

## Status Threat, Campaign Rhetoric, and U.S. Foreign Policy Supplementary Material

### 1. Status and National Identity Survey Results

The same survey experiment from Study 1 also contained a descriptive component.<sup>1</sup>

First, I asked a series of questions about American national identity to understand how status factors into American national identity.

#### Importance of Beliefs to Consider Oneself American

	Not at all or not very important	Somewhat or very important
Believing in individual freedom	6%	94%
Believing in democracy	12%	88%
Believing that the United States is exceptional	31%	69%
Believing that the United States is the greatest country in the world	37%	64%
Believing that the United States ought to be the world leader	35%	66%

**Table S1.** Responses to a question asking “Some people say that believing the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How important or unimportant do you think believing in each of the following things are to being American?”

Indeed, as shown in Table S1, large majorities of Americans see believing in individual freedom and believing in democracy as important to being American. Additionally, however, strong majorities also see believing that the United States is and ought to be exceptional, the greatest country in the world, and the leading power in the world are important if one wants to identify as American.

As a result of a significant majority of Americans associating believing in American exceptionalism, believing that the United States is the greatest country in the world, and believing that the United States ought to be the world leader with identifying as American, facing a situation where the United States declines in status to the point where another country is now seen as the world’s dominant superpower or the United States shares superpower status with a group of other countries is not only upsetting to many Americans, but it makes them question the country they know and rethink their national identity.

<sup>1</sup> Respondents completed a distraction task between the experiment and the descriptive component. There were no spillover effects from the experiment to the descriptive portion, as one’s treatment condition did not significantly affect any of these answers. Pre-registration for the descriptive survey can be found at [https://aspredicted.org/T1Y\\_XKY](https://aspredicted.org/T1Y_XKY). Non-experimental presented in the Supplementary Material are weighted by gender, region, age, education, race and ethnicity, rurality, and 2020 presidential vote.

### Effects of Hypothetical American Decline on National Identity

	Another country is now seen as the world's dominant superpower.	United States shares superpower status with a group of other countries
The United States would not feel like the country I know in this situation.	54% agree, 21% disagree	48% agree, 23% disagree
I would be sad, disappointed, and/or ashamed in this situation.	46% agree, 27% disagree	38% agree, 33% disagree
I would be less proud of my American identity in this situation.	24% agree, 45% disagree	25% agree, 45% disagree

**Table S2.** Responses to how Americans would react if the United States was overtaken. The question read: “Regardless of where you feel the United States stands in the world relative to other countries, we would like you to imagine a hypothetical future where...” and then respondents were randomly assigned to read one of the two scenarios in the second and third columns of the top row.


As Table S2 shows, a plurality of Americans say they would react negatively if the United States were no longer seen as the world’s dominant superpower, whether that be because another country overtook the United States or because of a shift to a more evenly multipolar international system. Americans agree by a two-to-one margin that the United States would not feel like the country they know in this situation and significant percentages say they would be sad, disappointed, and/or ashamed. As a harder test of the extent to which status decline represents a threat to a core part of many Americans’ national identity, one in four agreed that they would even be less proud of their American identity in this situation.

Finally, I also asked four questions gauging the strength of respondents’ national identities and one question asking them to rate their own anxiety over ongoing or potential national decline. The national identity questions read:

1. I am proud to be an American.
2. I would rather be a citizen of the United States than of any other country in the world.
3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the United States.
4. The fact that I am American is an important part of my identity.

The anxiety over ongoing or potential national decline question read: “Some Americans do not see the U.S. as in decline, or even if they do, are not too anxious or worried about it. Others see the U.S. as currently or soon to be in decline and feel anxious and/or uneasy about it. On a scale of 1-10, how anxious or uneasy does the prospect of ongoing or potential American decline make you?”

Figure S1 shows that there was a strong bivariate relationship between each of these measures of national identity and anxiety over national decline. These relationships remained statistically significant with various sets of controls.



