A. Appendix

A.1. Radical-Right Supporters by Country

Table A1: Radical-Right Supporters Sampled by Country

	Austria	Flanders	Germany	Denmark	Spain
Radical-right supporters	571	403	428	138	384

	France	Italy	Netherlands	Portugal
Radical-right supporters	187	261	159	97

As there is only one radical-right party in Austria, Flanders, Germany, Spain, France and Portugal, all radical-right party supporters in our sample originate from this one party (see section on Data and Methods for a full overview). Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands are however characterized by the presence of multiple parties. Of the 138 radical-right party supporters in our Danish sample, 63 respondents said they would vote for the Danmarksdemokraterne, 39 for the Dansk Folkeparti, and 36 for the Nye Borgerlige. In our Italian sample, 210 respondents would vote for Fratelli d'Italia and 51 for Lega. In our Dutch sample, 13 respondents would vote for Forum voor Democratie, 51 for JA21, and 95 for PVV.

A.2. Socio-Demographic Statistics and Past Voting Behavior Radical-Right Supporters by Country

Fig. A1: Socio-Demographic Statistics Radical-Right Supporters by Country: Age, Percentage Female, Percentage with Tertiary Education



Data on past voting behavior is only available in the first (larger) survey, spanning 9 polities (N_{RR} = 1,405). Of the 244 Austrian respondents who said they would now vote for the radical right, 143 previously voting for the radical right (FPÖ), 50 for the christian-democratic party (ÖVP), 9 for the social-democratic party (SPÖ), and 3 for the Greens (GRÜNE). The rest either did not vote (17), did not know (1), preferred not to answer (4), was not yet eligible to vote (1), or voted for another smaller party (8). Of the 100 Flemish respondents, 66 voted for the radical right (Vlaams Belang), 28 for the nationalist, conservative party (N-VA), 2 for the social-democratic party (sp.a, now Vooruit), 2 for the liberal party (Open VLD) and 2 for the christian-democratic party (CD&V). Of the 131 German respondents, 89 voted for the radical right (AfD), 10 for the christian-democratic party (CDU/CSU), 13 for the social-democratic party (SPD), 6 for the liberal party (FDP), 3 for the radical left (Die Linke), and 1 for the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). The rest either did not vote (3), preferred not to answer (1), was not yet eligible to vote (2), or voted for another smaller party (3). Of the 138 Danish respondents, the large majority voted for one of three radical-right parties (48 for Danmarksdemokraterne, 29 for Dansk Folkeparti, and 34 for Nye Borgerlige), 6 for the main center-right party (Venstre), 2 for the center party (Moderaterne), 1 for the liberal party (Liberalerne), 1 for the conservative party (Det Konservative Folkeparti), 1 for the socio-ecological party (Enhedslisten), 9 for the main social-democratic party

(Socialdemokratiet), 2 for a smaller social-democratic party (Socialistisk Folkep), and 1 for the radical left (Radikal Venstre). 2 respondents voted for even smaller parties and 2 did not vote in the previous elections. Of the 88 Spanish respondents, 53 voted for the radical right (Vox), 16 for the christian-democratic party (PP), 4 for the social-democratic party (PSOE/PSC), 7 for the liberal party (Ciudadanos), and 1 for the radical left (UP). 2 respondents voted for even smaller parties, 4 did not vote, and 1 was not eligible to vote. Of the 187 French respondents, 151 voted for the radical rigth (Rassemblement National), 10 for the main conservative party (Les Républicains), 4 for the center party (Renaissance), 5 for the social-democratic party (Parti socialiste), 1 for a center-right party (Mouvement Démocrate), and 4 for the radical left (La France Insoumise). 1 respondent voted for another, minor party, 1 did not know, 3 preferred not to answer, and 7 did not vote. Of the 261 Italian respondents, the large majority previously voted for one of the two radical-right parties (187 for Fratelli d'Italia and 47 for Lega), 1 for the socio-ecological party (Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra), 10 for the center-right party (Forza Italia), 4 for the social-democratic party (Partito Democratico), 5 for the liberal party (Terzo Polo), and 3 for the populist, left-wing party (Movimento 5 Stelle). 1 respondent voted for another, minor party, 1 preferred not to answer, and 6 did not vote. Of the 159 Dutch respondents, the large majority voted for one of the three radical-right parties (69 for the PVV, 15 for Forum voor Democratie, and 19 for JA21), 19 for the center-right liberal party (VVD), 6 for the center-left liberal party (D66), 9 for the main christian-democratic party (CDA), 1 for the smaller christian-democratic party (ChristenUnie), 3 for the farmers' party (BBB), 3 for the social-democratic party (PvdA), 3 for the animal-rights party (PvdD), and 2 for the radical left (SP). 1 respondent voted for another, minor party, 2 did not know, and 7 did not vote. Finally, of the 97 Portuguese respondents, 65 voted for the radical right (CH), 10 for the liberal-democratic party (PPD/PSD), 1 for the liberal party (IL), 5 for the social-democratic party (PS), 3 for the populist, left-wing party (B.E.), and 1 for the radical left (PCP). 2 respondents voted for another, minor party, 3 preferred not to answer, 2 were not eligible to vote, and 5 did not vote.

