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(Not Yet) The End of Television

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Editorial

Thematic Issue on The End of Television (Not Yet): Editor's Introduction

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Abstract
This editorial provides background considerations for challenging the long taken-for-granted narrative of the passing of television in the digital era, thus inviting scholars to re-interrogate the place of the medium in the new technology-saturated environment from perspectives that are not informed by the unquestioned assumption that the age of television is over.

Keywords
broadcasting; change; continuity; digital; microcasting; obsolescence

Issue
This editorial is part of the issue "(Not Yet) the End of Television", edited by Milly Buonanno (University of Roma "La Sapienza", Italy).

In November 2014 Netflix CEO pronounced that television will be dead by 2030. Hardly a new prediction, in actual fact, as statements of the soon-to-come collapse of broadcast TV have resounded in media pundits declarations since mid–Eighties. In turn the academy—which "every decade or so…is gripped by a fascination" (Livingstone, 2008, p. vii) with some new developments—has not remained immune to this same tendency. Media and cultural studies' fascination with technological transformations in the digital age, and the ensuing establishment of the (hierarchized) distinction between new media and old media, has in fact turned the obsolescence of television as we knew it into a key issue in early 2000s years, thus making 'the end of TV" a familiar trope in scholarly discourses (Katz & Scannel, 2009).

The passing of the broadcast era is being approached from two different perspectives, arousing opposing feelings of anxiety or satisfaction. The leading cultural studies scholar Graeme Turner has coined the definitions of 'broadcast pessimism' and 'digital optimism' (Turner & Tay, 2010, p. 32), to encapsulate the two diverging standpoints. The proponents of broadcast pessimism complain that we are witnessing the inexorable obsolescence of traditional television—the television of sharedness, of family togetherness—under the disrupting, disuniting impact of media digitization. The digital optimists, on the contrary, welcome the rise of the post-broadcast era which—by disclosing an unprecedented range of contents, and allowing unrestrained time, space and modes of access to an array of platforms, screens, outputs—is deemed to democratically satisfy individual needs and demands of free choice and control over television experience. Yet the two antithetical perspectives converge to provide the same diagnosis that *television is over.*

Is television really dying? In a sense, we could say that television has never been so healthy and triumphant as nowadays: it has entered an age of 'plenty' (Ellis, 2000), characterized by unceasing proliferation of channels, uncontainable spread of output across media, screens, platforms, and national and transnational phenomena of fully-immersive, addictive fandom that was unthinkable in the old days when audiences were known as passive 'couch potatoes'. But on the other hand it might appear that owing precisely to the transformation undergone by the medium in the digital age, television as we know it is definitely coming to an end.

Worries about the disappearance of television, manifested by the broadcast pessimists, are hardly an

unprecedented cultural phenomenon. As the wonderful book by Kathleen Fitzpatrick (2006) compellingly demonstrates, "the anxiety of obsolescence" has been a regular feature of the history of almost all the technologies and cultural forms of modernity, and has concerned from time to time novel, movie, radio, press, painting, photography etc. (all of which are still with us, albeit reshaped). In reality, the anxiety of obsolescence (or the opposite, the hunger: a point I will return to later) is perhaps less interesting for its alleged capacity to identify endangered technologies and cultural forms than for what it discloses about the way we conceive of those forms and envisage their possible evolution. It may be the case, for instance, that worries about the death of television help to unveil underlying essentialist conceptions of the medium, tending to solidify its nature into a set of given and unchanging characteristics: essentialist visions that resist coming to terms with processes of becoming. Further interesting and consequential aspect: as suggested by the Thomas theorem (Thomas & Thomas, 1928), discourses on the demise of TV end up by conferring on their subject a status of reality. In fact, whether this 'definition of the situation' emanates from broadcast pessimism or digital optimism, it achieves to bring into existence the 'epochal phenomenon' of the end of television, and to validate the largely taken-for-granted assumption that the broadcast era has definitely given way, for better (the optimists) or for worse (the pessimists), to the present post-broadcast, post-network era.

Writing about literary fiction Frank Kermode affirmed that as readers "we hunger for ends and for crises" (Kermode, 1996, p. 5). In the context of Kermode's discourse hunger for ends refers to a sense-making process; but the expression can be appropriated in its plain meaning as 'longing for the end/demise' of somebody or something, to point out a peculiar feature of pronouncements and discourses concerning the passing of television. Predictions and statements of facts (real or presumed) that over the entire history of the media have coalesced into the discursive formations of the demise of the book, the movie, the press, have usually entailed worries, anxieties, mourning, eulogies, in short sorrow on the loss. Only when it comes to television does an ambivalence emerges, since alongside of the 'anxiety of obsolescence' a 'hunger for obsolescence' also takes shape and place, engendering—partly in academia, mainly in journalism, industry, public opinion: wherever the digital optimism has successfully taken hold—its own discursive formation, replete with celebratory statements of the soon-to-come or already-come-true collapse of broadcast TV, and with vibrant hopes of a better life after television, as predicted by George Gilder since mid-Eighties (Gilder, 1985). What we are dealing here is probably the effect of two mutually reinforcing cultural stances: the 'modernist obsession for innovation and novelty' (Mulgan, 1990, p. 18), which fuels the highest expectations towards the new digital environment with its cornucopia of technologies of agency and liberation; and the "rejection and denigration" (Newman & Levine, 2012, p. 2) that cultural élites have long expressed towards broadcast Tv, as a low-quality medium suited to passive mass-audiences.

