda, bearing in mind that the challenge is not to manage trade-offs between two policy sectors, but to treat priorities within all policy sectors as an "indivisible whole." As the process moves from sectoral departments to the centre of government, it is necessary to gain a comprehensive view. However, "breaking down the silos," a slogan often invoked in the 2030 Agenda discourse, is likely a dangerous strategy. As argued in the input stage section above, sectoral expertise is necessary to build coherent policies (Nilsson & Persson, 2017).

What are required instead are institutional reforms that enhance foresight, communication and collaboration across departments. The process likely requires oversight and ownership at the centre of government, but also mobilization and leadership from those ministries that have traditionally been most powerful, such as the Ministry for Finance (Nilsson & Persson, 2017).

Existing ways to deal with trade-offs have become institutionalized through different, and often quite effective, policy mechanisms. Impetus to change these mechanisms will tend to meet resistance. This is not only about not wanting to change; more systemic focus on coherence and trade-offs comes at a cost, since more fully coherent approaches (Nilsson & Persson, 2017):

- Can be difficult to sell to the public and to media, as they tend to have longer payback cycles (that do not resonate well with political, including election, cycles);
- Can be at odds with internal accountability and performance evaluation systems;
- Can be at odds with bureaucratic routines and standard operating procedures.

However, it is worth noting that while reforming government processes might face several barriers, another driver for integration might come from the outside world. Indeed, the 2030 Agenda explicitly expects actors outside government, including the private sector and civil society, to engage in its implementation. Early experiences with the internalization of the agenda into the private sector suggest that it is met with far more interest and commitment than, for example, previous specific environmental and social protection agendas. Previously defensive industries are becoming much more proactive and are buying in to the 2030 Agenda at a strategic level. Thus, policy integration will get additional drive from a multi-stakeholder engagement approach where government officials engage more with societal stakeholders, in terms of both designing implementation instruments and following up on progress and results.

Concrete mechanisms for policy consultation have been in place for decades. What would be required is a more ambitious deliberative process which covers a wider set of policy issues, including problem identification, objective setting, development of options, and evaluation of those options in terms of impacts on and consequences for different policy priorities.

5. Addressing Trade-Offs and Building Coherence in Policy Outputs

While there is value in process, what matters ultimately is the coherence of the generated policy outputs, and ultimately the outcomes: changes in the behaviour, practices and choices of different actors in society. Ensuring more coherent outputs requires some form of standard that can inform or induce the design of policies so that trade-offs can be identified, addressed, and mitigated as far as possible. The most established and institutionalized form for this is impact assessment, which since the 1970s has become a significant field of professional practice as well as of research (Fischer & Montaño, 2019).

Most governments have, at least on article, some form of mandatory impact assessment approach. Commonly, these impact assessments concern the prediction of economic, social and environmental consequences of draft policy proposals, either economy-wide or in specific sectors. In some places, the focus is on the impacts in terms of regulatory burden (so-called Regulatory Impact Assessment; Hertin, Jacob, Pesch, & Pacchi, 2009); in others there is a stronger focus on environmental and/or social impacts (Environmental Impact Assessment; Social Impact Assessment; Becker, 2001).

Different forms of impact assessment use different methods. These methods have critical limitations and may overlook important dimensions or interactions, in particular when looking beyond the short term. Issues that tend to be neglected include dynamic or structural effects, the existence of thresholds, non-linear effects, or irreversible changes (Lade, Tavoni, Levin, & Schlüter, 2013). Furthermore, issues that are difficult to quantify

or model (e.g., quality of education, or empowerment of women) tend to be neglected. As Peter Drucker put it, "what gets measured gets managed" (Drucker, 1954).

The practices of impact assessment fundamentally differ between different communities and jurisdictions (Pope, Bond, Morrison-Saunders, & Retief, 2013). In some jurisdictions, such as with the EU, impact assessments used by the European Commission are mostly model-based technical studies. In others, such as Sweden, qualitative assessments and reasoning dominate. Ambitious efforts to include stakeholders in the assessment process through deliberative methods are rare.

The theory and practice of impact assessment has, despite many years of development, not strengthened its role as an instrument for governing policy coherence. The 2030 Agenda presents an opportunity to revamp it. By making the 2030 Agenda the starting point for impact assessments, governments can achieve a framework with strong international legitimacy and relatively comprehensive coverage of societal priorities in a systematic way.

In a revamped impact assessment framework, the 17 SDGs can form key impact categories, but they will need to be both condensed and interpreted in the context of the proposed policy intervention. The interpretation also depends on the political priorities and agendas in the jurisdiction in question. For the EU context, for example, we suggest the following parameters could be relevant under each SDG (depending ultimately on the policy intervention):

SDG 1—Impact on incomes of low-income and vulnerable groups;

SDG 2—Impacts on food security (national or local supply chains), on nutrition, and on environmental sustainability of agriculture;

SDG 3—Impacts on disease prevalence, and on lifestyles through changes in access to physical activity or nutrition;

SDG 4—Impact on school performance;

SDG 5—Impacts on equal opportunities and on equal treatment of men and women;

SDG 6—Impact on water quality and quantity;

SDG 7—Impacts on energy consumption and on security of supply;

SDG 8—Impacts on employment, on economic growth and on competitiveness;

SDG 9—Impacts on industry, on small and medium-sized enterprises, and on regulatory burden;

SDG 10—Impact on distribution of income and social equality, including regional effects;

SDG 11—Impacts on urban quality of life, inclusion, segregation and safety;

SDG 12—Impacts on natural resource use, on emissions of pollution, and on chemicals use;

SDG 13—Impacts on climate resilience and on greenhouse gas emissions;

SDG 14—Impacts on pollution of oceans and on ocean resources;

SDG 15—Impacts on biodiversity and on functioning of ecosystems;

SDG 16—Impacts on criminal activity, on local governance systems, and on inclusion of citizens in decision-making;

SDG 17—Impacts on developing countries and on international trade.

Clearly, many of these aspects are already treated today in existing frameworks. However, applying such a new SDG-based impact assessment framework will require development of methods. In many OECD countries, data will be available for a baseline, but the analytical toolbox to simulate impacts across all fields is not yet sufficient. For example, despite decades of effort in building comprehensive simulation and assessment models, we are largely unable to predict patterns of systemic change in society in areas such as climate mitigation policy (Pindyck, 2013).

There are international efforts to develop new methods and approaches in integrated assessment that can provide a more coherent or comprehensive view of development trajectories across the SDGs. The models that exist are highly complex and suffer from not having resolution at national scale. Another common problem is a lack of transparency which limits the possibility for the users of the result to interpret what the models suggest. Finally, there is deep scientific uncertainty about the systems studied, although progress is being made continuously (Weyant, 2017). Thus, we conclude that the state-of-the-art is such that the integrated assessment models will not be usable as impact-assessment tools for more coherent policy-making at national level in the near term.

Given that setting benchmarks is a highly complex and uncertain—and politicized—process, and that assumptions and projections into the future about impact chains add to the uncertainty, it must be recognized that impact assessment is fraught with challenges. The actual outcome of any implemented policy instrument can never be known with any degree of certainty. In reality, policy-making to manage trade-offs is not a one-off event, but rather a sequential decision-making process under deep uncertainty (Weyant, 2008). Assumptions need to be made regarding the way in which the policy will operate and what impacts it will have on behavior under different conditions within the larger political, economic and social context; how it will interact with other policies through causal relations; or the ways in which it will be adopted and implemented by different actors. Furthermore, its rationalistic assumptions about actors' responses to a policy change often run counter to the political realities.

It is not feasible to generate quantitative impact predictions for all 17 SDGs, much less for all 169 targets, in a policy impact assessment. However, it is possible to establish an impact assessment framework which enables qualitative assessments along all 17 dimensions. To a great degree, that assessment can draw on the in-

teractions assessment that was carried out in the input stage. It can also benefit greatly from continuing the deliberative input with multiple stakeholder within and outside government who contribute to the assessment. When deemed relevant and critical (as a result of identifying hotspots or because it is a political priority), deeper quantitative analysis, including with specific modelling or with statistical evidence, can be carried out for specific impacts.

6. Conclusions

This article suggests that lessons on and approaches to more coherent policy-making and policy analysis can be deployed to deal more effectively with trade-offs in political life. The mechanisms that they provide are useful at the input, process and output stage of the policy process. The 2030 Agenda does not fundamentally change the dynamic of trade-offs in politics, but with its broad scope, numerous interactions, and guiding principles of universality, integration and transformative change, it presents far greater challenges than past development agendas. It should prompt policy-makers and analysts to sharpen their tools, and generates demand for a more stringent and systematic approach and "governance infrastructure" that can address trade-offs, running through the entire policy process.

We have discussed the treatment of trade-offs in the input, process and output stages of policy-making. In the process and output stages, policy integration mechanisms and impact assessment mechanisms have been tested, used and abused by decision-makers for decades, whereas the proposed interactions assessment in the input stage is more unexplored territory. We see this as a critical addition, one which not only generates much-needed knowledge for policy-makers around the character of trade-offs that will need managing, but also paves the way for more effective approaches in the latter two stages.

An analytical-deliberative approach appears not only useful but essential in order to manage trade-offs and build coherence. It is not only that a broad range of stakeholders have a legitimate claim to be given a voice, and that involving them will generate better decisions, but also it reflects the fundamental premise that there is no single true, objective understanding of a policy problem that can be discovered through analytical work. Even with the greatest scientific rigour applied, the results of analytical work will inevitably reflect the biases of the participating bodies (Kurze & Lenschow, 2018).

This is, therefore, our final message: Managing policy trade-offs cannot be done solely through science and technical expertise; to facilitate policy change, stakeholders must drive the input of knowledge, perspectives and values at all of the three stages of policy formation. This also means making the most of existing knowledge in the current political context and institutional landscape.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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About the Authors

Måns Nilsson is the Executive Director of the Stockholm Environment Institute. He is also part-time Professor of the Practice of Environmental Strategies and Policy Analysis at the Royal Institute of Technology. Key areas of interest are low-carbon energy and transport policies, development studies and the 2030 Agenda, innovation and transitions, and institutions and governance. In recent years he has helped establish the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate and has been closely involved as an adviser to the UN, OECD and the European Commission on the SDGs. He is a member of the Scientific Council for Sustainable Development to the Government of Sweden. Måns received his MSc in International Economics from University of Lund, Sweden, and his PhD in Policy Analysis from Delft University of Technology, Netherlands.

Nina Weitz is Research Fellow within the Governance and Institutions Unit at the Stockholm Environment Institute. Her work focuses on national and global governance processes, including the formulation, implementation and follow-up of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. Nina has a background in political and environmental sciences, with an MSc in International Administration and Global Governance from Gothenburg University.

Article

The Theory of Democratic Antinomies and the Identification of Value Trade-Offs in Political Practice

Oliver Hidalgo

Department of Political Science, University of Münster, 48151 Münster, Germany; E-Mail: hidalgoo@uni-muenster.de

Abstract
In theory, the idea of democracy consists of several insoluble contradictions, aporias, and conflicts. In practice, democracy demands an effective balancing of its essentially opposing principles and values in order to preserve an authentic character as well as to avoid its inherent self-destructive tendencies. In this regard, the concept of value trade-offs promises a heuristic tool to grasp both the analytical and normative impact of a political theory which takes the complexity of democracy seriously. Proceeding from this, the contribution will demonstrate to what extent the conceptualisation of democratic antinomies and the notion of value trade-offs can be seen as a kind of communicating vessel. The article's general argument is that democracy is defined by several antinomies that are irreducible in theory and therefore require trade-offs in political practice. Moreover, it will discuss three relevant issue areas to suggest the approach's empirical relevance and to prove the existence of value trade-offs as an operating benchmark for the legitimacy and consolidation of democratic processes on the one hand but also for their shortcomings and risks on the other. Correspondingly, the article concerns the antinomic relationships between freedom and security, economic growth and sustainability, and finally, democracy and populism to underpin the general perception that the success of democratic institutions first and foremost depends on the balance of the necessarily conflicting principles of democracy.

1. Introduction

The intense consideration to the history of political thought reveals that the concept of democracy is generally associated with essentially opposing connotations and values: Liberty and equality, representative government and popular sovereignty, the principles of quality and quantity in respect of democratic decision-making, plurality and social unity, individual and collective claims, and last but not least universality and particularity—all of these evident contradictions inevitably belong to the idea of modern democracy and therefore provoke a permanent struggle of conflicting opinions, interests, and actors within the democratic system. Hence, the theory of democracy presented here argues that what is vaguely

called the government of the people, by the people and for the people is made up of several specific 'antinomies.' These antinomies stretch a discursive framework which can function as an adequate measure to distinguish legitimate political efforts from extremist enunciations and demands exceeding the democratic boundaries by suspending its obligatory opposites and rendering the always 'relative' features of democracy in terms of absolutes. Accordingly, one may say that an 'authentic' type of democracy is primarily characterised by a number of dynamic trade-offs between its inherent (and insoluble) antinomies.

Proceeding from these preliminary assumptions, the following line of argument briefly outlines the theory of democratic antinomies (Section 2), before it clarifies the

interdependence of these antinomies in theory and the need of (value) trade-offs in democracy's political practice (Section 3). Furthermore, the theoretical considerations should be illustrated by three substantiated examples, which will be reconstructed in terms of the relevant concepts in order to highlight both the structural benefits and problems of democratic discourse (Section 4).

2. The Theory of Democratic Antinomies

The history and theory of democracy are surrounded by numerous inconsistencies, paradoxes and aporias. For instance, as it is well-known, democracy exhibits a particular tendency to self-destruct as well as "autoimmunity" (Derrida, 2005), whenever an 'undemocratic' group of political actors attempt to gain the majority of voters in order to abolish civil rights and democratic institutions with the help of legally implemented 'democratic' procedures. An associated problem is a paradox identified by Richard Wollheim (1962). This paradox means that democracy is always confronted with the inherent dilemma that an outvoted minority nevertheless has to obey the political decisions taken by the representatives of the voters' majority, even if the outvoted minority is convinced that the majority is wrong and believe they have the moral right or even duty to engage in civil disobedience. This dilemma evidently leads to the need for, or at least the imagination of there being, an "overlapping consensus," in which the existing political antagonisms of a particular society are symbolically absorbed and therefore effectively defused (e.g., Heller, 1928/2000; Rawls, 1993, Chapter 4). A third aporia of democracy is indicated by Kenneth Arrow's "impossibility theorem," according to which it is not possible to formulate a consistent social preference ordering which can simultaneously satisfy the conditions of non-dictatorship, individual sovereignty, unanimity, freedom from irrelevant alternatives, and uniqueness of group rank (Arrow, 1963). Together with John Nash's (1951) critique on the "invisible hand" in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776/2012), Arrow's impossibility theorem suggests that there is no method to extrapolate from individual preferences to the common good. The same insight can be drawn from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's description of the "general will" as "sum of small differences" to people's individual interests (Rousseau, 1997, p. 60). In consequence, there will always remain a significant incongruence and therefore a deep tension between individual and collective claims, private interests, and public goods.

The above-mentioned (as well as many other) paradoxes basically result from one overarching reason: That democracy as a form of government and society established by the principle of competition requires every claim for (absolute) truth to be renounced (e.g., Arendt, 2007, pp. 223–259; Kelsen, 1955). Ensuing from this, two things are supposed to emerge: First, the implausibility to define the concept of democracy unequivocally; and second, the emphasis on democracy's multiple identities.

Thus, the almost countless patterns, (sub-)types and varieties of democracy which the history of democratic theory assembles (e.g., Cunningham, 2002; Diamond, 2008; Dunn, 2005; Eisenstadt, 1999; Held, 2006; Schmidt, 2010; Tilly, 2007) are not only logical outcomes of the classical statement by Walter B. Gallie (1956) that democracy—as justice or the arts—is among the "essentially contested concepts" lacking unique standards for both a commonly accepted definition and a consistent discursive practice. Far from being just an arbitrary political system, it has to be assumed that a unique characteristic of democracy is that it offers social and political struggles a reliable framework and a platform on which their political objectives might be transformed into legitimate individual and collective claims. This means the concept of democracy quasi 'internalises' the contradictions, oppositions and antitheses circulating in society. Thereby, the legitimacy of 'democratically' formulated political goals precisely emanate from the (paradoxical) fact that it accepts the entitlement of alternative political goals as a quid pro quo. Otherwise, a 'democratic' decision regarding any political conflict would be nothing but absurd.

Against this elaborated theoretical background, even common distinctions such as those between liberal and republican, direct and representative, consensus and majoritarian (for this distinction, see particularly Lijphart, 1999, Chapters 2–3), market and social democracy, as well as further discrepancies between elitist and participatory, deliberative and agonistic forms of democracy, or even strong opposition such as that between grassroots democracy and democratic leadership or Western and Non-Western ideas of democracy do not inevitably reinforce the popular prejudice that democracy can mean "everyone and everything" (Sartori, 1992, p. 11). Instead, the evident coexistence of many divergent conceptions and notions of democracy just confirms that democracy itself apparently consists of significant paradoxes, aporias, and contradictions. However, these 'democratic' contradictions do not prevent democracy being treated as an essentially contested concept which nevertheless has clear contours at its boundaries. Since it seems to be unmistakable what all legitimate controversies within democracy are about, the permanent (and essentially indissoluble) political struggles may indeed forbid a strict definition of democracy, but allow at least its theoretical framing as well as a normative estimation of democratic qualities. This approach may neither be confused with a minimal concept (Dahl, 1971, 1998) nor with the perception that the concept of democracy might only be "boundary contested" (Lord, 2004). In contrast, we have to become aware of the fact that it is exactly the special character of conflict giving democracy its distinctive feature. In this respect, first of all the recognition of plurality, the existence of conflicting opinions and values, and most notably, the integration of governments' and oppositions' rival claims, are what distinguishes democracy from every other political system (Luhmann, 2000). Likewise, this perspective

sheds new light on democracy's historical ability to subsume very contrary ideas and realities under its semantic field. In this regard, it is remarkable that the antithetical oppositions commonly associated with democracy, obviously imply a similar level of legitimacy: liberty vs. equality (Antinomy I); representation vs. popular sovereignty (Antinomy II); the principles of quality and quantity concerning democratic decision-making (Antinomy III); plurality vs. social unity (Antinomy IV); individual vs. collective claims (Antinomy V); and finally, universality vs. particularity (Antinomy VI). All of these antagonistic principles and values definitely include an 'authentic' side of democracy, even though a permanent clash is bound to occur (Hidalgo, 2014, Chapter 3). A main consequence of this essential discernment might be that even profoundly opposing theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau, Schumpeter and Barber, Kelsen and Loewenstein, Dahl and Pateman, Habermas and Mouffe, Nozick and Taylor, Kant and Derrida, each contribute to a comprehensive understanding of modern democracy in an appropriate and equitable manner.

The previously outlined characteristics of democracy can be conceptually grasped by the keyword: antinomy. With the concept of democratic antinomies going beyond the rather indefinite notion of a "democratic paradox" (Mouffe, 2000), we are able to stress that democracy actually 'consists' of several insoluble contradictions. This statement does not deny that the concept of antinomy linguistically overlaps with several similar notions as paradox, contradiction, tension, opposition, aporia or dialectic. But at least, one can say that by indicating a 'law-like' proposition, the application of the noun 'antinomy' verbalises the character of irreconcilable (democratic) principles in the strictest sense. Hence, the existence of democratic antinomies might even be seen as the fundamental reason for the inevitably resulting paradoxes, contradictions, tensions, oppositions etc., in democratic politics.

In accordance with Kant's definition of "antinomy" as a "conflict of laws" (*Widerstreit der Gesetze*; Kant, 1911, p. 407) leading to equally justified theses and antitheses which cannot be resolved by a compromise or synthesis, the identification of democratic antinomies primarily emphasises the underlying capacity of democracy to mediate between obviously opposing but equally legitimate principles. Though in Kant (1911, pp. 426–461), the identification of four (metaphysical) antinomies merges with a critique of pure reason itself. With regard to the political idea of democracy, it is supposed to be evident a priori that the historical discussion concerning the government of the people, by the people and for the people has to be distinguished from the claim for pure and absolute knowledge. Instead, the argument of demcratic antinomies is not a transcendental one suggesting that these antinomies did always exist. In contrast, the antinomies of democracy do not imply a matter of logic but only of semantics reflecting the contradictory meanings being attributed to the idea of democracy during its conceptual history and concluding from the relevant genealogy to the already mentioned main quality of democracy: the ability to subsume very contrary ideas and realities under one and the same semantic field. Additionally, the method of genealogy which has been applied in order to detect democratic antinomies within the history of political thought (Hidalgo, 2014) performatively implies both a thesis that the hitherto identified six antinomies cover the dominant historical debate on democracy and a concession that the relevant discussion is always open for supplements, advancements and the identification of further democratic antinomies.

Proceeding from this, democracy can also be understood as a basic idea or proposition from which further propositions and their very opposites can be deduced (cf. Müller, 2004, p. 516, footnote 6). Moreover, it is due to its antinomies that democracy shapes an infinite number of disagreements, disputes, and conflicts since there is never the one and only 'democratic' position but always a few or even a large number of alternatives for how a particular political question can be treated and decided. In addition and upon closer examination, the unique framework of democracy, in which different political decisions are available by pursuing, for example, liberty against equality, the individual against the community, quality against quantity or vice versa, is also a consistent result of democratic antinomies: As long as these one-sided political demands show respect for the (normatively equivalent and only temporarily neglected) other side of the opposition, the 'democratic' character of the political process or debate is maintained *in toto*. The latter is the case if a political demand or decision does not abolish the opposition itself by pursuing extreme objectives or denying the general entitlement to opposing views. Hence, democracy means not least a permanent struggle to bring or to keep its extremes into a dynamic balance. This balance of democratic antinomies should not be confused with the golden mean or the desirable middle between two extremes. Instead of falling prey to the fallacy of seeking the 'truth' as a compromise between two opposite positions, the theory of democratic antinomies rather demands the coexistence of the relevant extremes without signifying that the extremes are bad and the middle ground is good. Instead, the ideal coexistence could be described as an indispensable oscillation of democracy and its processes of political decision-making between its opposing principles. In this respect, Claude Lefort's conception of democracy as a system characterised by both the institutionalisation of conflict within society and the maintenance of an "empty space" of political power might be a helpful illustration (Lefort, 1988). In return, the possibility of a process of 'sublation' in the sense of Hegel that might unite and keep both sides and reproduce the contradiction on a higher level must be rejected from the perspective of democratic antinomies.

Although each of the aforementioned six democratic antinomies deserve a rather extensive reflection, it is cer-

tainly the first one (between liberty and equality) which needs the most clarification. At a first glance, the liberal doctrines of John Rawls (1971) or Ronald Dworkin (1981a, 1981b, 1987), combining both ideals as an ineluctable normative fundament of democracy, suggest that liberty and equality do not inevitably mean insoluble contradictions. However, a 'real' or 'essential' equality could only be achieved by repression since a free society must necessarily evoke social differences, inequalities, and hierarchies because of people's different procedures, capacities, and interests. That is also the reason, why liberals such as Rawls or Dworkin tend to reduce equality to a political or legal status and give priority to liberty, while social democrats conversely prefer equality against liberty and therefore support redistribution of wealth and greater intervention by the welfare state. Sometimes, it is even controversial to which camp an author belongs. For instance, Rawls might rather be assigned to the advocates of social democracy, since the difference principle and the fair equality of opportunity in the *Theory of Justice* (Rawls, 1971) suggest the legitimacy of an expansion of the welfare state. However, it is at least evident that Rawls was very aware of the fact that liberty and equality remain contradictions, as he arranged his principles of justice in a lexical order prioritising the liberty principle and determining this priority if the principles conflict in practice. In *Political Liberalism*, the priority of basic liberties against equality is not only confirmed (Rawls, 1993, Lecture 8) but intensified, as the liberty principle as the equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties is replaced by only an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties (Rawls, 1993, Lecture 8, Section 8). Indeed, since democracy means both liberty *and* equality, both groups, liberals and social democrats involve the first antinomy in their doctrines, while there is a never-ending political struggle between the left and the right concerning the necessary extensions and boundaries of both concepts and, additionally, the adequate balance of them.

A very similar thing regards the rather evident antinomies between people's sovereignty and representation, individual rights and collective duties, as well as about the quantitative principles of participation and majority rule on the one hand and the need for qualitative or normative measures to guarantee a particular output of political decision-making on the other. Democracy always means and includes both contradictory sides. Therefore, it is only complete if it does not ignore any one of these components, although it is obvious that democracy is unable to resolve the inevitable tensions and paradoxes which result.

3. The Identification of Value Trade-Offs in Democratic Politics

A trade-off is popularly known as a situational decision that involves the gaining or growing of one quality or quantity concerning a certain set or amount in return for simultaneously losing or diminishing qualities or quantities in different aspects. Similar to the figure of a reciprocal or inverse proportionality, a trade-off is often compared with a zero-sum game, in which each gain or loss of one actor's or group's utility is balanced by or compensated for by the gains or losses of other actors or groups. Thus, in simple terms, a trade-off is commonly observed, whenever the increasing of one thing is accompanied by the decreasing of another.

The origins of trade-offs are numerous, including basic physical or biological reasons. In economic realms, a trade-off is usually expressed in terms of the "opportunity cost" a particular choice implies, which is equivalent to the loss of or relinquishment of the best available alternative (Campbell & Kelly, 1994). Accordingly, the concept of economic trade-offs indicates a strategic or tactical situation, in which relevant actors have to come to a decision by considering the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative very carefully. In this respect, it could be that the (economic) reasons considered affect the field of ethics as well, which is particularly the case whenever a trade-off concerns not only the various (or even conflicting) interests and values of a single person but also the competing interests and values of groups of people. It is similar regarding situational decisions being defined by the rivalry of different ethical principles as with deontology and utilitarianism for instance.

On the surface, this general concept of economic and ethical trade-offs dominates democratic politics in an all-encompassing manner. As economic theories of democracy—e.g., by Gary Becker (1958, 1983) or Anthony Downs (1957a, 1957b)—insinuate, all politics and processes of political decision-making might be interpreted as an infinite series of trade-offs based upon the interests and core values that political actors, politicians, or just the majority of people share. However, the economic theory of democracy in the wake of Becker and Downs obviously fails in reflecting and understanding the fourth democratic antinomy: between plurality and competition on the one hand, and modern democracy's need for social cohesion, political unity, and an imagined community in the sense of Benedict Anderson (1991), or the previously mentioned "overlapping consensus" (Rawls, 1993) on the other. Hence, the question of trade-offs in democracy is rather complex than in an economy and must, therefore, go beyond the focus on politicians' and voters' rational choices. In democracy, the role of public good, as well as the principles of collective action and the common identity of people, are directed against the simplified notion that the 'typical' democratic situation is that, in which one person's gain inevitably means another's loss.

Nevertheless, the concept of trade-offs could be adapted through the democratic antinomies approach in a quite different way. An expedient application merely requires one to recognise the dual nature in the meaning and impact of trade-offs in the field of democratic pol-

itics. Instead of understanding trade-offs only in utility maximising terms, in which more of one good implies less of another, the democratic antinomies do not predominantly concentrate on choices across competing goods but on the need to find a balance between democracy's insoluble contradictions. Proceeding from this, the inherent 'self-contradiction' of the trade-off conception is coming to the fore: On the one hand, a trade-off between conflicting and even mutually exclusive alternatives ineluctably implies a constructive dealing, an arrangement with the underlying, (almost) equally desirable options for decision-making. Otherwise, situations which require trade-offs would not happen at all. Moreover, as far as this deal or arrangement avoids radical extremes (which is apparently plausible since both sides of the trade-off are positively connoted and every relevant decision between them had at least to guarantee the minor evil), it could be described as a kind of agreement, anyway if we want to call this more precisely an adjustment, a modus vivendi, a compensation for asymmetries or even a pragmatic compromise. On the other hand, no trade-off between such a set of alternatives would be able to solve or overcome the underlying conflict of political aims, goals, and objectives. At best, it might just be suitable to ensure that the relevant political conflicts in democracy are defused and unlikely to escalate.

As we have seen, the requisite balance of democracy's conflicting principles should not be confused with the (dis)solution or 'sublation' of the conflict itself. Instead, dealing with the indissoluble tensions and antagonisms appropriately within democracy requires the coexistence of contradictory (and conflicting) democratic principles. Hence, the concept of a trade-off between the democratic antinomies ensures both the respect of the antinomies' intrinsic character and an illustrative configuration in order to describe the (assumable) phenomenological hallmarks of democracy. Referring to this, the three different levels and functions of trade-offs concerning the theory of democratic antinomies can finally be highlighted:

- First, one may say that the occurrence of trade-off situations in democracy actually depends on the

condition that there are relevant public actors as political parties, members of parliaments and candidates who are running for elections, citizen and interest groups, as well as the media or judges, who are able to articulate and represent the wide range of legitimately conflicting principles and values within the democratic system;
- Second, and vice versa, the empirical existence of trade-off decisions in democratic processes provides a good indicator that the characteristic antinomies of democracy are still present and virulent. In contrast, a lack of trade-offs in any political society would suggest democracy's decline to its inherently deficient, self-destructive forms as for instance in illiberal or exclusive democracies (Antinomy I), tyrannies of majority or post-democracies (Antinomy III), as well as anti-pluralistic democracies or cases of social disintegration (Antinomy IV);
- Third, and finally, the concept of trade-offs offers a heuristic pattern to describe generic political, structural and institutional outputs of antinomically organised democratic processes. In this regard, the (six) democratic antinomies shown in Section 2 evidently correspond with a juxtaposition of concrete opposing characteristics which empirical democracies ordinarily combine. An overview is given in the following Table 1.

The table emphasises that due to the antinomies several empirical trade-offs concerning evidently antithetic structures and institutions are predestined within democratic societies. Concretely, the first antinomy between liberty and equality pre-eminently leads democracy to evoke essential affinities to both the free market and the social state, whereas the second antinomy between representation and popular sovereignty is translated into the normative equivalence of parliamentarism and popular referenda, elections, and public debate in respect of legislative processes. Moreover, the parallelism of influential power and lobby groups and the reverse validity of the classical principle 'one person, one vote' is an expression of the first two democratic antinomies as well. In

Table 1. Trade-offs in antinomic democracy.

Democratic Antinomies	Trade-Offs
I Liberty and equality	Free market and social state
II Representation and popular sovereignty	Parliamentarism and popular referenda Interest groups and 'one person, one vote'
III Quality and quantity	Rule of law and majority rule
IV Plurality and unity	Pluralism of opinions/lifestyles and collective identity
V Individual and collective claims	Civil rights and duty of solidarity
VI Universality and particularity	Global values/human rights and national interests Similarity and dissimilarity of all democracies

terms of the third antinomy between quality and quantity as contradictory principles of all methods of democratic decision-making, there is a further antithetic coexistence of majority rule and the rule of law to be noticed. And while the fourth antinomy provokes a salient clash of pluralistic opinions and lifestyles on the one hand and an efficacious collective identity of people on the other, the fifth antinomy finds its trade-off in the simultaneous validity of civil rights and the duty of solidarity. Last, but not least, we can conclude from the sixth antinomy between universality and particularity that a similar collision between national interests and global responsibility of a democratic association occurs. In addition, this antinomy includes as a further paradox that every democracy is inevitably both similar and dissimilar to all other (empirical) democracies because they all reflect a particular will of their people as well as also having a substantial affinity to universal claims and values such as human rights.