A.3. Dislike Differentiation: Measurement Zero-Positive Scores

Fig. A2: Positive Dislike Differentiation: Predictors in Full Sample



Note: Linear regressions include standardized coefficients with sample fixed effects and robust standard errors. Full regression results can be found in Table A2.

Fig. A3: Positive Dislike Differentiation: Predictors in Large Sample



Note: Linear regressions include standardized coefficients with sample fixed effects and robust standard errors. Full regression results can be found in Table A3.

Table A2: Predictors of Positive Dislike Differentiation: Full Sample (in Fig. A2)

	Positive Score
In-party like	0.159***
	(0.018)
Political salience	0.066**
	(0.021)
Political involvement	-0.029
	(0.022)
Ideological extremism	0.100***
	(0.021)
Age	0.082***
	(0.018)
Female	-0.066
	(0.037)
Tertiary education	0.126**
	(0.043)
Constant	-0.259***
	(0.046)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.263
Observations	2425

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A3: Predictors of Positive Dislike Differentiation: Large Sample (in Fig. A3)

	Positive Score
did not vote (ref. cat. = RR)	-0.112
	(0.120)
CR (ref. cat. = RR)	0.626***
	(0.082)
CL (ref. cat. = RR)	-0.388***
	(0.081)
Negative partisanship	0.059*
	(0.026)
In-party like	0.174***
	(0.030)
Political salience	0.017
	(0.034)
Political involvement	-0.013
	(0.026)
Ideological extremism	0.078**
	(0.030)
Age	0.038
	(0.026)
Female	-0.075
	(0.053)
Tertiary education	0.144*
	(0.057)
Constant	-0.444***
	(0.061)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.348
Observations	1128

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

A.4. Dislike Differentiation: Measurement Removed Respondents with Negative Scores

Fig. A4: Removed Dislike Differentiation: Predictors in Full Sample



Note: Linear regressions include standardized coefficients with sample fixed effects and robust standard errors. Full regression results can be found in Table A4.

Fig. A5: Removed Dislike Differentiation: Predictors in Large Sample



Note: Linear regressions include standardized coefficients with sample fixed effects and robust standard errors. Full regression results can be found in Table A5.

Table A4: Predictors of Removed Dislike Differentiation: Full Sample (in Fig. A4)

	Removed Score
In-party like	0.155***
	(0.020)
Political salience	0.068**
	(0.024)
Political involvement	-0.021
	(0.024)
Ideological extremism	0.090***
	(0.023)
Age	0.085***
	(0.020)
Female	-0.076
	(0.041)
Tertiary education	0.137**
	(0.046)
Constant	-0.277***
	(0.055)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.239
Observations	2029

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A5: Predictors of Removed Dislike Differentiation: Large Sample (in Fig. A5)

	Removed Score
did not vote (ref. cat. = RR)	-0.167
	(0.155)
CR (ref. cat. = RR)	0.712***
	(0.088)
CL (ref. cat. = RR)	-0.420**
	(0.134)
Negative partisanship	0.052
	(0.028)
In-party like	0.189***
	(0.035)
Political salience	0.014
	(0.037)
Political involvement	-0.007
	(0.030)
Ideological extremism	0.077*
	(0.034)
Age	0.040
	(0.029)
Female	-0.073
	(0.059)
Tertiary education	0.159*
	(0.062)
Constant	-0.431***
	(0.079)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.328
Observations	931

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

A.5. Correlation Matrix: Outcome Variables

Fig. A6: Correlation Matrix: Outcome Variables



Note: Pearson's correlation and significance levels are shown at * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

A.6. Descriptive Statistics: Outcome Variables

Table A6: Descriptive Statistics: Satisfaction with Democracy, Political Trust, and (Gap in) Political Tolerance

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Satisfaction with democracy (1-7)	3.31	1.81	1	7
Institutional trust: legislating (mean score)	2.77	1.52	1	7
Political tolerance mainstream	6.25	3.28	0	10
Political tolerance center right	6.69	3.30	0	10
Political tolerance center left	5.81	3.74	0	10
Gap in pol. tol. center right	1.62	2.84	0	10
Gap in pol. tol. center left	2.50	3.55	0	10

A.7. Attitudes Radical-Right Supporters per Sample

Fig. A7: Attitudes of radical-right supporters towards the center-left, center-right and radical-right ideological blocks



Note: CR=center-right parties; CL=center-left parties; RR=radical-right parties; EAP = emotions and affective polarization dataset; CSAP = coalition signals and affective polarization dataset.

