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Interdisciplinary Approaches to Studying Emotions within Politics and International Relations

Editors

Alex Prior and Yuri van Hoef

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Editorial

Interdisciplinary Approaches to Emotions in Politics and International Relations

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Abstract
The 'emotional turn' within the social sciences and humanities attracts increasing scholarly attention. Political Science, traditionally emphasising the 'rational' public sphere rather than the 'emotional' private sphere, has increasingly questioned this dichotomisation, identifying broader political concepts and practices. The international political process—frequently characterised by widespread distrust, populist campaigns and extreme rhetoric—necessitates addressing and examining its underlying emotions. Informal, affective manifestations of politics are enormously influential, profoundly shaping inter- and intra-national democracy; they accordingly require interdisciplinary study. This thematic issue of *Politics and Governance* includes disciplines as diverse as education, history, international relations, political theory, psychology, and sociology. In doing so, we illustrate that emotions are cross-disciplinary concerns, relevant beyond the study of politics.

Keywords
affect; emotions; friendship; individualisation; interdisciplinary; international relations; narratives; political history; political science

Issue
This editorial is part of the issue "Interdisciplinary Approaches to Studying Emotions within Politics and International Relations", edited by Alex Prior (University of Leeds, UK) and Yuri van Hoef (Utrecht University, The Netherlands).

1. Introduction

The emotional turn in the humanities and social sciences, especially within the discipline of international relations (IR), attracts considerable scholarly acknowledgement. This thematic issue of *Politics and Governance* presents multiple methodologies which have proven successful in elucidating this concept. In that vein, it cites recent works such as *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn* (Clément & Sangar, 2018), and studies of the role that individual actors play in IR (Jacobi & Freyberg-Inan, 2015), as well as Nussbaum's (2013, 2001) writings on the formation of diplomatic ties through encouraging certain emotions (sympathy, for example) and openly contesting others (such as disgust).

The relevance of this academic approach is clear within the current geopolitical landscape, increasingly characterised by brinkmanship and populist rhetoric. Investigating 'celebrity politics', politicians as 'personas', and the modes of communication underlying these topics, is crucial. The relevance of emotions to individualisation applies to studies of political leaders and elites (Berenskoetter & Van Hoef, 2017; Van Hoef, 2018) and of citizenries, increasingly characterised as self-actualising, informal and affective (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994; Bennett, 2008; Loader, Vromen, & Xenos, 2014; Manning, 2015). This development, particularly ev-

ident among younger generations, informs academic understandings of voting and party membership (both subject to considerable volatility), as well as informal modes including petitions and activism.

Academic acknowledgement of informal political participation was encouraged by proliferating protest movements and youth activism in the late 1960s. Recent decades have seen an expanded scholarly focus on post-materialist values, 'issue politics', and civic engagement. In the discipline of politics, the traditional dichotomisation of emotions and rationality (based fundamentally upon Cartesian mind-body dualism, and largely unquestioned since the Scottish Enlightenment) is increasingly subject to problematisation. This expanded academic scope encompasses expanding political practices and digital technologies, the latter necessitating research on online participation and dialogue. It represents a truly interdisciplinary set of concerns and investigations.

Acknowledging the contribution of psychoanalysis (in demonstrating emotions as *part of* rationalisation), Jenkins (2018) argues that politics, devoid of emotions, would jeopardise its own capacity to inspire. Hall (2007) conceptualises emotions as central to reasoning, collapsing the dichotomy between them. We have also observed increasing critique *within* sub-disciplines such as deliberative democracy, questioning Habermas' prioritisation of rationality as a means (and quantifier) of effective communication. Myriad perspectives on these topics necessitate and contextualise this thematic issue of *Politics and Governance*, encompassing a range of disciplines including Education, Psychology, Political Theory and Sociology. The articles are presented in a tripartite structure, as Table 1 illustrates.

2. Interdisciplinary Approaches to Emotions in Politics and International Relations

2.1. Part I: Emotions in Politics

In the opening article, Anne-Kathrin Weber (2018) reinforces the relevance of Nussbaum to studying passionate emotions, specifically their potential in encouraging social justice and societal 'love'. Weber problematises Nussbaum's theory of compassionate emotions (on the basis of 'hierarchisation' and tension with political and social reality) and, in doing so, employs Arendt's theorisation of pity. This is applied to the 2016 US election—specifically Clinton's "Love and Kindness" ads—to illustrate how these challenges threaten to come into play when compassionate emotions are utilised as political devices.

Table 1. Tripartite structure of this thematic issue.

Part	Author(s)	Article
I. Emotions in Politics	Anne-Kathrin Weber	The Pitfalls of 'Love and Kindness': On the Challenges to Compassion/Pity as a Political Emotion
	Amy Skonieczny	Emotions and Political Narratives: Populism, Trump and Trade
	Jo Warner	Emotional Interest Representation and the Politics of Risk in Child Protection
	Alex Prior	Getting the Story Right: A Constructivist Interpretation of Storytelling in the Context of UK parliamentary engagement
II. Conceptual Approaches	Anna Durnova	Understanding Emotions in Policy Studies through Foucault and Deleuze
	Rosa Sanchez Salgado	The Advocacy of Feelings: Emotions in EU-Based Civil Society Organizations' Strategies
	Yuri van Hoef & Andrea Oelsner	Friendship and Positive Peace: Conceptualising Friendship in Politics and International Relations
III. Emotions in International Relations	Simon Koschut	Appropriately Upset? A Methodological Framework for Tracing the Emotion Norms of the Transatlantic Security Community
	Trineke Palm	Interwar Blueprints of Europe: Emotions, Experience and Expectation
	Tereza Capelos & Stavroula Chrona	The Map to the Heart: An Analysis of Political Affectivity in Turkey
	Eleni Braat	Loyalty and Secret Intelligence. Anglo—Dutch Intelligence Cooperation During World War II

Amy Skonieczny (2018) also contextualises her approach through the 2016 US election; in this case, the candidacy of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. A psychoanalytic narrative framework is applied to the populist phenomenon in US politics, with an especial focus on Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders at the time of their candidacy. Populism is, through Skonieczny's (2018) framework, a discursive narrative that allows for a comprehensive investigation of its more emotional elements.

Jo Warner (2018) provides legitimacy for an inclusion of emotions within political representation; in this context, the representative responsibilities and efforts of British Members of Parliament (MP) in relation to child protection. This topic is examined through MPs' efforts to embody their constituencies in collective emotional responses, defending their respective constituencies from feelings of guilt and shame, apportioning blame in relation to personal feelings of guilt, and the role of the MP as an envoy for anxieties about risk to individual children.

Alex Prior (2018) echoes the importance of political representation within discussions of parliamentary politics. Parliament's role—rather than that of parliamentarians—is the focus here, with especial emphasis on attempts to engage citizens through storytelling techniques. These techniques are analysed on the basis of their fidelity to narrative theory, the way in which they represent parliament *and* citizens to each other (and to themselves), and their construction (and, by extension, presupposition) of an 'audience' that would feasibly engage as a result.

2.2. Part II: Conceptual Approaches

In bringing these discussions into more conceptual territory, Anna Durnova (2018)—working within the field of Policy Studies—calls for a dismissal of the binary relationship between emotions and 'meaning', and specifically a shift in focus (based upon the work of Foucault and Deleuze) toward adopting an emotions-based theoretical framework through which to view subjective and collective interpretations of meaning.

As discussed earlier in this introduction, one of the most intriguing (and widely-debated) aspects of the study of emotions is the degree to which emotions are dichotomised with concepts like reason and rationality. For example, as Rosa Sanchez Salgado's (2018) article points out, Civil Society Organizations (CSO) based within the European Union pursue an image of professionalism and expertise that could be considered at odds with emotions and feelings (especially with reference to the traditional conceptualisations earlier). Sanchez Salgado (2018), in investigating this interplay, examines the use of emotions (and emotional appeals) in the advocacy strategies of EU-based CSOs. These communications encompass appeals to reason, but also appeals to emotions used within the framework of advocacy strategies such as 'blaming and shaming'.

Yuri van Hoef and Andrea Oelsner (2018) present an overview of the current status of friendship studies, paying special attention to the overlooked role affect plays in political friendship. Building forth on this insight, they argue that studying friendship is of particular relevance to fields such as Peace and Conflict Studies, where it addresses the lacuna of research on positive peace. They provide several theoretical conceptualisations and methodological approaches that can be readily applied when making sense of friendship, both on a personal level between elite actors, and on the international level between states.

2.3. Part III: Emotions in International Relations

The research of Van Hoef and Oelsner (2018) serves to emphasise the relevance of emotions to International Relations, a theme that the third section of the thematic issue focuses upon. The relationship between norms and emotions—as well as their importance to collective self-image(s)—also forms an area of focus for Simon Koschut (2018). This study pursues a methodology for studying the integration of norms and emotions (in the form of 'emotion norms') within the transatlantic security community by tracing their prevalence historically, through texts that—in terms of self-conception and self-image—could be considered canonical.

Similar to Koschut's (2018) approach, Trineke Palm (2018) developed an emotion discourse analysis to the study of interwar Europe and its variously idealised end states, themselves based upon normative and moral claims. Drawing on Koselleck's concepts of 'space of experience' and 'horizon of expectation', Palm applied an emotional framework to Coudenhove Kalergi's canonical text *Pan-Europa* to examine the emotional and normative underpinnings of ideas about European unity and integration.

Building on this question of binary conceptualisations, Tereza Capelos and Stavroula Chrona (2018) investigate (and 'map') political affect 'clusters' that reach beyond (and problematise) traditional compartmentalisations of emotions (such as anger, hope, pride and fear). The authors discuss a rich and nuanced variety of emotional attitudes among the citizenry—shaped in their own right by ideological orientations—the significance of which goes far beyond the field of Turkish politics (serving as their case study).

Continuing with this international focus, Eleni Braat (2018) concludes the thematic issue by applying the study of emotions to a more (literally) elusive phenomenon—wartime intelligence—and the importance of ostensibly nebulous concepts like loyalty in building and maintaining its underlying networks and collaborative efforts, in comparison to formal work processes. This serves to reflect and encapsulate the broader relevance of this thematic issue, in advocating the relevance of emotions within formal (and informal) political processes.

3. Conclusion

The tripartite structure of this thematic issue offers scholars several fruitful avenues to study emotions in the humanities and social sciences. The first part emphasizes the relevance of emotions within discussions of political actors, representatives and institutions, offering a practical approach to make sense of emotions in politics. This is followed by several conceptual studies that offer a myriad of ways to make sense of emotions conceptually, which builds a bridge towards the third part of this thematic issue on approaches to studying emotions within the field of International Relations. Each of the individual contributions offers an invaluable scholarly approach to the study of emotions. They also offer detailed studies of emotions within their subdisciplines; their relevance, salience, and applications.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

The Pitfalls of "Love and Kindness": On the Challenges to Compassion/Pity as a Political Emotion

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Abstract
Martha Nussbaum's political theory of compassion offers an extensive and compelling study of the potential of employing compassionate emotions in the political realm to further social justice and societal "love". In this article, two pitfalls of Nussbaum's affirming theory of a politics of compassion are highlighted: the problem of a dual-level hierarchisation and the "magic" of feeling compassion that potentially removes the subject of compassion from reality. I will argue that Hannah Arendt's thoughts on pity provide substantial challenges to a democratic theory of compassion in this respect. Following these theoretical reflections, I will turn to Hillary Clinton's 2016 US-American presidential election campaign, to her video ads "Love and Kindness" in particular, in order to provide fitting illustrations from current *realpolitik* for these specific pitfalls of the political employment of compassionate emotions.

Keywords
compassion; emotions; Hannah Arendt; Hillary Clinton; Martha Nussbaum; pity

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Interdisciplinary Approaches to Studying Emotions within Politics and International Relations", edited by Alex Prior (University of Leeds, UK) and Yuri van Hoef (Utrecht University, The Netherlands).

1. Introduction

To claim that political emotionality was prevalent during the 45th presidential election in the United States would certainly be an understatement. Donald Trump's powerful play with people's anger, fear, and insecurities, coupled with his aggression (most notably directed against immigrants and women and the female body), his arousal of patriotism, and the successful emotional creation of the illusion of belonging to a well-defined community, has not only left a distinctive mark in the history of US elections but is already eagerly discussed in scholarly thought about emotions[1] in politics (e.g., Fording & Schram, 2017; Tucker, 2018; Valentino, Wayne, & Oceno, 2018).

However, Donald Trump was not the only candidate who was pressing emotional buttons in order to enforce his political vision during the election campaign. Trump's political adversary, the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, was also trying to address, visualise, and arouse emotions, although of a different nature: throughout her campaign, Clinton was relying on "love" and compassion. One example that perfectly illustrates this strategic employment and fostering of compassionate emotions both as a political means and a political end is the campaign video ad titled "Love and Kindness", released in April 2016[2],

[1] When referring to "emotions" I am concerned with phenomena which can be attributed to the subjective perception that one "is moved" by something, a sensation that is usually directed towards a specific object. I use the term in a broad sense, thus leaving room for variations in terms of the cognitivist and/or phenomenological content of these phenomena, but distinguishing them from pre-conscious affects (e.g., Leys, 2011, p. 443). The phenomena I am concerned with can occur in the public realm (this aspect is crucial in that Arendt draws a clear distinction between private "passions" and public "emotions", as we shall see later). By using the term "emotions" in this way, I am able to accommodate both Martha Nussbaum's (explicit, consistent, and extensively defined) and Hannah Arendt's (more vaguely defined) terminology in the comparison of the two theories.

[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/hillary-clinton-love-and-kindness–campaign-2016/2016/04/26/dc360c68-0b62-11e6-bc53-db634ca94a2a_video.html?utm_term=.b0f942d45e59

and a modified version under the same title that was uploaded onto Clinton's official YouTube channel several days before election day[3]. These two 60-second video clips show Clinton on the campaign trail, apparently attempting to display her emotional involvement with citizens and peers (women especially, but also children and families), addressing her audiences with lots of *pathos*, in the spirit of compassion. "I know it sometimes seems a little odd for someone running for president to say: 'We need more love and kindness in America'. But I am telling you, from the bottom of my heart, we do", Clinton is depicted declaring in the latter of the two ads. It is thus apparent that Clinton and her team had explicitly designated compassionate emotions as both worth striving for the future of the US-American society (political end) and as one of the basic instruments for her campaign and a potential presidency (political means). "From the bottom of my heart", furthermore, explicitly points us to the fact that Clinton sought to convey emotional authenticity and "warmth" in her political agenda. This is not surprising, given the fact that Clinton has widely been perceived as cold-hearted and "robot-like" (e.g., Cunha, 2016), thereby revealing the unsettling continuation of powerful gender stereotyping for women in politics.

Clinton's focus on compassionate emotions as both political means and political end in her electoral campaign reminds us, to some extent, of Martha Nussbaum's political theory of emotions (e.g., Nussbaum, 1996, 2001, 2013, 2016). Nussbaum promotes compassion as a useful and vital emotion to be employed in the political realm in order to advance social justice and more collective striving towards an Aristotelian version of the "good life", arguing that compassion, and public "love", help overcome tendencies of societal exclusion and providing support for the sacrifices which are needed for the common good.

In the following analysis, I will briefly outline Martha Nussbaum's political theory of compassion. I will then continue to problematise certain aspects of her normative recommendation to further compassion as both a political means and a political end with the help of another political theory of compassion/pity, the one Hannah Arendt proposed in *On Revolution* (1963/2016). It will become clear that Nussbaum's very affirming account of the potential of compassion in the political realm and her vision of a "public culture of compassion" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 157) are in fact at risk at generating substantial threats for a democratic understanding of politics—due to two specific pitfalls, namely the problem of a dual-level hierarchisation and the "magic" of feeling compassion that potentially removes the subject of compassion from reality. These underlying problems in Nussbaum's proposal might eventually undermine the exact values this compelling project was originally designed to promote.

After discussing these two challenges to Nussbaum's proposal of a compassionate "emotion-driven politics" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 396) I will turn to Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign which ran under the slogan "Stronger Together". I will argue that the two aforementioned campaign video clips are telling illustrations of the pitfalls of a politics of compassion. Obviously, the discussion of Nussbaum's and Arendt's theories in this respect does not explain Clinton's electoral defeat. It is neither my aim to provide a detailed analysis of the Democratic presidential campaign, nor do I seek to offer an extensive study on the myriad of possible reasons why it had failed at the ballot box. Instead, despite—or, rather, because of—their being one-dimensional and pointed due to their very purpose, Clinton's campaign videos fittingly illustrate my claim that a critical engagement with Nussbaum's theses with the help of Arendt's is fruitful and vital for further theoretical reflections on both the potential and dangers of employing compassion/pity as a political emotion.

2. The Potential of a "Public Culture of Compassion"

Election campaigns such as Hillary Clinton's are certainly not the only instances in which we can detect emotion in political life. Reflections on the role of emotion and affects in the political realm have increasingly been published over the last two decades, for particular emotions and with specific research foci (e.g., Ahmed, 2014; Arrifin, Coicaud, & Popovski, 2016; Demertzis, 2013; Engelken-Jorge, Güell, & Del Rio, 2011; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001; Hoggett & Thompson, 2012; Marcus, 2000; Walzer, 2004; Westen, 2007; Wodak, 2015). However, although compassionate emotions had once been prominent elements in influential political thought, for example in the political theories of David Hume, Adam Smith, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and although compassion/pity and empathy are now increasingly emphasised and valorised in neoliberal terms (Hochschild, 1983; Illouz, 2007; Pedwell, 2014; Rifkin, 2009)—despite this, (female connoted) compassionate emotions still seem to have to prove their worth both for (male connoted) *realpolitik* and current mainstream political science alike (notable exceptions are, e.g., Berlant, 2004; Pedwell, 2014; Ure & Frost, 2014).

In light of this research gap, Martha Nussbaum's extensive studies on the relationship between compassionate emotions and politics (1996, 2001, 2003, 2013) have attracted much scholarly attention. Nussbaum argues that emotions, in general, are not only ever-present in politics but that we should also think of strategies to actively *employ* certain kinds of emotions in order to create a more just society. She writes: "All political principles, the good as well as the bad, need emotional support to ensure their stability over time, and all decent societies need to guard against division and hierarchy by cultivating appropriate sentiments of sympathy and love" (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 2–3).

Nussbaum singles out one of the most promising, "positive and helpful" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 135) emo-

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-iuPeMdprQ

tions for stabilising "decent" societies and political systems (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 3): compassion[4]. Nussbaum defines compassion as "a painful emotion directed at the serious suffering of another creature or creatures" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 142). However, compassion, for Nussbaum, is not only a "private" emotion but very much a "collective" one: compassion can serve as a "bridge between the individual and the community" (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 28). It is this bridge that needs to be erected first, though, because Nussbaum acknowledges the fact that compassion, by its very nature, can be partial (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 157). This means that I might only feel compassion towards those who are literally nearest and those who, through familial or cultural ties, are dearest to me. In her programmatic and normatively charged study *Political Emotions* (2013), as a political end, she thus calls for a widening of our own very narrow circle of concern up to the national level, through education (p. 124) and through a compassionate culture that promotes shared encounters, especially in specifically designed public places (p. 261). As a political means, she demands that compassion be "practiced" in schools and beyond, with the help of literature (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 276–279, 1995, p. 10) and role play (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 176). Furthermore, politicians and other political agents should actively address and evoke compassion for fellow citizens in matters of social justice. This could be achieved with the help of imagery (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 283–284), for example, or moving and compassionate political speeches such as Lincoln's Gettysburg Address (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 229–234).

Meanwhile, legislation and jurisdiction, according to Nussbaum, have to be set up according to impartial principles (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 20), the support of which could also be furthered by her rather daring vision of a "public culture of compassion". Indeed, much of Nussbaum's account reads almost like a political utopia, which she claims to contain a very real potential for current political practices (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 383–385). However, this alleged realistic nature of Nussbaum's various ideas for how to foster "positive" emotions in a given society has been met with some scepticism. Veronika Vasterling, for instance, has criticised Nussbaum's focus on civic education through literature as being too unrealistic and sterile for a world that is actually much less coherent than Nussbaum allegedly gives credit for, a world which is based on the very "messy business" of interacting with the other (Vasterling, 2007, p. 90).

It is thus necessary to critically examine Nussbaum's claims with regard to the *limitations* of the "public culture of compassion". In the following analysis, I aim to highlight two specific challenges to Nussbaum's normative proposal. I will demonstrate that one of the best ways of doing so is to employ Hannah Arendt's political theory for this task (see also Degerman, 2016, pp. 17–18). An extensive and systematic comparison of the two theoretical explorations of (compassionate) emotions in politics has not yet been undertaken, even though some (rather) recent studies have provided brief and partial analyses of the two theories in this respect (e.g., Degerman, 2016; Roberts-Miller, 2007; Rosenmüller, 2015).

3. (Arendtian) Challenges to Compassion/Pity as a Political Emotion

The fact that both theories have yet to be systematically subjected to comparison is probably due to the impression that Arendt and Nussbaum offer very different views on the role of emotions in politics in general, as well as very different views regarding the "positive" and dangerous political effects compassion/pity might have[5]. Arendt has neither written about emotions extensively, at least not as extensively as Nussbaum, nor is she of the opinion that emotions should belong into the political realm at all (e.g., Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 91), a crucial point which she emphasises throughout her oeuvre. Arendt's theory is thus not the first choice to consult whenever one wishes to engage in a political theory of emotions, although some publications have sought to illuminate the role of (particular) passions/emotions in her political theory (e.g., Degerman, 2016; Heins, 2007; Lang, 2015; Newcomb, 2007; Swift, 2011).

Much of that which manifests Arendt's most well-known stance on emotions in politics can be found in her study on the French and the American Revolution. Arendt's deliberations in *On Revolution* (1963/2016) constitute a significant and comparatively extensive account on what happens when (compassionate) emotions are employed as a political means to a specific political end. Even if her thoughts revolve around the context of revolutions, it is clear from the content of other accounts in which she touches the issue of passions and emotions, notably *The Life of the Mind* (1978), *Men in Dark Times* (1968), and *Rahel Varnhagen* (1957/1997), that her remarks on pity as a political emotion can be extended to other, non-revolutionary political settings as well.

These deliberations serve as fruitful arguments against some of Nussbaum's very affirming claims of the potential of evoking compassion in the political realm. As a conceptual preliminary remark it must be said that if one is to bring Nussbaum's and Arendt's political theories of compassion/pity into any dialogue, it needs to be clarified that Arendt makes a twofold distinction between the private "true" "passion" of compassion, which marks a direct reaction to individual and concrete suffering (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 85), and the political "perversion" (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 84) of such passion into

[4] Compassion, according to Nussbaum, is not the same as empathy, which she defines as the "ability to imagine the situation of the other, taking the other's perspective" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 145), which is neither necessary nor sufficient for compassion (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 146).

[5] It is worth noting that Nussbaum herself refrains from referring to Arendt's theory throughout her work on political emotions, except from her brief rebuttal of Arendt's *Reflections on Little Rock* (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 316), and her engagement with Arendt's analysis of Augustine's concept of love (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 551–556).

pity, thus turning into a public "sentiment". This pity, being "sorry without being touched in the flesh" (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 80), is able to "reach out to the multitude" (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 84), and it can deliberately be evoked in the public realm in order to address a collective. Arendtian pity as a public sentiment can thus serve as the equivalent to Nussbaum's political emotion of compassion—despite the difference in terminologies and the widely diverging conceptual notions they attribute to this collective phenomenon.

In *On Revolution*, Arendt provides several reasons for her vehement warnings against using pity as both a political means and/or a political end—warnings that stress the proto-totalitarian potential of pity as a public emotion (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 96). Due to the brevity of this article, I can neither provide a detailed rendition of the general characteristics she assignes to pity, nor of all the reasons she gives for ascribing to pity not an apolitical, but an *anti-political* character (see also Newcomb, 2007, p. 117) according to the Arendtian notion of that which manifests "the political". I would like to focus on two major issues which Arendt has with pity which help us challenge Nussbaum's very affirming notion of a "public culture of compassion": the problem of hierachisation and the "magic" of feeling compassion and its relation to reality.

3.1. Dual-Level Hierarchisation

Let us first consider the issue of hierarchy, which brings us to a striking paradox in Nussbaum's theory: conceptually, Nussbaum explicitly tries to stay clear of any notion of a hierarchy that might be prevalent in compassionate emotions, and she insists that a given society will in fact potentially become less hierarchical if it furthers compassion as a political emotion. However, it is her proposal of a "public culture of compassion" itself which threatens to establish hierarchies—both between the subject and the object of compassion as well as between those who decide to pursue Nussbaum's vision and those who oppose this project.

Nussbaum purposefully refrains from using the term "pity" since, according to her, it has come to be regarded as establishing a hierarchy and superiority between the subject and the object of pity (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 301)[6]. In her proposal of a "public culture of compassion", Nussbaum seems to refute the negative aspects associated with the emotion of compassion despite its inherent shortcomings such as its inclination to partiality. We might be tempted to disagree, since the first problem in Nussbaum's account that threatens to reinforce a hierarchy lies with the connection between the emotion itself and its propensity to direct action: In that we feel pity, or are advised to feel it for others on a collective level, according to Arendt, the danger arises that we feel an (immediate) urge to help others, to rescue them, by making politics *for* them, and not *with* them (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 180).

This, I believe, is a crucial critique on compassion/pity as a political emotion—one that cannot be discarded easily, at least not if we refrain from a paternalistic notion of politics. Compassion/pity thus threatens to establish a clear hierarchy between the subject and the object of this emotion. Even though Nussbaum carefully tries to avoid this hierarchy, nevertheless this danger seems to underlie the notion of "a painful emotion directed at the serious suffering of another creature or creatures"—especially so because Nussbaum does not consider the condition of "similar possibilities" as a necessary element for compassion (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 144). Compassion/pity may thus further the societal divide, rather than reduce it.

The second challenge regarding the relationship between Nussbaum's proposal of a "public culture of compassion" and the pitfall of hierarchisation emerges on the metalevel: while Nussbaum rejects Rousseau's theory of "civic love" for being "obedient" and "hierarchical" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 45), she maintains that, in her "project", certain emotions such as compassion "conduce to *equal respect and toleration*" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 122, emphasis in original). Nussbaum insists that critical engagement and scrutiny with such a programmatic vision are necessary and need to be promoted actively (e.g., Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 389). Turning to John Stuart Mill and Rabindranath Tagore, Nussbaum is of the opinion that "a culture of sympathy and imagination is fully compatible with, and indeed can reinforce, a liberal culture of experimentation and dissent" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 105). However, Nussbaum does not offer satisfying answers as to how the opportunity for dissent and according political action should be incorporated into this particular visionary political and social culture.

Hence, the problem with Nussbaum's proposal is that, if put into practice, it at least urges people to, and in worst cases might even be perceived as forcing people to feel compassion/pity. It might thus be regarded as inflicted 'from above' and thus fuel resentment of 'the establishment' and its policies which is currently prevalent. Nussbaum's credo "[i]nvite, not coerce" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 388) tries to address this conceptual challenge but does not convincingly abolish it. Since her normative approach of actively fostering compassion encompasses nearly all areas of that which Nussbaum subsumes under her wide definition of the political realm (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 16–17), in effect, it will touch people's lives on various levels. According to Degerman, in this case, consequences such as "compulsory education or the stigma of abnormality" would be conceivable (Degerman, 2016, p. 17). Hence, it is this all-encompassing dimension of her vision that is both attractive and normatively problematic.

The challenges to Nussbaum's approach to foster a political culture of compassion will become clearer if we

[6] In fact, it might indeed have been Arendt's political thought that had a role in maintaining this notion of the hierarchical relationship between the subject and the object of pity. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.

again turn to Hannah Arendt's critical remarks on employing pity in the political realm: for Arendt, politics is necessarily a matter of dealing with the pluralistic. To her, pity, the "perversion" of the private passion of compassion into a public emotion, leads to the fact that this plurality of opinions and desires can become subdued by the one pressing issue that demands us to act immediately and in total unison (Arendt, 1963/2016, pp. 72–74). During the French Revolution, Arendt writes, this pressing issue was the abolishment of misery that was enforced in accordance with (her reading of) Rousseau's theory of the *volonté générale*, the "popular will" (Arendt, 1963/2016, pp. 70–74). Simon Swift has rightly pointed out that, in Arendt's interpretation, pity had thus served as a "grotesque alibi" (Swift, 2011, p. 84) for the revolutionaries' biopolitical agenda.

While agreeing in their refusal of the "dictatorial" nature of Rousseau's proposal of a "civil religion" (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 5), the political context of Nussbaum's and Arendt's thoughts differ fundamentally. Nonetheless, I think we can take a valuable point from Arendt's verdict which can legitimately be transferred onto Nussbaum's theory: A (compassionate) "emotion programme" such as Nussbaum's might potentially clash with the pluralistic and diverse (political) interests of each individual. Hence, to some, the political demand to live in and actively shape a compassionate society can indeed resemble a totalising notion of inflicting a single political will in the shape of "rules of feeling" (Hochschild, 2016, p. 228) onto citizens who may not be provided with the ability to dissent, or to have their dissent heard and incorporated into political decision-making. Additionally, with Arendt, it could be argued that compassion/pity as a political end might hinder or disable the impetus for individual political judgment itself. Arendt's insistence on the plurality of political opinions and interests, as well as on the possibility to judge independently and act accordingly with others, thus clashes with an "emotion programme" that is introduced as an overriding political means, and, in a way, a political end as well (e.g., Nussbaum, 2013, p. 392). This clash seems to be inscribed in Nussbaum's vision in its totality.

In his analysis of Arendt's stance on emotions in politics, Dan Degerman pushes a similar point about the question of authenticity in Nussbaum's theory even further: "By reasserting Arendt's distinctions between the heart, the private, and the public in political discourse, we can protect the depth of the individual from collective colonization" (Degerman, 2016, p. 18). We might not go this far and resort to Arendt's overall protection of the political realm from emotions (and thus, to a certain degree, support her controversial differentiation between the private, the political, and the social, e.g., Benhabib, 1996, p. 155; most articles collected in Honig, 1995; von Tevenar, 2014, p. 38) in order to challenge Nussbaum's theory and its alleged gravitation towards "collective colonization". However, despite Nussbaum's best intentions to state the contrary, the underlying problem of an "emotion programme" that enforces "feeling rules" and that potentially neglects diverse political and cultural attitudes certainly protrudes from the conceptual surface and demands to be addressed.

3.2. The "Magic" of Feeling Compassion/Pity

With Arendt, I would like to draw attention to a second major obstacle against Nussbaum's vision of a "public culture of compassion": the problem of the (self-deceptive) "magic" (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 76) of feeling compassion/pity.

In *Upheavals of Thought* Nussbaum states:

> People can all-too-easily feel that they have done something morally good because they have had an experience of compassion—without having to take any of the steps to change the world that might involve them in real difficulty and sacrifice....This does not mean that compassion by itself has bad tendencies; it means that people are frequently too weak to keep their attention fixed on a course of action and that a momentary experience is frequently much easier for them than a sustained commitment. This gives us reason to insist on going beyond compassion and to focus, as does Kant, on action and institutions. (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 399)

Hence, Nussbaum herself mentions a problematic side-effect of compassion—the exaltation of moral goodness that, paradoxically, might even prevent concrete action to alleviate the sufferer's pain: "When I feel compassion for a person who is suffering, I often *imagine* helping that person, and in many cases I do it" (Nussbaum, 2016, p. 22, emphasis added). This imagination can, in some cases, evolve into a powerful and lavish deception, a deception that defies reality and thus action that is designed to address this reality. Nussbaum's answer to this problem in *Political Emotions* is, on the one hand, to (rather vaguely) address and affirm the robustness of political institutions that serve as the necessary backbone of liberal politics. On the other hand, Nussbaum also strongly appeals to the emotional experience of a collective in order to actively further the political aim of social justice.

Even though Nussbaum seems to be aware of the problem of the specific "aura" of the lavish imagination of moral goodness that potentially threatens to encapsulate the subject of compassion, shield it from the harsh and "messy" reality of engaging with plural opinions, and potentially lead to inactivity, we cannot find any extensive problematisation of this pitfall in her account. Hence, it is helpful to turn to Arendt's deliberations again: According to Arendt, the good feeling of pity might indeed lure us into an "emotion-laden insensitivity to reality" (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 85). In that we lavishly revel in compassionate emotions, in our mere phantasies of helping others, of acting for them (potentially

as subordinate others), Arendt shows us that we are in danger of losing touch with reality. This not only leads to self-deception (see Arendt's criticism on the emotional state of the romanticists such as the Jewish salonnière Rahel Varnhagen; Arendt, 1957/1997) but also serves as a predisposition for totalitarian rule—which, for Arendt, showed its precursors in the French Revolution. Arendt writes, the French revolutionaries, in the "boundlessness of their sentiments…, felt no compunctions in sacrificing" real people for "their 'principles'" (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 85). The reality of violence and suffering, according to Arendt, did not move the French revolutionaries, who were spellbound by the magic of the collective emotion they had actively evoked.

While Nussbaum's theory was of course designed to promote the opposite of violence and terror, and while her project succeeds for the most part in promoting communal, peaceful, and even "loving" cooperation, the underlying challenge of an "insensitivity to reality" due to the elated feeling of moral goodness and compassion is still a conceptual and also quite real threat that cannot easily be refuted when one studies Nussbaum's theory of emotions.

4. The Pitfalls of "Love and Kindness"

In order to illustrate my theoretical reflections on the two substantial pitfalls of the strategic employment of compassion in the political realm, I would now like to turn to Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign video clips called "Love and Kindness".

The first of the two one-minute video clips features almost ten close-ups of Clinton's encounters with African Americans. In one scene in the first video clip, Clinton holds a black child tightly and is depicted saying, presumably to his relatives, "We will need to make sure he gets a chance to…learn how to do that". Also, females are distinctly featured in both video clips. The very first caption of the second video clip reads "For our daughters", while the caption "For our sons" follows after being separated by a scene without a caption. It is thus obvious that the original aim of the campaign ads was (a) to address African American and female voters, and to state that (b) these two major groups of the US-American society were to be supported in their struggle for equal opportunities and social justice—through an explicit demand for compassion. This demand is verbalised in a scene in which Clinton says: "We have too much inequality everywhere that limits the potential for a lot of people", and by the captions that accompany various scenes of Clinton on the campaign trail: "Let's break down barriers/So we can all rise together/Do all the good we can/In all the ways we can/For all the people we can/Let's protect each other/Let's support each other/Let's stand together", they read in the first video ad, and, in the modified version of the second: "For our daughters/For our sons/For our country/Let's support each other/Be kind to each other/Lift each other up/together/Stronger together".

It is in this explicit appeal to compassion as a political means and end that the *pitfall of a dual-level hierarchisation* is clearly recognisable. First, the scene of Clinton hugging the child displays a hierarchy between the (white) politician and the citizenry (of colour): from Clinton's statement "We will need to make sure he gets a chance to…learn how to do that" it is not clear whom Clinton designates as the "we". This scene, then, alludes to the promotion of a politics *for*, instead of a politics designed to undertake *with*, either/both the boy as a signifier for Americans of colour or/and a subordinate citizenry itself. Interestingly, the image remained in the second video ad, but not Clinton's accompanying statement. Secondly, on the metalevel of a politics of compassion, the campaign videos clearly visualise a political programme of urging citizens to be (more) compassionate. The explicit appeal to compassion as a public principle to be striven for is combined with an obvious partisanship for African Americans and women.

In her sociological study of Tea Party members in Louisiana, *Strangers in Their Own Land* (2016), Arlie Russell Hochschild records that, during the Obama administration, many Trump supporters and Tea Party members she spoke to had expressed resentment of the fact that they felt they were forced to sympathise with alleged "beneficiaries" of the welfare system, most notably with people of colour, when, really, they neither *felt* nor *wanted to feel* this forced compassion for people they perceived as "cutting the line" (Hochschild, 2016, p. 137). Reading Hochschild's emphatic study it becomes very clear that these (mostly white) Southern Tea Party members who, to a certain extent, seem to be representative of a larger group of Republican voters, regarded themselves as competing with people of colour, and, increasingly, with women, for the perceived sparse fruits of their hard labour. They found themselves in what they saw as a distribution battle that threatened their existence—both in terms of their wealth and their values. Politicians, especially non-Republicans, were perceived as promoting (their) exclusion for the sake of inclusion (of "the other").

From Hochschild's study, it thus becomes clear that inclusion and the enforcement of social justice were regarded as the one single pressing political issue that her interviewees rejected (often along underlying racial and gendered divisions). Hence, the call for more compassion towards others such as the one depicted in Clinton's "Love and Kindness" ads would have certainly been perceived both as a totalising notion of inflicting "politically correct rules of feeling" (Hochschild, 2016, p. 228) onto them that they absolutely rejected and, ultimately, as an obstacle to their own flourishing.

During his run for the presidency, Donald Trump created an emotional cloud that was explicitly directed against these perceived "feeling rules" and political correctness. The "high" of enthusiasm (Hochschild, 2016, p. 228) that Trump's candidacy created has so far led to a substantial neglect of (legal) reality and facts to an

unknown degree. However, shifting the analysis from Trump to Clinton means that we acknowledge that Clinton and her campaign team, too, sought to create a specific emotional atmosphere for her campaign, and beyond. Thus, the second potential pitfall of a politics of compassion that I have identified above, *the "magic" of feeling compassion/pity that might lead to deception and an insensitivity to reality*, can also be illustrated quite fittingly by the two campaign videos: accompanied by lots of musical *pathos*—the soul singer Andra Day's lyrics "Spread a little hope and love now/We will walk it out together now"—, particularly in the 60 seconds of the older campaign ad Clinton is continuously depicted smiling, hugging, embracing, exchanging high-fives, listening to citizens and their stories, appearing to be *moved* by others and their stories, offering verbal and non-verbal support. On reflection, the lavishly exhibited display of an appeal to compassion, kindness, solidarity, and public "love" might have led pre-inclined viewers to revel in the powerful *pathos* and utopia of a compassionate society. This specific mood might have intensified in contrast to Donald Trump's addressing of anger, fear, and aggression.

The contrast between the Democrat's display of an emotional revelling in altruistic feelings and the emotional state of the specific group of US-American voters that Hochschild portrays could not have been much bigger. If we again turn to Hochschild's study, we are presented with portraits of citizens who, instead of being willing to extend their compassion towards others and offer their share to act accordingly, felt that their own lot had been governed by the harsh reality of a life somehow gone downhill. Hochschild's interviewees perceived a cultural shift experienced as foreign and false that made them feel instead as "strangers in their own land" (Hochschild, 2016). It is against this backdrop that Trump, instead of a (female connoted) "public culture of compassion", proposed a (masculine) vision of a "greater" America and a better future for those who felt "left behind". As Amy Skonieczny (2018) also argues in this issue, Trump's explicit and calculated appeal to those mourning a "bygone America" (p. 71) was accompanied by a simultaneous proposition to blame and exclude "the other" (p. 63), which fell on fruitful ground.

Paradoxically, Hochschild's study shows that many of the people she portrayed regarded themselves as very compassionate, often acting as such, yet only towards those perceived as near and dear, and as "entitled" to support. The interviewees did not want an intrusive government urging them towards a more compassionate life, which they believed they were already living. Instead, they wanted light-touch governance to secure the promise of the American Dream by (re-)turning to political deregulation. In seeking to have this promise come true, they had to endure man-made catastrophes, pollution, and the deterioration of their health. "They were victims without a language of victimhood", Hochschild (2016, p. 131) emphasises. Interestingly, her interviewees seem to have been torn between the desire to demand compassion directed towards themselves and a disdain for exactly this kind of appeal (Hochschild, 2016, pp. 144–145).

It is this reality, the complexity of and the rift between the collective emotional states of US-American voters that Clinton's campaign ads do not seem to have been able to represent or address adequately. The overriding tone of the two campaign ads conveys an opulence in the promotion of compassion, a moral 'high-ground' of altruism for certain groups of the population, but not all, which apparently was not able to serve as a soundboard given the nation's great societal divide.

5. Conclusion

Both a look at Hannah Arendt's warnings against employing pity as a political emotion and at a fitting illustration of the attempt to utilise compassion as a political means and a political end in current politics—Hillary Clinton's election campaign videos—have provided us with relevant challenges to Nussbaum's ideal of a "public culture of compassion". Indeed, the very aspect Nussbaum so vehemently wants to overcome with her project—societal divisions due to hierarchies—nevertheless seems to crop up as part of the attempt to implement her normative vision. Furthermore, such a theoretical project might even threaten to border on a sort of Arendtian totalising notion of a "popular will" of a political collective, with compassion serving both as political means and end. This is a valid challenge to a democratic idea of a "public culture of compassion", one that might not easily be discarded by Nussbaum's rather unelaborated remarks on the notion that possibilities of dissent to such undertaking necessarily have to be provided for.

A rigorous "public culture of compassion" might indeed become at risk of suppressing plurality and plural (political) opinions at a certain point, by establishing hierarchical obstacles both in the relationship between the subject and the object of compassion/pity itself, and in the subject and the object of a political agenda of compassionate emotions. Hence, we should keep in mind that the utilisation of emotions in politics inevitably contributes to certain practices of power (e.g., Illouz, 2007) which are also, to a certain extent, prone to exclusion and even violence. Furthermore, Arendt cautions that pity serving as the heart of a political agenda demands that, logically, an object of pity *must* always be given: "Without the presence of misfortune, pity could not exist" (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 84). Theoretically, misfortune might thus be perpetuated, or even aggravated, in order to ensure that the political agenda of striving towards a collective emotion of compassion/pity continues to have a legitimate object.

Additionally, the specific "aura" that the attempt to invoke compassion/pity as political means and/or end can create may run counter to the subjective experience and the (more objective) givenness of reality. This is precisely that which Arendt has stressed throughout her unsystematic "theory of emotions"—that emotions in gen-

eral, and especially pity, create a "magic" feeling of being thus immersed in the respective emotion that reality becomes blurred. A "public culture of compassion" can thus impede its own aim of inclusion by furthering societal and political divides vertically and horizontally, providing obstacles to representation and thus, eventually, threaten the very essence of democratic practices.

All this is not to say, however, that Arendt's overall rejection of allowing pity to come into play in politics should not be equally criticised (e.g., von Tevenar, 2014; Whitebrook, 2014)—despite their difficulties and ambivalences (see also Pedwell, 2014) compassionate emotions perform vital functions in societies and politics. Thus, Nussbaum has not only rightly argued that a politics of compassion should be furthered to grant more justice and equality, but also, among others, Joan C. Tronto (1993/2009) and Elisabeth Porter (2006), who have established links between a politics of compassion with a very necessary politics of care.

Additionally, my aim was not to claim that Nussbaum's overall vision of a "public culture of compassion" should be refuted. On the contrary—we can draw from Nussbaum's theory the idea that there is a certain appeal, a beauty even, to the "emotion-driven politics" of compassion/pity if employed with decent motives and monitoring. With Nussbaum's account, we are convincingly tempted to counter exclusionary tendencies with compassion and a more utopian vision of the "good life" that can be created for one another in a communal space, both in theory and in practice. And, indeed, if one consults *Strangers in their Own Land*, one is inclined to agree with Arlie Hochschild that what is needed is the demolition of "empathy walls" (e.g., Hochschild, 2016, p. 5) and greater effort to understand "the other". Hochschild reports that many of those who supported the Tea Party movement, and very likely Trump as president, were compassionate neighbours and churchgoers. What is needed here, it seems, is in fact not the abolishment of compassion in our public life but the enlargement of our respective circles of concern (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 11)—as well as a resolute fight against prevailing societal sexism and racism.

Nussbaum's rather fascinating normative approach can hence provide us with very engaging ideas for a specific political agenda that is, in many ways, very different from the one that we see prevalent in Donald Trump's presidency, or in the many excesses of right-wing populism that have cropped up in many parts in Europe. Arendt's theoretical warnings and Clinton's practical example, however, have made it clear that there are some major challenges that must be addressed in further theoretical reflections on a "public culture of compassion", especially in such politically charged times of upheaval.

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Article

Emotions and Political Narratives: Populism, Trump and Trade

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Abstract
In 2016, a wave of American populism triggered emotional reactions to issues like trade and immigration, and dramatically impacted the Obama administration's plans to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) during President Obama's final year in office. This article asks how do emotions infuse populism with political power, and why was populism effective in sparking American economic nationalism and retreat from free trade during the 2016 presidential campaign? Drawing on a psychoanalytic, narrative framework, the article argues that populist narratives deployed by US presidential candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders characterized the American economy as a story of the people versus corrupt elites offering greater audience resonance that ultimately derailed President Obama's plan to pass the TPP and ushered in an era of economic nationalism under President Trump. The article contributes to the literature on emotions and foreign policy and explores the under-studied *emotional* features of populism as a discursive narrative.