**Figure S1.** Bivariate regressions plotting the relationship between various measures of national pride, national identity, and agreement with statements that the respondent would rather live in the US than anywhere else and that the world would be better if more countries were like the US on the x-axes and anxiety over decline on the y-axes.

Because of the high Cronbach's alpha between the four measures of national identity (0.89), I put them into one measure and plot the regressions, shown in Table S3, with status anxiety as the dependent variable to further show the strength of the relationship even with various sets of controls included.

**Table S3.** Relationship Between National Identity (4-question average) and Status Anxiety

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Anxiety over Decline		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
National Identity (4-question average)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)
Party: Independent	0.02 (0.19)		-0.06 (0.20)
Party: Republican	0.72*** (0.19)		0.63*** (0.20)
Age 30 to 44		-0.35 (0.24)	-0.38 (0.23)
Age 45 to 54		0.07 (0.27)	0.05 (0.26)
Age 55 to 64		-0.25 (0.27)	-0.27 (0.26)
Age 65+		-0.33 (0.29)	-0.38 (0.29)
Race: Black		-0.49** (0.22)	-0.31 (0.22)
Race: Asian		0.70* (0.38)	0.73** (0.37)
Race: Multiple		-0.05 (0.28)	-0.003 (0.28)
Race: Other		0.16 (0.35)	0.28 (0.34)
Gender: Male		-0.41*** (0.15)	-0.44*** (0.15)
Gender: Non-Binary		-0.70 (0.57)	-0.61 (0.56)
Education: Some College		0.02 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)
Education: College		-0.21 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.16)
Education: Postgrad Degree		-0.26 (0.25)	-0.19 (0.26)
Region: Midwest		0.43* (0.26)	0.41 (0.26)

Region: South		0.19 (0.23)	0.16 (0.23)
Region: West		-0.18 (0.26)	-0.22 (0.26)
Income: 25k to 50k		-0.002 (0.19)	-0.10 (0.19)
Income: 50k to 75k		0.03 (0.24)	-0.06 (0.24)
Income: 75k to 100k		0.53** (0.26)	0.45* (0.27)
Income: 100k+		0.07 (0.27)	-0.01 (0.27)
Constant	3.81*** (0.25)	3.96*** (0.36)	4.03*** (0.38)
Observations	2,273	2,213	2,213
Log Likelihood	-5,817.12	-5,635.56	-5,619.31
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,642.23	11,315.13	11,286.62
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

## 2. Study 1

Pre-registration can be found at [https://aspredicted.org/4LN\\_896](https://aspredicted.org/4LN_896).<sup>2</sup>

### Experimental Script

You will now read about a hypothetical scenario about a future presidential election in the United States and a candidate who campaigned for and won the presidency.

A candidate for president was elected after a long and difficult campaign season. In the campaign, the candidate was highly critical of the sitting president.

Control (1/2)	Status Treatment (1/2)
<p>The candidate brought up several issues that they had with the current administration. In campaign speeches, debates, and ads the candidate criticized the administration in office for not doing enough to improve the quality of [technological innovation/the military].</p> <p>In one debate, the candidate remarked, “I think it is a good idea to work to improve American [technological innovation/military strength]. This is an area where I believe we can do better than what we currently are.”</p>	<p>The candidate accused the current administration of being responsible for American decline at the hands of its rivals, saying that their “unpatriotic complacency” is responsible for the U.S. “losing the race for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.” In campaign speeches, debates, and ads the candidate criticized the administration in office for falling behind as its competitors out-compete and overtake the United States in quality of [technological innovation/the military].</p> <p>In one debate, the candidate remarked, “I think it is a good idea to work to improve American [technological innovation/military power]. If we fail to act, I fear that historians in ten years will look back on today as the moment the United States’ run as the world’s top superpower came to an end.”</p>

**Table S4.** Experimental conditions for Study 1.

1. For the next two questions, we would like you to rate your confidence in the leader's ability to do different actions once in office. What percent chance do you think there is that the candidate will do each of the following once in office? Slide the bar between 0% and 100% to indicate your answer.
  - a. Advocate for increased spending on [innovation in technology/the military]
  - b. Successfully pass spending increases on [innovation in technology/the military]
2. Is the candidate’s debate quote that you read a promise to invest in technological innovation?
  - a. Yes
  - b. No
  - c. Not sure
3. Please briefly explain why you do or do not expect the candidate to advocate for increased military spending once in office.