A.8. Attitudes Radical-Right Supporters in CSES

Fig. A8: CSES results per country: attitudes of radical-right supporters towards the center-left, center-right and radical-right ideological blocks



Note: CR=center-right parties; CL=center-left parties; RR=radical-right parties.

A.9. Dislike Differentiation: Regression Tables Absolute Measurement

Table A7: Predictors of Dislike Differentiation: Full Sample (in Fig. 3)

	Absolute Score
In-party like	0.136***
	(0.020)
Political salience	0.064**
	(0.023)
Political involvement	-0.018
	(0.023)
Ideological extremism	0.083***
	(0.022)
Age	0.086***
	(0.018)
Female	-0.062
	(0.039)
Tertiary education	0.133**
	(0.044)
Constant	-0.180***
	(0.050)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.192
Observations	2425

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A8: Predictors of Dislike Differentiation: Large Sample (in Fig. 4)

	Absolute Score
did not vote (ref. cat. = RR)	-0.061
	(0.131)
CR (ref. cat. = RR)	0.593***
	(0.081)
CL (ref. cat. = RR)	0.209
	(0.140)
Negative partisanship	0.060*
	(0.027)
In-party like	0.162***
	(0.032)
Political salience	0.024
	(0.035)
Political involvement	-0.017
	(0.028)
Ideological extremism	0.067*
	(0.031)
Age	0.055*
	(0.027)
Female	-0.081
	(0.055)
Tertiary education	0.135*
	(0.059)
Constant	-0.302***
	(0.065)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.257
Observations	1128

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

A.10. Out-Party Dislike: Results

The following appendix focuses on the analysis of the predictors and consequences of out-party dislike.

A.10.1. Out-Party Dislike: Operationalization

Our analysis centers on out-party dislike towards mainstream parties, operationalized as the average of the out-party dislike towards the center right and center left. All models control for all available political variables, age, gender and education. OLS estimates use standardized coefficients, robust standard errors and sample fixed effects.

A.10.2. Out-Party Dislike: Predictors

Our predictors for out-party dislike are the same as for dislike differentiation. In Figure A9, results for in-party like are once again shown first, and indicate that more strongly liking one's in-party has a significant, positive association with out-party dislike ($p < 0.05$). Interestingly, the more involved radical-right supporters are, and the more they value politics as part of their identity, the *less* out-party dislike they exhibit ($p < 0.001$). This stands in stark contrast with findings from mainstream party supporters where political engagement seems to increase affective polarization, thus highlighting once again that radical-right supporters differ in meaningful ways from mainstream voters. Ideological extremism, a strong predictor of out-party dislike for mainstream supporters, also leads to significantly more out-party dislike ($p < 0.05$).

As displayed in Figure A10, abstaining from voting or voting for the radical right in the previous election leads to significantly more out-party dislike compared to radical-right supporters who previously voted for either the center right or center left ($p < 0.001$). Higher levels of negative partisanship are also significantly associated with higher levels of out-party dislike ($p < 0.001$).

Fig. A9: Out-Party Dislike: Predictors in Full Sample



Note: Linear regressions include standardized coefficients with sample fixed effects and robust standard errors. Full regression results can be found in Table A9.

Fig. A10: Out-Party Dislike: Predictors in Large Sample



Note: Linear regressions include standardized coefficients with sample fixed effects and robust standard errors. Full regression results can be found in Table A10.

Table A9: Predictors of Out-Party Dislike (Mainstream): Full Sample (in Fig. A9)

	Out-Party Dislike (Mainstream)
In-party like	0.048*
	(0.024)
Political salience	-0.078***
	(0.023)
Political involvement	-0.115***
	(0.024)
Ideological extremism	0.048*
	(0.023)
Age	0.097***
	(0.020)
Female	-0.046
	(0.039)
Tertiary education	-0.040
	(0.042)
Constant	0.236***
	(0.054)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.146
Observations	2440

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A10: Predictors of Out-Party Dislike (Mainstream): Large Sample (in Fig. A10)