Keywords
economic nationalism; emotions; identity; narratives; populism; trade; Trans-Pacific Partnership; Trump; US foreign policy

Issue
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1. Introduction

In 2016, the turn against free trade led by US Presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump came as a surprise to many US policymakers set on passing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) during the last year of President Obama's presidency. Throughout 2015–2016 presidential campaign, the candidates effectively used economic populist rhetoric to turn the TPP and past trade agreements into equivalences with economic disaster and bad political decisions. The eventual collapse of US efforts to pass the TPP left many wondering why the anti-trade, economic populism of candidates resonated with so many Americans. Why was economic populism so appealing to so many across the left–right political spectrum?

This article argues that populism contains a core story about 'the people' reclaiming power from 'elites', and when applied to policy issues such as the TPP and trade, can turn dry, abstract economic issues into compelling narratives of betrayal, corruption, oppression and loss. Populist narratives overcame a pro-trade, pro-globalization, pro-TPP campaign by invoking powerful, charged characterizations of who 'we' are, who is to blame, and what the future should be, all framed in emotional language. In examining the public messaging on trade and the economy, the article finds that the economic populist campaigns of presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump more effectively evoked feelings of a certain type of 'we-ness' and connected better with the audience by conveying an emotional expression of lack and desire for repair of something broken that sparked wide-spread resonance with many Americans, ultimately derailing President Obama's plans to ratify the TPP.

Drawing insights from Ty Solomon's (2013) work on the resonances of neo-conservatism, the article develops a psycho-analytic, narrative framework that draws on Lacan (1981), and applies it to selected speeches on the economy and trade from the Obama administration and presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump during the 2015–2016 presidential campaign. Ultimately, the driving emotional features of resonate discourses, lack and desire as articulated by Solomon's work,

as well as fantasy and transgression (Eberle, 2017), are conceived here as emotional elements of story showcasing the benefits of bridging a Lacanian framework with narrative analysis and applying it to economic populism.

2. Emotions, Populism and Political Narratives

The study of emotions and affects as critical elements of discourse and language are flourishing in the International Relations literature (see, for example, the recent forum on emotions and discourse by Koschut, 2017b; see also Bially-Mattern, 2011, 2014; Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014;Clément & Sanger, 2018; Crawford, 2000; Eberle, 2017, 2018; Fierke, 2013; Hall, 2015; Koschut, 2017a; Solomon, 2014; Steele, 2010). More recently, scholars of populism have also argued that the emotional appeals of populist discourse provoke audience associations and mobilizations (Rico, Guinjoan, & Anduiza, 2017; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017). By turning to the study of emotions and affect, scholars contend that resonance can be better understood. In the past, scholars have sometimes struggled to explain why one discourse is more dominant than another or why one narrative wins out over another in a narrative clash (Solomon, 2013).

Ty Solomon (2013) argues that an explanation for why some discourses are more appealing than others is that some discursive constructions are infused with feelings such as anxiety, fear, desire or hope that provoke audience identification or relatability. Salmela and von Scheve (2017) found that emotions and feelings were central in right-wing populist rhetoric and that policy issues were framed in terms of emotions such as fear, anxiety, anger and feelings of powerlessness. Minkenberg (2000) claims that an underlying emotional content of the radical right channels a sensibility of 'modernization losers' where right-wing populism reflects a feeling of shrinking social and cultural capital rather than pure victimhood. In this sense, Salmela and von Scheve (2017) argue that the repressed shame of loss of social, economic and cultural stature seeks to be directed away from the self onto others as hatred and anger at other groups. Elaborating on this point, Jakob Eberle (2017) discusses what Lacan describes as transgression. It is an aspect of a particular type of story—a fantasy—wherein something or someone prevents the subject from obtaining wholeness and certainty, and not only exacerbates feelings of anxiety but actually enjoys the process of taking something away. As Eberle (2017) explains, the fantasy story fuels fervor by emphasizing the *transgression* "in which someone is depicted as stealing our enjoyment by blocking our achievement of a whole identity—and as enjoying herself in doing so" (p. 13). As such, a discourse of populism resonates because it directs feelings of lack and shame towards blame of others—typically elites but also scapegoats such as immigrants, refugees and economically weak groups like the long-term unemployed—and depicts them as taking advantage of others, the system or "the mark" (Glynos, Klimecki, & Willmott, 2012) *and* enjoying it.

In addition to analyzing how emotions affect discursive resonance, some scholars of emotions show that it is not just *what* is said, but *how* it is said that evokes audience association and strengthens identification with the speaker's position. For example, Steele conceptualizes discursive power as a strata made up of psychological, imaginative and rhythmic layers (2010). Rhythm helps explain the *how* of power—how it is articulated in iterative forms (Oren & Solomon, 2015), in operationalized practices (Steele, 2010), and in repetition (Oren & Solomon, 2015). Particularly in political speeches designed to illicit audience emotions either in support or opposition to an issue, iteration and repetition of certain, often ambiguous phrases, draws the audience into the performance as producers of the political spectacle (Edelman, 1988) that is the campaign rally, the 'stump speech', the 'roll-out' or the 'launch' of a campaign. In Oren and Solomon's (2015) work, they argue that audience engagement in political speech in terms of chants, and call and response repetition of simple phrases, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), is productive of a speech act and an ignored element of 'illocutionary force'. Indeed, Donald Trump's campaign rallies always include an audience call and response element such as the phrase 'lock her up' whenever he mentioned his political opponent. On June 27, 2018 the *Daily Show* even made fun of this particular style by tweeting the following after Donald Trump's rally in Minnesota: "Move over 'lock her up.' There's a new chant sweeping through MAGA (Make America Great Again) country: "SPACE FORCE!" (The Daily Show, 2018). During the Democratic National Convention in 2016, Bernie Sanders supporters chanted "No TPP" so loudly that several scheduled speakers, including President Obama, had to stop and attempt to quiet them (Arnold, 2016). To sum up, how the speech is delivered, including the way the audience engages or even disrupts, creates a speech experience that elevates emotion and audience resonance for or against an issue.

In his 2013 article, Solomon developed a framework built on Jacques Lacan (1981) to explain why the discourse of neoconservatism resonated with audiences and successfully drove the Bush administration's foreign policy in the 2000s as opposed to the 1990s when the ideas first circulated after the end of the Cold War. He found that an effective discourse must spark desire, and give voice to the subjects feeling of lack. Solomon's framework can provide insight into how the emotions of populism can mobilize audiences and succeed in rallying audiences against free trade.

Drawing on Lacan, Solomon (2013) conceptualizes the subject as decentered and longing for a stable sense of self. This perpetual but always unsatisfied desire for wholeness produces affect as subjects long to be made whole even if it is an unobtainable goal. As Solomon states, "The subject is constituted around a lack; an always missing 'full' sense of self that the subject always pursues through identification practices yet never ultimately attains" (2013, p. 105). Subject identifications

come, in part, from societal signifiers of national identity such as 'democracy', 'freedom', 'rights' or other types of collective identities proscribed in a discourse. Individuals see themselves as part of a collective whole and seek identifications with symbols of this collective.

This approach helps explain why individuals relate to seemingly abstract discourses such as neoconservatism and populism. Both discourses are ripe with symbols that fulfill, at least partly, a subject's desire for identification. It is this desire (for wholeness) that is the driving force that connects subjects with identifications as they seek meaning and enjoyment in pursuing fantasies that they will someday be whole again and fulfilled. However, the closer the subject feels to the object associated with wholeness, the quicker desire fades. For Lacan (1981), it is the fantasy of wholeness and the desire stimulated by lack that offers a stabilizing discursive identity for the subject. Thus, Solomon (2013) argues that the more a discourse represents lack as the political state of affairs, the more fantasies result creating greater identification for subjects. Moreover, Eberle (2017) contends that as a sense of lack drives desire for wholeness, it leads to a "fantasy narrative" that envisions how that wholeness might come about in the future or, in contrast, a "disaster scenario" that might prevent wholeness from coming to fruition (p. 6).

While Solomon (2013) refers to neoconservatism as a discourse, his framework could be interpreted as a narrative—a crafted and imbued story that has subjects, objects, past and future—a sense of time that gives it a plot. As Eberle (2017) points out, although starting from different perspectives, there is an enriching "trading zone" between Lacanian and narrative approaches that benefits both (p. 6). Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey (1995) identify three elements of narrative construction: 1) a selective recounting of past events and characters, 2) the events described are temporally ordered, 3) the events and characters are related to one another and embedded in some overarching theme that makes up the overall feeling or impression of the story (p. 200). Miskimmon et al. (2013) put it this way: "A narrative entails an initial situation or order, a problem that disrupts that order, and a resolution that reestablishes order….Narrative therefore is distinguished by a particular structure through which sense is achieved" (p. 5). In this way, populism can also be looked at as a narrative where the core ideas of it are used in story-form to connect a subject (the people versus the elite) theme to a problem (free trade that destroys the middle class) and a resolution (protectionism).

However, while narrative approaches explain how certain policies are linked to themes or ideas, and to particular subjects, they present narratives as constructing a sequential order that helps make sense. In so doing, the underlying affective drivers that give certain narratives force are overlooked and it can be hard to understand why some narratives are so powerful even when the content is ordered much the same way as other narratives. In connecting narrative approaches with psycho-analytic approaches to emotions, Lacan's concepts of desire, lack and fantasy help show what drives attachment and identification with certain narratives over others. From a Lacanian point of view, narratives feed our fundamental desire to cover a lack, overcome anxiety, and our "hunger for certainty" (Edkins, 2000, p. 154) and achieve a complete and stable identity even though this is, in fact, impossible, making it a *fantasy* rather than anything actually obtainable. Eberle (2017) states that in addition to the emotions derived from the drive to overcome lack and push towards wholeness, fantasy narratives "are distinguished from other narratives by their excessively simplified and clear-cut, 'black and white' character, which leaves little room for ambiguity or uncertainty…in fantasies, there are only two possible versions of the future with no middle ground: either we recapture the 'object' and we are safe (the beatific scenario of securing a complete identity), or we fail and we are doomed (the horrific scenario of losing it)" (pp. 6–7). Thus, it's not just selective events and characters ordered in a particular sequence that makes a *compelling* story—it's also the emotion *in* it that does.

Combining Solomon's Lacanian framework with a narrative approach produces a method for analyzing texts, such as campaign speeches. Increasingly, scholars have called for more transparent methodological approaches to the study of emotions (Clément & Sanger, 2018). In line with this thinking, this article develops a methodological framework from Solomon's (2013) work that articulates his theoretical insights through a narrative structure. Interpreting Solomon's (2013) work as narrative elements produces the following framework: collective subjects/actors, the theme or characterization of the socio-political environment in terms of lack or wholeness, and how the past and the future are fantasized. This framework is diagramed in Figure 1.

In applying this framework to the example of trade and the TPP during the 2016 campaign, I am able to analyze the different emotional resonances of the Obama administration's 'trade' narrative compared to the candidates' trade narratives, and better explain why populism had the impact it did on the TPP debate in the US.

In the sections below, I apply the Lacanian-narrative framework to speeches from President Obama, Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. The 2015–2016 period produced hundreds of press releases, media coverage, campaign ads and speeches on the TPP, and I selected the defining speeches on trade, the economy and TPP as representative of the overall trade/TPP narrative of each speaker. Since I was interested in understanding how and why Trump and Sander's emotional anti-TPP messaging derailed President Obama's pro-TPP campaign, I focused on only those three speakers. While it is the case that presidential candidate Hillary Clinton also eventually shifted her position against the TPP, she was not representative of a populist, economic nationalist candidate and so I did not include her in this analysis. My analysis



Figure 1. Lacanian-narrative framework.

shows that the candidates' narratives presented more attractive 'objects', more effectively aroused desire in audiences and offered retribution for transgressions of elites, ultimately creating stronger audience identification and resonance with their populist trade stories.

3. The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Economic Opportunity or Economic Disaster

In 2015, the US domestic climate for trade policy looked a lot like past free trade domestic battles, and President Obama signaled a robust public outside-lobbying campaign to convince the public and thus the Congress to ratify TPP during his final year in office. He relied on typical free-trade narratives that had been successful in the past (Skonieczny, 2001, 2018) and presented the TPP as a pro-globalization opportunity for American workers, a regional balance against a threatening China and an inevitable progression of the globalized economy that would lead to a prosperous future.

However, 2016 proved to be an unusual year for US election politics. During the 2016 presidential primary season, Republican candidate Donald Trump and Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders (and eventually Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton) aligned *against* the TPP offering a powerful, populist anti-trade message that resonated with an American public concerned with job loss and American decline. The anti-trade counter-narrative of Sanders and Trump constructed a story about free trade as a series of economic disasters that put Americans out of work, displaced the middle-class and benefitted rich elites and pro-business corporations, and this rallied NGOs, labor unions and others opposed to trade policies.

3.1. President Obama: Trade as Hope; TPP as a Balance against China

This section analyzes President Obama's pro-TPP narrative through the Lacanian-narrative framework discussed above. In particular, it focuses on one main speech given by President Obama on May 8, 2015, at the Nike headquarters in Beaverton, Oregon shortly after Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton had announced their candidacies for president but before Donald Trump's announcement. The speech, titled "Remarks on Trade", took place just prior to the 'fast-track' authority vote in Congress and was no doubt aimed at shoring up support for his trade legislation agenda which primarily included the TPP.

In it, Obama constructs a specific collective subject, the small business owner or entrepreneur, he characterizes the socio-political environment more towards wholeness over lack, and emphasizes a hopeful and optimistic American (fantasized) future (see Figure 2).

There are several striking features of the speech that showcase the overall pro-TPP messaging produced by the White House. The speech took place at Nike Headquarters—this choice of location and backdrop as well as choice of audience (Nike workers) projected a certain aesthetic power (Steele, 2010) and resonance that favored the primary subjects of Obama's speech—entrepreneurs and small businesses—and the unstated subject—corporations—arguably the subjects with the most to gain from the TPP free trade agreement. The choice of backdrop displays confidence in a 'winning' trade message that combined pro-globalization arguments with an anti-China, us/them character clash indicative of past trade victories (Skonieczny, 2018). It combines well with Obama's characterization of the socio-political environment as full of opportunity (rather than lack) and his optimistic, hopeful fantasy of the future as one where American entrepreneurs innovate, lead through technological development and set the standards for the rest of the world. Because the speech took place before the candidates' Sanders and Trump really began their campaigns in earnest, Obama's TPP narrative stands out as one not yet exposed to the populist surge that was just around the corner. However, even a full year later, Obama continued to push his TPP narrative primarily to business groups even as (or per-



Figure 2. Obama's trade narrative.

haps because) he encountered increased resistance at home as the presidential election heated up and anti-TPP sentiment grew. For example, in June 2016, President Obama continued his push for TPP to business audiences gathered by a federally-sponsored business group, SelectUSA: "This is not just about jobs and trade, it's not just about hard cold cash. It's also about building relationships across borders. When your companies come together, you help bring countries and cultures together" (Miller, 2016). Again, the main characters in Obama's TPP narrative continued to be businesses, building elite relationships with other businesses in foreign cultures. This particular type of 'trade story' unintentionally fueled an opposition built on populist sentiment that characterized the middle class environment as one filled with lack and exploitation from corporate elites who benefitted at their expense.

3.2. The Candidates' TPP Narrative: Populism, Despair, Transgression and a Scapegoat

In contrast to President Obama, Trump and Sanders trade narratives focused primarily on the exploitative relationship between subjects in a populist story of corrupt/corporate elites vs. the everyday people/worker. The power of the populism storyline in their anti-trade narrative came, in part, from tactical use of emotional language that emphasized a lack created by workers being 'left behind' by globalization and by 'others' taking something away whether China, Mexico, corporations, 'the elite' or immigrants. For example, at a speech at a United Steelworkers rally in Indiana, Sanders stated:

> We must rewrite our disastrous trade policies that enable corporate America to shut down plants in this country and move to Mexico and other low-wage countries. We need to end the race to the bottom and enact trade policies that demand that American corporations create jobs here and not abroad. (Sanders, 2016)

In this segment, Sanders signals that 'corporate America' is the responsible party who 'prevents wholeness' and causes a painful lack of progress for the working class suggesting a corporate 'transgression' profiting off of this action at the expense of the 'little guy'. As Eberle (2017) suggests certain narratives provide more attractive 'objects' of desire (e.g.: factory jobs) promised by fantasy futures that present the situation in notably 'black and white' terms (disastrous trade agreements caused by past actions of politicians corrupted by corporate elites) as fixable by future courses of action (Sanders' and Trump's economic plans of retreating from free trade and bringing jobs back). Moreover, Sanders and Trump enact collective identities that were favorable to a wider margin of American society such as the 'working people' or 'middle class'. In fact, in 2017, 62% of Americans self-identified as middle class (Newport, 2017).

In a similar narrative construction, one month earlier, Trump wrote an Op/Ed in USA Today against the TPP.

He wrote:

> The great American middle class is disappearing. One of the factors driving this economic devastation is America's disastrous trade policies....America's politicians—beholden to global corporate interests who profit from offshoring—have enabled jobs theft in every imaginable way. They have tolerated foreign trade cheating while enacting trade deals that encourage companies to shift production overseas. (Trump, 2016a)

Like Sanders, Trump emphasizes a corporate transgression that looked the other way while foreign countries (unspoken China) stole (wholeness) from the working people in America. The orientation of the candidates' narratives towards lack (stolen wholeness), corporate transgression and exploitation, and thus a fantasy future of change towards a new approach to trade, or repeated disasters if the candidates' vision is rejected, is almost diametrically opposed to Obama's trade story and thus, made the choice abundantly black and white.

In Figures 3 and 4 below, Sanders' campaign announcement speech in Burlington, Vermont, on May 26, 2015, and Donald Trump's speech on trade in Monessen, Pennsylvania, on June 28, 2016, are diagramed to show how the Lacanian-narrative framework applies to the two speeches.

As diagrammed in Figure 3, Sanders' announcement speech emphasizes a collective subject, the American people and workers, who have been shut out of politics and exposed to the greatest wealth inequality of America's history. Sanders' presents a socio-political environment gone very wrong and in need of a people's revolution to get America back on track. He suggests a scapegoat (lobbyists and super PACs) and contrasts his collective subject with the billionaires who benefit most from the current system (and are pretty happy about it), which just further exacerbates the transgression and thus, audience desire for an object that rights the wrongs.

In Figure 4, Trump's speech is diagrammed. It shows the many similarities to Sanders' in terms of how they construct a common collective subject, position opposites and characterize the current socio-political environment. Trump's speech is specifically about trade and the economy and directly addresses the TPP. It similarly sets up a common, populist storyline of workers versus powerful corporations and financial elites. It also characterizes the current socio-political environment as one of extreme lack deliberately caused by politicians and their bad trade deals. He harkens back to a past where the economy thrived due to a robust industrial, producerist economy and calls for an 'America first' future that only he can ultimately create. Of all the speeches, Trump's stands out for his prolific use of emotional trigger words and extreme characterizations.

The next sections break-down the narrative segments (characters/subjects, theme/characterization of the environment, and fantasies of the past/future) to further compare the different ways Obama and the candidates construct their TPP/Trade narratives.

4. Elements of Opposing Trade Narratives

4.1. Collective Subjects

In contrast to the candidates' narratives where the 'worker' is the collective subject, Obama bases his collective subject on the small business owner and the entrepreneur. He contrasts small business owners with the big corporations typically associated with benefitting from free trade agreements. For example, he states early



Figure 3. Bernie Sanders trade/TPP Narrative.



Figure 4. Donald Trump's trade narrative.

on his speech on trade at Nike:

> Small businesses are the backbone of our economy….They employ millions of people, 98 percent of exporters are small businesses…they represent something essential about this country—the notion that if you've got a good idea and you're willing to work at it, you can turn that idea into a business, you can grow that business, and…you can give other people a chance to earn a living even as you do well. That's America's promise. And it's up to us to keep that promise alive. (Obama, 2015)

In this segment, President Obama connects the small business owner to an American identity that is often activated in trade campaigns. The classic promise of America or the American Dream is that everyone can be successful through hard work and ingenuity. But here, he evokes the American Dream storyline by placing small businesses as a subject who can help fulfill this American Dream promise.

In contrast, Sanders' and Trump's speeches establish the collective subjects in populist terms as 'workers' and the 'people'. Sanders characterizes 'the people' as change agents responsible for leading a revolution that will take back the government and the country from billionaires. He states:

> Today, we stand here and say loudly and clearly that enough is enough. This great nation and its government belong to all of the people, and not to a handful of billionaires, their Super-PACs and their lobbyists. (Sanders, 2015)

Trump also constructs a collective subject of 'workers' in opposition to 'politicians' and 'financial elites'. Thus, at the outset of their speeches, Sanders and Trump similarly draw on populism to signal identification to the audience and also to position who is to blame for current, poor conditions of the American economy.

4.1.1. Scapegoat and Transgression

Also in the beginning of both speeches, Sanders and Trump blame at least one scapegoat for causing the current and past situation. Sanders clearly identifies who is to blame for disastrous trade policies and the economic hardship of middle-class Americans—the extremely greedy billionaire class and politicians who have supported free trade deals in the past. He states: "for decades, presidents from both parties have supported trade agreements which have cost us millions of decent paying jobs as corporate America shuts down plants here and moves to low-wage countries" (Sanders, 2015). Trump also immediately identifies a specific target of blame. He states:

> Our workers' loyalty was repaid…with total betrayal. Our politicians have aggressively pursued a policy of globalization, moving our jobs, our wealth and our factories to Mexico and overseas. Globalization has made the financial elite, who donate to politicians, very, very wealthy. (Trump, 2016b)

In Trump's speech, he also raises China as a target of blame particularly in his direct references to the TPP. He states:

> The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the greatest danger yet. The TPP, as it is known, would be the death blow for American manufacturing….It would further open our markets to aggressive currency

> cheaters—cheaters, that's what they are, cheaters. (Trump, 2016b)

By raising the issue of 'currency cheaters' in reference to the TPP, he associates trade disasters with one of his favorite scapegoats—China. By positioning the subject, China, in opposition to American identity, Trump constructs a well-known 'other' to the US self. He is able to contrast China to America—as a rule-breaker (cheater) and as an antithesis to American values. China is corrupt, America follows laws. China is a cheater, America plays on a level playing field.

President Obama also positions China as the distinct *other* in his story. Obama uses China as an opposite to the US but primarily by suggesting that if the US does not take a leadership role in Asia, China will—and in subsequent speeches he spells out that China is already working on a parallel trade agreement that mirrors the TPP but without many of the labor and environmental protections included. For example, he states:

> Some folks think we should just withdraw and not even try to engage in trade with these countries. I disagree. We have to make sure America writes the rules of the global economy. And we should do it today, while our economy is in the position of global strength. Because if we don't write the rules for trade around the world—guess what—China will. (Obama, 2015)

While he implies that Chinese leadership in Asia and in trade is not a good thing, he avoids describing China's actions as a *transgression* against American workers (cheaters) and thus does not inspire audience desire for retribution against China in the way that Trump does. Indeed, China's rise is triggered by America's retreat and thus the blame falls on US actions, not China's. Thus, even Obama's attempt at blame fails to land squarely on an identifiable scapegoat.

On the other hand, Sanders and Trump are prolific in their use of emotional trigger words such as 'disaster', 'betrayal', 'greed', and urgency such as 'enough is enough'. By establishing a target of blame, they are able to direct the audience to a specific *transgression* of an 'other' responsible for stealing certainty and safety from the working class, and personally benefiting and even 'tricking' the working class out of its piece of the American pie. This creates an association of 'we-ness' from a much broader audience who can readily associate with a 'worker' or 'people' identity in contrast to a billionaire or corrupt politician. This approach was far more effective than Obama's construction of a 'small business owner' collective subject without a clear scapegoat or target of responsibility.

4.2. Characterization of the Socio-Political Environment

All narratives have a theme and in the TPP narratives, the theme relates to how the speakers characterize the socio-political environment relating to the economy. For, Obama, his trade story characterizes the socio-political economic environment as robust, full of hope and thriving and thus closer to wholeness as opposed to lack. Indeed, President Obama references a past lack—the collapse of the US economy and the recession—that has been overcome by the hard work of small business entrepreneurs. He states:

> [America's] promise was threatened for almost everybody just about seven years ago, when the economy nearly collapsed, and millions of Americans lost their jobs and their homes and their life savings. But thanks to the hard work of the American people and entrepreneurs…we're in a different place today. (Obama, 2015)

Here the credit for overcoming lack goes primarily to his constructed collective subject—entrepreneurs. While he vaguely references the American people, he immediately specifies he means entrepreneurs, the collective subject he emphasizes throughout the speech. He goes on:

> So small businesses deserve a lot of credit. In fact, over the past several years, small businesses have created nearly two out of three new American jobs. And the question is, how do we build on success? We've got to be relentless in our efforts to support small businesses who are creating jobs and helping to grow the economy. (Obama, 2015)

This trade narrative positions a narrow and specific collective subject as pushing a thriving economy towards more American jobs and success in the future. As such, Obama's trade narrative fails to activate subject identification because his subject is narrow and one most Americans cannot relate to, and his environment characterization is more towards wholeness thus not sparking much desire on the part of the audience for change or fantasy.

In contrast, Sanders and Trump use their speeches to establish an assessment of the socio-political environment as eviscerated by bad past trade deals that have fundamentally transformed the American heartland and factory-working class. They continue to signal despair and lack, and then to inspire a fantasy of the future that can only come if either one of them is elected as the next president. For example, Sanders states that his campaign is going to send a message to the billionaire class that their "greed has got to end" (Sanders, 2015) and that under his leadership "trade policies will break that cycle of agreements which enrich at the expense of the working people of this country" (Sanders, 2015). According to Trump, globalization and the policies of the financial elite have left "millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache", "jobs have vanished and our communities were plunged into Depression-level unemployment" (Trump, 2016b). Trump continues to establish lack and blame through a populist narrative, "our politicians took away from the people their means of mak-

ing a living and supporting their families. Skilled craftsmen and tradespeople and factory workers have seen the jobs they love shipped thousands and thousands of miles away" and "towns are in a state of total disrepair". "Globalization has wiped out totally, totally, our middle class" (Trump, 2016b). The socio-economic environment is characterized as filled with despair, disrepair and economic devastation.

4.3. Past and Future (Fantasy)

Narratives are also distinguished by temporality or a sense of past and future. In Lacanian terms, temporality is a fantasy of what can come about in the future to bring about either wholeness and repair of a nightmare scenario of despair (Eberle, 2017). The past is also fantasized as it is selectively recalled to serve the overall purpose of the narrative theme. In Obama's trade narrative, he presents two futures of globalization—one where America is in charge and taking a leadership role (the beatific scenario of securing a complete identity), and one where the US takes a back seat to less-worthy leaders such as China (the nightmare scenario). For example, he states:

> We can't stand on the beaches and stop the global economy at our shores. We've got to harness it on our terms. This century is built for us. It's about innovation. It's about dynamism and flexibility and entrepreneurship, and information and knowledge and science and research. That's us. (Obama, 2015)

This segment solidifies his trade/pro-TPP narrative—it positions an entrepreneurial collective subject that is able and willing to lead in new areas of economic growth.

For Sanders and Trump, the solution for past disastrous trade and economic policies comes with a fantasized economic future where the American dream can be restored to small factory towns in middle America. They both signal the American dream that has been forgotten but can be restored. Sanders states it as such:

> I have seen the promise of America in my own life. My parents would have never dreamed that their son would be a US Senator, let alone run for president. But for too many of our fellow Americans, the dream of progress and opportunity is being denied by the grind of an economy that funnels all the wealth to the top. (Sanders, 2015)

For Trump, he also references a fantasized future of the American dream, he states: "you have a great future folks…I want you to imagine a much better life and a life where you can believe in the American dream again. Right now, you can't do that" (Trump, 2016b). In Sanders' and Trump's speeches, they reference a fantasized future that can restore a working-class American dream that returns factory jobs back to middle American by restoring 'America first' economic policies.

Sanders and Trump represent the past as both an example of bad choices by others (bad trade policies) and as an economic time before bad choices that can be reclaimed again. They seek to recapture something pure that was part of the American dream—whether it is governance by the people, or good, honest middle-class factory jobs that have been taken away by greedy elites. Trump's campaign slogan "Make America Great Again" suggests that Trump's platform is entirely focused on reclaiming what has been lost. Solomon (2013) suggests that an emphasis on lack (or what is missing) "drives desire for reclaiming that which has been lost" (p. 116) and that this conjuring of lack creates an effective and resonate discourse. In narrative terms, the type of subjects and the plot of overcoming a lack that is apparent in Sanders' and Trump's economic narratives explain, at least in part, what gave their trade stories more resonance.

Moreover, the candidates' narratives turned something rather unknown like the TPP, into an emotional story of betrayal, subversion, and conspiracy against the people. Sanders and Trump regularly deployed emotional trigger words and 'colorful' language to denounce free trade and the TPP. Indeed, in past and subsequent speeches and comments about US trade policy, Trump used the word 'rape' to describe bad trade deals. For example, he stated, "the Trans-Pacific Partnership is another disaster done and pushed by special interests who want to rape our country—just a continuing rape of our country" (Lima, 2016). Sanders' and especially Trump's use of emotional trigger words in association with trade helped elevate the issue's urgency and connect a policy issue that is often abstract with a visceral image of physical violation.

In contrast, Obama's trade narrative fails to appeal to three central features of resonance—a collective subject that inspires identification, a construction of an environment of lack that then sparks desire and affect in the audience for wholeness or at least a fantasy of wholeness, a sense of past that either inspires a harkening or something to overcome. It also lacks a fourth element that is a central part of the candidates' narrative, a transgression executed by a villain or a scapegoat. Moreover, Obama's speech was light on emotional trigger words and instead relied on a more typical narrative strategy that had worked in the past—constructing a positive American identity that is successful in the future and positioning trade as an extension of the American Dream and a crucial part of an inevitable globalization that can lead to success for the American middle class.

5. Conclusions

The article compares President Obama's and US presidential candidates Sanders' and Trump's TPP/trade narratives to provide an explanation for why populism resonated on both the political right and political left and upended President Obama's efforts to ratify the TPP during

his final year. It finds that Sanders and Trump were more effective at constructing broader, more appealing collective subjects within an emotional, populist story of people versus elites to target free trade. In contrast, Obama's collective subjects, small business owners, evoked little desire for identification because small business owners and entrepreneurs were already successful in economic sectors such as technology, services and information. His narrative also failed to resonate because it focused too closely on American wholeness and success and painted a picture of a thriving American economy that failed to inspire a fantasy of change and was disassociated from the broader American experience.

Moreover, Sanders and Trump were more successful at constructing emotional narratives of lack, economic betrayal and despair. They painted a picture of a bygone America eviscerated by bad trade deals signed by financial elites who benefited at the expense of everyone else. They used emotional trigger words directed at easily accepted scapegoats to inspire audiences to connect their personal losses to abstract, complicated trade agreements, and promised economic revival and wholeness in the future. By evoking audience desire for reclaiming something lost, Sanders and Trump succeed in dominating the public debate on trade and sidelining the TPP, and ultimately prevented President Obama from bringing the TPP legislation to Congress for a vote. Once elected, President Trump 'unsigned' the TPP on his first working day in office fulfilling one of his most commonly stated campaign promises.

The article contributes to the rapidly growing literature on populism and emotions. While there is an explosion of explanations for why populism is gaining traction worldwide, few analyses thus far have closely examined the emotional language of elites regarding trade and economic policy for insights into how and why economic populism is proliferating. The article argues that trade policy must be constructed as something that audiences can relate to in order to gain enough support, and consequentially, trade stories present an opportunity for understanding the relationship between narratives, emotions and foreign policy.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Emotional Interest Representation and the Politics of Risk in Child Protection

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Abstract
This article explores the emotional dimensions of political representation by British Members of Parliament (MP) in relation to child protection. The public speech acts and first-hand accounts of three MPs are drawn upon as examples. These highlight different forms of emotional interest representation that arise following the death of a local child from severe abuse or neglect and in response to anxieties in the community about risk. Firstly, I examine the role of the MP in seeking to embody their constituency in the public expression of collective emotional responses and to defend it from feelings of guilt and shame. Personal feelings of guilt and a consciousness of the politician's role in attributing blame are then considered. Thirdly, I explore the role of the MP as trusted envoy for anxieties about risk to individual children within their constituencies. The article draws on Berezin's concept of the secure state and Hochschild's notion of politicians as feeling legislators, and is based on qualitative documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with MPs. It is argued that the emotional processes outlined are central to understanding the problematic relationship between politics and state social work that fuels the cycle of crisis and reform in children's services in the UK.

Keywords
child protection; emotion; Members of Parliament; representation; risk; social work

Issue
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1. Introduction

Pitkin's classic account of political representation defines it as an *activity* that involves "the making present *in some sense* of something which is nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact" (1967, pp. 8–9, emphasis in original). Where the 'something' is a constituency of interests and concerns, this comes into being through the process of representation and is endogenous to it, rather than being necessarily formed prior to it (Disch, 2012). At the heart of Pitkin's radical account is therefore a 'constituency paradox': democratic representation must assume the existence of constituencies that in fact come into being through processes of representation (Disch, 2012). In relation to political representation by British Members of Parliament (MP), Crewe (2015) has similarly argued that their role in 'making' representation is paradoxical: "although they cannot logically both represent themselves and embody their diverse constituency, practically speaking they do. They do not choose between these roles but accomplish them at the same time" (p. 226). In this article, I argue that emotion is key to understanding the complex and paradoxical nature of political representation, and that collective emotional responses to the deaths of children from abuse and neglect illuminate these processes particularly acutely.

In the introduction to their edited volume on the 'emotional turn' in politics and international relations, Clément and Sangar (2018) stress the importance of researchers clarifying the specific conceptualisation of emotion they adopt. The three main terms used in research—affect, emotion and feeling—are "contested and particularly fuzzy at times", and have lines between them that are porous (Clément & Sangar, p. 17). A broad analytic distinction between affect and emotion is often made. Where affect can be considered largely uncon-

scious and "circulating through people" (Reeves, 2018, p. 115), emotions are subjectively and consciously experienced and therefore easily verbally represented; whereas feelings are the conscious awareness of an emotional experience (Clément & Sangar, 2018). This article draws on the sociological tradition of regarding emotions as being both embodied, physiological experiences and also relational and social in character (Williams & Bendelow, 1998). Emotions exist in social relationships by virtue of being "part of a transaction between myself and another. The emotion is *in* the social relationship" (Barbalet, 2002, p. 4). Through conceiving of emotions as existing both within and beyond the body in cultural, institutional, and ideological realms, they can be understood as collective as well as individual phenomena that are also embedded in political institutions (Berezin, 2002).

I have previously argued that the ritual crisis–reform–crisis cycle in child protection in Britain (see background section below) is fundamentally political and is characterized by an 'emotional politics' that is structured in specific ways (Warner, 2014, 2015). Child protection is political because of the intimate connections that exist between wider social democratic processes and the family-state axis in which the profession of social work, often uncomfortably, resides. Social work is charged with intervening on behalf of the state to protect children while not trammelling the rights of parents, save in the most extreme cases. Child protection systems are also structured in emotional terms in relation to the symbolic, idealised figures of 'the good parent' and 'the child', both of which occupy central positions for the state. In fact, love for 'the nation' and love for 'the child' can be considered interchangeable value positions. In short, in a good society, citizens can be trusted to love and take care of their children. Crucially, this assumption of natural love between parents and their children underpins the pact made between the state and its citizens in terms of its powers to intervene. This political philosophy is directly expressed through the rule of optimism that operates in front-line social work practice: "The family will be laid open for inspection provided the state makes the best of what its agents find" (Dingwall, Eekelaar, & Murray, 1983, p. 92).

The child protection system can be regarded as the institutionalization of protective feelings towards children, where the complex and fraught realities of child abuse and neglect are lived out on a daily basis. However, at this point, it must be stressed that there are clearly contradictions in social and political responses to children's suffering and indeed that of their families. Two of the most obvious examples are families living in poverty and children who are 'looked after' (i.e., in the care of the state). In each of these domains, a more ambivalent set of feelings exist compared with those identified with the iconic, idealized child. Disgust, contempt and fear characterize emotional responses to even the most vulnerable children (Ferguson, 2007). English social policy since the Tudor era has viewed vulnerable, abused children as threats to civil order rather than as victims (Dingwall et al., 1983). The emotional politics of child protection reflects wider social structures in which emotional responses, particularly of contempt, disgust and shame, are constitutive of class relations (Warner, 2013, 2015).

Collective responses to child abuse and neglect are marked by a fundamental paradox concerned with various states of knowing and yet not knowing. In his analysis of the inquiry into the death of eight-year-old Victoria Climbié, Cooper expresses this succinctly:

> At the level of both the particular case and the general responsibility, we know that terrible things are happening, but the pain of knowing is too great for us to be able to sustain our attention...we know that cases not so dissimilar to Victoria's are being reported to the authorities on a regular basis, and yet do not become the object of public attention or political handwringing. (Cooper, 2005, p. 9)

The paradox of knowing/not knowing can be further understood in relation to proximity. To the extent that knowledge about abuse can be sustained at all, it is apparently imagined to exist in other places and not 'here' (de Baat, van der Linden, Koojiman, & Vink, 2011, p. 7). The emotional dimensions of 'knowing/not knowing' about child abuse and neglect relate in important ways to citizen-state relations at a deeper level than those that seem immediately obvious. In simple terms, the imagined good society or community, so often called to mind in political rhetoric, is not compatible with the reality in which children are subjected to cruelty and neglect by their own parents or carers. These dynamics may account for the intense emotional impetus behind social and political reaction to certain child deaths while others are routinely ignored.

To highlight the implications of these dynamics, I draw on two main theoretical contributions to the understanding of emotion and politics. Firstly, the concept of the secure state and communities of feeling introduced by Berezin (2002), and secondly Hochschild's (2002) account of political leaders as 'feeling legislators' in their emotional reaction to crises. In applying these analytic tools to the arena of parenting, child abuse and child protection systems, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics of the crisis-reform cycle.

In her work on secure states and communities of feeling, Berezin (2002) stresses the link between trust, risk and emotion, arguing that emotions can be understood as a response to threats to security, acting as a warning when "something is in flux" (p. 47). In the modern nation state, political emotions such as loyalty and a sense of belonging constitute the secure state and are embedded within institutions such as schools and the legal system. Institutions provide a structure for expectations and adjudicate risk. Citizenship of a secure state is a felt identity as well as a legal category. Communities of feeling, in contrast, are emotional responses that lie outside institu-

tions and relate to collective action: "They bring individuals together in a bounded, usually public, space for a discrete time period to express emotional energy" (Berezin, 2002, p. 39). Communities of feeling can act to reinforce state stability or destabilize it. As Rose (1998) argues, fantasy has an important role in the secure state and the "unspoken components of social belonging" (p. 6). The state is as powerful for what it represents internally and emotionally as it is in reality, enacting "ghostly, fantasmatic, authority" (Rose, 1998, p. 9).

The death of a child from abuse and neglect represents a threat to security in at least two senses. Firstly, it challenges in profound ways our collective identification with a shared set of values as citizens and as parents—symbolic or otherwise. It produces, or intensifies, a sense in which our neighbours may not be trusted, but also begs questions about what a neighbour could or should have done to intervene 'behind closed doors'. Secondly, such an event challenges the belief that the state can provide an effective safety net for children, undermining still further our capacity to believe in the good society. The death of a child through severe neglect and abuse is horrific, not only in its own right, but also because it "represents the collision between the fantasy of the nation as a universal safe childhood, and the rejected, abject elements that render this fantasy impossible." (Provan, 2012, p. 186) However, threats to security are also powerfully identified with the state's efforts to intervene in family life to protect children if its activities are deemed excessively interfering in private family life. The story of the death of a child that dominates political, media and public discourse, such as the case of Peter Connelly (Baby P) (see Warner, 2014), can therefore be understood as a crisis in which political leaders are called upon, or take it upon themselves, to speak to a complex interplay of deeply emotive issues.

According to Hochschild (2002), periods of crisis are moments when people turn to political leaders as feeling legislators in order to re-establish trust in the world around them and "for a sense that we live in an environment where things make sense." (Hochschild, 2002, p. 121). The catastrophic nature of the terrorist attack on New York on 9/11 exposed an emotional regime, which is a structure that always exists but is seldom seen:

> This emotional regime includes a set of taken-for-granted feeling rules (rules about how we imagine we should feel) and framing rules (rules about the way we should see and think). Together these rules shape how we see and feel about everyday reality. (Hochschild, 2002, p. 118)

After 9/11, Hochschild (2002) argues, new feeling rules concerning blame, fear, suspicion quickly emerged, with a new emotional stratification system in which different groups from before became targets of suspicion and fear. Hochschild's conceptualisation of an emotional regime is helpful because it highlights the power political leaders have in relation to events that evoke deep social anxieties. While national leaders have a clear role to play, so too do local political leaders when a critical event occurs in their community. However, in the supposed era of anti-politics and increased cynicism about the motivations of politicians in general, we might question how far their role as feeling legislators can be considered credible.

While cynicism about politics and politicians generally may be rife, the relationship between an MP and their constituents appears to be more resilient (Crewe, 2015). This relationship hinges, to some degree at least, on a shared sense of belonging to a specific locality and loyalty to the population within it. Survey evidence has consistently suggested that voters prefer candidates who are local to the geographical area of the constituency (Campbell & Cowley, 2014; Cowley, 2013, p. 22; Evans, Arzheimer, Campbell, & Cowley, 2017). The central place of locality in representation extends to a form of exceptionalism which is widely accepted as natural and acceptable in the House of Commons (Crewe, 2015). An MP "should be the living embodiment of the constituency", defending and advocating for their constituency "with the ferocity of a mother protecting her offspring" (Paul Flynn, MP, as cited in Crewe, 2015, p. 84). The feelings of constituents in response to a wide range of issues are expressed through personal correspondence (increasingly through social media and email), face-to-face in MP surgeries, by word of mouth on the street, and in the local press and other media. Casework by MPs, in which they advocate on behalf of individual constituents in difficulty, has continued to expand since the rapid increase in the volume of this work in the post-war period (Gray, 2005). Far from being diminished, the role of the 'good constituency member', articulated in such depth by Searing (1985) more than thirty years ago, remains a vital one. Before moving on to outline the research undertaken as the basis for this article, I next provide a brief account of the nature of the cycle–reform crisis that is the focus of concern in this discussion.

2. Background

Social work and the child protection system in Britain have been subject to an accelerating cycle of crisis and reform since the 1970s. While most children who die from abuse and neglect do not attract significant attention, those that do can become the focus of intense political, media and public outcry that taps into a complex array of anxieties, with significant implications for the effective delivery of services. The reform phase of the cycle is characterised by a political commitment to ensure such events do not happen again. Multiple layers of reform have each held out the "false hope of eliminating risk", reflecting unrealistic expectations of social work on the part of the media and public (Munro, 2011, p. 134).

The horrific story of the death of Baby P which emerged in late 2008 and the negative media coverage of social workers that followed reached "entirely new levels

of irrationality" (Butler & Drakeford, 2011, p. 199). Key to the story as it unfolded was the role played by political leaders, particularly David Cameron (then Leader of the Conservative Party in opposition), and the then Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, Ed Balls. In concert with the press, particularly *The Sun* newspaper, politicians helped mobilise specific feeling rules about the case (Warner, 2015). Compassion felt for Peter Connelly's suffering was equated with intense anger at social workers. The front page headline of *The Sun* newspaper which read "Blood on their Hands" (The Sun, 2008) was a reference to Baby P's social workers and their managers, rather than his mother and the two men who were directly responsible for his death. Political appeals to moral feeling in the national media invoked a powerful sense of solidarity as parents, based on rage towards social work as it embodies the state in relation to family life (Warner, 2015).

The period following the vociferous media and political reaction to the death of Baby P saw a significant rise in initial referrals and demand for care proceedings in England (Parton & Berridge, 2011). Debates in Parliament reflected the perception that thresholds for care proceedings were too high, while morale among social workers during this period reached an historically low level, signalling severe recruitment and retention issues in many departments (Parton & Berridge, 2011, p. 80). The reforms that followed were wide ranging and enacted at every level of social work practice and education. However, beyond the Baby P case, political reaction to the deaths of other children who have not come to such public prominence are also worthy of our attention. The death of Lauren Wright in 2001, for example, was significant in terms of the failed attempts by local MPs to respond to public pressure to give her case equal national prominence to that of Victoria Climbié, whose death was made the subject of a public inquiry (Laming, 2003; see Warner, 2015). One of the main aims of this article is to further develop our understanding of the relationship between an MP and their constituency, and the collective emotions that are animated in relation to child protection.

3. Methods

Whilst a relatively new field, research on emotions in politics and international relations has expanded at a rapid pace over the past 20 years (Clément & Sangar, 2018). Two debates have been dominant: the first is concerned with how emotion and the related concepts of affect and feeling can be defined and differentiated; the second is concerned with the processes through which emotions can be said to play a role in politics and international relations, and how these processes can be observed and reported through empirical research (Clément & Sangar, 2018). Both debates have highlighted the need for researchers to provide insight into their methodological approach, choice of method, and the specific conceptualisation of emotion they are adopting.