In keeping with the hunger for television obsolescence, the enduring 'substitution approach' so often prevailing in discussions about the media and their evolutionary steps has expressed itself all too easily in declarations, predictions and expectations concerning the imminent demise of broadcasting. By substitution approach I refer to the intellectual penchant—to be found well beyond media studies—of conceiving processes of change and development in terms of displacement of the 'old' by the 'new'. U. Beck has defined this 'either-or' stance as "the mode of exclusive distinction", as opposed to "the mode of inclusive distinction" that accommodates co-existence and overlapping of differents phases, forms and directions of becoming (Beck, 2003), rather than postulating an inevitable sequence of obsolescence and replacement. The inescapability of such sequence is never so taken for granted as when the drivers of the change are believed to be the new technologies, whether this suggests pessimistic or optimistic predictions. Then, whereas broadcast pessimists mourn the loss of the television's ability to address the national community, putting the blame on the fragmentation brought about by media digitization, the optimists—who have on their side the digital orthodoxy enthusiastically embraced by conventional wisdom—celebrate the much awaited decline of a top-down centralized medium, superseded by a more progressive delivery system attuned to viewers' specific tastes and interests.

This is certainly not to deny that broadcast television has been deeply involved in processes of change and even of 're-invention' (Turner, 2015) that have thoroughly reshaped the contemporary media environment, of which the new media are a crucially distinctive component (not the only one that matters, though). However there seem to be no signs anywhere that the so-called 'old television' has been, or is in the process of being dislodged by the growing array of niche channels, new screens, digital platforms, streaming services, social networks and more besides. If we resist the tentation to conceive of the media, and namely the television becoming as a clash of old and new, where the old is sooner or later destined to surrender to the overwhelming advance of the new, we can find evidence that in contemporary media landscapes long established technologies and cultural forms can and do coexist in interaction and combination with their emerging counterparts, helping to put at users disposal a range of suitable resources and capacities to accommodate a plurality of habits and experi-

ences of media consumption. Actually the post-broadcast age offers the conditions of possibility not only of unheard plenty of choice—which has not gone without its own rethoric of liberation and control—but, even more important, of diversified practices of television access and viewing. In particular, time-shifting and place-shifting options enabled by digital technologies allow for television contents to be accessed and watched at will 'anytime-anywhere' on multiple available platforms and screens. This trend towards an extremely individualized and customized mode of accessing and watching television has suggested definitions like as microcasting (Gillan, 2011) or personcasting (Lotz, 2007); and has not surprisingly strengthened pessimistic and optimistic ideas that broadcast television is definitely coming to an end.

But we should be wary of confusing condition of possibilities with determinants, shifts with reversals, additions with substitutions. For conditions of possibility to be actualized, many societal, cultural, economic factors must come into play, well beyond the 'technological magic'. And it remains to be seen whether emerging trends, embraced by enthusiastic early adopters, will pave the way to a new mainstream/long-term shift or will remain a minority phenomenon, or a situational one: id est a phenomenon mostly pertaining to the youth and young adulthood phases of the life-course (Frolova, 2016; Gillan, 2011).

Our understanding of the present-day television would benefit from looking for continuities and not just for breaks between the old and the new, from drawing attention to resilience, re-adaptations, strategies of co-existence and complementarity between media past and present, rather than giving pride of place to ruptures, obsolescence, substitutions. For instance: the somewhat dystopian vision of an atomized audience made up of monadic and nomadic viewers is tempered with—if not contradicted by—the diffused evidence that the desire and the practice of sharing media experiences remain crucial even in digital environment. Nor the appeal of 'appointment television' has vanished altogether, as it continues to have an impact (especially but not esclusively) on fans' practices, to the extent that watching television simultaneously (inside or outside the box) gives viewers the chance and the pleasure to partecipate in on-line first-conversations on the show 'as-it-airs' live.

Television may well have lost centrality (not everywhere, though) in the post-broadcast age but ultimately it is still with us, part and parcel of an expanded media environment in which the old media persistence meets the new media revolution.

Admittedly, announcements of the end of TV have ceased to resound in academic circles over the last few years (Lotz, 2014), and signals of incipient researcher's interest in the survival of television in the digital world are now emerging (Jacobs & Bonner, 2016). However the bulk of contemporary media research confirms the observation that "academic engagement with media has always been concerned with the shock of the new" (Scannell, 2009, p. 220). Furthermore, media studies programs in a great many universities around the world are largely informed by "the assumption that the age of traditional media—especially television—is over" (Turner, 2015, p. 129). Such assumption is hardly questioned in the conventional wisdom about the current media age.

On these premises*, Media and communication* has invited media scholars to engage in a refreshing debate on the supposed, feared or hoped for, end of television as we knew it. The articles published in this special issue provide contextualized insights on what is television today in a range of specific locations (from Norway to Germany to Philippines to Mexico to Australia and more besides). In so doing, they help to reinvigorate our awareness about the resilience and the adaptability to change of an old medium that "has been and is always becoming" (Newcomb, 1996, p. XIX).

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

Television in Latin America Is "Everywhere": Not Dead, Not Dying, but Converging and Thriving

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Abstract
In Latin America, the now-venerable expression "the end of television" itself looks old, tired, and flawed: markets, cultures, politics, and policies alike find television more alive than ever, albeit in its usual state of technological, institutional, and textual flux. Advertising investment in TV continues to increase, governments still use television to promote generalized propaganda as well as their daily agendas, football on screen remains wildly popular, and fiction programs, most notably *telenovelas*, dominate prime time and draw large audiences aged between 25 and 60. While younger viewers watch television on a wider variety of screens and technologies, and do so at differing times, the discourse of TV remains an important referent in their audiovisual experiences. In addition, across age groups, divides persist between a minority with routine high-quality access to the digital world of technology and information and a majority without alternatives to the traditional audiovisual sphere, for whom cell phones, for instance, are at most devices for communicating with friends and family members. We cannot predict the future of TV in Latin America—but we can say with confidence that the claims for its demise are overstated. Television remains the principal cultural game in town.