	Out-Party Dislike (Mainstream)
did not vote (ref. cat. = RR)	-0.183
	(0.174)
CR (ref. cat. = RR)	-0.512***
	(0.078)
CL (ref. cat. = RR)	-0.527***
	(0.136)
Negative partisanship	0.140***
	(0.029)
In-party like	-0.008
	(0.038)
Political salience	-0.071*
	(0.035)
Political involvement	-0.106***
	(0.030)
Ideological extremism	0.017
	(0.034)
Age	0.092**
	(0.030)
Female	-0.030
	(0.056)
Tertiary education	-0.032
	(0.060)
Constant	0.504***
	(0.075)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.201
Observations	1140

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

A.11. 2x2 Typology: Results Consequences

Table A11: 2x2 Typology: Consequences (1/4) (in Fig. 5)

	Sat. w. Dem.	Pol. Trust
moderate ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.234*	-0.267**
	(0.105)	(0.103)
anti-system (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.890***	-0.952***
	(0.087)	(0.086)
extreme ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.663***	-0.771***
	(0.084)	(0.084)
In-party like	-0.069*	0.053*
	(0.030)	(0.025)
Political salience	0.102**	0.065*
	(0.033)	(0.027)
Political involvement	0.076**	0.206***
	(0.027)	(0.024)
Ideological extremism	0.005	0.016
	(0.031)	(0.028)
Age	-0.058*	-0.088***
	(0.026)	(0.024)
Female	0.013	0.073
	(0.053)	(0.048)
Tertiary education	-0.005	0.049
	(0.055)	(0.052)
Constant	0.462***	0.515***
	(0.098)	(0.096)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.242	0.378
Observations	1221	1219

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A12: 2x2 Typology: Consequences (2/4) (in Fig. 5)

	Pol. Tol.: Mainstream
moderate ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	0.045
	(0.088)
anti-system (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.610***
	(0.075)
extreme ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.285***
	(0.073)
In-party like	-0.028
	(0.032)
Political salience	-0.032
	(0.033)
Political involvement	0.047
	(0.048)
Ideological extremism	-0.019
	(0.034)
Age	0.157***
	(0.027)
Female	-0.049
	(0.058)
Tertiary education	0.136*
	(0.067)
Constant	0.422***
	(0.083)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.085
Observations	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A13: 2x2 Typology: Consequences (3/4) (in Fig. 5)

	Pol. Tol.: CR	Pol. Tol.: CL
moderate ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	0.196*	-0.095
	(0.087)	(0.101)
anti-system (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.609***	-0.532***
	(0.074)	(0.071)
extreme ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.109	-0.403***
	(0.072)	(0.075)
In-party like	0.002	-0.051
	(0.032)	(0.031)
Political salience	0.002	-0.059
	(0.032)	(0.032)
Political involvement	0.068	0.022
	(0.046)	(0.050)
Ideological extremism	0.005	-0.038
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Age	0.151***	0.142***
	(0.027)	(0.028)
Female	-0.037	-0.053
	(0.057)	(0.058)
Tertiary education	0.164*	0.093
	(0.064)	(0.069)
Constant	0.261**	0.511***
	(0.082)	(0.081)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.120	0.072
Observations	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A14: 2x2 Typology: Consequences (4/4) (in Fig. 5)

	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CR	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CL
moderate ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.140*	0.150
	(0.064)	(0.090)
anti-system (ref. cat. = non-committed)	0.765***	0.586***
	(0.064)	(0.061)
extreme ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	0.117*	0.391***
	(0.055)	(0.063)
In-party like	0.319***	0.315***
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Political salience	0.041	0.095**
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Political involvement	-0.002	0.027
	(0.041)	(0.046)
Ideological extremism	0.027	0.073*
	(0.033)	(0.032)
Age	-0.100***	-0.093***
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Female	0.009	0.029
	(0.052)	(0.055)
Tertiary education	-0.138**	-0.068
	(0.053)	(0.064)
Constant	-0.207**	-0.430***
	(0.072)	(0.070)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.256	0.194
Observations	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

A.12. Alternative 2x2 Typology: Cut-Off Values at the Mean

A.12.1. Alternative 2x2 Typology: Results Consequences

Fig. A11: 2x2 Typology: Consequences



Note: "Non-committed" functions as the reference category. Cut-off value for out-party dislike: > 0.50; cut-off value for dislike differentiation: > 0.2. Linear regressions include standardized coefficients with sample fixed effects and robust standard errors. Full regression results can be found in Tables A15, A16, A17, and A18.