The findings reported in this article are based on data collected in two research projects. Firstly, a case-study design using qualitative documentary analysis of a range of types of secondary sources including newspaper articles, the Daily Hansard record of political exchanges in the House of Commons, reports of Serious Case Reviews and inquiries into child deaths, and records of court judgements. This documentary research has spanned a number of years, comprising several discrete case studies which have each had as their focus the in-depth analysis of responses to child deaths (for a detailed account of the methodological approach taken in this research, see Warner, 2015, pp. 175–179). Documents have been drawn on by other researchers in the field of emotions and politics to good effect, for example, in the analysis of shifts in foreign policy over time (Heller, 2018) and the neutralization of emotions such as compassion in military strategy (Wasinski, 2018). Several of the papers in this issue also illustrate the central place of documents and texts for the analysis of emotions, including those by Braat (2018), Koschut (2018), Palm (2018) and Sanchez (2018). Interest in documents among social scientists in general has shifted away from viewing them as inert records of events towards seeing them as situated and social products (Prior, 2003). The study of documents is therefore a route towards the study of culture "or the process and the array of objects, symbols and meanings that make up social reality shared by members of a society" (Altheide, 1996, p. 2). The documents used as the basis for the first part of the discussion in this article were part of a wider case study of reaction to the death of Khyra Ishaq in Birmingham in 2008. Relevant local and national newspaper articles were identified using simple search terms in the LexisNexis database of UK newspapers, with a range of other articles and documents identified through a process of cross-referencing.

The second research project, referred to here as the 'MP study', was a pilot study comprising ten semi-structured interviews with British MPs on the subject of 'The Politics of Child Protection'. I obtained ethical approval for this research from the University of Kent's Ethics Committee. The discussion below draws on the preliminary analysis of a sub-set of data from five of the interviews. I analysed the interview material and documents using the three-stage process of open, axial and selective coding advocated by Strauss (1987).

In the next section of the article, three examples are briefly presented to explore different dimensions of the concept of emotional interest representation. Through these three examples, a number of interrelated themes can be discerned in terms of how various intense emotions such as shame, guilt and anger attach to events surrounding the death of a child. These are observed through the voices of three different MPs, either directly as interview respondents, or indirectly through accounts in secondary sources such as local newspapers. In the first example, the name of the child, the MP and other identifying details have been used because they are in

the public domain. In the second and third examples, the names of children and other details have been withheld in order to preserve the anonymity of respondents in the MP study.

4. Emotional Interest Representation in Communities of Feeling

4.1. "Everybody Has Been Touched by This"

The High Court Family Division Judgement concerning the death of Khyra Ishaq in Birmingham alludes to the painful juxtaposition of city life and the death in isolation of a young child: "it is beyond belief that in 2008 in a bustling, energetic and modern city like Birmingham, a child of seven was withdrawn from school and thereafter kept in squalid conditions for a period of five months before finally dying of starvation" (Birmingham City Council v AG & Ors, 2009, para. 258). Khyra's death was found to have been preventable, based on the failure of the local authority to carry out checks on the family after she was withdrawn from school. Beyond this, however, it is striking how many local people came forward after Khyra's death, apparently with knowledge of the family, having had suspicions about her plight and that of her siblings, but who had felt unable to report them. In a statement following the conviction of Khyra's mother and stepfather for her manslaughter, the Birmingham Safeguarding Children Board observed that the police investigation had identified at least thirty people who might have intervened: "it is alarming because it was clear to us that many people in the community had concerns but did not feel able to share them with the many agencies that are there to help" (full text reproduced in The Guardian, 2010). Almost exclusively, the local press reported the role played by neighbours sympathetically and in matter-of-fact terms, with an apparent reluctance to imply any blame for inaction:

> Bhagu Patel, 77 of Osborne Road, which backs onto Leyton Road, said he had seen a child aged around seven sitting in an upstairs window at the back of the house around six weeks ago, staring out of the window for more than 30 minutes "in agony". "I felt very sad when I heard the news. I could have done something for the children, if they had waved I could have done something," he added. (Lillington, Authi, & Cullwick, 2008)

Despite this and many similar accounts, and in contrast to the strong criticism of the local children's services, few media sources cast moral judgement on the possible role that the local community and family might have played. One notable exception was this opinion piece in the local press:

> Perhaps the time has come for Khyra's extended family and neighbours to stop casting aspersions on others and start asking a few tough questions of themselves. Did they do enough to help? (Goldberg, 2008)

The possible barriers to sharing concerns with agencies was addressed directly by the Serious Case Review into Khyra's death by the Birmingham Safeguarding Children Board. It attributes the reluctance to report concerns to the "mistrust and fragmentation of the community" and a general level of mistrust for authorities among many local people, particularly those who may have come to the UK with "damaging and frightening memories experienced elsewhere in the world" (Birmingham Safeguarding Children Board, 2010, Para. 17.1). With this vision of a fragmented community daunted by authority as the backdrop to events, it is particularly interesting to consider the reaction of the local MP, Khalid Mahmood, as voiced through the press in the immediate aftermath. In these reports, his voice is given prominence as he revisits familiar feeling rules about child deaths. The dominant feeling rule is that compassion for the suffering child must be equated with anger at services for failing her. Within this feeling rule, the community is constructed as united by the trauma it has experienced and cohesive in its compassionate response to Khyra's death. Simultaneously, the local authority is constructed as lying outside this community of feeling:

> [Khalid Mahmood] added: "a huge tragedy has taken place. All of us need to get together and resolve this—it is not about them and us. Everybody has been touched by this and yet the authority seems totally heartless". (Macintyre, 2008)

In taking up his task of representing the emotional needs of his constituents and, very likely it seems, shielding them from the very real prospect of guilt, the MP had called for an inquiry into Birmingham City Council's activities, accusing them of "treating my constituents with contempt" (Chadwick, 2008). But not only is the local council blamed for the death, it also stands accused of failing to support local people in coping with their grief:

> [Khalid Mahmood] said the council needed to "get together to support the people" affected by the tragedy. "People are upset and very concerned, children going to the local school will have been left upset….Nothing is being done to support them. They [the council] have let down the community."(Chadwick & Oliphant, 2008)

In this case, a robust public defence against guilt and shame is mounted by the MP on behalf of the people he represents, and in so doing, the constituency is *re*constituted as cohesive, at least provisionally, by virtue of the grief that is shared. Crucially, as part of this process, the local children's services are cast as bearing all of the responsibility and excluded from the community of feeling of grief by virtue of being heartless.

4.2. "Why Was I Not Aware?" Bearing Guilt and Shame, and Constituting Place

In the second example of emotional interest representation at work, the central importance of the sense of community and place is again in evidence. For this respondent in the MP study, the threat to security to her constituency not only arises from the deeply disturbing nature of the death of a local child, but more specifically from the notoriety that may attach to the community and the implications of this for its identity as a safe place:

> I think that people were shocked. I think that they were angry. I think that there was a lot of disgust…a sense of the mother being weak….And maybe a sense of disbelief that it actually happened that a case that *could* have had the same kind of notoriety as a Baby P but didn't; that that happened in a small town like [name of the town], not a big metropolis of London where there are lots of anonymous blocks of flats and it might be quite easy for people to get lost. (MP54)

In this account, what is understood as being under threat is the very constitution of a 'small town' because, in a small town, no-one should be lost or hidden away and children should be protected. The community of feeling in which shame is attached to a child's death is firmly associated with the fragmented and alienated life of a city like London, or Birmingham, as in the previous example. The idea that a child could die under circumstances akin to those suffered by Baby P in London is beyond comprehension. However, the strong emotional response to the apparent failure to notice the missing child was mixed with troubled uncertainty about when an absence could necessarily be taken as a warning signal to intervene:

> There was a real sense of disgust that it had happened in our community and that nobody had really known and that sense of a 'hidden child'…people hadn't seen her for a couple of weeks, well a kid could have chicken-pox and be hidden away for a couple of weeks...it's not that inconceivable . (MP54)

The MP is pinpointing here the moral dilemma for neighbours and others in terms of knowing when to report concerns, and she is specifically identifying a reason why, in this particular case, people may have legitimately thought nothing of the child's disappearance. The rule of optimism and how far trust in parents can reasonably be allowed to stretch, is here under direct scrutiny. This MP reflects on feelings of guilt that she experienced as being widely shared, but which she felt particularly sharply on a personal level:

> Interviewer: Do you think people felt guilty?
> MP54: I'm sure that people would have felt guilty. I mean, I haven't had people come to me and say that, but, I mean, *I* feel it; I feel like why don't I know what's going on in every single house in my constituency? Why was I not aware? If people had any concerns about the safety of the child, how come I didn't know about it? And in actual fact it's not my role necessarily to know about it…

The notion of the MP as the embodiment of their constituency is expressed here as a visceral connection to the daily lives of constituents. This respondent vividly animates the role of the MP as the figure who should be all-knowing and as the figure to whom people *might* have reported their concerns. Feelings of guilt among constituents, while not named by them explicitly to her, convey a powerful sense of an *unspoken* community of feeling of guilt that nevertheless may potentially have real political implications. One clear implication is the space that is opened up for a politician to be openly critical of the professionals that were involved with the family.

In terms of this MP's interaction with the local media, it was very different to that of the Birmingham MP in the previous example. She was conscious of what the local daily newspaper's approach to the story was likely to be and the suggestion of where blame might lie: "the only way they can continue to sell newspapers is by putting the most horrendous headlines on the front page accompanied with every sordid photograph that they can find…the more sensationalist the better". Her response to their request for comment was deliberately low key:

> I kept it very short and very simple along the lines of 'yes, there's some responsibility on the local authority *but* ultimately it's a parental failing and that's who killed [child's name]. Obviously we don't want to see this happening again'….But that's the line, you know, politicians will use, 'we never want to see another child die', because we *don't* want to see another child die, but how does that get delivered in practice? (MP54)

As this MP narrated her interaction with journalists from the daily newspaper it was clear that she had needed to consciously resist and actively decline the invitation to engage in sensationalist terms with the story of what had happened. The feeling rules of compassion being equated with anger for the local authority or social workers involved gave way to an assertion that, however unpalatable, the ultimate responsibility lay with the parent. Added to this is her consciousness that the repetitious political assertion 'never again', while authentic, is nonetheless an unrealistic aspiration.

4.3. 'Don't Say that I Said': Networks of Trust and Containing Anxiety

In this third example, the relationship between MPs and their constituents is explored as an important site in which the anxieties about knowing/not knowing about child abuse can be contained. In the MP study, some respondents provided accounts of the trust they felt they

had been able to mobilise in their communities. For this MP, this trust enabled constituents to share their anxieties without actively reporting the concerns to authorities, and also allowed generalized, perhaps even unspoken, anxiety to be named. Information can also be passively conveyed by constituents, such that the MP can be prompted to act on what they have heard without the constituent even being aware that they have done so. For this longstanding MP, trust has been built up over many years, often communicated between constituents via word-of-mouth: "You know, it's not an exaggeration I hope but, you know, it is because people say, 'Oh I'm a bit worried about this,' and they just say, 'Go and see [the MP]'" (MP101). This trust in the MP is the basis on which constituents will report concerns about a child, often instead of reporting them to services:

> MP101: The neighbours don't want to be identified so quite often I'm the, you know, the person who says [to services], you know, 'This has been brought to my attention'.
> Interviewer: Right. So it's a kind of anonymity?
> MP101: As well, yeah.
> Interviewer: And they wouldn't trust services to keep that?
> MP101: No.
> Interviewer: Do they ever tell you not to tell services?
> MP101: Yes, all the time….regularly…'Don't say that I said'

This exchange illustrates well the fact that the proximity that can afford intimate knowledge of a neighbouring family's troubles also increases the likelihood of individuals being identified if they report their concerns, with the possible repercussions that might ensue. In emotional terms, those who are close enough to have concerns about a family are also the ones who will carry the most anxiety about whether or not to let someone else know. As well as the anxiety about the child, and what may happen if no-one intervenes, there are real anxieties about the possible adverse consequences of making a report. One is the anxiety about being named as the source of a report to social services, with all the distress and anger that might well result. The insecurities about state intervention and the mistrust for authority that apparently characterized the community in the first example in this article above are therefore similarly identified by this MP. But in this case, his role in emotional interest representation is to contain the anxiety of those constituents who share concerns with him by acting as a conduit to services. By telling their MP, the delicate balance of community relations at street-level can be maintained. Through this MPs account, the expectation of the MP in the second example given above, "to know what's going on in every single house in my constituency", however unrealistic in reality, has a fresh resonance.

The idea of the hidden child is starkly apparent in this MP's account of his surgery work. He describes how a concern about a child can be buried or implicit in a discussion about other issues, and this 'knowing/not knowing' has to then be actively processed by pursuing in concrete and specific terms the concern that has merely been floated as an aside:

> There can be concerns about child protection at times and even this can be at a tangent from what that person that's come to see you about, your alarm bells go up and maybe I'm more attuned to it because I went through the whole thing with [local child who died], but I always make sure we ask the right questions and go to the right people to say: 'this has been raised with me and I'm concerned. What's the background here? Are you aware of this family? Are you aware of this child?' Because if you don't you could have been the last person to have had an opportunity to be the advocate for that…child". (MP101)

The task of emotional interest representation for this MP is to take generalized anxiety and ensure that the otherwise hidden child is made visible to those that can be directly mobilized to intervene. His acute awareness that he may be a final link to the safety net for a child at risk is plainly activated by the memory of a child's death in the constituency, even though it predated his term as an MP. This case received wide-scale national attention and became the focus of a public inquiry. In this third example, the task of emotional interest representation in terms of managing anxiety about risk is deeply embedded in the relationships that are the bedrock of this MP's constituency work.

5. Conclusions

This article has identified how politicians, simultaneously in speaking for themselves and embodying their constituencies, undertake forms of interest representation that are defined by collective emotional responses to the death of a child and anxieties about risk. Their role is in simultaneously standing *with* and standing *for* their constituents in the face of powerful emotions and moral dilemmas. In these concluding comments, attention is given to how the three examples of emotional interest representation discussed in the article may add to our understanding of the problematic relationship between politics and state social work in the UK.

The theme of the hidden child and knowing/not knowing about child abuse and risk was a central one in all three examples explored. The prospect of a child that is hidden, unnoticed, and subjected to horrific abuse and neglect at home behind closed doors arguably represents a society that is broken and is therefore a disturbing prospect for its citizens. Yet investigating suspicions of child abuse and neglect conjures up the prospect of the excessively interfering state that breaches parental rights and invades private family life without good cause. In the first example in the article, concerning the death of Khyra

Ishaq in Birmingham, the appeal to community by the local MP is paradoxically made in the midst of the growing public awareness that many local people did 'know' something of what was happening to her, yet Khyra remained a child hidden in plain sight for some five months until her death. The community that is constituted by the voice of the MP in the local press is subject to a form of 'protective scapegoating'. It is spared scrutiny over its failure to act and instead the relatively safe site for criticism—the local authority—is the focus.

In the second example, the dilemma of when to regard a child as being missing from view and thereby potentially at risk is alluded to. But the dominant focus is on the guilt that the MP feels had circulated the local community following the child's death. She embodies this guilt as the person who should be all-knowing about risk, as well as voicing her perception of the wider collective emotional response. This greater willingness to consider some degree of community responsibility may go some way to explaining her more measured response to the local media's invitation to call for 'heads must roll'. The perception of a community that is smaller and more cohesive may have diminished the sense in which a 'protective scapegoat' was needed. The MP publicly rejects the feeling rule that compassion for the child must inevitably entail blaming the local authority. She refocuses attention on parental responsibility, designating the individuals concerned *as subjects* who therefore had agency for their actions. In taking this step, the feeling rule that compassion for the death of a child *must inevitably* entail anger at the social workers or local authority involved is suspended. As feeling legislator, the stance she adopts is to assert the reality that, however unpalatable it may be, sometimes parents kill their children and it cannot always be prevented.

The MP in the third example positions himself as mediator between constituents and the state, where they are unwilling to voice their concerns directly. His role is also as protector, this time protecting constituents from the anxiety associated with knowing a child may be at risk and a family may be in trouble, but too fearful and mistrustful of state authorities to report it directly. The state that is mistrusted and is potentially daunting in its power to intervene in this example was represented in the first example as a key factor in the failure of local people to report their concerns about Khyra Ishaq.

The concept of the secure state facilitates a clearer understanding of why, in the political feeling rules following a child's death, the parents/carers can be less the focus of blame than local authorities and social workers. The idea of the parent who directly subjects their child to extreme abuse and neglect, or who, particularly in the case of mothers, allows someone else to, represent so profound a threat to the concept of a good society that their subjective status as people cannot be defended. Questions in public discourse about why they acted as they did are ultimately rendered as being a road to despair, since such questions can never be satisfactorily answered. In the sense that their actions are represented as being beyond belief and comprehension, they are cast outside the community entirely and designated an objective status within the criminal justice system—often as evil and objects of disgust. Within a moral designation such as evil, in which basic humanity is denied, the degree to which an individual truly has agency is also implicitly, if not explicitly, denied. Under these conditions, it is to *state* agencies—those that have powers to intervene—that critical attention inevitably turns. State agencies, however apparently incompetent and impotent in the face of evil, ultimately offer hope that 'this child's death may be the last' if they can only 'learn the lessons' from the perpetual processes of inquiry and case review. This is why, in terms of policy-making in child protection, the focus is on persistently building ever more robust systems and processes of risk detection in the vain hope that risk can be removed altogether. Ultimately, the potential for a changed dynamic between social work and the political sphere hinges on a deeper understanding of the dynamics that drive political responses to critical events, and specific forms of emotional interest representation such as those outlined here.

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Conflict of Interests

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About the Author

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Article

Getting the Story Right: A Constructivist Interpretation of Storytelling in the Context of UK Parliamentary Engagement

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Abstract
This article examines Parliament's use of storytelling techniques as a means of representing itself to citizens, and representing citizens to themselves. It does so with reference to the 'constructivist turn' in representation literature—particularly its emphasis on co-constitutive meaning-making—which, as this article shows, is also applicable to studies of engagement and narrative. Storytelling constitutes a vital means of engagement, yet has hitherto received insufficient scholarly attention within a parliamentary context. This lacuna is all the more significant when considering the emotional and often informal means of participation that increasingly characterise the UK's political landscape. In relating storytelling to parliamentary engagement (and emphasising the co-constitutive qualities of both), an innovative visual analogy (based on fractals) will illustrate the conductivity of storytelling to two pursuits: Parliament's attempts to represent itself within the political sphere, and its claims to be relevant to citizens. Both of these pursuits represent key tenets of Parliament's responsibility to engage, and to mediate between citizens and governance. Through the theoretical lens presented here, Parliament's attempts to engage through storytelling will be examined according to the techniques used, and their likelihood of reaching an audience that, in constructivist terms, is created through this act of representation.

Keywords
constructivist turn; emotions; engagement; narrative; parliament; participation; representation; storytelling

Issue
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1. Introduction

Parliament is relevant. *Parliament is evolving*. *Parliament is yours*. These words, emblazoned across a wall of the UK Parliament Education Centre, constitute the *modus operandi* of a legislature that has been unprecedentedly active in public engagement efforts, staking claims to its own political relevance. The plurality of these efforts—encompassing petitions (see Caygill & Griffiths, 2018; Leston-Bandeira, 2017), educational workshops, and social media campaigns (see Griffith & Leston-Bandeira, 2012; Leston-Bandeira & Bender, 2013)—belies the fact that parliamentary engagement is a relatively recent phenomenon. Parliament's discernible role in connecting citizens to governance was apparent only after the turn of the millennium (Leston-Bandeira, 2016, p. 502). This development must be understood alongside the UK's electoral history; the expanding franchise during the nineteenth century, and the emergence of mass parties in the twentieth century (Norton, 2013, p. 404), vastly expanded Parliament's representative responsibilities. Nevertheless, in recent decades the representative functions of political institutions across Western Europe have encountered widespread dissatisfaction (Norris, 2011). Despite appearing more interested in the political process, UK citizens' feelings of efficacy when engaging with Parliament are declining (Hansard Society, 2018). Moreover, self-actualising and informal (i.e. non-institutional) modes of political expression are increasingly pervasive, especially among younger generations (Manning, 2013, 2015). Disaffection towards institutional politics, and institutions' apparent failure to harness this increasingly

informal participation (Dalton, 2008), necessitates a re-examination of Parliament's engagement role.

Expressions of disaffection and disengagement have often followed recent parliamentary scandals, illustrating citizens' existing preconceptions and underlying social narratives; in other words, what citizens already thought about Parliament, and what they were 'primed' to think (Fielding, 2011). Notably, the 2009 parliamentary expenses scandal drew attention to "an already-established narrative in which politics and corruption were close bedfellows" (Fielding, 2011, p. 227). Dominant narratives constitute accepted and culturally-entrenched truths (Langellier, 1999; Lyotard, 1984; Young, 2000) and in this sense "are not called stories. They are called reality" (MacKinnon, 1996, p. 235). The twenty-first century has seen a proliferation of narratives—primarily as a means of fulfilling myriad commercial and political agendas (Fernandes, 2017; Salmon, 2010)—to the extent that they now constitute legitimate theoretical frameworks. Theories such as the narrative policy framework (NPF; Jones & McBeth, 2010) have provided an empirical basis for studying the ways in which public policy is informed and shaped by narratives. This carries significant implications for parliaments; "places where competing narratives are told and claims on public resources are made" (Parkinson, 2013, p. 440). Indeed, the relevance of narratives to parliamentary policy is already evident through O'Bryan, Dunlop and Radaelli's (2014) use of the NPF to analyse legislative hearings.

Nevertheless, Parliament's *utilisation* of narratives as a mode of engagement remains under-researched. The importance of storytelling in challenging dominant narratives (Andrews, 2004)—such as those of disaffection and dissatisfaction—are of especial importance in the political and parliamentary context described thus far. As this article shows, parliamentary storytelling—by bodies *within* Parliament—lacks unity in form and content. There is also an evident inconsistency in the institutional application (or awareness) of storytelling principles; that is to say, a lack of (broad) understanding that stories must be *told* rather than simply *presented*. This suggests a deficit of institutional understanding as to how and why stories work as an engagement device, reinforcing Kelso's observation of Parliament as an institution "lack[ing] any kind of corporate identity", or "the means to approach political disengagement in a holistic fashion" (2007, pp. 365–366). This article provides a comparative analysis—grounded in the 'constructivist turn' within representation theory—of parliamentary storytelling initiatives that attempt to co-constitutively represent Parliament to citizens (and the citizenry to itself). Through this analysis, it draws attention to a non-holistic parliamentary approach to storytelling that is likely to hinder the prospect of engaging an audience. However, it also serves to clarify ways in which parliamentary engagement can be strengthened through effective story*telling*.

2. Representation and Engagement amid Dominant Social Narratives

Parliamentary engagement is a comparatively recent phenomenon, and parliamentary engagement through storytelling is newer still. Politicians and Parliamentarians[1] (and/or their strategists) have historically employed stories to engage citizens (Fernandes, 2017; Fielding, 2011; Salmon, 2010), though their efforts have traditionally encouraged engagement *with them or their party* (e.g., securing votes) rather than with Parliament *per se* (Norton, 2013). Parliament's engagement efforts—making the aforementioned claims of *relevance*, *evolution*, and '*public ownership*'—have often been limited to providing information (Norton, 2013). Academics have frequently criticised this 'unidirectional' approach, describing Parliament's (and MPs') use of social media, for example, as prioritising depth (quality engagement) over breadth (the reach of a message), resembling 'broadcasting' rather than engagement (Coleman, 2005; Gibson, Nixon, & Ward, 2003; Norton, 2007). In these cases, there is no opportunity (or evident desire) for a response from the supposed audience. Moreover, the term 'parliamentary engagement' can presuppose a unified, coherent effort, itself a gross oversimplification. The initiatives discussed within this article are those of specific parliamentary services, and should not be generalised as 'institutional'. Examining their content addresses a lacuna identified by Judge and Leston-Bandeira: an overwhelming scholarly focus on the means—and extent—of interaction, while "relatively little attention has been focused upon what is being communicated to citizens" (2018, p. 2). These initiatives are accordingly conceptualised as attempts to *represent* Parliament to citizens, and citizens to themselves.

Contemporary representation literature continues to cite, build upon, and critique Pitkin's seminal *The Concept of Representation* (1967) as a theoretical touchstone. However, the work of recent scholars such as Michael Saward has sought to afford more attention to the *act* of representation:

> For Pitkin…it is the inanimate object—the painting, the icon, the symbol, the map—that represents. The intentions of the maker of the symbol, etc. are either ignored or reduced to merely informational impulses. (2006, p. 300)

The contribution of the 'constructivist turn' more broadly is in conceptualising a 'claim' made to an audience: a claim about the claim-maker to the audience, and a claim about the audience *to themselves* (Coleman, 2015; Disch, 2015; Hinchman & Hinchman, 2001; Mansbridge, 2011; Parkinson, 2009; Saward, 2010; Street, 2004). The audience's engagement with (and legitimation of) this claim brings it into being as representation. Saward's critique

[1] While the focus of this article is largely institutional in scope, please refer to Warner's (2018) article within this thematic issue for a discussion of political representation in relation to MPs.

of Pitkin emphasises the aims of the creator, and this article examines Parliament accordingly; as an agential co-constituent in a dynamic not only of representation, but of engagement and storytelling.

Conceptualising engagement as a dynamic thus affords just as much agency (and responsibility) to citizens as to institutions. This is highly pertinent to contemporary political engagement literature, which often characterises the citizenry as ignorant of politics or consciously removed from it. Peter Mair exemplifies this when stating that "for many, at least as far as conventional politics is concerned, it is enough to be simply spectators" (2013, p. 543). This characterisation of citizens as spectators and audiences (Gibson et al., 2003; Putnam, 1995; Street, 2004) implies pervasive inertia; other studies, as van Wessel points out, diagnose citizens' 'unrealistic expectations' of politics, stemming from failure to "understand what it is they are turning away from" and "what the reality and potential of democratic politics is" (2016, p. 2). Two objections can be raised here. The first relates to Mair's use of the term 'conventional'. Conflating disengagement with a detachment from formal politics implies a public/private dichotomisation—popularised during the Scottish Enlightenment (Manning, 2013)—that obscures contemporary societal trends, including "a blurring of public and private…reconnecting politics with morality/ethics" (Manning, 2013, p. 29). Secondly, descriptions of citizens' lack of understanding often say more about *scholars*' understandings of politics than those of citizens:

> Understandings are largely derived. Citizens' understandings are taken to be predictable, on the basis of analysis of large-scale developments political scientists have identified (chosen?) as important. (van Wessel, 2016, p. 4)

Van Wessel instead conceptualises engagement as "an interplay between a citizen and the democracy she/he is trying to understand" (2016, p. 5). Discussions of engagement (and means of strengthening it) must therefore take account of citizens' contextualised, situated knowledge of the political sphere.

Narratives are an essential facet of this situated knowledge, in that they create a structure for subjective experience. As Barthes argues "there is not, there has never been anywhere any people without narrative" (1975, p. 237). Storytelling, meanwhile—what Abbott refers to as 'narrative discourse'—is a means of alluding to a broader narrative through "the telling or presenting of a story" (2008, p. 241). Through repeated collective storytelling a narrative is constructed. This clarification is important, given the frequent treatment of 'narratives' and 'stories' as interchangeable terms within academia (Daigle, 2016, p. 27). Within political science specifically, narratives are generally acknowledged and discussed in one of two respects:

1. Context: circumstances, socially-entrenched norms and popularly-held assumptions.
2. Appeal: connecting with a reader/audience through relatability and self-recognition.

The first permutation of narrative—*context*, against which events, figures and theories are examined—is ubiquitous within political science; narratives, after all, intuitively constitute "the principal way in which our species organizes its understanding of time" (H. P. Abbott, 2008, p. 3). This accounts for the importance of narratives as 'structures'; as a form of meaning-making they reflect the human desire to establish patterns across random information and instances. This is substantiated by the cultural ubiquity of narratives (Campbell, 1968; Macintyre, 1977, 2007; Nussbaum, 2001) and their pervasiveness at a psychological level (Stephens & Breheny, 2013).

However, this is not the only human impulse that narratives speak to; there is a second permutation (*appeal*) which is especially relevant to storytelling. Stories constitute and reflect broader narratives – sometimes referred to as 'master narratives' or 'metanarratives'—but they also hold *appeal* in their own right. Studies that acknowledge the second permutation as a mode of engagement are infrequent and typically focus on electoral participation through political parties (Coleman, 2015; Escobar, 2011). Parliament (and engagement with it) remains under-researched through this particular lens. If narratives are indeed the representation of stories, then investigating stories potentialises an enriched understanding of what "we tell each other" (Langellier, 1999, p. 125). That "there are always conflicting stories—sometimes two, sometimes more—competing for acceptance in politics" necessitates understanding these stories, so that the narratives they aggregate (constituting an entire "social world") can be studied in turn (Bennett & Edelman, 1985, p. 160). Political science has a responsibility to address perceived weaknesses in political engagement (Flinders, 2012a, p. 30; Riddell, 2010, p. 552) and, by extension, understand existing (and potential) engagement mechanisms. Narratives and stories are not (just) academic 'vantage points'. They are a means of—and potentially an impetus for—engagement with social reality.

3. Visualising *Engaging* Stories: A Fractal Analogy of Context and Appeal

As discussed, narrative and storytelling are semiotic instruments; they entail a form of meaning-making. Establishing an accepted, legitimated meaningfulness ('making meaning') thereby underpins an effective story. According to Niklas Luhmann:

> Every intention of meaning is self-referential insofar as it also provides for its own reactualization by including itself in its own referential structure as one among many possibilities of further experience and action. (1995, p. 61)

The appeal (and success) of a story is incumbent upon the reader's self-identification within a broader context, "see[ing] himself living this written life" (Benjamin, 2006, p. 372). MacIntyre concurrently observes that "I can only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?'" (2007, p. 16). Nussbaum echoes this emphasis on relatability in observing that the reader(s) of a story, upon "seeing events as general human possibilities…naturally also see them as possibilities for themselves" (2001, p. 241). A story constitutes an allusion to possibilities that are appealing and relatable to a reader/audience, who must *recognise themselves* in the story they are told.

However, the importance of a story does not lie only in reflection. The relevance of storytelling *transcends* this immediate social and temporal context, thereby differentiating it from information:

> The value of information does not survive the moment in which it was new. It lives only at that moment….A story is different. It does not expend itself. It preserves and concentrates its strength and is capable of releasing it even after a long time. (Benjamin, 2006, p. 366)

The 'strength' of a story is therefore also incumbent upon on a transformative element, as elaborated by Nietzsche who, drawing on ancient Greek mythology, posits that "to be able to live at all [the Greeks] had to interpose the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians between themselves and those horrors" (1993, p. 23). Building on this, Kearney states that storytelling is *aspirational* "involv[ing] far *more* than a mere mirroring of reality" (2002, p. 12, emphasis in original). Indeed, as Nietzsche points out, storytelling "created the Olympian world with which the [Greek] 'will' held up a transfiguring mirror to itself" (1993, p. 23). The 'transfiguring mirror' is a useful analogy for combining two aforementioned tenets of narrative: context and appeal. 'Mirroring' is relevant to *context* (self-identification and situated-ness), while the 'transfiguring' relates to *appeal* (aspiration, possibilities, and allusion). Context and appeal can therefore be amalgamated to demonstrate the 'strength' of a story (and narrative more broadly), as Figure 1 shows.

This not only validates 'appeal' as an academic focus (transcending invocations of narrative in a purely contextual sense); it also replaces the context/appeal dichotomy with an *interplay* (demonstrated by Figure 1), illustrating (to both of these concepts) the relevance of self-similarity. Several scholars have discussed the importance of self-similarity within narratives, using fractals as an analogy; these include Abbott (2001) and Shenhav (2015). Both authors utilise self-similarity and recursion (repeated similarity from one 'progression' to the next); definitively fractal characteristics (Eglash, 1999). A 'fractal' pattern is one that is mirrored (at every scale) by its component parts; well-known examples include Mandelbrot sets, Koch snowflakes and Julia sets. One of the most widely-recognised fractals is the Sierpinski triangle.

As Figure 2 shows, isolating one part of the Sierpinski Triangle refers back to its structure. Stories work in the same way. They reflect dominant narratives and reflect readers back to themselves as part of 'something bigger', which constitutes their appeal.

What existing fractal analogies (particularly Shenhav's) have conspicuously lacked is an explanation of *why* (rather than *how*) their own analogies work. Scholars have critiqued Shenhav's fractal approach in ignoring "the inherent agency of human actors" (Krebs, Jones, Aronoff, & Shenhav, 2017, p. 3), an omission which compromises the value of narratives *and* fractals as theoretical tools. Let us address the narrative element first. As Barthes argues, "a narrative cannot take place without a narrator and a listener (or reader)" (1975, p. 260). Without acknowledging the reader—who, along with



Figure 1. A definition of 'engaging storytelling', amalgamating two academic understandings of *narrative*.



Figure 2. A Sierpinski Triangle: a fractal pattern in which individual elements reflect a broader self-similar structure.

the narrator, constitutes a storytelling dynamic—there is no narrative. Turning to fractals, Shenhav correctly observes that recursion and self-similarity are a *means* of (re)generating narratives (2015, pp. 60–68). In doing so he shows that narratives endure and perpetuate because they relate back to dominant, already-legitimated social narratives. As Derrida puts it, "everything begins by referring back (*par le renvoi*), that is to say, does not begin" (1982, p. 324). However, having identified self-similarity as a means of regeneration, Shenhav fails to also identify it as an *impetus*. Self-similarity constitutes the appeal of narrative; seeing oneself and 'completing the outline' "based on [one's] own fantasies, emotional circumstances, and ideologies" (Bennett & Edelman, 1985, p. 164). To omit this factor from a fractal analogy negates the analogy's *raison d'être*.

A fractal analogy of context/appeal interplay is provided below. At the level of the reader and of the narrative context, the reader is reflected as *part of* a broader structure that is self-similar to them; a 'transfiguring mirror', to borrow Nietzsche's aforementioned metaphor. The broader structure analogises the contextualising effect of narrative. It also demonstrates the centrality of the reader to a narrative, and the fractal nature of successful storytelling.

As Figure 3 shows, the reader—upon being told a story—relates the elements of this story (which are typically numerous, hence the multi-coloured arrowed lines) to their own personal context, i.e. a self-similar backdrop of narratives (represented here as a larger fractal pattern that the reader can 'find themselves' within, or with which they can identify). This backdrop constitutes the reader's own situated reality. Note that the relation of story elements—which may relate to the plot, characters, or 'moral'—can result in a (re)connection (i.e. the green and yellow lines, which reflect back upon the reader) but can also fail to do so; thus Figure 3 demonstrates how relating to a story is a granular process, rather than a binary 'success' or 'failure'. This illustrates how *appeal* is incumbent upon the reader's ability to relate to (i.e. find themselves within) the story via *the reader's own context*. The story itself is a conscious representation of the storyteller, "traces of [whom] cling to the story the way the handprints of the potter cling to the clay vessel" (Benjamin, 2006, p. 367), but also of the reader, who—in effective instances—recognises, and relates to, the representation. Figure 3 thus presents a stark contrast to the fractal analogies discussed previously, which do not incorporate *appeal* (to *context*) as a reason why stories perpetuate.

Taking the fractal analogy demonstrated in Figure 3, and applying it to the expenses scandal mentioned in the introduction, we can demonstrate the appeal of stories; in this case, media accounts of corrupt and selfish politicians, which were seen and read by the reader/audience, and interpreted against the reader/audience's own situated reality (composed of underlying assumptions and familiar, self-similar narrative elements). Ultimately these stories 'made sense' (i.e. were accepted and legitimated) amongst a public that, in the context of a global financial crisis—as well as the aforementioned 'corrupt politicians' narrative (Fielding, 2011)—"were acutely attuned to crisis narratives" (Flinders, 2012b, p. 10). The crucial point here is that through being attuned to (and *familiar with*) these *crisis narratives*, citizens could personally relate crisis stories to their situated knowledge. *Crisis stories* of corrupt politicians thereby reflected citizens' own understandings within a broader (and self-similar) narrative structure of *corruption in politics*. This example of public outcry shows how 'appeal' need not be positive, but must be accepted as 'making sense' in context. We will explore this phenomenon in a more prospective manner in the following section, and utilise the fractal analogy in analysing attempts at parliamentary engagement through storytelling.



Figure 3. Storytelling and its appeal: encompassing context and appeal through self-similarity and recursion.

4. *The Story of Parliament:* Informing through a Story

A comparative analysis of parliamentary storytelling initiatives reveals a great deal about the likelihood of success for these engagement strategies. The consistency between the desired audience and the form of storytelling will be assessed through the fractal theoretical framework elaborated previously; that is to say, a constructed audience's prospective ability to see themselves in the story presented to them. The questions addressed by this analysis are as follows:

1. In what way is Parliament being represented?
2. What audience is the storytelling initiative trying to create and appeal to?

In answering these questions, we will give consideration to the parliamentary body responsible for the initiative (to avoid 'defining' parliamentary engagement in any holistic fashion), as well as visible trends in citizen perceptions of Parliament. The latter point reinforces a co-constitutive study of parliamentary engagement, and also provides a basis for discussing the likely success of a specific initiative.

Numerous parliamentary engagement initiatives have thus far mentioned the term 'story' within their respective discourse. The Voice and Vote Exhibition, commemorating the centenary of women's suffrage, claims to "tell the story of women in Parliament, the campaigning, the protests and the achievements. It will also examine where we are today and how you can make change happen" (UK Parliament, 2018). We can see the way in which precedent and context is presented as an inducement to engage; the presupposition is that *appeal* (i.e. the desire to find out 'how you can make change happen') stems from *context* ('where we are today'). In engagement initiatives such as this, the mention of a 'story' is fairly incidental; it serves merely as a shorthand for the presentation of a sequence of events or information (consistent with a conceptualisation of narrative as a means of understanding *time*). This distinction provides a basis for comparing two recent parliamentary efforts, both of which cite a 'story': *The Story of Parliament*, and *Your Story, Our History*. Both were first publicised in 2016; an analytical comparison reveals two distinct conceptualisations of how stories can be communicated and—considering their contemporaneous existence—reinforces a perceptible lack of holism in Parliament's institutional approach to engaging storytelling.

The Story of Parliament (House of Commons Enquiry Service, 2016), published in booklet and poster form, presents a timeline of democratic milestones between the Magna Carta in 1215 and voting reform in 1969. It provides key details about Parliament and its history, resembling a story inasmuch as it presents a sequence of events (H. P. Abbott, 2008; Barthes, 1975) in the past tense, a common narrative device (H. P. Abbott, 2008). In discussing this initiative, let us return to Figure 3's fractal analogy and ask the following questions: who is the storyteller? What element of the story would the reader recognise themselves within? And who or what could the reader then engage *with*? The story being presented here is 'disembodied'; there is of course a 'creator' (the Enquiry Service) but no clear 'storyteller'. The 'informational impulses' that Saward (2006, p. 300) draws attention to (in order to 'de-encapsulate' their attributive importance to representation) aptly encompass *The Story of Parliament*. The initiative evidences an informational impulse from its creator, rather than a storytelling impulse, recalling Walter Benjamin's aforementioned dichotomisation of the two. In this situation, the reader/audience is provided with purely temporal context. There is no appeal to relate or engage, only the provision of further information: online links and contact details. Thus in the absence of a storyteller the reader/audience is presented with information and then expected to engage, in return, *with* that information.

The question of the *subject* of this story—and, by extension, the issue of 'ownership'—is extremely important here, as the following section will also demonstrate. The terminology of *The Story of Parliament* implies not only that the story is *about* Parliament, but also that the story *belongs* to Parliament. Assuming the voice of the narrator (even, in this case, a 'disembodied' voice) is an authority claim in itself; it is a position of privilege in terms of access to the knowledge being communicated, and (in more literal terms) the power this potentialises over the reader/audience (Bauman, 1986, p. 38). "Claims about story ownership", as Shuman argues, "follow unstated, culturally specific rules about who has a right to tell about particular experiences and in what way, to whom" (2015, p. 53). Allocation of the 'right' to these experiences is all the more pertinent to a document that, as discussed, concludes its 'story' in 1969 (i.e. within living memory). The reader/audience, moreover, is only directly addressed in the final section: "Parliament and you" (House of Commons Enquiry Service, 2016, p. 7), thus limiting the degree to which the story facilitates a narrative dynamic and instead recalling the 'broadcasting' discussed in Section 2. *The Story of Parliament* thus (re)presents Parliament as the 'owner' of its own democratic story (via disembodied information rather than a storyteller), jeopardising the prospect of connectivity with the audience it constructs.

It is important to further discuss the reader/audience that is constructed (or at least presupposed) in this manner. In successive Hansard Society audits, a clear majority of respondents have indicated Parliament's essentiality to democracy (2017, p. 5), while what is lacking, as discussed in the introduction to this article, is a widely-held feeling of efficacy; connectivity between citizen *input* and parliamentary *output*, or—more generally—connectivity *per se*. A lack of connectivity is unlikely to be addressed by *The Story of Parliament*, since it provides very little to connect *with*. Moreover, the same Hansard Audit, when comparing its most recent data to its first Au-

dit in 2004, found that recent respondents' claims to be:

> Knowledgeable about politics [were] 10 points higher (52% vs 42%), and knowledgeable about Parliament 16 points higher (49% vs 33%). But…satisfaction with the system of governing Britain is down seven points (36% to 29%) and people's sense of being able to bring about political change (our efficacy measure) is down three points (37% to 34%). (2018, p. 4)

This problematisation of the link between being informed and engaged—a link that serves as a prerequisite for *The Story of Parliament*'s effectiveness—is further undermined by the research of scholars such as Norris (2011) and Dalton (2008), who observe (respectively) a cleavage between perceived performance of political institutions and democratic aspirations, and an increasing skepticism as to the motives of these institutions. While not suggesting that greater access to information has *caused* these developments, their prevalence—alongside an increasingly politically sophisticated and informed citizenry—certainly problematises a causal link between information and engagement (indicated by satisfaction, trust, and efficacy). These citizen-wide characteristics undermine *The Story of Parliament*'s constructed audience, for whom information and engagement are positively correlated. It is important to reiterate that engagement is discussed in this article in a *parliamentary* context, with a co-constitutive view of the story's purpose (i.e. making a claim for parliamentary relevance). Parliament's claimed role as a 'mediator' is undermined by irrelevance and non-efficacy—i.e. citizens' *self-perceived* inability to effect political change *through Parliament*—narratives that this story does not address.

The constructed citizen audience within this case study is therefore *increasingly* inconsistent with the broader social trends that scholars such as Dalton (2008) and Norris (2011) have identified. As we have shown, *The Story of Parliament* does not tell a story, which negates the prospect of changing (or even addressing) broader citizen narratives of Parliament (with relation to efficacy, satisfaction and trust, for example). The information presented would (in accordance with the fractal analogy in Figure 3) simply be related to these narratives, which constitute the reader/audience's existing situated knowledge. This is important to point out because the *Story of Parliament* booklet is still distributed by the House of Commons Enquiry Service and remains available in Portcullis House, an important site of "social interaction and engagement" for visitors to Parliament (Hansard Society, 2011, p. 69). What we can see is a disjunction between the implied aims of the initiative (disseminating a greater degree of information about Parliament) and Parliament's broader aims of engagement; either in phenomenological terms (e.g., trust and satisfaction) or in more behavioural terms (given the failure to provide a subsequent 'avenue' for engagement). In Walter Benjamin's terms, then, the *Story of Parliament* is, as an engagement initiative, unlikely to "survive the moment in which it was new" (2006, p. 366).

5. *Your Story, Our History:* Engaging through *Storytelling*

The Story of Parliament was discussed in the previous section as a disjuncture between techniques, principles, and societal trends. It also demonstrates a presentation of context without an appeal to context. The *Your Story, Our History* initiative, by contrast, exemplifies appeal *through* context. It is a series of YouTube films in which citizens face the camera and describe the impact of a piece of legislation on their lives. Stories about race relations, gender equality, and female suffrage are thus told through first-hand experience. In this way, the *Your Story, Our History* initiative (crucially) acknowledges the role of a storyteller. The 1965 Race Relations Act, for example, is not framed as Parliament's story; instead, it is the story of Shango Baku, who relates his experience of persecution, and his positive experiences following the passage of the Act (UK Parliament Education and Engagement Service, 2016b). The audience being constructed here is one that can relate personally to the persecution Shango experienced, and/or directly benefited from parliamentary legislation. In addition, the story constructs a 'ghostly' audience (Langellier, 1999, p. 127); viewers who may not have suffered persecution but can relate to narrative cues of isolation and uncertainty, a "sea of circumstance" as Shango puts it (UK Parliament Education and Engagement Service, 2016b). The telling of the story thereby "makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale" (Benjamin, 2006, p. 364); those who share common values, if not experience (Young, 1996, p. 131).