Although these trade-offs cannot be measured with methods of mathematical exactness, which might be a feature of alternative approaches to eliciting value trade-offs in politics (e.g., Baron, 2000), quantifiable indices for measuring goods being implicit to antinomic democratic principles as liberty and equality are definitely available. However, since the theoretically identified (semantic) antinomies of democracy cannot be reformulated (and therefore be resolved) by the distinction of a meta language and an object language following Alfred Tarski's concept of truth in formalised languages, the resulting trade-offs in practice affect a subject beyond mathematical axiomatics, arithmetic, and particularly equivalence as well. Therefore, value trade-offs due to the democratic antinomies approach obviously cannot indicate (the intervals of) zero-sum games in a strict sense, since the antinomies cannot be enunciated by linear and inverse mathematical functions. But apart from that, the scheme above gives us a comprehensive impression of the prototypical value conflicts in modern democracies. For instance, the ferocious debate between the advocates of open borders, multiculturalism, and the right to immigrate as the only morally acceptable position for someone committed to democratic values (e.g., Carens, 2013) and their opponents who stress democracy's need for national identity and the legitimate interest of any political community in self-determination (which includes launching a rather restrictive immigration policy, e.g., Miller, 2016) is a perfect example of an argumentative trade-off in respect of the fourth and sixth antinomy. Moreover, the controversy between liberals and communitarians regarding the relationship between the individual and their community could easily be reconstructed in terms of the first and fifth antinomy. Hence, Section 4 of this article will discuss three further issues in order to strengthen and illustrate the assumed nexus between democratic antinomies in theory and value trade-offs in political practice.

4. Three Issue Areas

4.1. Freedom and Security

Since its inception, the modern democratic state stands for an evident trade-off between freedom and security. The institutional guarantee of civil rights and liberties protects the citizens from state despotism, while the security of the state can reciprocally be seen as a precondition of people's freedom. Moreover, checks and balances, as well as people's (indirect) contribution to the implementation of laws, mean that the legislative power generally provides a framework of private liberties which the large majority of citizens feel is justified. But although freedom and security might (and must) complement one another, both principles, at least *within* democracy, are equally the components of a trade-off similar to a zero-sum game. Self-autonomy and civil liberties are factually limited whenever the security of the state is effectively or virtually threatened. In return, democratic states have to accept surveillance gaps or incomplete control of their people in order to guarantee civil liberties.

Likewise, the maintenance of an at least unstable balance of freedom and security is one of the greatest challenges of the democratic state, since each social, economic, or political crisis is usually succeeded by a significant increase in state power and a restriction of freedom at the same time (e.g., Cobden, 1973; Higgs, 1987). Today, particularly the phenomenon of transnational terrorism tends to disturb or even destroy any trade-off between freedom and security. Basically, the transnational terrorist represents in a special sense a maximum of freedom and, inversely, a minimum of security. Comparable to a freedom fighter, the terrorist exhibits only few regards to his personal safety forcing the authority of the state to tighten counter-measures permanently. In the worst case, security fanatic politicians and citizens are even willing to sacrifice (all) civil liberties, which are assumed to endanger the survival of the state. In fact, democratic states often over-react to the risks of transnational terrorism (e.g., Art & Richardson, 2007; Jacobson, 2006). Hence, the democratic rule of law is under ongoing risk of becoming replaced by a 'state of prevention' which would be equivalent to a triumph of security over the freedom of democracy.

Undeniably, it was the theoretical thinker Thomas Hobbes, who first reflected on the antinomic foundations of the trade-off between freedom and security in the modern democratic state in 1651. However, in Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651/1996), the common argument, that there is no security without a significant restraint of freedom, had already been taken to its extremes. In Hobbes, the collective power of people represented by a single sovereign aims to ensure that all or at least the majority of citizens equally benefit from law, order, and security, while all other sides of the democratic antinomies (I to V)—individual rights, people's sovereignty and participation, the rule of law, freedom and plural-

ity (including a separation of powers)—are neglected. In other words, Hobbes' refusal to accept any trade-off between freedom and security likewise rejected democracy. Accordingly, the theoretical accomplishment of a balance between the relevant antinomies of democracy and particularly a trade-off between a guaranteed individual right to freedom and the collective interest in security (Antinomy V) was only achieved by his successors, e.g., Locke, Montesquieu, Kant or the Federalists. In practice, the antinomic trade-off between freedom and security in democracy demands that both principles remain under reservation of the other. Since a concrete state intervention either increases freedom or security, the relevant decisions should not focus on only one side of the paradox but need respect for both sides, which means nothing less than the underlying antinomies must be maintained. Otherwise, there is the risk that freedom is sold out for security or vice versa. Both alternatives—the obsession for a secure state or to have an anarchy—would be incompatible with democracy. Moreover, the democratic trade-off between security and liberty illustrates the fact that dissolving antinomies to one side might finally eliminate both sides, since erasing all security does not mean maximising liberty and, on the contrary, without security, there is no liberty at all. As it has been mentioned above, the reason for this is that, outside democracy, the identfied antinomies never lead to trade-offs similar to zero-sum games, since democracy depends on a (positive) coexistence of its opposing principles. Thus, the sum of them cannot be zero there, whereas within democracy (and beyond the undemocratic, one-sided extremes), it is very plausible that one can only increase one side of an antinomy by decreasing the other. This strengthens the argument that there is generally a need for trade-offs in democracy. In return, the trade-off between freedom and security advances to a measurable empirical quality of democratic antinomies.

4.2. Economic Growth and Sustainability

The basic principle of sustainable development is to meet "the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 41). This obligation towards sustainability originally attempted to combine the aspects of an intergenerational justice (Rawls, 1971, Chapter 5, Section 44) and a common responsibility for poverty reduction and environmental protection with a commitment to economic growth as a condition for global welfare. However, the conservation of natural resources and livelihoods on the one hand and social progress, productivity increases, and growth in global incomes on the other have meanwhile been proved as rather conflicting goals (e.g., Jackson, 2009; Latouche, 2009). In this matter, as things stand today, the prospect of "green growth" or "green capitalism" (e.g., Ekins, 2011; Fay, 2012; Heal, 2010; OECD, 2011) has to be estimated as very uncertain.

Once again, democracy is basically predestined to offer a discursive framework to negotiate an appropriate trade-off in this matter. But unfortunately, the democratic antinomies suggest sustainability being rather a structural deficit of democracy itself. Three main problems can be identified in order to grasp the reasons for this deficit systematically:

- In contrast to the theory and practice of ancient democracy (e.g., Finley, 1985), the powerful position of individuals in modern democracies requires and principally justifies the absence of a general priority of community and collective aims over individual rights and claims (Antinomy V). In consequence, a (temporary) subordination of individual interests, e.g., in the society's economic growth and welfare, might still be possible if there are good and traceable reasons. Nevertheless, a just virtual community of future generations is apparently too 'weak' in order to avoid the well-known "future-individual-paradox" (Parfit, 1983) and to enable such a withdrawal of current desires in favour of future goals;
- Although it is plausible, that, in democracy, environmental protection and the claim for sustainability acquires the quality of being an elitist or avant-gardist issue, it could hardly be expected to become a mass phenomenon (Antinomy III). Instead, the majority of people have been unwilling to renounce on their own rational advantage promised by economic growth;
- An additional focus on the levels of the democratic antinomies II and IV gives further rise to the suspicion that the interest in sustainability and the conservation of natural resources is structurally underrepresented in (Western) democracies. The main challenge is that there is not one single acting subject, one interest group of really concerned and affected people who are able to give environmental issues an unambiguously audible voice within the polyphonic choir of pluralistic democracy.

Thus, as Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1840/2002) has already pointed out, we are confronted with the inconvenient insight that, particularly in democracy, citizens usually do not cultivate the capacity to renounce their current needs and desires in favour of future prospects, chances, and obligations. The reason is obviously that, at least according to the consistently large majority of people, the issue of sustainability is not recognised as a normatively equivalent goal to the principle of economic growth. From this, against the background of the democratic antinomies approach, we could conclude that the antinomic conditions to achieve a balance or trade-off between the conflicting objectives—economic growth and sustainability—yet are not given. In consequence, as long as there is not an efficacious social "imagination" (Castoriadis, 2006) that present and future gen-

erations have to be considered as 'equal' (Antinomy I), while people ignore the fact that the contributors to climate change and environmental pollution from the industrialised countries bear a particular responsibility for those suffering the consequences in developing countries (Antinomy VI), a significant improvement of the contemporary ecological situation will remain out of reach. Therefore, in case of sustainability and economic growth, the theory of democratic antinomies even provides a benchmark, regarding the reform, efforts and institutional innovations which eventually have to be done in order to include all concerned parties in the controversial democratic discourse.

4.3. Populist Democracy

For the final example, we have initially to elucidate to what extent the theory of democratic antinomies serves as a reference point to understand the synchronic populist and non-populist character of democracy. Instead of encouraging a problematic separation between populism as a (thin) political ideology (e.g., Mudde, 2004) and as only a style of political communication (e.g., Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Taggart, 2000), the democratic antinomies approach underlines that democracy always includes two effects: first, a substantial alignment to populist strategies, whenever only one side of its contradictory and conflicting principles is getting accentuated; and second, an effective resistance to such one-sided appearances of populist democracy by cultivating its non-populist counter-principles at the same time.

The following chart (Table 2) illustrates these populist and non-populist sides and features of democracy due to its several antinomies: Here, the left hand side of the first column consisting of the principles of liberty, representation, quality, plurality, individual rights, and universality suggests that one half of democracy shows deep affinity to liberal and non-populist values; whereas the italicised right-hand side of the first column (assembling the norms of equality, popular sovereignty, quantity, homogeneity, collective claims, and particularity) indicates that the second half of democracy can barely be distinguished from the prototypical principles of political populism (e.g., De La Torre, 2015; Mudde, 2004, 2007; Priester, 2007, 2012).

In accordance with that, the table's second column alleges the kind of politics a (populist) dissolution of

each democratic antinomy (suppressing the liberal side of democracy while enforcing its illiberal one) must obviously lead to. As a result, which is apparently very close to the empirical programs and rhetoric of many right and left-wing populists in European and American democracies, a form of populist or illiberal democracy emerges which fails to ensure the necessary balance or trade-off between the relevant liberal and illiberal opposing principles. Such a populist or illiberal democracy, which is most of all characterised by a very one-sided emphasis on equality, popular sovereignty, majority rule, social homogeneity, and the particular interest of the political community, implies both a remaining affinity to democratic principles and their parallel degeneration. In detail, the populist denial of the existence of a trade-off between the liberal and the illiberal side of democracy provokes typical political phenomena such as:

- Sweeping defamation and condemnation of established political classes and active political professionals, often accompanied by a strong vindication of social security (Antinomy I);
- The advocacy of a rather limitless sovereignty of people which is emplaced against representative institutions, political elites and corporations (Antinomy II);
- An unleashed and destructive rule or even a tyranny of majority preventing a possible self-containment of democracy by the rule of law (Antinomy III);
- The enforcement of a homogeneous collective identity of people due to nationalist, culture-specific, or religious matters at the charge of pluralistic or multicultural requirements (Antinomy IV);
- The strict superiority of the political community over individual rights (including harsh polemics against liberal achievements in modern democracies particularly in the field of anti-discrimination of women, homosexuals, religion, foreigners and coloured people; Antinomy V).

In sum, the populist reason tends to overrule all sides of democracy showing affinity to universal values. In reverse, it forces all opposite sides of the antinomies to guarantee the particular national interest of their own democracy (Antinomy VI).

Table 2. Biased populist democracy with lacking trade-offs between democratic antinomies.

Democratic Antinomies	Imbalance/Lacking Trade-Offs
I Liberty and *equality*	Defamation of established political classes and politicians
II Representation and *popular sovereignty*	General critique on elites, corporations, and institutions
III Quality and *quantity*	Tyranny of majority
IV Plurality and *homogeneity*	Anti-pluralism and strict friend/enemy distinction
V Individual and *collective claims*	Anti-modernism (including gender- and homophobia)
VI Universality and *particularity*	Radical nationalism/chauvinism

Hence, a populist democracy in the rough sense builds a very biased form of a democratic order, not by attacking directly the liberal sides of democracy but by overemphasising or absolutising its populist counterparts. In contrast to this, every functioning democracy must remain able to keep its inherent populist elements in a balance or trade-off with non-populist and liberal institutions and principles. In other words, the populist side definitely belongs to democracy (e.g., Laclau, 2005) and might even function as a correction to liberal democracy because populism enables it to renew itself against its own post-democratic and technocratic tendencies whenever such biases have not been spotted by the liberal side of democracy (e.g., Mouffe, 2018; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). But, at the same time, populism always undermines democracy, since all democratic principles need to be balanced by their antinomic counterparts and would act against democracy if the (liberal) counter-principles were destroyed.

At a first glance, Table 2 and the ensuing argument in Section 4.3 shows indeed only tendencies or probabilities and therefore must necessarily be seen as a limited argument. Considering this objection, it is true that, for instance, there are a couple of populist movements (e.g., the Tea Party in the United States or the Progress party in Norway) pursuing not an egalitarian but rather an anti-welfare and pro-liberty agenda. Moreover, not all populists are homophobic (e.g., the former Pim Fortuyn list in the Netherlands) or chauvinistic (e.g., left-wing populists as Syriza in Greece or Podemos in Spain). Nevertheless, the antinomic tension between the 'liberal' and 'illiberal' parts of democracy can be observed in these special cases as well. Since illiberal politics should not be confused with strict anti-liberal positions but must rather be understood as an abuse or exploitation of liberal institutions in favour of illiberal purposes, an illiberal agenda of radical 'liberalism' is apparently as plausible as an illiberal suppression of minorities by other minorities. Hence, the countless examples and differences of populist parties and programs have to be analysed from case to case; but in general, the explanatory power of the democratic antinomies approach is not reduced too much thereof.

5. Conclusions

This article has applied the concept of value trade-offs in order to get a rather empirical benchmark for illustrating the political implications of democratic antinomies. In return, the democratic antinomies approach is able to give the relevance of trade-offs in political realms a theoretical basis. More precisely, it should have become evident how the democratic antinomies approach serves as an adequate reference point to identify the specific value trade-offs which are necessary within the political arena of democracy in order to keep its potential to degenerate in check. Therefore, it is vital to democracy that its genealogically recognised antinomies are never resolved

in such a way as to abolish oppositions or possibilities for new (and always temporary) resolutions.

In this respect, the three examples concerning freedom vs. security (Section 4.1), (short-range) economic and (long-range) ecological goals (Section 4.2), and, finally, this issue's area of populist democracy (Section 4.3) might suggest that the particular antinomic trade-offs in democracy demand less of a compromise but rather a peaceful coexistence to balance different but equally legitimate objectives. This means (and enables) that there be an only temperate articulation of political goals as well as a demonstration of substantial respect to the antagonistic positions of political opponents.

In sum, the identified trade-offs concerning the antinomies of democracy confirm that it is mostly not possible to accomplish all beneficial political goals at the same time. But, metaphorically speaking, it must nevertheless be guaranteed that all governance and politics in democracy provide a permanent symbolic 'presence' of these democratic values being occasionally and temporarily 'absent.' Even though this only offers a very preliminary perspective on how to balance the goods implicit in democracy's antinomies rather concretely, what has been achieved here in identifying value trade-offs as logical outcomes and requirements of the relevant theory in political practice might become helpful in order to fulfil this need in the future.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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About the Author

Oliver Hidalgo is a Senior Lecturer at the department of politics, University of Münster, and Professor of Political Science at the University of Regensburg. From 2015 until 2017 he was Visiting Professor of political theory in Münster. His main research topics are the history of political thought, democratic theory, politics and religion, and international political theory. Oliver's recent publications include the monography *Politische Theologie* (2018) and the edition of a special issue concerning religion and right-wing populism in the *Journal for Religion, Society, and Politics* (2018).

Article

Globalization and Modern Slavery

Todd Landman [*] and Bernard W. Silverman

School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK;
E-Mails: todd.landman@nottingham.ac.uk (T.L.), mail@bernardsilverman.co.uk (B.W.S.)

* Corresponding author

Abstract
This article presents a cross-national comparative analysis of the relationship between different dimensions of globalization and modern slavery. It argues that both the economic and political dimensions of globalization are strongly associated with lower levels of slavery prevalence. Recent estimates suggest there are more than 40 million people in some form of slavery and the United Nations has committed the world to ending this problem by 2030. Some argue that a race to the bottom, and the structure of economic incentives associated with globalization have contributed to the problem of modern slavery. Others argue that increased openness and the diffusion of values, the spread of democratic forms of rule, and the advance of human rights that come with globalization limit modern slavery. This article presents a preliminary empirical analysis of these arguments using data on slavery prevalence across more than 60 countries and various measures of economic and political globalization. The analysis shows that economic measures of globalization and higher levels of democracy are significantly related to lower levels of slavery prevalence, even after controlling for armed conflict and regional differentiation. In order to support these findings, the article examines the international law on slavery, definitions and conceptions of modern slavery, and comparative data on slavery prevalence modeled across indicators of economic and political globalization. It concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the trade-offs between globalization and modern slavery.

Issue
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1. Introduction

Globalization is a contested economic, social, and political phenomenon whose key features include the breaking down of traditional territorial borders, the redefinition of regions, new divisions of labour and the distribution of power, and a changing role of culture (Hermann, 2010). Its contestation varies across different sets of dimensions. First, there is a question as to whether it is progressive, linear, and/or inevitable (see, e.g., LeBaron, 2016). Second, there are concerns over whether it is a mere description of what is happening in the world

or offers a deeper causal theory of economic, social, and political change (Landman & Carvalho, 2016; Li & Reuveny, 2003). Third, there are arguments that it has been 'oversold' as to its overall positive benefits and importance (Held & McGrew, 2007; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999; Stiglitz, 2005, p. 229, 2017). The post 9/11 world has certainly brought new challenges to the idea of globalization as a positive and enlightening force for change. Some argue that there is evidence of a backlash against globalization and globalist aspirations. This evidence includes the growth in nationalist movements, some interpretations of the 2016 vote

of the UK to leave the European Union, the electoral victories of decidedly nationalist politicians in the US and Brazil, and the growing strength of right wing political parties in France, the Netherlands, and Italy (see Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Various indicators of globalization show increased inter-connectedness, economic flows of trade and investment, high levels of popular support for different dimensions of globalization (World Economic Forum, 2018), and until very recently (Diamond & Plattner, 2015; Diamond, Plattner, & Walker, 2016), the growth of democracy and human rights (Held & McGrew, 2007, p. 1; Landman, 2013). Patterns of cultural and political diffusion have seen the third and fourth waves of democratization (Deutsch & Welzel, 2016; Doorenspleet, 2005; Huntington, 1991; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Landman, 2013; Whitehead, 1996), the proliferation of human rights instruments and improved human rights enjoyment (Fariss, 2014; Landman, 2005b; Simmons, 2009; Welzel, 2013), an 'economic geography of human rights' (Edwards, Kernohan, Landman, & Nessa, 2018), as well as a 'justice cascade' (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999, 2013; Sikkink, 2011).

Alongside these debates around the true nature and extent of globalization and its demonstrable impact has been renewed attention to the phenomenon of modern slavery. Popular awareness of the problem varies, but there has been an increase in the formal political recognition of the problem at international and national levels. United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8.7 (United Nations Development Programme, 2015) calls for member states to '[t]ake immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour.' National governments, like the UK and Australia, are passing laws to combat modern slavery and to hold large organisations to account for the degree to which their operations are affected by the problem. International and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) work to raise awareness, advocate for change, make direct interventions, and provide support for slavery survivors.

Estimates of the prevalence of slavery have varied over the past few years, beginning with a series of calculations carried out by the Walk Free Foundation, which estimates that in 2013 there were 29 million slaves, followed by 36 million in 2014, and 45.8 million in 2016. Alongside these figures for slavery, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that those in conditions of forced labour totaled 21 million, while in 2018, the ILO and Walk Free jointly estimated the number of slaves to be 40.3 million, a figure that includes forced marriage and forced labour. This suggests that as an absolute number there are more slaves alive today than at earlier points in human history, but as a relative number, a lower proportion of the global population enslaved than during earlier periods of legalised slavery. Like other human rights problems, the phenomenon of modern slavery suffers from the fundamental problem of un-

observability and intractability. Human rights measurement efforts have included 'standards-based' measures (see Landman & Carvalho, 2009) for worker rights, including the scale developed by the Cingranelli and Richards 'Human Rights Data Project' (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 2014). Given that slavery prevalence is susceptible to different socio-economic, political, and cultural drivers, it is possible to test the degree to which different attributes of economic and political globalization are related to slavery prevalence.

The key question for this article is whether there is a trade-off between globalization and slavery. Increasingly systematic efforts to measure and estimate the problem of slavery show that it is indeed widespread and not isolated to developing countries alone, while some have argued that the development of global capitalism and processes of globalisation are in part to blame for the phenomenon (LeBaron, 2016, p. 382). Is it possible to have increased patterns of globalization without the downside of precarious labour conditions, some of which include modern slavery? Is slavery the 'dark underbelly of globalisation' (O'Connell Davidson, 2014, p. 29) or do the benefits of globalisation in terms of opening up economic and political contexts to trade, technology, values, and models of governance actually reduce the prevalence of slavery? Any attempt to begin to answer such questions requires a systematic analysis of the variation in the prevalence of slavery to see the degree to which such variation is related to the economic and political dimensions of globalization.

Using the 2016 and 2018 country level estimates of slavery prevalence provided by the ILO and Walk Free Foundation, this article provides the first systematic cross-national analysis of the relationships between different dimensions of globalization and modern slavery. Walk Free's methodology in partnership with the Gallup Organisation and the ILO uses survey methods to obtain country level prevalence estimates in a number of countries, and then extrapolates these to those countries for which there were no surveys. The extrapolation method is contested for a number of reasons (Silverman, 2018), and in any case does not lead to independent estimates for the various countries. For these reasons, we use the prevalence data for only those countries in which household surveys were administered. The total number of observations across the two years are thus 70. As a cross check on these prevalence data, we also use the worker protection scale developed by Cingranelli and Richards coded from the US State Department annual country reports. The coding for this variable includes: (1) the right of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (3) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsive labour; (4) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (5) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, occupational health and safety (Cingranelli et al., 2014, p. 65). These data have been used, for example, in studies on structural adjustment, trade, and direct foreign in-

vestment (see Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007; Neumayer & de Soysa, 2007) and range from 0 (no worker rights protection) to 2 (full worker rights protection).

The quantitative modelling includes independent variables that capture the economic and political dimensions of globalization that have appeared in the extant literature on globalisation, trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), democratization, and the diffusion of human rights. The results of our bivariate analysis show that slavery prevalence is significantly lower in countries with: (1) high levels of economic development (per capita GDP); (2) high levels of globalisation (using the KOF Globalisation Index); (3) high levels of democracy; (4) better records of protecting so-called 'physical integrity rights' (see Landman, 2005b; Landman & Larizza, 2009; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1999); and (5) countries that are not involved in some form of armed conflict. The multivariate analysis shows that across a variety of different model specifications, there are statistically significant relationships between economic development, globalisation, and democracy on the one hand, and lower levels of slavery prevalence on the other hand, even after controlling for the presence of armed conflict and regional differentiation. While this level of aggregate cross-country analysis cannot, at present, be broken down into different economic sectors, nor unpack more complicated country level processes, it does suggest that globalisation itself may not be the root cause of the problem.

To develop the argument and carry out this analysis, the article has five sections. Section 2 provides a definition of modern slavery that scholars and activists have used to underpin prevalence estimations. Section 3 presents a number of stylised facts and descriptive statistics for the measure of prevalence using the estimates from the 2016 and 2018 Global Slavery Index (GSI) reports. Section 4 discusses the data and methods used for the analysis. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses the implications for understanding the trade-offs between globalization and modern slavery.

2. Definitions of Slavery

Popular understandings of slavery often conjure up images of African slaves brought to the Caribbean, Brazil, and the US, where such images typically include slave ships, slaves bound in chains, and slaves auctioned at market. Such imagery tends to obscure current realities of slavery and relegate it as a problem of the past. Scholars of modern slavery (e.g., Bales, 1999, 2005, 2007; Bales & Soodalter, 2009; Bales, Trodd, & Williamson, 2009; Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2017), however, argue that slavery is alive and well and that it has taken on new forms or updated old forms comprising a variety of practices that include (but are not exclusive to) debt bondage, domestic servitude, forced prostitution, forced labour, forced marriage, and human trafficking (Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2017, p. 11; Cockayne, Grono, & Panaccione, 2016; Office of

the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002). These same scholars also argue that slavery is not a 'third world' problem or problem of the 'global south,' but rather one that is truly global in reach.

As in much human rights work, international law and norms are an excellent starting point for defining slavery. Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention (League of Nations, 1926) defines slavery as 'the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, 'where the ideas of ownership and property are given primacy. Additional legal developments have further articulated the definition of slavery, such as the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (Article 7a), the 1998 Rome Statute (Article 7.2.c), which established the International Criminal Court, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Article 5c), the 2000 United Nations Palermo Protocol on Trafficking in Persons and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.

The Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, from 2012, bring these various legal strands together, both in terms of the right to ownership, the powers attached to the right of ownership, and the notion of possession. In focussing on these elements as foundational to slavery, the guidelines emphasise the notion of control and lack of agency for victims of slavery, where different forms of coercion maintain power over individuals and prevent them from leaving the conditions of their enslavement. This denial of agency is crucial to the definition of modern slavery and moves it away from a strict focus on 'property' and 'ownership' to one of relative power relations, coercion, and inability for slaves to leave their conditions of enslavement (Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2017; Cockayne et al., 2016; Landman, 2018). While ownership and selling of individuals still takes place (e.g., the slaves traded in Northern Libya in 2017), other forms of activity associated with ownership include transfer of persons, using people, managing the use of a person, profiting from the use of a person, transferring a person to an heir or successor, and/or the disposal, mistreatment or neglect or destruction of a person.

In the context of the UK, for example, the Home Office has specified a typology of slavery with 17 different categories across different forms of labour exploitation, domestic servitude, sexual exploitation, and criminal exploitation (Cooper, Hesketh, Ellis, & Fair, 2017). In addition to this typology, the Home Office used a Multiple Systems Estimation (MSE) approach, based on data from various sources collated by the National Crime Agency, to yield an estimate of 10,000 to 13,000 UK victims (Bales, Hesketh, & Silverman, 2015). Similar analysis has been done for the Netherlands and the city of New Orleans (Bales, Murphy, & Silverman, in press; Silverman, in press; van Dijk, van der Heijden, & Kragten-Heerdink,

2016). The Walk Free estimates across Europe vary from less than 30 in Iceland to over 500,000 in the Russian Federation. The individuals that comprise these figures are typically found working in construction, agriculture, domestic service, in nail bars, hair dressers, drug houses, farms, car washes, adult parlours, and even as street performers in popular tourist destinations, where the day's takings are confiscated by gang masters and controllers. In each of these cases, the enslaver has some form of control or coercion that maintains the condition of enslavement, while the categories of slaves vary considerably across a wide range of economic sectors and markets. The nature of the enslavement means that slaves are often hidden in plain sight, and that investigators, the police, bank staff, health professionals, and even passers-by can assist in the identification of slaves in order for law enforcement to provide assistance and in some cases, pursue criminal prosecution. The Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines have therefore been a useful tool for setting the parameters and conditions for identifying modern slavery. Walk Free has adopted the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines as its working definition of slavery, underpinning the GSI estimates.

3. Stylised Facts and Descriptive Statistics

In the absence of cross-national MSE-derived prevalence data, we opt to use the country level estimates from the GSI. The two versions of the GSI from 2016 and 2018 provide data on a range of variables relating to modern slavery, including measures of vulnerability, prevalence, and government response. This article is concerned with explaining the cross-national variation in the prevalence of slavery as its primary focus. The prevalence measure is expressed as the estimated proportion of the total population in modern slavery (%), which are produced from mapping the vulnerability of individuals revealed through the use of Gallup administered household surveys. The estimation comes from the positive responses to a series of questions relating to the forced nature of work, the inability to leave, the duration of the condition, and/or the condition of forced marriage (ILO & Walk Free Foundation, 2017). These questions are in line with the content of the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines for the Legal Parameters of Slavery discussed above. For forced labour, the questions focus on the immediate family network, the presence of forced labour experience by anyone in the immediate family, who this person is (including their age and sex), when and for how long the condition lasted, the country in which it took place, the type of work that the person was forced to do, and the means of coercion that was used (ILO & Walk Free Foundation, 2017, p. 52). The fact that the surveys are administered to a random sample of households allows the estimation to be made as to the prevalence of forced labour and forced marriage as a percentage of the whole population. We use the prevalence measure only for those countries where Gallup conducted a household survey on behalf of

Walk Free (Silverman, 2018; Walk Free Foundation, 2016; Walk Free Foundation & ILO, 2018). Observational independence is a crucial assumption of statistical analysis so we chose data based on actual household surveys carried out. Walk Free used surveys from 25 countries in 2016 and 45 countries in 2018. Our data set thus has 70 total observations and provides enough degrees of freedom (DF) for the analysis we conduct here. There were 22 countries where surveys were carried out for both the 2016 and the 2018 exercises. Because these surveys were independent, each such country is included twice in the data set.

The GSI tends to focus on a global map of prevalence and single-country case studies and discussion; however, it is equally important to examine the overall distribution of prevalence for the observations in our sample to provide additional insights into the nature and extent of modern slavery. Figure 1 shows a histogram of slavery prevalence for those countries where Walk Free and Gallup administered a household survey, putting together the 2016 and 2018 samples. The histogram is constructed on a logarithmic scale and it can be seen that the logarithms of prevalence follow a relatively normal distribution. The median value of prevalence is 0.46%, the lower and upper quartiles 0.26% and 0.77%, and the extreme values 0.08% and 2.22%. In addition to this estimation of prevalence, the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project has coded worker rights protection from a close reading of US State Department annual country reports. The scale ranges from 0 (no worker rights protection) to 2 (strong worker rights protection), where it is clear that the most countries are grouped around 0 and 1 with a small number of countries receiving a score of 2. Figure 2 shows a histogram for the CIRI worker rights protection measures, where the limited nature of the variable shows strong country clustering for the 0 and 1 scores. There is a weak correlation between these two measures ($r = -0.20$; $p < 0.10$), where the mean prevalence level for each value of the scale are as follows: 0.66 for countries coded 0, 0.58 for those coded 1, and 0.35 for those coded 2. The GSI estimate is a more direct measure of prevalence than the CIRI variable, which includes forced labour alongside other dimensions of worker rights protection. We thus specify the estimated prevalence of slavery as our dependent variable.

4. Modelling Globalization and Slavery

This article tests the relationship between different indicators of globalization and slavery prevalence. There are indeed micro foundations for slavery, which are based on (1) instrumental rationality, market conditions and the structure of incentives; (2) criminality and deviance; (3) cultural framings and inter-subjective understandings (Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2017) and household and community relations (International Organisation for Migration [IOM], 2018). The level of analysis presented here, however, focuses on aggregate measures of slavery and how they re-

Figure 1. Histogram of estimated prevalence of slavery (after GSI). The histogram is constructed and presented on a logarithmic scale.