<sup>2</sup> For the experimental component, inattentive respondents were filtered out, as detailed in the pre-registration.

## 3. Regressions for Figure 2


<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Technology			Military		
	Advocate	Succeed	Promise	Advocate	Succeed	Promise
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.001 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.06** (0.03)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.08*** (0.03)
Constant	0.65*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.01)	0.43*** (0.02)	0.66*** (0.01)	0.57*** (0.01)	0.49*** (0.02)
Observations	1,127	1,125	1,127	1,153	1,153	1,155
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0000	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.01
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.01
Residual Std. Error	0.24 (df = 1125)	0.24 (df = 1123)	0.50 (df = 1125)	0.25 (df = 1151)	0.24 (df = 1151)	0.50 (df = 1153)
F Statistic	0.002 (df = 1; 1125)	3.20* (df = 1; 1123)	4.24** (df = 1; 1125)	4.68** (df = 1; 1151)	2.77* (df = 1; 1151)	7.59*** (df = 1; 1153)

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S5.** Regressions for Figure 2

#### 4. Open-Ended Responses Analysis

The open-ended responses further confirmed the extent to which respondents viewed the status treatment as promissory relative to the control group, despite both containing the same belief statement that the candidate “believe[s] it is a good idea” to increase spending. Figure S2 shows that the most common topic identified in the open-ended responses was a simple one; the candidate said they were going to increase spending, so the respondent expected them to increase spending. Receiving the status threat treatment had no effect on likeliness of responding with this topic (Topic 5). However, the next three most referenced topics reveal the perceived increased commitment brought upon by status-threatening rhetoric.



**Figure S2.** Top ten topics to appear in open-ended responses. Categories generated using the ‘stm’ package in R.

The next three most referenced topics concerned failed promises and lying politicians (Topic 7), the United States falling behind (Topic 8), and the United States declining from or losing its top spot (Topic 3). Figure S3 below shows that respondents in the treatment condition were substantially less likely to comment about failed promises and lying politicians and significantly more likely to comment about the United States falling behind or losing its top spot in the world.



Four most common categories:


Topic	Top Word Stems
Because they said so	spend, candid, increas, advoc, expect, innov, current, administer, critic, advoc, passion, debat, budget
Failed promises, lying politicians	promis, get, offic, politician, make, campaign, anyth, congress, elect, get, lie, parti, polit, main, politician, interest
America falling behind	technolog, believ, countri, behind, fall, way, feel, advanc, believ, america, technolog, futur,
US decline from top spot	will, state, sure, import, issu, power, world, top, unit, senat, priorit, lose

**Table S6.** Most common words mentioned for four categories generated by 'stm' package in R.

### Examples

- *Because they said so*: "I expect the candidate to advocate for increased spending because they have been very vocal about the current administration not doing enough."
- *Failed promises, lying politicians*: "Because politicians always promise everything to get elected but never follow through."
- *U.S. Decline from Top Spot*: "The candidate stresses that the advancement of technology is key to keeping the United States the top superpower, and failure to do so will lead to the loss of our leadership and influence in the world."
- *America falling behind*: "I do believe the candidate feels strongly about investing in technology innovations. His speech makes clear his serious concerns about the U.S. falling behind other countries. In these days of rapid technological advances that fear rings true."

### Status Anxiety Treatment Effects on Probabilities of Open-Ended Topics



**Figure S3.** Structural topic model showing the effect of the treatment on probability of the open-ended response being a member of one of the four most common topics.

The open-ended findings therefore yield additional support to the quantitative findings. Specifically, respondents reading the status threat treatment were significantly less likely than those in the control group to cite politicians' failed promises, lying, or obstruction from Congress as their rationale for their answers.