Keywords
mestizaje; realismo mágico; televisión; televisual

Issue
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1. Introduction

Latin America is both the most and least postcolonial region in the world. It is the most postcolonial because it held that status prior to most of Asia and Africa. And it is the least postcolonial, because it remains dominated by the two languages of its former masters and is interdependent with the "other" America. As the former dictator/modernizer, Porfirio Díaz put it, "Pobre de México, tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos" ["Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States"].[1]

Contested origin myths like that one are typical of the interplay of truth claims in and about Latin America,

[1] That's the standard *nostrum* (quoted in The Economist, 2009). Another version attributes the expression to the public intellectual and porfirista Nemesio García Naranjo (González Gamio, 2013).

where imagination, history, spirituality, and science have had rough-and-tumble interactions for centuries, and contradiction is a way of ironized life. The notion of *realismo mágico* (magical realism) is widely associated with Latin American art and literature. A complex, at least paradoxical blend of scientific observation and utopian hope, of imaginative anthropomorphism and description of the natural world, of Western Enlightenment preoccupations countered by indigenous cosmology, *realismo mágico* incarnates the coeval and coterminous spread of tradition and modernity; and as we propose here, it permeates the interchange between TV fiction and audiences. This matches the continent's official and vernacular ideologies of *mestizaje*, or mixedness.

Mestizaje stands testimony to a shared history of invasion, sexual violence, and slavery that goes back many hundreds of years. As native–American, European, and African genes merged, so too did their cultures, simultaneously forging new ways of being and sustaining more than traces of older forms. This is no blanket description of a successfully inclusive and popular multiculturalism—all sides may at times embrace and at others curse the concept. For instance, indigenous Argentines are a small minority, many African–descended peoples, notably in Brazil and Colombia, are excluded or exclude themselves from the norm and suffer extreme privation that articulates race to class, and hundreds of indigenous languages persist in everyday use by native peoples who frequently define themselves beyond *mestizaje*.

But the term is applied in everyday talk by most Latin Americans in most countries. And *realismo mágico* offers a metaphorized *mestizaje* contact story in which European and creolized elites encounter native peoples, flora, and fauna. Each leaves their mark on the other, albeit in a frequently tragic and unfulfilling way that is characterized by domination and inequality.

The dual concepts of *realismo mágico* and *mestizaje* help explain the complex history of development and modernity in countries that were imperial possessions for much longer than the rest of the modern world—and gained their independence much earlier. The Latin American experience is distinctly different both from colonized zones that remained largely intact genetically and culturally during European colonialism (say, Indonesia and India) and those that saw the overwhelming, ongoing demographic dominance of white settlers (Aotearoa and the US, for example). This also helps explain the mixture of wonderment and cynicism, of critique and embrace, that colors Latin American attitudes to "the new" and its provenance in the Global North. The continent is both of that world *and* of the Global South, both Western and not, both developed and not, as we shall see with reference to its experience of the online world.[2]

To examine the region, we'll traverse very varied terrain: questions of convergence; the specifically Latin American re-invention of television; what we are calling, after literature, the particular solitude of the region; and the probable future. To do so, we'll draw on research from a variety of traditions, such as ethnography, textual analysis, political economy, public policy, and media studies. And we'll start with two provocations.

First, Latin American TV draws upon, produces, and disseminates discourses of the nation, including propaganda, that help set the daily agenda for citizens. This is possible because of two factors: agreements and pacts, not always explicit, that exist between capital, state, and television impresarios in the region (Hernández & Orozco, 2007) and the fact that free TV in Latin America is almost omnipresent—akin to Coca-Cola—and like Coke, is more prevalent than potable water.

Second, television is big business. Commercial TV was long the media outlet with the biggest returns, a situation that only changed with the monumental success of Apple, Google, Facebook, and Amazon (Sánchez-Ruiz, 2012). But that has not spelt the end of television's dominance—rather, it marks a moment of transmogrification.

2. Convergence? With the Switch to Digital, Television Bursts Out on Many Screens

In 1940s sociology and 1960s economics, convergence referred to capitalist societies becoming more centrally planned, even as state-socialist ones grew more capitalist (Galbraith, 1967). In 1980s communications, convergence explained the processes whereby people and institutions share expressions and issues (Bormann, 1985). Links can be forged today between these institutional and symbolic approaches, tying the general to the specific and applied to the media. Néstor García Canclini argues that:

> "The fusion of multimedia and concentrated media ownership in cultural production correlate[s] with changes in cultural consumption. Therefore macro sociological approaches, which seek to understand the integration of radio, television, music, news, books, and the internet in the fusion of multimedia

[2] Beyond market differences between blocs such as Mercosur and the Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte, and particular combinations of minorities and majority cultures within countries, most scholars specializing on Latin American cultural and sociopolitical issues use the whole continent as a reference (e.g. Sinclair, 1999; Sinclair & Straubhaar, 2013; Sinclair & Wilken, 2007) as does the field of area studies (https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/eng). Of course, the US is a large and wealthy Spanish-language TV market, but it operates under very different regulatory regimes and patterns of ownership and control from its southern neighbors, lacks both the prevailing ideologies on which we draw, and is mostly an English-language nation.

> and business, also need an anthropological gaze, a more qualitative perspective, to comprehend how modes of access, cultural goods, and forms of communication are being reorganized." (2008, p. 390)

Prevailing sociopolitical and cultural contexts simultaneously influence and are changed by communications media. Technological innovation typically derives from prevailing "social relations and cultural forms" that condition the "selection, investment and development" of the media (Williams, 1989). Then the relationship becomes reciprocal. The latest reorganization takes a multitude of forms. It urges us not to proclaim an end to TV, but one more transmogrification of a medium that has been the major audiovisual entertainment industry and source of information in the region during the last six decades.

Latin Americans watch more television than ever before. With the spread of diverse options in the region for watching TV and video in the emerging digital era, dating from about 2010, what we might call the televisual world of Latin América is expanding, not contracting, as audiences experience different screens and audiovisual possibilities. For example, the average Peruvian spends nine hours a day in front of various screens enjoying a variety of formats. In Brazil, the figure is eight hours, and seven in Mexico (Milward-Brown, 2014). That's a third of one's life.

