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Ocean Governance in the Coral Triangle: A Multi-Level Regulatory Governance Structure

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Abstract

The current mode of ocean governance in the biogeographically defined space of the Coral Triangle emerged due to the framing of marine degradation as a de-bounded risk with a transboundary nature. This framing justified the rescaling of the issue's governance from the national to the regional. This article will explore how ocean governance in the form of the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security (CTI-CFF) is an example of a regional multi-level regulatory governance arrangement based on disaggregated, regulatory forms of statehood. These new kinds of regional regulatory governance are defined by the dominance of policy and technical expertise. As such, non-state actors work closely with national and supranational actors in the development, implementation, and regulatory functions of the CTI-CFF. The organizational structure of the CTI-CFF's governance framework provides an example of how regional regulatory systems are networked into existing national government structures. The CTI-CFF's Regional Plan of Action and corresponding mechanisms serve as a model for each member country's National Plan of Action and domestic programs. These plans of action promote the transformation and rescaling of national governance to be consistent with regional standards of marine resource governance. To summarize, CTI-CFF is a multi-level governance structure constructed to strengthen regulatory regionalism.

Keywords

Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security; functional specialization; marine degradation; meta-governance; non-state actors; ocean governance; regulatory regionalism

Issue

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1. Introduction

Often referred to as the “Amazon of the Sea” (Poernomo & Kuswardani, 2019, pp. 102–103), the Coral Triangle is considered “the global center for marine biodiversity” (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 22). However, marine and coastal resources in the Coral Triangle are threatened by “rapidly expanding populations, economic growth, and international trade” (CTI-CFF Regional Secretariat, 2016, p. 2). Specifically, these threats include “over-fishing, destructive fishing practices, land-based sources of marine pollution, coastal habitat conversion” and the effects of climate change, all of which exacerbate each other (Fidelman et al., 2014, p. 117). Many of these drivers of marine degradation in the Coral Triangle are trans-

boundary in nature, such as “overfishing of shared stocks, illegal cross-border fishing activity, trans-shipment of commercial-scale fishing operations” (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 35). The prevailing narrative surrounding marine degradation in the Coral Triangle is one of impending crisis, which is rooted in “empirical evidence of ecosystem degradation and species extinctions” (Berdej et al., 2015, p. 213). The two commonly used pieces of scientific evidence which support this crisis narrative are that the coral reefs in the Coral Triangle are reaching tipping points that will lead to their mass extinction (Burke et al., 2011) and that most of the fish stocks in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia are considered to be at a minimum fully exploited (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2011). This crisis narrative is used

to justify the creation of the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security (CTI-CFF), the need for political action, and the policy measures being implemented.

The policy responses which develop out of crisis narratives depicting the destabilization and degradation of ecosystems tend to promote conservation practices (Bischof, 2010). In the context of the CTI-CFF, conservation policy responses arising from the crisis narrative dominate due to the significant financial support and human resource capacity provided by international conservation organizations to create the CTI-CFF and support the implementation of its policies (Berdej et al., 2015). The dominance of conservation policy responses is also a consequence of the fact that the CTI-CFF was and is primarily framed as “the world’s largest conservation initiative” (Mills et al., 2010, p. 292) even though the CTI-CFF’s mandate covers food security, fisheries management, and measures to adapt to climate change (CTI-CFF Regional Secretariat, 2016). Because the conservation discourse is afforded priority, many policy solutions aim to restore, maintain, and protect ecosystems, often excluding or significantly limiting human activity in those areas (Berdej et al., 2015). This also prioritizes the involvement of “technical expertise and high-level, multilateral action” both in describing the problem and prescribing its solutions (Berdej et al., 2015, p. 215). Narratives, thus, privilege the specific theories, ideologies, scientific knowledge, and understandings of problems that underpin these narratives while marginalizing others.