This leaves the 'meaning' of the story incumbent upon the reader, who relates the appeal of the story to their own narrative context (discerning the former through the latter). The process by which this appeal is found is demonstrated below, building upon the fractal analogy presented earlier.

Figure 4 illustrates an instance in which themes of persecution and racism may not be relatable to an audience, whereas uncertainty and isolation are themes that they can relate to (via the reader/audience's narrative background). Context (of the reader/audience's narrative background) thereby becomes appeal (through facilitating the story's relatability). Figure 4 demonstrates only a hypothetical example, since the form that the appeal takes—and the existence of appeal in the first place—is inherently subjective.

Significantly, in *Your Story, Our History*, Parliament relinquishes a *claim* to the story, a key point of contrast to *The Story of Parliament*. Ownership of the story is allocated to the citizen *telling* it; stories of various pieces of parliamentary legislation are thus entitled "Layla's Story", "Shango's Story", "Jannett's Story", and so on (UK Parliament Education and Engagement Service, 2016b). As discussed in the previous section, this carries sub-



Figure 4. A reader/audience's relation of "Shango's Story" (and its associated themes) to their narrative context.

stantial significance in affording the 'right' of the story to the individual who tells it. In (re)allocating this right, the initiative presents an embodied (i.e. 'told') story that addresses pervasive sociological themes; that is to say, themes of abstraction, and a lack of identity, that pervade external *and internal* perceptions of Parliament (Kelso, 2007; Leston-Bandeira, 2016). It is highly significant in this context that an embodiment, or 'face', is presented; not that of Parliament *per se* but that of *citizens* (who can represent—i.e. 'speak for'—Parliament's importance to their own life stories). As Saward acknowledges, "to speak for others…is to make representations which render those others visible and readable" (2006, p. 313) The Education and Engagement service thereby represents Parliament *through* citizen representations, illustrated (and substantiated) by their own life stories. The transmission of these tangible experiences through storytelling potentializes effective engagement, enjoining citizens to engage not (only) with information, but with a story that facilitates self-recognition and relatability.

Furthermore, the effectiveness of *Your Story, Our History* is also potentialized by the construction of a citizen audience that embraces subjectivity and self-actualisation (in the manner illustrated by Figure 4); that is, the very descriptors that increasingly characterise the contemporary citizenry (Manning, 2013, 2015). Thus, parliamentary storytelling 'through citizens' eyes' would appear to be ideally-placed as an appeal to "the audience, whose members can complete the outline based on their own fantasies, emotional circumstances, and ideologies" (Bennett & Edelman, 1985, p. 164), because *Your Story, Our History* constructs an audience that actually reflects broader societal characteristics and trends. This is reinforced by the fact that self-actualisation is described as especially prevalent among younger citizens (Manning, 2013, 2015), which is highly pertinent to the current accessibility of *Your Story, Our History*—via YouTube—given the (albeit narrowing) gap in generational internet use (Office for National Statistics, 2018). These considerations are crucial to the effectiveness of storytelling (even in a potential or prospective sense), which is incumbent upon the intended audience and whether the narrative applied appears suitable to them; or indeed, whether an audience is even conceptualised (McBeth, Jones, & Shanahan, 2014, pp. 249–250).

Viewed as an act of representation, *Your Story, Our History* constitutes—via the storytelling it facilitates—several forms of claim-making:

- Relevance (in enacting legislation);
- Development (alongside broader societal trends);
- Relinquishing control over stories (in favour of 'citizen storytellers').

Relevance, development, and (non-)ownership reflect the *modus operandi* discussed in the first section ('Parliament is *relevant*, *evolving*, and *yours*'), to which *Your Story, Our History* displays fidelity (as well as to storytelling at a conceptual level). The definitively co-constitutive nature of storytelling is made relevant to the process of engagement (which in its own right is also co-constitutive) through letting citizens decide what Parliament means to *them*. This is a process specific to the *telling* of a story, rather than the *presentation* of one (i.e. making it available). Moreover, *Your Story, Our History* tells—rather than presents—an embodied, personified story via a story*teller*. This is the difference between *Your Story, Our History* and *the Story of Parliament*. The former tells a story as something to be engaged with; as a means of parliamentary engagement in its own right. The latter presents a story, showing how a person *might* learn more; not why they may wish to.

This last observation is a crucial distinction. It introduces what the narrative policy framework would refer

to as a 'moral', i.e. a policy solution (McBeth et al., 2014, p. 228). In the context of *Your Story, Our History*, parliamentary legislation is the 'moral' inasmuch as it constitutes the solution (for the citizens telling their stories). The relevance of parliamentary legislation, however, is not presented as finite within *Your Story, Our History*, which states that "there's still much more to be done" (UK Parliament Education and Engagement Service, 2016a). This is consistent with Benjamin's aforementioned description of a story—the value of which does not 'expend itself'—but it also signposts a channel of engagement: participation in the legislative process. This is especially pertinent to recent 'Public Reading Stage' pilots, in which citizens are provided the opportunity to view and comment upon bills (such as the Children and Families Bill in 2013, for which a public web forum was opened between Second Reading and Committee Stage) before they become laws (Leston-Bandeira & Thompson, 2017). As Figure 1 shows, the appeal of context lies in self-identification and aspiration. Nussbaum, as we have discussed, stresses the importance of the reader/audience "seeing events as general human possibilities", and applying (i.e. *making relevant*) these possibilities to themselves (2001, p. 241). The impact of this aspiration on specific means of engagement—in this case, a story of legislation encouraging participation *in* legislation—represents a valuable focus of future research.

It could be argued that the two initiatives we have discussed simply reflect varying aims, and different conceptualisations of storytelling. *The Story of Parliament* presents detailed historical information, and could be considered more ostensibly educational than *Your Story, Our History*, which presents a comparatively short timeline from a single perspective. The latter's framing of stories as *being about* and *belonging* to the citizen storytellers (e.g., "Shango's story") should not obscure the fact that the UK Parliament (literally) possesses and distributes these stories. "The intentions of the maker" (Saward, 2006, p. 300) therefore remain crucial. However, a number of observations justify the comparisons (and conclusions) made within this article. Firstly, it is important to reiterate that inconsistent storytelling practice (between two *contemporaneous* efforts) reinforces a lack of holism within Parliament's engagement strategy: holism that necessitates a shared engagement remit for the Enquiry Service and the Education and Engagement Service, which (respectively) released *The Story of Parliament* and *Your Story, Our History*. Secondly, even if *The Story of Parliament* does exist for educational purposes, its success rests on a positive relationship (between information and several key markers of engagement) that, considering broader social trends, is extremely difficult to substantiate. Lastly, attributing 'informational impulses' and 'storytelling impulses' to different initiatives does not downplay a crucial observation: that distributing information in isolation will not address, let alone challenge, disengagement and disaffection with popular conceptions of Parliament, or its underlying narratives. Responding to these narratives requires effective story*telling*.

6. Conclusion

This article has shown the varying ways in which parliamentary storytelling attempts to construct a representation that is conducive to engagement principles and a prospective audience. This analysis, conducted through a fractal analogy, demonstrates the way in which an effective story can (and must) be *told* in order to be relatable and engaging. In this regard, the storytelling evident in *Your Story, Our History* demonstrates a crucial acknowledgement of the storyteller and the reader/audience in co-constituting an engagement dynamic. This approach merits wider application within parliamentary engagement policy, and greater attention from academics, since it represents a step change from the 'unidirectional' engagement methods that so often characterise Parliament's mediator role. Storytelling, moreover, represents a form of engagement that is especially conducive to a modern political landscape characterised by citizens who exercise self-actualising forms of political action and expression, and establish subjective meanings independently. In the absence of a holistic approach to parliamentary storytelling as a mode of engagement, stories will remain limited to what citizens 'overhear' about Parliament. Reinforcing this situation is a continued conceptualisation of stories as resources that do not require *telling*, and thus fail to address or challenge citizen narratives that undermine Parliament's legitimacy. We need only consider the aforementioned narratives surrounding the expenses scandal—to take just one example—to have some grasp of the implications for the wider democratic process.

An assessment of the quantifiable effectiveness of parliamentary storytelling techniques is outside the scope of this article. At present there is no data relating to the impact of one form of parliamentary story over another; indicators such as Twitter activity do little to indicate the experience of the reader in response to the stories discussed within this article. In addition, the existence of these 'stories' across different media (print, websites, and social media) restricts the degree of quantitative analysis that can be undertaken at this point. As a precursor to future research, this article has discussed why a certain story would be potentially effective (and appropriate) in relation to another, with consideration to Parliament's basic engagement aims as well as socio-political trends among the citizenry. Further research in this area is required, potentially utilising additional theories such as the narrative policy framework and its research approach template (Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2018), as well as methods for *measuring* the deliberative quality of specific stories (Gold et al., 2017). However, at this point we can conclude that storytelling is becoming pervasive (even) within parliamentary engagement initiatives, but a deeper institutional understanding of

how (and why) these stories *work* is required. Effective storytelling holds considerable benefit for parliamentary engagement and representation, and in the construction of claims that an increasingly self-reflexive citizenry can plausibly relate to.

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Conflict of Interests

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COGITATIO

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Article

Understanding Emotions in Policy Studies through Foucault and Deleuze

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Abstract
Discussing Foucault's and Deleuze's work on meaning-making, the article argues that we might make better use of the intersubjectivity of a meaning when interpreting emotions. Interpreting emotions in texts remains complicated because discussion on the ontological character of emotions sustains an opposition of emotion to meaning structures. Both Foucault and Deleuze conceive meaning-making through permanent oscillation between the subjective accounts of a meaning and its collective interpretation. These two dimensions are not in conflict but create meaning through their interdependence. On the basis of this interdependence, we can conceive of an interpretive analysis of emotions as a way to study language means that label particular emotions as relevant, legitimized, or useful. This shift of the debate on emotions away from what emotions *are* and toward what they *mean* enhances the critical shape of interpretive analysis of emotions because it uncovers conflicts hidden behind the veil of allegedly neutral policy instruments.

Keywords
Deleuze; emotion; Foucault; interpretation; interpretive analysis; knowledge; meaning; policy studies

Issue
This article is part of the issue "Interdisciplinary Approaches to Studying Emotions within Politics and International Relations", edited by Alex Prior (University of Leeds, UK) and Yuri van Hoef (Utrecht University, The Netherlands).

1. Introduction

Despite a growing consensus in political science that emotions help us make sense of politics (see e.g., Clarke, Hoggett, & Thompson, 2006; Hunter, 2015; Jupp, Pykett, & Smith, 2016), a heated discussion still prevails over the ontological character of emotions. This discussion mainly concerns whether emotions are 'subjective', 'individual', or 'collective' practices, whether they are framed through bodily responses or are socio-politically and historically contingent (see the overview of the debate in Clément & Sangar, 2018). This large body of thought has an impact on the way the interpretation of emotions has been conceived in the analysis of politics. Scholarly works that analyze policies—working mostly with textual data (such as policy documents, parliamentary debates, transcripts of interviews, etc.)—have approached emotions in one of two ways. One approach considers 'emotions' as expressions of feelings and affects that are incongruous to meaning structures because of their bodily and sensual character, their unpredictability. This has been the main focus of the affective turn that loosely echoes Gilles Deleuze (Brennan, 2004; Clough & Halley, 2007). The other approach identifies emotions as a sort of pre-stage to meaning, as a raw energy or individual agency that must be inscribed in the meaning structure (Glynos, 2008; Norval, 2009). This approach was advanced mainly by poststructuralist political theory, which built on Michel Foucault (for Foucauldian discourse analysis see also Delori, 2018) and other theorists.

The present article affixes the rich discussion on emotions in politics to the issue of the interpretation of emotions. It argues that an intersubjective notion of meaning is needed to understand how emotions become part of meaning and how these meanings are transmitted through textual data for analysis in policy debates. This notion of meaning is conceptualized here through the discussion of Foucault's and Deleuze's work on meaning (Deleuze, 1968, 1975, 1978; Foucault, 1966, 1969a, 1971). Both Foucault and Deleuze provide conceptual tools for us to think about such an intersubjective notion because they see meaning-making as an intersubjective

activity that is produced and reproduced through interdependence between the subjectively expressed or articulated meanings and their inscription in patterns of collective interpretations. The article thus shows how the authors' mediating interest in this interdependence proposes epistemological groundings for an interpretive analysis of emotions (for the role of both authors for analyzing politics see Brass, 2000; Dean, 2010; Edkins, 2014; Howarth, 2002; Lövbrand & Stripple, 2015; Patton, 2000; Rabinow, 1991; Zevnik, 2016).

The article begins with an overview of how the turn to emotions in social sciences has enabled a distinct focus on knowledge in policy studies. It shows then that while operationalizations of knowledge have been proposed in policy studies (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Fischer, Torgerson, Durnová, & Orsini, 2015; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013; Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow, 1996), these works have not clarified the role of emotion in such analysis (see the critique also in Durnová, 2015). The interdependence of the subjective and collective dimensions of a meaning-making conceived by Foucault and Deleuze enables us to understand emotions as evaluating and value-loaded references to articulations of emotions that frame policy debate, giving legitimacy to some actors while silencing other actors by labeling them as 'emotional'. The interpretive analysis of emotions has the advantage of depicting concrete language means by that these references to emotions are displayed. The article concludes by providing examples of how such an interpretive analysis of emotions can be set up. It follows that this article does not aim to provide yet another site for discussing the ontological character of emotions, nor does it endeavor to resolve the dilemmas between the cognitive and representational nature of emotions that those discussions imply (as discussed, e.g., in Barbalet, 2002; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1990). Rather, it proposes epistemological groundings for identifying emotions in textual data, which can be used not just in policy studies but in any social analysis of knowledge.

2. Emotions as Intersubjective Elements of Meaning-Making

A diversified and somewhat antagonistic set of approaches has been deployed to understand emotions in politics, which has elevated the debate on the ontological character of emotions to prominence (see the review works on the topic, e.g., Berezin, 2009; Dixon, 2012; Jasper, 2011). It was deemed necessary to reflect on what emotions are in order to identify where emotions can be found and how they can help us to understand political phenomena better. In policy studies, mainstream research first resisted including emotions in its analytical toolkit, which has been emphasized mainly by Thompson and Hoggett (2001), van Stokkom (2005), and Newman (2012) in their critique of deliberation as an enterprise that excludes citizen groups, and knowledge on the basis of their emotionality. The critique of deliberation was part of larger paradigmatic framings of emotions in sociology and political theory, which defined them as socio-historically contingent practices (Ahmed, 2013; Hochschild, 2003; Zelizer, 2005). This debate helped scholars in policy studies conceptualize emotions as elements of knowledge framing policies and actors that discuss them and/or formulate them (Hunter, 2015; Jupp et al., 2016). Referring to emotions and emphasizing emotions of actors are then practices understood as revealing the socio-political hierarchy that affects what knowledge is seen as legitimate and which actors are seen as relevant. This perspective was set up to explain how emotions are used in policy debates to advance particular types of knowledge (see the example of the public debate on AIDS in Gould, 2009; and the example of the public debate on care in Durnová, 2013). While focusing on the use of knowledge, and the contexts of this use, works in policy studies have shown how emotions frame the identities of policy receivers through these uses of knowledge (Clarke, 2006; Hunter, 2003). These approaches have highlighted that emotions enter as evaluative components of policies (Greene, 2002; Orsini & Smith, 2010; Stenner & Taylor, 2008) and that the emotional lens helps scholars understand the values behind policies, which may otherwise be hidden behind the notion of a neutral policy instrument. How actors evaluate a particular policy issue against their feelings about that issue shapes what they do and which arguments and symbols they deploy in their actions (see the examples in family policies in Durnová & Hejzlarová, 2017; Jupp, 2017).

At the same time, all these works showed that emotions are used in the analysis of policies as contingent practices. This perspective positions them close to works in social geography that stress that emotions are 'embedded knowledge' (Bondi, 2014) and 'narrations' of problems (Czarniawska, 2015). Identifying emotions through their aspect of socially inscribed and collectively organized contingency is also the main strand of sociology of emotions working with qualitative data (Flam & Kleres, 2015) as well as in IR works (Koschut, 2018). Recent International Relations works take up such contingency, focusing on why specific emotions become relevant in particular situations (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014). As shows for example Ty Solomon (Holland & Solomon, 2014; Solomon, 2011), the analysis of emotional phenomena should focus on the interdependence between individual agencies and their inscription in these contingent practices. All these processes of socially and collectively organized inscription, regardless of whether they are described in the different social scientific disciplines as norms, rules, practices, or rituals, share the perspective that emotions are endowed with meanings and that, in order to understand their role in politics, we must interpret them.

However, the focus on the interpretation of policies has not automatically produced an inclusion of emotions. Interpretive works in policy studies focused on how polit-

ical phenomena have meaning (Yanow, 1996) and how we can understand politics better through interpretation (Wagenaar, 2011). They were focusing on language and meaning-making practices as practices coproducing the way problems are framed and understood as such (Fischer, 2003; Griggs & Howarth, 2004; Yanow & van der Haar, 2013). In doing so, these works have highlighted the role of 'arguments' (Fischer & Gottweis, 2012) or 'narratives' (Lejano & Leong, 2012) as language strategies that enable us to see the 'political process' behind the formulation or implementation of policies (Zittoun, 2014). These approaches have had a somewhat complicated relationship with emotions. On the one hand, some interpretive works have evoked the issue of emotions more in the sense of 'showing emotions' (Fischer, 2009; Gottweis & Prainsack, 2006) rather than interpreting their contingency. Other works have analyzed how the presence of emotions in policy processes enrolls a novel dynamic in policy negotiations (Verhoeven & Duyvendak, 2016). On the other hand, interpretive concepts such as 'arguments', 'narratives', and 'discourses' have developed into rationalizing meaning structures. This resulted in viewing the analysis of emotion in policies as a pre-stage to the analysis of meanings (see the conceptualization of affects in poststructuralist policy analysis in Glynos, 2008) or even opposed to it. An example that illustrates this opposition is scholarly work that analyzes feeling and performance in policy work; that perspective views the analysis of emotions as an antipode to the interpretive character of analysis (Anderson, 2017).

This article proposes solving this complicated relation of meanings to emotions by investigating more deeply the notion of 'meaning'. Analyzing policies and policy debates comprehends all manner of textual data: documents, media articles, and parliamentary debates, inquiry transcripts, but also field notes and notes from (participatory) observation. All these data are meaningful; they are conferred meaning by a variety of actors entering the policy debate. This makes 'meaning' a central unit of interpretation of policies. Returning to Foucault and Deleuze and their work on meaning proposes an epistemological grounding to argue for an 'intersubjective' notion of meaning. In its linguistic conception, intersubjectivity is the very condition of verbal interaction because it brings the subjective intentions of saying something together with the collective understandings of these sayings (used in different sorts of textual analysis such as Maingueneau, 2014). Understanding the intersubjectivity in the analysis of policies enables us to overcome the complicated relation between the interpretation of meanings and the analysis of emotions because it suggests that meaning is a result of interdependence between the subjective expression (moment, feeling, point of view) and its collective validation (socio-cultural contingency, path dependency, the established institutional practice). Making this interdependence central for interpretation allows the focus to shift from 'emotions' to particular discursive registers through which some references to emotions become legitimized in policy discussions while others are disregarded or even disqualified as illegitimate or 'too emotional'. This move from what emotions *are* toward what they *mean* enhances the critical shape of analysis. It makes visible the language means by which voices are silenced in a policy debate based on their alleged emotionality as much as it renders germane the conflicts hidden behind the veil of 'neutral' knowledge or policy instruments.

3. Understanding Intersubjectivity through Foucault and Deleuze

Reflections on meaning-making of Foucault and Deleuze are used here as a pathway to propose epistemological groundings for conceiving of textual data as revealing the intersubjectivity of meanings. Viewing through the lens of intersubjectivity enables us to conceive an interpretation of emotions in these textual data. Both authors reflect in their work that texts are full of fluctuation between 'classified' semantic categories and 'volatile' rhetorical devices that challenge these categories. Text can subsequently be seen as an oscillation between 'structured' narrations of events, which bring forward established and codified genres, and 'subjective' narrations that challenge these genres. Both thinkers emphasize that the meaning of an event is negotiated through subjective accounts of a meaning and the multiplicity of other meanings that could be used to describe such an event. Both authors assert that a necessary part of a meaning is the constant aspiration toward a certain type of codification. Even though subjective accounts are important, without this codification, meaning would not be understood by others. What diverges in the perspective of both authors is the focus on the codification procedure in Foucault (1966, 1969b) and the focus on the possibility of disturbing this codification in Deleuze (1968, 1978).

This focus on codification turns us first to 'discourse', Michel Foucault's key term. Discourse, for Foucault, presents a link between thought and the 'culture of thought', which presents, represents, articulates, and classifies meanings. The turn to discourse makes us attentive to meanings not as surplus decorations of political actions but as actions themselves that shape and coproduce what policy actors do. Discourse reveals the link between power and knowledge (see e.g., Fischer et al., 2015; Lövbrand & Stripple, 2015). Foucault defines power as an instance governing through—and governing of—a constantly developing knowledge (1966, 1969b, see also in 2009), which has given interpretivists' epistemological grounds to think of policies through meanings, texts, symbols, or arguments. For that reason, interpretivists analyze registers of knowledge that establish a hierarchy of what counts as valuable or legitimate, an idea advanced mainly in Foucault's *The Order of Things* (1969b).

Second, there is always the possibility of a change of a discourse. Discourse, albeit coding the collective, in-

teracts constantly with subjects using it. Foucault's emphasis on taxonomies, which order our subjective experiences to make them meaningful collective phenomena, represents one such interaction. Taxonomies reveal to us the dangerous mixing of elements within a language, which codifies our practices. If observed from a comparative perspective of different cultures, or from a perspective of diversified subjective experiences, as we can see in contested policy issues, the analysis has to pay attention to how the subject acquires the knowledge, and how she interiorizes it by both confirming it and rejecting it. Studying fractures in a discourse, thereby searching to conceptualize how to deal with multiplicity or contestation, has become pressing in policy inquiry, especially in times of plurality of knowledge and in times of ambivalent hierarchies in increasingly globalized and networked democracies. Some works in the interpretation of politics have thus suggested turning away from meaning structures to dramaturgy (Hajer, 2005) or to physical performances (Edkins, 2015) and the staging of events, referring explicitly to Deleuze (Lundborg, 2009).

That we constantly run the risk of repressing the subjective meaning of an event through some codifying mechanism is essential to the Deleuzian notion of meaning-making (Deleuze, 1968, 1975). However, instead of staying within the 'subjective', or the 'affective', Deleuze proposes focusing on the tensions that emerge between the subjective and collective dimensions of meaning. Deleuze describes a subject's role in meaning as both a producer and a suppressed object of a collective semantic boundary (1977, 1978; see also Deleuze & Guattari, 1972). To be attentive to a subjective shaping of knowledge, and to tensions that might result, is part of his idea of 'difference' (Deleuze, 1968). Through difference, Deleuze conceives the possibilities the subject has to emancipate herself from her discourse. The potentiality of being outside a structure gives a possibility that the discourse might change, that power relations might be subverted or that peripheral meanings might move to the center. This movement beyond, '*devenir*' in the language of Deleuze (1988), is conceived positively as a continual emancipation from all sorts of 'repression mechanisms' that try to restrict the subject in rigid formats. Beyond this, it also serves as a critical alert for analysts that their toolkits and theories can also develop into 'repression mechanisms'. Deleuze ties this risk to schemes of language such as 'explanation', 'analysis', and 'interpretation', which by seizing the manifold and rich reservoir of experience may become oppressive.

This view allows Deleuze at the same time to conceive meaning not as a compact category but as a constant possibility of disturbance (Deleuze, 1968). Irony, joking, and misunderstanding are semantic figures that *per definition* escape any order of discourse, but without this escaping they would not make any sense (Deleuze, 1977, p. 143). Deleuze thus pits the idea of an event against 'the potentiality of an event' because the potentiality explicitly entails tensions and possibilities of re-codification (Deleuze, 1988, p. 8). At the same time, Foucault does not abandon the individual mechanisms by which power is exercised, either. What rises as the important point for the study of a discourse is that, in Foucault's view, the subject adopts certain practices, rejects them, revises them, or becomes emancipated from them. Discourse and identity are inextricably linked (see also Foucault, 2008). The subject coproduces power by making these practices 'normal', 'rational', or 'legitimate' (Foucault, 1988, pp. 26-33). In *The Order of Discourse*, Foucault (1971) uses the disturbance, the eventual contradiction, to illustrate his emphasis on the order and his fascination with it. This can be seen also in his foreword to *The Order of Things*, where he explains how Borges's anecdote on the Chinese encyclopedia made him laugh, because it creates an order by placing together totally different elements (Foucault, 1966). He describes his laughter as the 'impossibility to think something' and it becomes an important epistemological category for the subsequent codification of meanings.

What is central for the conceptualization of intersubjectivity is that both authors point toward the interdependence between the subjective (instant) and the collective (codified): Foucault uses 'this impossibility to think' to explain that discourse has the power to 'speak truth', to give meaning to events and problems and to codify these meanings in a long-term perspective. Discourse achieves this because it codifies this impossibility of thinking in categories, practices, rules, and norms. These categories might be inaccurate for grasping subjective accounts, but the codification comprises also this inaccuracy. An example of this can be found in the verbal interaction in which we state that we know that something is difficult to describe, but then we describe it anyway. The difficulty of describing is the lens that Deleuze applies to deal with the interdependence. Deleuze uses the same 'impossibility of thinking' to explain that discourse cannot speak truth to power, nor can it coin the meaning of an event, because its power is constantly disturbed by the multiple subjective accounts of meanings (Deleuze, 1968), by inaccuracies, jokes, ironical statements, or even silence. But again, these rhetorical devices can function only in their relation to the codification, no matter how much we might feel oppressed by this structure when articulating the subjective meaning of an event.

Both authors cite the larger implications of this interdependence for social analysis: the context of modern rationality has made structures and norms and codes its ultimate device for organizing citizens into societies. The oscillation between organized codification and disorganized subjective accounts of meanings is what drives public debates on an issue. There are codified practices that become contested, disrupted, and challenged in the debate in order to become the new codification. From one perspective of the debate, these practices can be seen as 'codified', while from another perspective they are seen as 'disturbing'. Taking this oscillation into account

means that we cannot stand outside of a discourse; we are always within discourse, as debaters or as analysts (Foucault & Deleuze, 1972). Deleuze suggests in *Nomad Thought* (1978) that it is possible to overcome this constellation by embracing multiplicity. One of the examples he uses is the spread of psychoanalysis in France in the 1970s, which he also articulates together with Guattari (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972). Deleuze's reproach of the rising fashion of psychoanalysis was that—albeit searching to understand the wild subconscious—it alienated the subject through the codified analytic structure of psychoanalytic therapy. The main impetus of this critique was to uncover how intellectual positions that might understand themselves as 'critical' and 'innovative' or even 'revolutionary'—and in France the group advancing Freudian thinking was one such reference for them—run the risk of becoming just another new 'repression mechanism'. Deleuze was afraid that the focus on the analytical framing might reduce the multiplicity of meanings and the possibilities of becoming something else (Backes-Clement, 1976).

4. Embracing Emotions through Interpretation

Policy studies offer examples that enable setting up an interpretive analysis of emotions that takes advantage of the intersubjective notion of meaning. Maarten Hajer (2005), for example, shows in his analysis of the post-9/11 re-building process of Ground Zero in New York City the role of contradictory emotions for policy planning, although he does not discuss implications for respective analysis of emotions. Contradicting views of property owners, family members of victims, and New York residents were all meaningful parts of the decision-making process around the re-building of the site. All these subjective assessments of the event played some part in the city's mourning process over 9/11, yet they did not enjoy the same level of recognition during the decision-making process. The dramaturgy to stage a particular narrative of the re-building process in fact employed meaning-making procedures to bring forward some emotions expressed during the planning process as the 'important' or 'legitimate' ones. An interpretive analysis of emotions could study these particular staging further by examining the verbal interactions among actors and arguments in policy papers to identify how these particular emotions were referenced, how they were brought into relation with the events of 9/11 and with the aim of a 're-building process', and how, on that basis, they might be framed as 'emotional', which subsequently legitimized their exclusion from the process. Interpretive analysis of emotions can also uncover the hidden conflict around the paradigmatic framing of a planning process that—by conceiving of a policy design as a rational enterprise—allows only certain experiences to become a legitimate part of the discussion.

A second example is the issue of alimony policy, which shows how the subjective meanings of 'single motherhood' are diffused by the respective policy design (see the analysis in Durnová & Hejzlarová, 2017). That single mothers don't feel 'happy' and that they are 'frustrated' are excluded from the design of alimony because these are too emotional to be included in a policy. Subjective assessment of the policy is seen simply as part of the cost-benefit analysis because policies—as policy studies have taught us (May, 2012)—are always reductionist and therefore have winners and losers. Interpreting concrete references to emotions, such as references to a 'frustrated mother', enables those who argue for the policy design to disqualify these voices from a debate that is labeled as 'serious' because it is about 'real' financial costs and not about 'sentiments'. A third example of interpretive analysis is the end-of-life controversy (analyzed in Durnová, 2018). Every end-of-life policy, regardless of whether it is for or against self-chosen death, is intertwined with the diversified, and often ambivalent, subjective experience that each of us might have with the end of life. Any end-of-life policy oriented toward elaborating a concrete choice will in fact exclude other subjective experiences. Interpretive analysis of emotions, in this case, can look at how emotions are referenced in particular situations and how some of them become legitimized as 'understandable' while other emotions are not legitimized and instead are described as 'irrational' and the people who hold them as 'not really meaning it'. The analysis can then look behind the ethical debate on this issue to show that these ethical positions are sustained through references to emotions.

Setting up an interpretive analysis of emotions means identifying discursive registers through which emotions are articulated and shared because they are seen as legitimate or relevant, while other emotions are not acknowledged as either relevant or legitimate. Such identification means explaining through which concrete means these registers hold together, what challenges them, and what consolidates them. By revealing these registers, the interpretive analysis of emotions finally enhances the critical shape of policy inquiry: it allows those who are silenced by the paradigmatic framing of valuing political rationality over emotions to be heard. Analyzing the language means through which those complaining about a policy design are silenced can become a way to uncover the larger dichotomization of politics opposing arguments presented as 'rational', against arguments presented as emotions of 'strained mothers', or 'unhappy citizens' and 'suffering patients'. Making this dichotomization visible through an analysis of concrete references to emotions in a policy debate enables to identify the normative dimension lying behind the alleged neutrality of policy knowledge and policy instruments.

5. Conclusion

While analyses of political phenomena have paid attention to emotions through multiple approaches, viewing emotions as a 'necessary disequilibrium' (Berezin, 2009)

opposed to structured knowledge has persisted in the field. This limitation has also affected interpretation of policies. As I have demonstrated through discussion of the interpretative approaches to policy studies, emotions have been treated as elements with a special status or, as, Foucault put it, as 'impossible to think'. They have been seen as 'disruptions', as Deleuze holds about the role of the subjective accounts of meanings. In treating Foucault and Deleuze as the two main sources of inspiration for interpretation, the article proposes an outline for an epistemological framework for an intersubjective notion of a meaning. Emotions can be analyzed in terms of what they *mean* to whom without losing their aspect of disruptive elements that challenge those meanings. Emphasizing the interdependence between subjective accounts of meanings and their validation through collective understandings (socio-cultural contingency, path dependency, historical contingency) gives an epistemological grounding to understand that meaning is intersubjective, and the oscillation between subjective accounts and collective understanding is part of this. It also enables us to shift the discussion on emotions in social science away from what emotions *are* toward what they *mean* in a concrete policy debate and how they are used to design policies as much as they expose these policies to contestation.

The examples cited, along with the discussion on meaning in Foucault and Deleuze, permit us to draw a pathway toward the interpretive analysis of emotions. Looking for emotions as they can be found in the textual data can identify contradictions and misunderstanding once we treat these texts, as Foucault and Deleuze suggest, as a site for negotiation between what the subject says or does and how that is understood by the collective and subsequently framed in policy debates. Emotions are not opposed to meanings: they play with them, and sometimes against them. Emotions are inscribed in cultural or societal contingencies, underpinning actors' motivations to participate, while simultaneously enacting changes in contexts and actors in the policy process. Emotions both consolidate and challenge policies: they 'negotiate' with meanings while being simultaneously negotiated by them.

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The Advocacy of Feelings: Emotions in EU-Based Civil Society Organizations' Strategies

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Abstract
European Union (EU)-based Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are usually pictured as well-established professionalized actors basing their advocacy strategies on the provision of expertise. Does the focus on expertise imply the removal of emotions and feelings from political communication? Following the emotion turn in social movement and collective action studies, this article investigates how and why EU-based CSOs use emotions in their advocacy strategies. The article shows first how CSOs use rhetorical appeals to emotions and rhetorical appeals to reason in their communication. Secondly, the focus is directed to emotion-inspired advocacy strategies, namely blaming and shaming, fear-mongering and boosting. The choice of rhetorical appeals and strategies is mainly explained by three different inter-related factors: the logics of influence, the logics of membership and media logics. Empirical data is drawn from a content analysis of press releases and policy documents of environmental (climate change) and human rights (refugee crisis) CSOs active at the EU level and from semi-structured interviews with key CSO representatives.

Keywords
civil society organizations; emotions; European Union; feelings; interest groups

Issue
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1. Introduction

Do Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) act from the heart or from the head? After the end of the 1960s, emotions tended to play almost no role in the understanding of social movements and collective action, since rational, structural and organizational models dominated political analysis (Calhoun, 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, & Poletta, 2001). Since a few years, it may be the turn of social movements and emotions (Collins, 2001). Emotions have indeed attracted increasing scholarly attention in the 2000s, even if they have not deeply transformed the understanding of sociological and political theory (Calhoun, 2001).

Despite this increasing interest, many sub-disciplines within the field of political science, such as European studies or interest groups research, have not dedicated much attention to the role of emotions. Emotions are a key factor to ensure consent and social conformity and as such, they could help to address central questions in interest-group research in the European context, such as the democratic deficit and the legitimacy gap. Regarding the particular topic of CSOs in the European Union (EU), the emphasis has been placed on their expertise, their consensus-seeking strategies and their professionalism, and thus, little attention has been given to the role that emotions might have played in their advocacy strategies. A better understanding of the role of emotions can help explain how CSOs engage in dynamics of justification and persuasion. This article also constitutes an interesting addition to current literature on framing processes. Current research on framing tends to focus on the cognitive and normative aspects and there is considerably less research about the interaction between framing processes

and emotions (Gross & D'Ambrosio, 2004; Lecheler, Bos, & Vliegenthart, 2015).

To contribute to the development of knowledge on the role of emotions in advocacy activities, the present article answers the following research question: how do EU-based CSOs use emotions in their advocacy strategies? This question is further developed in the following sub-questions: To what extent do EU-based CSOs use rhetoric appeals to reason and rhetoric appeals to emotion in their political communication? If CSOs use appeals to emotions, how do they use them and why do they use them within the framework of different strategies?

This article first briefly introduces the study of emotions in social movement research. Secondly, I provide a preliminary analytical framework to study the use of emotions by CSOs and I discuss the methodology and the data collected. The empirical part applies the proposed framework. It shows how and why the analyzed CSOs use appeals to reason and emotions in their political communication and to which extent these CSOs use emotions in advocacy strategies including examples such as blaming and shaming, fear mongering and boosting.

2. Studying the Role of Emotions in EU-Based CSOs' Advocacy

This section introduces first the main concepts used in this article, namely CSOs and emotions, and discusses very briefly the study of emotions in social movements and collective action research. I also provide a preliminary analytical framework to study the use of emotions by CSOs in their communication and advocacy strategies.

2.1. CSOs, Emotions and the Study of Collective Action

Both the concept of CSOs and emotion are highly contested. Regarding CSOs, I opt for a definition that focuses on their public purpose (Sanchez Salgado, 2014). CSOs stand out for their normative dimension since they support values such as equality, justice and solidarity (Cohen & Arato, 1992). This definition differs from a broad conception of CSOs including economic and professional organizations and from a strict interpretation of CSOs as exclusively voluntary groups (Jordan, Halpin, & Maloney, 2004). CSOs analyzed also include organizations funded by public institutions, collective structures or organizations of organizations even when they cannot be considered as traditional voluntary groups.

Regarding emotions, I apply in this article a flexible and inclusive definition. Emotions can originate from cognitive judgments or can be non-conscious responses to bodily states (or a combination of both). The study of emotions differs from the study of the role of values or ideas in the sense that emotions are primed response structures that intervene automatically during the process of adaptation (Popa & Salanță, 2013).

While studying emotions, disciplines such as political science and sociology tend to emphasize the cognitive dimension (hypercognitivism). As a complement, my analysis also includes the possibility that emotions may be pre-conscious or even unconscious, since there is sufficient scientific evidence to at least contemplate this possibility (Arias Maldonado, 2016; Damasio, 1999). While the nature of interactions between emotions and cognition (or 'rationality') remains unclear, there seems to be an emerging consensus that the traditional assumption that there is a sharp distinction between emotions and cognition needs to be revisited (as Prior and Van Hoef state in this issue's editorial). It is also agreed that emotions do not have necessarily a negative impact on rational or reasonable decision-making. The way emotions are experienced depends in any case on culture, social class and context.

The study of emotions has increasingly attracted the attention of political scientists (Berezin, 2002; McDermott, 2004; Thompson & Hoggett, 2012). As may be expected, one of the most prolific subfields is political psychology (Marcus, Mackuen, & Neuman, 2011; Redlawsk, 2006). Another prolific subfield more directly related to the present study is social movements and collective action (Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005; Goodwin et al., 2001; Jasper, 2011). Existing research shows how emotions can help in understanding political behavior in elections and political campaigning, decision-making processes, risk assessment and political involvement.

Existing studies on the role of emotions in collective action and social movements research have been criticized for relying too much on a substantialist conception of emotions, for approaching emotions from a limited number of theoretical perspectives and for assuming the emotional neutrality of established institutions (Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005). Most current research indeed conceives emotions as if they were attributes of individuals, at the same level as beliefs, cognitions or interests. Emotional appeals are considered to be very powerful in getting people involved in protest against certain policies or political action against injustices. Emotions are thus usually associated with specific outcomes of collective action. To illustrate with an example, the ability to express anger is considered to be a means to challenge injustices (Jasper, 2011).

Much less has been written about collective emotions (Von Scheve & Salmela, 2014). Groups can be considered to have emotions when individuals identify with the group (Schmid, 2014) or when there is a joint commitment to the group as a body (Gilbert, 2014). While organizations do not have a body and thus, they do not feel as individuals do, emotions are visible in marketing and internal management strategies (Hochschild, 1983) or more interestingly for this article, in political communication. The institutional role of emotions at the empirical level is also currently underdeveloped in the political field of inquiry. Hochschild's (1983) research showing the significant role of feeling rules in the corporate world continues to be relevant today, but to my knowledge, it has rarely been applied to the study of collective action or politics.

2.2. Emotions and EU-Based CSOs Strategies: Analytical Framework

In this empirical part, I propose first an analytical framework for the descriptive analysis of CSOs' appeals to emotions, and I offer some elements of explanation to help understanding why CSOs may be using such appeals. Second, I establish a link between CSOs' appeals to emotion and their advocacy strategies, illustrating these links with a few examples of emotion-based advocacy strategies.

Rhetorical analysis can help with the operationalization of the study of political communication, making the study of emotions concrete by proposing the study of political arguments as they take place 'in the wild' (Finlayson, 2007, p. 552). Rhetoric is often understood as 'persuasive communications made in contingent and conflictual civic contexts' (Finlayson, 2007, p. 545). Rhetoric is here conceived more broadly, not only as a means of persuasion (merely instrumental), but as fully part of the process of coming to believe something.

Do CSOs use rhetoric appeals to reason or rhetoric appeals to emotion, and if so, why? The distinction between appeals to reason and appeals to emotion differs from the classical distinction between appeals to logos, pathos and ethos. Appeals based on logical justification (logos) often (if not always) include emotional or affective elements. Appeals to ethos (character of speaker) can be both related to reason (when they invoke expertise, formal qualifications or experience) and to emotions, when they involve charisma or affect for a leader. In mainstream research on collective action, the duality between emotion and reason has persisted in more or less subtle ways. Just to give an example, while analyzing CSOs strategies, it is commonly considered that professionalized CSOs focus on expertise provision and social movements and grassroots groups on contentious action. This could be interpreted as a distinction between a few professionalized CSOs basing their arguments on reason and a group of contentious social movements basing their action on emotions.

In the absence of emotions, CSOs would only publish formal and unemotional documents characterized by lack of style, literary tropes or word play with the aim to confer to these publications clarity and a certain gravitas (Finlayson, 2007). This style is usually employed by government and civil servants to confer certain objectivity to their work. In these cases, normative and affective elements may remain, but in a blurred and implicit way. The idea of objectivity and commitment to the better argument has been criticized for ignoring the reality of political communication in the current conflictual, power-laden and inegalitarian context (Bickford, 2011).

Using emotions in political communication can also be considered as part of policy framing, which can be seen as a strategic choice or/and as a result of constraints derived from group characteristics or contextual characteristics (Klüver, Mahoney, & Opper, 2015). The present article will help to understand the pressures CSOs face while selecting specific frames. This is an interesting contribution to existing research in political communication that places the emphasis on how framing affects individuals. While it has been shown that framing has important effects on emotions and that emotions play an important mediating role (Lecheler et al., 2015), not much is known about the constitutive role that emotions may play in framing dynamics.

Political actors such as CSOs indeed enter into a specific structure of communication that must satisfy certain conventions and institutional codes (Finlayson, 2007). Regarding CSOs, these conventions and institutional codes may come from political institutions, namely government (logic of influence), their members (logic of membership) or from the news media (media logic). The logic of influence requires that interest groups choose frames that allow them to have influence on decision makers (Schmitter & Streeck, 1981). It implies that interest groups adapt their communication strategies to the particular preferences and beliefs of policy makers. Previous research has shown that EU-based interest groups tend to focus on expertise provision and consensus-building strategies (Sanchez Salgado, 2014). Previous research has also shown that public frames are more used when addressing EU departments that deal with public goods giving some credit to the logic of influence (Klüver et al., 2015).

The logic of membership demands from interest groups that they behave in accordance with their constituency (Schmitter & Streeck, 1981). Public interest groups such as CSOs are more pressured to become known by the public in order to obtain resources from members and supporters. Previous research has confirmed that CSOs tend to stick to public frames following the logic of membership (Klüver et al., 2015).

The media logic (Altheide & Snow, 1979) leads to a process of mediatization introducing changes in the criteria and rationalities following which interest groups decide upon and act (Brändli, Donges, & Jentges, 2011). Previous research has shown that interest groups respond and adapt to the media logics with structural changes, but not to the expected extent since the abovementioned logics (membership and influence) also play a relevant role.

Regarding the logic of influence, one would expect that professionalized EU-based CSOs use few appeals to emotion. The European Commission promotes a type of lobbying that is based on information and expertise provision where there seems to be little space for emotional displays. However, following the logic of membership, CSOs may appeal to emotions to promote engagement or mobilization of their members. Radical and contentious repertoires of action (often based on symbols and emotions) are frequently used to strengthen motivations among protestors and to develop feelings of solidarity and belonging (Della Porta & Caiani, 2009). There are also several reasons why one should expect that media logic promotes rhetorical appeals to emotions in

advocacy strategies. News reporting is often related to a few bias including personalization and dramatization (Bennett, 2016). Personalization refers to the framing of stories in terms of human interests, which usually includes an emotional angle. Dramatization includes the focus on conflict and negative emotions. Providing drama is usually considered by interest groups as a way to get access to the media and for CSOs this often consists of organizing pseudo-events to provide dramatic visuals and symbolism (Thrall, 2006).

If CSOs use appeals to emotions, how and why do they use them within the framework of different advocacy strategies? Existing studies on lobbying and advocacy strategies have so far proposed several classifications such as the inside/outside strategies model where the role of emotions remains implicit or absent. They rarely focus on emotions with the remarkable exception of blaming and shaming (Kapyla & Kennedy, 2014). In the following section, I show that appeals to emotions can be directly related to advocacy strategies. On the basis of the empirical material collected for this research, the appeals that seemed to be the most relevant for CSOs advocacy strategies were appeals to shame, appeals to fear and appeals to hope and pride. The emotion-based strategies analyzed in this article are not exhaustive but they provide a first overview of how appeals to emotions can be used within the framework of advocacy strategies.

Compassion filtered through anger is likely to take the form of blaming and shaming or of a public accusation (Kapyla & Kennedy, 2014). Blaming and shaming consists of appealing to guilt or shame to generate a desired action. While blaming and shaming has often contributed to short-term victories for CSOs (Franklin, 2008), it is also considered that they can hold back CSOs by alienating them from potential allies or be used strategically by policy makers (Van Erp, 2008). There is not much research about how CSOs use fear in their advocacy strategies. The so-called fear-mongering strategy is mostly attributed to journalists and politicians. Fear mongers deploy fear through narrative techniques to normalize errors in reasoning, for example through repetition, through the presentation of isolated occurrences as trends and through misdirection (Glassner, 2004). Last but not least, appeals to hope and pride can be related to boosting. Boosting is an advocacy or lobbying strategy consisting of using media work to enhance the general public's impression of particular policy makers with the purpose of maintaining good relationships with the latter (Trapp & Laursen, 2017). Within this strategy, CSOs would produce positive content regarding politicians' public image.

