

## **Robustness checks on “Rebuilding trust in broken systems?”**


Marlene Mauk

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## A. Main effects


Figure A-1: Robustness checks: including countries without a successful populist party



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 137 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 118 (trust in parties).


Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.

**Figure A-2: Robustness checks: including country dummies**



*Notes:* Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties). All models include country dummies (coefficients not displayed).  
*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.


**Figure A-3: Robustness checks: seat gains**



*Notes:* Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.


**Figure A-4: Robustness checks: satisfaction with democracy**



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125.

Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.

**Figure A-5: Robustness checks: controlling for populists in government**




Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).


Sources: European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.

**Figure A-6: Robustness checks: right-wing and left-wing populist parties' success**

*Right-wing populist parties' vote gain*




*Left-wing populist parties' vote gains*




*Notes:* Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. For right-wing populist parties, N = 103 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 88 (trust in parties). For left-wing populist parties, N = 33 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 28 (trust in parties)  
*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.

**Figure A-7: Robustness checks: populist and non-populist electorates**

*populist electorate*



*non-populist electorate*



*Notes:* Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).


*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.




## B. Conditional effects

**Figure B-1: Robustness checks: including countries without a successful populist party**


*democratic quality*



*corruption control*



*economic performance*




*Notes:* Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 137 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 118 (trust in parties).


*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.


**Figure B-2: Robustness checks: including country dummies**

*democratic quality*






*corruption control*





*economic performance*




*Notes:* Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance; country dummies. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).


*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.


**Figure B-3: Robustness checks: seat gains**

*democratic quality*






*corruption control*






*economic performance*



*Notes:* Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.

**Figure B-4: Robustness checks: satisfaction with democracy**




*Notes:* Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 125.


*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.

**Figure B-5: Robustness checks: controlling for populists in government**

*democratic quality*




*corruption control*





*economic performance*





*Notes:* Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance; populists in government. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).



*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.

**Figure B-6: Robustness checks: right-wing and left-wing populist parties' success**


*Right-wing populist parties' vote gain – democratic quality*




*Right-wing populist parties' vote gain – corruption control*




*Right-wing populist parties' vote gain – economic performance*




*Left-wing populist parties' vote gains – democratic quality*



### Left-wing populist parties' vote gains – corruption control



### Left-wing populist parties' vote gains – economic performance





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

*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.

**Figure B-7: Robustness checks: populist and non-populist electorates**


*Populist electorate – democratic quality*




*Non-populist electorate – democratic quality*




*Populist electorate – corruption control*




*Non-populist electorate – corruption control*



### Populist electorate – economic performance



### Non-populist electorate – economic performance



*Notes:* Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GDP/capita, urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption, economic performance. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) / 107 (trust in parties).

*Sources:* European Social Survey 2002-2016; ParlGov 1997-2016; V-Dem v9; World Development Indicators 2002-2016.