Not only is the Coral Triangle a biodiversity hotspot, but its marine and coastal resources are also of significant economic importance. Reference is made in the CTI-CFF’s Regional Plan of Action (RPoA) to the estimated 2.3 billion USD annual value of the mangroves, coral reefs, and related natural habitats in the Coral Triangle, the multi-billion USD tuna industry, the role of reef systems and mangrove belts in reducing the economic and human costs of storms and tsunamis, and the nature-based tourism industry which generates tens of millions of USD annually and thousands of jobs (CTI-CFF Regional Secretariat, 2016, pp. 1–2). In light of drastic marine degradation and the economic importance of preserving the existence of marine and coastal resources for the future, the countries in the biogeographically defined Coral Triangle region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste), with the support of the international community, agreed in 2007 to launch the CTI-CFF and develop an RPoA to radically transform marine resource management in the region by 2020 (Fidelman et al., 2012).

This article will explore how ocean governance in the form of the CTI-CFF is an example of a regional multi-level regulatory governance arrangement based on disaggregated, regulatory forms of statehood. This form of regulatory regionalism manifests in the rescal-

ing and transformation of domestic governance to conform to regional standards. The first section will describe the establishment of the CTI-CFF and how non-state actors worked with national and supranational state actors in the development, implementation, and regulatory functions of this new type of multi-level governance. The second section will explain how the CTI-CFF functions as a multi-level regulatory governance system by examining the networked governance structure of state and non-state actors from the regional to the national, using Indonesia as an example, highlighting the fact that technical experts are incorporated into every level of governance.

1.1. Regulatory Regionalism

Regulatory regionalism, a term coined by Jayasuriya (2003, 2008, 2009), is a contested process in which the state’s internal spatial architecture is transformed, manifesting in the emergence of novel forms of multi-level governance. This occurs primarily through reorganization to meet international standards of states’ regulatory and legal arrangements and the networking of responsible national institutions into regional and global monitoring systems (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). These new configurations of regional regulation depend more on the active cooperation of national agencies and actors and the harmonization of national policy than on their enforcement through international organizations or formal international treaties (Jayasuriya, 2009). The regulatory state takes on the new role of managing the system of regulatory networks that have developed (Jayasuriya, 2009). Domestic regulatory agencies build networks with their foreign counterparts and transnational regulatory units (Jayasuriya, 2009). These new kinds of regional regulatory governance are defined “by the dominance of technical and policy expertise” (Jayasuriya, 2009, p. 340). As Jayasuriya (2009) notes, non-state actors have increasingly been working with national and supranational state actors in the development, implementation, and regulatory functions of new types of multi-level governance. Importantly, regulatory regionalism embodies the rescaling of policymaking and governance to spaces within the state or parallel to existing state institutions but does not indicate the advent of supranational rule (Hameiri, 2009; Jayasuriya, 2008). Regulatory regionalism is, thus, characterized by its efforts to integrate benchmarks, criteria, and systems of policy coordination at all governance levels (Jayasuriya, 2009).

1.2. Meta-Governance, Functional Specialization, and De-Bounded Risk Management

There are three main mechanisms of regulatory regionalism: meta-governance, functional specialization, and de-bounded risk management (Hameiri & Jayasuriya, 2011). Meta-governance refers to the “governance of governance” occurring through the establishment of

processes that regulate governance systems that include non-state actors and the provision of guidelines for the establishment of intricate multi-level and networked governance systems (Jayasuriya, 2005, p. 22; see also Jayasuriya, 2004; Jessop, 1998). Jayasuriya (2005) elaborates that the functions of meta-governance are often situated in international organizations and the state's core executive, while the implementation of that governance is increasingly scattered amongst an assortment of state and non-state actors.

Functional specialization pertains to efforts to control boundaries by distinguishing between the technical and political, thereby creating "new scalar arrangements within task-specific jurisdictions" (Hameiri & Jayasuriya, 2011, p. 29). These task-specific jurisdictions tend to cut across firmly delineated political boundaries and necessitate the active involvement of national and subnational agencies in the governance process (Hameiri & Jayasuriya, 2011). In addition, functionally specific jurisdictions generally relocate decision-making from centers of political structures legitimized by notions of territorialized rule to actors who gain their authority from claims to expertise on a certain issue (Hameiri & Jayasuriya, 2011).