Table A15: 2x2 Typology: Consequences (1/4) (in Fig. A11)

	Sat. w. Dem.	Pol. Trust
moderate ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.226**	-0.318***
	(0.075)	(0.072)
anti-system (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.887***	-0.924***
	(0.075)	(0.070)
extreme ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.743***	-0.768***
	(0.081)	(0.074)
In-party like	-0.063*	0.061*
	(0.030)	(0.025)
Political salience	0.098**	0.062*
	(0.033)	(0.026)
Political involvement	0.076**	0.209***
	(0.026)	(0.024)
Ideological extremism	0.003	0.010
	(0.030)	(0.027)
Age	-0.062*	-0.093***
	(0.026)	(0.024)
Female	-0.016	0.045
	(0.052)	(0.048)
Tertiary education	-0.021	0.035
	(0.055)	(0.051)
Constant	0.387***	0.408***
	(0.085)	(0.080)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.275	0.396
Observations	1221	1219

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A16: 2x2 Typology: Consequences (2/4) (in Fig. A11)

	Pol. Tol.: Mainstream
moderate ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.102
	(0.066)
anti-system (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.771***
	(0.080)
extreme ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.365***
	(0.092)
In-party like	-0.011
	(0.032)
Political salience	-0.040
	(0.033)
Political involvement	0.058
	(0.047)
Ideological extremism	-0.011
	(0.033)
Age	0.170***
	(0.027)
Female	-0.037
	(0.056)
Tertiary education	0.118
	(0.065)
Constant	0.389***
	(0.075)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.116
Observations	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A17: 2x2 Typology: Consequences (3/4) (in Fig. A11)

	Pol. Tol.: CR	Pol. Tol.: CL
moderate ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	0.088	-0.257***
	(0.065)	(0.070)
anti-system (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.791***	-0.654***
	(0.079)	(0.074)
extreme ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.266**	-0.406***
	(0.088)	(0.094)
In-party like	0.019	-0.036
	(0.032)	(0.031)
Political salience	-0.009	-0.063
	(0.032)	(0.032)
Political involvement	0.079	0.032
	(0.045)	(0.049)
Ideological extremism	0.013	-0.031
	(0.033)	(0.033)
Age	0.165***	0.153***
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Female	-0.027	-0.042
	(0.055)	(0.058)
Tertiary education	0.141*	0.083
	(0.062)	(0.068)
Constant	0.242**	0.470***
	(0.075)	(0.073)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.161	0.089
Observations	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A18: 2x2 Typology: Consequences (4/4) (in Fig. A11)

	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CR	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CL
moderate ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.120*	0.242***
	(0.051)	(0.061)
anti-system (ref. cat. = non-committed)	0.878***	0.645***
	(0.077)	(0.067)
extreme ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	0.191*	0.315***
	(0.076)	(0.084)
In-party like	0.301***	0.302***
	(0.026)	(0.025)
Political salience	0.050	0.097**
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Political involvement	-0.017	0.016
	(0.040)	(0.046)
Ideological extremism	0.021	0.068*
	(0.033)	(0.032)
Age	-0.113***	-0.102***
	(0.025)	(0.026)
Female	-0.006	0.015
	(0.051)	(0.055)
Tertiary education	-0.116*	-0.061
	(0.052)	(0.064)
Constant	-0.116	-0.341***
	(0.071)	(0.065)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.291	0.205
Observations	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

A.12.2. Alternative 2x2 Typology: Proportions Per Country

Table A19: 2x2 typology: proportions per country

	Typology: radical-right supporters			
	non-committed	moderate ideologues	anti-system	extreme ideologues
country				
AT	21.02	21.02	41.33	16.64
DE	26.40	21.03	41.82	10.75
DK	21.74	25.36	34.78	18.12
ES	10.42	45.31	19.27	25.00
FR	17.11	12.30	53.48	17.11
IT	19.16	49.43	9.20	22.22
NL	25.79	25.16	33.96	15.09
PT	25.77	36.08	21.65	16.49
VLG	38.71	37.97	10.42	12.90
Total	23.10	30.40	29.60	16.89

Note: Percentages reflect the proportion of each category within each country. Cut-off value for out-party dislike: > 0.7; cut-off value for dislike differentiation: > 0.2.

A.13. Dislike Differentiation and Out-Party Dislike: Separate Consequences

Whereas our main analysis tests the interaction of dislike differentiation and out-party dislike on democratic attitudes (namely, satisfaction with democracy, political trust, and political tolerance), this appendix also tests the two measures of dislike separately.

A.13.1. Consequences Dislike Differentiation

To examine whether dislike differentiation between mainstream party matters, we regress our dislike differentiation measure on 1) satisfaction with democracy, 2) political trust, and 3) political tolerance (towards the mainstream as a whole and center right and center left, separately). Regression analyses use standardized coefficients with sample fixed effects and robust standard errors. All models control for age, gender, education level (binary), salience of one's political identity, political involvement, ideological extremism, and in-party affect.