2.3. Methodology and Data Collection and Analysis

The present article focuses on EU-based CSOs activities in two domains: migration policy (issue of refugee crisis) and environmental policy (issue of climate change). The inclusion of two different policy areas permits to show if there is variation across issues. These policy areas and issues were selected because CSOs have well-established advocacy strategies. Emotions tend to be prominent in both policy areas at the European level, but the presence of emotions in both fields tends to be average, and thus, they can be studied as typical cases. The next sections provide specific information about the corpus of arguments that are going to be analyzed and the context of relations in which they take place.

Regarding the corpus, this analysis covers a total of 267 press releases and short policy documents published online by six well-established EU-based CSOs working on the two topics under analysis (climate change and refugee crisis)[1] from 2014 to 2017 (see Table 1). The number of documents and timing varies depending on the data availability on each of the websites. The content analysis also covers the last 50 Facebook statuses from every CSO under analysis (year 2017). The Facebook statuses covered all types of issues and not only the ones mentioned above. All data were published in English and analyzed with the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti. For the Atlas.ti content analysis I used descriptive markers and automatic coding. First, I read all the documents to identify empirically what could be seen as cognition markers, including words such as statistics, survey, reason or research. Emotion markers included only words referring *directly* to basic emotions such as fear, compassion and shame. I did not use emotion markers that referred to emotions implicitly or indirectly.

Regarding the context, most policy documents analyzed were addressed to the press or directly to policy makers with the aim to (directly or indirectly through media pressure) persuade policy makers to change their

Table 1. Documents of CSOs analyzed.

	AI	HRW	IRC	Greenpeace	FoE	EEB	Total
Amount	86	46	30	50	50	5	**267**
Years	2015–16	2015–16	2015–17	2014–17	2014–17	2014–16	2012–17

Source: elaborated by the author.

[1] The press releases and policy documents selected were the ones that CSOs themselves considered to fall within these themes (I used the search function and limited the search to these themes). Regarding the Facebook statuses, it was difficult to order them by topic since Facebook does not have a search function.

course of action in the sense of the goals of the CSOs under analysis. Facebook statuses have a much broader audience, including CSO members and followers. This data was triangulated with five semi-structured interviews with key players working for the direction or communication department of the CSOs analyzed. In contrast to surveys, semi-structured in-depth interviews are flexible. The emphasis is placed on how the interviewee frames and understands issues and events. Since interviewees are left to raise issues and frame them in their own way, there is less risk of bias such as social desirability bias. For example, instead of asking directly if CSOs were employing a fear mongering or boosting strategy, I engaged in a general discussion about the place of fear in CSOs' political communication.

The six environmental and human rights CSOs selected are to be counted among the most well-known EU-based CSOs. They are not only prominent members of the EU umbrellas on their respective topics, such as the Green 10 (environment) or the Human Rights and Democracy Network (HRDN); they also interact frequently with European policy makers. These CSOs are quite similar to other well-established professionalized EU-based CSOs. The selected CSOs differ in their relationships with their membership and in their relationships with public authorities. While all CSOs under analysis have sufficient resources to make noise and make news (Thrall, 2006), they are well-known for approaching the media in rather different ways. This variation will help understanding better the different effects of the logics of influence, membership and media under analysis.

Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Greenpeace EU office are well-established popular organizations getting most of their support from their large number of donors and supporters. Organizations like AI and Greenpeace claim to reach a large number of members and supporters (7 million and 3 million people respectively). With only 1,000 volunteers and ambassadors, the logic of membership is expected to play a lesser role for HRW. HRW is however known to be an organization focused on getting media attention, and for this reason, the media logic may play a relevant role. Organizations such as Friends of the Earth (FoE), International Rescue Committee (IRC) and European Environmental Bureau (EEB) are funded by public bodies, namely European institutions. For this reason, the logic of influence may unfold differently for these organizations. They are expected to be less dependent on the logic of membership since their constituencies do not provide them with the resources they need to operate. However, FoE is known for its connections with social movements, and in this sense, the logic of membership may play a relevant role. Most CSOs have are very active on the topics under analysis. Only EEB, well known for its work on topics such as circular economy, had so far little opportunity to focus on Climate change, which explains the reduced number of press releases published on this topic. While also a member of the HRDN, IRC can also be considered as a humanitarian CSOs more focused on service delivery than on the publication of documents.

3. Rhetorical Appeals by EU-Based CSOs

In this empirical section I discuss the presence of appeals to reason and appeals to emotion in the document analysis. I first present the results of the descriptive content analysis showing the frequencies of the presence of emotions in the different documents. Secondly the attention is turned to the explanations provided in the analytical framework: logic of influence, membership and media logic. For a better understanding of the dynamics at work, and in-depth content analysis has been triangulated with in-depth interviews and placed in context.

3.1. Complementarity between Rhetorical Appeals to Emotions and Rhetorical Appeals to Reason

Data collected suggest that EU-based CSOs use both rhetorical appeals to reason and emotion. Tables 2 and 3—displayed here for descriptive purposes—show how frequently emotion and cognitive markers (as initial indicators of appeals to reason and emotion) appeared in the documents analyzed. These tables showing emotion and cognitive markers should be understood as the tip of the iceberg. CSOs analyzed also used other methods to display emotions in their documents such as figures of speech or expressive speech acts, including metaphors and nomination strategies. While referring to emotional content during the interviews, CSOs staff also mentioned storytelling, pictures, videos and examples.

Regarding cognitive markers, CSOs used logical argumentation and reasoning which is not clearly reflected in the Atlas.ti analysis. CSOs also back up their assertions and statements with citations to authority, including mainly international organizations, public authorities and the press. CSOs have also commissioned surveys by leading research companies or consultancies (Ipsos Mori or Globe Scan) to support their points. More interestingly, when the documentation is analyzed carefully, the distinction between emotions and facts is problematic. Indeed, most CSOs' scientific reports and documents do not only report facts but they also report the—often emotionally—charged testimonies of victims and survivors.

Data show that the choice for expertise does not necessarily imply the exclusion of emotions and feelings. Preliminary research also shows that this finding can be replicated among national and local CSOs such as Secours Catholique and Cimade in France (Sanchez Salgado, 2017). While these analysis show that emotions and cognitive markers coexist, further research could focus on collecting additional quantitative data to establish to which extent these two types of appeals are correlated.

Human Rights CSOs working on migrants used emotion markers frequently (see Table 2). Another interest-

Table 2. Human rights and humanitarian CSOs (refugee crisis).

Markers	AI	HRW	Rescue	Total
Emotion markers	83 (0.96)[2]	48 (1,04)	32 (1,06)	163
Compassion	6 (7,22%)	7 (14,58%)	4 (12,5%)	17 (10,42%)
Fear	22 (26,50%)	14 (29,17%)	4 (12,5%)	40 (24,54%)
Hate	7 (8,43%)	6 (12,5%)	0 (0%)	13 (7,97%)
Hope	12 (14,46%)	9 (18,75%)	9 (28,12%)	30 (18,40%)
Shame	16 (19,28%)	3 (6,25%)	2 (6,25%)	21 (12,88%)
Suffering	15 (18,07%)	5 (10,42%)	2 (6,25%)	22 (13,50%)
Others	5 (6,02%)	4 (8,33%)	11 (34,37%)	20 (12,27%)
Cognitive markers	78 (0,9)	34 (0,74)	20 (0,66)	132
Reason	6 (7,69%)	11 (32,35%)	3 (15%)	20 (15,15%)
Research	48 (61,54%)	19 (55,88%)	3 (15%)	70 (53,03%)
Statistics	11 (14,10%)	1 (2,94%)	5 (25%)	17 (12,88%)
Survey	7 (8,97%)	0 (0%)	5 (25%)	12 (9,09%)
Others	6 (7,69%)	3 (8,82%)	4 (20%)	13 (9,85%)

Source: elaborated by the author[3].

Table 3. Environmental CSOs (climate change).

	Greenpeace	FoE EU	EEB	ALL
Emotions	16 (0,32)	59 (1,18)	2 (0,4)	77
Fear	2 (12,5%)	10 (16,9%)	0 (0%)	12(15,58%)
Hope	0 (0%)	12 (20,33%)	0 (0%)	12(15,58%)
Others	14 (87,5%)	37 (62,7%)	2 (100%)	53(68,83%)
Reason	20 (0,4)	30 (0,6)	3 (0,6)	50
Reason	2 (10%)	9 (30%)	1 (33,34%)	11 (22%)
Research	8 (40%)	11(36,66%)	2 (66,67%)	19 (38%)
Expert	8 (40%)	2 (6,67%)	0 (0%)	10 (20%)
Others	2 (10%)	8 (26,67%)	0 (0%)	10 (20%)

Source: elaborated by the author.

ing finding is that rhetorical appeals varied per policy area since CSOs use different types of emotional and cognitive markers. Compassion and shame were frequently used by human rights CSOs, while they were almost absent in the documents published by environmental CSOs. Data also showed that there are differences among CSOs, which is particularly evident in the environmental policy field. FoE used significantly more appeals to emotions in the press releases than Greenpeace and EBB. The press releases of these two last organizations are, as general rule, much more technical. Having said this, emotional or catchy expressions and metaphors were still used in the titles, quotes of staff or campaigners.

Table 4 confirms two main expectations: that there are differences depending on the communication channel (and the audience targeted) and that there are differences depending on the type of CSO[4]. Since the nature of press releases and of Facebook statuses is very different (press releases contain more words), it is difficult to say in which channel emotions are the most present. However, some CSOs, such as IRC used more emotions on Facebook than on press releases (at least in comparison with other CSOs). The main finding is that environmental CSOs displayed rather positive emotional messages on Facebook and used regularly emojis. While hope and positive emotions are not absent, Human Rights NGOs also used Facebook statuses to appeal to what are usually considered as negative emotions. This is in line with their strategy of requesting urgent action from their members to place pressure on authorities responsible for human rights violations.

3.2. Explaining the Use of Appeals to Emotions

All the factors mentioned highlighted by previous literature (logic of influence, logic of membership and media logic) played a relevant role as expected. These factors were combined in different ways and thus, CSOs were un-

[2] To give an idea of the relative important of emotions I added the average number of markers per press release.
[3] To avoid an excessively long table, only the emotion and cognitive markers that appeared more than 10 times have been included and the rest have been placed in the others category.
[4] Again, while interpreting the results of Table 4, it is important to keep in mind that emotional markers are just the tip of the iceberg when it refers to the emotional content of Facebook statuses, since they often include pictures and videos.

Table 4. Emotion markers in 50 last Facebook statuses 2017 (all topics included).

	EEB	FoE	Greenpeace International	IRC	AI	HRW	CSOs
Sad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Disturbing	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Fear	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Happy	3	2	1	3	1	0	10
Hope	2	1	1	4	2	1	11
Love	0	1	1	1	1	0	4
Passion	0	0	0	1	2	0	3
Sad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shame	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
EMO	**5**	**4**	**3**	**14**	**9**	**3**	**38**
Emoji	4	7	5	1	0	0	17

Source: elaborated by the author.

der contradictory pressures. On the one hand, policy officials (logic of influence) often imposed a discursive style in which emotions had no place. On the other hand, CSOs also believed that strong emotions were needed to show that there was an urgent problem that required the attention of their members and of the news (logic of membership and media logic).

As expected, the logic of influence led to more technical and formal documents based on facts. The logics of influence was particularly visible in the case of Greenpeace EU office, because–contrary to the other organizations analyzed–this Greenpeace office only addressed policy makers. While communicating with the EU, especially the Commission, Greenpeace did not put emotions in the forefront. According to the Greenpeace representative:

> In the European Commission is evident in the discourse: they use the word emotion to disqualify an opponent, so if you say something they will say let's not get emotional or we are not dealing here with emotions, we are dealing with facts…the attempt is to say that what you say does not matter because that's not factual. That's their approach, they have a very theoretical and analytical approach. (Interview 3)

While it may be less evident (since combined with other logics), the logic of influence was also relevant for the other CSOs. FoE, for example, considered that emotions do not work when trying to influence policy makers like the Commission but that they work when you try to shape the public debate (Interview 1).

As expected, the logic of membership led to the presence of emotional content. FoE's strong links with social movements seem to have contributed to the presence of emotional content in their political communication. The FoE representatives explained that their role was to take grass-roots discussions to decision makers, reach the public and inform the democratic debate (Interview 1). EBB representatives also mentioned frequently their democratic base, but due to their members' lack of resources, the logic of membership seemed less relevant in the shaping of their communication strategy (Interview 4). However, an increasing interest in addressing directly the public led the EBB to elaborate a new communication strategy with more space for emotional content.

All those interviewed, especially those working in communication departments with a journalistic background, were well aware of the media logic. The emphasis was often placed on dynamics of personalization with an emotional content. For example, on the topic of the refugee crisis, AI would focus on families, since all of us have families and this was expected to make people feel empathy for refugees. Personalization and the use emotions was also considered to be important to appeal to a sense of humanity and compassion, as well as to raise sympathy (Interviews 2 and 5). Adaptation in terms of the dramatization bias was less clear. Some CSOs representatives expressed reluctance to focus on dramatic negative stories, while others considered that you can create a drama effect without necessarily focusing on the negative aspects of a situation. All interviewees explained that their organizations increasingly included in their communication strategies elements that contribute to dramatization (Bennett, 2016) such as videos, graphics, drawings and multimedia, etc. Following this new way of presenting information, a CSO representative even affirmed that they had been transformed into a 'journalistic organization' (Interview 5). Interviewees also adapted to the media logic in more organizational (and not only content related ways). For example, they emphasized the need to react quickly and to write press releases in a way that would be the most useful for journalists. At AI, to keep the media pace, press releases were even written before events took place with several scenarios in mind (Interview 2).

The different logics (membership, media and influence) also depended on the issue at hand. Human Rights CSOs working on refugees were more prone to use ap-

peals to emotions in their communication strategies. In the interviews, Human Rights CSOs affirmed than using strong emotions was a way to humanize the issues so the broader public and policy-makers could understand that there is really an urgent problem that needs to be addressed (Interviews 2 and 5). The FoE representative interviewed thought that their focus on a justice and human rights perspective may explain why they used more emotional content in their communication (Interview 1). On top of this, the use of emotions in political communication may be more problematic for environmental CSOs. In any case, environmental CSO representatives generally placed more emphasis on negative reactions from policy-makers.

4. Emotional Appeals in CSOs' Advocacy Strategies

Without being exhaustive, the next section shows how appeals to emotions are used in CSOs' advocacy strategies. Based on the empirical material, the emotional appeals that seemed to be the most frequent or relevant for advocacy strategies were appeals to shame (blaming and shaming strategy), appeals to fear (fear mongering strategy) and appeals to hope and pride (boosting strategy).

4.1. The Complexity of Blaming and Shaming

The blaming and shaming strategy is clearly visible in the case of the refugee crisis (Box 1). The explicit emotional marker 'shame' appears 21 times in this issue, which is much more than the average emotional and cognitive marker (see Table 2). The word shame is mostly used to refer to Europe or to the EU and its member states (17 times out of 21).

When asked if they used a blaming or shaming strategy, the representative of AI responded 'of course we use blaming and shaming, that's our battle' (Interview 2). The HRW representative also confirmed that blaming and shaming is just 'what we do' (Interview 5). Blaming and shaming is thus a conscious strategy used systematically by the human rights CSOs analyzed. However, CSOs representatives expressed some doubts about the usefulness of blaming and shaming in the new political context since a new generation of populist politicians tended to feel proud about facts that in other times would have been perceived as shameful (Interview 2 and 5). Despite these doubts, blaming and shaming continued to be considered one of the main strategies with overall positive results when you looked at the broader picture.

In the environmental policy field the use of blaming and shaming is not so evident while looking at emotion markers alone. FoE is the only CSO that seems to visibly engage in the blaming of policy makers through different forms, including wordsplay and metaphors. Public authorities are pictured as hypocrites (5 occurrences), dirty (30 occurrences)[5] and employing 'shallow speeches' or referring to the 'blatant emptiness of speeches'. Governments are also blamed using metaphors such as their 'infatuation with gas' and 'plastic obsession'. FoE's representatives confirmed that they indeed used a blaming and shaming strategy in a few occasions but that they were very careful to place the blame accurately (e.g., on a particular faction of the Parliament) to avoid feeding discourses of the type all is the EU's fault (Interview 1).

Greenpeace and EBB used blaming and shaming only in specific cases, which can explain why this was not so visible in their documents. The EBB representative affirmed that they used blaming and shaming sometimes, but that they would think hard before because they did not want to undermine their relationships with policy-makers and business (Interview 4). Greenpeace EU office representative explained that they used blaming and shaming, but only in very specific occasions and with a very specific target and objective in mind (In-

Box 1. Examples of the use of emotion marker 'shame'.

Before it was demolished at the end of October, the sprawling migrant camp in Calais had become a symbol of Europe's shame. (HRW, November 22, 2016)
European Union (EU) governments should hang their heads in shame at the ongoing reluctance of many to ensure a collective and concerted search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean, said Amnesty International. (AI, 12 March 2015)
Europe's response to the refugee crisis within its borders is shamefully inadequate. (IRC, November 4, 2015)

Box 2. Examples of blaming by environmental CSOs.

As the dirtiest kid in the European Union class, the Netherlands has also been neglecting its duty to combat climate change for a long time. (FoE)
Greenpeace EU legal adviser Andrea Carta said: "The Commission is being spectacularly irresponsible: it's allowing massive subsidies for a project backed by a government that openly challenges the importance of independent oversight for nuclear safety".

[5] Most of the time dirty is used to refer to dirty energies such as coal, etc. However, FoE also uses the term dirty to refer to public authorities and corporations.

terview 3). For example, during the process of adoption of the REACH directive, Greenpeace EU office published a rather shocking picture where Commissioner Gunter Verheugen could be seen feeding chemical products to a baby, while President Barroso looked passively. This picture had a very specific purpose: to make other Commission and EU officials feel ashamed about the stand of Verheugen regarding this issue, including his links with German industry. The caution of these two organizations in using blaming and shaming seemed well-justified since they affirmed that when they used blaming and shaming they usually got strong (even personal) reactions from their targets.

4.2. Avoiding Fear Mongering? A Complex Balance between Fear and Hope

While the emotion marker fear appeared quite frequently in the documents of some CSOs under analysis, this does not seem to be part of a strategy of fear mongering (as previously defined). CSOs representatives interviewed were conscious that fear was present in their work, but they affirmed that they were not consciously trying to spread fear. They insisted that what they were saying was faithful to the truth and supported by facts. In addition to this, the interviewed affirmed that they usually tried to downplay fear by focusing on more positive and hopeful facts. This seems to be confirmed by the content analysis that shows—especially for environmental CSOs—that the word marker hope is used as frequently as the word marker fear.

CSOs working on the refugee crisis used the word fear more frequently than environmental CSOs. When using the word fear, human rights CSOs aimed at combating the fear mongering strategy used by politicians, rather than the contrary. The emotion 'fear' was indeed frequently used to refer to public authorities (15 times). CSOs would argue that current public policy towards migrants is based on fear. The majority of references to fear referred however to the fear of refugees and migrants and seemed to be directed to move readers and policy makers to compassion rather than to spread fear itself.

While the use of the word marker fear by FoE does not seem relevant[6], when reading in-depth FoE's press releases, it could be eventually interpreted that they engage occasionally in fear mongering using words such as horrendous and devastating or metaphors such as 'the world is still on a collision course with climate change'. Rather than fear mongering, this could also be interpreted as a faithful description of reality based on current scientific evidence. FoE representatives considered they were unfairly accused of fear mongering and because of this, they took special care of supporting their arguments with data and facts. It could also be argued that environmental organizations are actually refraining themselves from spreading fear. Environmental CSOs claimed that they did not share all the information they had about the current situation regarding climate change because this would give such a fearful picture that people and policy-makers would fall in despair. Finding the right balance between fear and hope seemed to be a concern for CSOs representatives interviewed, but not always one easy to solve:

> I think we are also kind of aware that by raising fear without giving directions to what the solution really is can lead to all sorts of false solutions. You know, putting blame in the wrong place and I am thinking about some of the riots of the far right-wing populism which is all about fear mongering but without telling the genuine solution at all. (Interview 1)

4.3. Boosting: Encouraging Members to Promote Change

In the documents analyzed, Greenpeace EU office praises institutions or policy makers more frequently than the rest of CSOs. Greenpeace representative affirmed that praising policy makers was done to be fair (giving praise when it was deserved) rather than within the context of a boosting strategy (Interview 3). This fair play could also help Greenpeace to be heard when they were more critical. Praising the EU was also related to Greenpeace's global assessment according to which the EU, while having major problems, had very developed environmental legislation compared to other countries. Within this context, Greenpeace wanted to highlight the positive role of the EU.

Box 3. Examples of use of emotion marker fear by CSOs.

Leaders need to be serious about identifying and removing people who pose a threat or who don't need protection, but they should not foment fears and prejudice that play into the hands of extremists and risk blinding host communities to their common humanity. (HRW, March 4, 2016)
The EU needs to be responding not with fear and fences, but in the best tradition of the values it purports to hold dear. (AI, November, 2015)
This is relevant in countries like Greece, where the fear is that refugees bring economic burden, but the reality could be of benefit. (IRC, September, 2016)

[6] Most occurrences were placed in a poem (7 occurrences) where the author was claiming not to be afraid.

Box 4. Examples of boosting.

Li Shuo, climate policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, said: "We are seeing much needed leadership emerge from the EU and China today". (Greenpeace, June, 2017)
A new plan by key members of the European Parliament would help the EU retake global leadership on climate change, just as the US dithers on its commitments under the Paris climate agreement, said Greenpeace.
Sebastien Risso, Greenpeace EU forest policy director, said: "The Parliament is right to recognise the huge responsibility that the EU has to stop deforestation, and how important this is for climate action and sustainable development. (Greenpeace, April, 2017)

Box 5. Examples of boosting directed to members (from Facebook).

Over the next year, you have the opportunity to make history. You're going to help create the largest protected area on Earth. (Greenpeace, Facebook post, December 29, 2017)
There's an emerging, strong, diverse, inspiring movement coming together to demand that the transition from an extractive economy to a regenerative one is fair and fast. (FoE, November 29, 2017)
Your words have real power—the power to comfort, heal and even set people free. (AI, November 27, 2017)

While this did not appear very frequently in the documents analyzed, other CSO representatives also affirmed that they praise the positive steps by public authorities when they act as required. One might argue that organizations such as AI and HRW might—all in all—praise policy makers as much as Greenpeace, but that in this specific issue (refugee crisis) there were fewer occasions to praise policy makers. According to a CSO representative (Interview 4) the European level did not seem the most adapted for the application of a boosting strategy because elections are not as relevant as at the national level and because there were less opportunities to make policy makers believe they would be remembered for their legacy.

However, boosting members and the public in general is part of the strategy of the CSOs analyzed and this is mainly done through non-traditional channels of communication such as Facebook. In their communication, CSOs are actively trying to empower citizens and to make them feel proud of doing something good for human rights or the environment. CSOs also consciously celebrated their victories and displayed the power of their network and their movement.

5. Conclusion: Breaking Down the Emotional Paradox

This article has shown the important and ambiguous role that emotions play in CSOs' advocacy strategies. The descriptive content analysis showed that CSOs tend to combine the use of appeals to emotions with appeals to cognition in their communication. The emphasis on emotions depended on different factors such as the logics of influence, the logics of membership and the media logic. While the logics of influence led to less emotional content, the logic of membership and the media logic seemed to increase the emotional content in CSOs political communication.

CSOs are thus confronted to contradictory pressures. On the one hand, activists know that politics is about emotions and that they need strong emotional appeals to make problems really matter. This translates in the use of emotions in their communication and the use of emotion-inspired advocacy strategies, such as blaming and shaming. On the other hand, the perception that emotional expression can be detrimental for rational and objective decision-making is also prevalent among activists. For this reason, activists tend to downplay certain emotions. This apparent paradox is supported by the prejudice according to which emotions interfere with the proper functioning of rationality. If emotions were recognized as an effective way to reach a rational view, these two logics would be more consciously (and possibly effectively) combined. The recognition of emotions as a way to reach a rational view would also led to question the current position of public authorities that rely exclusively on cognition. It could also help promoting the further exploration of the nuances of emotions in advocacy strategies.

This research has also shown the relevance of emotions in advocacy strategies. Blaming and shaming seems to be a very relevant strategy for CSOs with many variants. Does blaming and shaming really intend to shame policy makers (as suggested by the definition of this concept) or does it rather intend to make them feel afraid for their reputation? Do different types of blaming and shaming have different effects? This article also showed that CSOs do not seem to be aiming at spreading fear within a framework of a fear-mongering strategy. It also showed that managing fear in CSOs' advocacy strategies raises complex issues. Should CSOs share all the information they have regarding the climate situation and human rights violations, even if this information may lead to discouragement and despair?

Last but not least, this article also showed that a clear boosting strategy does not seem to be systematically applied with policy makers. CSOs affirm they just praise them occasionally to be fair and to increase their credibility. CSOs are however greatly involved in promot-

ing good feelings among their members and supporters. Further research could analyze how effective boosting is to get people more involved in the causes that CSOs are defending.

These conclusions also raise important normative questions. Is it acceptable to use blame or fear to induce a change of behavior? While triggering fear to manipulate behaviour is generally—and probably rightly—perceived as wrong, it seems reasonable—and probably right—to inform policy makers of the consequences of their actions. If these consequences are negative or dangerous, fear may be needed to adopt the most adequate policy solutions. Thus, while fear can certainly disrupt politics and decision-making, it may also be a form of wisdom in the face of real danger.

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Article

Friendship and Positive Peace: Conceptualising Friendship in Politics and International Relations

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Abstract
In recent years, the study of friendship has gained traction in political science. The aim of this article is threefold: (1) to offer an overview of the status of friendship studies and how it relates to the emotional turn in international relations, (2) to present a wide variety of different approaches to studying friendship, and (3) to highlight the contribution that a friendship perspective can make to other fields, such as Peace and Conflict Studies. From Aristotle and Plato onwards, we trace the development of the concept of friendship, and present several theoretical conceptualisations and methodological approaches that can be readily applied when making sense of friendship, both on a personal level between elite actors, and on the international level between states. We end by drawing attention to the merit of the study of friendship specifically for the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, where it helps to address the lacuna of research on positive peace.

Keywords
affect; emotions; friendship; international relations; Johan Galtung; peace and conflict studies; peace research; politics; positive peace; state leaders

Issue
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1. Introduction

The language of friendship is ubiquitous in contemporary politics. In the past decade, historians and political scientists have made great progress in what has traditionally been a neglected field: the study of friendship. In this article, we follow Brent E. Sasley's definition of affect as 'general valence feelings toward something' (2010, p. 689) when speaking of emotional/affective ties, be they between states or persons. Following Graham M. Smith (2011b, p. 25), rather than offering a single definitive conceptualisation of friendship, we consider 'friendship as a family of related phenomena', highlighting the affective side of friendship in politics.

The aim of this article is threefold: (1) to offer an overview of the status of friendship studies and how it relates to the emotional turn in international relations (IR), (2) to present a wide variety of different approaches to studying friendship, and (3) to highlight the contribution that a friendship perspective can make to other fields. This is illustrated with the case of positive peace in Peace and Conflict Studies.

In what follows, the arguments are organised in three parts. The next section, Section 2, reviews the concept of friendship in a long historical perspective. It discusses the question of affect and emotions, and offers several pathways to the study of friendship, especially on the interpersonal level between political actors. Section 3 maps the multiple ways in which the IR literature has approached the issue of friendship, a field that has done much to further our understanding of friendship at the international level. Building on these two sections, Sec-

tion 4 explores the overlap between conceptualisations of friendship and positive peace. It argues that studying friendship specifically is a fruitful way to address the lacuna of research on positive peace in Peace and Conflict Studies. The conclusions summarise the main claims made in this article, including the contributions that a friendship approach can make to peace research via the concept of positive peace, and highlight that friendship, with its transformative capacity, has the potential to contribute further to other main areas of IR.

2. Conceptualising Friendship

In this section, the development of the concept of friendship is traced through an affective lens. The red thread is formed by Sasley's (2010, p. 3) definition of affect, which places the positive affect actors have for each other, whether they be states or politicians, at the centre of analysis. What follows is an overview of the concept within political philosophy, starting with the works of Plato and Aristotle, ending with a discussion of the link between contemporary conceptions of friendship and the 'emotional turn' in IR.

In political philosophy, the study of political friendship has been long and rich. The key imprint was left by Aristotle, following on the works of Plato. That friendship took centre stage to Greek political thought is no accident: relations of friendship, *philia*, pervaded Greek society: family members, both immediate and extended, in-laws and other groups of kin and friends were all considered *philia*. To the Greeks, friendship brought with it the reciprocal obligation to help one's friends and to hurt one's enemies (Baltzly & Eliopoulos, 2014, pp. 28–30). From the Greeks onwards, friendship scholars have always been beholden to Aristotle and Plato.

Illustrative of the centrality of friendship in Greek society is the meeting between Diomedes and Glaucus in the Iliad. In Homer's work, the Trojan Glaucus and the Greek Diomedes find themselves on opposing sides and, before joining battle, they both proudly declare their lineages. Upon this, Diomedes hails Glaucus as a friend: their fathers once hosted each other, and that guest-friendship still extends to them to that day. Both resolve to fight away from each other, and to exchange their armour (Homer, 1924, Book 6, pp. 215–230). Guest-friendship, *xenia*, was a formal and ritualised relationship between two members of different communities, in contrast to *philia*, which existed between members of the same community. The above example illustrates the responsibilities that a bond of guest-friendship holds: the Greek *xenia* is a precursor of friendship in the international arena. Both *philia* and *xenia* showcase that Greek concepts of friendship are firmly rooted in practicality.

Drawing upon Greek praxis, Plato and Aristotle offer conceptualisations that simultaneously are different and overlapping. To Plato, befriending someone means falling in love with them, because you glimpse something which is reminiscent of the true Form of Beauty in the friend. Vlastos (2000, p. 160) summarises it succinctly: 'what we are to love in persons is the 'image' of the Idea in them. We are to love the persons in so far, and only in so far, as they are good and beautiful'. Plato never goes as far as Aristotle in conceptualising friendship: his best-known treatise on friendship, *Lysis*, famously ends with the admission that he has not succeeded in discovering what exactly friendship is, but that in the process of the discovery he has become friends with his students (Plato, 1925, pp. 71, 223).

Nonetheless, authors such as Sheffield (2011) have been able to distil a model of friendship from Plato's works. Following Plato, Sheffield differentiates between three forms of friendship: pleasure-based, honour-based, and virtue-based, each linked to an actor's dominant desire. The pleasure-based and virtue-based friendships are opposites of each other. In a pleasure-based relationship, friends are only interested in deriving pleasure from each other. In contrast, virtue-based friendship is the highest form of friendship. It helps the philosopher to see true Beauty (Sheffield, 2011, pp. 258–259). The honour-based friendship sits in the middle. Friends take oaths, exchange benefits, and recognise something of beauty in the other, but because they are not governed by reason, they occasionally let the dark horse get the better of them. Though they have fallen to their desires, Plato still considers these honour-friends to be on the right path towards eventual enlightenment (Plato, 1914, pp. 255–256, 499–503). Their bond, though, remains inferior to that of the philosopher.

In his *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle (2003, Books VIII and IX) builds upon Plato's concept of friendship. In contrast to Plato, the central value of friendship for Aristotle is affection for the other, wishing the other good 'for that other's sake' (Aristotle, 2003, bk. 9 IV, p. 533; Schwarzenbach, 1996, p. 97). According to Cooper (1977, p. 621), this means 'doing well by someone for his own sake, out of concern for him (and not, or not merely, out of concern for oneself)'. Aristotle, too, discerns between three kinds of friendship. The lowest form is *utility* (or *advantage*) *friendship*, where the friendship is focused upon the concrete mutual benefit offered to each other, and ends when one of the friends no longer delivers the utility they did before. Aristotle rates *pleasure-friendship* slightly higher where the love is not directed towards the other person, but rather towards the specific pleasure that person offers. While in both the other is still loved for the other's sake, the reason for the friendship is tied to one specific element of advantage or pleasure (Cooper, 1980).

The highest form of friendship is *virtue-friendship*. Here, the 'other's whole (or near whole) character is loved' (Schwarzenbach, 1992, p. 253), rather than one particular aspect of it. This friendship is based on a mutual recognition of *good* character: the friends strive towards a common good, and in doing this together they strengthen each other. Although reciprocal, virtue-friendship is not egoistic; it is based upon good character

rather than pleasure. Virtue-friends have an obligation to help each other strive towards the good and to correct each other when they make mistakes. In its reciprocity, virtue-friendship is altruistic. The friends love each other's qualities, not just the advantage or pleasure they find in the other, and the friendship ends when one of them no longer pursues the good, because then they no longer share the same purpose of spreading goodness (Aristotle, 2003, VIII.iii., pp. 1–9; Stern-Gillet, 1995, pp. 49–50).

By and large, the rich philosophical tradition that followed stayed within the lines that Aristotle drew. For instance, Michel de Montaigne (1627) championed the altruism of the virtue-friendship, which in its extremity meant self-sacrifice, while Francis Bacon (1627) idealised the economic benefits of the utility-friendship. Søren Kierkegaard (2013) focused on friendship's reciprocity as an inherently egoistic bond: you only love because you want to be loved in return. C. S. Lewis (1960) argued that there is a clear spiritual side to a powerful bond between two people, and that friends do not only raise each other up towards goodness, but they can also bring each other down in evilness.

For Carl Schmitt (2007a, pp. 29-30) the distinction between friend and enemy brings politics into existence. By studying the Spanish Civil War, Schmitt concluded that there were two kinds of friendship: utilitarian and existential. Spanish rebels formed utilitarian bonds with international supporters that sent them supplies, while at the same time they enjoyed an existential bond with fellow fighters (2007b, pp. 77–78). Schmitt's theories have recently been brought back into IR, where they have proven insightful for the study of the relations between states (Slomp, 2007, 2009; Smith, 2011a, 2011b). Note, too, how very reminiscent of Aristotle's first demarcation Schmitt's definitions are.

Following from the philosophers, it becomes possible to distinguish between two very diverse bonds: a quid pro quo business-like partnership, and something very different, friendship (Van Hoef, 2014, pp. 66–67). Apart from affect, several key elements of friendship come to the fore in the analysis above. These include equality, which, according to Kirby (2017), means no individual is under the natural authority of another. There also exists something very different from a partnership's quid pro qui reciprocity: an altruistic reciprocity. This quality of friendship means that friends act for the sake of the friendship itself, rather than some reward that might come in return. Friends also impose moral obligations upon each other. The meeting of these moral obligations strengthens a relationship, while failure to meet them might mark the beginning of the end. Finally, in the vein of Aristotle's virtue-friendship, political friendships are concerned with a project: a shared vision (Van Hoef, 2018a, p. 55). This element of shared world-building is also observed in friendship between states in IR:

> Because friends are embedded in a larger social environment—an international society—their world-building efforts not only create an exclusionary space that seals friends from criticism and creates bias, but also promote an idea of international order that affects others. (Berenskoetter, 2014, p. 67)

Approaching friendship through the concept of affect allows it to be studied at an intermediate level, taking the power of elite actors as reflective active agents into account (Vogler, 2016, p. 77). Affect and emotions are not new in IR, but scholars have tended to rely on them implicitly rather than explicitly (Clément & Sangar, 2018, p. 4), and most probably without realising that they were doing so. Friendship scholars within IR, in contrast, have been more receptive to the idea that affect plays a crucial role both between individuals and between states (Eznack, 2011, p. 241; Eznack & Koschut, 2014). It is the affective element of friendship that makes it such a powerful bond (Van Hoef, 2018b). This can be readily observed both on an individual and a state level. Thus, while 'state intentions are individual intentions since it is individuals who create them' (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 114; Holmes, 2018, p. 28), studying friendship through affect also allows one to study friendship between states because 'affect is not a property of an individual but a capacity of a body that brings it into some specific social relation, such as a nation or political movement' (Ross, 2006, p. 212).

Traditionally, as far as IR scholars have relied (implicitly) on emotions, it has mostly been on negative emotions (Sasley, 2011, p. 456). Through approaching friendship as an affective emotional bond between actors, friendship offers a more sophisticated alternative to traditional realist notions of self-interest (Berenskoetter & Van Hoef, 2017). Emotions are one of the most revealing aspects of friendship and they are a powerful motor behind political change (Brader, 2005; Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, 2000). They are also a possible danger to political relationships: actors that are attached to each other can make decisions that run counter to the interests of their own states (Wheeler, 2018). States can also employ emotions as a diplomatic strategy to achieve concrete results (Hall, 2015), which can even include political self-sacrifice (Fierke, 2014). Sasley (2010, p. 693) has demonstrated that 'affective attachments…order priorities for leaders'. The challenge of studying emotions lies in the fact that scholars use the concepts of affect, emotions, and feeling, interchangeably and do not agree on the conceptualisations of these definitions.

Following Sasley, a study of friendship concentrates on the positive affect political actors hold for each other, and the extent to which this positive valence influences their policies. This allows us to include several further aspects when studying emotions, which is in line with Jonathan Mercer (2014, p. 516), who proposed to treat emotions and feelings as synonymous, as well as Hutchinson and Bleiker (2014, p. 502), who pointed out that these 'can be seen as intrinsically linked, for affective states are subconscious factors that can frame and influ-

ence our more conscious emotional evaluations of the social world'. As Crawford (2000, p. 156) has argued, research on affect 'may lead to a fundamental reconceptualisation of agents and agency in world politics' because 'humans make decisions that are always both classically self-interested and emotional'.

In sum, the development within political philosophy of the concept of friendship can be seen through an affective lens. The wide variety of contemporary conceptions of friendship, and the role these give to affect, are ultimately closely related and indebted to the works of Plato and Aristotle. Affect in friendship aptly allows us to link political philosophy with the 'emotional turn' in IR, and review the role that affect plays in the latter discipline.

3. Friendship in IR

This section sets out to trace the directions in which the IR literature on international friendship has developed. This literature has only become substantive in relatively recent years, given that for decades the term 'friendship' in international politics was either dismissed by IR specialists as utopian, disregarded because it was seen as 'cheap talk', or used lightly as synonymous with 'good relations'.

Indeed, in contrast to political theory's long tradition of thinking about and studying friendship, in the field of IR there has been reluctance to engage with questions of friendship in the international system. It is not that the term 'friendship' has been absent from IR studies, discourse, and diplomacy. However, for the most part it has been used rather loosely in empirical work to refer to non-confrontational or harmonious interstate relations without receiving proper IR theoretical attention[1].

This can be explained by the dominance of realist and neorealist theory, and its unquestioned assumption of systemic anarchy. Under the condition of anarchy, states—the most important actors in the international system—cannot rely upon other states for their own security and survival. Instead, they should accumulate power for defensive and deterrence purposes (Waltz, 1979). The security dilemma which ensues from all states following this behaviour rules out the emergence of trust and ultimately friendship. This particular understanding of the nature of the international system, though not unchallenged, prevailed throughout the cold war (and arguably beyond), with the consequence that the images and concept of 'enemy' made up a substantial part of the IR literature, whereas the images and concept of 'friend' remained undertheorised (Wendt, 1999, p. 298).

There is, though, little reason for this. Over the centuries 'the terminology of "friendship" has been applied to the various treaties and contracts on peace, trade, military assistance and colonisation' (Devere & Smith, 2010, p. 347), from the Greeks and the Romans, who used treaties of *philia* or *amicitia*, to the original populations in the South Pacific before the arrival of the Europeans, to the rulers of medieval Europe.

In 2007, Felix Berenskoetter (2007, p. 642) called for the inclusion of '"friendship" into the reading of international relations, a conception which has so far remained outside the analytical focus of IR theorists'. Since then, the number of studies specifically dealing with friendship in IR has grown to form a modest but decent body of literature.

To many authors contributing to this literature, Arnold Wolfers' classic essay 'Amity and Enmity among Nations' published in his 1962 *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* has proven an inspiring intellectual trigger. Wolfers (1962, pp. 25–35) explains that while some states prefer 'to go it alone', other states decide to 'go it with others' by seeking cooperation and integration. Motivations for 'going it with others' are two-fold. In some cases, it is the outcome of an arrangement based on mutual assistance against an external threat ('outward-looking friendship'). Yet in other cases, cooperation is the result of a desire to improve relationships with others ('inward-directed friendship'). Despite introducing the language of friendship, Wolfers (1962, p. 27) warns that outward-looking cooperation—'predicated on the continuance of the threat'—is much stronger an incentive.

In more recent years, an understanding of friendship 'as a site and tool for analysis both within the state (as a means to identify the connective tissue between communities, citizens and the nation) and between states (in the realm of international politics)' (Devere & Smith, 2010, p. 347) emerged. Since then, international friendship has increasingly become the focus of more rigorous and systematic research. The remainder of this section concentrates on the interstate dimension of friendship, whereas the next section explores the potential of incorporating friendship into the study of emotions in peacemaking in the context of positive peace[2].

The field of international friendship has been advanced through several debates at national and international conference panels, which have often resulted in collective research projects and outputs, such as King and Smith (2007), Oelsner and Vion (2011), and Koschut and Oelsner (2014). In addition to the articles and chapters included in these collections, individual journal articles and book chapters have also added to the literature (among them, see Berenskoetter, 2007; Berenskoetter & Giegerich, 2010; Devere & Smith, 2009b, 2010; Digeser, 2009a, 2013; Eznack, 2011; Keller, 2009; Kupchan, 2010; Roshchin, 2006, 2008), and in 2016, in *Friendship Reconsidered: What it Means and How It Matters in Politics*, P. E. Digeser (2016) devotes the entire third part of her book to international friendship.

[1] See, for instance, Chambers (2005), Dobson (1995), Druks (2001), Farinella (1997), Fung and Mackerras (1985), Haigh et al. (1985), Jha (1994), Joo (2001), Kaim (2003), Krammer (1974), Kupchan (2010), Guchang (2006), Mahmud (2001, 2007), Meier (1970), Mukerjee (1975), Rouwhorst (1990), Wolfers (1962), Woodward (1993), Zahniser (1975).

[2] We would like to thank one of the reviewers for suggesting the connection of emotions and peacemaking with friendship.

A review of the research on friendship between states shows the parallel development of three clusters[3]. Firstly, there has been a preoccupation with epistemological and ontological issues. Scholars working in this area have demonstrated the existence of an epistemological and ontological space for friendship in international politics as well as IR theory 'by providing a rationale for why it exists, what its characteristics are, and how it structures international politics' (Berenskoetter, 2007, p. 648; see also Digeser, 2009a, 2009b; Lu, 2009; Schwarzenbach, 2011; Smith, 2011b).

Secondly, documentary and archival research has looked into how the term 'friendship' has been employed in official international documents, such as international peace treaties, military pacts, and agreements of trade and colonisation, as well as international and diplomatic events such as peace and friendship youth festivals held by the USSR. Using discourse analysis, research has revealed the rhetorical and largely instrumental role of friendship in international politics across different regions, cultures and historical periods (Devere & Smith, 2010; Devere et al., 2011; Roshchin, 2006, 2011).

Finally, a third strand within the literature has focused on international friendship as an analytical category of international political practice. Case studies have covered various levels of analysis, ranging from the interpersonal to the transnational and the interstate level. In terms of the interpersonal level, Constantin (2011) and Patsias and Deschenes (2011) have studied the political impact of personal relationships between leaders and networks, while Van Hoef (2018a, 2018b) focuses on friendship between state leaders, present at the intermediary level of IR. In terms of cooperation and trust building at the levels of intergovernmental relations and relations between civil societies, Oelsner and Vion (2011, p. 136) have argued that their institutionalisation through an accumulation of friendship speech acts and institutional facts represents 'a process of friendship,' which can be linked to notions of deep-rooted peace (Oelsner, 2007; Vion, 2007).

Bearing in mind the multiple areas of enquiry that have emerged, it is useful to view international friendship not as an essential concept with a defined content, but rather as 'a group of features that friendship can be said to share in a plural world' (Smith, 2011b, p. 19). Thus, following Wittgenstein (1963), we can understand international friendship as bearing a 'family resemblance' with all other forms of friendship. This is the approach taken by Smith (2011b), Digeser (2013), and Oelsner and Koschut (2014). Choosing this path allows for approaching international friendship as an ongoing site of phenomena which can take place at multiple levels—be it within, between, and beyond states (Smith, 2011b, p. 10).

