Supplementary Files to the Article "Voter disenchantment in the aftermath of the 2005 EU constitutional referendum in France: an empirical examination"

A: Descriptive Statistics

A.1. Outcome Variables

Table A1 shows summary statistics for the outcome variables for the analysis of the EP elections in 2009.

Table A1: Summary Statistics for Outcome Variables, Year 2009

	N	Mean	Standard deviation	min	max
Turnout	36,194	46.33	8.46	16.68	100
Blank votes, share	36,194	6.11	3.78	0	62.87
Traditional mainstream parties vote share	36,194	43.58	8.82	0	100
Extreme parties vote share	36,194	15.25	7.89	0	74.29
PS vote share	36,194	15.50	7.17	0	88.24
UMP vote share	36,194	28.09	9.31	0	90.48
Far Left vote share	36,194	7.86	5.94	0	74.29
FN vote share	36,194	7.39	5.38	0	64.71

As explained, we pay special attention to EP elections. Plotting their turnout rates, and coarsely distinguishing municipalities in terms of their No-vote, provides preliminary motivation to investigate this relationship more deeply. While turnout rates were falling in all French municipalities, there was a reversal for the municipalities that accepted the TCE for the elections in 2009, see figure A1. This stands in contrast to the remaining municipalities, especially to the ones that rejected the TCE by a larger margin.

The "Far Left" is defined as *Lutte ouvriere* (LO), *Ligue communiste révolutionnaire* (LCR) and *Parti communiste français* (PCF) in the elections in 2007, and as LO, *Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste* (NPA, formerly LCR) and *Liste Front de Gauche* (PCF, *Parti de Gauche* and *Gauche unitaire*) in all remaining elections.

Figure A1: Turnout in EP Elections, France 1994 – 2019. Notes: The vertical axis represents percentage points; the horizontal axis depicts election years. Municipalities are allocated to coarse groups based on their No-vote share in the referendum on the TCE in 2005.

A.2. Explanatory Variables

In order to mitigate the threat of omitted variable bias, we employ a large array of control variables which jointly influence our key explanatory variable and our political outcome variables. We include election controls, namely the levels of the outcome variable in the previous election and participation levels in the referendum in 2005, socio-economic controls, namely median income, the unemployment rate, the share of buildings in a municipality laying vacant, and the shares of the labour force employed in, respectively, the agricultural sector, blue-collar jobs (Insee defines this group as all workers under a "working class" collective agreement; examples include maintenance professionals, and low-skilled industrial workers), education and science, business owners and self-employment, and the share of the population that is immigrants. As demographic controls we include the share of residents over the age of

60, the average household size, the share of the population having completed (lower) higher education, the size of the population eligible for voting, and a categorical variable indicating the population density. All data is taken from Insee and merged with the other data via unique municipality codes.

Table A2 below summarizes the control variables and provides summary statistics for the year 2009. Pre-analyses indicate that our chosen municipality conditions are good predictors of the election outcomes and hence able to diminish the threat of omitting relevant municipality controls.

Table A2: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables, Year 2009

	N	Mean	Standard deviation	min	max
Share of No-votes, Referendum 2005	36,191	58.95	10.15	0	100
Turnout, Referendum 2005	36,191	74.97	5.8	32.25	100
Eligible voting population	36,202	1172	8233	8	1217372
Share of population aged 60+	36,202	24.75	8.05	0	91.67
Share of buildings laying vacant	36,202	7.1	4.12	0	53.33
Avg hhsize	36,202	2.422956	0.265831	1	7
Share of pop, low education	36,202	31.66	8.86	0	100
Share of pop, high education	36,202	18.85237	7.64	0	100
Unemployment	36,202	7.9	3.55	0	40
Share of labour force, agriculture	36,202	7.14	10.44	0	100
Share of labour force, blue-collar jobs	36,202	27.96	12.07	0	100
Share of labour force,	36,202	36,260	9.06	7.78	0

education & science

Share of labour force, self-employed & small business owners	36,202	36,260	7.02	6.2	0
Share of immigration population	36,202	4.49	4.54	0	67.47
Median income	33,135	17986.59	3217.40	7884	53591