Figure 2. Histogram of worker rights protection.

late to different dimensions of globalization. There have been earlier and related attempts to examine the relationship between globalization and forced labour. For example, Manzo (2005a, 2005b) examined the processes of uneven development and trafficking, slavery among children, and 'deproletarianisation' in West Africa, with a particular focus on media reports in Côte d'Ivoire. LeBaron and Ayers (2013) examine the relationship between neo-liberalism (for many the dominant economic

model of globalization) and modern slavery in Africa, where they link labour market reform and privatisation with the rise of 'unfree' labour. Jian and LaFree (2017) examine the relationship between trade openness and human trafficking, finding that countries making the transition between low and high levels of trade openness struggle to avoid increased levels of trafficking. Finally, and most related to the analysis presented here, Neumayer and de Soysa (2007) analyse the relationship between

trade openness and FDI on the one hand with women's rights and the protection of labour rights on the other, using the CIRI worker rights protection scale as their main dependent variable. Across a cross-section of 166 countries, they find that trade openness is positively related to better protection of women's economic rights and worker rights, alongside additional variables such as overall levels of development and democracy.

Drawing on these earlier studies and the work on globalization more generally, we derive a number of observable implications that we examine empirically. On the positive side, it is argued that there are a number of plausible tangible benefits to globalization that stem from countries opening up their economic and political systems to the influences of trade, technology transfer, and the diffusion of values. Participation in the economic dimensions of globalization can have a positive impact on economic development, which in turn can lead to value change and the embrace of systems of governance that adhere to democratic principles and the protection of human rights (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013). The work on the 'Kantian Peace' shows that increased trade, the advent of 'civic republican' systems of governance (read democracy and human rights), and increased participation in global governance regimes (however weak they might be) can significantly reduce the probability of 'militarised disputes' (Russett & O'Neal, 2001), which in turn are related to the problem of modern slavery. Overseas development assistance and trade can also lead states to participate in the international regime for the promotion and protection of human rights (Landman, 2005a; Simmons, 2009; Smith-Cannoy, 2012). On this view, globalization ought to be good for combatting slavery and should be related to lower levels of slavery prevalence.

On the negative side, it is argued that the process of globalization is uneven, creates inequalities, and varies in its impact across different economic sectors and across the quality of democracy and the protection of human rights (O'Connell Davidson, 2014; LeBaron, 2016). For these arguments, economic globalization through increased trade and economic flows leads to the concentration of wealth within and between countries in ways that have differential impact on labour, marginalised peoples, and local communities. Capital-intensive extractive industries, labour-intensive manufacturing, textiles, fishing and other industries that comprise the contours of economic globalization bring with them structural inequalities, the proliferation of and complexity in supply chains, potential opportunities for labour exploitation, and the kinds of economic precarity and vulnerability that can lead to individuals falling into modern slavery. In addition, the growth of democracy and human rights protection can show great variation within and between countries, where varying degrees of state capacity and the quality of political institutions do not deliver on their promise, with pockets of dysfunctional deliberation, the persistence of informal and formal patron-client

networks, and long term impunity and lack of accountability for human rights violations (see, e.g., Foweraker & Treviso, 2016; Landman, 2013).

These contending views on the effects of globalisation remain theoretically ambiguous, and thus as a first step, it is helpful to engage in the kind of empirical analysis presented here. The availability of the GSI allows for a new analysis of these relationships with a different form of data (prevalence) on a more direct understanding of the most extreme form of exploitation. The concept that underpins the derivation of the prevalence measure is rooted in international human rights law and the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery. This study thus adopts the research design approach used in Neumayer and de Soysa (2007) and Jian and LaFree (2017), namely, a cross-sectional analysis of globalization and modern slavery across a reasonably large selection of countries (n = 70). This kind of research design has been popular in studies of other human rights problems (see Mitchell & McCormick, 1988), where data sets progressed from single time cross-section analysis to the use of pooled cross-section time series structures (see Landman & Larizza, 2009; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). There are not the data available to achieve this latter form of data structure, but our global sample of countries provides enough preliminary DF for useful analysis to illustrate the potential trade-offs associated with globalization and the problem of modern slavery.

The starting point for this macro-model is to understand that the phenomenon of modern slavery at first blush appears to be a wholly economic phenomenon; however, the anti-slavery and anti-trafficking movement argues that there are larger social, political, and cultural dimensions and 'determinants of vulnerability' that make individuals more likely to fall into slavery. The IOM argues that in addition to the individual determinants of vulnerability, there are family, community, and larger structural factors that when combined raise the probability that any one individual will fall into slavery or be trafficked (IOM, 2018, pp. 5–8). At the micro level, there are a series of socio-economic factors that can increase the probability of any individual to be trafficked or fall into slavery, while at the structural level, factors include poor governance, absence of accountability mechanisms, and weak rule of law, as well as long term stable economic factors (IOM, 2018, p. 7). This combination of economic and political factors is at the heart of the analysis presented in this article, which aligns with studies that seek to explain the variation in other human rights issues (see, e.g., Edwards et al., 2018; Mitchell & McCormick, 1988; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999).

Across these previous studies, variables such as per capita GDP and income and land inequality are standard economic measures (see Landman & Larizza, 2009), while those interested in the economic interaction between countries include variables such as FDI (see Janz, 2018). For its focus on the economic dimensions of globalization, the article uses several different variables. First,

it uses World Bank data on per capita GDP as a measure of the level of overall economic development. Second, it uses the full KOF Globalisation Index (*de facto* and *de jure*) as a composite measure of globalisation (see Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke, & Sturm, 2019; Potrafke, 2015). Third, it uses FDI as a percentage of total annual GDP for the period 2006–2017. The reason for calculating the ratio of FDI and GDP over this longer period is that the annual figures for FDI are extremely volatile. Fourth, it uses 'trade openness', which is expressed as the total value of import and exports as the percentage of annual GDP (see Jiang & LaFree, 2017; Neumayer & de Soysa, 2007; Squalli & Wilson, 2011), and is one component of the KOF Globalisation Index. The bivariate analysis reported below shows that these variables are highly correlated with one another and feature across different model specifications estimated through multivariate analysis. For the political elements of globalization, the article uses three different measures, one for democracy and two for human rights. First, it uses the 'Liberal Democracy' measure for 2016 drawn from the Varieties of Democracy Project (see Coppedge, Lindberg, & Skaaning, 2015). The scale ranges from 0 (low democracy) to 1 (high democracy). Second, it uses two different measures that are part of the Political Terror Scale. Both of them rate country human rights performance with respect to personal integrity rights (i.e., state violation of arbitrary detention, disappearance, torture, and extra-judicial killing) and are based on the Amnesty International annual reports (PTSAI) and the US State Department annual reports (PTSSD). The scales range from 1 (low violation of human rights) to 5 (high violation of human rights; see Poe & Tate, 1994).

In addition to economic and political globalization, there are two further factors to take into account: armed conflict and regional differentiation. It is important to consider these two factors as controls, which may account for additional variation in the prevalence of modern slavery. Studies on modern slavery have linked its presence to armed conflict, where increased political instability, violence, and displacement and migration increase the chances that vulnerable populations will fall into some form of slavery, including child soldiers and human trafficking (Freedom Fund, 2016). Refugees and 'people on the move' can become unwittingly drawn into large criminal networks that move them from sites of conflict to safer havens and recipient countries with strong welfare systems to provide support. Once they have migrated, however, they can find themselves in modern forms of indentured servitude, where their passports are withheld and they engage in a variety of forms of economic activity from which they cannot escape. These patterns are complemented with child and female sexual exploitation and trafficking, as well as recruitment networks enslaving children to fight in armed conflict. The example of Libya in 2017 showed how the civil conflict between rival factions produced an open slave market in which young males are being sold. Armed conflict is coded as a simple dummy variable (i.e., 1 for armed conflict, 0 for no armed conflict) for all conflict types from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP).

Finally, the geographical distribution of slavery is not uniform. Rather, it is highly skewed across countries such as India and Bangladesh in Asia; Mauritania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Africa; and Colombia in South America (GSI, 2016). There is undoubtedly some regional clustering in the prevalence of modern slavery, where, like other human rights problems cross-border diffusion underpins these observations (see Edwards et al., 2018). The model thus includes a series of regional dummy variable using World Bank categories for Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Russia and Eurasia, which have the highest levels of slavery prevalence. Table 1 lists these variables, their description, and their sources.

As the data set for this article are for a cross-section of countries, estimation of the parameters of the model is a straightforward process using a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. The sample size of countries provides enough DF for the inclusion of the different independent variables. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all the main variables in the model (excluding the regional dummy variables), including the total number of observations (N), the minimum value,

Table 1. Variables and data used in the analysis of slavery prevalence.

Variable Name	Description	Source
EPSRAW	Estimated prevalence of Slavery 2016, 2018	GSI 2016, 2018
CIRIRWRP	Worker Rights Protection	Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data
KOFTOTAL	KOF Globalisation Index	Gygli et al. (2019)
TRADE	Trade Openness	World Bank World Development Indicators (2018)
FDI	FDI as a percentage of GDP, (mean 2007–16).	World Bank World Development Indicators (2018)
PCGDP	Per capita GDP, 2016	World Bank World Development Indicators (2018)
VDEM2016	Level of liberal democracy, 2016	Varieties of Democracy
PTSAI	Physical Integrity Rights	Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)
PTSSD	Physical Integrity Rights	Political Terror Scale (US State Department)
ARMEDCON	Armed Conflict (including internal)	Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP)
REGION	Regional categorical variable	World Bank World Development Indicators (2018)

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

Variable Name	Description	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Median
EPSRAW	Estimated prevalence of slavery, 2016, 2018	70	0.08%	2.22%	0.60%	0.46%
CIRIWRP	Worker Rights Protection	70	0	2	.61	1
KOFTOTAL	KOF Globalisation Index	70	38.57	84.2	61.70	61.89
TRADE	Trade Openness	70	21%	310%	77%	64.9%
FDI	FDI as a percentage of GDP (mean 2007–2016)[1]	70	0.34%	20.14%	4.54%	2.%
PCGDP	Per capita gross domestic product (GDP), 2016[2]	70	320	51880	5398	3580
VDEM2016	Level of liberal democracy, 2016	70	0.11	0.78	0.40	0.45
PTSAI	Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)	70	1	5	3.06	
PTSSD	Political Terror Scale (State Department)	70	1	5	3.04	
ARMEDCON	All armed conflict	70	0	1	0.34	

Notes: [1]The ratio is calculated over the period 2006–2017; [2]The data are for 2016, but indexed to USD in 2010.

the maximum value, the mean, and the median. Medians are given for variables on continuous scales. For those variables with very skewed distributions, the logarithm of the variable gives a reasonably symmetric distribution, and is therefore used for the analysis.

5. Findings

This section of the article examines the second-order relationships between the prevalence of slavery and the other variables. Table 3 is a correlation matrix of all the variables with the exception of the regional variable. Reading down the first column shows that the prevalence of slavery is significantly correlated with worker rights protection, the overall level of globalisation, democracy, human rights, economic development, human rights and armed conflict. First, the correlation between slavery prevalence and worker rights protection is the weakest of the correlations. Second, higher levels of globalisation and economic development—PCGDP— are associated with lower levels of slavery prevalence. Third, higher levels of democracy and greater protection of human rights are associated with lower levels of slavery prevalence. Third, the presence of armed conflict is associated with higher levels of slavery prevalence. The second column on worker rights protection shows that the correlations are very similar as those in the first column, but have a smaller magnitude and lower level of

significance. Column three shows the strong correlations for all the main variables and globalisation. The strong correlation between the level of economic development ($r = 0.86$, $p < 0.001$) is not surprising and will be taken into account in the multivariate analysis to address the problem of multicollinearity. Equally, the strong correlations for trade and FDI are not surprising since they are components of the KOF globalisation index.

As this article is primarily interested in the relationship between globalisation and slavery prevalence, Figure 3 is a scatterplot for the KOF Globalisation Index and the prevalence of slavery (logged). It is clear from the figure that those countries with a higher level of globalisation (e.g., Hungary, Poland, and Latvia) have a much lower level of slavery prevalence, while those with a much lower level of globalisation (e.g., Afghanistan, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Pakistan) have a much higher level of slavery prevalence. The notable outlier in the figure is Brazil, which has relatively lower level of globalisation and a lower level of slavery prevalence. Figure 4 shows this overall relationship as smoothed line with a 95% confidence interval, which captures its magnitude and significance. Both figures suggest that the relationship warrants further exploration that controls for other possibly confounding factors.

Moving beyond these bivariate relationships, we conducted a series of multivariate regression models for all the main variables, where slavery prevalence (logged) is

Table 3. Correlation matrix of all variables.

	Ln(EPSRAW)	CIRIWRP	KOFTOTAL	Ln(TRADE)	Ln(FDI)	Ln(PCGDP)	VDEM2016	PTSAI	PTSSD
CIRIWRP	−0.20*	—							
KOFTOTAL	−0.59***	0.26**	—						
Ln(TRADE)	−0.15	0.19	0.50***	—					
Ln(FDI)	−0.18	0.04	0.40***	0.62***	—				
Ln(PCGDP)	−0.64***	0.26**	0.86***	0.29**	0.27**	—			
VDEM2016	−0.56***	0.48***	0.49***	0.06	−0.02	0.54***	—		
PTSAI	0.48***	−0.18	−0.50***	−0.52***	−0.38***	−0.42***	−0.49***	—	
PTSSD	0.47***	−0.27**	−0.63***	−0.57***	−0.42***	−0.59***	−0.49***	0.78***	—
ARMEDCON	0.45***	−0.32**	−0.38***	−0.51***	−0.30***	−0.34***	−0.51***	0.74***	0.73***

Notes: Pearson's r. Significance levels are denoted: *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.001$.

Figure 3. KOF Globalisation Index and slavery prevalence (logged). Note: For maximum ease of visualisation, abbreviated country names are as follows: Cambodia (CAM), Guatemala (GU), Indonesia (IN), Myanmar (MY), Nigeria (NI), Romania (ROM), and South Africa (SAF).

Figure 4. KOF Globalisation Index and slavery prevalence (logged): polynomial smoothed line with 95% confidence interval.

the dependent variable in order to understand the relative magnitude and significance of the relationships for our main independent variables of interest. Table 4 reports the results of our analysis for all the main variables. The table is broken into two main parts: one for models using democracy as an independent variable alongside the KOF Globalisation Index and the level of economic development, and the other for the two human rights scores as independent variables. Additional controls in-

clude armed conflict and three regional dummy variables for those regions where slavery prevalence is the highest. Since armed conflict is significantly correlated with human rights, it is excluded from the human rights models. The different combination of variables yields 12 models overall.

Reading across the first row of the table shows that the KOF Globalisation Index is significantly related to lower levels of slavery prevalence for all the models in

Table 4. Multivariate regression estimates for globalisation and slavery prevalence.

Ind. Variables	Democracy Models				Human Rights Models							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
KOFTOTAL	−0.03*** (.006)	−0.02** (.008)			−0.03*** (0.007)	−0.03*** (0.008)	−0.02*** (0.008)	−0.03*** (0.009)				
Ln(PCGDP)			−0.35*** (.07)	−0.26*** (.06)					−0.39*** (0.07)	−0.42*** (0.08)	−0.32*** (0.08)	−0.35*** (0.09)
VDEM	−1.19** (.53)	−1.05* (.55)	−0.88* (.51)	−0.75 (.52)								
PTSAI					0.18** (0.08)		0.10 (0.08)		0.18** (0.07)		0.11 (0.08)	
PTSSD						0.12 (0.09)		0.04 (0.09)		−0.10 (0.08)		0.03 (0.08)
ARMEDCON	0.24 (0.18)	0.19 (0.17)	0.28 (0.17)	0.22 (0.17)								
Region												
Asia		0.54** (0.21)		0.51** (0.19)			0.58** (0.08)	0.64** (0.20)			0.51** (0.19)	0.60** (0.18)
Russia-Eurasia		0.23 (0.19)		0.22 (0.21)			0.50* (0.30)	0.56* (0.31)			0.40 (0.28)	0.48* (0.29)
Sub-Sahara Africa		0.42** (0.19)		0.35** (0.17)			0.42* (0.23)	0.43* (0.23)			0.33 (0.21)	0.37** (0.21)
Constant	1.22*** (0.40)	0.26 (0.49)	2.24*** (0.53)	1.27** (0.48)	0.52 (0.62)	0.86 (0.73)	0.02 (0.70)	0.28 (0.80)	1.83** (0.71)	2.27** (0.21)	1.23 (0.78)	1.60* (0.90)
R^2	0.46	0.52	0.50	0.56	0.37	0.34	0.42	0.41	0.45	0.40	0.49	0.47
N	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70

Notes: Dependent Variable: Natural log of estimated slavery prevalence. Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.001$. Method of estimation: OLS.

which it is included, while the same is true for the level of economic development. This suggests that countries with a higher level of globalisation or economic development have lower levels of slavery prevalence. The results show that countries with higher levels of democracy also have lower levels of slavery prevalence. The inclusion of regional dummy variables shows that slavery prevalence is consistently higher in Asia relative to the rest of the world, with varying degrees of significance for Russia and Eurasia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite its significance in our bivariate modelling (see Table 3), armed conflict does not appear to have a significant relationship with slavery prevalence across any of the models. The R^2 values for the models in the table show that these models explain between 34% and 56% of the variation in slavery prevalence.

6. Summary and Implications

Since it first gained global attention in the late 1990s, modern slavery has increased in salience as a public policy problem and as an intractable problem of development. This saliency has come from a growing recognition within government and as the result of advocacy from NGOs and anti–slavery activists. It is a persistent problem despite its legal abolition and a proliferation of anti–slavery laws, policies, and programmes. Our aim in this article has been to understand and explain the variation in slavery prevalence across a sample of countries with respect to different dimensions of globalization. We have been motivated by the question as to whether there is a dark side to globalization, which includes the emergence and maintenance of precarious labour conditions and modern slavery. We set out the contending arguments for the possible relationships between slavery prevalence on the one hand and the economic and political dimensions of globalization on the other. We used slavery prevalence data on those countries in which the Walk Free Foundation in partnership with Gallup developed a battery of questions in household surveys. Walk Free deployed these surveys to over 70,000 respondents that captured vulnerability to modern slavery. Their work grounds itself conceptually in the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery. These estimates were then crosschecked against the Cingranelli and Richards scale for worker rights protection.

The descriptive analysis shows clearly that the distribution of slavery is highly variable across the countries in the sample. The bivariate relationships show that there are statistically significant correlations between prevalence of slavery and worker rights protection, the overall level of globalisation, economic development, and democracy. These findings were further borne out by our multivariate regression results, which show that globalisation, economic development, and democracy all have significant relationships with slavery prevalence, and that these models explain a decent range of varia-

tion in slavery prevalence. One interpretation of these results is that is that globalised and/or richer countries have more resources, greater state capacity, and are more engaged with the global community in ways that mean that slavery prevalence is significantly lower. On our reading, it is thus too early to lay the blame for modern slavery at the feet of globalisation. As our sample of countries is quite conservative and only available for a limited amount of time means that draw this conclusion with some caution. Further research needs to unpack the dimensions of the empirical generalizations reported here. Breaking the data down by sector and for those industries that produce tradeable goods, for example, could possibly differentiate these relationships further. Tradeable goods are increasingly subject to international scrutiny that may limit the degree to which their production involves modern slavery, while domestic production of non-tradeable goods may well have higher levels of modern slavery and are not subject to such international scrutiny.

Our findings for democracy may relate in part to countries in the sample being part of the recent 'waves' of democratization, the pace and contours of which include elements of international diffusion and contagion (Edwards et al., 2018; Whitehead, 1996). For example, Chile is in our sample, a country that experienced prolonged authoritarian under the Pinochet regime between 1973 and 1988, when it made a transition to democracy. Brazil and Argentina are also transitional cases after period of authoritarian rule during the period from the mid–1960s to the mid–1980s. Mongolia and Mexico are also transitional countries (1991 and 2000, respectively). The sample also contains ex–communist countries such as the Poland and Hungary, which for the years of our sample have relatively high levels of democracy compared to other countries. As Amartya Sen (1994) has noted about the absence of famine in democracies, the electoral survival of leaders depends in part on being responsive and attendant to the needs of the voting public; a condition that lowers the probability of total government neglect and may explain why we see lower levels of slavery prevalence across the democracies in the sample. The one exception may be India, which has a long-standing tradition of democracy and high levels of slavery prevalence, although its liberal democracy score is lower than the other democracies in the sample.

Taken together, these findings mark out a new direction in the cross–national analysis of modern slavery. The fight against slavery is now embedded in the United Nations SDGs, and the results here suggest that the pursuit of other SDGs alongside 8.7 (particularly SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions) will complement and enhance the world's ability to address the problem of modern slavery. We show that there may not be a trade-off between globalization and modern slavery. Rather, we show that slavery prevalence is much lower in those countries that are more globalised and wealthier, and those that have higher levels of democ-

racy. Globalization is not a monolithic global process that necessarily creates conditions for modern slavery. These findings suggest that the pursuit of sustainable development and the establishment of inclusive and democratic institutions can help in the struggle to end modern slavery.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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About the Authors

Todd Landman (FRSA) is Professor of Political Science in the School of Politics and International Relations, Pro Vice Chancellor of the Faculty of Social Sciences, and Executive Director of the Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham. He is author of numerous research monographs, articles, and reports on the systematic analysis of development, democracy, and human rights. He has carried out a large number of international consultancy projects for governmental and non-governmental organisations.

Bernard W. Silverman (Sir, FRS) is Professor of Modern Slavery Statistics in the School of Politics and International Relations and Chair of the Modern Slavery Evidence Unit in the Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham. He was the Chief Scientific Advisor to the Home Office (2010–2017). He is a member of the UK Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner's Advisory Panel and the Prime Minister's Task Force on Modern Slavery. He also serves as an advisor to the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery and the United Nations University Modern Slavery Knowledge Platform.

Appendix

	Country	YEAR	REGION	ASIADUM	SSADUM	READUM	KOFTOTAL	CIRIWRP	EPSRAW	EPS2016R	EPS2018R	TRADE	FDI	FDI0716	VDEM2016	PTSAI	PTSSD	PCGDP	ARMEDCON1	LNEPS	LNTRADE	LNFDI	LNPCGDP
1	Afghanistan	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	38.57	1	2.22	NA	2.22	55.92	0.48	0.0057	0.24	5	5	570	1	0.797507	4.023922	−5.16729	6.345636
2	Argentina	2018	AMERICAS	0	0	0	63.02	1	0.13	NA	0.13	26.12	0.59	0.0186	0.61	2	2	11970	0	−2.04022	3.262701	−3.98459	9.390159
3	Armenia	2018	RUSSIA AND EURASIA	0	0	1	67.09	1	0.34	NA	0.34	75.92	3.21	0.0515	0.23	3	3	3770	0	−1.07881	4.32968	−2.96617	8.23483
4	Bangladesh	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	45.54	0	0.95	0.95	NA	37.95	1.05	0.0124	0.16	4	4	1330	1	−0.05129	3.63627	−4.39006	7.192934
5	Bolivia	2016	AMERICAS	0	0	0	57.74	1	0.44	0.44	NA	56.4	1.54	0.0287	0.4	1	3	3070	0	−0.82098	4.032469	−3.55086	8.029433
6	Botswana	2016	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	56.22	0	0.52	NA	−0.16	97.13	0.83	0.0374	0.58	2	2	6750	0	−0.65393	4.57605	−3.28608	8.817298
7	Botswana	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	56.52	0	0.36	0.36	−0.16	97.13	0.83	0.0374	0.58	2	2	6750	0	−1.02165	4.57605	−3.28608	8.817298
8	Brazil	2016	AMERICAS	0	0	0	59.64	1	0.08	0.08	NA	24.57	4.34	0.0351	0.57	4	3	8840	0	−2.52573	3.201526	−3.34955	9.087042
9	Cambodia	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	57.89	0	1.65	1.65	1.68	126.95	11.43	0.1148	0.11	3	2	1140	0	0.500775	4.843793	−2.16456	7.038784
10	Cambodia	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	56.67	0	1.68	1.65	1.68	126.95	11.43	0.1148	0.11	3	2	1140	0	0.518794	4.843793	−2.16456	7.038784
11	Cameroon	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	48.08	0	0.69	NA	0.69	42	2.06	0.0182	0.17	4	3	1400	1	−0.37106	3.73767	−4.00633	7.244227
12	Chile	2016	AMERICAS	0	0	0	77.13	1	0.15	0.15	0.08	55.51	4.95	0.0846	0.76	2	2	13540	0	−1.89712	4.016563	−2.46982	9.513404
13	Chile	2018	AMERICAS	0	0	0	74.14	1	0.08	0.15	0.08	55.51	4.95	0.0846	0.76	2	2	13540	0	−2.52573	4.016563	−2.46982	9.513404
14	Colombia	2018	AMERICAS	0	0	0	61.68	1	0.27	NA	0.27	36.47	4.94	0.0404	0.52	3	3	6310	1	−1.30933	3.59649	−3.20893	8.749891
15	Czech Republic	2018	EUROPE	0	0	0	83.41	1	0.13	NA	0.13	151.6	5.56	0.0384	0.78	1	1	17540	0	−2.04022	5.021245	−3.2597	9.77224
16	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	41.14	1	1.37	NA	1.37	59.59	2.35	0.0574	0.12	5	5	430	1	0.314811	4.087488	−2.85771	6.063785
17	Egypt	2018	MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA	0	0	0	60.87	0	0.55	NA	0.55	30.02	2.44	0.0244	0.17	4	4	3410	1	−0.59784	3.401864	−3.71317	8.134467
18	Ethiopia	2016	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	43.67	0	0.41	0.41	0.61	35.51	5.46	0.0272	0.12	4	5	660	1	−0.8916	3.569814	−3.60454	6.49224
19	Ethiopia	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	42.51	0	0.61	0.41	0.61	35.51	5.46	0.0272	0.12	4	5	660	1	−0.4943	3.569814	−3.60454	6.49224
20	Georgia	2018	RUSSIA AND EURASIA	0	0	1	72.5	0	0.23	NA	0.23	102.93	11.04	0.0968	0.55	2	2	3830	0	−1.46968	4.634049	−2.33511	8.25062
21	Ghana	2016	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	61.03	1	0.38	0.38	0.48	89.34	8.14	0.0696	0.55	2	3	1380	0	−0.96758	4.492449	−2.66499	7.229839
22	Ghana	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	55.83	1	0.48	0.38	0.48	89.34	8.14	0.0696	0.55	2	3	1380	0	−0.73397	4.492449	−2.66499	7.229839
23	Guatemala	2016	AMERICAS	0	0	0	63.09	0	0.84	0.84	0.29	47	1.71	0.0211	0.48	2	3	3790	0	−0.17435	3.850147	−3.85848	8.240121
24	Guatemala	2018	AMERICAS	0	0	0	63.17	0	0.29	0.84	0.29	47	1.71	0.0211	0.48	2	3	3790	0	−1.23787	3.850147	−3.85848	8.240121
25	Haiti	2018	AMERICAS	0	0	0	47.33	0	0.55	NA	0.55	73.34	1.32	0.0145	0.31	2	3	780	0	−0.59784	4.295106	−4.23361	6.659294
26	Honduras	2018	AMERICAS	0	0	0	61.71	0	0.33	NA	0.33	100.49	1.32	0.0612	0.33	3	3	2150	0	−1.10866	4.610058	−2.79361	7.673223
27	Hungary	2016	EUROPE	0	0	0	83.13	1	0.23	0.23	0.26	168.99	55.49	0.1594	0.57	2	2	12570	0	−1.46968	5.129839	−1.83634	9.439068
28	Hungary	2018	EUROPE	0	0	0	84.2	1	0.26	0.23	0.26	168.99	55.49	0.1594	0.57	2	2	12570	0	−1.34707	5.129839	−1.83634	9.439068
29	India	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	61.18	1	1.4	1.4	0.61	40.35	1.95	0.0199	0.47	4	4	1670	1	0.336472	3.697591	−3.91704	7.420579
30	India	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	56.77	1	0.61	1.4	0.61	40.35	1.95	0.0199	0.47	4	4	1670	1	−0.4943	3.697591	−3.91704	7.420579
31	Indonesia	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	62.97	0	0.29	0.29	0.47	37.44	0.49	0.0197	0.48	3	3	3400	0	−1.23787	3.62274	−3.92714	8.131531
32	Indonesia	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	62.04	0	0.47	0.29	0.47	37.44	0.49	0.0197	0.48	3	3	3400	0	−0.75502	3.62274	−3.92714	8.131531
33	Jordan	2018	MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA	0	0	0	74.31	0	0.19	NA	0.19	91.32	4.02	0.0674	0.23	3	3	3920	1	−1.66073	4.51437	−2.69711	8.273847
34	Latvia	2018	EUROPE	0	0	0	75.42	1	0.2	NA	0.2	119.19	0.88	0.0351	0.74	1	1	14570	0	−1.60944	4.780719	−3.34955	9.58672
35	Lebanon	2018	MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA	0	0	0	65.11	0	0.17	NA	0.17	72.61	5.18	0.0815	0.32	2	3	7980	0	−1.77196	4.285103	−2.50715	8.984694