Results are displayed in Tables A20, A21 and A22. Whereas political trust does not seem to matter, dislike differentiation is significantly associated with both satisfaction with democracy and political tolerance ($p < 0.05$). When radical-right supporters differentiate in their dislike between mainstream parties they are more satisfied with democracy and are more politically tolerant towards the mainstream parties. However, closer examination shows that respondents who differentiate more in their dislike only display higher levels of political tolerance towards the center right ($p < 0.001$), not the center left ($p > 0.05$). In sum, radical-right supporters who more diffusely dislike all mainstream parties seem to be more dissatisfied with democracy and less politically tolerant towards the center right, whereas ceiling effect may have occurred with the center left.

In addition to the absolute score, we again repeat our analyses on the two alternative measures of dislike differentiation: 1) a measurement which simply removed all negative scores (i.e., the removed score) and 2) a measurement which merges the negative scores with the neutral score (i.e., the positive score). Results are higher similar, and only slightly differ for the level of significance.

Table A20: Dislike Differentiation: Consequences (1/3)

	Sat. w. Dem.	Pol. Trust
Dislike differentiation (abs.)	0.064*	0.030
	(0.031)	(0.029)
In-party like	-0.074*	0.045
	(0.032)	(0.029)
Political salience	0.117***	0.077**
	(0.035)	(0.029)
Political involvement	0.104***	0.242***
	(0.029)	(0.026)
Ideological extremism	-0.032	-0.019
	(0.033)	(0.030)
Age	-0.092**	-0.130***
	(0.029)	(0.026)
Female	0.027	0.098
	(0.056)	(0.052)
Tertiary education	-0.002	0.049
	(0.058)	(0.055)
Constant	-0.245***	-0.266***
	(0.065)	(0.059)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.166	0.284
Observations	1201	1200

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A21: Dislike Differentiation: Consequences (2/3)

	Pol. Tol.: Mainstream	Pol. Tol.: CR	Pol. Tol.: CL
Dislike differentiation (abs.)	0.128***	0.248***	0.005
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.034)
In-party like	-0.048	-0.026	-0.061
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Political salience	-0.024	0.004	-0.047
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Political involvement	0.080	0.103*	0.050
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Ideological extremism	-0.036	-0.015	-0.051
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Age	0.131***	0.120***	0.124***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Female	-0.023	-0.015	-0.028
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.059)
Tertiary education	0.118	0.138*	0.085
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.070)
Constant	0.043	-0.027	0.098
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.062)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.043	0.094	0.036
Observations	1222	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A22: Dislike Differentiation: Consequences (3/3)

	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CR	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CL
Dislike differentiation (abs.)	-0.289***	-0.008
	(0.031)	(0.033)
In-party like	0.351***	0.325***
	(0.030)	(0.028)
Political salience	0.037	0.082**
	(0.029)	(0.031)
Political involvement	-0.044	-0.002
	(0.042)	(0.047)
Ideological extremism	0.051	0.086**
	(0.034)	(0.033)
Age	-0.064*	-0.074**
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Female	-0.018	0.003
	(0.053)	(0.056)
Tertiary education	-0.108*	-0.060
	(0.054)	(0.064)
Constant	0.158*	0.009
	(0.064)	(0.056)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.211	0.154
Observations	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A23: Dislike Differentiation: Consequences (1/3)

	Sat. w. Dem.	Pol. Trust
Dislike differentiation (rem.)	0.062	0.032
	(0.035)	(0.033)
In-party like	-0.046	0.054
	(0.037)	(0.032)
Political salience	0.138***	0.100**
	(0.038)	(0.032)
Political involvement	0.098**	0.215***
	(0.031)	(0.029)
Ideological extremism	-0.047	-0.031
	(0.036)	(0.033)
Age	-0.076*	-0.112***
	(0.032)	(0.029)
Female	0.026	0.089
	(0.062)	(0.058)
Tertiary education	0.004	0.028
	(0.064)	(0.059)
Constant	-0.223**	-0.295***
	(0.080)	(0.069)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.169	0.278
Observations	996	994

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A24: Dislike Differentiation: Consequences (2/3)

	Pol. Tol.: Mainstream	Pol. Tol.: CR	Pol. Tol.: CL
Dislike differentiation (rem.)	0.154***	0.324***	-0.015
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.039)
In-party like	-0.070	-0.063	-0.067
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Political salience	-0.012	0.021	-0.039
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Political involvement	0.069	0.092	0.040
	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.055)
Ideological extremism	-0.032	-0.014	-0.044
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Age	0.145***	0.127***	0.142***
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Female	-0.029	-0.003	-0.048
	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.066)
Tertiary education	0.098	0.106	0.079
	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.077)
Constant	0.038	0.027	0.044
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.073)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.052	0.130	0.036
Observations	1032	1032	1032