Density category (majority of voters lives in square-km belonging to one of the following categories):

Very sparsely populated	12,487	15 pop/km^2	12	0.65	450
Sparsely populated	19,573	57 pop/km^2	60	0.83	1300
High density	3,378	303 pop/km^2	296	24	3154
Very high density	776	1888 pop/km^2	2030	102	16770

B: Justification for Used Methods

We argue that cross-sectional analysis is the most adequate estimation technique to explore how the French "No" affected the country's political outcomes. We motivate this by the following reasons:

First, we acknowledge that our key explanatory variable, the share of the No-votes in the French TCE referendum in 2005, is not exogenous; as its intensity can stem from municipality-specific (unobserved) characteristics that could also influence election outcome variables (for example the local infrastructure, popularity of local politicians, and traditional voting patterns). Municipalities self-select into their "treatment" intensity (i.e. the fraction of No-votes in 2005) and precursors of the No-vote might be discernible in outcomes of pre-treatment periods. Moreover, there is no "threshold" which credibly divides a treated from an untreated group, since the referendum vote was wholly inconsequential for municipalities on a practical level. Thus, causal inferential estimation techniques requiring strict exogeneity, such as the difference-in-difference technique or regression discontinuity design, are not suitable for our research. Furthermore, since our key explanatory variable is a one-time observation (the referendum vote in 2005), within-variation in the key variable cannot be exploited and we also cannot employ proper panel data techniques.

For these reasons, we deem investigating elections independently and focusing on differences between all communes to be the most appropriate approach in our context.
A different challenge for the assumptions of standard linear regression arises from the bounded nature of proportional dependent variables. Electoral outcomes are inherently bounded between 0 and 100 percent, and if strongly skewed towards one of the bounds it could lead to non-normality and heteroskedasticity in the error term.

Standard linear regression provides tools to account for these issues and tends to perform well regardless. In our case, DVs are relatively normally distributed and do not display strong skewness. Predictions out of bounds are also few in our setup. Nevertheless, we check our results with a model that is specifically geared towards handling proportionate DVs: a GLM model with a MLE estimator assuming a beta distribution of the underlying data, see appendix section D. Results are in line with the ones obtained in our main regression.

C: Main Results

This appendix section shows further regression results with respect to our key explanatory variable, the municipality No-vote in the referendum 2005, on different election outcomes. Tables depicting the coefficients of all explanatory variables are available upon request.

C.1. Turnout and Blank Votes

Table A3: Linear Regression Estimation Results: Impact of No-vote Share in 2005 on Turnout and Blank Voting in National Elections in 2007-2014

	Effect of No-vote on Turnout	**Effect of No-vote on Blank vote**
Leg., 2007	-0.446***	0.0962***
	(0.0513)	(0.0206)
OT delta	3.61	1.37
Leg., 2012	-0.079	0.0093
	(0.0599)	(0.0150)
OT delta	0.29	0.60
Pres., 2007	-0.248***	0.0640***
	(0.0284)	(0.0186)
OT delta	1.23	1.76
Pres., 2012	0.0021	-0.0065
	(0.0363)	(0.0128)
OT delta	-0.20	0.48
EP., 2009	-0.614***	0.261***
	(0.0609)	(0.0447)
OT delta	1.72	1.60
EP, 2014	-0.254***	0.188***
	(0.0682)	(0.0282)
OT delta	1.12	1.66
N	33,047	33,047

Notes: Election controls include turnout in the previous EP election and turnout for the referendum 2005. Municipality controls contain (1) the size of the eligible voter base (2) the population density in four categories (from very densely to very sparsely populated) (3) the share of the population 60 years and older, (4) the share of residences that lay vacant, (5) the average household size (6) the share of relatively lowly educated graduates (highest degree vocational studies or aptitude certificate), (7) the share of the population with a university degree, the share of workers engaged in (8) blue-collar labor, (9) agriculture, (10) education and science, and (11) artisans (such as craftsmen, tradesmen and small business owners), (12) the population's immigration share, and (13) the unemployment rate. Median income (14) is listed separately as it excludes municipalities with less than 50 households from the sample. All independent variables are standardized. Also included in all regressions are regional fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered over 94 departments are in parentheses. $^{*} p < 0.10$, $^{**} p <$