	Country	YEAR	REGION	ASIADUM	SSADUM	READUM	KOFTOTAL	CIRIWRP	EPSRAW	EPS2016R	EPS2018R	TRADE	FDI	FDI0716	VDEM2016	PTSAI	PTSSD	PCGDP	ARMEDCON1	LNEPS	LNTRADE	LNFDI	LNPCGDP
36	Malawi	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	46.24	1	0.75	NA	0.75	77.91	5.99	0.0526	0.4	2	3	320	0	−0.28768	4.355554	−2.94504	5.768321
37	Mauritania	2016	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	50.6	1	1.06	1.06	2.15	100.53	5.72	0.1074	0.16	3	3	1130	0	0.058269	4.610456	−2.2312	7.029973
38	Mauritania	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	51.1	1	2.15	1.06	2.15	100.53	5.72	0.1074	0.16	3	3	1130	0	0.765468	4.610456	−2.2312	7.029973
39	Mexico	2016	AMERICAS	0	0	0	71.49	1	0.3	0.3	0.27	76.22	3.29	0.0263	0.48	4	2	9040	0	−1.20397	4.333624	−3.63819	9.109414
40	Mexico	2018	AMERICAS	0	0	0	70.46	1	0.27	0.3	0.27	76.22	3.29	0.0263	0.48	4	2	9040	0	−1.30933	4.333624	−3.63819	9.109414
41	Mongolia	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	64.09	1	1.24	NA	1.24	95.64	−37.17	0.1161	0.51	3	2	3590	0	0.215111	4.560591	−2.1533	8.185907
42	Morocco	2018	MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA	0	0	0	67.01	1	0.24	NA	0.24	80.42	2.24	0.0269	0.25	3	2	2850	0	−1.42712	4.387263	−3.61563	7.955074
43	Myanmar	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	43.57	1	0.96	0.96	1.1	39.06	5.18	0.0378	0.27	5	5	1190	1	−0.04082	3.665099	−3.27545	7.081708
44	Myanmar	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	39.8	1	1.1	0.96	1.1	39.06	5.18	0.0378	0.27	5	5	1190	1	0.09531	3.665099	−3.27545	7.081708
45	Nepal	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	47.55	1	0.82	0.82	0.6	48.88	0.5	0.0034	0.45	3	3	730	0	−0.19845	3.889368	−5.68398	6.593045
46	Nepal	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	45.59	1	0.6	0.82	0.6	48.88	0.5	0.0034	0.45	3	3	730	0	−0.51083	3.889368	−5.68398	6.593045
47	Nigeria	2016	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	54.39	0	0.48	0.48	0.76	20.72	1.1	0.0152	0.47	5	4	2450	1	−0.73397	3.031099	−4.18646	7.803843
48	Nigeria	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	54.93	0	0.76	0.48	0.76	20.72	1.1	0.0152	0.47	5	4	2450	1	−0.27444	3.031099	−4.18646	7.803843
49	Pakistan	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	53.53	0	1.13	1.13	1.68	25.31	0.89	0.0117	0.27	4	4	1500	1	0.122218	3.2312	−4.44817	7.313221
50	Pakistan	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	51.7	0	1.68	1.13	1.68	25.31	0.89	0.0117	0.27	4	4	1500	1	0.518794	3.2312	−4.44817	7.313221
51	Philippines	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	66.97	1	0.4	0.4	0.77	64.9	2.72	0.0155	0.38	5	5	3580	1	−0.91629	4.172848	−4.16692	8.183118
52	Philippines	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	64.08	1	0.77	0.4	0.77	64.9	2.72	0.0155	0.38	5	5	3580	1	−0.26136	4.172848	−4.16692	8.183118
53	Poland	2016	EUROPE	0	0	0	81.2	2	0.48	0.48	0.21	100.47	3.55	0.0308	0.57	2	1	12690	0	−0.73397	4.609859	−3.48024	9.448569
54	Poland	2018	EUROPE	0	0	0	78.72	2	0.21	0.48	0.21	100.47	3.55	0.0308	0.57	2	1	12690	0	−1.56065	4.609859	−3.48024	9.448569
55	Romania	2018	EUROPE	0	0	0	77.88	1	0.35	NA	0.35	83.57	3.33	0.0301	0.65	2	2	9480	0	−1.04982	4.425684	−3.50323	9.15694
56	Russia	2016	RUSSIA AND EURASIA	0	0	1	72.29	0	0.73	0.73	0.53	46.23	2.53	0.0263	0.12	4	4	9720	1	−0.31471	3.833629	−3.63819	9.181941
57	Russia	2018	RUSSIA AND EURASIA	0	0	1	69.06	0	0.53	0.73	0.53	46.23	2.53	0.0263	0.12	4	4	9720	1	−0.63488	3.833629	−3.63819	9.181941
58	Serbia	2018	EUROPE	0	0	0	75.28	1	0.16	NA	0.16	107.5	6.15	0.0662	0.35	1	2	5310	0	−1.83258	4.677491	−2.71507	8.577347
59	Singapore	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	80.01	1	0.34	NA	0.34	310.26	23.97	0.2014	0.34	2	1	51880	0	−1.07881	5.737411	−1.60246	10.85669
60	South Africa	2016	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	69.89	1	0.45	0.45	0.28	60.79	0.75	0.016	0.61	3	4	5490	0	−0.79851	4.107425	−4.13517	8.610683
61	South Africa	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	68.63	1	0.28	0.45	0.28	60.79	0.75	0.016	0.61	3	4	5490	0	−1.27297	4.107425	−4.13517	8.610683
62	Sri Lanka	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	58.92	1	0.22	0.22	0.21	50.01	1.1	0.0121	0.5	3	3	3780	0	−1.51413	3.912223	−4.41455	8.237479
63	Sri Lanka	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	54.45	1	0.21	0.22	0.21	50.01	1.1	0.0121	0.5	3	3	3780	0	−1.56065	3.912223	−4.41455	8.237479
64	Thailand	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	68.15	0	0.89	NA	0.89	121.66	0.74	0.0241	0.11	3	3	5640	1	−0.11653	4.80123	−3.72554	8.637639
65	Tunisia	2016	MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA	0	0	0	67.3	1	0.77	0.77	0.22	91.44	1.48	0.0286	0.66	3	3	3690	0	−0.26136	4.515683	−3.55435	8.213382
66	Tunisia	2018	MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA	0	0	0	64.86	1	0.22	0.77	0.22	91.44	1.48	0.0286	0.66	3	3	3690	0	−1.51413	4.515683	−3.55435	8.213382
67	Uganda	2018	SUBSAHARAN AFRICA	0	1	0	52.66	0	0.76	NA	0.76	47.22	2.6	0.0404	0.28	3	3	630	1	−0.27444	3.854818	−3.20893	6.44572
68	Ukraine	2018	RUSSIA AND EURASIA	0	0	1	70.6	0	0.67	NA	0.67	104.81	3.69	0.0419	0.22	4	4	2310	1	−0.40048	4.652149	−3.17247	7.745003
69	Vietnam	2016	ASIA	1	0	0	64.27	0	0.15	0.15	0.45	184.69	6.14	0.0624	0.2	3	3	2100	0	−1.89712	5.218679	−2.77419	7.649693
70	Vietnam	2018	ASIA	1	0	0	59.7	0	0.45	0.15	0.45	184.69	6.14	0.0624	0.2	3	3	2100	0	−0.79851	5.218679	−2.77419	7.649693

Article

Free Trade versus Democracy and Social Standards in the European Union: Trade-Offs or Trilemma?

Claudia Wiesner

Department of Social and Cultural Sciences, Fulda University of Applied Sciences, 36037 Fulda, Germany;
E-Mail: claudia.wiesner@sk.hs-fulda.de

Abstract
This article aims at conceptualising, in analytical as well as normative-theoretical terms, the tensions between free trade, democratic and social standards, and national sovereignty that are named in Dani Rodrik´s "globalisation trilemma" for the case of the European Union (EU). It is argued that the trilemma concept is much more fitting to the EU than a simple trade-off concept. This model offers a conceptual path to both analysing existing tensions and thinking of resolving them: a) the EU has, indeed, been intervening into national democracies and national sovereignty as its legislation is superior to national legislation; b) EU legislation and judgements of the Court of Justice of the EU have been reducing national social standards; c) executives and numerous new institutions and agencies with indirect legitimation have taken over competencies that formerly lay in the domain of national directly legitimated legislatives; and d) these negative effects relate to the EU's giving preference to the liberalisation of free trade of capital, goods and services over democracy, social standards, and national sovereignty. Against the framework of the globalisation trilemma, analysis is combined with normative-theoretical judgements on the quality democracy of the setting that has been found and a conceptual discussion. The article concludes by discussing the perspectives of the setting examined and the possible paths to solutions, arguing that in order to keep a high level of economic integration, democracy, and social standards in the EU, national sovereignty needs to give way.

1. Introduction

This article aims at conceptualising, in analytical as well as normative-theoretical terms, the tensions between free trade, democratic and social standards, and national sovereignty that are named in the "globalisation trilemma" (Rodrik, 2011) for the case of the European Union (EU). I argue that the trilemma concept is much more fitting to the EU than a simple trade-off concept, as it offers a conceptual path to both analysing existing tensions and thinking of resolving them.

European integration has had a negative impact on democratic and social standards in the member states

because: a) the EU has been intervening into national democracies and national sovereignty as its legislation is superior to national legislation; b) EU legislation and judgements of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) have been reducing national social standards; and c) executives and numerous new institutions and agencies with indirect legitimation have taken over competencies that formerly lay in the domain of national directly legitimated legislatives (see Grimm, 2017; Scharpf, 1999; Wiesner, 2019). As will be discussed below, d) these negative effects relate to the EU's giving preference to the liberalisation of free trade of capital, goods and services over democracy, social standards, and national sovereignty.

In the current discussion on the EU's impact on democracy and social standards, several contributions (see Section 2) argue that the EU endangers national democracy and national social standards. I share this critical diagnosis. There is, however, one part in these arguments that I do not share: they assume a trade-off between either an ongoing integration and trade liberalisation in the EU, or an upkeeping of democratic and social standards. In this article, I argue in favour of analysing trade liberalisation, democracy, and high social standards as a trilemma instead. The trilemma conception fits better with the complexity of the tensions at stake, and furthermore it offers a conceptual path to resolving them. This approach offers both an alternative perspective and a conceptual path to thinking about solutions.

The second section of this article analyses the EU's negative impact on democratic and social standards. Against the framework of the globalisation trilemma, I will analyse these tensions. The analysis will be followed by normative-theoretical judgements on the quality of democracy of the setting that has been found. The third section discusses why the tensions described should be conceptualised as a trilemma rather than a trade-off. The fourth section evaluates the state of the art of democratic and social standards in the EU. Finally, the fifth section develops the perspectives of following a path towards upkeeping high democratic and social standards in the EU at the expense of national sovereignty.

2. Globalised Capitalism, the Globalisation Trilemma, and the EU: Conceptual Reflection and Analysis

Over the last years, the academic debate has started to focus on the question whether democracy is compatible with globalised and financialised capitalism. Several authors agree that the dominance of a market-oriented financialised form of capitalism threatens representative democracy in its substance, with several contributions criticising the EU in this respect (e.g., Menéndez, 2015; Merkel, 2014; Somek, 2015; Streeck, 2014; Wiesner, 2016). The critical view on global financialised capitalism and its effects for democracy is in fit with Dani Rodrik's (2011) analysis. He states, first, that successful economies depend on successful democratic institutions: "Markets and governments are complements, not substitutes. If you want more and better markets, you have to have more (and better) governance. Markets work best not where the states are the weakest but where they are strong" (Rodrik, 2011, p. xviii).

This leads Rodrik (2011) to argue not only in favour of keeping good government, but also in favour of accepting that there is not only one path to economic prosperity, i.e., the path of trade deregulation. On the contrary: Using several examples, he demonstrates how in the case of many countries it was precisely economic intervention and regulation that led the path to economic success (Rodrik, 2011, pp. 135–158). The discussion leads Rodrik to present the conceptual framework of the:

Political trilemma of the world economy: We cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination, and economic globalisation. If we want to push globalisation further, we have to give up either the nation state or democratic politics. If we want to maintain and deepen democracy, we have to choose between the nation state and international economic integration. And if we want to keep the nation state and self-determination, we have to choose between deepening democracy and deepening globalisation. Our troubles have their roots in our reluctance to face up these ineluctable choices. (Rodrik, 2011, pp. xviii–xix)

Rodrik, however, does not explicitly discuss the EU in his book. So why, as has been argued above, is the EU in fit with the argument of the globalisation trilemma (on the following see also Wiesner, 2016, 2017b, 2019)? The argument that out of three decisive political goals—free trade, national sovereignty and national social security, and democracy—only two can be combined in a satisfactory manner explains the EU's current problems very well.

EU integration, as will be discussed in more detail throughout this article, has been strongly based on an intensification of free trade via creation of an internal market and the abolition of market barriers. As has been said above, this entailed a cutting down of national social and democratic standards. When conceptually applied to the EU, the trilemma entails not just one, but three trade-offs. The EU has to decide between having or keeping either: 1) national sovereignty, national social security, and free trade, i.e., cutting down democracy; 2) national sovereignty, national social security, and democracy, i.e., limiting free trade; or 3) free trade and democracy, i.e., cutting down national sovereignty. One cannot have all three of these at a time.

My argument is now that this trilemma not only describes a setting of three different trade-offs in the EU, it also allows to conceptualise a solution to an ongoing reduction of democratic and social standards via EU economic integration. I will, in the course of my argument, detail the conditions for reconciling democracy, social standards, and free trade in the EU: The EU needs to compensate for the losses of democratic and social standards on the national level. It then can become an example of free trade between nation-states not being a nuisance to democracy and social standards. But the path that combines internal free trade in the EU with keeping up high democratic and social standards leads to a reduction of national sovereignty, the third dimension of the trilemma.

In the following sections, I will describe how the realisation of the EU's liberal market rights collided with social and democratic standards in the member states. Two empirical examples shall be briefly sketched: a) a possible trade-off between trade liberalisation and social standards (Section 2.1); and b) a possible trade-off

between financial liberalisation and national democracy (Section 2.2).

2.1. A Trade-Off between Trade Liberalisation and National Social Standards?

As has been said, European integration has been related to economic deregulation and trade liberalisation. The EU is based on the so-called four freedoms, i.e., free circulation of goods, people, services, and capital in the EU's inner market. After decades of market integration, these four freedoms today are realised. The CJEU (formerly European Court of Justice [ECJ]) played a decisive part in interpreting these principles and thus shaping legal and political practice. In its important judgements which were decisive for establishing legal and political standards in applying EU law, the Court mostly judged in favour of free trade—and often against national social standards (Grimm, 2017; Scharpf, 1999). What was tellingly termed "negative integration" by Fritz Scharpf (1999) thus affected national social standards. With this concept, Scharpf wants to emphasize that market creation in the EU, much more than on the creation of new rules and common standards ("positive integration"), was based on what he terms "negative integration," i.e., the abolition or reduction of national social standards because they were considered as obstacles to market integration (Scharpf, 1999).

Two judgements of the Court are illustrative for the effect of negative integration on social rights. The posted workers directive (EU, 2006) rules the conditions for workers that are posted into EU member states other than their home countries. The cases Rüffert and Laval referred to the working conditions in the state the workers were posted into, and also the right of trade unions to be protesting. In its judgements, the Court tried to interpret both these rights as narrow as possible, arguing explicitly that the posted workers directive was defining maximum rather than minimum standards. Member states receiving posted workers thus could claim the posting companies only to keep the standards defined in the directive, but not more.

In the Rüffert case (*Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen*, 2008), the Court judged that the German federal state of Lower Saxony could not take action against a German company that did not pay agreed wages to the workers employed by a Polish subcontractor. In the Laval case (*Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet*, 2007), the Court even decided that national trade unions could only protest or get on strike against companies that were not resident in the respective member states in the few cases touched upon by the posted workers directive. In all other cases, legal action or strike against companies that sidetrack national social standards are excluded.

In these cases, the effects of European integration and trade liberalisation laws visibly worked along the lines of the globalisation trilemma, emphasising trade liberalisation in the EU at the expense of national sovereignty and national social standards. But, and this is a normative judgement, social rights are an elementary prerequisite of democracy (see in detail Wiesner, 2012, 2019, pp. 249-260) as social inequality hinders equal democratic participation and representation. Reducing social rights thus must be judged critically for its negative effects on equality and, ultimately, democracy.

Related to such arguments, one of the most critical accounts on the EU by Wolfgang Streeck (2014, 2015) establishes a clear and causal link between a decrease of welfare standards and democratic substance in the EU's member states and deregulation by the EU. Streeck (2014, 2015) therefore concludes that national sovereignty, national welfare states, and national democracies must be restored. In his view, capitalism should be de-globalised, and embedded democracy restored by re-embedding capitalism on the national level, which would also entail cutting down the EU (Streeck, 2015, pp. 59–60).

2.2. A Trade-Off between the Effects of Financial Liberalisation and National Democracy?

Second, and more recently, European integration has led to deteriorating or circumventing national democratic institutions, especially during the financial crisis and regarding the new institutions that have been set up. A system of supervision and new bodies developed, decisively cutting down competencies of national legislatives. Moreover, the new institutions make it difficult to determine who is to be held accountable for budgetary decisions and austerity. All this brought about numerous challenges for representative democracy in the EU multilevel system (e.g., Bellamy & Weale, 2015; Crum, 2013; Laffan, 2016; Majone, 2014; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2017; on the following see also Wiesner, 2016, 2017b, 2019).

Depending on which level is concerned (EU or member states), which kind of measure and instrument (European Stability Mechanism [ESM], Six-pack, Two-pack) and which status the respective state has (debtor or creditor), the effects of crisis governance on representative democracy vary (e.g., Fischer, 2016; Jančić, 2016; Maatsch, 2017). First, there are measures that fall under the regime of the Lisbon Treaty and have been voted upon with the participation of the European Parliament (EP), such as the Six-pack and Two-pack measures. Second, other measures are excluded from the treaty framework, such as the ESM. It is based on a new intergovernmental treaty and hence falls outside the official realm of the Lisbon Treaty and the checks and balances it establishes. Third, implementation of financial aid legislation has led to governmental attempts to strengthen executive dominance in many member states, for instance by using fast-track procedures in decision-making (Maatsch, 2017). The two latter points have led to serious consequences for representative democracy in the member states concerned. The case of financial aid governance is most pertinent here.

In order to understand and analyse the setting of financial aid, one player is crucial: Article 137 of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU (TFEU) states that the 19 Euro states constitute the "Euro Group." It is closely related to both the Council of the European Union (Council in this text) and the European Council[1], as the respective ministers of finance belong to the Council, and the respective heads of state and government to the European Council. But, as Protocol No. 14 of the Lisbon Treaty states, Euro Group meetings are informal (EU, 2016). This leads to a decisive difference in transparency: While Council meetings are public when the Council is acting in its legislative function, this is not the case for the Euro Group.

The ESM, which officially started on October 8th, 2012, is also related to the Euro Group. As the German Ministry of Finance explains, it is an intergovernmental financial institution and therefore subject to international law (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2017). Governance of financial aid has in large parts been concretely operated by the often cited "Troika," consisting of representatives of Commission, European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Formally, the Troika is their agent and is charged with: a) negotiating the conditions of financial aid; and b) controlling that these conditions are kept. The ministers of finance and economics of the Euro states decide on financial aid and its conditions (European Council, 2012, Art. 5)—after the Troika has negotiated these conditions and fixed them in a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MoU). This MoU is signed by representatives of the Commission in the name of the ESM (European Council, 2012, Art. 13, 3).

This means that the Troika not only is the agent that controls all conditions linked to any financial assistance, it is also in charge of negotiating these terms and putting them down in MoU. The Troika, accordingly, has a high degree of independence and considerable hard power—while it shows a low degree of accountability and transparency. The ESM Treaty defines the members and the general tasks of the Troika, but neither sets limits for its competencies nor establishes standards for its accountability. In particular, it remains unclear which competencies the Troika has over the member states, their governments, and their parliaments, how those competences refer to the Troika's principals, ECB, Commission, and IMF, and how they relate to the Euro Group's governments. It might be argued that such undefined competencies are an outcome of "incomplete contracting" as part of a principal-agent relation. Nevertheless, the structure is so opaque that it is difficult to see how the principals control the agent in the end.

But as the Troika negotiated the MoU, it de facto set the conditions for the national budgets. Accordingly, the most decisive change in the debtor states is to be seen in the fact that key standards of representative democracy are not followed anymore and decision-making powers in the budget procedure were handed over from the bodies that have been directly legitimised by the sovereign (national parliaments and governments) to bodies that either are only indirectly legitimised, such as the Euro Group, international non-majoritarian bodies, such as the IMF, or expert groups such as the Troika. But budgetary right is, for good reasons, understood as one of the crown jewels of a parliament: a budget symbolically and materially expresses the will of the parliamentary majority by defining the policies to be carried out in a country. A parliament that, in the end, cannot decide on details and between true alternatives regarding the budget, has lost the core of its role as a parliament. Decisions, then, not only are de-politicised, but also void of the substance of parliamentarism. In such cases, parliament takes on a referendum role (voting just Yes or No) rather than the parliamentary function of deliberation and vote. This also reduces the role and weight of the input legitimation once given by the sovereign in domestic elections: the legitimised national parliaments and governments whose decision-making powers have been cut down in substance (see in detail Wiesner, 2019).

This means that all crisis governance institutions brought a power shift from legislatives to executives and experts, both in the EU and in the member states. The financial aid part of crisis governance severely impedes national representative democracies and their balances of powers in the EU's multilevel system. In addition, the new intergovernmental institutions bypass the progresses to supranational representative democracy obtained in the EU over the last decades by excluding the EP. It is a decisive legitimisation problem to have shifted decisive parts of the decision-making competencies both outside the EU's and most of the national representative institutions.

Again, this scenario fits into the globalisation trilemma: The liberalisation of financial markets together with monetary integration first led to a crisis, and the attempts to remedy that crisis ultimately led to reducing national democratic standards. A number of recent contributions have underlined these problem fields. For instance, a special issue of the European Law Journal discusses financial crisis governance and its effects on democracy in terms of German constitutional lawyer Herman Heller's concept of authoritarian liberalism. Heller had, in a 1932 essay, linked upcoming authoritarianism to economic liberalism (Heller, 2015). In his discussion of Heller's essay, Alexander Somek speaks of a move towards authoritarian liberalism in the EU:

> First, what emerges is a clear drive towards the centralisation of power. The autonomy of Member States to decide their fiscal and economic policies has been drastically curtailed….Second, the Eurozone has become equipped with the means to extend credit to

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[1] The Treaty on European Union distinguishes the Council of the European Union, i.e., the Council of Ministers, and the European Council, i.e., the body representing the heads of state and government (European Union, 2016). When I mention the Council in the following, I refer to the Council of the European Union. The European Council is named as such.

its Member States through the European Stability Mechanism….The granting of aid is closely tied to the so-called 'economic conditionality'….The conditionality is supposed to ensure that states are capable of sustaining the 'stability' of financial markets, which must not be upset by the state not back paying on either interest or principal debt. (Somek, 2015, p. 341)

Others have argued in a similar vein that the EU, especially in what I have termed its "crisis mode" (Wiesner, 2019), is in a state of emergency (Maatsch & Cooper, 2017; White, 2015; see in detail Wiesner, 2019). In a slightly less dramatical tone, Claus Offe has highlighted that the crisis emphasised a discrepancy between executive dominance and governance of crisis measures and decreasing citizen support for the EU (Offe, 2015).

3. Trilemma, Not Trade-Offs

Returning to the conceptual questions, in this section I will further argue why the possible trade-offs sketched should, rather than as either-or constellations, be conceptualised as part of a trilemma. This is mainly because they are not unresolvable, but can be settled by making choices. If the EU sets up new democratic and social standards at the EU level and hence cuts down national sovereignty some more, it can keep up its high level of trade integration. To underline my argument, I will start by an analysis of the political and legal processes that have shaped the fields of conflict that have been sketched.

3.1. Why Does the EU Challenge Democratic and Social Standards?

Why did European integration lead to the outcome that was sketched? A first explanation is to be seen in the EU's historical origins. European integration started with the goals to create a balance of powers in Europe, to centralize control over the core industries of coal and steel, and to tame Western Germany. Economic integration was the tool for this, so the creation of an inner market for the first three decades of integration has been at the core of the integration process (Wiesner, 2014). Accordingly, the EU Treaties, i.e., the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community (EEC), and Euratom treaties and the ones that followed them, make a strong point of abolishing all obstacles to a free market economy and a successful inner market in the EU (or former EEC). Thus, the EU Treaties helped pave, and still do so, the way for market liberalisation, putting down all possible barriers to free trade, and even national social standards.

Besides the Treaties, a second decisive part was played by their interpreters, namely the Commission and the Court. Dieter Grimm (2017) knowingly describes the role of the latter, pointing out decisive factors. First, the Court acted as an agent of integration and deregulation.

Second, this limited the possibilities of member state governments to successfully shape and correct EU secondary law. Third, the EU Treaties as EU primary law regulate policy fields that normally should be subject to secondary law. Fourth, the Court became a major player in integration via its own judgements.

In two judgements in 1963 and 1964, the ECJ had claimed EU law to be superior to nation-state law, a move that has been interpreted as a constitutionalisation of the Treaties. But, different from national constitutions, the Treaties regulate a number of fields and issues that in a nation-state would belong to the field of secondary law, and, namely, economic policy rules. Decisive economic policy rules thus being of constitution-like character, it was not the legislative, but the judicative in the sense of the ECJ that had the strongest power to interpret them. In many cases, the ECJ decided in favour of abolishing obstacles to the inner market—even in the shape of national social standards. The ECJ therefore pushed negative integration in the sense of putting down market obstacles without creating new regulations. This is why Grimm (2017) judges the Court to follow a political agenda in favour of deregulation.

But the former ECJ was not alone in putting forward economic deregulation in the EU. The Treaties set the framework, but the Commission issued the respective law initiatives. Moreover, often enough, the EU legislators, i.e., member state governments and the EP, voted in favour of deregulation laws. But why?

The simplest explanation is policy preferences. From the 1970s onwards and, in particular, after the end of the social democrat era, governments deciding in the Council were increasingly led by conservatives and/or liberals, and economic policy was shaped by liberal market orientations. Governments not only shaped their national economic policies, but also deregulation policies in the EU via their votes in the Council. Discrepancies between richer and poorer EU member states favoured this: Negative integration is wished for by both rich and poor countries, as it facilitates market access and trade. Positive integration, that is, raising new standards, is not wished for by the poorer states, as they tend to profit from social dumping and a race to the bottom (Hix & Høyland, 2011, pp. 209–215). The dynamics in the Council have become even more pertinent in the crisis as findings state that the Council became a more important decision-making forum alongside other intergovernmental institutions such as the Eurogroup (Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016).

Since legislative co-decision between EP and Council has been introduced in Maastricht, the EP regularly co-decided on the new inner market laws. Liberals and Conservatives were a decisive force in the EP as well, and often in the majority. The EP therefore could not present a serious obstacle to the deregulation agenda led by Commission, Council and ECJ. On the contrary: the EP approved of several of the new EU deregulation laws.

Another additional reason behind the decision-making of Council and EP is a self-binding, at first of the

governments, but then also the EP majority, to the rules of the financial markets. As Wolfgang Streeck sketches in detail, the new common currency in the 1990s was prepared not by an economic government, but by a control of the criteria of convergence (Streeck, 2014, pp. 97–164) which have been anticipating today's austerity regime. Most member states, Commission, and EP in their majorities supported this self-binding to the markets from the 1990s onwards.

All this, first, is in fit with the economic *Zeitgeist* in favour of deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s that has been at length described by Dani Rodrik (2011) as one reason for the dominant directions in economic policies of the time. Second, it means that a complex setting of actors, interests, strategies, and political decisions led to economic deregulation in the EU. Besides the Court as a major driving force, Commission, member state governments, and also the EP have been deciding and co-deciding in favour of deregulation—either because it was in their political interests, or because of a self-binding to financial austerity. The decrease of democratic and social standards that has been described above is a consequence of these policies. Third, there is political action and representative-democratic decision-making behind deregulation, and this means that it is possible that the actors in question decide and act otherwise.

4. Democracy and Social Standards on the EU Level: State of the Art

So far, I have discussed and conceptualised whether and to what extent the EU is entrapped in a trilemma. I have argued above that there are some crucial tensions between deregulation, trade liberalisation, social standards, and democracy to be noticed in the EU, but that none of these is an unresolvable or definite trade-off. They rather have to be seen as part of a trilemma that allows for policy choices in favour of democratic and social standards. As a first conclusion, then, I argue that the globalisation trilemma presents a valuable framework for conceptualising and analysing tensions between trade liberalisation, national sovereignty, social standards, and democracy present in the EU.

On this basis, in this section I will argue in favour of the possible path to reconcile integration, a certain level of free trade, and democratic and social standards. We can aim for restoring democracy and social rights at the EU level itself and hence re-regulate free trade and its effects. But, and again, this is in fit with the globalisation trilemma, such a reconciliation would require resolving the trilemma at the expense of national sovereignty because the democratic procedures and the means of regulation of the EU level would need to be strengthened. This loss of national sovereignty of the member states would be linked to strengthening the EU as another level of democracy, social protection, and regulation. What are the perspectives for such a solution? Or has it already been partly achieved? What is hence the state of the art

concerning democracy in the EU? And what about social standards? Analysis shows that there have been considerable achievements in these respects, but they are incomplete. Accordingly, if the loss of national democratic and social substance is to be compensated in the EU, the EU needs to be better democratised and social standards need to be better protected.

In short, the problems are decisively linked to an accumulation of seven problem fields (on the following see in detail Wiesner, 2019, pp. 281–301) that can be related to the globalisation trilemma's tensions that have been described. The problem fields that are most pertinent for the democratic deficits are: 1) an over-bureaucratisation; 2) expert dominance; and 3) an over-constitutionalisation—these three reduce horizontal and vertical accountability and limit the space for political and public deliberation on politics and policies. The problem fields that impede social standards are: 4) differentiated integration; and 5) the effects of negative integration—these two cut down national democratic and social standards without creating them anew on the EU level. Two more problem fields relate to the EU's origin as an intergovernmental organisation and question whether national sovereignty in the EU should be further cut down. They are: 6) the lack of an idea and a practice of the EU common good; and 7) a weakly developed *demos*.

4.1. Democratic Standards and Deficits in the EU

The first three problem fields limit the quality of democracy in the EU:

1) Over-bureaucratisation: consensus-building and bureaucracy dominate in decision-making processes in the EU (see in detail Tömmel, 2014), at the expense of democratic deliberation and publicity. Processes such as trilogues (pre-negotiations between EP and Council representatives that lead to most legal projects in the EU being accepted upon first readings) largely take place behind closed doors and in expert circles. Trilogues do not withdraw decisions from parliamentary decision-making as such. In trilogues, parliamentary committees and also the plenary are involved from the beginning to the end. The problem is one of weights and substance: if the most decisive part of the legislative process is carried out behind closed doors by experts in non-transparent negotiation circles, democratic accountability is reduced even if in the end parliament and its committees are involved just as they should be formally and legally (Reh, 2014; Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, 2015, 2017). Trilogues de-democratise and de-politicize decision-making in the EU.

2) A number of expert bodies that have been created over the years possess executive competencies,

and they are also largely withdrawn and decoupled from the realm of public representative decision-making. The EU's agencies, as well as private consultancy firms that do work for the Commission are examples here, but also the Troika (see in detail Wiesner, 2019, pp. 237–248).

3) Over-constitutionalisation: This problem is further emphasised by the Treaties themselves limiting the possible realm for democratic deliberation and decision-making. As described above, they fix decisive parts of the EU's economic governance with a quasi-constitutional character (see in detail Grimm, 2017), whereas in most national representative democracies, economic policymaking is subject to simple legislation.

The problem cluster of expert dominance, bureaucracy, and over-constitutionalisation in sum limits the realm for public deliberation and politicised decision-making. It limits accountability in both horizontal and vertical direction, and it limits transparency. But these problems could be reduced by just filling the democratic bodies that there are with active life. Concretely, the EP should use its co-decision powers to the fullest extent possible and shift the substantial weight of parliamentary debates and decisions back into the parliamentary and public bodies and arenas, away from trilogues. This would also increase the EP's horizontal accountability and legitimacy as well as its responsiveness. Furthermore, decision-making competencies should be taken away from indirectly legitimised agents such as the Troika: Decisions should be discussed and taken by the bodies that are directly legitimised for this, and that are directly accountable.

More room for democratic deliberation is possible and needed on the EU level and in the multi-level system. A broad solution here would be to de-constitutionalise the EU and to turn a large part of the EU's primary law into secondary law, in order for economic policy goals—which currently are largely fixed by the Treaties—to be made subject to political debate and representative-democratic politicised decision-making. But this change would depend on a major treaty change and again require unanimity of the member state governments, and in the EU's current situation it seems highly unlikely it could be obtained, especially as not all the member states governments (and Germany first in rank) would subscribe to the goal to politicize and democratize economic policymaking in the EU.

Nevertheless, a number of policy areas already are potentially subject to political and controversial deliberation and decision-making, both on the EU and on the national level. But the non-transparent decision-making structures and preferences of national governments that have been discussed above hinder open debate in many cases. Why shouldn't, for instance, austerity policies be debated in the Euro Group member states, in a similar vein as national pension scheme reforms? And why shouldn't debates about EP decisions on the budget be subject to EU wide political discussion? Similarly, it can be asked why Council and EC do not have more controversial and also more public political debates—at least the Council has a number or parliamentary functions (Palonen & Wiesner, 2016) that could be more open to the public, just as in other parliaments.

