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## Codebook

- 1.1 Appeal to democracy used yes
  - 1.1.2 Appeal to democracy used yes and ineffective
  - 2.1 Veto threat yes
    - 2.1.1 EP red lines
    - 2.1.2 EP to extend MFF 14-20
  - 2.2 Co-legislation MFF as veto
  - 2.3 Limits to the veto threat
  - 3.1 Issue linkage yes
    - 3.1.1 MFF used to get concessions in other elements
    - 3.1.2 Coordination among the negotiation teams of the different elements
  - 3.3 Limits to the issue linkage
  - 4.1. Time pressure on EP
    - 4.1.1 Emergency situation time pressures the EP
    - 4.1.2 Council puts time pressure against the EP
    - 4.1.3 Public opinion pressures the EP
    - 4.1.4 Time pressure consequence: indefiniton of some aspects of the RRF
  - 4.2 Time plays in favour of the EP: Council suffers time pressure
  - 5.1 Intergroup consensus yes
    - 5.1.1 Intergroup consensus based on equal participation
      - 5.1.1.1 Non-mainstream groups participating in the consensus
        - 5.1.1.1.1 Inclusion of the Greens
        - 5.1.1.1.2 Greens early exclusion corrected afterwards
      - 5.1.1.2 Non mainstream groups missing in the consensus
        - 5.1.1.2.1 Reasons for the exclusion/non-participation
    - 5.1.1.3 Intergroup negotiations trade-offs
  - 5.1.2 Intergroup consensus based on precursory team
  - 5.1.3 Intergroup consensus based on geography
  - 5.1.4 Intergroup consensus based on large convergence
- 5.2 Cohesion reinforces Parliament negotiating position
- 5.3 Cohesion for institutional self-reinforcement
- 5.4 Limits of the intergroup consensus
  - 5.4.1 MEPs dependence on national governments: same party
  - 5.4.2 MEPs dependence on national governments: opposition party
- 5.5 Indefinition of some aspects of the RRF in order to get consensus
- 5.6.1 Intragroup interest in avoiding plenary
- 5.6.2 Intergroup interest in avoiding plenary
- 5.7.1 Intragroup consensus: clear
- 5.7.2 Intragroup difficulties to reach consensus
- 6.1 Commission played as an honest broker: end of the negotiations
- 6.2 Commission did not play as an honest broker: beginning of the negotiation
- 6.3 Commission's preeminent control of the RRF
- 6.4 Commission's alignment with EP in policy issues
- 6.5 Illegality of EP governance demands
- 6.6 EP-EC relation depended on EC negotiator

- 7.1 EP preferences: large scope
- 7.2 Governance demands
  - 7.2.1 Priority of governance issues
  - 7.2.2 Governance on equal footing with policy issues
  - 7.2.3 Maximum governance preference
    - 7.2.3.1 Maximum governance preference unachievable
    - 7.2.3.2 Maximum governance preference undesirable
    - 7.2.3.3 Maximum governance preference unrealistic
  - 7.2.4 Alternatives to the maximum governance outcome
  - 7.2.5 Expansive aim of the EP
- 7.3 EP policy preferences
  - 7.3.1 Priority of policy preferences over governance
  - 7.3.2 Preference for increasing the size of the available funds
- 7.4 Preferences trade-off
- 7.5 Geography of the MEPs: impact on the outcome
- 8.1 Satisfaction in general terms with the package
- 8.2 Satisfaction with policy and monetary outcomes
  - 8.2.1 Facility as an old EP aspiration
  - 8.2.2 Satisfaction: +16 billion euros
- 8.3 Satisfaction with governance outcomes
- 8.4 Disatisfaction with governance outcomes
- 8.5 Both positive and negative evaluation of governance outcomes
- 9. Future governance
  - 9.1 Limits to future governance
  - 9.2 Long-term scope of the RFF
    - 9.2.1 Long-term scope of the RFF: no
  - 9.3 Art.122 in the future: EP participation
- 10.1 Council non EP aligned attitude
- 10.2 Council's preeminent control of the RRF
  - 10.2.1 Council's preeminent control of the RRF: achieved
- 10.3 German Council's Presidency relevance
  - 10.3.1 German Council's presidency tactics
- 10.4 Council stronger than EP
- 10.5 Council's sensitive agreement
- 11.1 EP negotiations with the Commission
- 11.2 EP negotiations with the Council
- 11.3 EP position not tough enough
- 11.4 EP negotiation position from less to more
- 11.5 Governance most difficult aspect of the negotiation