De-bounded risk management involves governing social issues through risk rather than the governing of risk (Aradau & van Munster, 2007; Dean, 1999; Ewald, 1993; Mythen & Walklate, 2008). De-bounded risks, such as ecosystem degradation and species extinction, denote risks that are not bound by political borders nor calculable timeframes (Arnoldi, 2009). Risks should not be viewed as objective because "the very framing of particular issues as 'risks' is linked to forms of governance in which experts operating outside the official national governing apparatus play a key role in defining, assessing and managing such phenomena" (Hameiri & Jayasuriya, 2011, pp. 31–32). These de-bounded risks are the regional governance project's ideological drivers (Hameiri & Jayasuriya, 2011).

The CTI-CFF as an institutionalized form of ocean governance emerged due to the framing of marine degradation as a de-bounded risk with a transboundary nature, which justified the rescaling of the issue's governance from the national to the regional. There are multiple examples of functional specialization and meta-governance in the governance processes and framework of the CTI-CFF, while the de-bounded risk associated with marine degradation served as the ideological driver for the establishment of the CTI-CFF.

2. Establishment of the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security

The socio-economic contexts of the six countries in the Coral Triangle vary drastically and cover the spectrum from small to large governments and economies. Between the six member countries, there are differences in language, development trajectories, economies, population size and density, governance frameworks, cul-

tures, and traditions of marine resource management (Fidelman et al., 2012). To put the economic disparity in perspective, Indonesia is the world's 10th largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (The World Bank Group, 2022), while the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste are on the United Nations Least Developed Countries list (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2022). The main political and cultural divide is between the Southeast Asian countries and the Pacific Island nations (von Heland et al., 2014). In general, the Southeast Asian countries have more resources available and greater political power than the Pacific Island countries (Berdej et al., 2015; von Heland et al., 2014).

In March 2006, at the 8th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, former President of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono first raised the need for an initiative in the Coral Triangle to protect marine and coastal resources for future generations (Rosen & Olsson, 2013). By December 2007, in conjunction with the 13th Conference of the Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change hosted by Indonesia, the six countries in the Coral Triangle agreed to initiate the CTI-CFF and develop an RPoA (Fidelman et al., 2012). Immediately following this announcement, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and the Conservation International (CI) committed to providing funding for the consultative planning processes in each country (Fidelman et al., 2012). The support of international NGOs and donors, such as the Asian Development Bank and the US and Australian governments, helped bolster the buy-in of stakeholders inside and beyond the region (Fidelman et al., 2014).

Though the former President Yudhoyono proposed the establishment of the CTI-CFF to Indonesia's five neighboring countries, this regional regulatory governance framework could not have been created without international financial support in the form of over 500 million USD (Mills et al., 2010, p. 292). The CTI-CFF continues to rely on international donors because the contributions from the six member countries are not sufficient to fund the implementation of the activities under the RPoA's five goals. For example, the cost of funding the activities under only the marine protected area (MPA) goal of the RPoA over the first ten years was estimated at 400 million USD (Clifton, 2009, p. 93). This reliance on external funding has introduced the interests of actors outside the six member countries into policy decisions and the prioritization of activities under the CTI-CFF. Some donors provide funds targeted at specific technical support in line with their programs of work, while the NGO development partners use their own funds and project-related funds from CTI-CFF donor partners to deliver on their CTI-CFF-related activities (Thomas et al., 2017). This reliance on piecemeal external funding linked to different actors' interests has affected the pace at which the implementation of CTI-CFF goals progresses (Thomas et al., 2017). The lack of guaranteed long-term

funding also jeopardizes the sustainability of the CTI-CFF as well as the operationalization of the goals in the RPoA (Fidelman et al., 2014). To conclude, because the CTI-CFF relies on external funding, donor partners significantly influence the operationalization of activities and can dictate the focus and direction of programs.