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A25: Dislike Differentiation: Consequences (3/3)

	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CR	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CL
Dislike differentiation (rem.)	-0.361***	0.017
	(0.032)	(0.039)
In-party like	0.382***	0.336***
	(0.033)	(0.032)
Political salience	0.015	0.068
	(0.032)	(0.035)
Political involvement	-0.028	0.014
	(0.046)	(0.052)
Ideological extremism	0.062	0.089*
	(0.036)	(0.037)
Age	-0.075**	-0.094**
	(0.028)	(0.030)
Female	-0.030	0.031
	(0.056)	(0.064)
Tertiary education	-0.086	-0.058
	(0.056)	(0.072)
Constant	0.078	0.041
	(0.068)	(0.067)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.249	0.152
Observations	1032	1032

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A26: Dislike Differentiation: Consequences (1/3)

	Sat. w. Dem.	Pol. Trust
Dislike differentiation (pos.)	0.037	-0.005
	(0.032)	(0.030)
In-party like	-0.071*	0.049
	(0.033)	(0.029)
Political salience	0.118***	0.078**
	(0.035)	(0.029)
Political involvement	0.104***	0.243***
	(0.029)	(0.026)
Ideological extremism	-0.031	-0.017
	(0.033)	(0.030)
Age	-0.090**	-0.127***
	(0.028)	(0.026)
Female	0.025	0.096
	(0.056)	(0.052)
Tertiary education	0.001	0.054
	(0.058)	(0.055)
Constant	-0.244***	-0.273***
	(0.066)	(0.061)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.164	0.283
Observations	1201	1200

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A27: Dislike Differentiation: Consequences (2/3)

	Pol. Tol.: Mainstream	Pol. Tol.: CR	Pol. Tol.: CL
Dislike differentiation (pos.)	0.124***	0.301***	-0.048
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.036)
In-party like	-0.051	-0.042	-0.052
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Political salience	-0.025	-0.001	-0.042
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Political involvement	0.081	0.108*	0.046
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Ideological extremism	-0.037	-0.024	-0.044
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Age	0.131***	0.114***	0.129***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Female	-0.021	-0.007	-0.030
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.059)
Tertiary education	0.121	0.136*	0.092
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.070)
Constant	0.050	0.003	0.085
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.041	0.110	0.038
Observations	1222	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A28: Dislike Differentiation: Consequences (3/3)

	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CR	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CL
Dislike differentiation (pos.)	-0.331***	0.053
	(0.029)	(0.035)
In-party like	0.366***	0.315***
	(0.030)	(0.028)
Political salience	0.042	0.077*
	(0.030)	(0.031)
Political involvement	-0.049	0.002
	(0.042)	(0.046)
Ideological extremism	0.060	0.079*
	(0.034)	(0.033)
Age	-0.059*	-0.080**
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Female	-0.026	0.006
	(0.053)	(0.056)
Tertiary education	-0.108*	-0.068
	(0.053)	(0.064)
Constant	0.128*	0.024
	(0.062)	(0.057)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.223	0.156
Observations	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

A.13.2. Consequences Out-Party Dislike

To test whether out-party dislike is associated with satisfaction with democracy, political trust, and political tolerance, we once again run all our models controlling for age, gender, education level (binary), salience of one's political identity, political involvement, ideological extremism, and in-party affect using standardized coefficients with sample fixed effects and robust standard errors.

Shown in Tables A29, A30, and A31, results are highly robust and substantial. When radical-right supporters dislike the mainstream parties more, they are significantly less satisfied with democracy and show lower levels of political trust and political tolerance both towards the center right and center left ($p < 0.001$). Effect sizes are substantial, ranging from 0.28 to 0.42. When out-party dislike increases by one standard deviation, satisfaction with democracy decreases by 0.41 standard deviation, political trust decreases by 0.42 standard deviation, and political tolerance decreases by 0.28-0.39 standard deviation. Interestingly, political tolerance towards the center right seems to decrease more than political tolerance towards the center left. These differences are however not significantly different from one another ($p > 0.05$). Thus, in line with our findings for lower levels of dislike differentiation, higher levels of out-party dislike are very strongly associated with problematic consequences.