Table A4: No-vote Share, Pre-Referendum Elections

	EP, 1999	EP, 2004	Legislative, 2002	Presidential, 2002
Turnout	0.109	-0.063	-0.398***	-0.003
	(0.103)	(0.0728)	(0.0745)	(0.0573)
adj. R^2	0.558	0.574	0.525	0.440
OT delta	0.14	0.34	0.49	-0.01
Blank Votes	0.093	0.101**	0.153***	0.0431
	(0.0574)	(0.0330)	(0.0213)	(0.0312)
adj. R^2	0.239	0.195	0.085	0.150
OT delta	0.26	0.41	1.21	0.21
N	33,047	33,047	33,047	33,047

Notes: Election controls include turnout in the previous EP election and turnout for the referendum 2005.. Municipality controls contain (1) the size of the eligible voter base (2) the population density in four categories (from very densely to very sparsely populated) (3) the share of the population 60 years and older, (4) the share of buildings that lay vacant, (5) the average household size (6) the share of relatively lowly educated graduates (highest degree vocational studies or aptitude certificate), (7) the share of the population with a university degree, the share of workers engaged in (8) blue-collar labour, (9) agriculture, (10) education and science, and (11) artisans (such as craftsmen, tradesmen and small business owners), (12) the unemployment rate, and (13) median income. The share of immigration population is not available for elections prior to 2007. All continuous explanatory variables are standardized. Also included in all regressions are Nuts2 fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered over 95 departments are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.2. Party Vote Shares

Table A5: No-vote Share and Party Vote Shares, EP Election 2009

	Mainstream Parties	Anti-system parties	Far Left	FN
No-vote	-3.23***	1.90***	1.01***	0.386***
	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Election Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Median income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	33,047	33,047	33,047	33,047

adj. R^2	0.37	0.61	0.368	0.620
OT delta	1.21	2.54	0.65	0.41

Notes: The two traditional parties are the *Parti socialiste* (PS) and the *Union pour un mouvement Populaire* (UMP) (column 1). As anti-system parties (column 2) we count the far Right *Front National* (FN) (column 3), and the far Left parties Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (NPA), Lutte ouvriere (LO), as well as the far Left coalition *Front de gauche* (LFG) consisting of the Parti communiste français (PCF), the Parti de gauche (PG), and the Gauche unitaire (GU) (column 4). Election controls include turnout in the previous EP election and turnout for the referendum 2005. Municipality controls contain (1) the size of the eligible voter base (2) the population density in four categories (from very densely to very sparsely populated) (3) the share of the population 60 years and older, (4) the share of residences that lay vacant, (5) the average household size (6) the share of relatively lowly educated graduates (highest degree vocational studies or aptitude certificate), (7) the share of the population with a university degree, the share of workers engaged in (8) blue-collar labor, (9) agriculture, (10) education and science, and (11) artisans (such as craftsmen, tradesmen and small business owners), (12) the population's immigration share, and (13) the unemployment rate. Median income (14) is listed separately as it excludes municipalities with less than 50 households from the sample. All independent variables are standardized. Also included in all regressions are regional fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered over 94 departments are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: No-vote Share and Party Vote Shares, EP Election 2014

	Mainstream Parties	Anti-system parties	Far Left	FN
No-votes	-2.823***	3.004***	0.871***	1.733***
	(0.156)	(0.112)	(0.053)	(0.128)
Election Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Median income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	33,047	33,047	33,047	33,047
adj. R^2	0.367	0.638	0.59	0.6
OT delta	0.77	2.13	0.68	0.85