Of course, quantity is not the only significant factor. In qualitative terms, viewers mix several televisual options: established genres, such as *telenovelas* and dramatic series; professional and amateur videos; sports, most notably football; and films that may be either industrial or artisanal (Smith, 2014). For research reasons, these texts are often separated by genres and platforms, but if they are to be understood holistically as contemporary audience *televidencia* (a bundle of televisual practices) it is crucial to comprehend the way people watch screens on a continuum and as a social and televisual practice, in accordance with García Canclini's proposals. So "televisual melodrama [the world of the *telenovela* in this case] is not only a site where the tensions among the national, the local, and the global are articulated and made manifest, it is also a communicative bridge that links viewers across national, expanded regional, and global realms of transmission and reception, working to shape new cultural and intercultural communities" (Benamou, 2009, p. 152).

Televidencia has several implications for daily life in terms of activity, emotion, and the historic *compadrazgo* (the ongoing, family–like relationship) between TV and its audiences (Orozco, 2014b). Viewers derive a variety of messages and norms from TV about paternal and pedagogic roles in ways that affect everything from the organization of daily domesticity to behavior in school.

Televidencia also establishes a complicity between "la oralidad que perdura como experiencia cultural primaria de las mayorías, y la visualidad tecnológica, esa forma de 'oralidad secundaria' que tejen y organizan las gramáticas tecnoperceptivas de la radio, el cine, el video y la televisión" [oral communication that dominates the quotidian, as part of growing up, and a secondary oral communication, which derives from listening and watching radio, film, video, and television] (Martín-Barbero & Rey, 1999, p. 34).

In Latin America, as in many other places, distinctions between the use of a variety of screen and types of service (free, subscription, broadcast, video on demand, computers, smart TVs, and other digital devices) are not hard and fast. Rather, there is a flow across the categories, with differences established as social practices rather than technological essences (Verón, 2009). The latest data also confirm that Latin Americans watch TV in this broad sense *with others*—that the norm is collective viewing, across genres and media, due in part to the need to share resources in a zone where wealth is so unevenly skewed (ComScore, 2015). This adds to the cultural embeddedness of the medium and its orality.

Of Latin America's six hundred million people, approximately half have encountered the internet, with growth of over 1,700% between 2000 and 2015. That puts the region just ahead of the Arab world and the global average, and well beyond the percentage of people who have experienced connection in Asia or Africa (http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats10.htm; http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm).

But such numbers can be misleading: being on line at some point in one's life or in a given year is entirely different from enjoying broadband on a daily basis, and there is dramatic variation across nations within the region.

Mexico, the biggest and most influential Spanish–speaking country, boasts 45 million internet users, or 38% of the population, and Chile leads the region with 61%; but just 27% of Paraguayans and 20% of Salvadorans and Hondurans have access (Alvarez, 2014). The Comisión Económica para América Latina [Economic Commission for Latin America] (2015) indicates that the proportion of Latin Americans with regular access to broadband more than doubled between 2006 and 2013, from 20.7% to 46.7%. This compares with the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development average of 79% (only Mexico and Chile from the region qualify as members of this club of wealthy democracies). In addition, the quality of broadband in Latin America by contrast with, for instance, Sweden and Japan, is poor, which diminishes citizens' capacity to download and stream at high bandwidth. There are obvious implications for replacing TV as a distribution system (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2012). And while the use of smartphones has exploded over the last five years, they are rarely connected to high-quality bandwidth—to 3G, let alone

5G (Mediatelecom, 2015; MilwardBrown, 2014).

There are also major disparities in pricing within the region. One megabit a second in Mexico costs US$9, or 1% of average monthly income; in Bolivia, it is US$63, or 31%. And access is structured unequally in terms of race, occupation, and region: indigenous people represent a third of rural workers in Latin America, and in some countries, over half are essentially disconnected. The digital divide between indigenous people and the rest of the population in Mexico is 0.3, in Panama 0.7, and Venezuela 0.6 (Bianchi, 2015). Hence the complexity of a notion such as *mestizaje* for explaining television: it both highlights and obscures the way that ideas of racial and cultural mixture are badges of pride, but inequality is still determined by racial and cultural difference. The extraordinary irony of *mestizaje* is captured in *realismo mágico*, as we shall see subsequently in discussions of regional history and *telenovelas*.

Unlike phones, tablets, or laptops, large screens in homes generally have defined locations—but not as per the TV sets of old, which were akin to furniture. The new screens, as in other countries, tend to be on walls, more like artworks than chairs and tables, albeit still located to facilitate joint family viewing, a collective experience. And beyond the domestic sphere, large televisions are prominent in public spaces, such as malls, bars, restaurants, metro stations in major cities, and even markets, in recognition that they are part of bringing people together peacefully in the region's mega-cities such as Buenos Aires and Mexico City (Repoll, 2014). This is of course not so much the case in extremely poor countries or in the rural and jungle areas that take up much of the continent, nor among the millions of impoverished Latin Americans who essentially live outside consumer norms.

With that *caveat* in mind, Latin Americans who can afford them clearly time their purchases of the latest audiovisual technologies to coincide with the four-yearly World Cup of men's football (Notimex, 2012). They show great passion for watching football and other sports on big screens and other collective sites beyond the domestic sphere, as per the classic US sports bar (García, 2010; McCarthy, 1995; Wenner, 1998). The option of going out to enjoy a football match or baseball game on a big screen evokes the same commitment and pleasure as being at the cinema to watch a movie, and it's a dominant mode of consuming screen sports in the region. Apart from in Argentina, where 80% of the population has subscription TV, most other countries don't have access to this kind of television in domestic spheres (ComScore, 2015).

Argentina is also distinct because during the Kirchner political dynasty of 2000–2015, the state assumed responsibility for televising football, and broadcast it on free-to-air TV (Mariotto, 2015). Elsewhere, football coverage has increasingly become a profit–making domain reserved for pay TV. The Mexican case exemplifies the norm. Televisa and América Movil are conglomerates that offer "triple play" services to customers, with matches available live and simultaneously on TV, the internet, and smartphones. They have effective duopolistic control of both cable and satellite television. So Mexicans who want to enjoy football can only do so under certain specific conditions that oblige them to pay monthly rates to these corporations. As football is the most popular sport on TV in Latin America, and the vast majority of the public cannot afford to watch it at home, they are forced into communal viewing experiences in commercial spaces. The tendency across the continent is to watch TV in open contexts. For example, Paraguayan urban dwellers routinely view television in the street, in the liminal space between homes, hearths, and sidewalks (Gumucio-Dagron & Tufte, 2006).