2.1. NGO Development Partners in the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security

In addition to the six member countries, non-state actors were heavily involved in the establishment of the CTI-CFF. The NGO development partners of the CTI-CFF, who de facto orchestrated the CTI-CFF to a significant extent, were the WWF, TNC, and the CI (Rosen & Olsson, 2013). They exerted disproportionate influence over its development by leveraging technical, financial, and political resources (Fidelman, 2019). This entailed strategically using lobbying and informal networks to gain initial support from the Indonesian President for the idea of the CTI-CFF and identifying and mobilizing technical and political support and partners throughout the process of establishing the CTI-CFF (Rosen & Olsson, 2013).

These NGOs provided significant financial and technical capacity support to the creation of the CTI-CFF and the development of the RPoA. The development of the RPoA was integral to establishing the CTI-CFF as it serves as the CTI-CFF's roadmap and policy agenda for the 10 to 15 years following its establishment (Fidelman, 2019, p. 278). The task of developing the RPoA was assigned to a CTI Coordination Committee comprised of representatives from each of the six member countries and technical advisors, predominantly from the WWF, TNC, and the CI (Fidelman, 2019). The CTI-CFF development partners worked closely with the six Coral Triangle countries for over 17 months to develop the RPoA (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 27). The NGOs' technical experts drafted the RPoA to which the six Coral Triangle countries then agreed (Thomas et al., 2017). As a result, the goals and targets of the CTI-CFF's RPoA directly reflect the specific agendas of the NGO development partners working in the region and, to a lesser extent, donors' agendas (Fidelman, 2019). For example, Goal 1 is typically viewed as an objective of the CI, targets related to live-reef fish trade and tuna fisheries under Goal 2 were pursued by the WWF, and the TNC and WWF were interested in the establishment of networks of MPAs under Goal 3 (von Heland et al., 2014, p. 57). This explains the CTI-CFF's strong focus on marine biodiversity conservation (Foale et al., 2013). The NGO development partners' extensive involvement in the development of the RPoA can also explain the fact that the framing of problems and the proposed associated solutions in the RPoA predominantly employ Western intellectual frameworks instead of drawing on national and local contexts (Clifton & Foale, 2017). This meant that some of the goals, such as the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management and MPAs, advocated for by NGO partners, were not well

understood by governments and other non-state actors (Fidelman et al., 2014, p. 125). These misunderstandings have led to slow progress towards some RPoA goals due to disagreements over terminology, the appropriate way to proceed, and the activities that should be adopted (Thomas et al., 2017).

Not only did the NGO partners steer the development of the RPoA, but they and donor partners also provided financial and capacity resources to support the interim Regional Secretariat in its coordination duties. The establishment of the CTI-CFF's internal structure and collaborative working methods were largely supported by the 60 million USD grant from the US Coral Triangle Initiative Support Program (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 31). Of this program's total budget, 44 million USD (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 31) went to the Coral Triangle Support Partnership (CTSP), which was a consortium of international conservation NGOs composed of the WWF as the leading organization, and TNC and the CI (Fidelman, 2019, p. 280). The CTSP established the framework of the technical working groups (TWGs), Senior Officials Meetings, National Coordinating Committees (NCCs), Regional Exchanges, and the interim Regional Secretariat (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 31). The NGO development partners continue to influence the CTI-CFF through their involvement in the TWGs and Governance Working Groups (GWGs), where NGO personnel supply expert technical advice and leadership in driving the process of implementing the CTI-CFF's goals forward, and their membership in each country's NCC (Thomas et al., 2017; von Heland et al., 2014). Due to their extensive programs running on the ground in the region, the NGO development partners also implement a substantial proportion of the activities involved in meeting the goals of the RPoA (Thomas et al., 2017). By providing key technical and financial capacities to the CTI-CFF during its establishment and afterward, the NGO development partners have ensured and continue to ensure that their interests are reflected in the CTI-CFF's structure and processes.