This would imply shelving the pursuit of a *definitional* account of friendship. Instead of posing the question 'what *is* friendship?', the issue can be approached from a *functional* perspective, thus changing the question to 'what does friendship *do*?'. In a functional approach, friendship involves a particular set of connections, relations, and affects. As Smith (2014, p. 47) argues, in IR, groups and hierarchies such as states and nations 'are not simply animated by an impersonal power or mechanical laws. They are brought to life by the feeling of mutual identification, reciprocation, concern, and togetherness of their members.' In this reading, friendship creates the nation and the state, thus rendering them a deeper and more generalised ontology in IR, as they become particular instances of friendship.

For Evgeny Roshchin (2007), friendship and the use of the friendship language in international politics contribute to maintaining international order. He demonstrates that this is done through four main mechanisms: (1) the invocation of friendship during political crises or periods of transformation of the social order, (2) the constitution of sovereignty through friendship treaties, (3) the contractual nature of the treaties, and (4) the maintenance of state security.

Felix Berenskoetter (2007, 2014) also proposes a functional approach to friendship. He argues that international friendship provides friends with ontological security in a context in which states seek to control anxiety produced by anarchy and the security dilemma. In turn, this empowers states by shaping and reinforcing their identities, and allowing them to engage in a joint process of 'world-building' that can affect the two states involved, but can affect other states outside the friendship too.

Yet another approach is to ask: '*how* is friendship enacted?'. In this instance, we are less concerned with what friendship *is* or what it is *for*. Instead, friendship can be interpreted as a 'family of practices' (Digeser, 2013), where the focus is on the *how*, rather than the *what* or the *why* friends do certain things. Digeser calls this the adverbial character of practices. Because there is no single and substantive definition of friendship, and consequently no preferred level at which friendship occurs, there is also no single set of adverbial features to perform or practise friendship.

To view international friendship as a practice, as social action guided by the logic of practicality (Pouliot, 2008), is not the same as arguing that friendship involves automatic or irrational action. It does imply, though, that its enactments are less meditated. For instance, calling a newly built bridge that crosses over a river separating two states 'Friendship Bridge' is not necessarily a sign of international friendship. Actually, as with friendship treaties, this is more likely to be an indication of the absence of friendship (see Devere, 2014; Devere et al., 2011; Roshchin, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2014). Instead, states go on reproducing their friendship in *the way* they do their bilateral business; a way that appears to be less of a reflected-upon choice and more as natural, intuitive, and spontaneous interaction.

[3] The next few paragraphs build on Oelsner and Koschut (2014).

The logic of practicality highlights that friendships are produced and reproduced almost without the actors taking full notice of it, given that they enact the practice through their bilateral interaction. This will take place not only at the level of heads of governments, but can occur throughout all levels of bureaucracy and civil society (for illustrations, see Oelsner & Vion, 2011).

Finally, authors such as Oelsner and Koschut (2014) have differentiated between strategic and normative international friendship, which somewhat resembles Wolfers' inward-directed and outward-looking cooperation. For these authors, normative international friendship has more transformative capacity, given that it represents a thicker or denser type of relations among actors 'who share high levels of ideational and emotional bonds that permit mutual identification and trust' (Oelsner & Koschut, 2014, p. 14). As such, international friendship can become a 'catalyst for change in international politics by transforming the nature of interstate relations' (Koschut & Oelsner, 2014, p. 201).

This brief overview has highlighted the multiple dimensions that research on friendship in IR has engaged in. Scholars have explored it from descriptive, normative, and analytical angles. They have studied it from theoretical and empirical perspectives. They have relied on historical evidence as well as on contemporary cases. They have investigated it by using definitional, functional and practical approaches. All these different ways of studying international friendship should not be seen in exclusive terms, but rather as a larger conversation that seeks to draw attention to the presence, importance, and constitutive capacity of friendship in international politics.

4. Friendship as Positive Peace

> Man surrounds himself with a sphere of amity and mutual aid. (Galtung, 1964, p. 1)

The growing presence of friendship in the IR literature has not been echoed by Peace Research. Yet judging by recent developments within Peace Research, which place emphasis on the role of emotions in peacemaking (Brewer, 2011) and in 'cultures of peace' (De Rivera & Páez, 2007), the insights from the debate on friendship within IR could enrich the debate, especially in what concerns Galtung's notion of positive peace. In turn, this can further contribute to the IR debate, which focus on negative peace has tended to obstruct any thinking on the concept of positive peace[4]. In this section, we make the case that friendship is a form of positive peace, and that studying friendship in the international arena therefore addresses the lacuna of research on positive peace.

In the inaugural issue of the *Journal of Peace Research* (JPR) editor and founder Johan Galtung (1964, p. 2) defined the two central concepts of Peace Research, negative peace and positive peace, as 'the absence of violence, absence of war' and 'the integration of human society' respectively. Though not unchallenged (Evangelista, 2005, pp. 2–3; Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, & Strand, 2014, pp. 149–150), these definitions have remained central to Peace and Conflict Studies since its foundation, as Gleditschet et al. (2014) show in their analysis of 50 years of the JPR.

The attention they have received, nonetheless, has been unbalanced. Already in 1981, when reviewing the first 17 volumes of the JPR, Håkan Wiberg (1981, p. 113) noted that only one out of approximately 400 articles had been devoted to positive peace. In their 2014 quantitative analysis of 50 years of the JPR, Gleditsch et al. (2014, p. 152) found that articles that address positive peace do so only to the extent that they 'now contribute to research on how to overcome negative peace'. This leads to the sobering conclusion that '[a]lthough there have been changes over time in the use of terms such as "peace", "war", "violence", and "conflict", there was no "golden age" of peace research which focused more clearly on peace' (Gleditsch et al., 2014, p. 155).

This is perhaps unsurprising, because positive peace has proven a particularly hard subject to grapple with. Disagreement over the definition of positive peace in the early years of the JPR led Galtung (1969) to introduce the idea of differentiating between personal and structural violence, equating the absence of personal violence with negative peace, and the absence of structural violence with positive peace.

For Gleditsch et al. (2014, p. 155), though, Galtung's redefinition of positive peace as the reversal of structural violence had not stood the test of time, and disappeared from the JPR after a decade. Since then, negative peace has become the central focus of the JPR and Peace and Conflict Studies in general. Early attempts by Galtung and Wiberg (Galtung, 1969; Gleditsch et al., 2014; Wiberg, 1981) to offer an agenda for studying positive peace have been unsuccessful.

Yet for a concept that has proven elusive, Galtung has offered several concrete indications as to what positive peace should entail. In fact, his early conceptualisation of positive peace comes very close to the definition of friendship discussed in the previous section, and therefore refocusing more explicitly on emotions and friendship can offer a promising avenue to approach positive peace.

Galtung (1964, p. 1) points out that humans are social beings 'capable of empathy and solidarity', living in a group that values 'a norm of reciprocity' and where cooperation is a 'dominant mode of interaction'. From this, human integration naturally follows, because humans surround themselves 'with a sphere of amity and mutual aid'. Note here the overlap with the importance of the emotion of hope in peacemaking, highlighted by Brewer (2011). Hope, both in the sense of 'the *act of imagining* a future desirable state' and of 'the *emotion* aroused by the end state that is being envisioned' (Brewer, 2011, p. 304), is more likely to result from, and conduce to a positive emotional climate (De Rivera & Páez, 2007). The

[4] We thank the reviewers' comments highlighting this.

development of such positive emotional climate can be substantiated by the diffusion of friendship as a social practice made up of strong gestures, symbolic political acts, repetitive practices, and other speech acts and institutional facts.

Positive peace, Galtung (1964, p. 3) emphasises repeatedly, concerns human integration, and can cover an extensive list of subjects, ranging from 'functional cooperation between groups or nations through technical and cultural cooperation or trade policies, to institutional fusion with superordinate bureaucracies, police forces, courts and governments till the world state is reached'. Galtung's primordial vision of positive peace closely echoes the historical process of Franco-German cooperation in the twentieth century (cf. Vion, 2014). The social practices of friendship emanating from and within these areas of cooperation can help flesh out a normative, substantive concept of positive peace and peaceful culture.

5. Conclusions

This article set out to give an overview of different theoretical and methodological approaches to studying friendship in political philosophy and political science, in particular zooming into how friendship scholars currently make sense of friendship, both between individual political actors and between nations.

Drawing upon political philosophy through Sasley's affective lens, we pinpointed five characteristics of friendship: (1) affect (2) a shared project (3) altruistic reciprocity (4) moral obligations and (5) equality. By doing this, friendship becomes less elusive. Affect makes friendship observable both on an individual and on a state level, and allows friendship in IR to be studied at an intermediate level: between elite political actors such as state leaders. Nonetheless, while in political philosophy there has been an effort to define and give substantive content to friendship, many IR approaches to friendship tend to understand it as a family of concepts and a family of practices, where they see 'family resemblances'.

Current IR research approaches the issue of friendship from multiple dimensions (descriptive, normative, and analytical). Here, following Graham M. Smith (2011b, p. 25), we propose to consider 'friendship as a family of related phenomena', which means that all the different ways of studying international friendship should be considered as complementing—rather than competing with—each other. Doing so leaves more space to see that friendship as a process might be 'a catalyst of change in its own right' (Koschut & Oelsner, 2014, p. 202), transforming the quality of regional and national relations.

Some authors within Peace and Conflict have started to explore the potential impact of positive emotions on peacemaking. A more in-depth engagement with the study of friendship would address the lacuna left in positive peace research. Connecting positive peace with notions of positive emotions informed by hope and friendship allows for fleshing out an otherwise normative concept. Friendship as social practice 'normalises' behaviour, attitudes and gestures and helps to construct a positive culture of positive peace.

Ultimately, this article has sought to offer a deeper understanding of the history of the concept of friendship, of the many possible methodological and theoretical approaches to studying friendship, and finally, to several fruitful avenues of future research. In particular, we propose that the under-explored concept of positive peace can benefit from using and further developing a practice approach to friendship.

While this task could inform the next positive peace research agenda, the potential is still larger, multidimensional, and crosses several levels. As much as power and interest have been brought into every area of IR research, to keep leaving friendship out of its main research agenda can only be IR's own loss.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Appropriately Upset? A Methodological Framework for Tracing the Emotion Norms of the Transatlantic Security Community

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Abstract
Emotions have been found to underpin the moral hierarchy of values and beliefs within and among groups by restraining undesirable attitudes and behavior. As such, emotions serve as potential indicators for analyzing whether or not certain norms are still deemed relevant. As Jon Mercer puts it: "One way to test for the presence of norms is to look for emotion". While the literature in International Relations (IR) generally accepts the emotional underpinnings of norms, there has been strikingly little elaboration of appropriate methods and criteria for studying the link between emotion and norms in IR. In this contribution, I suggest that socialization processes in a security community involve the internalization of appropriate rules of emotional expression or, in short, emotion norms. I propose that emotion norms can be historically traced via the emotional vocabulary and expressive rules derived from the production of texts. To do this, I searched for documents and treaties that serve as canonical texts for the collective self-conception and self-image of the transatlantic security community. As I hope to show, in these texts one can find substantial evidence of emotion norms, which designates these documents as 'emotional landmarks' that embody the emotional construction of the transatlantic emotional (security) community.

Keywords
emotions; methodology; norms; security community; transatlantic security community

Issue
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1. Introduction

How do members of international institutions exercise power and authority when they generally lack formal rules and norms? In this contribution, I argue that international institutions—more specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—are composed of emotion norms that set the frame for appropriate interpretations and meanings of emotional performance among its members, and thus incorporate sociocultural standards into the emotional lives of agents. Emotion norms provide intersubjective patterns of standardized emotional expressions that underpin collective meanings and beliefs, and thus constitute a particular community by setting it apart from others. What makes emotions political, and thus relevant for International Relations (IR), is their communitarian nature: the emotional connections between individuals and their respective communities (Hutchison, 2016; von Scheve & Salmela, 2014).

To develop this argument, this article takes a social constructivist viewpoint for studying emotions in world politics (Harré, 1986). A social constructivist perspective argues that emotions are cultural products that owe their meaning and purpose to socially acquired feeling rules (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990; Averill, 1980; Hochschild, 1979). Social constructivist emotion theories are based on a shared set of interrelated ontological and epistemological assumptions that separate them from more conventional emotion theories. Whereas biological and cognitivist emotion theories stick to a subjective ontology of emotion, social constructivism shifts the analytical focus from their internal phenomenological perception of emotions and a psychological appraisal by in-

dividuals to their representative articulation and communication within social spheres. This does not mean that a constructivist approach to emotions simply denies their phenomenological expression in the sense of physically perceived feelings or ignores the role of the body in enacting feeling rules. Social constructivists are less interested in the inner feelings and thoughts of individuals but instead focus on the socially shared emotional patterns within and between groups. Constructivists thus employ a social ontology of emotions that is less concerned with investigating the subjectivity but rather the *inter*subjectivity of emotions. From this social ontology of emotions follows a social epistemology. A social epistemology of emotions states that emotions, and the discourses and power relationships they disclose, can only be fully grasped within the collectively shared meaning systems and social worlds in which they are represented and known. To sum up, constructivist emotion researchers are interested in the particular sociocultural spaces in which emotions are contextualized, the institutional and discursive mechanisms through which they are expressed, and the prescriptive and purposive social functions they serve to include or exclude subjects from entering the boundaries of their respective communities.

This suggests an underlying *functionalist* role for emotions. That is, emotions are not simply socially constructed, but these emotions serve an important purpose by fulfilling a series of social functions for a community (e.g., producing solidarity, disciplining noncompliance, affirming moral order, clarifying social hierarchy, etc.). Conversely, resistance to comply with established emotional conventions challenges the very foundations of such communities and paves the way for undermining and transforming them (Fattah & Fierke, 2009; Hutchison, 2016; Koschut, 2014). Such a communitarian theory of emotions can help unpack and resolve the puzzle of how communities manage and distribute authority and power, particularly when they lack formal or written-down rules and norms.

2. Towards a Methodological Framework for Studying Emotional (Security) Communities

The concept of emotional community was originally developed by the historian Barbara Rosenwein. Emotional communities are "groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value—or devalue—the same or related emotions" (Rosenwein, 2006, p. 2). Rosenwein looks at how emotional communities formed and vanished during the Early Middle Ages and shows how these communities emotionally linked together a particular group of actors through the expression of a particular set of collectively shared emotions. While her empirical focus lies on selected emotional communities at a particular point in time, she explicitly formulates her concept as being universally applicable, for all times and cultures including nation-states and the modern world, making it particularly relevant for the study of world politics (Rosenwein, 2010, p. 12).

An emotional community rests on shared "accepted modes of emotional expression" that can be methodologically traced through similar emotional styles and discourse (Rosenwein, 2006, p. 24). Such emotion norms provide the emotional fingerprint that makes one emotional community distinguishable from other emotional communities. The members of an emotional community may (and often do) disagree on a variety of issues. What remains important is that, in resolving their conflicts, members follow the use and expression of properly agreed emotion norms, e.g., when and how anger is an acceptable form of emotional expression. In such communities, emotions do not "float freely" but are managed by its members in a way that makes them more reliable (Flam, 1990). Emotional communities thus limit the availability of particular emotional expressions in a given situation and their impact on proper behavior. Finally, emotional communities may overlap and some members may be part of several emotional communities at the same time (Rosenwein, 2006, pp. 109, 199).

How can we study emotional communities in world politics? Rosenwein (2006; 2010) considers emotional communities to be also "textual communities", in which people are linked together through shared discourse and narratives. From a methodological viewpoint, such textual and verbal utterances provide researchers with a promising way to make emotions empirically accessible for researchers. As Bleiker and Hutchison (2008, p. 128) note, "one of the most promising locations to study emotions is in the manner in which they are represented and communicated". The approach put forward here is to ask for a method of inquiry that involves careful attempts to analyze emotions via their representational meaning within social spheres. A promising way to study these representations, and thus gain access to emotional meanings, is through their explication in discourse (Koschut, 2017a, 2017b). Below, I suggest some elements that a methodology of emotional communities must entail.

2.1. Gathering a Dossier of Sources

Rosenwein (2006) started with groups of individuals that already lived a communal life. For this group, she compiled a broad array of sources. The focus here should be on emotions that are explicitly expressed or tacitly implied over a range of sources and within or across a coherent time period. This may include a variety of textual sources, including (but not limited to) official statements (speeches, press releases, parliamentary debates), legal texts (treaties, conventions, agreements), biographical texts (diaries, autobiographies, personal notes), media texts (newspaper articles, interviews, editorials), and even popular culture (poems, novels, songs). While the selection of texts ultimately depends on the research question, there are some things to consider when studying the emotions within these texts. While it is preferable

to have several different utterances from the group, researchers have to ultimately make do with what is available. Another problem results from the temporal framing of texts. Emotional expressions during relatively brief and unstable periods, such as a crisis, are likely to be very different from those expressed during more stable periods. Finally, texts are highly contingent on their historical and cultural embedding. It is thus important to include a larger text-based analysis from the relevant time period under study as well as secondary sources to confirm or disconfirm the findings and/or to detect changes in emotional meanings and expressions.

2.2. Establishing Patterns and Meanings

Once the researcher has managed to gather a satisfactory dossier of sources, the next step would be to extract emotion words from them and to assemble similar emotion words into dossiers. Here, it is important to keep in mind that emotions are often expressed implicitly, for example through imagery, figurative speech or connotations. Concepts such as *genocide*, *terrorist*, *rogue state*, *outlaw*, *massacre* not only carry a negative appeal but they also refer indirectly to specific emotions of disapproval such as anger and contempt. By contrast, emotional connotations such as *peaceful*, *freedom fighter*, *hero*, *honest broker*, *responsible member of the international community* indicate a different emotional attitude. Or consider the emotional underpinnings of metaphors. For example, to speak of *floods of refugees* produces fear among members of a community through a linguistic dehumanization of refugees. Thus, in addition to paying attention to emotion terms like *fear*, it is equally important to pay attention to borrowings and imagery in emotional language, such as metaphors or figures of speech. Also, the meanings resulting from emotional expressions are often sociocultural constructs and may thus resonate differently from culture to culture. Finally, it is equally important to read the silence (the emotion terms that are avoided) and how different kinds of silences can hold different kinds of emotional experiences.

2.3. Tracing the Cultural Script

Having established significant patterns and meanings of emotional expressions, the researcher will then be able to trace the cultural script and thus uncover the system of feelings underlying emotional communities. It is not sufficient to establish a set of emotion words. Rather, the weight and significance of these words needs to be examined: "what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations they make about other's emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore (Rosenwein, 2002, p. 842). Researchers who wish to trace the emotion norms of a particular emotional community need to consider which emotions are most fundamental to their styles of expression and sense of community. This may be achieved through two types of methods, both of which can be easily combined. In putting the dossier together, one might establish the frequency of particular emotion words with a quantitative evaluation or simple word count. Another way would be to conduct a qualitative interpretation of particular emotion words or their lack as part of a larger cultural framework.

2.4. Detecting Change over Time

Emotions are neither inherently moral nor beyond the scope of moral consideration, but they are deeply rooted in the collective values and beliefs of communities. By tracing such emotions, we can learn a lot about the values and moral meanings of these communities. But emotional communities are also subject to change. Emotions can change and sometimes vary significantly in their historical meaning and cultural expression. A fruitful strategy to analyze norms and their social consequences is to conduct a broad historical analysis that is able to retrieve identifiable patterns of emotional expressions that might tell us something about how emotion norms—the expression of appropriate emotions in a given situation—have come to be constituted in their current form. A promising research strategy to develop such a genealogy of standardized emotional expressions over time is to historicize them. To historicize emotions means "subjecting discourses on emotion, subjectivity, and the self to scrutiny over time, looking at them in particular spatial locations and historical moments, and seeing whether and how they have changed" (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990, p. 5). The sociologist Norbert Elias (1939/1994), for example, suggests in his seminal work on the history of emotions that standards of emotional expressions gradually changed in the course of a long "civilizing process" in Western societies. Building on Elias (1939/1994), IR scholars such as Linklater (2014, p. 574) argue that increasingly pacified political communities in the Western world have tabooed open displays of anger since anger is regarded as triggering violence.

3. Tracing the Emotion Norms of the Transatlantic Security Community

In this contribution, I suggest that emotional socialization in a security community involves the internalization of appropriate rules of emotional expression—or emotion norms. The concept of security community was introduced to IR by Karl W. Deutsch in 1957, describing it as a regional system of independent states that is characterized by such high levels of amity and patterns of social communication and interaction that war between its members becomes virtually inconceivable. Since then, many scholars have made use of the concept and expanded its original scope, broadened its empirical use and positioned it as an alternative concept

to other forms of security governance and peaceful orders such as alliances, regimes, international organizations, and imperial orders. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett's (1998) path breaking book is perhaps the most well-known scholarly work among many others. This impressive attention to the concept and workings of security communities in IR, however, has not included a sustained consideration of emotions. Deutsch's magnificent work on security communities was largely devoid of a substantial treatment of emotions. This is not to argue that Karl Deutsch did not pay attention to the emotions. Deutsch's philosophical assumptions on human reason included a firm belief that the essential political and economic questions of world politics lie beyond the rational-choice paradigm and instead "are at bottom moral and spiritual" (Deutsch, 1967, p. 64). As Donald Puchala (1981, p. 151) notes in his reflections on Deutsch's theory of integration: "Deutsch's most important contribution to the study of international integration are in his findings concerning sentimental relations among peoples". Deutsch found human behavior to result from the interplay of reason *and* emotion arguing that people "is a community of rational beings united in the object of their love". The fact that Deutsch explicitly refers to the emotions demonstrates his awareness of their constitutive role in shaping social life. As he notes in his description of the North Atlantic area, there exists a "'Western' way of life which is so often felt and referred to" (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 134). In fact, Deutsch goes as far as to conceive of collectively shared emotions as a necessary condition of a security community formation because this makes it more resistant to managing crises: "The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration, and therefore for our study, turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of '*we-feeling*', trust, and mutual consideration…in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making. 'Peaceful change' could not be assured without this kind of relationship" (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 36). "We-feeling" describes the formation of an emotional bond among members of the security community that underpins social belonging to this particular group, or as Deutsch put it: "common subjective feelings of the legitimacy of the integrated community, making loyalty to it also a matter of internalized psychic compulsion" (Deutsch, 1966, p. 241). In other words, members of security community conceive themselves as part of an emotional community, in the sense that they *feel* as a community.

Attributing emotions, or emotion norms to an international institution, such as NATO, is not an uncontroversial position. It raises fundamental questions concerning the level of analysis and conceptual scope of studying security communities *as* emotional communities. Many of these conceptual issues have been dealt elsewhere (Koschut, 2014). This article is more concerned with the practical and methodological ways to operationalize emotions. Still, since the article relates directly to normative emotional discourses and the legitimization of emotion norms, the emotion-knowledge-power nexus needs to be further addressed here. Understanding security communities as emotional communities points to the epistemological centrality of emotional knowledge. Emotional knowledge is an agent's ability to cognitively and morally categorize emotional expressions and to emotionally connect these affective categories to Others' identities based on experience over time (Frevert, 2011). In other words, members have to be able to *know* what it means to be angry, ashamed, or happy in order to understand its social implications and evoke appropriate emotional reactions toward others within a particular social situation based on previous experience and moral judgments. For example, anger can be interpreted as destructive to close relationships because one may have experienced the destructive nature of anger in previous relationships. At the same time, anger may be perceived as displaying the closeness of a relationship based on a very different emotional experience.

Emotional knowledge is based on intersubjective learning, i.e., the habituated establishment and recurring exchange of emotions that shape the identities of social actors. One member communicates emotions to other members who then give emotional feedback and, in turn, receive emotional feedback on their part, and so on. Through this perpetuating process of emotional socialization, members of an emotional (security) community can enter a stage of understanding by building a common emotional history together which contributes to the establishment of shared meanings and even trust (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996, p. 181). In sum, emotional knowledge is about orientation and meaning. It is the accumulation of memories, founding myths, experiences, and symbolic patterns that enables members to make sense of the world around them within an emotionally shared reality.

Process sociology has shown how emotional knowledge forms part of asymmetries of power and status in which "established" groups secure the compliance of outsiders (Elias & Scotson, 1965). Insiders maintain and reproduce a particular self-image of social superiority vis-à-vis outsiders based on group charisma and emotional knowledge (feeling of social superiority/pride). At the same time, established groups persuade outsiders to internalize feelings of social inferiority (shame) through emotional rigidity, stigmatization, and by placing the contact of insiders with outsiders under a taboo. Accordingly, contact with outsiders is associated with negative feelings. Through these figuration processes, 'inside' groups exercise and maintain a power asymmetry that is rooted in emotional knowledge (Elias & Scotson, 1965, pp. 8, 12).

Inside an emotional (security) community, members are not treated as approximate equals but are woven together in asymmetrical power relationships. The self-image of the established group is formed based on the minority of its 'best' members (core group). This

core group performs a norm building function and exercises power over potential or actual norm breakers through control and stigmatization (Elias & Scotson, 1965, pp. 13, 42). Members can only participate in an emotional community by complying with certain emotional patterns of affect control. Members who do not comply by siding with or showing sympathy toward outsider groups will risk losing their power and status within the "inside" group. In other words, the core group is able to teach and enforce emotion norms. The notion of a core group corresponds nicely with Deutsch's notion of "cores of strength" within a security community. Security communities develop around cores of strength that possess material and moral authority due to their superior material power, international legitimacy, and acquired norms and practices (Adler, 2001, p. 147; Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 28). In the transatlantic (emotional) security community, it seems fair to suggest that the US forms such a core. In sum, processes of emotional socialization involving power and status are constantly present in an emotional (security) community and reproduced through knowledge: less superior members assimilate in relation to more powerful core groups, rivaling other members for status and power, shaping and reshaping their emotional experience and group charisma, or responding in ways that satisfy other members (Elias, 1939/1994). Hence, emotional knowledge and power are interwoven: communicating and transferring emotional knowledge within and between groups constitutes and maintains power relationships.

The emotion norms in the transatlantic security community will be empirically traced here on the inside as well as on the outside. Accordingly, the case study is structured into two parts. First, the presence and effects of the inside emotion norm of amity will be shown. Second, the case study will switch perspective by looking at the outside emotion norm of enmity expressed by the same community members. The empirical analysis will mainly focus on key documents and elite discourse among political leaders. Political leaders are defined here as "responsible decision-makers" having a political mandate in one form or another which includes heads of state, heads of governments, cabinet members and other elected representatives (Hill, 2003). Since political leaders are publicly mandated representatives of their respective state one would expect them to internalize (at least to a significant extent) the emotion norms of the emotional (security) community (Eznack, 2012, p. 242).

It is fair to suggest that many political leaders may simply not show their "true" emotions unless it is politically opportune. Thus, the emotional expressions (or lack thereof) on the surface may not necessarily reflect what these individuals feel underneath. Obviously, it is impossible to look into the heads of political decision makers—be it interests, ideas, or emotions and this article is no exception to that. Even though these limitations are real they do not make the empirical analysis irrelevant. The main task of this article is to show that emotions have a binding role in social arrangements at different levels of world politics. It is thus less interested in emotional patterns *within* individual political leaders but more inclined to trace emotional patterns *between* individual political leaders and the societies they represent. This conception can be based on Elias concept of 'figuration': "The social fabric and its historical change are not chaotic but possess, even in phases of greatest unrest and disorder, a clear pattern and structure. To investigate the totality…does not mean to study each individual process within it. It means first of all to discover the basic structures which give all the individual processes…their direction and their specific stamp" (Elias, 1939/1994, p. 400). A similar argument can be found in the concept of emotionology, which distinguishes the collective emotional standards from personal emotional experiences (Stearns & Stearns, 1985, p. 813).

It is argued here that inside a security community, members value and encourage emotions that emphasize the norm of amity like empathy, pride, gratitude, honor, respect, compassion, and sympathy. At the same time, they tend to discourage or show restraint toward emotional expressions that stress the norm of enmity such as fear, disgust, hatred, jealousy, and rage. Outside the security community, members collectively express emotions that are compatible with the norm of enmity, such as anger or fear, toward those non-members that are perceived as threatening or incompatible with the community's "way of life". What is of importance to the argument developed here is that a combination of particular emotional expressions (and their meaning) directed inwards, and reserved exclusively for the members of the emotional community, and particular emotional expressions directed outwards, contribute to the consolidation and stability of the community during crises (Koschut, 2014). Based on this inside/outside dualism, the emotion norms of an emotional (security) community are categorized here as amity (inside) and enmity (outside).

3.1. Inside Emotion Norm: Amity

Amity produces durable bonds, reliability, and trust in at least three ways. First, it assures a "distinctive way of life" and a sense of belonging that sets the community apart from other areas and regions including the one they previously inhabited (Deutsch et al., 1957). The development of such a way of life is closely related to the social construction of a collective identity, a sense of community or "we-feeling" in a security community (Adler & Barnett, 1998). Second, amity encourages community members to respond to each other's needs, messages, and behavior in a way that enables members to resolve their conflicts peacefully. Finally, through processes of social learning the emotional expressions of community members align in a way that enables them to predict one another's intentions and, ultimately, to overcome feelings of uncertainty. As van Hoef and Oelsner (2018)

also argue in this issue, this alignment of collectively expressed emotions serves as a background condition for peaceful interaction by developing shared moral meaning. In an emotional (security) community, members feel secure through an intensified emotional state of connectedness and belonging: they "lose their selves in the others" (Flam, 1990, p. 48). In sum, the norm of amity performs important functions within an emotional (security) community: it encourages mutual commitment, responsiveness, and predictability and thus contributes to the stabilization of collective identification and mutual trust.

The emotion norm of amity can be historically traced via the emotional vocabulary and expressive rules from the production of texts. In order to do this, I searched for documents and treaties that can be said to have served as canonical texts or monuments for the self-conception and self-image of the transatlantic security community. For this purpose, I chose the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 (which is also known as the Washington Treaty) and the Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Invocation of Article 5 on September 12, 2001. Both texts constitute central reference points as seminal historical moments for the transatlantic security community. The Washington Treaty forms the foundational charter of the transatlantic security community. The Statement on the Invocation of Article 5 marks the first time the transatlantic security community formally activated the collective defense clause. In these texts, one can find substantial evidence of the emotion norms of amity, which designates these documents not only as textual monuments but, significantly, also as emotional landmarks that embody the emotional knowledge and norms of the transatlantic emotional (security) community.

First, in the preamble of the Washington Treaty (NATO, 1949), NATO members pledge to promote "well-being" in the North Atlantic area. Well-being obviously implies not just material benefits but, importantly, also a psychological state of emotional well-being, free from fear or anxiety. Both conceptions, "to live in peace" and "well-being" arguably form the *raison d'être* for the Atlantic community. Significantly, they are rooted not just in cognitive beliefs about the shared history and values of a socially constructed "North Atlantic area", but in shared emotional beliefs of overcoming mutual suspicion and fear (the security dilemma) as well as creating a state of confidence and trust among its members (the security community). In the Washington Treaty, "peace" and "well-being" is consequently equated with feelings of pleasure ("desire"), feelings of purpose ("to safeguard freedom"), and a social connection of mutual belonging ("the common heritage and civilization of their peoples"). In the subsequent treaty articles, one finds further traces of emotional expressions that reinforce amity. For example, in Articles 2 and 3, respectively, members express emotional feelings of amity by emphasizing the "friendly" (sympathy, respect) character of their relationship and the goal to promote "better understanding", "mutual aid" and "encouragement" (care-taking, compassion, empathy) among them. Mutual "consideration" and "respect" is voiced explicitly in Articles 9 and 11, respectively, implying not only a pledge "to consult together" about matters of common interest but also a willingness to take the feelings of other members into account before taking action in order to avoid making fellow members feel upset or angry. All of these aspects can be said to promote a "we-feeling" among members of the transatlantic security community that is reinforced by frequent references to solidarity and unity ("resolved to unite", "encourage…collaboration", "assist", "in concert"). The most important aspect, however, is the principle of collective defence enshrined in Article 5 of NATO's founding treaty, which bears a highly symbolic and sacred quality to NATO members. As the official website of NATO (2018) explains:

> The principle of collective defence is at the very heart of NATO's founding treaty. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.

In a Durkheimian sense, the principle of collective defence resembles a cultural totem that reflects the security community's collective sense of purpose, arouses intense emotions, and reinforces metaphysical beliefs of mutual trust and solidarity (Durkheim, 1912/2001).

Second, the statement by the North Atlantic Council (NATO, 2001) on the historical occasion of invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in response to the September 11th attacks on the United States puts the emotion norm of amity into practice. As pointed out above, since the principle of collective defence enshrined in Article 5 constitutes a sacred quality for the members of the security community as well as the symbolic manifestation of mutual trust and collective identity, its invocation (and above all, for the first time in its 52-year history) should arouse very intense emotions that can be traced in the text of the statement. Moreover, these emotional expressions conveyed in the text should reiterate the emotion norm of amity. Indeed, a closer study of the statement on the invocation of Article 5 in 2001 reveals just that. NATO members begin by emphasizing that even though the principle of collective defence had been originally designed to protect European members from Communist attack, "it remains no less valid and no less essential today". This "commitment" suggests an emotional state of being dedicated to a common cause and a pledge to honour a joint obligation. Another emotional reference to the emotion norm of amity is stated when NATO members pay "tribute to the success of the Alliance in ensuring the freedom of its members during the Cold War and in making possible a Europe that was whole and free". Here, we can trace not only the emotional expression of pride in the collective accomplishments of the transatlantic security community but also underlying gratitude among European member

states whose safety had been guaranteed by the United States throughout the Cold War. Most importantly, the statement expresses shared sympathy and mutual joy about the unbroken bonds among NATO members in the face of a new threat. This notion is reinforced by members' "reaffirmed…determination", their "commitments to one another" and their pledge to "stand ready to provide the assistance". Ten years on, this "we-feeling" continued to feature prominently when the members of the North Atlantic Council (NATO, 2011) reflected on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Invocation of Article 5: "This decision was a powerful expression of transatlantic solidarity and unity…NATO and our partner nations from across the world can be proud of what we have achieved". The basic connotation of this statement suggests an attitude of "we stand together and nothing can divide us".

As these examples from two key transatlantic texts illustrate, amity among members of an emotional (security) community is chiefly expressed through collective emotions of care, sympathy, compassion, pride, honor, gratitude, and respect. The expression of care and sympathy protects its members against indifference by feeling along with each others' distress and by "being there" or caring for each other in symbolic and material ways (the mutual defense clause comes to mind). Pride and honor reinforce the confidence among members that they deserve and value the privileges and virtue of superiority that is associated with group membership ("the most successful defensive alliance in history"). Gratitude and respect both serve as an emotional commitment to reciprocate in the future. Members of a security community do not expect to be "paid back" immediately but base their exchanges of support and caring on need, not on payback.

3.2. Outside Emotion Norm: Enmity

Enmity builds trust among members of an emotional security community by setting insiders apart from outsiders and thereby generating internal cohesion. Disconnecting insiders from outsiders is an act of identity building necessary for developing and maintaining a security community (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 38). In an emotional (security) community, amity and enmity are two sides of the same coin. Collective identification in a security community cannot be treated in isolation but can only be fully understood if viewed as an emotional construction of a (or multiple) shared "disgusting Other(s)" (Leep, 2010). Such a shared Other must not exclusively be defined in strictly military terms such as an outside military threat but contains a much broader concept based on regime type (e.g., democracy vs. non-democracy), cultural or religious differences (e.g., Occident vs. Orient), and/or spatial concepts (e.g., the Atlantic area vs. the Pacific rim). Thus, the norm of enmity must not primarily be defined in terms of material or physical coercion but rather in terms of a perceived risk or harm to the distinctive "way of life" of an emotional (security) community.

It is certainly not suggested that all outsiders are considered a threat. It does emphasize, however, that such inside/outside configurations sharpen the moral boundaries between insiders and outsiders. This is particularly the case in crisis situation when members of an emotional (security) community become "locked into" an insider-outsider dualism that is hard to disrupt and leaves little room for differentiation. It is also important to point out that this configuration does not negate the possibility of new members to join. It does suggest, however, that these new members will enter the community not as approximate equals but as members with inferior status and power vis-à-vis established members.

The same landmark texts cited above indicate many emotional expressions of the emotion norms of enmity that complement the emotion norms of amity. First, the Washington Treaty addresses the need "to safeguard" the values and principles shared in the North Atlantic area, which implies an emotional feeling of fear or anxiety that outsiders might undermine or harm the community's "way of life". A similar emotional expression of fear and anxiety is used in Articles 1 and 4, respectively. Here, members voice their concern that peace and the security of any member shall not be "endangered" or "threatened". The most vivid expression of the emotion norm of enmity can be found in NATO's collective defense clause. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty explicitly mentions an "armed attack" by outsiders: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all". An armed attack implies emotional feelings of anger or even hatred attributed to outsiders because the very word "attack" suggests an aggressive and violent intention that may cause great suffering and pain. By pledging to collectively resist such an attack by outsiders, members simultaneously express a sense of community and "we-feeling" ("shall be considered an attack against them all"), perhaps even gratitude (mutual defense is a commitment that they make for each other in the future), that, in turn, reinforces the emotion norms of amity and reduces unwanted emotions for the in-group, such as fear or anxiety. This discursive pattern can be found several times in the document and, as we shall see, in many other NATO documents and statements as well. The emotional-linguistic structuring of texts in emotional communities very often employs emotional expressions of enmity to reinforce and strengthen the emotion norm of amity, for example by contrasting compassion with contempt ("mutual aid…to resist attack") or empathy versus fear ("consult together whenever…any of the Parties is threatened"). Underlying this pattern is the idea of triggering an emotional upward spiral that increases the confidence and trust that members invest in the community, while simultaneously reducing or even eliminating feelings of uncertainty and fear.

Second, the Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Invocation of Article 5 contains very intense emotional expressions that more directly reflect the emotion norm of enmity. For example, NATO members "condemn" the "appalling attacks" and "acts of barbarism" that were "perpetrated" against the United States. The latter verbal use of *perpetrate* constitutes an emotional reference to dishonourable behaviour by someone else. This statement represents a vivid case of emotional Othering (a "disgusting Other") by strategically employing emotional expressions of contempt and anger against particular outsiders (see also Sanchez Salgado, 2018, in this issue). This is further underlined when NATO members refer to the "scourge of international terrorism". By employing a synonym for something extremely evil and menacing, NATO members express emotions of contempt and anger against a radical Other. At the same time, they reveal emotional expressions of fear and grief by referring to 9/11 as an event that caused great suffering. Likewise, the mentioning of "appalling attacks" exposes emotional expression of fear in response to aggressive action by enemy forces coupled with an affective adjective emphasizing grief for the victims of the attacks.

As these examples illustrate, enmity toward outsiders is expressed through collective emotions of fear, anger, contempt, and jealousy. Fear alerts members to an imminent danger focusing attention on the source of the threat. Jealousy mobilizes members to protect their values and attachments against outsiders. Anger and contempt reinforce attachment to community values by activating collective emotions against other groups or life styles that seem to work against the values of the security community. The emotion norm of enmity is particular evident when members of a security community practically engage in military interventions against outsiders, as Gray (1959, p. 146) explains: "We cannot fight without an image of the enemy as totally evil, for whom any mercy or sympathy is incongruous, if not traitorous". In other words, the emotion norm of enmity "closes the ranks" by focusing attention on the negative attributes of outsiders.

To sum up, the emotion norms of amity and enmity—a combination of particular emotional expressions (and their meaning) directed inwards and reserved exclusively for the members of the emotional community, and particular emotional expressions directed outwards—undergird and strengthen the transatlantic security community. Emotions underpin the distinct set of values and beliefs "that makes up much of that 'Western' way of life which is so often felt and referred to" (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 134).

4. Conclusion

In this contribution, I advanced the argument that social relations between members of a security community resemble an *emotional* community. I sought to demonstrate how security communities are constituted through the development and expression of emotion norms and proposed that emotion norms can be historically traced via the emotional vocabulary and expressive rules derived from the production of texts. In the end, this contribution advocates investing more research into the practical ways to study emotions empirically. We cannot allow methodological conventions and epistemological "fist-fighting" to cut us off from emotions' less easily detected effects simply because conventional social science methods cannot account for all aspects of emotion. Instead, we need concrete tools and techniques as well as greater cross-fertilization across areas of specialization—a "thinking without a banister" (Arendt, 2018)—within the discipline of IR, and the social sciences more generally. Proposing such a methodological toolkit, I drew on linguistic accounts as well as interpretative approaches by historians to advance the development of concrete research tools and methods that would facilitate cross-disciplinary inquiries, overcoming existing methodological hurdles. As envisioned by the editors of this special issue, such an interdisciplinary focus offers an ideal way that builds on and enters into dialogue with other disciplines, including Psychology, Sociology, History, and Anthropology. In the end, this approach entails two paradigmatic shifts: first, understanding security communities as emotional (security) communities that are guided by collectively shared emotion norms forces a conceptual rethinking about our knowledge of the internal mechanisms within these groups and contributes to a wider debate about the socio-psychological and emotional foundation of world politics. Second, it offers a radical departure from the overwhelming dominance of the rational actor paradigm in much of the social sciences, which has stood in the way of taking emotions seriously.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

Interwar Blueprints of Europe: Emotions, Experience and Expectation

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Abstract
The notion of European integration has been contested from its very start. In the interwar period many ideas were floating around on how to shape European unity. These interwar Blueprints for Europe have to be understood in the context of conflicting and contradictory emotions of enmity and amity. This article looks at the emotive vocabulary of the canonical text of Coudenhove-Kalergi's *Pan-Europa*. It applies an emotion discourse analysis, using Koselleck's notion of "space of experience" and "horizon of expectation". As such it shows the connection between the understanding and use of time and emotions in discourse—thereby demonstrating the necessity of "reading" the blueprints of European integration as highly normative and moral claims on the design of this European order.

Keywords
discourse; Coudenhove-Kalergi; European integration; emotion; interwar; pan-Europa

Issue
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> There is but one way to avert that ruin: the economic federation of Europe's continental democracies….This is the only road to salvation, alike for European politics and European industry. (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 70, author's own translation)

1. Introduction

Before the European integration project started to institutionalize into the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, many ideas floated around on how to shape European integration. Already during the interwar-period and during World War II (WWII) there were several plans that envisioned a united Europe. These interwar years were the "first golden age" of the European ideal among intellectuals (Lacroix & Nicolaïdis, 2010). Recently, Cattani (2017) combined conceptual history with discourse analysis to examine the meaning of concepts such as "European homeland" and "European nation" in the context of the two intellectual conferences organized by the League of Nations in 1933. Similarly, Ifversen (2002) analyzed the interconnected notions of crisis, civilization and Europe in the interwar era.

This article aims to further expand on this by explicitly focusing on the role of emotional vocabulary in relation to the meaning of key concepts of European unity. To this end, it analyzes a canonical text of the time, with a transnational outreach: Coudenhove-Kalergi's *Pan-Europa* (1923).

There is ample research on the postwar process of European integration based on a rationalist account of European integration as the outcome of the autonomous calculations of different nation states based on their economic, political or military interests (e.g., Milward, 1992), and ideational accounts focusing on transnational networks, their norms and institutions, that pushed for European integration (e.g., Kaiser, 2007; Lipgens, 1968; Müller, 2004). While Lipgens' (1968) work on the blueprints of national resistance movements has been criticized for its "normative overdrive" (Kaiser, 2007), it shows that there is a wide variety of blueprints of Europe that transcend particular national views. While these networks did not necessarily produce a common political European idea, they provided a forum for collective learning, and fostered mutual understanding and trust (Kaiser, 2004). Moreover, they created normative-

emotional bonds able to withstand domestic/nationalist pressures (Kaiser, 2007).

Concerning the interwar-period, numerous transnational networks can be identified that did contribute to these normative-emotional bonds, such as the Roman-Catholic networks (Secrétariat International des Partis Démocratiques d'Inspiration Chrétienne), ecumenical networks (Life & Work, Faith & Order) and business networks (Council of Directors of European Industrial Federations [CDEIF]; Colpach-Group).

However, little is known of the ways in which these substantive ideas for a future European order were connected with specific emotives and emotional beliefs. Hence, building upon the "emotional turn" in international relations (IR), this article develops a framework of analysis that highlights the role of emotives and emotional beliefs that were evoked in these transnational visions of Europe, and that served to create moral and political support for them. In particular, it aims to show how experience and expectation are connected by emotives. As such, the focus on how emotives are used to strengthen the substantive ideas (moral/spiritual, political and economic) gives us new insights on how a future Europe was invoked and made attractive to a wider public/audience.

Moreover, beyond the topic of European integration, this article aims to advance research on emotions in IR. While the literature remained rather theoretical or focused on single emotions to account for decision-making failures (Sasley, 2011; see also Bleiker & Hutchinson, 2008), the methodology of studying emotions in (the history) of IR gained more attention recently (see Clément & Sangar, 2018). Building upon Koschut (2018b), I develop an emotion discourse analysis, distinguishing between two types of emotion (enmity and amity), enriched by combining this with Koselleck's (2005) notions of "space of experience" and "horizon of expectation". As such this article engages with the need for more structured, systematic empirical research on emotive vocabulary in European integration history.