4.2. What Impedes Social Standards?

The two next problem clusters both lead to downgrading national social standards and impede setting up new EU-wide social standards:

4) Differentiated integration: Different degrees of integration in different policy areas, and among different groups of member states, disperse the EU into a great variety of different regulation regimes and schemes. These range from co-decision in the inner market over the intergovernmentally structured Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Euro Group that just unites the Euro-Countries, to the Schengen System. This dispersion of governance modes in a polity as big as the EU does not simply create differing patterns of legitimisation and control: if it is unclear, even to experts, who has taken a decision and what way the decision-making process went, democratic accountability and transparency are also clearly hampered.

5) Negative integration: As said above, the EU negative integration (i.e., the abolition of market-hindering regulations) dominates over positive integration (i.e., re-regulation; Scharpf, 1999). Negative integration has cut down national democratic standards and achievements such as social citizenship rights (see in detail Wiesner, 2019, pp. 249–260). Moreover, there has not been a compensation on the EU level. EU-related citizenship rights are mainly market-related freedom rights, with the addition of a core set of political rights linked to Union Citizenship. Social rights have rarely been defined on the EU level so far. As has been explained above, besides a harmonisation of some basic social standards, positive integration in the sense of setting up new EU related social rights has been difficult to obtain because of diverging interests of the member states.

The effects of both differentiated integration and negative integration need to be limited, especially when it comes to achievements that are crucial for democratic standards. In brief (for detailed discussions see Wiesner, 2017a, 2017b) there are two possible ways that refer to either upkeeping the trilemma and its tensions, or to resolving it at the expense of national sovereignty:

a) There is a narrow solution: In policy areas ruled by the EU, democratic and social standards in the

member states must be protected and negative integration hindered. This could, for instance, happen via EU laws that exclude any intervention into national democratic and social standards even in times of financial aid. If the MoU, for instance, only fixed the sums to be cut in the budgets rather than the related policies as well, national parliaments would keep much more decision-making powers.

This solution, *nota bene*, is a defensive one because following the argument above, national democratic standards are in permanent latent tension with free trade in the EU, and this permanent tension can only be resolved if they are ultimately transferred to the EU. As long as this is not the case—mainly because of the reasons discussed in the concluding section—it is an interim protection mechanism to keep up national standards. The trilemma in this scenario is kept.

b) In the broad solution, new democratic and social standards would be created at the EU level as the EU would be fully integrated, national sovereignty would be decisively cut down, and the trilemma would be resolved into one direction. The EU would then decide or co-decide in all, or almost all, of the policies that are currently ruled by democratic nation-states. This would stop differentiated integration and submit all policy areas to one mode of legitimation, but it would require a number of changes that are neither realist nor workable in the moment, such as EU taxes to finance EU redistribution and common social standards to safeguard one and the same level of protection everywhere.

5. The EU's Common Good versus National Sovereignty

I have argued that, in order to resolve the tensions between trade liberalisation and deregulation on one hand and democratic and social standards in the EU on the other, it is necessary to strengthen democratic and social standards on the EU level. This claim immediately leads to the third trilemma dimension, the one of national sovereignty. As argued above, it is a consequence that it needs to be cut down somewhat further.

As long as this is not the case, an inbuilt tension inherent to the EU will have its way that relates to the last two problem clusters at stake. As intergovernmental and supranational dynamics coexist and are represented in the EU's institutions, these are only partly led by an orientation towards an EU common good, and they are only weakly related to an EU *demos*:

6) The EU's common good: The EU's supranational bodies—the EP and the Commission—are oriented towards the EU's common good, while the intergovernmental bodies—the Council of the European Union and the European Council—are oriented towards the national particular interests (see in detail Tömmel, 2014, pp. 324–330). Moreover, while national governments work in a short-term logic as they want to be re-elected, EU institutions are much more independent from electoral choices (see in detail Hix & Høyland, 2011). This situation creates a tension and a tendency in the EU's system that in a very general way hinders an overall orientation to an EU common good. Such an orientation, however, should be a basic principle of all institutions of a democratic polity. So far, there is not only a weak level of institutional orientation towards an EU common good, there is also no agreement what this common good is about. Should the EU just continue to create an inner market, as it did? Or should it become a truly supranational federation?

7) These questions lead to asking how the distance between EU citizens and elites can be reduced, and how the EU citizenry could turn into a stronger *demos*, i.e., a real and active democratic subject.

It is immediately evident that these two last problem clusters directly relate to national sovereignty and the questions to what extent a common good can be supranational rather than national, and in what respect a *demos* can be EU-related rather than nation-state-oriented. One answer given in the academic debate is that the EU must continue not as democracy, but as demoi-cracy, i.e., as an organisation that continues to be based on the democratic input legitimacy of the member states national *demoi* (see, e.g., Cheneval & Schimmelfennig, 2013; Nicolaïdis, 2013). My argument is obviously—and for a number of reasons—opposed to this view.

As I have argued above, the tensions between democracy, free trade, and social standards in the EU must be seen in their interrelations in the multi-level system between the EU and its member states. If one sticks only to the nation-states and their *demoi* as resource of legitimation, the tensions inflicted by trade liberalisation in the EU remain unchanged and will continue to challenge democratic and social standards. As I have argued, the only way to resolve the trilemma without reducing either democratic or social standards—or without cutting down economic EU integration—is to strengthen democratic standards at EU level and to keep social standards intact, or even better, set them up at EU level as well.

If the member states agreed to this, to protect and create new democratic and social standards, in principle the EU could use the same means that helped to embed capitalism in the nation-state context: laws that regulate trade and protect democracy, accompanied by political debates and representative democratic decision-making on the goals of economic policy. But, as said, this would require treaty changes (making economic policy subject to secondary legislation) and hence unanimity between the EU's governments in the Council, and this prospect does not seem realist at the moment.

As long as such a thorough treaty change is not to be obtained, an interim solution is a compromise. The tensions of the trilemma can be soothed via a mix of different measures and steps that combine mechanisms that strengthen democracy in the EU and help re-regulate the effects of negative integration, without completely playing down the role of the national democratic systems, and while upkeeping their democratic standards. In addition, protection mechanisms in the multi-level system are needed which safeguard what social standards have been achieved. But, to conclude, it needs to be underlined that the tensions described by the trilemma conception are impossible to be completely resolved. If no clear option in the trilemma can be achieved, it can only be hedged in a probably permanently instable way.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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About the Author

Claudia Wiesner is Jean Monnet Chair and Professor for Political Science at Fulda University of Applied Sciences as well as Adjunct Professor in Political Science at Jyväskylä University. Her main research interests lie in the comparative study of democracy, political culture, and political sociology in the EU multilevel system. She especially focuses on changes of concepts and institutions, as well as on the related debates and discourses.

Article

Associations between the Mixture of Governance Modes and the Performance of Local Public Service Delivery

Yin Lei Win Swe [1] and Seunghoo Lim [2,*]

[1] Department of Applied Economics, Yangon University of Economics, 11041 Yangon, Myanmar;
E-Mail: yinleiwinswe@gmail.com
[2] Public Management and Policy Analysis Program, Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan, 9497277 Minami Uonuma, Japan; E-Mail: seunghoo.lim@gmail.com

* Corresponding author

Abstract
Since the Myanmar central government decentralized some of its power to state and regional governments, few studies investigated the performance of local governments, and no studies investigated the relationships between the types of governance modes and the performance of public service delivery. This study investigates the associations between three types of governance—i.e., hierarchy, market, and network—and the multiple performances of agricultural services in terms of the competing public values of efficiency, effectiveness and equity in southern Shan State. The findings indicate that the three types of governance simultaneously coexist in local agriculture departments and that their associations with the performances of public services differ. Network governance is negatively associated with efficiency, effectiveness, and equity during its initial stage, but these associations become positive when the degree of network governance increases in agriculture departments. In contrast, market governance is positively related to effectiveness and equity during its initial stage; however, increasing the degree of market governance further leads to a negative association with both public service values. This assessment of the performance of public programmes in terms of the trade-offs among public service values contributes to improving the local governance of public service delivery not only in Myanmar but also in other developing countries.

1. Introduction

In the economic, political and social sectors in Myanmar, decentralization has been one of the major reforms in the country's administration system since 2011, when the civilian government came to power. The union government has decentralized and delegated some powers to state and regional governments according to the 2008 Constitution. However, in Myanmar, state and regional governments have very limited power relative to the

union government because of the short time required to reform. Although local-level governments have a low level of decentralization in Myanmar, their roles become prominent in delivering public services such as health, education, communication, and water supply. Because of the geography, insurgency, and insufficient skill and capability of government staff, public services still lag far behind a satisfactory level for local residents in some remote areas.

Among the various public services, this study examines the agricultural service provided by the local agri-

culture department in Myanmar. The agriculture sector is the backbone of the country's economy, with 70% of the country's population living in rural areas and most of this group working as farmers (Nyein, 2009). Because of the high labour intensity combined with the low utilization of capital and material input in agricultural production and the undersupply of public goods such as agricultural research and extension, agricultural productivity in Myanmar is lower than in other neighbouring countries, and most of the country's rural farmers are poor (World Bank, 2016). There are still weaknesses in the collaboration between R&D and extension and training institutions, including insufficiency in agriculture credits, underdevelopment of farm mechanization and utilization of farm implements due to the lack of improvement in technology, limited extension budgets and low salaries and incentives for public employees in the agriculture sector (Tin Wai, 2012). The public system cannot provide enough good seeds in Myanmar, while farmers in other Asian countries such as Thailand and Vietnam do not have difficulties with seed availability (World Bank, 2016). Moreover, farmers widely use urea and fertilizers without knowing the appropriate application rate and nutrient composition, and Myanmar farmers' level of fertilizer use is higher than that of farmers in other Asian countries (World Bank, 2016). Therefore, education and training services for farmers are critical and indispensable for enhancing their living standards, and the quality of services provided by the agriculture department requires assessment.

In this study, public service delivery by the local government in the agriculture sector will be examined in 21 townships in southern Shan State. Agriculture plays a crucial role in the economy of Shan State, and farming is the major income source for local residents. Poor knowledge of fertilizer usage and plantation, the accessibility of agricultural loans and grants, and a shortage of workers are major issues for farmers. Growing opium poppy in the hills of southern Shan State is another problem that must be efficiently approached by educating farmers (Department of Agriculture, 2017). Therefore, agricultural education and training services are very important to enhance farmers' knowledge, income, living standards, and agricultural productivity and to eradicate poppy planting. Most of the farmers in this area do not have a formal education or a good understanding of the Myanmar language. Additionally, there are some political instabilities and insurgencies in some townships.

The main functions of the agriculture department include: (i) seed production; (ii) training and education; (iii) research and development; and (iv) human resource development. In Myanmar, agriculture extension attempts to transfer appropriate agricultural technologies to farmers and determine solutions based on research investigating the field problems faced by farmers. The extension delivery methods used in the study area include: (a) Conducting workshops and training for capacity building to improve agricultural techniques, the systematic use of pesticides, fertilizers, and farm implements; (b) launching a special high yielding production programme (the SHY programme) in selected areas for selected crops; (c) establishing efficient contacts between farmers and extension agents through agricultural education camps (farmer field schools) and seasonal demonstrations; and (d) implementing training and visiting systems on farmers' fields (Department of Agriculture, 2017; Zaw Win Tun, personal communication, July 20, 2017).

Public management theories have discussed three types of governance—i.e., hierarchy, market, and network—as ways of solving complex societal problems and providing public services (Yoo & Kim, 2012). These three types of governance coexist in a combined form in each governmental organization, and each service applies a mixture of these three governance modes in various contexts and countries (Keast, Mandell, & Brown, 2006; Meuleman, 2008). However, our knowledge of the connections between these governance modes and their service delivery performances is quite limited. Coelho (2007) found that the effects of different governance modes on the efficiency of the education, health, and social protection systems differ in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, but this study did not sufficiently address the expanded multiple dimensions of performances in the public sector. For example, some previous studies have already employed the 3E framework (i.e., "E"fficiency, "E"ffectiveness, and "E"quity) to assess the performance of public programmes in terms of competing public service values (Andrews & van de Walle, 2013; Guo, Fu, Chui, & Xue, 2017; Oh, Park, & Lim, 2014).

The comprehensive study of the relationships between governance modes and performances in the Myanmar context is timely and urgent as the Myanmar public sector has recently experienced a rapid transition from a hierarchical and militarized regime to a more civilian and democratic regime. Some governance research in Myanmar has focused only on the trend of decentralization, the constitutional framework of local governance, and the government-military relationship in Myanmar (Lai Win & Sripokangkul, 2017; The Asia Foundation, 2013; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Thus, an empirical examination of the relationship between distinct but mixed governance modes and the results of public service delivery in Myanmar could provide relevant information regarding whether these changes could be legitimized from ordinary citizens' efficacies with these changes. The purpose of this study is to investigate the governance structure of public organizations for agricultural public services in Myanmar and the associations of the types of governance with the performances of public service delivery. Accordingly, this research is expected to contribute to improving the system of public service delivery and to furthering studies on the service delivery of local governance in Myanmar.

2. Modes of Governance

Many prior studies on governmental roles have examined organizational and management patterns to explore ways of addressing societal or policy problems and accomplishing public goals. Prior studies have developed and tested three distinctive types of governance modes—i.e., hierarchy, market, and network—and have also examined the relationships among them and how they both engage in trade-offs and coexist. As each mode of governance revolves around the distinct type of relationship (i.e., authoritative integration and supervisory structures given the hierarchical mode of governance, contractual relationships under the market mode of governance, and interdependent relationships based on trust with the network mode of governance), they could be incompatible with one another (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Maurya & Srivastava, in press; Powell, 1991; Williamson, 1985). On the other hand, in terms of problem-solving capacity, they could be complementary to each other; for example, the emergence of market governance was related to the ineffectiveness of hierarchy governance (i.e., government failure), and it has been suggested that network governance addresses the societal problems of both market and government failures (Meuleman, 2008; Rhodes, 1997; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). Therefore, these three types of governance do not stand individually, and no service uses a singular governance mode (Yoo & Kim, 2012).

2.1. Hierarchical Governance

Hierarchical governance is a type of public administration system that is ideal for standardizing governmental tasks (Meuleman, 2008). Weberian bureaucracy is based on the ideas of efficiency and rationality and is one of the fundamental factors in the development of bureaucratic organizations (Meuleman, 2008). Hierarchical governance standardizes rules and procedures to follow, a top-down planning system, power at the top, and a hierarchical supervision system, and it relies heavily on supervisors. The goal of individual employees in a hierarchical structure is to follow the right procedures to provide identical public services to clients, and public employees are controlled by centralized rules to give fair and equal services to the public (Considine & Lewis, 1999; Yoo & Kim, 2012). Due to the carefully and clearly defined procedures, tasks can be established uniformly within the organization. To obtain the desired outcomes, tasks can be divided into sub-processes depending on task specialization, rationality and the structure of the organization (Bednar & Henstra, 2018; Mitchell, 1991). When individuals face societal problems, and cannot tackle the issues, they need to report to their superiors according to the hierarchical modes of supervision; there is close supervision, and supervisors know a considerable amount about their subordinates' daily activities. Therefore, hierarchical modes lead to systematic and obedient organization with uniform results.

However, some scholars criticized the hierarchical type of governance. Hierarchical governance lost some of its popularity in the mid-1970s, even if other types of governance were not yet clearly defined (Considine & Lewis, 2003). In a hierarchically structured organization, power is at the top; scholars have criticized this type of organization for being a monocentric system and pointed out the need for a polycentric system to address more complex, wicked societal problems in public administration (Meuleman, 2008). Interdependent decision-making and coordination within and outside of the organization were considered necessary factors, and organizational goals were believed to be achieved by cooperating with other partners. Herbst (1976) stated that the assumptions of hierarchical governance did not suit a complex environment anymore. In particular, under the New Public Management (NPM) concept in the 1980s, policy makers adopted the idea that decentralization plays a key role in improving the efficiency of organizations, and market-type governance became popular.

2.2. Market Governance

Market governance functions like an external market within an organization, and it involves the establishment of a quasi- or internal market in the internal activities of a public organization (Considine & Lewis, 1999; Thompson, Frances, Levacic, & Mitchell, 1991).

Market governance was born in the 1980s based on the market logic and functions under the NPM concept. The main idea of NPM is to incorporate efficiency concepts, procedures and principles from the private sector into the public sector, and this idea was based on the belief that market logic and mechanisms lead to greater performance (Brown, Ryan, & Parker, 2000; Considine, 1996; Considine & Lewis, 1999). Market governance has fewer rules and regulations and greater managerial flexibility for public employees relative to hierarchical governance (Considine & Lewis, 2003). Market logic replaced the strict rules and rigid system of hierarchical governance with a flexible management style, customer orientation and contractual basis for service delivery to reduce costs and offer multiple choices to customers through competition. Market governance became popular in the 1990s and has led governments to work with smart buyers when contracting out using competitive tenders to deliver public services to clients (Considine & Lewis, 2003; Yoo & Kim, 2012). Therefore, as a result of this type of governance, individual employees make flexible decisions depending on the different needs of clients when they are providing public services and goods.

Under NPM practices, constituents are considered customers of public programmes and services, and bureaucrats engage with citizens regarding public programmes and services for public interests to efficiently generate positive public recognition (Willoughby, 2014). In contrast with NPM in the ability to solve policy problems that can be addressed only through interdepen-

dent policy decision-making, hierarchical governance lost some of its attractiveness (Meuleman, 2008). In many modern government bureaus, market-driven options, such as privatization and contracting out, are employed, and organizational operations are decentralized rather than operating through traditional hierarchical structures and command-and-control governance (Willoughby, 2014). Additionally, clients can choose among diverse services available due to the increased competition in public service delivery (Yoo & Kim, 2012).

Market governance faced the criticism that, for many reasons, public organizations are different from private organizations and that business-like logic and practices sometimes fail in the public sector because citizens' roles extend beyond those of customers, and thus they cannot be viewed only as customers. In addition, the notion that public services are provided based on customer choices and satisfaction is questionable because the provision of public services is based on an adequate financial condition and budget allocation of public departments. The NPM concept of flexible management can conflict with some strict procedures and mandates in civil service and contribute to low morale in public administration, and privatization is also a short-term solution (Meuleman, 2008). The transition to a market-driven mode of governance tended to diminish the publicness of services in terms of eroding the public–private distinction, shrinking the socio-economic role, narrowing the composition of services recipients, worsening the conditions of accountability, and reducing the level of public trust (Haque, 2001).

2.3. Network Governance

Network governance is the management of complex societies through interdependent decisions among different actors. It has also been developed in Western public administration, with networking playing an important role in open democracy and the information technology revolution upgrading its importance in social life (Meuleman, 2008). Since the 1970s, many politicians and stakeholders have wanted different parties to participate in the public policy decision-making process. In addition, they preferred multi-actor policy making rather than a single controlling system. They expected that less control and more collaboration with other organizations could contribute to the effectiveness of public service delivery. Cooperation and interactions with various organizations to reach a common agreement among different views can contribute to the best solution for the public. It is believed that interdependent decision-making among different actors, the combination of different opinions, and less control and command may lead to improved effectiveness of public organizations (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Meuleman, 2008). Although hierarchical governance and market governance have been recognized as key modes, they cannot solve many issues associated with complex public programmes; thus, the

importance of network governance must be considered (Keast et al., 2006). This type of governance provides horizontal coordination to improve organizational effectiveness, whereas market governance suggests decentralization and privatization (Bednar & Henstra, 2018; Meuleman, 2008).

Network governance became a popular governance mode in the 1990s, as policymakers believed that it could solve more complex societal problems through collaboration and building trust among participants such as clients, suppliers, producers, and decision makers in a network (Considine & Lewis, 2003; Ebrahimi & Lim, 2018; Htein, Lim, & Zaw, 2018; Vitiea & Lim, 2019). A network makes better decisions for clients by increasing collaboration and interdependence with other organizations, and government rules are established to promote cooperative procedures among participants (Yoo & Kim, 2012). The enterprise and network governance modes are currently operating as norms of public service delivery in addition to the older form of the hierarchical governance mode in modern societies (Considine & Lewis, 2003).

3. Multiple Dimensions of Public Service Performance in Terms of Public Values

As mentioned above, to address complex public problems, it has become more important to utilize a mixture of the three governance modes and select optimal mixes (Keast et al., 2006). However, prior studies rarely discuss how a mixture of diverse governance modes could be matched to the outcomes, results, or situations of the competing modes desired by the citizens in a society. Although assessing the performance of the public sector is difficult, evaluating public sector performance in terms of competing norms and public values is important. Evaluation methods measure the actual quality and extent of public service delivery, the competency and management of public employees, and the extent of benefits that citizens receive. This type of policy or programme evaluation helps provide information on the functioning of actual programmes established and delivered, the management patterns of public administrators, and the performance of public service delivery (Guo et al., 2017). However, the three public service values of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity are completely different and there are trade-offs among them; a complete welfare scheme should have all three of these dimensions (Guo et al., 2017).

3.1. Efficiency

Efficiency can be achieved by producing the same amount of outputs with fewer inputs. The amount of expenditure, the size of the labour force, and the time used for a particular service represent the public service inputs. Efficiency relates to cost-saving and time-saving ways to achieve the desire output, and it does not focus on the quality of the output and its distribution.

Therefore, efficiency could conflict with the other public service values of effectiveness and equity. Efficiency is related to the input–output relationship and productivity and is concerned with achieving maximum outcomes while minimizing costs (Guo et al., 2017). Efficiency can be achieved by reducing the amount of resources or inputs—i.e., time, money, and costs—used to produce the output. Technical efficiency depends on the extent to which the government reduces or saves costs when delivering public services. Contracting and privatization are approaches that public organizations have adopted to reduce costs (Oh et al., 2014). Although cost saving leads to efficiency, the quality of public services is not necessarily good, and the distribution of services is not necessarily equal (Oh et al., 2014).

3.2. Effectiveness

Effectiveness refers to the measurement of the achievement of the goals and objectives of public programmes (Oh et al., 2014). Effectiveness is an important value in the measurement of government performance because it is associated with the realization of the ultimate outcomes of public services. If a government organization emphasizes improved effectiveness, i.e., better quality of services, then effectiveness may not be associated with cost saving. Effectiveness is a criterion for assessing the achievement of desired results. Previous scholars have believed that efficiency could not be attained without effectiveness because achieving the desired goal is more important and because effectiveness is a necessary condition for achieving efficiency (Mihaiu, Opreana, & Cristescu, 2010). Furthermore, effectiveness is more difficult to measure than efficiency because effectiveness involves assessing the achievement of the intended goals of programmes or policies, which may not be tangible or easily observable because public policies and programmes have both economic and social effects (Mihaiu et al., 2010).

3.3. Equity

Equity is the third public service value for the measurement of government performance regarding public services. Although equity is difficult to measure in the real world (Oh et al., 2014), the principle of equity is to measure the extent to which the allocation of services or distribution of outputs achieves fairness among the participants or service recipients. Equity is measured in terms of the extent to which public services are distributed fairly and equally among citizens, including disadvantaged groups. Equity refers to the degree to which a public organization can fulfil the requirements, demands, and needs of diverse citizens within a community (Andrews & van de Walle, 2013). Equity is a criterion for measuring the degree of fairness in the allocation of resources and social benefits among a particular group of people (Guo et al., 2017). Therefore, the concept of eq-uity entails the availability of the same quality of public services between poor people and wealthy people.

4. Research Method

4.1. Background of the Study Area

Shan State is the largest state and has the greatest ethnic diversity among the fourteen regions and states of Myanmar. Its geography, topography, hilly and rugged terrain, and armed conflicts among ethnic groups have shaped the complicated socio-economic conditions of the inhabitants of Shan State for centuries (UNDP, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). The remoteness of some areas suggest that this area still requires a well-functioning social infrastructure for transportation (lack of rural and urban roads), electricity (low levels of access to electricity), education (a shortage of qualified teachers), health (lack of trained personnel and medical equipment and the cost of medication), and agriculture sectors (poor knowledge regarding agriculture techniques), including educating farmers on poppy eradication and substitution because drug use and drug trade represent serious issues in Shan State (Centre for Diversity and National Harmony [CDNH], 2018; UNDP, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). The cultivation of opium poppy is increasing because it requires a lower effort to obtain and provides a guaranteed return to farmers (CDNH, 2018). There is some relationship between the opium production economy and armed conflicts (Buchanan, 2016; Meehan, 2015).

Many various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have rebelled in Shan State since Myanmar gained independence in 1948. Although Shan State has the highest number of EAOs among other states, there are only two EAOs in Shan South, i.e., the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and Pa-Oh National Organization (PNO). PNO signed ceasefire since 1991 and has highly cooperated with the government in administering local populations through both the Pa-Oh Self-Administered Zone (SAZ) and its people's militia force. The PNO has become a political party and won all seats in Pa-Oh SAZ in the 2010 and 2015 elections. However, RCSS signed a ceasefire in 2011 and was permitted to have bases and locate in all rural areas. Although there have been many clashes between the RCSS and the Military over territorial disputes, such clashes declined in 2014 and 2015 in Shan South and Shan East (Burke, Williams, Barron, Jolliffe, & Carr, 2017; Callahan & Zaw Oo, 2019; Jolliffe, 2015).

This study covers only the delivery of agricultural services in southern Shan State in Myanmar. Three districts, i.e., Taunggyi, Loilen, and Langkho, are included in southern Shan State. Taunggyi district comprises 10 townships, Loilen district comprises seven townships, and Langkho district comprises four townships. There are two SAZs within Taunggyi district, i.e., Pa-Oh SAZ and Da-Nu SAZ (CDNH, 2018; Jolliffe, 2015). In total, 21 townships are included in this study; three townships are located in Pa-Oh SAZ, and two townships are located in Da-Nu SAZ.

PNO's administration over SAZ is nominal, and the governance structure and social services are almost the same as those in other government-controlled areas (Jolliffe, 2015). Because of the non-Da-Nu people purchase and take-over of some agricultural areas within the Da-Nu SAZ, the influence of the Da-Nu people is declining in their own SAZ (CDNH, 2018). Agriculture is the largest economic sector in Shan State, followed by the mining sector and tourism sector (CDNH, 2018). In this area, difficulties in accessing agricultural loans and grants, the shortage of workers in farming, poor knowledge of fertilizer and pesticide usages, and soil erosion are major issues for farmers (CDNH, 2018; Department of Agriculture, 2017). Furthermore, staff shortage leading to the inability to share information and knowledge with farmers, communication difficulties caused by differences in language, financial budget constraints, and political insurgencies and instability are major issues for the agriculture department (Department of Agriculture, 2017; Zaw Win Tun, personal communication, July 20, 2017).

Nationally, after five decades of authoritative military control, Myanmar has initiated a critical transition to an elected civilian government, and locally, Shan South is in the processes of armed-conflict reduction, but many national and local tensions are continuously challenging the tenuous political transformation. Therefore, currently, examining citizens' satisfactions and efficacies with these changes in governance modes and the outcomes pursued by local residents is urgently needed.

4.2. Data Collection

The necessary primary data were collected from local agriculture authorities and farmers through separate questionnaires. Overall, data from 275 farmers and 155 agricultural officers in 21 townships were collected in this study.

4.3. Measurements

4.3.1. Dependent Variables

The multiple performance values of public service delivery based on the 3E framework that target a specific policy instrument (i.e., workshop training) are the dependent variables in this study. Policy instruments refer to tools utilized by policy makers to transform a policy into specific outcomes (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 1998; Salamon, 2002).

In the study, survey data about the farmers' perceptions of the quality of the local agricultural service from the multiple competing public value perspectives of efficiency, effectiveness and equity were collected in the local research area through a questionnaire based on the following measurements adapted from Andrews and van de Walle (2013). In this study, efficiency is measured by the perceived value of the time the farmers spent receiving agricultural public services. Therefore, the farmers are asked whether the time spent attending the information sharing workshops was worthwhile. The efficiency of the public sector can be measured by the relationship between the economic and social benefits (output) resulting from the implemented programmes and the monetary and nonmonetary resources (input) used to implement those programmes (Mihaiu et al., 2010). Effectiveness is measured by whether the agricultural methods or techniques promulgated by the agriculture departments have been adopted by the farmers. The main objective of agricultural services is to promulgate systematic and modernized methods and educate farmers regarding these methods. Effectiveness is an indicator reflecting the achievement (outcome) of the implemented programmes (Mihaiu et al., 2010). To measure equity, farmers are asked whether they agree that educational/training services are distributed equally among all of the farmers living in the same township. Equity is measured by the extent to which public services are distributed fairly and equally among the citizens (Oh et al., 2014). To measure the three dependent variables, this study uses a dichotomous variable: If the farmers respond that the public services are efficient, effective, or equal, then that variable is coded as "1," otherwise it is coded as "0" (see Annex, Table A1).

4.3.2. Independent Variables

The independent variables in this study are the three governance modes with their distinctive features. This study follows and adapts the methods to measure these variables developed by Yoo and Kim (2012). These authors adopted six characteristics—i.e., rules, discretion, supervision, clients, goals, and the environment—to measure the governance modes. These three main independent variables (hierarchy, market, and network) are measured by using 7-point Likert-type scales (see Annex, Table A1) ranging from strongly disagree (= 1) to strongly agree (= 7).

4.4. Estimation Method

To examine the relationships between governance types and the three public service values, this article applied the Heckman selection model. Because some farmers have never attended the agricultural training workshop programmes conducted by agriculture departments, the relationships between governance types and the three public values should be examined only among farmers who received agricultural services, i.e., those who attended the training workshops. The Heckman selection model offers consistent and efficient estimates by providing a way to correct for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). It is a two-equation model that includes the outcome equation and the selection equation. The outcome equation for this study is as follows:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \cdots + \beta_n x_{ni} + u_i \text{ and } u_i \sim N(0, \sigma_u^2)$$

Where:

y_i = Efficiency, effectiveness, and equity;
x_{1i} = Hierarchical governance;
x_{2i} = Market governance;
x_{3i} = Network governance;
x_{4i} = Age of the farmers;
x_{5i} = Years of education of the farmers;
x_{6i} = Occupation statuses of the farmers;
x_{7i} = Years of farming;
x_{8i} = Sizes of acres;
x_{9i} = Numbers of crops.

The outcome equation examines the relationships between governance types and public service values. Next, the selection equation is as follows:

$$s_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 z_{1i} + \delta_2 z_{2i} + \cdots + \delta_n z_{ni} + e_i \text{ and } e_i \sim N(0, 1),$$

Where:

s_i = Farmers' workshop attendance (i.e., farmers attended the workshop if $s_i > 0$, $s_i = 1$ if $s_i > 0$, and $s_i = 0$ if $s_i \leq 0$);
z_{1i} = Gender;
z_{2i} = Age of the farmers;
z_{3i} = Years of education of the farmers;
z_{4i} = Majority ethnicity;
z_{5i} = Occupation statuses of the farmers;
z_{6i} = Years of farming;
z_{7i} = Sizes of acres;
z_{8i} = Numbers of crops.

The selection equation tests whether the farmers attended the educational/training workshops conducted by agriculture departments (Yes: 1; No: 0).

5. Results

This study applied the Heckman selection model to analyse the relationships between governance types and the three public service values regarding the policy instrument of workshop training. The three models are presented in Table 1: Model 1 regresses the independent and control variables on the efficiency measurement; Model 2 regresses the same variables on effectiveness; and Model 3 regresses on equity.

The results of Models 1 to 3 show that hierarchical governance is not significantly related to efficiency, effectiveness, or equity. Thus, in this study, the fixed rules and procedures, close supervision, and top-down operation structures of hierarchical governance cannot generate positive effects on the three performance values of public service delivery, implying that the local grievances expressed by Shan State farmers are a result of authoritarian, exclusionary, or hierarchical governance practices.