During the establishment of the CTI-CFF, two mechanisms of regulatory regionalism were present. One mechanism was functional specialization, which refers to efforts to control boundaries by distinguishing between the "technical" and "political." An illustration of this is the composition of the CTI Coordination Committee tasked with developing the RPoA, which included both "political" representatives from the member countries' governments and "technical" advisors who were predominantly NGO partners. These functionally specific jurisdictions relocated decision-making regarding the development of the RPoA away from centers of political structures legitimized by notions of territorialized rule to actors who gain their authority from claims to expertise on a certain issue. As the RPoA is the CTI-CFF's roadmap and policy agenda for the 10 to 15 years following the CTI-CFF's establishment, this rescaling and boundary control has clear implications for the governance outcome.

A second mechanism was meta-governance. The CTI-CFF is an example of meta-governance, or the “governance of governance,” occurring through the establishment of processes that regulate governance systems that include non-state actors and the provision of guidelines for putting in place intricate multi-level and networked governance systems. The following section will present the CTI-CFF as a multi-level and networked governance system.

3. Governance Framework of the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security

The CTI-CFF governance framework has been welded onto existing governance frameworks at the global, regional, and national levels. These agreements cover conservation, climate change, marine sovereignty, development, and trade (Fidelman & Ekstrom, 2012). The agreements at the regional level tend to exist respectively among Southeast Asian countries and between the Pacific Island countries (Fidelman et al., 2012). In addition to the bilateral and multilateral regional agreements, there are other regional institutions that govern marine resources across the Coral Triangle (Fidelman & Ekstrom, 2012). Some of these regional institutions, which overlap with the CTI-CFF in geographical implement area as well as subject matter, are the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Programme, the Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia, and the Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 59). There are also regional and sub-regional instruments that were adopted outside of the CTI-CFF framework, but the CTI-CFF nevertheless considers them to be implementing measures under its framework (Thomas et al., 2017). An example is the Sulu Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion’s Action Plans which the Tri-National Committee adopted in July 2009 (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 57). This committee, a precursor of the CTI-CFF, was set up as a result of a memorandum of understanding between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines on February 13, 2004 (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 57). These different governance processes have evolved in a gradually binding manner (Thomas et al., 2017). To summarize, the CTI-CFF developed upon existing processes but also created new ones at the regional, cross-regional, and sub-regional levels.

3.1. Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security: Governance Structure

The formal source of authority for the CTI-CFF comes from the Coral Triangle Initiative Leaders’ Declaration signed by the six member countries’ heads of state in May 2009 (CTI-CFF, 2022a). This declaration marked the official establishment of the CTI-CFF as a regional institution and the adoption of the RPoA at the highest political levels (Fidelman, 2019). Though the CTI-CFF is not legally binding, it holds significant authority in the sense

that prominent stakeholders support it and it aligns with existing international institutions (Fidelman, 2019).

The CTI-CFF has a functionally specific jurisdiction that networks together state and non-state actors across regional, national, and local levels. The state actors include the six Coral Triangle countries, the US, Australia, and Germany (CTI-CFF, 2022b). The non-state actors are composed of international NGOs and the academic community (von Heland et al., 2014). The CTI-CFF governance framework includes a Council of Ministers composed of the heads of each of the six countries’ primary national implementing ministries, a Committee of Senior Officials formed from designated senior government officials from the six member countries, a CTI-CFF Regional Secretariat to manage the CTI-CFFs internal and external relations, and a parallel system of the NCCs that serve as a channel between transboundary marine management and national management structures (CTI-CFF, 2022c).

Figure 1 illustrates the governing bodies at the regional and national levels and their interlinkage with the CTI-CFF’s development partners composed of other governments, international NGOs, and multilateral organizations. As indicated in Figure 1, at the same level of reporting as the Regional Secretariat are the GWGs, the TWGs, and the Cross-Cutting Initiatives. The five TWGs, which correspond to each of the RPoA goals (CTI-CFF, 2022a), are comprised of representatives nominated by each of the NCCs and technical experts endorsed by the CTI-CFF development partners and donor organizations (CTI-CFF, 2022c). Chaired by two countries each, the TWGs supply technical inputs and recommendations to Senior Officials Meetings, the NCCs, and the Regional Secretariat, and advance implementation of activities that contribute to the RPoA goals (CTI-CFF, 2022c). At the national level, each member country of the CTI-CFF has an NCC and national TWGs.