## 5. Study 2

Pre-registration can be found at [https://aspredicted.org/84X\\_FJ3](https://aspredicted.org/84X_FJ3).<sup>3</sup>

### Experimental Script

You will now read about a hypothetical scenario about a future presidential election in the United States and a candidate who campaigned for and won the presidency.

A candidate for president was elected after a long and difficult campaign season. In the campaign, the candidate was highly critical of the sitting president.

The candidate accused the current administration of being responsible for American decline at the hands of its rivals, saying that their "unpatriotic complacency" is responsible for the U.S. "losing the race for the 21<sup>st</sup> century." In campaign speeches, debates, and ads the candidate criticized the administration in office for falling behind as its competitors out-compete and overtake the United States in quality of technological innovation.

In one debate, the candidate remarked, "I think it is a good idea to work to improve American technological innovation. If we fail to act, I fear that historians in ten years will look back on today as the moment the United States' run as the world's top superpower came to an end."

*You will now read a brief update of what happened after the election.*

T1 (no follow through, no excuse): After becoming president, they decided not to advocate for increased funding to improve American innovation in technology.

T2 (follow through): After becoming president, they advocated for and eventually signed into law a new bill that increased funding to improve American innovation in technology.

T3 (pivot to cooperation): When asked to defend their decision to not support the bill despite their previous rhetoric, the president said that they made a mistake treating innovation in technology as a contest between countries that can be tallied on any box score. Instead of looking to be competitive, the president said that they wanted to pursue cooperation with geopolitical rivals so both countries could focus on bettering themselves and work towards a greater good.

---

<sup>3</sup> Inattentive respondents were filtered out, as detailed in the pre-registration.

T4 (pivot to military): When asked to defend their decision to oppose the bill despite their previous rhetoric, the president said that they were still fiercely defending America from its decline, but after recent developments, they came to the decision that the US needed to instead focus its spending on improving its armed forces, not on improving innovation in technology, in order for the United States to avoid falling further behind in the race for the 21st century.

T5 (pivot to education): When asked to defend their decision to oppose the bill despite their previous rhetoric, the president said that they were still fiercely defending America from its decline, but after taking office and receiving new information, they came to the decision that the U.S. needed to instead focus its spending on improving its quality of education, not on improving innovation in technology, in order for the United States to avoid falling further behind in the race for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

T6 (partisan attack): When asked to defend their decision to not support the bill despite their previous rhetoric, the president, the president argued that the bill written by [OUT-PARTY] in Congress was so flawed and filled with waste that it would actually hurt America's standing in the world more than it would help it, even if it did seek to direct funds to innovation in technology.


**Table S7.** Experimental treatments for Study 2.

#### Study 2 Dependent Variables

- From what you read, we would now like to ask you about some of the traits that you think do or do not apply to the candidate. Following their campaign rhetoric and decision once in office, how would you rate the candidate in each of these areas on scales from 0 to 100? [randomize order]: Honest, Trustworthy, Authentic, Caring, Strong, Patriotic, Effective, Competent
- Under this president, do you think the United States' standing in the world would increase, decrease, or stay about the same?
- From what you read, what percent of your neighbors or people in your community do you think would vote for this leader when they are up for re-election?
- From what you read, how would you rate your personal feelings towards this leader on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 being that you strongly dislike them and would not be interested in voting for them and 100 being that you like them a lot and would vote for them.
- Thinking about the leader's legacy after their time in office is up, how weak or strong do you think they will be remembered when it comes to foreign policy? [0 to 100 scale ranging from very weak to very strong, neutral in the middle]
- From what you read, how likely would you be to vote for a leader like this one? (extremely unlikely to extremely likely Likert scale)
- How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (strongly disagree to strongly agree Likert scales)
  - a. This leader is a liar.
  - b. This leader broke a promise.
  - c. Regardless of whether or not I agree with this leader, I think they are genuine when they speak.
  - d. This leader seems to care about making the United States better.