Market governance is not significantly related to efficiency in Model 1 but is significantly related to effectiveness in Model 2 and to equity in Model 3. Market governance is positively related to effectiveness (Model 2: $\beta = 5.43$, $p < .01$) and equity (Model 3: $\beta = 5.33$, $p < .01$)

in the initial stage market mechanisms used by agriculture departments, but is negatively related to effectiveness (Model 2: $\beta = -.24$, $p < .01$) and equity (Model 3: $\beta = -.24$, $p < .01$) when agriculture departments use market mechanisms to a greater extent. These results imply that using market governance tools and practices such as fostering competition among public employees and attempting to achieve the maximum returns initially generates positive outcomes; however, further implementation of market mechanisms can lead to negative outcomes in agricultural public service delivery.

In addition, the results of Models 1 through 3 indicate that network governance progresses at the expense of efficiency (Model 1: $\beta = -.52$, $p < .05$), effectiveness (Model 2: $\beta = -.71$, $p < .01$), and equity (Model 3: $\beta = -.51$, $p < .10$) in its initial stage but is positively related to efficiency (Model 1: $\beta = .01$, $p < .05$), effectiveness (Model 2: $\beta = .02$, $p < .01$) and equity (Model 3: $\beta = .01$, $p < .10$) when there is a higher degree of network governance in agriculture departments. These results demonstrate that the higher the extent of network governance, the higher the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of agriculture departments. These relationships imply that, to some degree, network governance requires trust to be built among the different actors to allow the government to make cooperative decisions with other organizations, and such trust, contacts, and interactions among different actors cannot be initiated, forged, or formed immediately.

In the selection equation, the number of years of education is positively associated with workshop attendance (Model 1: $\beta = .13$, $p < .01$; Model 2: $\beta = .12$, $p < .01$; Model 3: $\beta = .11$, $p < .01$). These results demonstrate that the higher the farmers' educational level, the more likely they are to attend the educational and training workshops conducted by agriculture departments. Belonging to an ethnic majority group (i.e., Shan) in the research site is also positively related to workshop attendance (Model 1: $\beta = .62$, $p < .05$; Model 2: $\beta = .54$, $p < .05$; Model 3: $\beta = .53$, $p < .05$). These findings indicate that opportunities to attend workshops are offered to the ethnic majority group in this area more often than other ethnic minority groups. The diversity of crops cultivated by farmers is negatively related to workshop attendance (Model 1: $\beta = -.15$, $p < .05$; Model 2: $\beta = -.16$, $p < .05$; Model 3: $\beta = -.15$, $p < .05$). Thus, the greater the number of crops planted by the farmers, the less likely they are to participate in workshops.

6. Conclusion

This study analysed the associations between the three types of governance and the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of the agricultural services provided by local agriculture departments. The findings indicate that the local agriculture departments employed all three governance types—i.e., hierarchy, market, and network—to deliver agricultural services and that these three modes

Table 1. Assessing the relationships between governance types and the three multiple public values for attendance at training workshops.

	Model 1 (Efficiency)	Model 2 (Effectiveness)	Model 3 (Equity)
Outcome Equation = Multiple Values of Public Service Delivery			
Hierarchy	−.38 (1.65)	1.60 (2.44)	3.91 (3.39)
Market	.84 (1.10)	5.43 (2.01) ***	5.33 (1.99) ***
Network	−.52 (.22) **	−.71 (.27) ***	−.51 (.28) *
Hierarchy ^{2}	.008 (.05)	−.03 (.07)	−.09 (.09)
Market ^{2}	−.032 (.05)	−.24 (.09) ***	−.24 (.09) ***
Network ^{2}	.01 (.01) **	.02 (.01) ***	.01 (.01) *
Age	−.006 (.01)	.02 (.01)	−.02 (.02)
Years of Education	.04 (.03)	.03 (.04)	.004 (.04)
Occupation Status	−.43 (.50)	.56 (.64)	.25 (.59)
Years of Farming	.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.003 (.02)
Acres Cultivated	−.03 (.13)	.06 (.14)	.16 (.14)
No. of crops	.05 (.06)	.09 (.07)	.03 (.07)
Selection Equation = Attending the Training Workshops or Not			
Gender	−.51 (.35)	−.36 (.37)	−.44 (.35)
Age	.05 (.07)	.06 (.07)	.06 (.05)
Age ^{2}	−.0002 (.00)	−.0003 (.00)	−.0004 (.00)
Years of Education	.13 (.04) ***	.12 (.04) ***	.11 (.03) ***
Majority Ethnicity	.62 (.26) **	.54 (.26) **	.53 (.26) **
Occupation Status	.093 (.72)	−.11 (.69)	.03 (.70)
Years of Farming	.062 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.03)
Years of Farming ^{2}	−.001 (.00)	−.001 (.00)	−.001 (.00)
Acres Cultivated	.17 (.18)	.15 (.17)	.16 (.17)
No. of crops	−.15 (.07) **	−.16 (.07) **	−.15 (.06) **
Rho	.99	.99	1.00
Wald Chi2	14.20	20.04	22.93
Selected	237	237	237
Non-selected	38	38	38
Wald test of rho = 0			
Chi2(1)	6.81	3.67	3.36
Prob > Chi2	.00	.05	.06

Notes: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Standard errors are in parentheses.

coexist in agriculture departments. Thus, these three types of governance developed sequentially and simultaneously affect governmental organizations (Keast et al., 2006; Yoo & Kim, 2012). Extending beyond the consistent findings reported in previous public governance studies, we empirically and comprehensively showed the connections between the governance types and multiple results or outcomes of public services. All three types have their own virtues in delivering public services, and employing a combination of the three governance modes rather than relying on a single government mode is necessary for improving the performance and accountability of public services in a complementary way. Utilizing a single mode independently is not sufficiently effective to produce better public programmes, and a single mode cannot respond to the changing environment and complex societal demands.

Furthermore, our attention was paid to the dynamics between the mixture of governance modes and public service outcomes as previous studies have not answered the question of which governance mode and corresponding institutional arrangements could be optimal for which types of public values and interests in a society. This study demonstrated that mixed governance modes can differentially affect each public value depending on the evolutionary or developmental stages of each governance mode. First, market governance is positively associated with effectiveness and equity during the initial stage of the implementation of market mechanisms in agriculture departments; however, this relationship becomes negative after the optimal point, indicating that too strong a dependence on market practices and schemes within agriculture departments decreases effectiveness and equity. Thus, the increasing

use of market behaviour in public organizations and the diminishing use of internal rules lead to a distortion and displacement of the organizations' original goals and objectives (Fox, 1974; Lane, 1991). Too much marketization could lead to a loss in the public interest concept and a collapse of the organizational structure of the public sector (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000).

In contrast, network governance is negatively related to efficiency, effectiveness, and equity during the initial stage of the implementation of network governance mechanisms, but this relationship becomes positive when network-oriented operations become more strongly incorporated in agriculture departments. At the initial implementation stage of network governance mechanisms, mutual trust, and collaborative behaviours among different actors are not strong enough to obtain positive results. Trust is essential for team building and group work but can be broken anytime as networks are open (Meuleman, 2008). However, after networking has reached the optimal degree, the mutual trust and collaborative relationships among the different participants have become strong, and the transaction costs are reduced; thus, the intended effects of network governance on performance values are achieved.

Local agriculture departments are currently coordinating with numerous organizations, including international non-governmental organizations, such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the UNDP, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Food and Agriculture Organization; private companies selling and distributing pesticides and fertilizers; other departments under the same ministry, such as the Irrigation and Water Utilization Management Department, the Department of Agriculture Land Management and Statistics, and the Myanmar Agriculture Development Bank; and other ministries, such as the Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry. The participation of many different actors in public service delivery and the resultant coordination of different views for the production of better performance are key concepts in network governance. Public officials employing network governance can establish effective collaborations between suppliers, producers, and customers through a much more flexible way of developing the quality of service (Considine & Lewis, 1999). The role of the government is not merely to direct all actions through rigid regulations and decrees; rather, it should bring other participants to the table to negotiate and facilitate solutions to public problems to improve community interests (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). To achieve the community's shared goals, local agriculture departments should coordinate and cooperate with other organizations and invite the varied perspectives of farmers with empathy and trust. In the Myanmar civil service system, collaboration across administration bodies and shared decision making are still needed to upgrade performance (Htay Lwin, 2014).

Finally, hierarchical governance does not have any significant effect on any public service performance measure. Myanmar public administration is still in a centralized nature of administration with the lack of sufficient impetus. The high and complicated bureaucratic procedures of most public departments should be solved, and giving incentives and motivation may lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness in civil services in Myanmar (Htay Lwin, 2014). Regarding market governance, the higher the degree of market behaviour, the lower the effectiveness, and equity of agricultural services. However, the higher the degree of implementation of network mechanisms, the higher the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of agricultural services. The results show that market governance and network governance form a complementary pattern in the agricultural services in the study area. While the implementation of market mechanisms leads to a disintegration of the organizational structure of the public sector, network governance reintegrates this structure (Davis & Rhodes, 2000).

The implication is that using only one governance mode in agriculture departments is inadequate to respond to the diverse demands of society. Each governance mode has its own advantages and disadvantages, and applying only one mode can cause problems (Keast et al., 2006). The weak points of hierarchical governance and market governance have led to network-based ideas and concepts in public administration (Keast et al., 2006). Democracy, community, and the public interest should be considered, and public employees should pay attention to serving and empowering citizens rather than controlling and steering the community (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). However, the best ideas of hierarchical governance and market governance should not be lost while adopting the new concepts of network governance.

Education, training, and the provision of resources such as agriculture loans, seeds, and fertilizers are capacity instruments among other policy tools (Schneider & Ingram, 1990). The Department of Agriculture is currently providing high yielding variety of seeds and fertilizer to substitute opium poppy cultivation by organizing formal workshops in this study area (Department of Agriculture, 2017; Zaw Win Tun, personal communication, July 20, 2017). However, there is no significant improvement, and poppy production is still increasing in these areas (Meehan, 2015) mainly due to the large gap between the profit gained from normal seasonal crops and the profit gained from opium crops. Moreover, cultivating opium crops is largely related to ethnic armed conflict in these areas. The participation and empowerment of farmers are important for improving agricultural services. Oo and Ando (2012) noted that mass media should be used in agriculture extension to rapidly deliver uniform information to and properly inform farmers. Because of poor transportation, an inadequate number of instructors (extension staff), and a large number of farmers to reach, extension methods that use farm and home visits have encountered some problems. However, incentives for public employees are also needed to mo-

tivate them to deliver services efficiently, effectively, and equitably. It is also necessary to improve the transparency in the payment system for hardship allowance and in-kind allowance in remote areas to motivate civil services (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2017).

In addition, recruiting public employees who can understand and speak the regional language in the area studied is necessary because communication difficulties are a major issue affecting the efficient delivery of public services. The Burmese language is the common language of Myanmar, and all ethnicities have their own languages (Smith, 1994). In this study area, some local farmers use and understand only their own ethnic language, such as the Shan language, Pa-Oh language, etc., and they do not understand the Burmese language very well, especially in remote areas. However, some local farmers living near urban areas can speak and understand both the Burmese language and their own language, which is also related to their education level. The finding in the selection equation also shows that workshop attendance is positively related to the education level of the farmers.

Although there are two SAZs, i.e., Pa-Oh and Da-Nu, and one ceasefire EAO, i.e., RCSS, in this study area, this study could not consider "mixed administration" and its effect on public service delivery. If this factor was included in our analysis, it could produce more relevant information regarding public service delivery in Shan State. Despite this limitation, the distinct and differentiated effects of each governance mode on competing public values observed in this study should help all local governments that deliver public services not only in Myanmar but also in developing countries.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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About the Authors

Yin Lei Win Swe is Assistant Lecturer in Economics in the Department of Applied Economics at the Yangon University of Economics, Myanmar. Her specializations are public policy process, macroeconomic policy, economic development, public administration, and public management.

Seunghoo Lim is Professor of Public Policy at the International University of Japan, where he is the Director of the Public Management and Policy Analysis Program. His specializations are public policy process, network governance, policy tools, and public/nonprofit management. His research has appeared in refereed journals, including *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory*, *Public Administration & Development*, *Public Performance & Management Review*, *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, and *Public Personnel Management*, among others.

Annex

Table A1. Measurements and sources of the variables.

Variables	Measurements	Sources of Data
Dependent variables		
Efficiency	Whether the time spent attending the information sharing workshops conducted by the agriculture department was worthwhile. (Yes: 1; No: 0)	Service seekers (farmers) through survey questionnaires
Effectiveness	Whether the methods promulgated by agriculture department officers were adopted. (Yes: 1; No: 0)	
Equity	Whether the educational/training services were equally available to all the farmers living in the same township. (Yes: 1; No: 0)	
Independent variables		
Hierarchy	Rules, discretion, supervision, clients, goals, and the environment (7-point Likert-type scales)	Service providers (agricultural officers) through the survey questionnaires
Market	Rules, discretion, supervision, clients, goals, and the environment (7-point Likert-type scales)	
Network	Rules, discretion, supervision, clients, goals, and the environment (7-point Likert-type scales)	
Farmers' years of experience	The number of years that the farmers have worked as farmers.	Service seekers (farmers) through survey questionnaires
Workshop attendance	Attendance or non-attendance at workshops conducted by the agriculture department. (Yes: 1; No: 0)	
Age	The age of the farmers	
Gender	The gender of the farmers (Male: 1; Female: 0)	
Education	The years of education completed/attended by the farmers	
Ethnicity/race	The ethnicity of the farmers (Shan: 1; Non-Shan, including Pa-Oh, Bamar, Inn-Thar, Da-Nu, Taung-Yo, Pa-Laung, Yinn, and others: 0)	
Status of the farmers	Self-employed: 1; Tenants: 0	
Size of area cultivated	How many acres do the respondents cultivate? (1) None (= 0); (2) Below 5 acres (= 1); (3) 5–10 acres (= 2); (4) 11–20 acres (= 3); (5) 21–30 acres (= 4); (6) 31–40 acres (= 5); (7) 41–50 acres (= 6); (8) Above 50 acres (= 7)	
Types of products (number of crops)	How many crops do the farmers cultivate? (1) Rice; (2) Corn; (3) Potato; (4) Tomato; (5) Ginger; (6) Garlic; (7) Soy bean; (8) Tea; (9) Coffee; (10) Vegetable; (11) Flower; (12) Peas and beans; (13) Orchard crops (crops grown in orchards)	

Table A2. Descriptive statistics.

Variables	Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
Gender	275	.88	*	0	1
Age	275	41.87	11.89	14	80
Majority Ethnicity	275	.44	*	0	1
Years of Education	275	6.79	3.02	0	14
Occupation Status	275	.95	*	0	1
Years of Farming	275	21.04	12.60	1	60
Acres Cultivated	275	1.43	.76	0	7
No. of Crops	275	3.53	1.66	1	10
Workshop Attendance	275	.86	*	0	1
Efficiency	275	.19	*	0	1
Effectiveness	275	.16	*	0	1
Equity	275	.16	*	0	1
Hierarchy	275	17.92	1.30	15	21
Market	275	11.57	1.50	8	14
Network	275	18.41	3.49	11	23

Notes: * designates binary variable (0, 1).

Article

Identifying Profiles of Democracies: A Cluster Analysis Based on the Democracy Matrix Dataset from 1900 to 2017

Oliver Schlenkrich

Chair of Comparative Politics and German Government, University of Wuerzburg, 97074 Würzburg, Germany;
E-Mail: oliver.schlenkrich@uni-wuerzburg.de

Abstract
This study examines types of democracies that result from trade-offs within the democratic quality. Recently, the existence and relevance of trade-offs has been widely discussed. The idea is that the functions associated with the quality of democracy cannot all be maximized simultaneously. Thus, trade-offs are expressed in distinct profiles of democracy. Different profiles of democracy favour certain democracy dimensions over others due to their institutional design. Conceptually, we differentiate between four different democracy profiles: a libertarian-majoritarian (high political freedom, lower political equality, and lower political and legal control values), an egalitarian-majoritarian (high equality combined with lower freedom and control values), as well as two control-focused democracy profiles (high control values either with high degrees of freedom or high degrees of equality). We apply a cluster analysis with a focus on cluster validation on the Democracy Matrix dataset—a customized version of the Varieties-of-Democracy dataset. To increase the robustness of the cluster results, this study uses several different cluster algorithms, multiple fit indices as well as data resampling techniques. Based on all democracies between 1900 and 2017, we find strong empirical evidence for these democracy profiles. Finally, we discuss the temporal development and spatial distribution of the democracy profiles globally across the three waves of democracy, as well as for individual countries.

Issue
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1. Introduction

How can we make sense of all the different institutional designs of democracies? Ordering the political reality is an important task of comparative politics. Therefore, typologies are a useful and necessary tool. Typologies structure the confusing political reality by reducing empirical complexity and focusing on its most relevant aspects. Various efforts have been made to capture the fundamental institutional choices in the diverse and heterogeneous world of democracies (Bogaards, 2017): For example, democracies are divided into parliamentary and presidential systems (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Steffani, 1979), collective and competitive veto points (Birchfield

& Crepaz, 1998; Crepaz & Moser, 2004), decentralized and centripetal democracies (Gerring & Thacker, 2008), or nation-state and state-nation institutions (Stepan, Linz, & Yadav, 2010). The most influential proposal is Lijphart's (2012) typology of majoritarian and consensus democracy which has been much debated and considerably criticized (Bormann, 2010; Fortin, 2008; Giuliani, 2016; Kaiser, 1997; Lauth, 2010).

Recently, the quality of democracy research began to distinguish between different types or profiles of democracies, concluding that a perfect democracy does not exist. A democracy cannot perform at its best in all dimensions and functions simultaneously. Rather "every democratic country must make an inherently value-

laden choice about what *kind* of democracy it wishes to be" (Diamond & Morlino, 2004, p. 21). There are trade-offs between central dimensions and functions of democracy. Thereby, democracies emphasize some dimensions or functions, while others are necessarily neglected. Newer measurements of democracies (e.g., Democracy Barometer, V-Dem) try to explore this idea. On a preliminary basis, the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann, Merkel, Müller, Giebler, & Weßels, 2012) identifies several different clusters of democracies. V-Dem examines the possibility of trade-offs in their conceptual papers and highlights the tension between institutions of the liberal and majoritarian conception of democracy (Coppedge et al., 2011). However, these democracy measures are not able to measure different democracy profiles (e.g., countries can have high degrees of democratic quality in each dimension).

In this article, we draw on the novel dataset of the Democracy Matrix (Lauth & Schlenkrich, 2018a) which is a customized version of the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al., 2018). It is a measurement instrument which is not only designed to gauge the quality of democracy, but also to capture several trade-offs between dimensions caused by specific institutional choices of the democracies. It proposes various trade-offs between three fundamental democracy dimensions, namely political freedom, political equality, and political and legal control. Conceptually, the Democracy Matrix identifies four democracy profiles: Libertarian-majoritarian democracies stress the freedom dimension over both the equality and control dimension; egalitarian-majoritarian democracies focus on the equality dimension but neglect freedom and control. In addition, it is possible that there can be a mix between high freedom and control dimensions (libertarian-control-focused democracy) as well as a mix between high equality values and high control values (egalitarian-controlled-focused democracy). This study applies a cluster analysis with validation strategies to this dataset to empirically test whether we can find these conceptually proposed democracy profiles.

This article proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the conceptualization and measurement of the Democracy Matrix. Section 3, the methodology section, presents the multiple steps of the cluster analysis and the cluster validation strategies. Finally, the results of the cluster analysis are presented (Section 4) and discussed (Section 5), followed by a conclusion (Section 6).

2. The Democracy Matrix: Trade-Offs and Democracy Profiles

2.1. Democracy Conception

How can we reasonably define democracy? In democracy theory, three different conceptual ranges became apparent: minimal definitions, middle-range definitions, and maximal definitions. Although there is a large scien-

tific consensus on the minimal definition of democracy—the repeated holding of elections with competition and broad participation, it has become clear that a nuanced view on the quality of democracy, especially for established democracies, is not possible within the boundaries of this definition. Maximal definitions overstretch the concept of democracy by focusing on socio-economic outcomes unrelated to the democratic procedures which are the real focus of the analysis (welfare state within the social democracy concept). However, middle-range definitions supplement the minimal democracy concept only insofar as this is necessary for a differentiated analysis and thus, the definition remains within the limits of a narrow and procedural understanding of democracy. The democracy concept of the Democracy Matrix (Lauth, 2015; Lauth & Schlenkrich, 2018a) is based on such a middle-ranged understanding of democracy.

The Democracy Matrix combines three dimensions with five central democratic functions: While the dimension of freedom captures the extent of citizens' free self-determination based on civil and political rights, the equality dimension encompasses legal egalitarianism and the actual realization of those rights (input-egalitarianism). The control dimension takes into account the protection of the two other dimensions through legal control by judiciaries and political oversight by intermediary institutions, the media, and parliament.

In addition, five key functions cut across these three dimensions specifying the concept of democracy quality. The function "procedures of decision" captures the democratic quality of representative elections and direct democracy. The "regulation of the intermediate sphere" analyzes interest aggregation and interest articulation by parties, interest organizations, and civil society. "Public Communication" evaluates the functioning of the media system and the public realm. The function "guarantee of rights" analyzes the democratic quality of the court system, whereas the last function "rules settlement/implementation" focuses on the democratic quality of the executive and legislative branches' work. This produces 15 matrix-fields which guide and support a detailed analysis of the quality of democracy (see Figure 1). For example, the three matrix fields of the institution "Public Communication" assess whether the media system can freely operate (freedom dimension), whether interests are equally represented in the public sphere by diverse media outlets (equality dimension), and finally, whether the media system is able to criticize and control the government (control dimension).

Democracies—defined by the Democracy Matrix—preserve all dimensions of political freedom, political equality, and political and legal control, as well as maintain a democratic functional logic in all five key institutions. It may be that some of its characteristics are only partially developed as long as the central democratic functional logic is retained such as in deficient democracies in which elections occur in combination with some deficits in the rule of law.

Figure 1. Concept of the Democracy Matrix. Notes: The dark blue boxes represent the three dimensions and the five central institutions of the Democracy Matrix. Light blue boxes are the 15 matrix fields, each representing a combination of one dimension and one institution. The focus of the analysis of the democratic quality for each matrix field is described by the text in the light blue boxes (e.g., "communicative freedom" is the focus of the matrix field which is part of the institution "Public Communication" and the freedom dimension). The two-headed arrows represent the derived trade-offs and the text inside the grey boxes describes the components involved in the trade-off, e.g., there is a trade-off between judicial review (control dimension) and effective government (freedom dimension). Source: Lauth and Schlenkrich, 2018b.

Thereby, the democracy matrix conceptualizes the internal relationship of these central dimensions to each other (Lauth, 2016). It differentiates between complementary effects and conflicting effects of the democracy dimensions (trade-offs). On the one hand, these dimensions reciprocally support one another: Elections are only meaningful if they are not only competitive but also allow nearly universal suffrage, or more generally, freedom needs a minimum level of equality and vice-versa. On the other hand, there are tensions between the dimensions (Diamond & Morlino, 2004). This means a perfect democracy that fully realizes all democracy dimensions cannot exist. Conflicting effects (trade-offs) can also be understood as a normative dilemma for demo-

cratic societies. They give expression to a political conflict over values, on which society must take a position. Stressing one value, which might have been selected in a process of negotiation by the different social forces (Bühlmann et al., 2012, p. 123) or which reflects a specific cultural preference (Maleki & Hendriks, 2015), changes the degrees of development of the individual dimensions and their weights relative to one another. The conflicting effects of the dimensions or trade-offs allow citizens to shape their democracy according to their normative preferences. As Berlin (2000) states:

Liberty and equality, spontaneity and security, happiness and knowledge, mercy and justice—all these are

ultimate human values, sought for themselves alone; yet when they are incompatible, they cannot all be attained, choices must be made, sometimes tragic losses accepted in the pursuit of some preferred ultimate end. (p. 23)

Trade-offs arise because some democracy concepts (e.g., egalitarian vs. libertarian democracy) can be arranged as opposing pairs and prefer different institutional solutions for the same function. These conceptions have an equal normative weight and it is equally possible to justify them. In addition, they are recognized as having the same level of democracy quality, which means that the conceptions and their institutional decisions are neutral concerning the quality of democracy. Ultimately, every conception of democracy emphasizes different political values, while others are neglected (e.g., equality as opposed to freedom). This means that they exhibit a different dimensional structuring of the same democratic quality (e.g., equality dimension over the freedom dimension). Hence, due to their connection to different conceptions of democracy, institutions emphasize different democracy dimensions. The tensions between the dimensions are reflected in institutional decisions and one cannot completely realize all three dimensions of the Democracy Matrix since they are unavoidably bound to conflicting goals.

The Democracy Matrix differentiates between two opposing pairs of democracy conceptions. The first pair tackles the levels of effectiveness of the government or the conflicting relationship between the freedom and control dimension: Is the decision-making process separated between the different powers which control the government and does the government have to rely on a broad consensus? Or is there a higher level of freedom for the government through its centralized power? This follows the idea of a distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies (Lijphart, 2012) which are opposing concepts of democracy and cannot be realized simultaneously. The former focuses on majority rule, the latter on an extended system of reciprocal mechanisms of oversight. Whereas consensus democracy emphasizes the interplay of several veto players

(Tsebelis, 2002), which restrict the action of governments (e.g., strong second chambers, coalitions, constitutional courts), the ideal-typical development of majoritarian democratic structures favours effective government, that is structures with more limited capacities for oversight. Consensus democracy can also be understood as a constitutional democracy, whose core element is a strong constitutional court. Popular legislative initiatives are included as a further trade-off element. To emphasize the dimension involved in this trade-off, we call these types majoritarian and control-focused democracy profiles.

The second opposition is the gap between libertarian and egalitarian conceptions of democracy which represent the tension between freedom and equality. This trade-off captures the inclusiveness of access to the government or political influence. Whereas egalitarian democracies underscore political equality, libertarian democracy focuses on the realization of political freedom. Egalitarian democracies emphasize inclusiveness by the introduction of equal representation and an equal chance of representation through PR-systems, egalitarian political finance, and fair media regulation. To the contrary, libertarian democracies are considered to be more exclusive with their FPTP-system and their "lack of restrictions on expenditure and contributions, market principles of access to the media [and] no public funding" (Smilov, 2008, p. 3).

Both opposing pairs can be combined and displayed in a two-by-two matrix (as seen in Table 1).

Moreover, these two opposing pairs of democracy conceptions resemble, on the one hand, the democracy models of decentralism and centripetalism (Gerring & Thacker, 2008; Gerring, Thacker, & Moreno, 2005) and, on the other hand, the distinction between collective and competitive veto points (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998). Gerring and Thacker differentiate between two fundamental aspects; authority and inclusion. While the trade-off between freedom and control encompasses the aspect of authority which "indicates the extent to which political institutions centralize constitutional sovereignty within a democratic framework" (Gerring & Thacker, 2008, p. 16), the trade-off between freedom and equal-

Table 1. Democracy profiles.

		Effective Government (Freedom vs. Control)	
		High	Low
Inclusiveness (Freedom vs. Equality)	**High**	Egalitarian and majoritarian democracy (FEc)	Egalitarian and controlled-focused democracy (fEC)
	Low	Libertarian and majoritarian democracy (Fec)	Libertarian and controlled-focused democracy (FeC)

Notes: The letters in brackets represent the three central dimensions of democracy, namely freedom (F), equality (E), and control (C). An upper-case letter instead of a lower-case letter indicates that the dimension is pronounced relative to the other dimensions. For example, the abbreviation *Fec* stands for a democracy that emphasizes the freedom dimension at the expense of the equality and control dimensions.

ity is similar to the inclusion element which "indicates the extent to incorporate a diversity of interests, ideas, and identities in the process of governance" (Gerring & Thacker, 2008, p. 16). Translating our democracy profiles to the types developed by Gerring and Thacker, libertarian-majoritarian democracies correspond to the centralized democracies (high authority, low inclusion), egalitarian-majoritarian democracies resemble the centripetal model (high authority, high inclusion), and finally, the controlled-focused democracies (either in a libertarian but more in an egalitarian way) are quite similar to the decentralized democracies (low authority, high inclusion).

We can also link these considerations to the differentiation between collective and competitive veto points. Whereas collective veto points result "from institutions where the different political actors operate in the same body and whose members interact with each other on a face to face basis" (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998, p. 182), competitive veto points emerge when the power is "institutional diffused" (Crepaz & Moser, 2004, p. 266) in separate institutions between different political actors. On the one hand, the trade-offs between the freedom and control dimensions, especially the components of bicameralism and the divided government, represent the competitive veto points. On the other hand, the trade-offs between the freedom and equality dimension, especially the element of the electoral system, approximate the theoretical underpinnings of the collective veto points.

Overall, the Democracy Matrix is able to incorporate and represent these diverse democracy conceptions by drawing on the idea of trade-offs between central dimensions of democracy.

2.2. Measurement

How is this democracy conception and its respective democracy profiles measured? We use the data from the Democracy Matrix Dataset V1.1 (see www.democracymatrix.com). The Democracy Matrix is a customized version of the Varieties-of-Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al., 2018). V-Dem offers over 400 key indicators for determining democracy quality, covering a period from 1900 to 2017 (as of March 2019) and including approximately 200 countries. The data is collected according to an elaborate procedure and is subject to statistical tests to increase the reliability and validity of the assessments. Calculations in this article are based on version 8 of the V-Dem dataset (as of March 2019). The development of the Democracy Matrix is designed according to the state of the art for measurement concepts, made up of three phases; conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).

Thereby, the Democracy Matrix dataset not only measures each individual matrix field but also provides data for the matrix fields aggregated into dimensions and institutions (see Figure 1). In contrast to other democracy

indices, the Democracy Matrix explicitly considers the integration of trade-offs in the measurement stage by applying a two-step measurement strategy (Lauth, 2016): Quality measuring indicators consist of the usual indicators used by various democracy measures, while trade-off measuring indicators measure the conflicting impact of the dimensions within the Democracy Matrix. The former indicators are linear in the sense that higher values indicate a higher democracy quality. The latter are bipolar which means that each end of the scalar indicates a highly developed characteristic of the profile. Therefore, maximum values are not possible simultaneously in each dimension. The conflicting effects are not characterized by generally differing degrees of democratic quality, but rather by the distribution of democracy quality in different dimensions. Trade-off indicators represent the differences in the shape of these dimensions to each other. A libertarian-majoritarian and an egalitarian-majoritarian democracy have a different profile, but they could have the same democratic quality.

For example, the freedom dimension of the institution "Public Communication" is measured as follows: The matrix field is conceptually based on the idea of communicative freedoms which is made up of the two components "freedom of the press" and "freedom of opinion." These two elements are measured by seven V-Dem indicators in total. The first component, freedom of the press, is the average of the three indicators "Harassment of journalists" (v2meharjrn), "Government censorship effort" (v2mecenefm), and "Internet censorship effort" (v2mecenefi). The freedom of opinion component is the average of the four indicators "Freedom of discussion—women" (v2cldiscw), "Freedom of discussion—men" (v2cldiscm), "Freedom of Religion" (v2clrelig), and "Freedom of academic and cultural expression" (v2clacfree). Finally, both components are scaled between 0 and 1 and are multiplied together in the sense of necessary conditions to derive the final value for this matrix field. These values are linear in the sense that higher values indicate a higher level of quality of democracy in this matrix field. All other matrix fields are measured similarly so that the Democracy Matrix applies approximately a selection of 100 V-Dem indicators. This is the first step of the measurement strategy: These quality measuring indicators are the basis for the regime classification and the subsequent trade-off measurement if the country is classified as a democracy.