These viewing contexts are not so much substitutes for classic TV watching at home as new supplements that mix entertainment, socialization—and expenditure. Television in general, whether it is in domestic or public contexts, is primarily a source of entertainment (OBITEL, 2015). With the region's economies slowing down in 2015, it was one industry that appeared too solidly embedded into everyday life to shrink (Daswani, 2015).

How might we understand and explain the characteristics of Latin American TV and viewers' experiences of it, beyond these matters of circumstance, preference, and mode of interaction? What is the impact of a world where viewing is dominated by restrictions imposed by monopolistic companies, digital technologies are emerging, but TV remains the most important game in town for most Latin Americans?

3. The Latin American Re-Invention of TV

TV in Latin America is not just determined by technologies or programing schedules but by the materially-based, frequently collective interpretations of viewers, for whom texts are not necessarily over when they disappear from screens. This is particularly the case with fictional series, whose cultural impact expands beyond, for instance, the conclusion to a particular *telenovela* chapter, because the story line has an afterlife in audience thoughts and interactions.

The *realismo mágico* author and Colombian Nobel laureate Gabriel García Márquez (2002) entitled his memoir *Vivir para contarla* [*Living to Tell the Tale*]. Life in Latin America is seen as a narrative that draws on fictional tropes to organize and enrich itself in the face of extraordinary suffering, injustice, and inequality. This is a stark contrast to, for example, British empiricism or US pragmatism, which assume a sturdy certainty about truth that can be known in a way that is unembellished by fiction. At its heart, cultural difference is a means of portraying both the profound mixture of culture and language but also the way that pain and exploitation are experienced so unevenly. So for resi-

dents of the region, fictional genres are frequently more than they may first appear.

Beginning with revolutionary Cuban radio drama and expanding across Latin America, *telenovelas* have become opportunities to invent histories, imagine lives, seek liberation, engage in reinterpretation, encourage personal encounters, and seek new forms of communication. The symbiosis between audiences and *telenovelas* endures well beyond the moment of watching on a screen; it gains expression in private and public life, with families, neighbors, and co-workers (Martín-Barbero et al., 1992).

What happens on TV is transformed into the cultural, if not legal, property of spectators, as they process information, relate it to their own lives, and imbue it with new meaning. Families gather in the street to chat with their neighbors about what they are watching and have already seen, appropriating *novela* chapters as intertexts with their own lives (Orozco, 2014a). Everyday existence becomes mixed up with *telenovelas* as per *realismo mágico*, making both programs and experiences into an inter-calculation of the fictional and the factual, with the dividing lines cosmically blurred. Watching becomes a safe place for many Latin American viewers to emote, to cry and laugh, without social consequences, and to ponder the inequality that so discolors the supposed togetherness of *mestizaje* (Orozco, 2001).

We must also consider the political economy that both underwrites and is underwritten by this affective economy. The Observatorio Iberoamericano de Ficción Televisiva [Iberoamerican Fictional Television Observatory] (OBITEL) reports that fictional TV is the genre that attracts most financial as well as audience investment (2014). This investment is not only via production costs and advertising. It also takes the form of product placement and political propaganda within stories (Orozco & Franco, 2011). Venezuela under *Chavismo* and Mexico under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional [Institutional Revolutionary Party] are prototypes of such investments. For example, in Mexico, expenditure on propaganda in fiction, what we might call "political placement," exceeded US$205 million in 2012—much more than parties spent on formal campaign advertising (Fundar Centro de Análisis e Investigación, 2015).

Like other regions, Latin America is seeing the owners of texts and networks diversifying to fit in with their younger audiences by making programs available through smartphones and other devices, and creating the new genre of *web novelas*, very short *telenovelas* that preserve the emotional intensity of their progenitors, but adapt the format to suit contemporary circumstances, technologies, and audience expectations—but for the popular classes, the old norm remains the most important (Orozco et al., 2012).

The combination of advertising and propaganda within fictional programs is a response to citizen-viewers' fascination with the genre and industry and academic studies into the impact of *novelas* on audiences (Clifford, 2005; Igartua & Vega, 2014; Slade & Beckenham, 2005). *Yo soy Bety la fea* [*I Am Ugly Betty*], a Colombian *telenovela* remade via format sales in the US as *Ugly Betty* and Mexico as *La fea más bella* [*The Beautiful Ugly One*], exemplifies these tendencies. A week before the 2006 Presidential elections in México, *La fea más bella* featured the following exchange: "Who are you voting for? I'm voting for Felipe Calderón." Beyond the screen, Calderón won the subsequent election (Orozco & Franco, 2011). This historical example emphasizes both the significance of *orality* within the *novela* itself and *realismo mágico* as a mixture that can be produced by the audience as well as the network. Of course, this anecdote does not indicate mass observance of an instruction—that is not how product placements work. Rather, it is about constructing a climate of normalcy, whether that be purchasing a certain product or voting in a particular way. The climate of normalcy has to be understood within the peculiar circumstances that made contemporary Latin America.

4. The Particular Solitude of Latin America

We take the idea of this next section from two of the most illustrious titles in the canon of Latin American literature. *Laberinto de la Soledad* [*Labyrinth of Solitude*], written by Mexico's Nobel Prizewinner Octavio Paz in 1950, recognized and incarnated a tragic sense of unfulfilled desire that has dogged citizens throughout Latin America, while García Márquez leapt to fame with his novel *Cien años de soledad* [*One Hundred Years of Solitude*] at the end of the 1960s. Jesús Martín-Barbero (2002) redisposes the metaphor of the century of solitude to suggest that since Latin America's independence in the second decade of the 19th century, it has suffered not one but two hundred years of solitude.