Notes: The two traditional parties are the Parti socialiste (PS) and the Union pour un mouvement Populaire (UMP) (column 1). As anti-system parties (column 2) we count the far Right Front National (FN) (column 3), and the far Left parties Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (NPA), Lutte ouvriere (LO), as well as the far Left coalition Front de gauche (LFG) consisting of the Parti communiste français (PCF), the Parti de gauche (PG), and the Gauche unitaire (GU) (column 4). Election controls include turnout in the previous EP election and turnout for the referendum 2005. Municipality controls contain (1) the size of the eligible voter base (2) the population density in four categories (from very densely to very sparsely populated) (3) the share of the population 60 years and older, (4) the share of residences that lay vacant, (5) the average household size (6) the share of relatively lowly educated graduates (highest degree vocational studies or aptitude certificate), (7) the share of the population with a university degree, the share of workers engaged in (8) blue-collar labor, (9) agriculture, (10) education and science, and (11) artisans (such as craftsmen, tradesmen and small business owners), (12) the population's immigration share, and (13) the unemployment rate. Median income (14) is listed separately as it excludes municipalities with less than 50 households from the sample. All independent variables are standardized. Also included in all regressions are regional fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered over 94 departments are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: No-vote Shares and Party Vote shares, Legislative Elections 2007 and 2012

	Mainstr. Parties 2007	Mainstr. Parties 2012	Anti-syst. Parties 2007	Anti-syst. Parties 2012	Far Left 2007	Far Left 2012	FN 2007	FN 2012
No-vote 2005	-0.592* (0.30)	-0.771** (0.32)	0.758*** (0.08)	1.284*** (0.10)	0.582*** (0.07)	0.792*** (0.08)	0.159*** (0.02)	0.418*** (0.05)
N	33058	33058	33058	33058	33058	33058	33058	33058
adj. R^2	0.37	0.26	0.50	0.46	0.56	0.44	0.452	0.498
OT delta	0.77	1.01	1.02	1.60	0.88	1.35	0.72	0.84

Notes: The two traditional parties are the Parti socialiste (PS) and the Union pour un mouvement Populaire (UMP) (column 1). As anti-system parties (column 2) we count the far Right Front National (FN) (column 3), and the far Left parties Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (NPA), Lutte ouvriere (LO), as well as the far Left coalition Front de gauche (LFG) consisting of the Parti communiste français (PCF), the Parti de gauche (PG), and the Gauche unitaire (GU) (column 4). Election controls include turnout in the previous EP election and turnout for the referendum 2005. Municipality controls contain (1) the size of the eligible voter base (2) the population density in four categories (from very densely to very sparsely populated) (3) the share of the population 60 years and older, (4) the share of residences that lay vacant, (5) the average household size (6) the share of relatively lowly educated graduates (highest degree vocational studies or aptitude certificate), (7) the share of the population with a university degree, the share of workers engaged in (8) blue-collar labor, (9) agriculture, (10) education and science, and (11) artisans (such as craftsmen, tradesmen and small business owners), (12) the population's immigration share, and (13) the unemployment rate. Median income (14) is listed separately as it excludes municipalities with less than 50 households from the sample. All independent variables are standardized. Also included in all regressions are regional fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered over 94 departments are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A8: No-vote Shares and Party Vote Shares, Presidential Elections 2007 and 2012

	Mainstr. Parties 2007	Mainstr. Parties 2012	Anti-syst. Parties 2007	Anti-syst. Parties 2012	Far Left 2007	Far Left 2012	FN 2007	FN 2012
No-vote 2005	-1.140*** (0.14)	-1.373*** (0.10)	1.832*** (0.07)	2.149*** (0.07)	0.741*** (0.04)	0.719*** (0.05)	0.804*** (0.05)	0.949*** (0.07)
N	33037	33037	33037	33037	33037	33037	33037	33037
adj. R^2	0.40	0.43	0.62	0.57	0.50	0.50	0.63	0.61
OT delta	0.81	0.83	1.05	1.11	0.75	0.87	1.09	1.00