Furthermore, the Democracy Matrix locates the following trade-off between the freedom and the equality dimension in the institution "Public Communication": Libertarian Media Access versus Egalitarian Media Access. Whereas libertarian media access is characterized by the fact that "it only provides for market access to the media" (Smilov, 2008, p. 9, emphasis in the original), the egalitarian model relies on free airtime and restrictions on the purchase of additional media airtime. This trade-off is the weighted average of the three V-Dem indicators "Election paid interest group media" (v2elpaidig),

"Election paid campaign advertisements" (v2elpdcamp), and "Election free campaign media" (v2elfrcamp). These combined indicators are then transformed in a bipolar way: If there are no restrictions, they provide higher values for the freedom dimension (up until 1) and lower values for the equality dimension (down until 0.75 which is the threshold of a working democracy). And vice-versa, the more regulation exists, the higher the value for the equality dimension (up until 1) and the lower the value for the freedom dimension (down until 0.75). Afterwards, these values are multiplied with the values for the quality measurement of the first step. This applies to all the matrix fields where a trade-off is identified. This produces the final values for the trade-off measurement stage.

3. Research Design: Multi-Step Cluster Analysis

Can we empirically detect these democracy profiles in the data? Do countries have similar democracy profiles? To answer these questions, we apply a cluster analysis with a strong focus on cluster validation to trade-off measurement data of the Democracy Matrix dataset. Cluster analysis classifies observations using data in form of variables (features) and different cluster algorithms (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011; Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2009; James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2013; Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005). Cluster analysis can be seen as a form of exploratory data analysis because it reveals structures in the form of groupings within the data. Validation is an important aspect of cluster analysis, as different cluster solutions are often possible and cluster algorithms "tend to generate clusterings even for fairly homogeneous data sets" (Hennig, 2007, p. 258). Therefore, we apply several conceptual and methodological strategies to validate the cluster solution in this study:

- A conceptual and theoretical validation: Do the clusters found in the data correspond to our deductively expected democracy profiles? This ensures that the cluster solution is not just a random artefact but rather conforms to democracy theory. For example, do we find a cluster of democracies which have a higher freedom than equality or control dimension (libertarian and majoritarian democracies)?
- Examination of the internal cluster quality using fit indices: Are the clusters similar to each other and different to observations belonging to other clusters? We refer here to the Silhouette Width Criterion (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005). Thereby, the "silhouette shows which objects lie well within their cluster and which ones are merely somewhere in between clusters" (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005, p. 86). This fit index determines whether the clusters are internally coherent and well separated externally. It checks whether the

objects are close to their own cluster and do not overlap with observations from other clusters. In addition, the Average Silhouette Width has a clear visualization in the form of the silhouette plot. Values near 1 suggest that an observation is well clustered; values near -1 shows that the observation is misclassified;
- Evaluation of the robustness of the cluster solution using different cluster algorithms and resampling procedures: If different cluster algorithms (e.g., hierarchical vs. partitioning algorithms) identify the same cluster solution, we can be reassured that the cluster solution which was found is not random but reliable. We compare the similarity of the cluster solutions with the Adjusted Rand Index (Hubert & Arabie, 1985). It quantifies the level of agreement between the cluster solutions corrected for chance (0: no agreement; 1: perfect agreement). Furthermore, we randomly partition the data by using a nonparametric bootstrap method and randomly subsetting 50% of the data to assess the stability of the clusters over 100 resample runs (Hennig, 2007).

For the clustering process itself, we chose a multi-step clustering strategy (see Figure 2). As a result of analyzing all democracies, that is both functioning and deficient democracies at the same time, we may not only find clusters of different dimensional shapes, but we may also find that these shapes may be on overall different levels of democracy quality. There might be egalitarian democracies—democracies with a higher equality dimension relative to the freedom and control dimension—with overall low values for all dimensions compared to egalitarian democracies which exhibit higher values for all dimensions. To disentangle the effects of shapes and levels in our analysis, we use a correlation-based distance (Pearson correlation distance) in the first step. This distance classifies objects as similar whose features are correlated, even if they are at different levels (James et al., 2013, p. 396), which means it groups observations based on the similarity of their democracy profile (e.g., democracies which emphasize the freedom over the equality and control dimension regardless of the overall democratic quality of these dimensions).

One drawback is that, unfortunately, the correlation-based distance cannot determine whether the dimensional values are actually balanced in the sense that there is no difference between the dimensional values. Even if there is only a minimal difference between the dimensions, the correlation-based distance treats these observations similarly to observations with larger differences between the dimensions. Therefore, we manually extract these balanced configurations of the dimensions and assign them to their own cluster with a balanced shape (threshold for no difference between dimensions is set to 0.05 points; the entire range for democratic val-

Figure 2. Overview of clustering strategy.

ues is between 0.5 and 1). This also has the effect that we only cluster those observations with a significant difference between the dimensions (greater than 0.05 points).

We use the following cluster algorithms and cluster validation strategies. Firstly, we detect and eliminate outliers which could adversely affect the clustering process. This is especially important because the Pearson correlation distance is prone to the effects of outliers. A commonly-chosen outlier detection algorithm is a hierarchical clustering algorithm with single linkage because outliers "are left as singletons if they are sufficiently far from their nearest neighbour" (Everitt et al., 2011, p. 81).

Secondly, we rely on divisive as opposed to agglomerative clustering. Divisive clustering (DIANA) groups the data in a top-down direction in contrast to the bottom-up direction of the agglomerative algorithm. This means that the whole dataset is treated as a single cluster and is split successively until each cluster contains only one observation. It has several advantages over agglomerative clustering, particularly the fact that it tends to partition the data into a smaller number of clusters (Hastie et al., 2009, p. 526). In addition, even though it shares the weakness of all hierarchical clustering algorithms in that the decision to split the data at an earlier stage cannot be reversed, divisive clustering is generally considered to be safer and more accurate (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005; Sharma, López, & Tsunoda, 2017). The resulting dendrogram of the cluster solution visualizes the relationship between the clusters in a tree-like diagram and is used to identify the relevant number of clusters as a starting point for the next algorithm to be applied.

Finally, we apply a second algorithm which does not belong to the family of hierarchical clustering algorithms but instead belongs to a group of partitioning clustering algorithms. The algorithm, Fuzzy Analysis (FANNY), optimizes this solution while increasing its robustness. Due to the empirical complexity, we do not expect the

clusters to be well separated. Hence, we allow for this by using fuzzy instead of crisp clustering (D'Urso, 2015). Instead of classifying an observation uniquely to only one cluster, fuzzy clustering calculates for each observation the "strength of membership in all or some of the clusters" (Everitt et al., 2011, p. 242). The strength of the membership of an object can vary between 0 and 1 for each cluster (a high value of an object for a cluster indicates a high probability that this object belongs to that cluster). In addition, we compare the cluster solution to agglomerative hierarchical clustering with the average linkage which is a frequently chosen option in other studies.

The cluster analysis is based on country-year observations. With this setting, it is easier to track the temporal change in the democracy profile for each country. However, the analysis has to ensure that a cluster is built, not from years of a single country, but from a reasonable number of countries.

The spatio-temporal range of this study is the following: Since democracy profiles presuppose the existence of a democratic regime, the observation must be classified as a democracy in order to be included in the sample. There are 3427 observations (country-years) classified as democracies in the Democracy Matrix dataset. 2906 cases have no missing values for the trade-off indicators and can be included in the analyses. The analysis covers all years from 1900 to 2017. The number of included countries is 86 from all regions, the average of years per country is 35 with a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 117 years (see Appendix, Section 1, for more a detailed overview).

4. Results of the Cluster Analysis

In a first step, we split the dataset into two samples: One sample with a balanced configuration of the three di-

mensions, and one sample with an unbalanced configuration. Only 493 country-years show a balanced profile meaning that they show no or almost no differences between the three dimensions (40 countries with an average of 12 years per country). This balanced cluster does not contradict the idea of trade-offs. Rather, this means that some political systems do not occupy the extreme ends of the trade-offs. The larger unbalanced sample which shows differences between the three dimensions is made up of 2413 country-years. Only these observations are subjected to cluster analysis in the next step. The outlier detection via hierarchical clustering with single linkage (see Appendix Figure A1) determines just seven outliers (Latvia from 2006–2011; USA 1972–1973). These outliers combine low freedom and low equality with somewhat higher control values. After removing those cases, divisive clustering is performed. The dendrogram (see Appendix Figure A2) shows that we can differentiate between four clusters according to the height of the branches and nodes.

These clusters correspond mostly to the conceptual and theoretical considerations above (see Figure 3): We find empirical evidence for the libertarian-majoritarian democracy profile (Fec) which emphasizes higher freedom than equality and control values (e.g., United Kingdom, Canada 1951–1973, New Zealand until 1995). In addition, the results indicate the existence of an egalitarian-majoritarian profile (e.g., Netherlands, Sweden, Spain). These democracies stress the equality dimen-

sion in contrast to the other two dimensions (fEc). We also find empirical evidence for the controlled-focused democracy profiles. High control values tend to go along with higher freedom dimension representing a mix between a libertarian and controlled-focused democracy (FeC, e.g., USA and Switzerland). In addition, high control values mix with higher egalitarian values (egalitarian-controlled focused democracy, fEC, e.g., Germany and Italy). The largest group are the egalitarian-majoritarian democracies with 858 cases (51 countries with an average of 17 years per country) and the egalitarian-control-focused countries with 652 observations (54 countries with an average of 12 years per country). Lower observations are found for the libertarian-majoritarian profile (440 cases—23 countries with 19 years on average) and the libertarian-control-focused group (456 cases—19 countries with 24 years on average).

Inspecting the internal cluster validity (see Figure 4), we see that the average silhouette width is acceptable (0.69). Each cluster has a silhouette width well above the 0.5 threshold indicating a reasonable partition. There are only a few negative silhouette widths within the egalitarian-control-focused and the libertarian-majoritarian cluster indicating a minor misfit for these observations. The fuzzy clustering algorithm accounts for those misfits by providing a lower membership probability of these observations to their clusters. Overall, this means that most of the observations are near their own cluster centre and most observations do not over-


Figure 3. Boxplot of the cluster solution. Notes: N = 2899 country-years. This box plot shows the democratic quality for all dimensions split by democracy profile (unbalanced and balanced configuration). Higher values indicate higher democratic quality. The cluster distribution of countries and years is as follows: Fec: 23 countries (average years: 19); fEc: 51 countries (average years: 17); FeC: 19 countries (average years: 24); fEC: 54 countries (average years: 12); FEC: 40 countries (average years: 12). Source: Author's calculations based on the Democracy Matrix dataset V1.1.

Silhouette-Plot (FANNY)
Average Silhouette Width: 0.69 (n = 2406)

Figure 4. Silhouette plots for the four cluster solution (FANNY). Notes: N = 2406 country-years. The silhouette plot shows only the four unbalanced configurations. No cluster analysis was performed on the observations with a balanced configuration. Therefore, no silhouette plot can be created for the balanced cluster. The plot shows the silhouette width (y-axis) for each observation sorted by cluster (x-axis). The average silhouette width for each cluster is shown in bold within each cluster. The overall average silhouette width is presented in the subtitle. Values near 1 indicate a very good clustering result in the sense that observations are close to their own cluster and are well-separated from objects of other clusters. Negative values signal a misfit so that the observation lies close to the observations from other cluster centres. Overall, the values can be interpreted as follows (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005, p. 88): ≤ 0.25: no cluster structure; 0.26–0.50: weak structure; 0.51–0.70: reasonable structure; 0.71–1.00: strong structure. Source: Author's calculations with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.

lap with other clusters. Thus, the clusters are reasonably compact and reasonable separated from each other.

The robustness of the cluster solution is reasonable as well: The Adjusted Rand Index between the divisive algorithm and the FANNY algorithm signals an excellent agreement (Adjusted Rand Index: 0.83). However, the FANNY solution and the cluster solution of the agglomerative hierarchical clustering with average linkage is a moderate 0.65. Nevertheless, visual inspection in the form of boxplots (see Appendix Figure A3) makes it clear that the agglomerative clustering with average linkage recovers the four identical shapes, even though the assignment of the observations to their specific clusters varies. Finally, the bootstrap resampling method indicates strong stability of all four clusters (Jaccard coefficients for each cluster > 0.95). All clusters can be recovered by the cluster algorithms even if we randomly vary some of the data or randomly drop 50% of the observations.

5. Discussion: Temporal and Spatial Development of Democracy Profiles

The temporal development of the democracy profiles from 1900 to 2017 is shown in Figure 5. If we divide

this timeline according to the three waves of democracy (Huntington, 1993), we see that every wave of democracy has a distinct combination of democracy profiles: In the first wave of democracy (until 1926), democracy profiles emphasizing the freedom dimension (FeC or Fec) dominated. In the second wave (1945–1962), egalitarian democracies (either with a weak or strong control dimension—fEc, fEC) complement this image. During this wave, all democracy profiles coexisted at almost the same rate. However, this drastically changed with the third wave (since 1974). While libertarian democracy profiles (Fec, FeC) almost disappeared, profiles emerged which focused more on the equality dimension (fEc and fEC). Especially countries which democratized after 1990 have opted for an egalitarian democracy profile. It seems that egalitarian profiles are booming and libertarian democracy profiles have gone out of fashion.

Figure 6 shows the spatial distribution of the democracy profiles for the third wave of democracy. The countries are classified according to their longest lasting democracy profile during this period. On the one hand, the majority of democracy profiles in North America and South America are control-focused democracies. The USA combines the control-dimension with a more pronounced freedom dimension (FeC), whereas the coun-

Figure 5. Temporal distribution of democracy profiles: count (left); percent (right). Source: Author's calculations with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.

tries in South America show higher control and equality values (fEC). On the other hand, Europe has a mix of egalitarian-majoritarian (fEc) and egalitarian-control-focused democracies (fEC). The United Kingdom is the exception, as it is the only libertarian-majoritarian democracy in Europe (Fec). Similar to the finding by Lijphart, Britain seemed to have transferred its libertarian democracy profile to some of its former colonies. They either have the same profile (Fec: Botswana, New Zealand, Solomon Islands) or a very similar profile (FeC: Trinidad and Tobago, Sri Lanka, Australia). However, there are also exceptions to this rule (FEC: India).

Finally, this new typology allows the development of democracy profiles for individual countries to be tracked. Figure 7 shows this development for four selected countries after 1945. The United Kingdom is an example of a political system with a very stable democracy profile. For instance, the United Kingdom never changed its libertarian-majoritarian profile: The freedom dimensions is favoured by a highly disproportional electoral system, "no limits of the total expenditure of and donations to political parties" (Smilov, 2008, p. 14) at least until 2000, no judicial review and no divided government as well as a weak second chamber. In addition, some of those char-


Figure 6. Spatial distribution of democracy profiles (1945–2017). Notes: World map shows the mode of the democracy profiles for each country in the period between 1945 and 2017. The mode is the value which appears the most in a set of values. Grey indicates that the democracy profile is not available because data is missing or the country is not classified as a democracy. Source: Author's calculations with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.

Figure 7. Temporal development of the democracy profile for single countries after 1945. Source: Author's calculations with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.

acteristics have changed partially since 2000. The cluster analysis, however, does not change its classification.

There are also countries with minor changes. Germany remains an egalitarian-control-focused democracy most of the time. It only shifts towards a more egalitarian-majoritarian democracy after the parliamentary elections in 2002. However, the membership probability shows that there is a high chance (48%) that it still belongs to the fEC cluster. Nevertheless, Germany's democracy profile can be seen as the opposite of the United Kingdom's democracy profile. PR (also with a 5% threshold which make it majoritarian in some cases like 2013 where two parties fell just below the 5% hurdle), an egalitarian party finance system and egalitarian media access model strengthen the equality dimension, whereas a rather strong second chamber in combination with a strong constitutional court favour the control dimension. These institutional decisions are at the expense of the freedom dimension.

Finally, there are political systems whose democracy profile has changed drastically: New Zealand was first a libertarian-majoritarian democracy and changed to an egalitarian-majoritarian profile in 1996 with the electoral reform from a First-Past-the-Post system to Proportional Representation. Switzerland established a balanced democracy profile in 1972. This was caused by a change in the quality measuring indicators rather than by trade-off indicators. Switzerland introduced woman suf-

frage in 1971 and changed from a deficient democracy to a working democracy.

6. Conclusion

Based on the work by Lauth and Schlenkrich (2018a), we have shown how to conceptually link trade-offs between dimensions with democracy profiles: From a democracy theory perspective, a perfect democracy seems impossible, a complete realization of all three key democracy dimensions—freedom, equality, and control—is unattainable. The tensions between dimensions manifest themselves in institutional choices and we have identified two opposing pairs of profiles: libertarian vs. egalitarian democracy, as well as majoritarian vs. control-focused democracy.

In this article, we have drawn important conclusions. A cluster analysis with a strong focus on cluster validation revealed that we can indeed find these deductively derived profiles. Based on the Democracy Matrix dataset—a customized version of the Varieties-of-Democracy dataset—we find empirical evidence for a libertarian-majoritarian democracy cluster (high political freedom values; lower values for political equality, and political and legal control) and an egalitarian-majoritarian democracy cluster (high equality, less freedom and control). In addition, we find mixed control-focused clusters: High control values are associated either with

higher freedom or higher equality levels (the libertarian-control-focused and the egalitarian-control-focused cluster respectively). Finally, there is a smaller balanced cluster whose dimensional values do not vary.

Furthermore, we have shown that each wave of democracy has its own characteristic distribution of democracy profiles. In the first wave, libertarian democracies (either with majoritarian or control-focused features) dominated. The second wave presented a mixed picture, meaning that all profiles of democracy were more or less equally represented. The third wave showed that egalitarian democracy profiles (either with majoritarian or control-focused features) gained the upper hand. Referring to the spatial distribution, there is a concentration of control-focused democracies in North and South America, whereas a stronger mix of democracy profiles exists in Europe. An exception seems to be the United Kingdom with its libertarian-majoritarian democracy profile. We also discussed cases where the democracy profile was mostly stable over the whole period from 1945 to 2017 (United Kingdom, Germany) as well as countries where there was a significant change (New Zealand and Switzerland). Further research is warranted: What are the causes for these specific democracy profiles? What causes them to change? Lastly, what are the consequences of these democracy profiles on the performance of these countries (e.g., in terms of economic development, economic inequality)?

Acknowledgments

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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About the Author

Oliver Schlenkrich is a PhD Student at the Chair of Comparative Politics and German Government, University of Wuerzburg. He is currently working on a DFG research project led by Prof. Dr Hans-Joachim Lauth, "Causes of Transformation and Democracy Profiles: Empirical Findings of the Democracy Matrix." His research interests concern democracy, political culture, political participation, quality of statehood, and quantitative methods.

Appendix

1. List of Countries included in the Cluster Analysis

Albania (13), Argentina (26), Australia (117), Austria (1), Belgium (107), Benin (1), Bosnia and Herzegovina (14), Botswana (52), Brazil (19), Bulgaria (19), Burkina Faso (1), Canada (97), Cape Verde (22), Chile (13), Colombia (2), Costa Rica (65), Croatia (11), Cyprus (23), Czech Republic (47), Denmark (114), Estonia (40), Fiji (6), Finland (77), France (97), Georgia (6), Germany (69), Ghana (3), Greece (43), Guyana (3), Hungary (27), Iceland (83), India (64), Indonesia (6), Ireland (29), Israel (67), Italy (70), Jamaica (25), Japan (62), Latvia (28), Liberia (1), Lithuania (17), Luxembourg (94), Macedonia (5), Mauritius (49), Moldova (6), Mongolia (7), Montenegro (5), Namibia (24), Nepal (4), Netherlands (107), New Zealand (107), Norway (24), Panama (24), Peru (10), Poland (31), Portugal (32), Romania (8), São Tomé and Príncipe (15), Senegal (28), Serbia (8), Seychelles (8), Slovakia (16), Slovenia (3), Solomon Islands (1), South Africa (19), South Korea (3), Spain (40), Sri Lanka (30), Suriname (3), Sweden (101), Switzerland (99), Tanzania (10), Timor-Leste (8), Trinidad and Tobago (52), Tunisia (4), Turkey (6), United Kingdom (98), United States of America (94), Uruguay (65), Vanuatu (34), Venezuela (36), Zambia (1).

The number in brackets is the number of years each country occurs in the sample. This shows that there are missing cases, especially for Austria and Norway. This list shows all countries that are classified as a democracy according to the context measurement of the Democracy Matrix (see Lauth & Schlenkrich, 2018a). The Democracy Matrix classifies an observation as a democracy if all institutional and dimensional values are above the threshold of 0.5.

2. List of Countries per Cluster

The number in the parenthesis is the number of years the country occurs in the cluster.

Fec: Australia (8), Belgium (18), Botswana (52), Canada (22), Czech Republic (13), Denmark (2), Guyana (1), Iceland (49), India (23), Ireland (6), Jamaica (2), Japan (13), Latvia (4), Luxembourg (1), Namibia (4), Netherlands (4), New Zealand (82), São Tomé and Príncipe (3), Solomon Islands (1), Sri Lanka (10), Sweden (28), Trinidad and Tobago (7), United Kingdom (87).

fEc: Albania (1), Argentina (14), Australia (12), Austria (1), Belgium (51), Benin (1), Bosnia and Herzegovina (14), Bulgaria (13), Burkina Faso (1), Canada (18), Cape Verde (20), Costa Rica (8), Croatia (3), Cyprus (15), Czech Republic (18), Denmark (33), Estonia (17), Fiji (6), Finland (37), France (23), Georgia (5), Germany (15), Greece (35), Guyana (2), Hungary (14), Iceland (29), Ireland (3), Japan (12), Lithuania (10), Luxembourg (92), Mongolia (5), Montenegro (1), Namibia (20), Netherlands (85), New Zealand (25), Norway (6), Panama (5), Poland (19), Portugal (25), Romania (6), São Tomé and Príncipe (3), Senegal (6), Serbia (8), Slovakia (6), South Africa (2), Spain (38), Suriname (3), Sweden (51), Tanzania (9), Timor-Leste (8), Vanuatu (3).

FeC: Argentina (11), Australia (73), Belgium (38), Canada (30), Chile (4), Denmark (15), France (38), Iceland (2), India (3), Jamaica (7), Latvia (10), Netherlands (17), Sri Lanka (12), Sweden (20), Switzerland (60), Trinidad and Tobago (33), United Kingdom (11), United States of America (69), Uruguay (3).

fEC: Albania (11), Argentina (1), Australia (5), Brazil (19), Bulgaria (6), Canada (1), Chile (7), Colombia (2), Costa Rica (43), Croatia (6), Cyprus (3), Czech Republic (16), Denmark (16), Estonia (8), Finland (17), France (7), Georgia (1), Germany (54), Ghana (3), Greece (2), India (15), Indonesia (6), Israel (67), Italy (55), Jamaica (1), Japan (1), Latvia (6), Lithuania (4), Luxembourg (1), Mauritius (21), Moldova (6), Mongolia (2), Montenegro (4), Nepal (4), Netherlands (1), Norway (18), Panama (15), Peru (7), Portugal (7), Senegal (22), Slovakia (10), Slovenia (3), South Africa (17), South Korea (1), Spain (2), Sri Lanka (1), Tanzania (1), Tunisia (4), Turkey (4), United States of America (17), Uruguay (46), Vanuatu (18), Venezuela (36), Zambia (1).

FEC: Albania (1), Australia (19), Canada (26), Cape Verde (2), Chile (2), Costa Rica (14), Croatia (2), Cyprus (5), Denmark (48), Estonia (15), Finland (23), France (29), Greece (6), Hungary (13), Iceland (3), India (23), Ireland (20), Italy (15), Jamaica (15), Japan (36), Latvia (3), Liberia (1), Lithuania (3), Macedonia (5), Mauritius (28), Panama (4), Peru (3), Poland (12), Romania (2), São Tomé and Príncipe (8), Seychelles (8), South Korea (2), Sri Lanka (7), Sweden (2), Switzerland (39), Trinidad and Tobago (12), Turkey (2), United States of America (6), Uruguay (16), Vanuatu (13).

3. Figures

**HC — Single Linkage (Correlation Distance)**

Figure A1. Hierarchical clustering with single linkage. Note: N = 2413 country-years. Source: Author's calculations with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.

DIANA (Correlation Distance)

Figure A2. Dendrogram of the divisive clustering. Note: N = 2406 country-years. Source: Author's calculations with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.

Figure A3. Boxplot of the agglomerative hierarchical clustering with average linkage. Notes: N = 2406 country-years. This box plot shows the democratic quality for all dimensions split by democracy profile. The balanced configuration is not included because these observations are not subjected to the cluster analysis. Higher values indicate higher democratic quality. Author's calculations with the dataset of the Democracy Matrix V1.1.

Reference

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Article

Dilemmas and Trade-Offs in Peacemaking: A Framework for Navigating Difficult Decisions

Anne Isabel Kraus [1], Owen Frazer [2], Lars Kirchhoff [1], Tatiana Kyselova [3], Simon J. A. Mason [2,*] and Julia Palmiano Federer [4]

[1] Center for Peace Mediation, Europa-Universität Viadrina, 15230 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany;
E-Mails: kraus@europa-uni.de (A.I.K.), Kirchhoff@europa-uni.de (L.K.)
[2] Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland; E-Mails: ofrazer@ethz.ch (O.F.),
simason@ethz.ch (S.J.A.M.)
[3] Mediation and Dialogue Research Center, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 04655 Kyiv, Ukraine;
E-Mail: t.kyselova@ukma.edu.ua
[4] Swisspeace, University of Basel, 4001 Basel, Switzerland; E-Mail: julia.palmianofederer@swisspeace.ch

* Corresponding author

Abstract
This article focuses on the dilemmas and trade-offs that third parties face when mediating violent political conflicts. Should they ignore human rights violations because pushing the issue could jeopardize relationships with political actors who grant access for humanitarian aid? Will bringing moderates and hardliners together help the peace process or radicalize moderate actors? What should dialogue facilitators do when the act of identifying non-mainstream groups to be included into dialogue increases division and polarization? The activity of peacemaking is inherently characterized by such process and strategy dilemmas where two equally compulsory imperatives seem not to be attainable at the same time. The article proposes a framework to break out of either-or thinking in these situations. We argue that: 1) making oneself aware of how a decision is perceived, and 2) systematically exploring a set of different strategies for creating new unexpected options helps to ease these decisions and avoid rotten compromises. The model reworks and combines existing problem-solving strategies to create a new explorative option generation approach to peacemaking dilemmas and trade-offs. Some of these strategies, such as sequencing and incrementalization, are already well-established in peacemaking. Others, such as compartmentalization and utilization, are rather unconsciously used. All identified strategies, however, are not yet systematically employed to manage third parties' own dilemmas and trade-offs. Under the suggested framework, these strategies can act in complement to synthesize creativity and strategic thinking with surprising ease. Using examples from the authors' peacemaking activities and observations in Myanmar, Thailand, and Ukraine, the article demonstrates the real-world benefits of the framework in terms of decision assessment and optional thinking.

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Trade-Offs in the Political Realm: How Important Are Trade-Offs in Politics?" edited by Todd Landman (University of Nottingham, UK) and Hans-Joachim Lauth (University of Wuerzburg, Germany).

1. Introduction

In peacemaking, good things do not easily come together. Rather, several priorities typically compete with or contradict one another. As both scholars and practitioners of this field, working in Myanmar, South Thailand, and Ukraine, we see firsthand the dilemmas inherent in peacemaking processes, and also the sacrifices in the

trade-offs we and others make in these situations. In essence, even the most basic principle of 'do no harm' is sometimes arguably unachievable (UK Government Stabilization Unit, 2019, p. 7). Thinking how we—and others in the field—could better deal with these quandaries, we delved into the problem-solving and decision-making literature of various disciplines and found a range of promising strategies for dilemma and trade-off situations. Through an iterative process we developed the Tough Choices Framework. The prototype has been road-tested and adapted in a first round of practical applications. In this article, we share this model for the first time with the wider public. More broadly, we aim to create an understanding of dilemmas and trade-offs as inherent tensions of the peacemaking process, which require responses based in sensitivity, creativity and pragmatism.

Our understanding of peacemaking encompasses all third-party interventions that aim to prevent, manage or resolve violent conflicts. The dilemmas and trade-offs in this field are as manifold as the contexts and situations in which they occur; yet they all reflect peacemaking's basic dialectics between negative and positive peace, short and long-term goals, and pragmatic and ethical or legal aims: "First, the third parties must help the belligerents abandon the status quo of armed hostilities. Second, they must foster a new relationship between the combatants that precludes the return to violence" (Beardsley, 2011, p. 3). Particularly when tempted or pressured to settle agreements quickly (UN, 2006, p. 495), the resulting compromises can have significant negative societal impacts, such as "sacrificing democracy in the short-run in order to establish peace and stability as pre-requisites for the consolidation of democracy in the long-run" (Nathan, 2016, p. 3). In essence, peacemaking dilemmas and trade-offs result from the apparently competing mandates that pervade the whole field, with roots in the UN Charter and other key documents (e.g., 'stop the fighting' and 'address punishable human rights violations,' UN, 2006, p. 495).

Despite a growing range of studies that focus on peacemaking dilemmas of political and strategic (Beardsley, 2011; Greig & Diehl, 2005; Margalit, 2010; UK Government Stabilization Unit, 2019, p. 5; Zartman, 2008), methodological, ethical, and legal nature (Bush, 1994; Frazer, 2015; Hellmüller, Palmiano Federer, & Pring, 2017; Kraus, 2011a, 2011b; Palmiano Federer, 2018; Shapira, 2018, pp. 354–363), their generic patterns and mitigation techniques have not yet been systematically analyzed in the conflict resolution literature. Only the brokering of agreements that may violate international norms has gained some attention, for instance in the context of transitional justice (Davis, 2014; Hayner, 2018; Kirchhoff, 2009), gender equality or inclusivity (Lanz, 2011; Paffenholz, 2014). Single studies encourage mediators to apply mediation techniques to their own dilemmas (treating conflicting imperatives as positions and underlying goals as interests) but again leave open how to deal with conflicts between incommensurable goals

(Shapira, 2018, p. 361). Hands-on guidance for peacemakers on how to manage dilemmas and trade-offs in everyday practice is particularly rare (UK Government Stabilization Unit, 2019). Altogether, there is a remarkable discrepancy between the level of difficulty and magnitude of sacrifices resulting from dilemmas and trade-offs in peacemaking, and the low awareness and scant methodological resources to address them.

Conversely, other disciplines like psychology, ethics, and business, offer a broad range of methodologies for dealing with dilemmas and trade-offs in a constructive manner (laid out in Sections 3 and 4). Their common denominator is that even in the most controversial, deadlocked and painful cases, there are more unexpected possibilities than usually imagined. To detect these possibilities, one needs to employ exploratory optional thinking, i.e., systematically develop multiple and diverse options without seeking confirmation for what is already seen as (not) viable (Schneider & Shanteau, 2003, pp. 438–439; Weston, 2006, pp. VI, 3, 7). Most peacemaking actors are familiar with such techniques to find common ground between conflict parties (Cooley, 2005), but they usually do not apply these skills to their own dilemma perception and decision-making. Nor are these techniques alone enough. They need to be integrated into an approach that expressly helps to break out of habitual patterns of thinking.