Table A29: Out-Party Dislike (Mainstream): Consequences (1/3)

	Sat. w. Dem.	Pol. Trust
Out-party dislike (mainstream)	-0.407***	-0.416***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
In-party like	-0.057*	0.064**
	(0.029)	(0.024)
Political salience	0.086**	0.048
	(0.032)	(0.026)
Political involvement	0.060*	0.193***
	(0.026)	(0.023)
Ideological extremism	-0.002	0.007
	(0.029)	(0.027)
Age	-0.052*	-0.085***
	(0.026)	(0.023)
Female	0.005	0.071
	(0.051)	(0.046)
Tertiary education	-0.012	0.039
	(0.054)	(0.050)
Constant	-0.099	-0.113*
	(0.060)	(0.053)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.306	0.433
Observations	1216	1214

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A30: Out-Party Dislike (Mainstream): Consequences (2/3)

	Pol. Tol.: Mainstream	Pol. Tol.: CR	Pol. Tol.: CL
Out-party dislike (mainstream)	-0.352***	-0.386***	-0.277***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
In-party like	-0.011	0.030	-0.045
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Political salience	-0.045	-0.009	-0.071*
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Political involvement	0.045	0.058	0.027
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.050)
Ideological extremism	-0.006	0.030	-0.037
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Age	0.179***	0.183***	0.153***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Female	-0.041	-0.037	-0.039
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Tertiary education	0.123	0.158**	0.075
	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.068)
Constant	0.100	0.017	0.161**
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.131	0.166	0.099
Observations	1222	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A31: Out-Party Dislike (Mainstream): Consequences (3/3)

	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CR	Gap in Pol. Tol.: CL
Out-party dislike (mainstream)	0.418***	0.268***
	(0.031)	(0.029)
In-party like	0.288***	0.309***
	(0.026)	(0.025)
Political salience	0.051	0.106***
	(0.028)	(0.030)
Political involvement	0.006	0.020
	(0.041)	(0.046)
Ideological extremism	0.001	0.072*
	(0.033)	(0.032)
Age	-0.135***	-0.103***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Female	0.007	0.014
	(0.051)	(0.055)
Tertiary education	-0.133**	-0.051
	(0.051)	(0.063)
Constant	0.115	-0.051
	(0.062)	(0.054)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.286	0.212
Observations	1222	1222

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

A.14. Replication Analysis with Past Voting Behavior on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)

In order to replicate our analyses on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, a few adjustments had to be made. For the predictors of dislike differentiation, in-party like could be measured in line with our main analyses. Moreover, we added positive partisanship, measured through the CSES' party attachment questions (from being not at all close to very close to a specific party). Negative partisanship is not included in the CSES. We also add past voting behavior as one of the main variables. As a measure on political involvement is absent, we included external political efficacy (the additive index of two variables: 1) who is in power can make a difference, and 2) who people vote for makes a difference). Finally, ideological extremism as the distance from the midpoint was added as well. For the consequences part, the CSES only provides a measure on satisfaction with democracy, which we subsequently examine here. All analyses control for age, gender, and education. Models utilize robust standard errors and country-year fixed effects.

As shown in Table A32, in-party like and positive partisanship increase dislike differentiation significantly ($p < 0.001$), in line with the findings of our analyses reported in the main text. Similarly, having previously voted for the center-right significantly increases one's dislike differentiation ($p < 0.001$). External political efficacy is also significantly associated with higher levels of dislike differentiation, and so is ideological extremism ($p < 0.001$). When regressing our 2x2 typology on satisfaction with democracy (see Table A33), results are once again very similar to those reported in the main text. The non-committed showcase the highest satisfaction with democracy, whereas the anti-system and extreme ideologues are characterized by particularly low levels of democratic satisfaction ($p < 0.001$).

In sum, results are highly robust and are in line with those reported in the main text.

Table A32: Predictors of Dislike Differentiation: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

	Absolute Score	Absolute Score
In-party like	0.124***	
	(0.021)	
Positive partisanship		0.066***
		(0.018)
CR (ref. cat. = RR)	0.200***	0.164***
	(0.039)	(0.040)
CL (ref. cat. = RR)	-0.071	-0.109*
	(0.047)	(0.049)
External political efficacy	0.090***	0.099***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Ideological extremism	0.175***	0.188***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age	0.018	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Female	0.003	0.002
	(0.031)	(0.032)
Tertiary education	0.044	0.031
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Constant	-0.021	-0.032
	(0.110)	(0.111)
Sample FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.211	0.206
Observations	3647	3573

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A33: 2x2 Typology: Consequences Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

	Satisfaction with Democracy
moderate ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.158***
	(0.037)
anti-system (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.349***
	(0.039)
extreme ideologues (ref. cat. = non-committed)	-0.410***
	(0.036)
In-party like	-0.062***
	(0.014)
External political efficacy	0.042***
	(0.012)
Ideological extremism	-0.055***
	(0.012)
Age	-0.016
	(0.011)
Female	-0.043
	(0.022)
Tertiary education	0.019
	(0.024)
Constant	0.430***
	(0.081)
Sample FE	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.256
Observations	6422

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$