These figures of speech and their literary and sociological iterations are attempts to represent some harsh realities: an independence that is only relative; impulsive and compulsive forms of communication, tied to the pain of conquest; and the complexities of *mestizaje* between conquerors and conquered, which arch across history in their effects. This solitude also finds expression in the insufficient and flawed communication among Latin American countries and between different social groups within them, leading to a history of violence.

For the two hundred years of solitude have been characterized by massacre after massacre, dictatorship after dictatorship. In addition to the grotesque inequalities that have produced revolutionary conditions, for example in Mexico, followed by authoritarianism, the region has been dogged by ruthless dictatorships at different times in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay. In the last century, Chile's "Operation Condor"

and Mexico's Tlatelolco massacre eroded the prospects and hopes of Latin Americans throughout the region, above all young people. These anti–democratic tendencies have been dedicated to opposing land reform and other redistributive mechanisms for sharing national wealth fairly—and have often done so with collusion and stimulus from the US, in keeping with the latter's corporate self-interest and geopolitical priorities.

In the midst of solitude comes a dream of collective prosperity. Fiction becomes a site of dreams made material, a world where something not real can be made so (Orozco, 2014a, p. 4). It is a possible way out of the labyrinth, via catharsis, as per crying along with the heroine of a *telenovela* without feeling silly or guilty, identifying with a criminal in a police series without fearing arrest and incarceration, or shrieking with pleasure when one's favorite footballer scores without being able to kick a ball in earnest oneself. Televised fiction and sport embody and stimulate an abundance of dreams, desires, and identifications, at the intersection of reality and the screen.

Martín Barbero and German Rey argue that "Si la televisión atrae es porque la calle expulsa, es de los miedos que viven los medios" ["If TV draws people in, that is because the street rejects them—the media appeal because of fear of the world outside"] (1999, p. 29). They handily question the *donnée* that media monopolists fulfil the textual tastes of their audiences, satisfying Latin Americans' innate cultural needs. This is rather what neoclassical economists would call "bounded rationality" (Simon, 1978)—far below delivering what is truly desired, in this case safe passage out of the labyrinth.

But Martín-Barbero and Rey (1999) also argue that TV has had a positive influence as a decisive actor in political change in Latin America, offering new ways of "doing" politics. The "No" campaign in Chile in 1988 is an example. When the opportunity arose to reject the dictator Augusto Pinochet, who was seeking popular legitimacy through a plebiscite to counter global condemnation of his systematic abuses of human rights through mass incarceration, torture, and murder, the advertising campaign was won hands down by the left. Santiago's Museo de la Memoria y Derechos Humanos [Museum of Memory and Human Rights] (http://www.museodelamemoria.cl/) includes an archive of television advertising from the plebiscite: glossy, childlike nationalism from the Pinochet people versus dramatic, populist participation from his democratic opponents. The nation was evenly divided when the campaign began, which ended in triumph for the opposition, based in part on their promotional material (and the stance of the US Government, which had abetted the dictatorship, but instructed Pinochet to accept the result) (Khazan, 2013; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1988).

The vote was an endorsement of democracy, of joy, of self-expression, of peaceful co-existence, and of a populist TV appeal against business, élites, the military, and their institutionalized violence. Pablo Larraín immortalized the triumph in his 2012 film *NO*, which emphasizes the role of communications and TV, personified by the Mexican actor Gael García Bernal, creative director of the advertising agency supporting the case against Pinochet, who must struggle against national, professional, and personal demons, contradictions, and opponents.[3]

Something similar occurred in Mexico during the 1970s via various *novelas* produced by the former theater director, the television executive Miguel Sabido, and broadcast on Televisa. These were thought of as "telenovelas de refuerzo social" ["*telenovelas* of social solidarity"] (Cueva et al., 2011). The questions they addressed included birth control and literacy. So one series explained the benefits of family planning and restricting the number of children to two per family. Another showed that analphabetic citizens struggle in life by contrast with those who can read and write.

The producers' objectives were met over time. After watching the *telenovela Ven Conmigo* [*Come with Me*] (1975), of the ten million analphabetic adult Mexicans at the time, a million soon enrolled in literacy classes run by the Education Ministry. And following *Acompáñame* [*Let's Go*] (1977) 562,464 people were using contraceptives, almost a third more than prior to its broadcast. This is a fine example of social merchandising via product placement—whereby a policy outcome is facilitated by embedding proposed new conduct in TV fiction (Garnica, 2011, p. 96).

This political–economy approach applies across borders. In the last five years, primetime in most Latin American countries has been dominated by regionally-produced *telenovelas* (Vassallo & Orozco, 2014). Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina are the dominant producers, while Uruguay, Ecuador, and Chile have also entered the market (OBITEL, 2014). OBITEL shows that regional national TV fiction characteristically draws the highest ratings across Latin America. This has been theorized as a function of audience preferences for cultural proximity when available (Sinclair & Straubhaar, 2013, p. 3).

The success of such closeness does not, however, necessarily militate against the ongoing power of the US as a TV exporter to the region, because of its capacity to set prices below the costs of local material, to draw on high production values, and to target cable and satellite specialty channels. But again, this amounts to a case of bounded rationality by Latin American TV stations and audiences; both might prefer to buy and watch local texts—hence the direction of primetime—but will accept cheaper if high-quality foreign product that lacks cultural consanguinity (Miller, 2010).

[3] See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2059255

5. The Future of Television: The Reign of "the Televisual"

Of course, we are in a new epoch. Television, film, radio, and the press continue to play important roles, even as they struggle for co-existence and dominance with new screens, new technologies, and—above all—new "figuras de razón" ["rationalities"] of communication (Martin-Barbero, 2001). This new era has been labeled "post television"; but such leading authors as Milly Buonanno (2015) disagree, while acknowledging that TV must make its way in a new constellation of communications.