Notes: The two traditional parties are the Parti socialiste (PS) and the Union pour un mouvement Populaire (UMP) (column 1). As anti-system parties (column 2) we count the far Right Front National (FN) (column 3), and the far Left parties Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (NPA), Lutte ouvriere (LO), as well as the far Left coalition Front de gauche (LFG) consisting of the Parti communiste français (PCF), the Parti de gauche (PG), and the Gauche unitaire (GU) (column 4). Election controls include turnout in the previous EP election and turnout for the referendum 2005. Municipality controls contain (1) the size of the eligible voter base (2) the population density in four categories (from very densely to very sparsely populated) (3) the share of the population 60 years and older, (4) the share of residences that lay vacant, (5) the average household size (6) the share of relatively lowly educated graduates (highest degree vocational studies or aptitude certificate), (7) the share of the population with a university degree, the share of workers engaged in (8) blue-collar labor, (9) agriculture, (10) education and science, and (11) artisans (such as craftsmen, tradesmen and small business owners), (12) the population's

immigration share, and (13) the unemployment rate. Median income (14) is listed separately as it excludes municipalities with less than 50 households from the sample. All independent variables are standardized. Also included in all regressions are regional fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered over 94 departments are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A9: No-vote Share on Party Vote Share, *Liste Extreme Gauche* (LO + RCL/NPA)

	Effect of No-vote on Party vote share
EP 2009	0.460***
	(0.051)
EP 2014	0.094***
	(0.0111)
Leg., 2007	0.367***
	(0.0302)
Leg., 2012	0.09***
	(0.0113)
Pres., 2007	0.519***
	(0.0239)
Pres., 2012	0.0521
	(0.0135)
N	33,037

Notes: This table presents results for a narrower definition of the French Far left, namely only the coalition between *Lutte ouvriere* (LO) *and Ligue communiste révolutionnaire* (LCR - until 2009)*/ Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste* (NPA – from 2009 on). While ideologically strongly overlapping with the other far Left parties, the Liste Extreme Gauche parties explicitly rule out any coalition with the traditional *Parti Socialiste* and could therefore be regarded as more consequentially illiberal. Results show that significance of the estimated positive coefficients for the far Left does not depend on any specific denomination within it.

Election controls include turnout in the previous EP election and turnout for the referendum 2005. Municipality controls contain (1) the size of the eligible voter base (2) the population density in four categories (from very densely to very sparsely populated) (3) the share of the population 60 years and older, (4) the share of residences that lay vacant, (5) the average household size (6) the share of relatively lowly educated graduates (highest degree vocational studies or aptitude certificate), (7) the share of the population with a university degree, the share of workers engaged in (8) blue-collar labor, (9) agriculture, (10) education and science, and (11) artisans (such as craftsmen, tradesmen and small business owners), (12) the population's immigration share, and (13) the unemployment rate. Median income (14) is listed separately as it excludes municipalities with less than 50 households from the sample. All independent variables are standardized. Also included in all regressions are regional fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered over 94 departments are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

D: Beta Regression

We check our results with a GLM framework employing a Maximum Likelihood estimation and pre-specifying a beta distribution. This approach aims to tackle issues inherent to dependent variables (DV) that are proportions (i.e. strictly bounded between 0 and 100 percent).

This "beta regression" is thus, in theory, a more adequate estimation technique in our electoral outcome setting. If not indicated otherwise, the following delineation of the approach relies on the works of Paolino (2001) and Smithson and Verkuilen (2006), sources that the reader should consult for a more in-depth explanation.

The following tables show that GLM confirms most of our standard linear regression results. If anything, standard linear regression underestimates the effect of the No-vote on the predictions on electoral participation. Party vote shares are very similar as well, with the exception of the UMP vote share in the legislative election 2007. Wald test χ^2 values (omitted in the tables) show the joint significance of our independent variables in all model specifications.

Table A10: Beta Regression Results: No-vote Share on Turnout and Blank Voting

	Effect of No-vote on Turnout	Effect of No-vote on Blank vote
EP 2009	-0.614***	0.253***
	(0.059)	(0.040)
EP 2014	-0.253***	0.157***
	(0.069)	(0.0223)
Leg., 2007	-0.54***	0.074***
	(0.056)	(0.0137)
Leg., 2012	-0.131*	0.00233
	(0.0676)	(0.0098)
Pres., 2007	-0.297***	0.0523***
	(0.0333)	(0.0077)
Pres., 2012	-0.0377	-0.0141