Though the CTI-CFF is not legally binding, the agreement establishing the Regional Secretariat is (Thomas et al., 2017). This agreement formalized the Regional Secretariat’s coordination procedures and the financial contributions of all six countries to the Regional Secretariat (Thomas et al., 2017). The Regional Secretariat supports the three other decision-making and implementing bodies: the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Senior Officials, and the working groups. The Regional Secretariat is crucial to the effective functioning of the CTI-CFF and successful operationalization of the RPoA because it ensures that each country’s National Plan of Action (NPOA) aligns with the RPoA and provides technical and coordination support to the NCCs (Pratikto, 2016).

The goals of the RPoA are implemented through each country’s NPOA, which were developed by representatives from each country’s national government with support from NGOs and other stakeholders (Fidelman et al., 2014). Each of the six countries designated a national ministry to be the lead agency charged with coordinating the implementation of the respective country’s




Figure 1. The CTI-CFF's governance structure at the regional and national levels.

NPoA. These ministries were selected based on their existing relationship with the NGO development partners rather than on a strategic assessment of each country's socio-political and economic context (Thomas et al., 2017). The lead agencies of each country then established NCCs comprised of representatives from the designated lead agency, a range of national ministries, technical experts, academic institutions, national and international NGOs, and the private sector (Fidelman et al., 2014). A CTI-CFF coordinator, typically based in the lead government ministry, organizes each NCC (CTI-CFF Regional Secretariat, 2016). The functions of the NCCs are broadly to facilitate the national operationalization of the RPoA and their respective NPoAs (CTI-CFF Regional Secretariat, 2016). Members of the NCCs also represent their countries at regional CTI-CFF meetings and in the CTI-CFF TWGs (CTI-CFF, 2022c). The NCCs cooperate with the CTI-CFF development partners who implement activities at the national and local levels and also undertake communication and outreach activities (CTI-CFF, 2022c). Depending on country-specific conditions, the NCCs will take different forms, but all NCCs are tasked with ensuring the implementation of the RPoA and leading multi-stakeholder processes to achieve this.

The CTI-CFF multi-level governance structure illustrates regulatory regionalism through the networking of domestic institutions into a regional regulatory system and by transforming countries' domestic regulatory systems to meet regional goals, policies, and standards. These new transnational regulatory regimes, such as the CTI-CFF, are not designed nor empowered to intervene but instead operate through regulatory regionalism. As such, there is a dearth of binding law present in the CTI-CFF regime and a lot of "goodwill commitments"

(Thomas et al., 2017, p. 56). The NPoAs, like the RPoA, tend to be policy instruments and are not legally binding for the countries that adopt them (Thomas et al., 2017). By leaving the development of the NPoA up to each member country, the intention was to respect each country's national jurisdiction and encourage the incorporation of their varying laws, national institutions, and local contexts on marine resource protection (Berdej et al., 2015). The CTI-CFF does not impose strict standardization; instead, it provides the coordinating space for the six member countries and all development partners to agree to "priorities, minimum standards, methodologies and progress metrics" (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 42). For example, each member country manages the portion of the transboundary MPAs and seascapes (e.g., Sulu-Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion) in the CTI-CFF implementation area that falls under their national jurisdictions. Meanwhile, the CTI-CFF supplies the overarching mechanism that ensures these different approaches produce a coordinated transboundary outcome (Thomas et al., 2017). The CTI-CFF has, for the most part, successfully standardized the approach to the management of transboundary MPAs (Thomas et al., 2017). Since the CTI-CFF does not have compliance assessment or dispute settlement mechanisms, the national implementation measures contain enforcement mechanisms following national laws (Thomas et al., 2017).