In a comparative analysis of two key perspectives on the end of television—the Eurocentric and the Latin American—the Argentine researcher Mario Carlón (2012) concludes that while a Eurocentric position emphasizes the end of TV, a Latin American view stresses the possibility of a longer life for the device, even though it is changing. Television's prior hegemony as *the* cultural machine of the everyday may now face competition from other devices, but it continues to be a principal "programadora de la vida social" ["programmer of everyday life"].

The former position sees TV becoming extinct (Carlón & Scolari, 2014, p. 7), displaced by computers, laptops, tablets, and smartphones, driven by audience demands and corporate inventiveness. "Before and after the Internet," "before and after Facebook," "before and after Twitter," "before and after Google," are periodisations that exemplify such vanguardist thinking. It focuses remorselessly on technology as comprehensive ways to understand the social order and textuality (Piscitelli, 2010).

True believers invest with unparalleled gusto in Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, evolutionary economics, creative industries, and technological revolutions. Faith in devolved media-making amounts to a secular religion, offering transcendence in the here and now via a "literature of the eighth day, the day after Genesis" (Carey, 2005). "My children don't watch television," "Nobody I know does it," or "Kids today aren't interested," are part of *techno–boosters'* everyday discourse.

A fetish for endless upgrades as part of built-in obsolescence fuels this discourse. We are supposed to forget the contemporary relations of people, money, regulation, and power that shape technology—the exploited workers, the toxic factories, the wasteful global supply system, the patent wars, the trade barriers, the planned obsolescence (Maxwell & Miller, 2014). And the fact that almost a billion people worldwide subscribe to satellite and cable TV remains an inconvenient truth (Friedman, 2013)!

Authors who represent the Anglo–Saxon perspective, such as Elihu Katz (2009), emphasize technological developments as the major causes of change to television, while those from the Latin American side pay more attention to the social practices that television audiences favor. The latter recognize today's accelerated technological transformations, which in turn influence *televidencias* via the *mestizaje* and *realismo mágico* that characterize Latin–American popular culture, rather than some essence of new technologies.

Beyond these positions, a more practical question can be posed: what is "the televisual" today (Orozco, 2014c, p. 4)? By "the televisual," we mean a quality that is essential to all screens, based as they are on TV style and form, and subject to the representational protocols that both limit and stretch televisual norms.

Television is not the only form of communication that has installed itself inside homes, but it has long been the true warehouse of culture, bringing cinema, theater, circus, dance, documentary, drama, sports, and music into both private and shared spaces.

In short, TV has been a model for internet–related media in its convergence of genres and platforms, its instantaneity, and its archive. This blend of immediacy and memory, of present and past, curated for viewers but increasingly available on demand as well as via structured schedules and via specialist stations in addition to comprehensive services, is becoming available across devices—but in the technological, legislative, and commercial context of the televisual landscape. This is particularly true in Latin America, with its uneven and unequal distribution of broadband versus the near–ubiquity of television. Beyond this political–economic foundation, the success of television lies in its essentialist ontology: people believe the evidence of their own empirical engagement with spoken and seen reality, allied, paradoxically, to TV's fantasy world and openness to self-insertion by viewers into the pleasures of identification and de-identification (Orozco, 2014c, p. 16). The classically denotative, seemingly non–interpretative notion of TV reality still applies (Carlón, 2013; Hall, Hobson, Lowe, & Willis, 1980).

As for the future, we expect to see increased production of Latin American TV fiction, in both broadcast and pay segments of the industry. This will probably extend beyond the typical *telenovela* to include more miniseries and docudramas, and beyond the traditionally strong private sector via competition from public channels. "Narco series," which are currently fashionable on pay television, illustrate niche markets that may develop. The future will clearly see an abundance of fiction, which will emerge across a variety of platforms, albeit limited by broadband access. Football will continue to be hugely popular (ComScore, 2015).

Despite the specificities of particular countries, some elements of communications are very much in common across the 20th century and on to the present—namely the way that daily life for hundreds of millions of people has been not just affected but in fact structured by the media (Press & Williams, 2010). This experience has crested over the past two decades, in

Latin America as in Western Europe and the US. In keeping with this transformation, populations have been subject to "audienciación"[4] ["becoming audiences"] in ways that alter the rest of daily life (Orozco, 1996). Being an audience—being a public—means connecting with others, but in a form mediated through screens that make us objects as well as subjects of knowledge and representation.

These forms of identity may now amount to "self-mass communication" (Castells, 2009, p. 99). What had previously been a centralized form of communication still matters, but can be customized to more individual experiences. This new tendency does not so much mark the death of television as one more moment in its development and transformation, to be put alongside color, cable, satellite, and demand services. And its textuality and cultural resonance in the Americas will in part be decided by *realismo mágico* and *mestizaje*.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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[4] This concept was first proposed by Guillermo Orozco (1996) and has been revived by Sonia Livingstone (2015).

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Article

"There Will Still Be Television but I Don't Know What It Will Be Called!": Narrating the End of Television in Australia and New Zealand

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Abstract
Australia and New Zealand, like other countries, have unique TV systems and practices that shape the possibilities enabled by emerging technologies, enterprises, behaviors and ideas. This article explores two recent articulations of the concept of television that have motivated 'end of television' narratives in the two countries. One is future-oriented – the introduction of online subscription video services from local providers like Fetch TV, Presto, Stan and from March 2015, the international giant Netflix. It draws on a survey of senior people in TV, technology, advertising, production, audience measurement and social media conducted in late 2014 and early 2015. The other is recent history – the switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial television, completed in both countries in December 2013. Digital TV switchover was a global policy implemented in markedly different ways. Television was transformed, though not in the precise ways anticipated. Rather than being in the center of the digital revolution, as the digital TV industry and policy pioneers enthused, broadcast television was, to some extent, overrun by it. The most successful online subscription video service in Australia and New Zealand so far, Netflix, talks up the end of television but serves up a very specific form of it. The article poses a slightly different question to whether or not television is ending: that is, whether, in the post-broadcast, digital era, distinctions between unique TV systems and practices will endure, narrow, dissolve, or morph into new forms of difference.