	(0.0388)	(0.0115)
N	33,042	33,037

Table A11: Beta Regression Results: No-vote Share on Party Vote Shares

	Leg. 2007	Leg., 2012	Pres., 2007	Pres., 2012	EP, 2009	EP, 2014
PS	0.685***	0.542*	1.312***	1.151***	0.315***	-0.2154***
	(0.2066)	(0.3173)	(0.0581)	(.0695)	(0.068)	(0.0520)
UMP	-0.298	-1.045***	-2.16***	-2.40***	-2.943***	-2.267***
	(0.5017)	(0.406)	(0.1423)	(0.112)	(-0.154)	(.1843)
Far Left	0.319***	0.079***	0.508***	0.038	.316***	.0712***
	(0.0269)	(0.0109)	(0.0244)	(0.147)	(.034)	(.0076)
FN	0. 175***	0.474***	0. 822***	0.956***	0.382***	1.772***
	(.0228)	(0.0673)	(0.0517)	(0.0814)	(.0395)	(0.1323)
N	33058	33058	33037	33037	33047	33047

Notes: Election controls in all model specifications include turnout in the previous EP election and turnout for the referendum 2005. Municipality controls contain (1) the share of the population 60 years and older, (2) the share of buildings that lay vacant, (3) the share of relatively lowly educated graduates (highest degree vocational studies or aptitude certificate), (4) the share of the population with a university degree, the share of workers engaged in (5) blue-collar labour, (6) agriculture, (7) education and science, and (8) artisans (craftsmen, tradesmen and small business owners) (9) the unemployment rate, (10) the average household size, and (11) the size of the eligible voter base. Median income and population density categories are listed separately as it excludes municipalities with less than 50 households from the sample. All continuous explanatory variables are standardized. Also included in all regressions are fixed effects for 21 NUTS2 regions. Robust standard errors clustered over 95 departments are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E: Supplementary Analysis: Corsica and Overseas Territories

We excluded Corsica and French overseas departments from our main analysis, as elections in both regions tend to be marked by idiosyncratic issues. For overseas departments, there is also mostly only aggregate, i.e. departmental, election and referendum results available. We are thus able to add 472 additional units in this supplementary analysis, 360 from Corsica and 112 from the overseas departments. Results largely stay the same, see figure A2 and A3.


Figure A2: Association Between Municipal No-vote and Turnout in National French Elections, 2007-2014. Notes: Results are from the fully specified model with all covariates included (as in column (3) and (6) in table 1). Dots represent the estimated coefficients; whiskers show the 95% confidence interval around them.

Figure A3: Association Between Municipal No-vote and blank voting in National French Elections, 2007-2014. Notes: Results are from the fully specified model with all covariates included (as in column (3) and (6) in table 1). Dots represent the estimated coefficients; whiskers show the 95% confidence interval around them.

F: Supplementary Analysis: EP Elections 2019

Table A11 shows the coefficients of the municipal No-vote in the referendum 2005 and EP election turnout and blank voting in 2019. Estimation results turn insignificant.

Table A12: No-vote Share and political participation, EP election 2019.

	Turnout	Blank votes
No-votes	0.0896	0.0441
	(0.059)	(0.0427)
Political Controls	Yes	Yes
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes
Median income	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes
N	33,047	31,507
Adj. R²	0.487	0.257
OT delta	-0.84	0.22

Political controls include turnout in the previous EP election and turnout for the referendum 2005. Municipality controls contain (1) the size of the eligible voter base (2) the population density in four categories (from very densely to very sparsely populated) (3) the share of the population 60 years and older, (4) the share of residences that lay vacant, (5) the average household size (6) the share of relatively lowly educated graduates (highest degree vocational studies or aptitude certificate), (7) the share of the population with a university degree, the share of workers engaged in (8) blue-collar labor, (9) agriculture, (10) education and science, and (11) artisans (such as craftsmen, tradesmen and small business owners), (12) the immigrant population share, and (13) the unemployment rate. Median income is listed separately as it excludes municipalities with less than 50 households from the sample. All independent variables are standardized. Also included in all regressions are regional fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered over 94 departments are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$