3.2. Networking Indonesia Into the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security

In the case of Indonesia, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) was selected as the thematic home for the CTI-CFF. This undertaking empowers

Indonesia's designated lead government agency, the MMAF, through its access to financial and technical resources. The major challenge regarding the selection of the MMAF is that it is not the sole managing authority of coastal and marine resources. Established in 1999, the MMAF is relatively new compared to other Indonesian ministries (Susanto et al., 2015). To create it, the Ministry of Agriculture transferred its fisheries and aquaculture sectors to the MMAF, while the Ministry of Forestry handed over the authority to manage some national MPAs (Poernomo & Kuswardani, 2019; Susanto et al., 2015). Though the MMAF is mandated with the integration of marine and coastal zone management, this management is at best arbitrarily formulated and lacks coordination with the various implementing institutions (Poernomo & Kuswardani, 2019). Thus, the creation of the MMAF caused significant changes in the Indonesian government's administrative system.

The reality of implementing and enforcing the MMAF's mandate, including the conservation aspects, is very complicated. In Indonesia, coastal and marine resources are primarily governed by the state through two ministries at the national level: the MMAF and the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry (MEF; see Susanto et al., 2015). In practice, there are a minimum of "nine line departments, three state ministries, one coordinating ministry, four non-departmental government agencies, and one interministerial council" participating at the national level in marine and coastal management (Asian Development Bank, 2014, p. ix). At least eleven national government institutions jointly enforce the management of Indonesia's marine and coastal resources (Asian Development Bank, 2014, p. 19). Currently, Indonesia has 197 MPAs in coastal and marine areas covering approximately 235,622 km² (White et al., 2021, p. 578). Article 78A of Law No. 1/2014 mandates that all MPAs be under MMAF management (Susanto et al., 2015, p. 33). However, of these 197 MPAs, 30 are managed by the MEF, 157 are managed by the sub-national government—while the MMAF manages only 10 (White et al., 2021, p. 578). Thus, alone the management of MPAs is challenging and requires extensive coordination between the MMAF and MEF as well as between national and sub-national governments. These intricacies surrounding coastal and marine resource management illustrate the challenge of networking national government agencies into regional governance systems.

As the selected national implementing agency, Indonesia's MMAF is networked into the CTI-CFF's multi-level governance system. Three statutes integrate the MMAF and other Indonesian ministries into the CTI-CFF governance framework and outline the membership and tasks of the committees and working groups established under these statutes. These regulations are the Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 85/2015 enacted on July 23, 2015, the Decree of the Coordinating Minister for Maritime

Affairs No. SKEP/9/Menko/Maritim/III/2016 of March 31, 2016, and the Decree of the Director-General of Marine Space Management No. 27/KEP-DJPRL/2016 gazetted on August 2, 2016. These decrees established the membership composition and working procedures of Indonesia's NCC, the Secretariat of the Indonesian NCC, and Indonesia's working and expert groups. Reporting directly to the President of Indonesia and housed in the MMAF, the Indonesian NCC is tasked with operationalizing the RPoA and formulating the country's NPoA (President of Indonesia, 2015, sec. 3).

The Presidential Regulation outlines eight national working groups (NWGs) with members coming from ministries, academic institutions, or NGOs (Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Resources, 2016; MMAF, 2016). The eight NWGs cover the following: seascapes, ecosystem-based fisheries management, MPAs, climate change adaptation, management of endangered species, capacity building, food security, and CTI-CFF data and information (President of Indonesia, 2015, sec. 7). The first five NWGs correspond to the RPoA's five goals and the CTI-CFF's five TWGs. Thus, the governance structure at the national level corresponds to the model provided by the CTI-CFF itself.