## 6. Study 2 Additional Results and Regression Tables


The findings reported in the main text for Study 2 held for all dependent variables. Figure S4 shows that when a leader follows through on their rhetoric with action, respondents were significantly more likely to vote for them and rate them more positively, electable, and strong, relative to a candidate that did not follow through. Leaders who used the partisan attack excuse or pivoted the arena in which they were tackling American decline from technological innovation to education or the military still fared better than leaders who made no excuse for their inaction.



**Figure S4.** The top figure shows treatment effects on 0 to 100 rating of the leader, estimated percentage of neighbors who would vote for that leader for re-election, and 0 to 100 rating of whether their legacy on foreign policy will be seen as very weak (0) to very strong (100). The bottom figure shows treatment effects on the likelihood that the respondent would vote for the leader for re-election.


Figure S5 shows that leaders who do not follow through were more likely than those who do to be seen as a liar and as breaking a promise and less likely to be seen as genuine or caring about making the United States better. However, like above, excuses can mitigate these perceptions slightly. Leaders who

used the partisan attack excuse or pivoted to education or military were less likely than those who used no excuse to be seen as a liar or as breaking a promise.



**Figure S5.** Experimental treatment effects on the extent to which respondents agreed (5) or disagreed (1) with several statements about the leader.

These results therefore show strong support for my hypotheses; leaders can use partisan attacks or divert status threat to another issue to slightly mitigate the political and personal damage to not following through on their prior status-threatening rhetoric, but even those who do not follow through and make an excuse still face significant damage to their image, electability, and legacy relative to those who do follow through.



**Figure S6.** Experimental treatment effects on 0 to 100 ratings of how well (100) or poorly (0) various traits describe the leader. The reference group for these regression results is leaders who did not follow through once and office and offered no excuse as to why.

**Table S8.** Study 2 Regressions for Trait Ratings

Baseline category = Leader did not follow through, offered no excuse

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Authentic (1)	Honest (2)	Competent (3)	Effective (4)	Patriotic (5)	Trustworthy (6)	Strong (7)	Caring (8)
Followed Through	47.73*** (2.78)	48.34*** (2.85)	40.87*** (2.77)	45.47*** (2.77)	43.02*** (2.94)	47.31*** (2.67)	43.64*** (2.87)	36.00*** (2.76)
Partisan Attack	18.95*** (2.86)	19.78*** (2.94)	13.06*** (2.85)	7.96*** (2.85)	18.84*** (3.03)	18.39*** (2.75)	14.81*** (2.96)	18.57*** (2.84)
Pivot to Cooperation	2.81 (2.88)	3.99 (2.96)	4.87* (2.87)	3.26 (2.87)	4.53 (3.05)	4.03 (2.77)	2.40 (2.98)	7.08** (2.86)
Pivot to Education	15.83*** (2.84)	18.76*** (2.92)	16.43*** (2.83)	15.58*** (2.83)	20.79*** (3.01)	16.13*** (2.73)	13.01*** (2.94)	20.77*** (2.82)
Pivot to Military	10.85*** (3.00)	11.18*** (3.08)	13.90*** (2.98)	15.53*** (2.98)	19.91*** (3.17)	11.72*** (2.88)	12.46*** (3.10)	13.62*** (2.98)
Constant	16.43*** (1.98)	15.01*** (2.04)	27.77*** (1.97)	23.75*** (1.97)	23.62*** (2.10)	12.28*** (1.91)	22.99*** (2.05)	16.63*** (1.97)
Observations	933	933	933	933	933	933	933	933
R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.28	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.30	0.24	0.18
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	0.28	0.22	0.27	0.21	0.29	0.24	0.17
Residual Std. Error (df = 927)	25.64	26.31	25.50	25.50	27.14	24.65	26.50	25.45
F Statistic (df = 5; 927)	75.28***	72.01***	52.19***	69.67***	51.97***	77.82***	58.34***	39.88***