The central aim of this article is to examine how particular emotives and emotional beliefs were used to gain support for a specific and salient blueprint of European integration. *To what extent and how are the experiences and expectations, as expressed in Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa, informed by emotives?*

Blueprints are understood here as a set of moral/spiritual, economic and political ideas about a future European order, that are expressed in a particular emotive vocabulary. The next section discusses the relationship between ideas, emotives and emotional beliefs in general, and emotion discourse analysis in particular. Subsequently, I introduce Coudenhove-Kalergi's *Pan-Europa* (1923) as a canonical text, and emotional landmark, of interwar writings on European unity. In Sections 4 and 5 I analyze the emotive vocabulary of Coudenhove-Kalergi's text, focusing on the "space of experience" he refers to and his outline of Europe's future ("horizon of expectation"). In Section 6, based on secondary literature, I reflect upon the emotionalizing effect, reception and response.

2. Emotive Turn

2.1. Ideas, Emotives and Emotional Beliefs

The emotional turn in IR builds on research in the history and politics of emotions. Frevert's (2011) work on the history of emotions is well-known, showing that our understanding of emotions has changed over time. Moreover, in *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Ahmed (2014) aims to show how the emotionality of text connects individuals to a collective, which includes some at the expense of others.

Research on emotions in IR consists of both macro-theoretical approaches that develop generalizable propositions about political emotions, and micro-approaches that examine specific emotions in specific contexts, often decision-making failures (Hutchison & Bleiker 2014; see also Sasley, 2011). The "emotional turn" in IR encompasses a wide variety of approaches and concepts, ranging from a focus on individual subjective experiences (emotions) and bodily expressions (affection) to more collective systems of feeling (emotional communities, Rosenwein, 2010; Koschut, 2018a), emotional cultures (Moïsi, 2009), institutionalized emotional norms (emotional regimes, Reddy, 2001; see also Crawford, 2000) and conceptual/abstract expressions (emotional beliefs, Mercer, 2010).

This article does not engage with questions about the biological or cultural basis of emotion, but rather conceives of emotional expressions as a strategy to constrain or enable particular substantive ideas about Europe. As such, it does not refer to emotions, but emotives. Emotives are expressed emotions (i.e., emotional vocabulary) that are instrumental in changing, building, hiding and intensifying emotions that are accepted and recognized in a particular community (see Reddy, 2001, p. 105). Emotions are inadmissibly present in any political discourse, however much this discourse tries to present its language in impartial, objective and rational means. In fact, doing so is in itself an emotional strategy, in the sense that it tries to channel specific "non-emotional" emotions, in order to render its contents more convincing.

Of equal importance in the analysis are emotional beliefs (Mercer, 2010). In contrast to emotives that refer to basic emotions, emotional beliefs are more abstract concepts that integrate emotion and cognition (Mercer, 2010, p. 2). Examples of emotional beliefs, in the context of this article, are nationalism, responsibility, solidarity and reconciliation. Emotion is not an addition to these concepts, but is an essential component for understanding its meaning (Mercer, 2010, p. 7). These conceptualizations of emotives and emotional beliefs point out that, although research on emotions is often focused on the level of the individual, there is also a strong collective

and political dimension to it: "[Emotions] frame what is and is not possible in politics. They reveal and conceal, enable and disable" (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014, p. 508). Moreover, they contribute to identity formation, possibly resulting in an emotional community.

As such, emotions are closely tied to morals in at least two ways. First, emotional regimes prescribe what emotives are "appropriate". As such, morals precede emotions. However, emotions and morals also are in a constitutive relationship. So-called moral emotions entail a certain judgment, condemning others (i.e., contempt, anger and disgust), or praising others (i.e., gratitude, awe, elevation) (Haidt, 2003).

It is the connection between ideas and emotives that serves as a mobilization for action. Without ideas, emotives have not object, and without emotives, ideas fail "to produce a sense of obligation or loyalty necessary for collective action" (Koschut, 2018b, p. 286).

2.2. Emotion Discourse Analysis

An emotion discourse analysis looks into the emotion potential and emotionalizing effect of political discourse (Koschut, 2018b) and is concerned not so much with the frequencies of specific emotives, but rather with the prevalence of certain emotional patterns/structures, i.e., a certain combination of emotives and emotional beliefs. These master emotives "structure the social meanings and effects of the discourse and thus set the collective standard of emotional expression" (Koschut, 2018b, p. 294).

This article combines emotion and time in discourse (see also Skonieczny, 2018, p. 70). Concerning emotive vocabulary, I distinguish between emotions associated with *amity* (i.e., empathy, pride, gratitude, grief, honor, respect, compassion and sympathy) and *enmity* (i.e., fear, anger, disgust, hatred, jealousy, rage) (Koschut, 2014). Moreover, building upon Koselleck (2005), I distinguish between the "space of experience" and "horizon of expectation" of this emotional vocabulary. No emotive can be crafted and disseminated without the presupposition of an existing, collective reservoir of experiences and expectations to tap into. "Space of experience" refers to references to past experiences and reflections on the state of affairs. "Horizon of expectation" refers to references to a future European order. Both can be combined by a positive, inclusive emotional vocabulary or a more negative, exclusive emotional vocabulary (see Table 1). So, negative backward emotions are anger and hatred, whilst trust is a positive emotion with reference to experience. In contrast, forward looking emotions are fear and hope. An example of an emotive that connects experience with expectation is revenge, i.e., it refers to anger based on the past, with the conviction to make up for that in the future. These emotives are not an exhaustive list, but rather examples to show the connection between emotives and notions of time. Moreover, while analytically distinctive, empirically these emotions may be intertwined. The connection of past and future, of experience and expectation, leads to particular blueprints of Europe.

The emotion discourse analysis proceeds in three steps (Koschut, 2018b). First, the selection of texts (Section 3). Second, the mapping of verbal expressions of emotions (Sections 4 and 5). Third, interpreting and contextualizing its political effects (Section 6).

3. Pan-Europa as Emotional Landmark

For the purpose of this article, a canonical text on European unity in the interwar period has been selected: Coudenhove-Kalergi *Pan-Europa* (1923).

Coudenhove-Kalergi's writings are among the first of blueprints of European unity in the interwar-era. During this "first golden age" of intellectual debate on European unity over 600 articles were published on the topic between 1919 and 1939, with a peak between 1925 and the early 1930s (Chabot, 2005, p. 14). While the interwar period was characterized by intellectual debate on European unity, it was also a period of thriving nationalism. In the same year that *Pan-Europa* was published, national socialist party leader Hitler called for a "national revolution", in strong emotives: "what motivates us is neither self-conceit or self-interest, but only a burning desire to join the battle in this grave eleventh hour for our German Fatherland" (Frevert, 2015). Moreover, Coudenhove-Kalergi's work has been compared to Rohan's *Europa* (published in 1924 at the same publisher as *Pan-Europa*), which proposed a culturally united Europe built on a shared Catholic basis (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2013, pp. 167, 176). With 16,000 copies being sold in 1926 *Pan-Europa* was a best-seller at its time (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2012). Translated in many languages it also had a clear transnational reach and was discussed in transnational settings such as the Pan-European conferences that Coudenhove-Kalergi organized as part of his Pan-European Union. At the first conference, in 1926, 2,000 participants from 24 nations gathered in Vienna. As such, the Pan-European Union "constituted a public space where both the meaning of

Table 1. Coding scheme emotion discourse analysis.

	Space of Experience	**Horizon of Expectation**
Enmity	Hatred, Anger Revenge	Fear
Amity	Trust	Hope

Europe and the vision of a united Europe were discussed" and "provoked new conceptualisations of Europe as a bearer of common identity" (Orluc, 2002, pp. 25, 43).

Although Coudenhove-Kalergi, born in 1894, did have a Catholic background, he "generally ignored the theology of his time" (Sorrels, 2016, p. 213). His biographer Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer (2001) classifies Coudenhove-Kalergi as a Christian socialist. As we will see, his work consists of emotives with a strong religious connotation.

Coudenhove-Kalergi's approach is based on a neo-aristocracy, i.e., a blend of "forward-looking enthusiasm for technological and industrial progress and a backward-looking authoritarian elitism" (Sorrels, 2016, p. 137). While Coudenhove-Kalergi opposed Hitler and was unequivocal in his condemnation of Nazi anti-Semitism, he flirted with Mussolini's fascism, emphasizing the need for a "wise mixture of the authoritarian and aristocratic principle with what can be healthy in the democratic principle [conceding] room to justice and the enlightened command of superior personalities" (Evola, 1933/2015, p. 47; see also Coudenhove-Kalergi , 1934, pp. 94–96).

While initially a great admirer of the American President Woodrow Wilson, Coudenhove-Kalergi became strongly disappointed in Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations, which suffered from utopian overstretch and did too little for the European dream of a unified continent: "Wilson's attempt to set up an ecumenical League of Nations has failed" (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 20). Coudenhove-Kalergi eventually abandoned his support for the League of Nations in favor of a United States of Europe, inspired by Fried's *Pan-Amerika* (1910)[1]. In this, he pitted his plan for Europe squarely against the 'Red International', channeling both conservative, 19th century concert ideas and new, fascist dreams for a rejuvenated European unification. As we will see, he does so by positing negative emotives of revenge and destruction against positive emotives of reconciliation and understanding. The United States of Europe is presented as the 6th Europe, after Hellas, Roman empire, *Völkerwanderung*, Roman-Catholic Europe, and the era of enlightened absolutism. This way Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923, pp. 31–33) presents Pan-Europa as a continuation of a century old project. This Pan-Europa would consist of 26 states (excluding England and Russia)[2]. After a Pan-European conference, the participating countries would sign an obligatory arbitration and guarantee treaty, eventually leading to a customs union. So, Coudenhove-Kalergi prioritizes political and security integration over economic integration, i.e., a customs union is to be developed only after political treaties and security pacts are agreed upon.

The life and work of this Austrian-Japanese politician and philosopher have been evaluated rather negatively in the EU integration history literature; he was ineffective (Horner, 2001), and a marginal political figure (Milward, 1997). His political ideas have been criticized as well: "As a blueprint it was imprecise, naïve and optimistic" (White, 1989). Nevertheless, Coudenhove-Kalergi's movement was well-known and contributed to a coalition of idealism and commercial interests that was of importance after WWII (Klemann, 1966). Honorary president of the Pan-Europa Movement and Prime Minister of France, Aristide Briand, proposed a European Federal Union in 1930 at the League of Nations. After the war, with the emergence of many other movements for European integration, Coudenhove-Kalergi's position was less central. However, his work was acknowledged, as he was mentioned by Churchill in his famous speech at the University of Zürich in 1946: "Much work has been done upon this task by the exertions of the Pan-European Union, which owes so much to the famous French patriot and statesman Aristide Briand (Churchill, 1946)." Moreover, he was awarded the first Charlemagne Prize in 1950, acknowledging his efforts for promoting European unity.

Hence, although contested, his writings have been central to the interwar thinking about European unity. As such this text is taken as an "emotional landmark" (Koschut, 2018b).[3] As a product of its time, *Pan-Europa* is a telling example of the use of emotive vocabulary in the interwar years. It tells us something about the recognized and accepted emotions among the transnational European elites of that time.

4. Space of Experience in Pan-Europa

In this section I will take a closer look at the emotional vocabulary of Coudenhove-Kalergi concerning Europe's past and how he understands this to affect his contemporaries' emotional outlook. First, we identify Coudenhove-Kalergi's understanding of emotions in international politics. Second, we will see how Coudenhove-Kalergi connects the key emotives of his time (hate and fear) with (a) an emotional belief in nationalism, and (b) a narrow space of experience.

4.1. Emotions Trump Interests

While the role of emotions in inter-state relations is debated (see Bleiker & Hutchison, 2018), in Coudenhove-Kalergi's writings they are omnipresent. He argues that "not only are political relations between states functions of national sympathy and antipathy—but national friendships and enmities are also often functions of political relations" (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 122). Coudenhove-Kalergi even claims that the emotional di-

[1] For an extensive discussion of the relationship between Fried's work and that of Coudenhove-Kalergi , see Sorrels (2016).

[2] England had transformed into "an oceanic empire" with non-European interests, and Russia distanced itself from the democratic system of Europe by proclaiming Sovietism (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 33).

[3] Other relevant writings of Coudenhove-Kalergi in this period consist of *Paneuropa ABC* (1931), *Kampf um Paneuropa* (1925) and *Europe Must Unite* (1938).

mension of the relations among states (Germany and France in particular) trumps rationality and interests[4], and that these emotions are artificially created over centuries for political-military purposes (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, pp. 121–122)—a typical expression of a lingering 19th century preference for "concert" and great power understanding and deliberation (De Graaf, in press).

4.2. Hate, Fear and Nationalism

The defining space of experience, against which Coudenhove-Kalergi writes *Pan-Europa* is World War I (WWI). Against this backdrop, the master emotives that Coudenhove-Kalergi identifies are: hate (*Hass*) and fear (*Furcht*)[5]. These emotives of jealousy, hatred, envy, revenge, and malice[6] fuel a vicious circle of *eternal* fight in which Europe tumbles from one crisis to another. Coudenhove-Kalergi connects these emotives of hate and jealousy to nationalism and argues that this toxic combination of national hate and national jealousy results in a descent, *from month to month*, of the spiritual and material European culture (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 68). Feelings of hate trump those of solidarity (p. 71).

As such, it is the "national chauvinist", who in propagating a European war shows that blind hate against the enemy is stronger than love of one's own (p. 101), that is Coudenhove-Kalergi 's (1923) main antagonist. On Coudenhove-Kalergi 's (1923) list of opponents, they are followed by the communists, militarists and protected industries (p. 162). Russia is seen as merely taking advantage of Europe's internal weakness. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923) even seemed to resist too much of an American interference in European matters: "neither the West nor the East will save Europe: Russia wants to conquer Europe, America wants to buy it" (p. XI).

4.3. A Narrow Space of Experience

Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923) observes that the space of experience expands. Because of technical progress, the world becomes smaller (p. 18). Hence, in terms of the "space" of these emotives, Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923) notes that the effects of these feelings of hate are not restricted to the European continent but contaminate the international atmosphere (p. 23). He refers to Europe as an *eternal* source of uncertainty and anxiety, with analogy to the tempestuous developments in the Balkans (p. 24). Moreover, taking an outside-in perspective, Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923) portrays an image of Europe as once being "feared", but now "pitied" and derided by the upcoming powers (pp. 17, 27).

This progress in the rest of the world contrasted with Europe's decline (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. VIII) is due to the fact that the (technical) abilities to expand the horizon of expectations are not grasped by his contemporaries—they lack the necessary imagination (*Phantasie*) and are backward-looking, according to Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923, p. 98). Because of a lack of imagination, Coudenhove-Kalergi sees the European politics of his days as yesterday's politics rather than the politics of tomorrow (1923, p. VIII). Instead of focusing on how to prevent a future war, more space in the discussions is given to the last war (1923). This experience of war is a too weak foundation to prevent another one[7].

So, in Coudenhove-Kalergi 's understanding, the *eternal* focus on "yesterday" is the main cause of Europe's fragmentation (1923, p. VIII). Hence, he suggests the following tactic: *Das Übermorgen gegen das Morgen ausspielen* [To Set the Day after Tomorrow Against Tomorrow] (p. 87). In other words, he aims to propose to widen the horizon of expectation and accuses his opponents of limiting that same horizon and only looking back.

5. Horizon of Expectation in Pan-Europa

In this section we will look at the use of emotional vocabulary by Coudenhove-Kalergi regarding his proposed future European order. He distinguishes between two options—a third option does not exist (1923, p. 54). The fight between anti-European and pan-European is a fight between "*Vergangenheit und Zukunft*" (p. 168). Key to this choice for a Europe of the past, or a Europe of the future, is the Franco-German relationship.

5.1. Anti-Europe: Europe of the Past—Revenge & Destruction

The default option is to continue on the road of hate, which would inevitably cause Europe's demise, conquered by the upcoming powers (i.e., the United States and Russia) (1923, pp. 21–22). This default option is based on a vicious circle of French politics of destruction and a German politics of revenge. Unforgiveness on both sides lead to a politics of respectively destruction and revenge (p. 134). These two are closely interlinked, and Coudenhove-Kalergi is very much aware of the strength of revenge politics: it is fueled by every act of violence (p. 131).

5.2. Pan-Europe: Europe of the Future—Reconciliation & Understanding

Against this grim picture, Coudenhove-Kalergi proposes his alternative, almost eschatological, horizon of salva-

[4] "Never was the hate between Germans and French bigger than it is now. This hatred for each other is stronger than reason, stronger than their common interest" (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, pp. 121–122, author's own translation).
[5] "Everywhere there is misery, unrest, discontent, hatred and fear" (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. VIII, author's own translation).
[6] "These states of the West are disjointed and disorganized, in everlasting conflict with one another, and torn by hatred and jealousy (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 23)"; "controlled by mutual hatred and envy, by revenge and resentment" (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 95).
[7] "To base the hope for peace on this foundation is short-sighted and hopeless" (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 104, author's own translation).

tion, or redemption (*Rettung*), liberation and solidarity: European economic integration, based on a political union (1923, pp. IX, 27, 70). The pan-European horizon that Coudenhove-Kalergi aims to provide would be based on a French politics of reconciliation (*Versöhnung*) and a German politics of understanding (*Verständigung*) (pp. 124–128). This almost eschatological and salvific horizon unites the "fallen men" of Europe with their once so greatly ordained destiny; thereby channeling a typical sense of Christian teleology into the political realm. To step towards this horizon, this Christian notion of redemption and reconciliation also entails a break with the past; redemption does not arrive automatically—the way needs to be paved with sacrifices and personal engagement (1923, p. 71).

The notion of sacrifice was a key emotive used as part of the war culture rhetoric (Horne, 2004) that Coudenhove-Kalergi is so strongly opposing. Rather than referring to sacrifice as a way to claim moral compensation and renewing antagonism, Coudenhove-Kalergi uses this vocabulary in combination with the notion of reconciliation.

To pave the way for reconciliation and understanding would require a magnanimous, generous and redemptive act (*grossmütiger Akt*) of France to "teach Germany to believe in the French will to reconciliation to strike a deadly blow to the politics of revenge" (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 131). In particular, Coudenhove-Kalergi thinks of "a voluntary renunciation of the occupation of the Rhine" in exchange for an "inter-European guarantee treaty" (1923). This shows that, in Coudenhove-Kalergi's understanding, pan-Europe provides the necessary conditions for a politics of reconciliation.

The notion of reconciliation is of course closely connected to that of sacrifice (*Opfer*):

> Those who love Europe must not shy away from any sacrifice in order to save their continent from this mortal danger. (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 97, author's own translation)

This quote also underlines the point that while Coudenhove-Kalergi speaks about the relationship between France and Germany at a state-level, he also calls on every individual citizen to assume its responsibility. Neutrality in this question of "life and death" is not possible, running away from a decision is high treason (1923, p. 102). Moreover, it recognizes the feelings of enmity.

To break the resistance against Pan-Europa, Coudenhove-Kalergi looks for an awakening (*Erwachen*) of a pan-European feeling of solidarity (1923, p. 109). This awakening suggests that solidarity is already there, it only has to be activated. Coudenhove-Kalergi distinguishes between two types of solidarity—a solidarity of love and a solidarity of reason. He primarily refers to the latter, i.e., the awareness that the ruin of the other would bring about one's own ruin, would suffice in first instance (1923, p. 124).

In his opposition of anti-European and Pan-European Coudenhove-Kalergi is careful not to position national identity against a pan-European identity. Rather, he refers to Pan-Europe as *Übervaterland* (1923, p. 156). In later writings he further expands on this relationship between European and national identity, arguing that "just as love for the mother does not detract love for the father, neither does love for the European *Mutterland* reduce love for the national *Vaterländern*" (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1931, p. 17). So, national and European identity are no zero-sum relationship (perhaps: "are not mutually exclusive"). This image of the family has a strong emotional connotation, referring to a given relationship—whether you like it or not. Against the background of the suffering caused by WWI, the maternal reference to Europe underlines its emotional and pacifist connotation (Cattani, 2017, pp. 677–678)[8].

5.3. A Narrowing Horizon of Expectation

As long as there is a democratic regime in Germany, Coudenhove-Kalergi deems it is not too late for reconciliation. Nevertheless, he is pessimistic about the time that is left (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 131). His book aims to underscore the urgent need of European unity, before the horizon of expectation will narrow again. The United States of Europe is "the only salvation from the chaos of the present—before the collapse of the future" (p. 39).

6. Emotionalizing Effects, Reception & Response

Central to *Pan-Europe*, and Coudenhove-Kalergi's writings in general, is its rather dichotomous character. Coudenhove-Kalergi integrates a sense of time with particular emotives and emotional beliefs. The anti-European option is based on backward-looking emotives of enmity, whereas the pan-European order is referred to in terms of forward-looking emotives of amity (Figure 1).

Coudenhove-Kalergi did recognize the dominance of emotives of enmity among his contemporaries and aimed to expand their horizon of expectation to conceive of a different European order. At his Pan-European Congresses he aimed to practise these notions of reconciliation—a highly Christian infused and morally laden emotive—and solidarity—a more social and secularized one. When the German government discussed whether to officially participate in the 2nd Pan-European Congress in Berlin in 1930, Minister of the Interior Wirth, argued in favour with reference to this notion of reconciliation (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2001).

Although Coudenhove-Kalergi strongly connects emotion to mobilize forces for his Pan-European order, his Pan-European movement has not proved able

[8] Other interwar intellectuals referring to Europe as maternal at symposia initiated by the League of Nations in 1933 in Paris and Madrid are the French Jesuit Yves de la Briere and writer Georges Duhamel (see Cattani, 2017, pp. 675, 677).



Figure 1. Emotional discourse Pan-Europa.

to change the course of history. As Coudenhove-Kalergi (1943) himself points out in his memoirs, his movement was supported by many individual members of governments, but at a more official level, governments ignored it. Opposition did not only come from nationalist groups, but also from pacifists accusing Coudenhove-Kalergi of advocating a Machiavellian pacifism (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2013, p. 163). Coudenhove-Kalergi (1943) recalls that he had not expected Hitler to take over Germany: "When I came back to Germany in 1924, the Hitler chapter seemed definitely closed". Nevertheless, his fear of another cycle of rage and destruction politics came true.

7. Conclusion

While research on the interwar plans for European integration is well developed, much less is known about the emotive vocabulary that is involved in those "blueprints of Europe". To this end, this article analyzed Coudenhove-Kalergi's canonical text *Pan-Europa*.

Central to his experience is WWI and the hate between Germany and France. This hate is combined with a strong inclination to look back. As such it leads to a vicious circle of destruction and revenge. These negative emotives associated with nationalism as emotional belief feed into Coudenhove-Kalergi's plan for an alternative European political order which is centered on the emotional and spiritual belief of reconciliation, sacrifice and solidarity—invoking a moralistic appeal and call to action. Coudenhove-Kalergi uses fear of the past to urge his audience to expand their horizon of expectation, and to mobilize their inner redemptive drive. He aims to expand this horizon of expectation with an almost eschatological plan for European unity, in which these negative emotions would turn into feelings of solidarity. While he acknowledges that a solidarity of love may be a bit too much, he calls for a solidarity of reason—and for great acts of sacrifice to meet these high-pitched stakes.

Using Koselleck's (2005) meta-historical categories of space of experience and horizon of expectation allows one to contextualize this emotive vocabulary. We have seen how Coudenhove-Kalergi aimed to connect the emotive of sacrifice to a politics of reconciliation, rather than destruction and resentment. While Coudenhove-Kalergi's *Pan-Europa* is strong in using moral and religious emotives to mobilize his audience, it was not successful in preventing another vicious cycle of French-German politics of hate. As such, this article highlights the constraining force of emotives of enmity on what can be imagined as possible horizons.

This emotion discourse analysis of *Pan-Europa* has been a limited exercise. There are, at least, three ways to further expand on this analysis. First, compare Pan-Europa with Coudenhove-Kalergi's emotional vocabulary after the war. This would allow to reflect upon the relationship between emotives and crisis. Second, compare Pan-Europa with the emotional vocabulary of contemporaries (e.g., Briand's Federal European Union, 1930; Rohan's Europa, 1924). It would allow one to assess to what extent and how Coudenhove-Kalergi's notions of reconciliation and solidarity resonated with contemporary political elites, and to what extent religiously inspired idiom still could find a home in European politics. As Frevert (2015) shows, the Nazi politics of emotions drew also on religious semantics to mobilize its audience. Third, methodologically it would be of interest to investigate in what ways an analysis of the images (i.e., book covers, symbols) confirm the emotion discourse analysis.

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Article

The Map to the Heart: An Analysis of Political Affectivity in Turkey

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Abstract
This study examines the complexity of citizens' political affectivity in Turkey. Drawing from componential models of affect, we rely on situational (motive consistent versus inconsistent) and motivational state (gain or loss) appraisals to test hypotheses on systematic differences in the clusters of political affect that span beyond the traditionally measured discrete emotional reactions of anger, hope, pride and fear. Using qualitative interview data from 2012, we develop a topography of affect clusters and systems of associations between political concepts. We find citizens express their emotionality in rich terms. They are linked to appraisals of multiple political objects, they reflect aversive, anxious, loss and gain oriented emotional responses, and they are guided by citizens' ideological orientations. This study is valuable as it addresses a significant gap in the study of political affect going beyond their discrete categorizations. It introduces a mapping methodology as an effective way of capturing the complexity of affect systems, and it reveals powerful insights into the depth and richness of emotions based on appraisal dimensions, enriching our understanding of political tensions and developments in Turkish politics and beyond.

Keywords
affect; appraisals; cognitive affective maps; emotions; ideology; interviews; political affectivity; Turkey

Issue
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1. Introduction

This study examines the complex affectivity of political orientations in Turkey. Recent developments in this deeply divided society make it an excellent place to study political affect. During the Gezi protests in 2013 diverse segments of the public came to the streets against the AKP's authoritarian system of governance; calling for social justice against the increasing restrictions on individual rights and freedoms (Bee, 2017; Öniş, 2015). The Gezi movement brought together people from diverse backgrounds, who shared individual grievances and hopes, fears and frustrations, and appeared to overcome ideological boundaries that traditionally set them apart (Bee & Kaya, 2017; Chrona & Bee, 2017; Göle, 2013; Öniş, 2015; Özdemir, 2015).

Expressions of anger, fear, hope, frustration and pride during that time were frequent in interpersonal interactions, social media and various online blogs[1]. International news and academic studies reported on the raised levels of emotionality in Turkish politics but the discussion of these emotions took for granted their origins and content (BBC, 2013; Mullen & Cullinane, 2013; Odağ, Uluğ, & Solak, 2016). In an original set of studies, Erisen

[1] See Facebook groups *Gezi Solidarity*, *Diren Gezi Parki* and *Taksim solidarity*, and Twitter hashtags #direngeziparki, #occupygezi, #direnturkiye, #direnistanbul #direndunya, #direnankara, #direnizmir, #DuranAdam which hosted Gezi related tweets.

(2013, 2017) tested the impact of anger, fear and enthusiasm on public attitudes of Turkish citizens towards their leaders, least liked groups in society, social mobilization, and risk perception related to ISIS and Syria. He found that these emotions were responsible for changes in citizens' 'risk assessments, threat perceptions, policy evaluations, information seeking, premiership approval and performance evaluations' (2013, p. 131). These findings highlight the value of the study of emotions in Turkey and generate new pressing questions. What gave rise to these emotions? What did these emotions 'mean' for the citizens that experienced them, and to which considerations were they attached? As we cannot assume a 'common citizen' reacting to political events, we also should not assume common experiences of anger, fear, hope or pride. Their content should be investigated to understand the origins of political actions and reactions.

Our study uses qualitative in-depth interview data from 2012 in Turkey to provide valuable insights on citizens' affective experiences. Because these experiences are rich, fluid and ever changing, we prefer the analytical category of *affect*, which contains emotions, but also moods, feelings, sentiments, and emotional traits (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018; Thagard, 2012). We explore under what conditions they arise and assist individuals to make sense of politics. We also take into account *ideological dispositions* to examine citizens' differential accounts of political events. As we show, uncovering the origins of political affectivity allows us to appreciate variation in political action and reaction. Our approach can be extended to examine the affective profile of recent spikes in unconventional participation or the controversial electoral outcome of 2018 in Turkey which has been characterized as following a downward turn to authoritarianism (Chrona & Capelos, 2017; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017; Tansel, 2018; White & Herzog, 2016).

2. Modelling Affective Experiences: Complex Reactions beyond Anger and Fear

Affect is one of the three mental functions alongside cognition and motivation (Reber, 1985, p. 15). As a general term *affect* is often used interchangeably with emotions but in essence affect is a fundamental functional category that concerns or arouses the emotional root of judgements and beliefs (Barrett, 2006). It is important to understand affective processes because together with cognition they drive thinking and decision-making (Damasio, 1994; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Emotions, feelings, sentiments and moods are all affect types combining cognitive appraisal and psychological perception (Thagard, 2012). Emotions, like love, hate, anger, fear, hope and pride are acute and momentary expressions of affect, which originate from cognitive appraisals and evaluations of the environment; they are bound to social expectations, and result in physiological changes that prepare an individual for action (Capelos, 2013).

In contrast to moods, which usually last longer, emotions are brief and distinct affective experiences. In addition, emotions are directed towards something, while moods are general and can have combined sources. Feelings refer to our conscious experience of our emotions but at times they can also be imperceptible. Sentiments (our likes and dislikes) and emotional traits last longer, but sentiments are directed towards an object while traits are personality characteristics and are generally directed at the world (Damasio, 2003; Frijda, 1994).

The spectrum of our affective experiences is approached by theories of *basic emotions* which identify a set number of discrete emotions each with distinctive patterns, like anger joy, fear, enthusiasm; by *circumplex model theories* (Russell, 1980) which propose the classification of affect along two key dimensions of arousal and valence; and *componential models* (Frijda, 1986) that see emotions sharing particular configurations on appraisal dimensions which can be grouped together (Ekman, 2003). Barrett (2006) points out that the boundaries between similarly-valenced discrete emotions are not as distinct as is usually assumed. Emotions fit a combination of appraisal clusters, which share co-relational themes (Lazarus, 1991).

Componential models explore these themes further and offer a topography of affect. The key mechanism for the elicitation of different emotions are the appraisals of the event as motive inconsistent or consistent (situational state), whether it involves a punishment or reward (motivational state), whether it is uncertain or certain (the event's probability), whether it is perceived as weak or strong (power) whether its negative or positive outcome is deserved (legitimacy) and whether the event is caused by circumstances, another person or the self (agency) (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 2005). Emotions are linked to combinations of appraisals (Scherer, 1984) and can bind together in affective clusters (Ekman, 2003). *Motive inconsistent* affect involves *aversive emotions* like anger and irritation which arise as response to the appraisal of an event seen as obstruction or infringement to reaching a goal or satisfying a need, with a possible action tendency to attack (Scherer, 2001). They also involve fear, worry and anxiety, the *anxious affectivity* cluster which unlike aversive affect, are generated in situations involving threat, demonstrating the tendency to withdraw to avoid contact (Frijda, 2004). Motive inconsistent is also affect generated in situations where the opportunity to obtain a reward is either lost or absent, experienced as sadness and disappointment (Sabini & Silver, 2005). *Motive consistent* joy and pride are elicited when the motivational appraisal of an event is beneficial, reward eliciting, within reach and deserved. Motive consistent situations with uncertain outcomes linked to the anticipated termination of a motive inconsistent event are experienced as hope (Roseman et al., 1990).

The study of appraisals raises the question of the temporal primacy of emotion versus cognition, which is dif-

ficult to settle. While some scholars assume the impact of emotions on evaluations of concepts, others note that the arrows can point inward, where the appraisals of concepts give rise to the emotions (Clore & Ortony, 2000). In addition, Lazarus, Kanner and Folkman (1980) note the high level of fluidity of affect: the same event may be appraised and reappraised in different ways over time, producing differing affective experiences. To complicate matters further, the experience of specific, distinct emotions arises partly from cultural knowledge about emotions (Barrett, 2006). This links to studies that show that emotions implicate social experiences and are the result of social interaction (Hochschild, 1979). *Socially enacted emotions* like compassion, embarrassment, shame, humiliation and guilt concern our *personal identity* as it relates to others. We also experience *collective emotions* that involve our *social identity* and generate shared experiences, strengthen social bonds but can also carve out rigid boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. Collective emotions are experienced in the plural, and like individual emotions, take specific expressions of anger, shame, pride, hope, fear and disappointment (Hatfield, Caccioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Rime, 2007; Ross, 2014). Moreover, the 'me' and the 'us' are interconnected as they arise from our interactions with the social and political environment (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007; Capelos, Exadaktylos, Chrona, & Poulopoulou, 2018; Jost, Nam, Amodio, & Van Bavel, 2014).

3. Complex Political Affectivity and Citizens' Preferences

The above highlights that our experience of affect in politics, in other words our *political affectivity*, is dynamic, relational, ambivalent and often contradictory (Capelos, 2013; Demertzis, 2013). Individual, social and collective political experiences give rise to discrete emotions, but also moods, feelings and sentiments, which often *bind together* as individuals describe how they feel. When we only measure citizens' individual discrete emotions and their effect on political decisions, we take a narrow approach that ignores the links between the experience of clusters of emotions and their associated cognitive representations. Our starting hypothesis is that affective experiences emerge from a variety of political concepts. Although moods, sentiments and feelings are often sidestepped in the examination of political affectivity due to the methodological domination of instruments that focus on discrete emotion measures, we postulate that citizens' political affectivity is richer and broader than quantitative survey accounts can capture. Hence, we test this hypothesis by using qualitative data, focusing on two key appraisal dimensions (situational and motivational state). Our analyses identify clusters of emotions, moods and feelings and their interconnections with salient political concepts that make up citizens considerations about politics.

Our first hypothesis is that *aversive affectivity* like anger, disgust, annoyance, or frustration will be associated with negative reactive attitudes towards political objects (Capelos, 2013). *Aversive affectivity* carries discontent and punishment related tendencies and promotes action without much deliberation. *Anxious affectivity* such as worry, uneasiness and fear is associated with avoidance and risk aversion behavioural patterns with the aim to reduce exposure to the source of anxiety so our second hypothesis is that it will relate to concepts that denote exposure to stressful stimuli but not inspire action. Third, in accordance with studies in psychology, we expect that sadness and disappointment will be related to the activation of memories of other misfortunes and failures and to ebbing away from any urge towards action (Frijda, 1994). Enthusiasm, joy and pride generate participatory practices and trust towards institutions, hope promotes altruism, and combined with efficacy promotes action readiness. Our fourth hypothesis is that pride will be observed when events are appraised as motive consistent and reward eliciting, and hope will be observed with the anticipated termination of motive inconsistent events (Capelos, Katsanidou, & Demertzis, 2017; Ekman, 2003; Frijda, 1986).

4. Ideological Orientations as Drivers of Political Affectivity

Different people in the same situation feel different emotions (Roseman et al., 1990). We therefore look beyond individual preferences to ideological orientations to understand differentiation in the sources of affectivity. *Political ideology*, being an externally generated, socially shared system of competing beliefs about the way society should function, structures individual thinking and responses, which in turn influence social and political reality (Conover & Feldman, 1984; Converse, 1964; Lane, 1962; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). Ideological orientations serve as foundations of individuals' mental structures: a pool of connotations that links motive consistent evaluations with preferred ideological inclinations, and motive inconsistent ones with least-preferred ideological principles (Markus & Zajonc, 1985).

In Turkey, the ideologies of Kemalism and political Islam dominate the socio-political structure[2]. The Kemalist inheritance advocated by centre-left CHP, embedded in the Constitution the secular and modern driven nature of Turkey. The neoliberal version of political Islam, advocated since 2002 by AKP, has tried to reconcile modernity and a version of conservative neoliberalism with Islamist principles (Ciddi, 2009; Gülalp, 2001; Kaya, 2015; Özbudun, 2006; Somer, 2007; Uyusal, 2011; Yavuz, 2006, 2009).

[2] *Political Islam* and *Islamism* refer to the political connotation of Islam and influence of religion in the socio-political arena. Political Islam is 'a form of instrumentalization of Islam by those pursuing political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition' (Denoeux, 2002, p. 61).

The nature of the ideological changes of the main advocators of political Islam and Kemalism have been thoroughly examined (Çarkoğlu, 2002, 2007; Taniyici, 2003; Yavuz, 2006). In addition, public opinion research offers complex models that point to the long-standing effects of the existing dichotomies and social cleavages as well as factors that shape citizens' electoral choices and political behavior such as centre vs. periphery, left-right ideology, political values, core personal values, economic considerations, education, interest and knowledge and ethnic and collective identity (Akarca & Tansel, 2007; Arikan, 2013; Başlevent, Kirmanioğlu, & Şenatlar, 2009; Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006; Çarkoğlu & Kalaycioğlu, 2007; Erdoğan & Uyuan-Semerci, 2017; Ergünder, 1980–1981; Erisen, 2016; Esmer, 2002; Kentmen-Çin, 2015; Mardin, 1973; Toros, 2014; Yilmaz, Sarıbay, Bahçekapılı, & Harma, 2016). However the interplay between ideological orientations and political affectivity has been underexplored in the Turkish context. Our hypothesis here is that motive consistent affectivity such as hope and pride will occur for concepts (parties, actors and issues) which align with an individual's system of beliefs. We also expect that motive inconsistent affectivity expressed as anger, frustration, disappointment, sadness, fear, worry, anxiety and uneasiness, will arise with concepts that contradict ideological inclinations.

5. Methodology

To test the above hypotheses, in-depth interviews were conducted in Istanbul with native Turkish citizens between July and September 2012 using snowball sampling[3]. Thirty-eight participants from diverse educational and socio-economic backgrounds were invited and twenty-five agreed to participate[4]. The interviewer spoke Turkish and English fluently and fourteen participants chose to speak Turkish while eleven opted for English, switching to Turkish as needed. The average duration of the interviews was 1 hour and 25 minutes and the overall duration of the recorded material was approximately 32 hours.

At the start of the interview a short survey measured demographics and ideological placement on three 7-point scales (Kemalism vs. political Islam, left vs. right orientations, and liberalism vs. conservatism) and participants were invited to discuss their responses. As the interview progressed to a general discussion of politics, participants were asked what made them feel as they did when they mentioned affect terms (discrete individual or collective emotions, moods, sentiments and feelings). We recorded their responses verbatim and identified the specific affect mentions.

Next we grouped affect items together in five clusters-families based on their key appraisal dimensions (situational and motivational state): *motive consistent gain-related* pride, joy, satisfaction, and admiration; *motive consistent loss-avoidance* related hope, expectation and anticipation; *motive inconsistent aversive affectivity* with expressions of anger, frustration, rage and irritation; *motive inconsistent anxious affectivity* with expressions of fear, worry, concern, uncertainty, and insecurity; and *motive inconsistent loss-related* disappointment, distrust, dismay, sadness, and pessimism. Based on our hypotheses we anticipated patterns in the concepts that were mentioned in reference to these emotions.

We organized the data using a variant of Cognitive Affective Maps (CAMs), which displays in diagrams the conceptual and emotional structure of people's views (Homer-Dixon, Milkoreit, Mock, Schroder, & Thagard, 2014)[5]. CAMs are used in psychology, cultural anthropology, sociology and political science, to describe cultural thought and action-potential for individuals and groups (Thagart, 2012)[6]. We created a master map (Figure 1) with concepts mentioned in relation to how participants felt about politics, and maps for each of the five affective clusters highlighting only the concepts mentioned in relation to the cluster (Figures 2 to 6).

Because our aim was to test hypotheses regarding the rich cognitive explanations of political affectivity (beyond positive and negative affect), our maps divert from traditional CAMs in three ways. First, the main frames are the affective clusters, so instead of identifying valence between concepts, the specific affective clusters are linked with the concepts that gave rise to them. The maps represent the main affect frame as the platform on which the related concepts are activated (rather than using lines to connect shapes). Second, our maps do not provide a comprehensive account of concepts related to Turkish politics. Instead, we focused on concepts associated with how participants *felt* about politics. Third, our maps do not account for associative strength because it was not possible to assess this reliably from our qualitative interviews.

[3] Snowball sampling (non-probability) relies on referrals from initial subjects to identify hard-to-reach subjects, when materials are sensitive. Snowball and respondent-driven samples can provide asymptomatically unbiased estimates (Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004; Snijders, 1992).

[4] Of the 25 participants, 20 (80%) were 18–29 years old and 5 (20%) were 30–49 years old; 14 were men (56%) and 11 were women (44%); most were employed in the private sector (tourism, private tutors, bank, school teachers) and 2 unemployed; 88% obtained or were studying for an undergraduate or postgraduate degree and 12% had a high school degree; 64% were middle class, 20% upper-middle, and 16% lower- middle; 60% voted for CHP, 24% for AKP voters, 8% for MHP and 8% for TKP.

[5] CAMs visualize citizens' cognitive and affective conceptual structures (Homer-Dixon et al. 2014; Thagard & Findlay, 2014). The main frames (key concepts) connect into a network that represents systems of beliefs, with links highlighting complex associations. Changes in associative strength (weak or strong) vary the thickness of the line that connects the main frames, and changes in valence (positive or negative) vary the colour of shapes (green for positive, red for negative). CAMs track the affective framework tagged to the respective cognitive process and allow for the evaluation of emotional coherence by modelling the associative power of positive and negative values, which can change or remain constant across individuals (Thagard, 2006).

[6] CAMs have been used in small-N studies (see Wolfe, 2011, interviews with 25 participants), as well as analyses of negotiations and documents (see Findlay & Thagard, 2014; Homer-Dixon et al., 2014).

6. Findings

Our overall hypothesis was that affect is experienced in a variety of complex and fluid formulations rather than a handful of emotions like anger, fear or hope. In our interviews we identified 259 affect mentions expressed as individual and collective emotions, feelings, moods and sentiments, grouped into five affect clusters on the basis of their situational and motivational state appraisals. The richness of our data suggests that using a few discrete emotion labels to identify citizens as 'angry', 'afraid', 'or 'enthusiastic', ignores more nuanced expressions of individual and collective affect. In addition limiting the affective content of concepts to 'positive' and 'negative,' does not do justice to citizens' complex affective worlds.

Our first CAM examined the origins of all affective mentions and showed that they were linked to a variety of political objects: political leaders and parties, religion, current affairs, issues such as individual rights and freedoms, oppression, and social and political stability versus change (Figure 1). Next, we analysed each affect cluster separately and identified the concepts linked specifically to each one (Figures 2 through 6). Our aim was to examine whether affective reactions originate from a common core of concepts or differ in content based on their appraisal dimension.

Our second and third CAMs examined motive consistent affect like pride, admiration, joy and hope. Figures 2 and 3 show them linked with favourable ideological orientations and party preferences. The justifications offered by the interview participants regarding the way they felt pointed to motive consistent ideological orientations and objects congruent with their preferences and vote choices. Figures 4, 5 and 6 highlight the particularities of motive inconsistent affect, and its links with unfavourable ideological orientations, issues and political actors. On the whole, we noticed that participants reported affect that span across the five dimensions confirming our theoretical expectations. In addition, their affective experiences were rich and at times ambivalent. For example symbols like the flag or the picture of Ataturk inspired pride but also worry, the AKP governance tactics were a source of hope but also anger, actions that undermine democracy were linked to anger, fear, worry and disappointment.

Focusing specifically on motive consistent affect, we expected that gain-related and loss-avoidance affectivity would have different origins (Figure 2 and 3 respectively). Motive consistent, gain-related affective expressions such as pride, joy and enthusiasm, were mentioned 28 times mostly for the Turkish flag and/or the picture of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Figure 2). They were also linked to secularization and modernization values, the nation, and ideological party preferences. More specifically, eleven participants reported feeling proud when looking at the Turkish flag, considering it a significant



Figure 1. Map of concepts linked to political affectivity.

symbol for them and the society. Four AKP supporters viewed it as a national symbol of unity, combined with religion. Two MHP supporters focused on the significance of the flag for Turkish citizens and national unity. For six CHP supporters the flag brought pride and admiration for the secularist ideas it represents.

Motive consistent, gain-related pride appeared in complex interactions with motive inconsistent affect. Four participants indifferent about the flag or the picture of Ataturk when they were in Turkey, felt pride when seeing them abroad. For some others, the excessive use of both symbols generated anger and disappointment. Others experienced ambivalence: nine noted that although they felt proud for the Turkish flag and the picture of Ataturk, their excessive use created negative feelings. In the words of P5:

> Especially in the last years you can see the flag pretty much everywhere. Although I am proud to be Turk, seeing the flag in every place doesn't make me feel comfortable. You know it resembles with very negative situations where the flag dominates all spheres of life.

Motive consistent loss-avoidance considerations giving rise to hope, were mentioned 16 times, and linked to opposing government practices, supporting freedoms and rights, and future economic development (Figure 3). AKP supporters hoped that conservative AKP forces (representing the Islamists) *would not* dominate the party and the country's future, and that AKP would continue the positive change in society and harmonize social relations, 'ending the domination of conservative Kemalists'. The country's economic development under the AKP rule also created hope among these participants. For AKP opponents however, hope had a different meaning. Characteristically one participant (P1) noted:

> To walk down the streets promoting our rights…it's the only hope we have left and the only tool we have against Erdoğan and AKP.