The NWGs are similar to the TWGs at the regional level, both in member composition and technical focus. For example, Indonesian NWG no. 3 (*Kelompok Kerja Kawasan Konservasi Perairan* in Indonesian) is tasked with spearheading the implementation of the goals and objectives of the RPoA and the NPoA as they relate to MPAs in Indonesia. This NWG corresponds to the MPA working group at the regional level tasked with supporting the implementation of Goal 3 of the CTI-CFF's RPoA. NWG no. 3 is led by the Director-General of Marine Space Management from the MMAF (Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Resources, 2016). With 13 members, NWG no. 3 is split almost evenly between state and non-state actors. There is a representative from the Ministry of Tourism and the MEF, respectively, with four spots filled by MMAF members (MMAF, 2016). Representatives from NGOs, including all three of the CTI-CFF's founding international NGO development partners, occupy six of the seats in NWG no. 3 (MMAF, 2016). NWG no. 3 is supported by an expert working group almost exclusively composed of scientists affiliated with either research institutions or NGOs (Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Resources, 2016). Thus, the composition of members of NWGs is similar to the composition of the TWGs at the regional level.

The description of the CTI-CFF governance structure and the way in which Indonesia's government agency is networked into the CTI-CFF governance system demonstrate that the CTI-CFF is a form of meta-governance. The organizational structure of the CTI-CFF's governance framework provides an example of how a regional regulatory system is networked into existing national government structures. Non-state actors are included in the processes that regulate the CTI-CFF's governance system.

The functions of the CTI-CFF are situated in its regional governance bodies and each member country's NCC, while the implementation of its RPoA is reliant on each member country's national implementing ministry and the non-state actors who assist in the operationalization of the RPoA's activities. The creation of the RPoA and the corresponding NPoAs, which promote the transformation and rescaling of national governance to be consistent with regional standards on marine resource governance, are mechanisms of regulatory regionalism.

Furthermore, the CTI-CFF has functionally specific jurisdictions involving state and non-state actors who cooperate to further conservation and ocean and environmental management following international rules and principles. Inherent to this regional regulatory governance arrangement are complex boundary conflicts over what should be governed, by whom, and at what level. Due to the number of interests involved and the intricacy of the governance structure, the governance system's effectiveness can be questioned.

4. Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that regional regulatory governance occurs in the Coral Triangle. The current mode of governance in the Coral Triangle emerged due to the framing of marine degradation as a de-bounded risk with a transboundary nature, which justified the rescaling of the issue's governance from the national to the regional. The efforts to manage the transboundary marine degradation in the Coral Triangle do not, however, indicate the advent of the rule of the CTI-CFF as a supra-national organization. Instead, the governance of marine degradation occurs primarily through the reorganization of countries' domestic regulatory arrangements using regional standards and the integration of responsible national institutions into a regional multi-level regulatory governance arrangement, the CTI-CFF. As a regional multi-level regulatory governance structure composed of state and non-state actors in which policy and technical experts participate at every level of governance, the CTI-CFF demonstrates the rescaling and multiplicity of scales of governance that distinguish regulatory regionalism.

Functional specialization and meta-governance as mechanisms of regulatory regionalism are present in the ocean governance of the Coral Triangle. In particular, the NGO development partners have used their specialization in technical aspects of topics covered in the CTI-CFF to ensure that they have seats in decision-making bodies such as working groups at the national level and in the CTI-CFF. Meta-governance, which occurs through the establishment of processes that regulate governance systems that include non-state actors, has also been demonstrated. This article has shown that the functions of this meta-governance of the Coral Triangle are situated in the CTI-CFF and national ministries, while the implementation of that governance is scattered amongst national and sub-national state actors as well as international and

local non-state actors.

As a multi-level regulatory governance system, the CTI-CFF is based on disaggregated, regulatory forms of statehood. The organizational structure of the CTI-CFF's governance framework provides an example of how a regional regulatory system is networked into existing national government structures. Indonesian state apparatuses have also been rescaled. They are no longer only confined to the national level as they apply regional standards and are networked across national borders with their international counterparts through the CTI-CFF. The CTI-CFF's RPoA and corresponding mechanisms also serve as a model for each member country's NPoA and domestic programs. These plans of action promote the transformation and rescaling of national governance to be consistent with regional standards on marine resource governance. To summarize, the hallmarks of regulatory regionalism (integration of benchmarks, criteria, and systems of policy coordination at all governance levels) exist in the ocean governance structure of the CTI-CFF. Thus, the CTI-CFF is a multi-level governance structure constructed to strengthen regulatory regionalism.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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