We argue that truly constructive ways of dealing with dilemmas and trade-offs begin when we acknowledge that we have reached an impasse and look beyond the immediate controversies and difficulties, and beyond what we hold as right and wrong (Weston, 2006, p. VI). This means deliberately changing our mode of thinking: abandoning the unfruitful efforts of forcing the competing claims together, and instead exploring unusual and more indirect responses in a creative and playful manner. We are not arguing for discarding the standard response of deliberating and weighing the conflicting imperatives (Shapira, 2018, pp. 357–360), but rather for complementing this practice with a preceding routine: respect normative, political and practical limits where they have a truly constitutive function, try to deconstruct them where they do not, and uncover and utilize the space of unusual but acceptable possibilities that have either been overlooked or never explored.

The model we developed emerged from bridging dilemma theory and peacemaking practice using an action research approach (Kraus & Kyselova, 2018). Theoretical and methodological knowledge was applied to, and tested in, peacemaking activities, and from that a framework was developed that aims to be helpful both in theory and practice. The modeling was inspired by bricolage research (Rogers, 2012), meaning that we assembled different conceptual and methodological approaches to get a better grasp of the problem so as to develop alternative readings and practices (Rogers, 2012, pp. 1–2). The model re-contextualizes existing decision-making concepts as well as problem-solving and

dilemma strategies and marries them into a new over-all approach. The prototype will be further tested and modified in collaboration with practitioners and political decision-makers until it has proven useful in different peacemaking contexts.

After briefly outlining three examples that will serve as illustrations throughout our article, we then clarify what precisely makes those decisions difficult from a conceptual point of view. Next, we describe the ideas that inspired the model, explain its components and demonstrate how it works.

2. Difficult Decisions in Peacemaking: Three Examples from Myanmar, Thailand, and Ukraine

The three examples that illustrate the type of difficult decisions on which we are focusing draw on our own experiences and observations in Myanmar, Thailand, and Ukraine. These cases were selected both for pragmatic and methodological reasons. Given that we were directly involved in supporting or observing peacemaking activities, these contexts were a natural place to begin our investigation. Methodologically, they also represented diverse settings, with differing intervention strategies, which could be compared and contrasted to build a generalizable framework.

2.1. Myanmar

In 2017, attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on government outposts in Myanmar's northwestern Rakhine state resulted in the Myanmar military's disproportionate crackdown on the Rohingya Muslim population. The crackdown has led to mass exodus of more than 700,000 Rohingyas into neighboring Bangladesh (Human Rights Council, 2018). For the UN in Myanmar, two imperatives clashed: On the one hand, the UN mandate clearly called for a response to grave human rights abuses against the Rohingya population. On the other hand, it was necessary for the UN to maintain a cooperative relationship with the Myanmar government and military in order to ensure the provision of aid to both Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim communities in Rakhine state. The UN's normative imperative to uphold and protect human rights thus collided with the strategic and normative imperative to maintain political, humanitarian, and developmental access to the country.

2.2. Thailand

A violent separatist conflict in the Malay Muslim majority south of Thailand has claimed over 6,000 lives since 2004. Many in the minority Buddhist community feel marginalized, perceiving that peacebuilding efforts there have focused on the grievances of the Malay Muslim population. An intra-Buddhist dialogue project was launched to prevent such sentiments from becoming an obstacle to peacebuilding. The project aimed to: a) provide a safe

space for Buddhists to voice their concerns; b) support Buddhists to communicate these concerns to other stakeholders; and c) thereby encourage efforts by the authorities and Malay Muslims to engage with the Buddhist community in a way that took account of their concerns. However, facilitating a dialogue inclusive of all viewpoints within the Buddhist community risked providing a platform for 'anti-peace' voices interested in strengthening opposition to engagement and dialogue with other groups. Thus, the project's approach of preparing the Buddhist community to engage with other stakeholders in constructive ways that could contribute to peacebuilding ran the danger of undermining the support for Buddhist involvement in peacebuilding that it ultimately aimed to promote.

2.3. Ukraine

Currently, inter-community dialogues in Ukraine suffer from the absence of Ukrainians with non-mainstream political views such as anti-Maidan, anti-European, or pro-Russian (Kyselova, 2018). These views are widespread enough to deserve a voice (SCORE, 2016) and according to the basic assumption of the inclusion imperative, any societal model that does not include them will be inherently undermined. Within the adverse context of on-going armed conflict in the East of Ukraine and the dominant conflict narrative of Russian aggression in Ukraine, these population groups are dispersed, disorganized, and delegitimized by dominant political discourse. To include them, one would first need to identify and legitimize them. However, beyond the security risks of such inclusion, dialogue facilitators fear that by naming and distinguishing these political identities they would strengthen or even initiate dynamics that would inevitably deepen the division lines in the society, namely in-group/out-group identity narratives and polarizing political identity discourses in the public sphere (Svensson & Brounéus, 2013).

3. Dilemmas and Trade-Offs: What Makes Them Difficult—And Easier

Dilemmas and trade-offs are closely related terms. As decision-making and conflict resolution literature offers no precise distinction so far (definitions rather seem to overlap, see Gowans, 1987, p. 3; Shapira, 2018, p. 354), we suggest the following delineation of the terms.

We understand a dilemma as a standoff between two or more imperatives (A vs. B) that are perceived as equally compulsory but not attainable at the same time, leaving only either-or options. A trade-off is understood as a balancing of two or more imperatives (A vs. B) that are perceived as similarly compulsory and opposed, but partly satisfiable at the same time by exchanging one thing in return for another. Both, dilemma and trade-off, can arise from normative and pragmatic claims. The distinction between the terms lies in two aspects: a) the

state of perceived solvability—in a dilemma there seem to be only clearly exclusive solutions possible that either way neglect one of the imperatives, while a trade-off represents a balanced solution between both imperatives; b) the state and moment in time of the decision-making process—a dilemma is an unsolved decision problem where no decision could be made yet, while a trade-off represents an act or a result of a weighing up, thus a solved decision problem, even if this solution is not satisfying. The also closely related term of a paradox, which is often confused with the term of a dilemma, describes one self-contradictory statement, whereas a dilemma and a trade-off both result from two contradictory, or mutually exclusive, claims.

Using these terms as analytical lenses for the examples outlined above, the inter-community dialogues in Ukraine are hampered by what we, as observers, perceive as a dilemma: The imperative to include all relevant political groups in political discourse (A) clashes with the equally essential imperative to prevent further polarization within Ukrainian society (B). In the somewhat similar situation in southern Thailand, facilitators perceived the two opposing imperatives rather as a trade-off that had to be made: Giving space to the 'anti-peace' voices (A) had to be constantly balanced with the other central imperative, which was to jointly develop 'pro-peace' ideas and actions within the Buddhist community (B).

Holding a cognitive constructivist point of view, we consider dilemmas and trade-offs as perception patterns created by reference frames such as ideas, practices, narratives, goals, values, emotions, and beliefs (Goffman, 1986; Lakoff & Wehling, 2016). Frames are key codes for making sense of the world and thus tend to resist change; when their premises are incommensurable, compete, or collide, a dilemma or trade-off is the result. Like the frames themselves, the perception patterns of dilemmas are contingent: Some people see dilemmas and trade-offs where others—with other contexts and histories—do not (Acharya, 2004; Harding, 2017). However, as frames are inextricably linked to unconscious thinking habits, worldviews, existential experiences, and social identity, they can be difficult to modify. Cognitive mechanisms like confirmation bias, where contradictory information is filtered out, also serve to reinforce existing reference frames that underly one's original assessments of a situation.

The less constitutive a reference frame is for the individual or social system holding it, the easier it is to alter it and consequently what constitutes a dilemma or trade-off. Fundamental normative convictions and established principles will remain unsusceptible to such deconstruction, but they might entail more flexible aspects than assumed. For instance, if the frames that determine what ought to be done resist any attempts to change them, the frames determining how this ought to be done might be more open and flexible. Weston (2006, pp. 36–37) gives some examples from other contexts for generating options that vary the how without disregarding given limits of the what: The owner of a cafeteria in the 1950s in

North Carolina removed all tables from the place to treat white customers the same way as black customers who were forbidden to sit down under segregation-era laws. Instead of seating black customers in direct defiance of the law he looked for other modes of opposition; thus, the first stand-up café was born of an anti-apartheid initiative. Another example is the teacher who shaved her head after a child who had lost her hair in chemotherapy was laughed at by classmates, resulting in a rash of children also begging their parents to cut their hair. Instead of camouflaging or moralizing the problem, the teacher responded indirectly through an act of solidarity, which turned an odd action into an appealing one (Weston, 2006, pp. 36–37):

> The general rule is to revisit *all* the parts of a problem, not just the one or two that currently fill the screen….It may well be that some other aspect of a problematic situation, pushed into the background at the moment, offers us a way to go forward while the current routes seem blocked.

This suggests we do not need to seek for better ways to unblock blocked cognitive routes (embedded reference frames that are resistant to change) but search for better ways to detect and utilize flexibility in other aspects of a dilemma or trade-off (reference frames that leave more space for solutions than assumed).

In order to develop useful, applicable guidance for decision-makers, our conceptual approach deliberately focuses on the decision-makers' subjective contextual and situational perception when facing a decision. Theoretical concerns, like the validity and even existence of logical dilemmas (Gowans, 1987, pp. 3–33; Statman, 1995, pp. 29–54), will be left aside, as they are irrelevant from a practitioner point of view: Whether or not the dilemma is logically real or only perceived, in any case the decision-maker will have to explore the extent to which it can be effectively deconstructed in the (inter)subjective reality of those involved.

4. The Tough Choices Framework: How to Make Difficult Decisions Easier

4.1. Requirements

Dilemmas and trade-offs force peacemakers to make decisions under highly challenging conditions: A problem's complexity is often exacerbated by a lack of information and predictability regarding the potential costs and benefits of different solution options. Furthermore, the humanitarian, societal, political, moral, and monetary costs deriving from a proposed decision might be impossible to prioritize.

However, extensive needs assessment with practitioners revealed that, rather than a complex instrument for calculating and weighing up of potential costs and benefits of available options, what is required is a sim-

ple framework for exploring whether better options exist(ed) than the ones already adopted. We explain this by drawing on dual process theories of decision making: The actual weighing up of costs and benefits takes place in the automatic, intuitive thinking of system 1, in which an experienced practitioner can correlate numerous sets of subtle data from comparable cases, faster and more reliably than any artificial intelligence can, let alone any model we would be able to develop. In contrast, for generating new options that actually could expand the benefits and reduce the costs, pro-active efforts of the systematic, rational, self-reflective thinking of system 2 are required (Kahneman, 2012; see also Section 4.3). System 2 thinking needs both more time and consciously structured guidance in order to produce meaningful results.

With this working hypothesis on the requirements for the model we focused on strategies for generating new options in a systematic fashion to support system 2 thinking, while system 1 thinking would automatically digest and weigh up the results. We still included routine feedback loops for assessing the degree of satisfaction achieved through the strategies, but the actual weighing up of benefits and costs is deliberately left to system 1 thinking. In our future research, we will test the hypothesis behind this set up; in case it proves wrong, an element for systematically weighing up the costs and benefits of the options generated by the strategies needs to be integrated into the model.

4.2. Theoretical Underpinnings

This section presents a short overview of the main theories that inspired the framework.

An important indicator that reflective practice is needed is when "professionally designed solutions to public problems have had unanticipated consequences, sometimes worse than the problems they were designed to solve," as seems to have been the case in some peacemaking compromises (Schön, 1983, p. 4). Reflective practice models are simple, cyclical structures for problem assessment, developing options, and planning implementation (see Borton, 1970). Some of these models have already been applied to mediation (Macfarlane, 2002). With adaptive peacebuilding (de Coning, 2018), iterative experiential learning has become an important aspect of improving peace processes on the whole, but it has not yet been applied to dealing with dilemmas.

In complex or chaotic environments such as peacemaking, where no clear cause–effect relationships are discernible and contexts vary greatly, a decontextualized best practice from one context will not work in most other cases (Mason, 2016; Snowden & Boone, 2007). Thus, the best way to find out what works in a conflict scenario is by experimenting with different strategies. As a result, any generic model for peacemaking dilemmas and trade-offs must avoid rigid, reductive, mechanistic thinking, and offer diverse and flexible options for promoting exploratory thinking.

Drawing on cognitive dual-process theories, we hold that whenever decisions imply a high degree of complexity or create cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 2009), they require both intuitive system 1 and systematic/deliberative system 2 thinking to ensure the most optimal solution (Gigerenzer, 2008; Kahneman, 2012). Particularly where a decision-maker can draw on internalized experiential knowledge in their own judgments, deliberative routines should be combined with intuitive ones. Therefore, we aimed at a decision-making model that would activate both analytical and creative thinking in concert.

4.3. Main Components

The framework consists of a three-component model focusing on clarifying the decision situation and stimulating creative exploratory thinking. It offers two types of strategies to generate innovative and unexplored options: 'Separating the Responses,' and 'Reframing the Reference Frames' (Figure 1).

The strategies can be attempted in any sequence until the potential solutions are considered sufficiently satisfying to all actors concerned. The principle of 'Starting


Figure 1. Main components of the Tough Choices Framework.

with the Most Promising' hence refers to the choice of strategy for generating new options, not to the choice between the conflicting imperatives. Thus, it is an instrument for enlarging the bunch of options before or while processing the weighing up in the highly complex and efficient manner of system 1 thinking (see Section 4.1).

This also implies that the prototype model leaves also the identification of biases and blind spots (e.g., costs for indirectly affected actors) and the explicit balancing of risks to the individual decision-maker. Methodical guidance for opening the entrapped or resigned mind to truly new perspectives and ideas seemed (at least at this point of research) much more important than ethical guidance preventing and correcting shortcomings and distortions when considering benefits and costs. We assume that peacemaking actors do see the costs and risks of their decisions and are constantly balancing their competing priorities; what they lack are the methods to decrease these potential costs in the first place. In the next round of testing the model in practice, we will check if this assumption holds true.

4.4. The Framework

4.4.1. Analyze the Decision Situation

The first step is mapping how the decision situation is perceived by answering the following questions: What are the conflicting imperatives (A vs. B)? Are we facing a full dilemma or trying to balance a trade-off? What reference frames within the conflict, process and third-party system exacerbate this tension?

In reference to the second question, the literature offers no integrated analytical instrument to assess how a decision problem is perceived. We propose the following map: juxtaposing two factors, the (non)negotiability of imperatives and the (in)compatibility of responses, de-

termines the perception of difficult decision situations. These factors can then be used to interrogate this perception and demonstrate how it might be altered to find more satisfying solutions. Figure 2 measures the negotiability of imperatives on the vertical axis, and the compatibility of responses on the horizontal axis. The point where the two axes converge marks the lowest degree of solvability and the diagonal opposite side marks the highest. The resulting map measures the distance to a satisfying solution for a given difficult situation.

Dilemma and trade-off situations have in common that responses seem mutually exclusive or incompatible. They differ in the degree of negotiability of their imperatives: In a dilemma, the imperatives are perceived as non-negotiable, leaving only either-or options. In a trade-off, a compromise that balances the two imperatives is at least potentially achievable.

In the field of human rights, Margalit (2010) coined the term of 'rotten compromises' for unacceptable solutions, referring to the appeasement politics vis-à-vis the German Nazi regime as an example: rotten compromises "are not allowed, even for the sake of peace" because they "establish or maintain an inhuman regime, a regime of cruelty and humiliation, that is, a regime that does not treat humans as humans" (Margalit, 2010, pp. 1–2). On the map, rotten compromises are to be located opposite to trade-offs: There is a practically feasible way out of a dilemma but at the cost of something non-negotiable. By integrating this term, it is possible to distinguish between acceptable (trade-offs) and unacceptable (rotten) compromises. Dilemmas, trade-offs, and rotten compromises all induce a distributive lose–lose or win–lose perception pattern; win–win seems to be unthinkable in all situations (Spangler, 2013).

The concepts of dilemma, trade-off, and rotten compromise should be illustrated with the example from Myanmar. As introduced above, for the UN in Myanmar,


Figure 2. Anatomy of difficult decisions.

two imperatives were involved: responding to (and maybe preventing further) grave human rights abuses against the Rohingya minority (A) and maintaining a cooperative relationship with the Myanmar government and military in order to ensure the provision of aid to both Rakhine and Rohingya communities in Rakhine state (B). One possible perception of this situation is to regard it as a dilemma that leaves no other choice than to either prioritize humanitarian access or publicly criticize human rights violations. Another possible perception is to see the situation rather as a trade-off than a complete dilemma, for example, consider it an acceptable compromise to respond to the human rights imperative by making non-public representations to the government. However, for many international observers—without insight into internal decision-making processes and parameters—such a response focusing on the humanitarian could easily be perceived as a rotten compromise, compromising too much on human rights for short-term humanitarian access (Safi, 2018). The frames complicating the situation were substantial international pressure to address human rights (without understanding the nuances of the context), a perception by many national actors of UN activities as foreign intrusion, and probably also a lack of a clear and coherent mandate from UN headquarters and UN member states.

The map suggests two further alternative decision situations that do not entail compromising on imperatives. The term 'integration' refers to situations where a win-win response is possible that gives both claims what they want to an sufficient extent; it represents a compatibility and negotiability of the responses (Sparrer, 2007, p. 106; Statman, 1995, p. 8). A neither-nor situation avoids the typical patterns of either-or thinking, as it does not respond to the imperatives at all but is capable of transcending them (through humor or refraining from evaluation, for example; Sparrer, 2007, pp. 106–108). In the Myanmar case, an integrative solution of the UN could be to delegate the provision of humanitarian aid to another organization making sure that the humanitarian imperative is fully taken care of by somebody else, so the UN can focus its mission on human rights issues. Here, an integration of imperatives is made possible by thinking beyond the actors and resources already considered for response. A neither-nor situation would entail the promotion and acceptance of a Myanmar national identity that recognizes and accepts diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, so that conflicting ethnoreligious groups may co-exist together without feeling a sense of loss or concession. This would require, however, inter-generational change of historical narratives, thus identity reference frames embedded over hundreds of years, and is far beyond the scope of many international peace supporters, including the UN.

As one navigates through a decision-making process and considers different response options, one's perception of a situation may move between the different positions on the map: For instance, one might start from

a dilemma perception and see no viable options at all; then, trying out all of the strategies, one might find the resulting options represent a rotten compromise, or a trade-off, or even the possibility for an integration of both imperatives or a neither-nor solution. The model's dilemma strategies will thus be mainly used to reconfigure dilemma, rotten compromise, and trade-off positions into a somehow better position, ideally into an integration or neither-nor configuration.

Locating their own perception of the decision problem on the decision map can help peacemakers to visualize how the other positions would look like in their case. This brings their thinking closer to the next step, to search for strategies that avoid unacceptable and unnecessary compromises on imperatives. In the following section, we outline a menu of response options that peacemakers can consider to this effect.

4.4.2. Developing Response Options

Once the situation has been mapped, the next step of the framework is to choose from two sets of strategies for developing response options (Figure 3). The strategies offer different avenues to address the perception of difficulty of a given decision that was analyzed in step one: 'Separating the Responses' aims to deconstruct the incompatibility of response options to conflicting imperatives. 'Reframing the Reference Frames' seeks to deal constructively with the non-negotiability of imperatives. The two avenues help assess what type of strategy might be fruitful: Is the case so intractable because the responses to the two imperatives are so incompatible that they can simply not be realized at the same time? Then one might first try the strategies in the first column that in one way or another hold the conflicting responses apart. Or is the situation so difficult because the two conflicting imperatives are so absolute that that they cannot be reconciled? In this case one might first try the strategies in the second column that address flexible elements in the framing of the whole problem perception or in how acceptable responses can look.

In working through the strategies, the most organic approach is to start with the set of strategies that, according to this first assessment of the case, looks most promising. Then one may continue in any sequence in an explorative way. It is recommended that all four strategies in a set are applied to ensure as robust a solution as possible is found. The specific case conditions that make one or the other strategy appropriate to particular decision problem types will be explored in further comparative empirical research using this prototype as a common basis. As well, we will investigate whether the strategies typically produce specific types of results (rotten compromises, trade-offs, integration, neither-nor).

While brainstorming potential solutions, an intuitive process of balancing and evaluating priorities automatically takes place (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2). Not all strategies will make sense in each case, and some might even

SEPARATE THE RESPONSES	REFRAME THE REFERENCE FRAMES
Prioritize Rate responses differently according importance, chances and risks	**Meta-frame** Identify joint basis or compatible goals from higher perspective
Sequence Time responses one after another according urgency and flexibility	**Rescale** Zoom in/out at smaller or bigger picture of conflict, actor, process set up
Incrementalize Find gradual (non-threateningly small or indirect) simultaneous responses	**Utilize** Find out in which sense the dilemma can actually be useful and beneficial
Compartmentalize Split up roles, responsibilities, information into independent units	**Bypass** Invent creative subsitute structure satisfying both functional aims

Figure 3. Strategies for developing options.

do harm in certain circumstances. Therefore, it is vital that, in addition to this automatic evaluation process, all potential solutions be located on the decision map so their degree of success can be measured (Figure 1).

4.4.2.1. Strategies to Separate the Responses

The approach of the four strategies in this column is to uncouple the responses from the conflicting imperatives: They challenge the perceived necessity to respond with the same importance (Prioritize), at the same time (Sequence), to the same extent (Incrementalize), or by the same actor (Compartmentalize).

Prioritizing, the most classical strategy in all fields from management to ethical decision-making, is ordering the responses according to their importance, urgency, opportunities, and risks, or effort required (Gert, 2007, pp. 60–79). However, ranking is only possible if one overriding frame (e.g., ethical ideals, political or practical necessities) can be established. In dilemmas with competing, incommensurable reference frames prioritization is unlikely to bear fruit. With regards to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, the UN seemed to have prioritized the imperative to keep life-saving humanitarian access to all residents in the poverty-stricken Rakhine state over the imperative of explicitly addressing deep-seated political and human rights abuses reported against Rohingya Muslims (which held comparably low chances of success).

Sequencing, another well-established strategy in peacemaking (Weiss, 2003), refers to timing responses one after another according to their urgency and flexibility. The typical risk of this strategy—failing to envision follow-up steps or getting derailed after the first step(s) are completed—needs to be carefully managed. In the case of Thailand, the trade-off between 'anti' vs.

'pro-peace' voices was balanced out by sequencing them: First giving space to 'anti-peace' voices, based on the assumption that they needed to feel heard before they could listen and be ready to change their attitudes towards peacebuilding activities. In Ukraine, the current absence of pro-Russian groups from dialogue activities can be rationalized as postponing the inclusion of these groups until the hot phase of the armed conflict is over. This might explain why around 70% of the dialogues carried out by professional local Ukrainian facilitators deal with technical issues (reforms, Human Rights, integration of IDPs, restoration of community infrastructure), but not with reconciliation (Kyselova, 2018).

Incrementalizing is an increasingly popular approach in the peacemaking field (Conciliation Resources, 2018; Hayes, 2017), but has yet to be explicitly incorporated in dilemma/trade-off strategy. It describes a gradual accumulation of small or indirect changes in service of an imperative that are compatible with responses to a conflicting imperative. The imperceptibility of changes reduces resistance to these interventions and lets the system slowly adapt to change. Because of the ethical dangers of imperceptible manipulation, incremental strategies need to be critically examined to confirm whether they are justified and must ensure the consent of actors for the intended changes. The Thailand dialogue project incrementally shifted the exclusive focus on intra-group dialogue (which risked reinforcing or perpetuating anti-peace voices) to a mix of intra-group dialogue and inter-group dialogue with representatives of Malay Muslims. Hardliners could become more familiar with Malay Muslims and come to see the value of rebuilding relationships.

Compartmentalization, a concept taken from psychoanalysis, describes mechanisms that permit contra-

dicting cognitions, principles, tasks, or responsibilities to co-exist without friction by setting boundaries between them or splitting them up in independent units (McWilliams, 2011, pp. 135–136). In political science, organization theory, and economics, compartmentalization underpins the idea of role division, delegation, and outsourcing (Falcó-Gimeno, 2011). In its most radical form, mediation actors with non-negotiable conditions or restrictions might be replaced by other more flexible ones. In the years before the crisis, there seemed to be a role division between different UN actors, with UN actors with specific human rights or humanitarian mandates being delegated to carry out substantive negotiations on human rights and humanitarian issues. However, as some Myanmar nationals in Rakhine state see all international actors as a monolith, many stakeholders still viewed the UN in Myanmar as a human rights agent. Perhaps this could have been overcome by shifting certain activities, e.g., provision of humanitarian aid, to organizations outside the UN system, leaving the UN to focus on human rights issues. In Thailand, compartmentalization could be used in targeted dialogues with sub-groups (e.g., only monks or hardliners) as small group dialogue is more transformative than larger group dialogue with higher diversity.

4.4.2.2. Strategies for Reframing the Reference Frames

The approach of the second set of strategies is to identify alternative reference frames that allow for the issue to be seen as a creative opportunity (Goffman, 1986; Weston, 2006). To achieve this, one can identify commonalities (Metaframe), focus or broaden perspectives (Rescale), find hidden opportunities (Utilize) or develop acceptable substitutes (Bypass).

Metaframing looks at conflicting imperatives from a broader perspective to find a joint basis or goal. In peacebuilding, metaframing is already successfully used to bridge divided groups by strengthening overarching common identities (Sasse & Lackner, 2018; Shapiro, 2017). For example, in Northern Ireland efforts have been made to bridge the divide between Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist identities by emphasizing a common Northern Irish identity. Similarly, technical dialogues in Ukraine already frame discussions around broad issues of practical concern to all that encompass the specific issues of many groups (Kyselova, 2018, p. 9). Frames such as talking about shortcomings of political reforms might be also able to attract unrepresented political views without dividing the participants along political lines.

Rescaling zooms in or out to a smaller or bigger picture of the conflict, the process and the third-party context. This practice can allow a switch into a genuinely different process logic, with different premises and goals. In this case, the Ukrainian example may once again be instructive. Including and validating pro-Russian perspectives in a country that largely considers Russia as an aggressor might be an unrealistic task. Comparatively, in-

corporating these minority viewpoints at the local level, and focused on specific and concrete themes (e.g., decommunization) may prove more feasible. In Myanmar, the situation in Rakhine state could be rescaled from either human rights or humanitarian access imperatives to larger political themes such as national identity and belonging, the legal and constitutional framework, the role of authority, self-determination, equality, and education.

Utilization, a strategy derived from psychotherapy (Hammel, 2011), turns the problem into a resource: It explicitly recognizes and positively takes advantage of controversial elements instead of fighting against them. The unexpected, and often openly paradox positive framing of an acknowledged obstacle can result in a moment of enlightened surprise, and thereby a release of pressure. In the Thai case, a fearless acknowledgement of the fear of radicalization could give the groups an opening to discuss their differences and shared views without constraints—perhaps blowing off the elephant in the room more quickly than ever imagined. In a similar vein, the UN in Myanmar could have chosen to explicitly engage the international community in discussions about the underlying dilemma. This could, in turn, have fostered more nuanced thinking about the context of the conflict, and may have released some of the pressure to address human rights. Clearly identifying the major obstacle could further be used as an opportunity to clarify the mandate from UN headquarters and to contextualize international human rights standards into a Myanmar-specific, or even Buddhist, perspective.

Bypassing refers to a method that seeks a pragmatic substitute or provisional mechanism that satisfies the imperatives in some alternative way. These measures typically circumvent the problem or postpone the solution; consequently, they often confer some genuine functional or strategic advantage in order to compensate for the apparent political or ethical concession. In the Ukrainian case, bypassing could include choosing to ignore the absence of non-mainstream views in dialogues. Instead, other, tailor-made and low-threshold mechanisms of civic participation in communities could be developed that would include minority views. This could avoid further polarization between political affiliation groups and create an opportunity to show the Ukrainian people that civil society groups (which some consider to be puppets of the Russian government) are part of Ukrainian democratic structures that deserve their trust.

5. Conclusion

In sum, when facing intractable dilemmas and trade-offs, peacemakers do not necessarily need to capitulate if they dare to be creative. The framework presented in this article offers a practically applicable routine of systematic optional thinking for situations that otherwise could be considered unsolvable. By walking through different strategies for developing alternative responses,

the model reduces and reorganizes the complexity of difficult decisions. It reveals both non-negotiable red lines and the unseen flexibilities of each case. Used effectively, the framework can help define and reveal context-sensitive and widely acceptable solutions. In the best case, the model can transform a lose–lose or win–lose into a win–win situation, and turns dilemma and trade-off decision-making into something playful and constructive. In the worst case, a difficult decision might remain unresolved even after all strategies have been attempted. At a minimum, however, the framework provides a comprehensive and conscientious way to explain and justify a tough choice.

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Conflict of Interests

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About the Authors

Anne Isabel Kraus (PhD), Conflict Researcher, Mediator, Supervisor/Coach, is Co-Director of the Center for Peace Mediation at European University Viadrina, Germany. Her current research focuses on dilemmas in peacemaking in various contexts, with a special focus on Ukraine, where she has also practically supported local dialogue actors. She teaches mediation and decision-making at various academic and policy institutions and provides conceptual support and supervision/coaching to peacemaking actors such as the German Federal Foreign Office, the GIZ and NGOS.

Owen Frazer is Senior Program Officer in the Mediation Support Team at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Working within the program on Culture and Religion in Mediation (joint program with Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs [FDFA]), he provides trainings to mediation practitioners and policy-makers, develops practice and policy guidance, and directly supports mediation and conflict transformation processes. Owen is also a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Birmingham, where he is investigating the role of mediation in overcoming impasses during formal peace negotiations.

Lars Kirchhoff (PhD), International Lawyer and Practicing Mediator, is Academic Director of the Institute for Conflict Management and Co-Director of the Center for Peace Mediation at European University Viadrina, Germany. He teaches mediation at institutions like the German Federal Foreign Office, the EU and the OSCE and a wide spectrum of organizations, foundations and think tanks. He coaches diplomats and special representatives to improve their mediation and process skills, advises on specific crisis regions, and serves as facilitator in conflict.

Tatiana Kyselova (PhD) is Associate Professor at the Departments of Law and Political Science of National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine. She is the Founder and Head of the Mediation and Dialogue Research Center at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. She has doctoral degrees in Law and Socio-Legal Studies from the University of Oxford and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Her current research projects focus on the impact of dialogues and inclusiveness of peace processes in Ukraine and in other conflict contexts.

Simon J. A. Mason (PhD) is Senior Researcher and Head of the Mediation Support Team at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Within the Mediation Support Project (joint program with Swisspeace, funded by the Swiss FDFA) and the Culture and Religion in Mediation program (joint program with Swiss FDFA), he trains actors from various conflict contexts and policy and academic institutions in conflict analysis, dialogue, negotiation, and mediation. He is a member of the UN and OSCE mediation rosters and a Senior Advisor in the MAS ETH Mediation in Peace Processes.

Julia Palmiano Federer (PhD) is a Program Officer in the mediation team at Swisspeace, Switzerland, and completed her PhD at the University of Basel. Her doctoral research analyses the role of NGO mediators in norm diffusion, specifically in the peace process in Myanmar. She has published academic articles and policy papers on Myanmar politics and diverse topics in mediation such as norms, gender, and counterterrorism. Furthermore, Julia works on Swisspeace's activities supporting national actors involved in Myanmar's peace process.