Ten CHP supporters felt hopeful when discussing the role of CHP's socio-democratic agenda as the sole opposition to AKP. Two MHP voters were hopeful that their party leader (Bahçeli) would enhance the party's position as a constructive opposition to the AKP. Two extreme-left supporters, disappointed with Turkish politics hoped for the creation of a new party to be the real oppositional force against the AKP governance.

Next, we turned to motive inconsistent affectivity (Figures 3, 4 and 5). All three motive inconsistent affective clusters (aversive, anxious and loss-related) were linked to state control and oppression; violation of individual rights and freedoms; the policies, agenda and influence of AKP; actions that undermine democracy; the



Figure 2. Map of motive consistent gain-related affect.



Figure 3. Map of motive consistent loss-avoidance related affect.

future of the country; past religious oppression; oppositional ideologies and societal polarization. This highlights the value of the question we posed early on: what are the mechanisms and origins that underlie affective phenomena.

Looking specifically at the *map of aversive affect* in Figure 4, anger, frustration, annoyance, rage and irritation were mentioned 113 times, in discussions of dominant ideologies, key political actors, certain policies, democratic principles and individual freedoms and rights as well as state-generated oppression.

About 17 participants expressed aversion for the dominant ideological orientations and their key political advocators. They disliked the AKP attempts to promote the party as agent of conservative neoliberalism while violating individual rights and freedoms. Two were frustrated with the AKP Islamist agenda and the aim 'to convert the Turkish state into a conservative Islamic state'. Four were angry with the control of the judiciary, the media and the armed forces. Kemalist supporters disliked the 'false promises about democracy', the 'limitation of personal freedoms and rights', and the increased role of religion. According to P23 (CHP voter):

> I get really angry when I hear that AKP is a party promoting human rights and freedom. Come on. AKP is a party that has taken a series of measures that go against public rights and freedoms in the name of its religious conservative agenda. It is governing the country by oppressing individuals, reducing our freedoms and generating a widespread feeling of fear.

Five were angry with conservatives' disapproval of public behaviours like drinking or women smoking, and three mentioned individual rights restrictions with examples of friends or relatives being under investigation or prosecuted. Six were averse to AKP's power to silence oppositional voices, and five were frustrated with the 'never-ending conflict' between supporters of political Islam and Kemalism. The socio-political environment and the pressure from political Islam and Kemalism were sources of anger, and also loss-related affect like deep disappointment, sadness and pessimism about the future of Turkey. We see here clear evidence of affective experiences spanning across the motive inconsistent clusters.

Two participants were angry with fanatic supporters of both sides. As P1 said:

> 'Kemalists that shout at women with headscarves', 'making tattoos with Ataturk's signatures'; 'the police [following the government's orders] targets people that drink beer on the streets'.

Three AKP supporters were angry at CHP and Kemalist forces that historically imposed rules of life and oppressed religious segments. A CHP supporter felt angry



Figure 4. Map of motive inconsistent aversive affect.

because in the past citizens lived together but since 2005 tolerance decreased and polarization increased. 17 participants with divergent ideologies supported religious freedoms and the placement of religion in the private sphere, and the high levels of religiosity generated aversive emotions. Four socio-democrats CHP voters did not see the Islamic culture and traditions as posing a danger to the country and democracy, but expressed anger and frustration wanting religion to remain a private matter and society to be open for the individual expression of religious beliefs. Two AKP supporters acknowledged the importance of religion in Turkey, yet noted that all citizens should have religious freedom of expression. AKP supporters also expressed anger and annoyance against the past religious oppression generated by Kemalist elites.

As we saw earlier, symbols like the Turkish flag and pictures of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were linked to aversive affect in addition to pride. Six noted the extensive use of both symbols in spaces such as banks, shops, restaurants and schools, which makes citizens feel that these are 'holy untouchable symbols' (P1) and that having the flag 'in every corner makes you feel that someone is trying to impose on you a sense of national identification' (P17). One AKP supporter and one anarcho-communist said that having the picture of Ataturk was undemocratic and closer to dictatorial systems. Two AKP voters felt angry seeing pictures of Ataturk everywhere although they respected the ideology he represented, while a nationalist MHP supporter felt angry with the Kurdish BDP:

> BDP is under the control of PKK. It makes me very angry to know that a party is allowed to propagate in support of a terrorist organisation and play a legitimate role in politics. (P14)

For CHP and extreme-left supporters, aversive affect was also linked to value preferences towards individual freedoms and liberties and the role of women in society. They expressed anger when talking about mandatory military service, violence and attacks against LGTB people, social policies towards women in general, the enforcement of power and open provocations against oppositional voices, the expanding role of religion, the increase of Imam Hatip schools over secular education, and political life in general because 'there are no choices left for us anymore' (P1).

Motive inconsistent anxious affectivity was mapped in Figure 5. It was expressed as fear, worry, concern, anxiety, uncertainty and insecurity was mentioned 45 times often in combination with aversive and loss-related affectivity when discussing the political Islam-Kemalist conflict, the AKP domination, restrictions of freedom and individual rights, the AKP influence on the police and security forces, and the future of democracy. Items linked primarily to anxiety were minority and women's rights,



Figure 5. Map of motive inconsistent anxious affect.

the Syrian crisis, terrorism, fanaticism, and concerns over national unity. Ideological leanings were again important for these experiences.

Three extreme-left participants expressed fear towards fanatic Kemalists and political Islamists voting for CHP and AKP respectively, who 'legitimize social polarization and undermine the country's democratic establishment'. Another source of anxious feelings was social and political instability identifying specific social groups as threats (Kemalists, hard-line Islamists, Kurds, terrorist groups), depending on the participants' ideological and political orientation. According to P2:

> Whoever wants to change the current situation and impose their own reality can play a significant destabilising role for Turkey. And these groups are many and too dangerous.

Citizens were also afraid of the high polarization, were anxious about the way social conflicts will unfold socially and politically, and tensions among friends, colleagues and family. An AKP supporter (P19) feared that once the economic state of Turkey starts 'the downward slide then tolerance will definitely collapse and underlying problems that are currently hidden will come to the surface'. CHP and extreme-left participants were scared to follow modern European-like lifestyles mentioning violations of individual rights and freedoms and state control over citizens, the AKP's oppression and the consequences for expressing views, beliefs or ideas that oppose the government and its status quo.

Uncertainty about the future of democracy was mentioned by two participants who worried about the increasing influence of the AKP government on security forces and the police. They had experienced fear of/or prosecution directly (themselves) or indirectly (their friends) and worried about the role of the police towards those that express dissent against the government or the Prime Minister. Two AKP supporters also expressed worry about the party's administration and future plans, and noted that by securing a healthy economy, social life would improve. CHP and extreme-left supporters expressed worry and uncertainty for the inability of other political agents to play a decisive role against AKP. As P23 noted:

> I'm very worried about the future of democracy in Turkey. AKP has a very strong support and it seems that the more power they get the more invasive there are in the society with their practices.

Six female AKP opponents reported fears about Turkey's increasing Islamization and its impact on women. Four male extreme-left supporters and CHP voters were also afraid of compromises to women's rights to abortion. Eight AKP opponents expressed fear and concern for

the country's future because of the increasing power acquired by Erdoğan and 'Turkey turning into a dictatorship'. A similar fear (concern for the future) was expressed by two liberal AKP supporters.

Finally we examined motive inconsistent loss-related affect in Figure 6. It was expressed as disappointment, distrust, and pessimism, mentioned by 21 participants, and appeared often alongside aversive and anxious affect.

AKP opponents expressed deep disappointment and pessimism about the increasing role of Islam, freedoms and human rights undermined by the AKP governance. As one participant noted:

> I don't have trust for my future. Not anymore. I am even thinking of moving abroad maybe to Germany where I already have some family members. I am worried about how things will unfold; and what worries me the most is that no one feels free anymore to express opposition or an alternative position. If there was a healthy dialogue among political actors that would be one thing but when you lose that then you lose your hope.

7. Discussion

Our interviews in 2012 in Turkey point to complex affective experiences, which were neither static nor singular. Hope, pride, joy, anger, irritation, frustration, fear, worry, anxiety, uncertainty, sadness and disappointment were felt towards a variety of political objects, in complex blends and sometimes ambivalent systems. Our affective maps indicate the diverse sources of affect, drawing on considerations of religious or civic freedom, expressions of hope towards change and the strengthening of current conditions, anxious reactions towards security, the present and the unknown, disappointment for the state of democracy, pride for national symbols, and joy for how far the country has come. We also learned that affect aligned with ideological inclinations, confirming our hypothesis that emotions are differentiated by the appraisals of the events that trigger them. Based on the above, we think it is not meaningful for empirical models to split citizens into mainly angry, afraid or happy groups. Obtaining a deep understanding of what citizens think, feel and want allows for a better grasp not only of the mechanism that moves individual political behaviour but also of political process itself.

A critical examination of our study recognizes certain limitations. The small sample size does not allow us to perform powerful statistical analysis and significance testing. In addition, because our sample was non-probabilistic the findings are not representative of the Turkish population. This is counter-balanced by being able to uncover the underexplored complexities of political affectivity. This study invites further investigations with larger interview samples, which will challenge sim-



Figure 6. Map of motive inconsistent loss-related affect.

plified approaches to emotions, and complement evidence on the significance of affect currently on offer by standard public opinion surveys.

By analysing our interview data with CAMs we were able to produce comparable maps of political concepts related to the expression of affectivity in Turkey. We focused on situational state (motive consistency versus inconsistency) and motivational state (gain or loss) appraisals to identify key affect-clusters. Future studies can expand to appraisals of power, legitimacy and agency. They can also measure appraisals directly, by asking participants to rate the event that caused their emotion on indicators of the hypothesized appraisals. For example, legitimacy predictions of a positive deserving outcome is characteristic of anger, but also pride, joy and hope, while a negative deserving outcome is characteristic of guilt (Scherer, 1988).

Our interview data allowed us to study naturally occurring affects recorded in the interviews rather than laboratory-induced emotions. So while authenticity is high, we are not able to test causal hypotheses. Experimentally induced emotions, moods or sentiments would have lower ecological validity but would gain in control of the scenarios manipulated. Experimental studies would be excellently suited to test the cause-effect links between specific event appraisals and their affective reactions (Capelos, 2013).

With the above in mind, the next step is to extend and replicate these findings using larger interview samples. Once the representativeness of the results is established, experimental and computational simulation models can test hypotheses about the role of specific affective clusters and their related appraisals on evaluations of specific political objects. Another promising and hitherto neglected area is to examine whether similar patterns are evident in group discussions and focus-group activities. This would allow for interesting comparisons between individual and collective affective experiences.

8. Conclusion

Since our 2012 interviews, Turkey has undergone a series of events that placed the country in an extended state of emergency that lasted for 2 years and left significant marks in the country's social and political spheres. Following Gezi and the 2016 attempted coup, the state launched a massive crackdown targeting all oppositional voices. This resulted in the arrest of thousands of civil servants from the armed forces, as well as teachers, academics, health workers and media representatives over alleged links with the Gülen movement. Many non-governmental organisations working on human rights and individual freedoms were banned and closed down and political figures were imprisoned, on alleged connections with terrorist organisations (see the arrested members of the pro-Kurdish HDP).

A few studies looked at the recent changes in the public sphere offering insights into the way that the public and in particular activists organize and act (Bee, 2017; Bee & Kaya, 2017). Several scholars have pointed to the creation of new social dynamics that relax the clear-cut boundaries of secularism-Islamism (Acar & Uluğ, 2016; Bayramoğlu, 2009; Damar, 2016; Turam, 2015). The 2013 and 2016 political developments generated a new wave of strong emotions that shook again the social and political life of Turkey. Public sovereignty, democratic principles and individual rights and freedoms served as key mobilising agents, pointing to deep-rooted divisions and polarization even as the secularism-Islamism boundaries have become more fluid (Bayramoğlu, 2009; Capelos & Chrona, 2012; Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007; Göle, 2013; Turam, 2015).

A working hypothesis for future research is that the country's increasing authoritarianism outstrips the relaxed boundaries across existing divisions, reiterating and reinforcing new types of polarisation founded on traditionally oppositional ideologies. As Akarca and Başlevent (2011) put it, cultural, ethnic and socio-economic elements that bring together segments of the population can create clear-cut divisions in the country's public sphere. Our findings suggest that ideological orientations shape different affective worlds; this could be the key for understanding how citizens negotiate their political identities amidst the current turbulent environment, and warrants further investigation.

We close with an invitation for the rigorous, comprehensive and systematic study of political affectivity. Moving beyond a handful of discrete emotions, towards a careful examination of the cognitive representations of specific affect clusters allows us to engage seriously with the content of expression of anger, hope, pride, joy, irritation, fear, worry, concern disappointment, loss in the Turkish context and beyond. Here we identified considerations that set these emotions apart, and others that connect them, as they form rich affective experiences. Evidence that emotions matter abounds, in recent studies that examine UK's Brexit, Trump's reactionary America, anti-globalization and anti-elite populist narratives, challenges of European integration, the gained support of far right, extreme and radical movements and parties, energy and climate change debates, the drivers and consequences of international crises of migration, the emotional economy of austerity politics, the internal functioning of international institutions (see Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; and in this issue Koschut, 2018; Palm, 2018; Sanchez Salgado, 2018; Skonieczny, 2018; Weber, 2018).

We found that affective reactions in 2012 in Turkey were rich, interconnected, ideologically consistent, and linked to evaluations of multiple political objects. Research on political affect can contribute to the in-depth study of intergroup and intercultural relations as well as current and future political developments in these heated times. Importantly, it can offer insights into the impact and viability of specific political models and practices in contemporary developed and developing democracies.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Loyalty and Secret Intelligence: Anglo–Dutch Cooperation during World War II

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Abstract
Secrecy and informal organisation produce, sustain, and reinforce feelings of loyalty within intelligence and security services. This article demonstrates that loyalty is needed for cooperation between intelligence partners as well as within and between services. Under many circumstances, loyalty plays a larger role in the level of internal and external collaboration than formal work processes along hierarchical lines. These findings are empirically based on the case study of Anglo–Dutch intelligence cooperation during World War II. By demonstrating that 'loyalty' critically affects the work of intelligence communities, this article contributes to current and future research that integrates history, intelligence studies, and research on emotions.

Keywords
emotions; history; informal organization; intelligence; international relations; loyalty; secrecy; World War II

Issue
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1. Introduction

Secret intelligence is the missing dimension in the history of international relations, as Christopher Andrew and David Dilks argued (Andrew, 1998; Andrew & Dilks, 1984, p. 1). Since this famous observation, a new generation of scholars has challenged this neglect, leading to the emergence of 'intelligence studies' as a new field of historical research. We now know more about the operational history of intelligence and security services, their sources and methods, and to a lesser extent, their role in political decision-making processes. For example, we know that secret services can be of decisive operational and political importance, as shown by the significance of signals intelligence (SIGINT) for the Allied victory of World War II, the decisive role of Stalin's spies in copying Anglo–American plans to build an atomic bomb, and the repressive and ever-present East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit ('Stasi') (Childs & Popplewell, 1996; Lichter, Loeffler, & Siegloch, 2015).

However, we still know little about the social fabric that binds intelligence communities together. Scholars of intelligence primarily focus on the (at times spectacular) operational history of services, putting adventurous agents and their handlers in the limelight, who seem to act in a strategic and calculated manner. This focus neglects both a broader selection of intelligence personnel and the less-adventurous emotions that influence their actions, which have not been given much thought when reflecting upon intelligence and its institutions. More knowledge on a broader variety of internal socio-cultural factors and dynamics and better insights into structural characteristics and factors of influence contribute to our understanding of intelligence communities and similar organizations that deal with classified information. Relating to the growing body of literature on emotions in international relations (Clément & Sangar, 2018, pp. 3-4), this article contributes to current and future research that integrates history, intelligence studies, and research on emotions. I show how loyalty as an emotion may become institutionalized within secret services (Crawford, 2014).

In this article, I argue that secrecy and informal organization produce, sustain and reinforce feelings of loyalty in the socio-cultural structure of intelligence and se-

curity services. Loyalty is crucial to the level of cooperation between intelligence partners, within and between services. As such, I argue that loyalty, as a building block of the relationship between individuals, plays a larger role in the level of internal and external intelligence cooperation than formal work processes which occur along hierarchical lines. In order to assess the role of loyalty in intelligence communities, I focus on the Dutch secret services-in exile in London and their British counterparts during World War II. We know Dutch wartime intelligence history mainly through the lens of operational *causes célèbres* such as the Venlo-incident (1939) in which the Sicherheitsdienst trapped two SIS officers and a Dutch officer (e.g., De Jong, 1969), the disastrous Englandspiel (1942–1943) that drove 40 agents on Dutch soil right into German hands, eventually killing most of them (e.g., Foot, 2005a, 2005b; Wolters, 2005), and the motives of the double agent Christiaan Lindemans, nicknamed 'King Kong' (De Graaff, 1997). Lou de Jong's work on wartime intelligence (De Jong, 1979) has a broader strategic-political and socio-cultural focus. For the purposes of this article, de Jong's work has proven particularly interesting due to the combination of its detailed operational account and its eloquent and detached insights into the characteristics of the Dutch wartime intelligence community. Finally, the meticulous, encyclopaedic work of Kluiters (1993) provides an impressive amount of detailed information on services' official tasks, organisation, addresses, dates, and agents.

The case study of the Dutch secret services-in-exile and their British counterparts is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First, during World War II the Dutch intelligence community was forced to collaborate not only internally, but also externally with their British counterparts on whom they depended heavily. The relatively high, external dependence (or low organizational autonomy), strong internal dependency relationships, and the 'young' age of the Dutch organizations involved, make it a case in which it is likely that loyalty would strongly influence working relationships. At the same time, the secret nature of the work of intelligence communities, as further noted below, seems to encourage loyalty-based relationships. Even if the wartime secret services-in-exile are an atypical context for 20th and 21st centuries intelligence and security services, the secret environment in which the services functioned make it to a large extent a typical case study with relatively broad external validity for contemporary and historical intelligence organizations.

Second, this case study provides us with unexplored historical sources giving insights into the specific emotions that shaped the socio-cultural characteristics of the Dutch intelligence community. A most valuable, detailed and colourful historical source to partly reconstruct the socio-cultural atmosphere of the Anglo–Dutch wartime intelligence community are the reports of the post-World War II Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the Policy of the Wartime Government-in-Exile. This commission was set up in 1947 to hold the government-in-exile retrospectively accountable due to the lack of parliamentary oversight during the war. This commission, initially aiming to complete its work within one year, worked between 1947 and 1956 and produced eight large reports in 20 volumes. These contain the commission's findings and, more interesting for the purpose of this article, the word-for-word testimonies of 850 witnesses. Five out of these eight volumes relate to the Dutch secret services-in-exile.

Another valuable source is the 'London Archive' of the Ministries of the Interior and of General Affairs in the Dutch National Archives. It contains, for example, information on Dutch personnel, correspondence between ministers and heads of Dutch services and their British opposite numbers, reports on the training of agents as well as on the division of labour between Dutch and British services. Also, the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam has a small number of files on the 'Bureau Inlichtingen'. Finally, this research draws on memoirs of individuals involved in the Dutch wartime intelligence community.

Below I first conceptualize loyalty in secretive environments and then briefly introduce Anglo–Dutch intelligence cooperation during World War II. The empirical part of the article scrutinizes the two phases (crisis and recovery) of the Dutch services' work, the key players, and their collaboration with their British opposite numbers. In conclusion, I assess how secrecy and informal organization sustain and reinforce feelings of loyalty in intelligence communities, and I suggest ways to further integrate research of emotions into intelligence studies.

2. Conceptualizing Loyalty in Secretive Environments

'Loyalty' is a special attachment to a state ('our country, right or wrong'), an individual or an organisation (Hirschman, 1970, p. 77). In the context of this research 'loyalty' concerns the attachment to individuals (colleagues) and organisations (the Dutch secret services-in exile and/or their British counterparts). It is related to, but distinctive from sympathy. While 'sympathy' is understood as a feeling of likeness and recognition towards another person (Schliesser, 2015), I understand 'loyalty' is possible on both the individual and the group level. 'Loyalty' presupposes that feelings of sympathy towards another individual are related to the other's affiliation and the connotations that this affiliation evokes. As such, loyalty can be closely related to individual and collective interests, and can also be understood from the perspective of path dependency. In the empirical section of this article, I analyse first-hand descriptions of interaction between (groups of) individuals who show strong feelings of (unconditional) likeness and recognition towards the other.

The secretive environment of intelligence and security services is likely to reinforce feelings of loyalty. Loyalty becomes part of a mutually, beneficial and reciprocal

relationship in which secrets and loyalty are exchanged between organizational members (Blau, 1964, p. 30). In addition, a shared secret can bring great joy, relief and intimacy with others who share the same secret (Bok, 1989, pp. 36-37). It fosters a strong sense of community (Braat, 2012; Gusterson, 1998), so strong that keeping the secret can become more important as a purpose than any other specific purpose the community officially has (Bok, 1989, p. 46). Accordingly, secrecy functions as an organizing principle of social relations: it sets barriers and presupposes separation, between the secret and the non-secret, between insiders and outsiders, creating and reinforcing feelings of loyalty among the secret-keepers (Horn, 2011, p. 110). Members of the insiders' community, well-organized and tightly knit, may feel superior vis-à-vis the often unorganized community of outsiders. In this sense, (the pretence of) secrecy strengthens the elitist nature and the social exclusiveness of the group of insiders and raises the walls between insiders and outsiders (Simmel, 1906, pp. 486–487, 489).

Feelings of loyalty within the insiders' community are further strengthened because secrecy may function as a means to wield power. Being part of a secretive community is a means to increase one's influence and to maintain and strengthen the status quo. Accordingly, the use of secrecy by governmental bureaucracies extends far beyond the functionally motivated secret (Weber, 2013, pp. 992–993, 1271), and may have a self-reinforcing effect: the socio-cultural and political benefits of secrecy incite more secrecy.

3. Disentangling the Anglo–Dutch Intelligence Community during World War II

No other policy area of the Dutch wartime government-in-exile, the Parliamentary Commission stated, required so many hearings as the area of military and civil intelligence. This was 'an extraordinarily elaborate and complex' subject. 'The number of questions was so abundant and problems appeared to be so intensely interwoven, that two years were needed to manage this information and to process it in such a way that could result in a good overview of the matter' (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4AB, p. 2). Even Minister of War Van Lidth de Jeude, responsible for the Dutch subversive services between 1942 and 1945, had clearly lost track, and complained in June 1942 that 'there are now so many commissions [sic] that overlap and obstruct each others' work that I am getting mind-boggled' (Lidth de Jeude, 2001, p. 727). Indeed, there was a large number of Dutch intelligence and subversive services which succeeded each other, worked in parallel, and completed or overlapped each other's work, as Figure 1 clarifies.

Secret services-in-exile were essential in order to know what was going on in occupied Holland. Queen Wilhelmina even considered the services the most important of all government institutions-in-exile (according to van 't Sant, as cited in De Jong, 1979, pp. 843, 973). They gathered military and political intelligence through the Centrale Inlichtingendienst (CID) and the Bureau Inlichtingen (BI), and they committed subversive acts through the Bureau Voorbereiding Terugkeer (BVT), Bureau Militaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer (MVT) and the Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten (BBO). The Allied forces, including the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), prioritized military intelligence, aimed at collecting data on the number of German forces in The Netherlands, and the location of their headquarters and military stock points. Political intelligence, aimed at grasping public opinion and the needs of the resistance movement in occupied Holland, was of mostly Dutch interest. Therefore, it remained a secondary matter throughout the war, sometimes to considerable frustration of the Dutch intelligence community. Sabotage, finally, was of British and later Allied interest and was intended to harm the German presence in occupied Dutch territory. It was the field of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Dutch subversive services.



Figure 1. Schematic overview of the Dutch secret services-in-exile by years in function, May 1940–May 1945 (Kluiters, 1993). Abbreviations: CID: Centrale Inlichtingendienst (Central Intelligence Service); BI: Bureau Inlichtingen (Bureau Intelligence); BVT: Bureau Voorbereiding Terugkeer (Bureau for the Preparation of the Return to the Netherlands); MVT: Bureau Militaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer (Bureau for the Military Preparation of the Return to the Netherlands); MID: Militaire Inlichtingendienst (Military Intelligence Service); BBO: Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten (Bureau for Special Assignments).

The Dutch gathered military and political intelligence and committed sabotage through nine services and several separate intelligence channels.[1] Each service collaborated either with the Dutch section of SIS under W.J. Hooper (until December 1940), then C.E.C. Rabagliati (until June 1942) and finally C.O. Seymour, or with the Dutch section of SOE under R.V. Laming (until autumn 1941), Ch.C. Blizard (until August 1942), S. Bingham (until November 1943), and finally R.I. Dobson. Seymour, Laming, Blizard and Bingham all spoke fluently Dutch.

4. The Years of Crisis

On 10 May 1940, Germany invaded The Netherlands. Three days later Queen Wilhelmina escaped to London and the Dutch government followed her soon after. On her journey to London, the Queen was accompanied by François van 't Sant, a former chief superintendent of police in The Hague and former liaison officer of GS III, the Dutch security service before World War II. An enigmatic and stern man both respected, feared and hated, he had become the subject of numerous rumours (Van der Zee, 2015). Nevertheless, van 't Sant had become Queen Wilhelmina's confidant, a position he had earned by preventing scandals due to the Queen's unfaithful husband Prince Hendrik (De Jong, 1979, pp. 844–859; Verburg, 2001, pp. 274, 378–388). Upon arrival in London, he became head of the first secret service-in-exile.[2] And although he would not remain in this position for long, his presence in London would leave a strong mark on the functioning of the subsequent Dutch secret services and their collaboration with their British opposite numbers. In many ways Francois van 't Sant—with his secretive nature, the personal and exclusive character of his connections, and the strong feelings of loyalty and animosity he aroused—exemplified some important characteristics of Dutch intelligence during the war.

During the wartime years, the Dutch secret services experienced a long period of institutional and operational crisis (1940–1942/1943) followed by a period of recovery (1943/1944–1945). The years of crisis, between July 1940 and November 1942, were characterized by feelings of both loyalty and rivalry. Several services succeeded each other rapidly and there was hardly any operational continuity or success.

Francois van 't Sant headed the first intelligence service CID, founded on 19 July 1940.[3] He was strongly supported by Queen Wilhelmina and, more importantly, he was the only Dutchman with whom Menzies, head of SIS, wanted to collaborate and whom he trusted (De Jong, 1979, p. 861). Van 't Sant was a familiar face to SIS; during and after World War I he had successfully established and maintained connections between GS III and SIS (De Jong 1979, p. 845). Indeed, van 't Sant had proven to be a keen assistant to his British opposite numbers, even though he had strong British opponents too. For example, Laming, the first head of SOE Dutch section, was convinced van 't Sant was unreliable, he refused to work with him, and made it a personal quest to convince others of his suspicions against van 't Sant. Finally, possibly because of his quest against van 't Sant, he was transferred to another position (De Jong, 1979, pp. 836–837). In Dutch governmental and resistance circles van 't Sant also suffered from a rather negative reputation. He was considered a traitor and a 'sinister figure' (De Jong, 1979, p. 972; Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4AB, p. 32). A later head of a Dutch subversive service, van Oorschot, declared that 'van 't Sant meddled with everything. He was a dictator.…We escaped Hitler and his likes and we got van 't Sant instead' (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 342).

Van 't Sant's CID was based in 77 Chester Square and had four members as of August 1940. It had to establish connections with occupied Holland and coordinate intelligence activities from the departments of Justice, War, and Home Affairs. Van 't Sant collaborated harmoniously with Hooper, head of SIS Dutch section. He collaborated even more harmoniously with Hooper's successor, Euan Rabagliati, 'a lean, impeccably dressed short Englishman' (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 130). Van 't Sant and Rabagliati intensified their collaboration when Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions, Chris Krediet and Peter Tazelaar, offered to work for them. The 'Hazelhoff Roelfzema group' became noted for establishing a risky transportation service between the Dutch and English coasts. Of all drop-offs at the Dutch coast, the most innovative drop off was the one from Tazelaar at Scheveningen, near The Hague, in November 1941. As a convincing guest of the pro-German dancing party in Scheveningen, Tazelaar defied the wave breakers and arrived at the beach in a 'waterproof cocoon' within which he was dressed in a dinner jacket, sprinkled with a substantial amount of rum (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 546).

Hazelhoff Roelfzema considered he was serving the Dutch Queen directly, rather than any Dutch bureaucratic intelligence organisation. Not surprisingly, he entitled his memoirs 'Soldier of Orange' in which the Queen figured as a distant mother.[4] Van 't Sant had provided Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions with an office and apartment behind 77 Chester Square, where van 't Sant himself, Queen Wilhelmina and Prince Bernhard had their offices. The choice of this location indicates a degree of likeness and appreciation between the Queen, Van 't Sant and Hazelhoff Roelfzema. Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions lived in a coach house, next to the Queen's garage and with a view on van 't Sant's office. Hazelhoff Roelfzema considered the 'Mews',

[1] I specifically exclude the Bureau voor Bijzondere Aangelegenheden, which functioned between 8 February 1941 until mid-June 1941 and came under the Ministry of War. Its work and influence seem negligible (Kluiters, 1993, pp. 102–103).
[2] With the general term 'secret service' I refer to all Dutch security, intelligence and subversive services. I specify when needed.
[3] All addresses, dates of foundation and liquidation of services are from Kluiters (1993).
[4] The Dutch Queen is a member of the House of Orange-Nassau.

as he called it, 'his base and all official Dutch services outside the Mews as hostile' (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 122). Even if Hazelhoff Roelfzema did as he pleased, lacked modesty and was difficult to keep in check, he made a good match with van 't Sant and Rabagliati, who he affectionately nicknamed 'the Rabbi' (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 132). Their collaboration was to outlast van 't Sant's brief period as official head of service:

> The reason why we got to van 't Sant', Hazelfhoff Roelfzema explained later, 'was that he was the only man in the whole of London who could get things done when you needed something. Every time I needed backing and special things, I went to van 't Sant. All Dutchmen who escaped the Netherlands and arrived in London in 1940-1941 to join the Allied forces…eventually all ended up with van 't Sant. They all knew that under his guidance something happened at least. We needed someone important who supported us. (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, pp. 544–545)

On van 't Sant's position in relation to SIS Dutch section and the Hazelhoff Roelfzema-group, Hazelhoff Roelfzema wrote in his memoirs that:

> From the moment the Rabbi…entered the scene, the Mews were fully on steam. We collaborated directly with SIS where nothing seemed impossible. Nevertheless, van 't Sant mysteriously remained the centre of the enterprise….It seemed as if we were involved in an important family project of which General van 't Sant, modest, silent, in the background, nevertheless firmly retained the lead. (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, pp. 132–133)

Van 't Sant had a diplomatic approach to his British opposite numbers. This amounted to an efficient way of acquiring his say in controlling contacts with the Netherlands without, however, explicitly demanding more influence. According to himself, this was due to his basic assumption that:

> We worked jointly for the greater goal, and the English were in the lead in England. So we provided assistance to the English through our local knowledge of Dutch contacts and circumstances and we gave our most able fellow compatriots to contribute to this goal. But the highest leadership has always been with the English; they were, after all, the experts on intelligence services in their country. (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 486)

Even if SIS preferred military intelligence, van 't Sant made sure to 'satisfy…those who wanted to know something positively' (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 483). By this he meant Queen Wilhelmina and several ministers. They were accustomed to turn to van 't Sant every time they required non-military information, for example about an individual's political inclination or reliability.

Accordingly, van 't Sant had surrounded himself with a number of influential actors in the intelligence community, who appreciated the combination of van 't Sant's servitude toward the British services and his skills in obtaining operational means. These loyal individuals were his British opposite numbers, Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his companions, Prime Minister Gerbrandy, Queen Wilhelmina and her son-in-law Prince Bernhard.

By the summer of 1941 van 't Sant's position as head of the service became difficult as he was plagued by persisting rumours, in the Netherlands and London, that he was responsible for arrests by the Sicherheitsdienst in the Netherlands, and the rumours continued until the end of his life (De Jong, 1979, pp. 863–870). On 14 August 1941, R.P.J. Derksema succeeded him in the second CID, which had about ten members. Derksema, a former lawyer, lacked management skills and had little sense of security. He was, according to Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 'a charming, friendly man, way too decent for the tough world of secret services' (Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 2005, p. 128). Under his leadership, he did not manage to send out even one agent (De Jong 1979, pp. 888–889). Rabagliati refused to work with him and objected that 'nothing ever happens there. There are never any results. They cannot be galvanised into action' (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 543). Hazelhoff Roelfzema complained that 'from Derksema I didn't get the slightest support. Every time I wanted to talk to him, he was on leave' (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 542). 'While we were all possessed with that sense of urgency….The less business we had to do with them [from the CID], the better we worked' (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 544). Prime Minister Gerbrandy, however, did not seem to care much for the weak guidance of the CID because he knew that van 't Sant continued to collaborate with Rabagliati and Hazelhoff Roelfzema behind the scenes and outside the realm of the CID. Not only did Gerbrandy know about this rather singular construction, he supported it (De Jong, 1979, p. 833). Correctly, Rabagliati described van 't Sant's dismissal as head of the service as 'kicking him out through the front door and letting him back in again through the back door' (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, pp. 515–516). And not surprisingly, relations between Derksema and Rabagliati were bad, and collaboration between the CID and SIS Dutch section was negligible.

Besides these personal rivalries and the loyal bonds between the trinity Hazelhoff Roelfzema-van 't Sant-Rabagliati that by-passed Derksema, there were other reasons for the poor relations between the CID and SIS Dutch section. Derksema had a radically different approach to working with Rabagliati and obtaining the control he wished to have on operational matters. In the first meeting he had with 'the English' he 'explicitly required that [he] have a bigger say in the future deployment of

agents than the Dutch institutions had had until then. [He] wanted to be completely informed of the aim of the missions, the preparations etc'. What Derksema probably did not realise well enough was that van 't Sants diplomatic approach had, unofficially and implicitly, provided him with substantial knowledge and influence on operational matters. Derksema further hardened his position, and between August 1941 and the beginning of 1942, he refused to provide new agents for deployment to SIS (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C2, pp. 1110–1111). Rabagliati, in turn, found it 'impossible to work with the man' (van 't Sant, as cited in Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C2, p. 1565)

With Colonel M.R. de Bruyne, Derksema's successor, relations with SIS Dutch section deteriorated even further and reached an all-time low in the spring of 1942. De Bruyne assumed office on 5 February 1942 and resigned on 31 May 1942; frustrated, disillusioned, and tired of intelligence work. His character was surely a significant contributory factor as were the loyal bonds between Hazelhoff Roelfzema, van 't Sant, and Rabagliati who continued working behind his back, irritating him severely.

De Bruyne was 'fully reliable and straightforward', as Minister of War Van Lidth de Jeude (September 1942–February 1945) described him. 'A fair soldier', he continued, 'but politically completely unskilled, who has become the victim of those who are more experienced in the profession' (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, pp. 692, 712, 812, 973–974). 'Completely honest', according to Hazelhoff Roelfzema, 'he didn't appear to me as the typical intelligence guy' (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 550). De Bruyne preferred to stick to his own concepts and ideas, he was proud, with little fantasy and little flexibility, and he liked to see hierarchical relations respected (De Jong, 1979, p. 900). He was also anxious not to be bypassed.[5] De Bruyne, like Derksema, decisively launched himself into a power struggle to acquire more control of contacts with occupied Holland. His personality, keen on clear agreements, openness and hierarchy, was not able to solve the matter in a diplomatic way.

The 'small clique' of Hazelhoff Roelfzema (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, p. 692), which officially worked under de Bruyne's supervision but in practice ignored him completely, was another source of irritation to de Bruyne. Hazelhoff Roelfzema's powerful supporters also annoyed him, van 't Sant in particular (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 450).

> Every time I went to Chester Square, I noticed Rabagliati was talking to van 't Sant. I did not know anything about the finer points of the Hazelhoff Roelfzema-case. So I said to Rabagliati: what are you doing here? He would say: these are matters that are none of your business.…So I stopped sharing information with van 't Sant, but Rabagliati was informed on everything and he used to tell everything to van 't Sant. The effect was therefore zero. (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 453)

De Bruyne and Rabagliati were in violent dispute, and in the subsequent months, the situation exacerbated even further, with Hazelhoff Roelfzema's and van 't Sant's loyalty to Rabagliati being the principal source of unrest within the Anglo–Dutch intelligence community. As a result, de Bruyne resigned in May 1942 and Minister Van Lidth de Jeude noted in his diary that: 'the "clique" had won the battle again' (Van Lidth de Jeude, 2001, p. 704).

While de Bruyne led the CID and maintained his embittered relations with Rabagliati, he also led the subversive services BVT and MVT: the Dutch opposite numbers of SOE. De Bruyne's relations with SOE concerned primarily Blizard and Bingham, heads of SOE's Dutch Section, Hambro, deputy head of SOE, and Gubbins, head of operations at SOE.

In the course of 1942, SOE approached de Bruyne with the purpose to arrive at some degree of collaboration in sending out agents to the Netherlands for sabotage activities. In April 1942 this resulted in the 'Plan for Holland', and in June 1942 the first agents were sent out and BVT and SOE started collaborating on a more structural basis. However, the realisation of the 'Plan for Holland' had to first overcome the obstacle of de Bruyne's insistence that he acquire more control over operational matters.

From the summer of 1942, de Bruyne, worn out by his power struggle with Rabagliati, began distancing himself from intelligence and subversive matters. And in November 1943 the first disconcerting signs of the tragic Englandspiel were noticed: the German Abwehr had captured Dutch agents who had been dropped by SOE into the Netherlands and repeatedly fooled SOE into sending more agents, eventually resulting in 54 deaths.[6] As a result, De Bruyne was no longer allowed to collaborate with SOE and in February 1944, when the full extent of the Englandspiel was discovered, de Bruyne resigned. The MVT, including the MID, ceased to exist.

5. Sudden Recovery

The years of crisis ended around 1943/1944 with the Bureau Inlichtingen (BI), the Dutch intelligence service,

[5] De Bruyne's fear to be bypassed is shown in his following correspondence: Neave to de Bruyne, 29 November 1942 in: National Archives, Nr. toegang: 2.13.71, *Ministerie van Defensie te Londen; Ministerie van Oorlog te Londen en afwikkeling daarvan*, Bestanddeel: 2166, *Correspondentie met kapitein A.M.S. Neave inzake de samenwerking met de Engelse inlichtingendienst*, de Bruyne to Van Lidth de Jeude, 21 April 1943, de Bruyne to Van Lidth de Jeude and Somer, 2 November 1943, and de Bruyne to Van Lidth de Jeude and Gerbrandy, 10 July 1944 in: National Archives, Nr. toegang: 2.13.71, *Ministerie van Defensie te Londen; Ministerie van Oorlog te Londen en afwikkeling daarvan*, Bestanddeel: 2394, *Correspondentie met het bureau Militaire Voorbereiding Terugkeer van het ministerie van Oorlog*.

[6] The Englandspiel has attracted scholarly and more speculative attention. The idea that the Englandspiel agents were deceived by SOE instead of the Abwehr is widespread, especially in the Netherlands (for example, see Wolters 2005). The most convincing and elaborative accounts of the Englandspiel remains de Jong (1979) and Foot (2005a). Wolters and Foot disagreed sharply concerning the Englandspiel (see Foot, 2005b, pp. 241–243).

and the Bureau voor Bijzondere Opdrachten (BBO), the Dutch subversive service, as new actors within the Dutch intelligence community. This was 'the last chance' to organize a new Dutch subversive service and to find a means to collaborate efficiently, as Lord Selborne, then minister of Economic Warfare and responsible for SOE said to Gerbrandy. With BI and BBO, the Dutch services finally acquired a larger say in agents' training, assignments, and communications; Anglo–Dutch collaboration became more efficient, fairly equal, and competition softened considerably. Strikingly, the change had been sudden rather than gradual. Undoubtedly, the discovery of the Englandspiel contributed to this turning point. And possibly, the years of rivalries, incompetence and inefficiency prompted fatigue and the willingness to change among several actors within and outside the intelligence community.

BI's existence was steady, its personnel diligent, and its collaboration with the British efficient especially when compared to the years of crisis. Its most influential head of service was J.M. Somer, a major in the Dutch East Indies Army and former staff member of GS III. Under Somer, BI played a leading role in the Dutch intelligence community until the end of the war. Even if quick-tempered, keen on a fight, provocative in his extramarital contacts and his authoritarian views, (De Jong, 1979, pp. 949–953) Somer was the right person to head BI. Under his guidance, BI managed to collaborate with SIS on an almost equal footing, in the fields of agents' recruitment, training, and assignments. (De Jong 1979, pp. 957–958) Simultaneously, Hazelhoff Roelfzema disappeared from the centre of attention and as the principal source of unrest within the Dutch intelligence community.

On the subversive side, BBO armed and trained the Dutch Forces of the Interior that were created in September 1944 to coordinate the Dutch resistance, and it collaborated with SIS and SOE (De Jong, 1979, p. 960). After the discovery of the Englandspiel BBO was a fresh start with initially no office and no personnel. Head of service Major-General J.W. van Oorschot, former head of GS III, staffed BBO together with two colleagues. All three agreed that 'we need to change, collaboration with the English should become much heartier' (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, p. 344; De Jong, 1979, pp. 964, 967–968). And indeed, Anglo–Dutch collaboration became 'very pleasant', and Dobson, head of SOE Dutch section, was 'a very suitable man to work with', Van Oorschot explained (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, pp. 344–346). Even if SOE Dutch section was responsible for technical matters, BBO and SOE Dutch section collaborated on an almost equal footing.

Van Oorschot was not easily offended, a calm and modest person, conscious of what he knew and what he did not. And importantly, one of his key concerns was to avoid fights:

> If secret services fight, they won't get much work done. That's the biggest disaster there is. I always told [my colleagues De Graaf and Klijzing]: whatever you do,…never get into a fight.…Because you'll start competing with each other and you'll keep things concealed from each other and you'll get nothing but trouble.' (Enquêtecommissie, 1950, vol. 4C1, pp. 345–346)

6. Conclusions

Nobody within the Dutch intelligence community made better use of secrecy as a means to foster loyalty and wield power than van 't Sant. It suited his personality and it came naturally to him. He never properly explained his actions and hardly left any written accounts of his involvement in intelligence matters: no agreements on his collaboration with Rabagliati, no diary, and no memoirs. Together with Eric Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Euan Rabagliati, and Queen Wilhelmina, he was in his native element in informal organisational forms.

Loyalty was a major determinant in the level of collaboration within the Dutch intelligence community and between the Dutch and British intelligence communities. This case study suggests the existence of an inverse correlation between a strong emphasis on personal loyalty and informal relations in intelligence relationships, on the one hand, and a certain level of professionalism and organisational stability on the other. As such, it argues that loyalty has two interrelated force multipliers: secrecy and informal organisation. First, shared secrets sustained and reinforced the loyal bonds between Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Van 't Sant, Rabagliati, and Queen Wilhelmina. These bonds of loyalty disregarded and thwarted formal work processes along bureaucratic and hierarchical lines. The Hazelhoff Roelfzema group was spectacular in terms of the social and institutional turmoil it caused within the Dutch intelligence community and its counterproductive effect on formal intelligence collaboration. Derksema and de Bruyne—as outsiders—underestimated the strong ties, fostered by secrecy, among members of this group. Naively, they expected to be included in the circle of insiders by forceful demands or by official agreement.

Second, informal organisation strengthened loyalty as a basis for efficient collaboration. During the years of crisis, the Dutch services functioned informally, allowing ample leeway for the 'clique' of van 't Sant to carry out business as usual, based on feelings of loyalty. Only after the discovery of the Englandspiel Anglo–Dutch intelligence collaboration was formalized (instead of personalized) and its efficiency improved. As the prominent significance of loyalty receded to the background, Anglo–Dutch collaboration finally professionalized.

Intelligence and security services are an inherent part of international relations. Arguments in favour of research on emotions in the field of international relations, as put forward by for example Bleiker and Hutchison (2018), also apply to intelligence studies. Moreover, the secretive environment of intelligence is likely to mag-

nify certain emotions and increase their significance in intelligence communities, such as trust, distrust, and fear. Research on emotions in intelligence communities could add to our knowledge on, for example, the motivations of intelligence officers and agents, the psychological benefits and costs of operational work, and community feeling. Also, the great importance of emotions in the relationship between a case officer and his agent can hardly be overstated, even though systematic analysis of this topic is scarce in intelligence literature. Research on these topics would require the use of (historical) sources such as interviews, memoirs, and personal files. By adding emotions to the dominant operational focus of intelligence studies we can further deepen our understanding of intelligence communities and, as such, contribute to a further professionalization of the field of intelligence studies.

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Conflict of Interests

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