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S9.** Study 2 Regressions for Favorability, Electability, and Legacy Ratings  
Baseline category = Leader did not follow through, offered no excuse

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	0 to 100 Rating of Leader	Percent of Neighbors Who Would Vote	0 to 100 Strength of Legacy	How Likely Respondent Would be to Vote for Leader
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Followed Through	37.45 <sup>***</sup> (2.55)	22.85 <sup>***</sup> (2.13)	37.98 <sup>***</sup> (2.44)	1.48 <sup>***</sup> (0.11)
Partisan Attack	15.79 <sup>***</sup> (2.62)	10.77 <sup>***</sup> (2.19)	11.73 <sup>***</sup> (2.51)	0.53 <sup>***</sup> (0.11)
Pivot to Cooperation	4.35 <sup>*</sup> (2.64)	4.37 <sup>**</sup> (2.21)	3.70 (2.53)	0.12 (0.11)
Pivot to Education	17.32 <sup>***</sup> (2.60)	9.93 <sup>***</sup> (2.18)	9.88 <sup>***</sup> (2.49)	0.66 <sup>***</sup> (0.11)
Pivot to Military	12.21 <sup>***</sup> (2.75)	7.81 <sup>***</sup> (2.30)	13.53 <sup>***</sup> (2.63)	0.46 <sup>***</sup> (0.12)
Constant	16.91 <sup>***</sup> (1.82)	29.70 <sup>***</sup> (1.52)	21.50 <sup>***</sup> (1.74)	1.69 <sup>***</sup> (0.08)
Observations	933	933	933	933
R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.12	0.24	0.20
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.12	0.24	0.19
Residual Std. Error (df = 927)	23.48	19.63	22.50	1.01
F Statistic (df = 5; 927)	52.15 <sup>***</sup>	26.22 <sup>***</sup>	59.66 <sup>***</sup>	45.32 <sup>***</sup>

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



**Table S10.** Study 2 Regressions for Agreement with Statements About Leader  
Baseline category = Leader did not follow through, offered no excuse

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Leader is a liar	Leader broke a promise	Leader is genuine	Leader cares about making US better
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Followed Through	-1.79*** (0.11)	-2.08*** (0.11)	1.66*** (0.11)	1.62*** (0.11)
Partisan Attack	-0.82*** (0.12)	-0.41*** (0.11)	0.70*** (0.12)	0.82*** (0.12)
Pivot to Cooperation	-0.14 (0.12)	0.03 (0.11)	0.07 (0.12)	0.25** (0.12)
Pivot to Education	-0.72*** (0.12)	-0.26** (0.11)	0.62*** (0.12)	0.88*** (0.11)
Pivot to Military	-0.37*** (0.12)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.45*** (0.12)	0.71*** (0.12)
Constant	4.15*** (0.08)	4.35*** (0.08)	1.81*** (0.08)	2.16*** (0.08)
Observations	933	933	933	933
R <sup>2</sup>	0.25	0.37	0.23	0.21
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.25	0.37	0.22	0.21
Residual Std. Error (df = 927)	1.06	1.00	1.05	1.03
F Statistic (df = 5; 927)	62.78***	110.63***	54.90***	49.49***

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S11.** Study 2 Regressions for Likely Change to US Status  
Baseline category = Leader did not follow through, offered no excuse

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	US Status Increase (1)	US Status Decrease (2)	US Status Stay Same (3)
Followed Through	0.57*** (0.04)	-0.57*** (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Partisan Attack	0.06 (0.04)	-0.23*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)
Pivot to Cooperation	0.05 (0.04)	-0.13** (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Pivot to Education	0.13*** (0.04)	-0.33*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)
Pivot to Military	0.17*** (0.04)	-0.23*** (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)
Constant	0.04 (0.03)	0.65*** (0.04)	0.31*** (0.04)
Observations	933	933	933
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.14	0.02
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.14	0.02
Residual Std. Error (df = 927)	0.36	0.46	0.48
F Statistic (df = 5; 927)	56.48***	30.52***	4.62***
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		