Keywords
digital switchover; digital television; Netflix; subscription video; SVOD; television; video

Issue
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1. Introduction

Asked in early 2015 whether, by 2025, there would still be something called television, Fetch TV CEO Scott Lorson replied: "Yes—but I don't know what it will be called!" Fetch TV is a subscription service available in Australia since 2010 that plans to expand to New Zealand. Customers sign up through their internet service providers or a retailer and get a set-top-box/personal-video-recorder that provides access to broadcast, subscription, transactional and online content. They can watch and record broadcast channels and access the networks' catch-up TV services. They can watch around 40 premium English-language channels as part of the basic package and pay extra for Netflix and Asian language channel packages. They can rent or buy from a library of over 4,000 movies and buy episodes or seasons of TV shows. They can use web-based apps like YouTube for TV. All of this can be done on TV sets or on iOS and Android mobile devices using free apps.

Fetch TV's stated goal is to 'Make TV Better'. Like the service, the organisation is a hybrid, founded and based in Australia and majority-owned by Australians but with a large equity stake held by Malaysian-based Astro All Asia Networks. Scott Lorson, appointed CEO of the start-up business in 2009, is a dual Australian/US citizen with degrees in science and business management from the University of California at Berkeley, and

a diverse business background in consumer finance, telecommunications and media (Fell, 2011). He is placing many wagers on the future of television. "We are effectively spreading our chips on the table by betting that a complete solution offering FTA [free-to-air, or broadcast], SVOD, TVOD and traditional linear subscription will be required to win the living room and that all important HDMI1 position" (Groves, 2015). It is a hybrid strategy, acknowledging that television is now many things that are used by consumers in many ways, but it also asserts the continuing importance of scarcities or bottlenecks: the HDMI connections at household TV receivers and the individual consumers that Fetch TV's advertising encourages to 'Show TV who's boss'. Fetch TV does not imagine the end of television, or even the end of a particular kind of television. Instead, it proposes to integrate many different kinds of television within a single subscription service, embracing and profiting from the diversification of TV's forms.

This article explores two recent articulations of the concept of television that have motivated 'end of television' narratives in Australia and New Zealand. One is future-oriented—the introduction of online subscription video services from local providers like Fetch TV, and from March 2015, the international giant Netflix. The other is recent history—the switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial television, completed in both countries in December 2013. The analysis of online subscription video services draws on a survey of 25 senior people in TV, technology, advertising, production, audience measurement and social media, conducted in late 2014 and early 2015. The discussion of the transition from analogue to digital broadcast television builds on research conducted throughout that long process (see Given, 1998, 2003, 2007, 2015).

Television scholars have suggested many ways to summarise and explain the medium's history. Writing about TV in the United States, Amanda Lotz proposes three phases: the Network Era (1950s–1970s), the Multichannel Transition (1980s and 1990s), and the Post-Network Era. She describes a gradual transition from the first era, when viewers watched single TV sets in homes, chose from among a small set of options scheduled by network programmers and shared a fairly uniform viewing experience, to the current era, with its multiplicity of devices, service providers, forms of content and modes of viewing. The Network Era drew its enterprises and its dominant organizational form from radio broadcasting and scheduled types of programs through the days and seasons in ways that came to seem natural, as if they were intrinsic to the medium. During the Multichannel Transition, novel technologies including remote controls, VCRs, cable transmission and people meters provided new ways to deliver, choose, watch and measure US television; direct subscription provided a new way to pay for it. Specialized channels became popular and profitable enough to commission their own programs, encouraging the fragmentation of individual viewing that multiple sets in households enabled. Lotz initially envisaged the Post Network Era as "an erosion of network and channel control", but came to imagine a primarily non-linear future "devoid of networks or channels" (Lotz, 2014, pp. 21-34).

William Uricchio proposes similar phases but renames them to emphasise the role of viewer interfaces in each—Dial Television (1950–1975), Remote Control (1975–1999) and From TiVo to YouTube (1999+)—and challenges the lingering perception of stability in the first era. He sets out eight further conditions that define the medium in each of these eras, including scheduling ('real time', time shifting, on-demand), amount of content (scarcity, plenty, unlimited), audiences (mass, segmented, niche) and metrics (stable, under siege, complete datasets). The first period, roughly equating to Lotz' Network Era, has come to represent the "conceptual default definition" for television, says Uricchio, although he contends it is "but a blip in the larger developmental history of the medium". Unlike film, radio and print, television "has from the start demonstrated an unusually opportunistic potential with regard to technological platforms". The present changes, he argues, are not so much "the end of television as a return to the pluriformity that has long characterized the medium" (Uricchio, 2009, pp. 60-72).

Television's pluriformity is especially striking when the focus shifts from the United States to the rest of the world. A common observation is that television has been different at different times and in different places (see for example Given, 2003, p. 20). "The fact is", writes Graeme Turner, "especially since the digital revolution and notwithstanding the processes of globalization, 'television' involves such varying forms, platforms, and content in its different national and regional locations that it is increasingly implausible for one set of experiences to be regarded as representative" (Turner, 2011, p. 32). Features that seem central to the distinctive shape of the medium at one time and place often emerged earlier or later or not at all in other places. For this article, focused on television in Australia and New Zealand (which I will call A/NZ, when referring to them as a region rather than as separate nation states or markets), there are a number of important differences from the US television of Lotz' and Uricchio's phases, including significant variations between the two Antipodean markets themselves. The most important differences lie in local and national program production, the level of commercialization, the scale of national networks, the existence of public broadcasters serving cultural diversity objectives and the degree of multichannel cable and satellite TV take-up.

First, arguably the most important single policy issue raised by television in both countries has been its contribution to distinctive local and national cultural and industrial development. Early television was domi-

nated by British and American programs; the development of the medium was marked by the increasing production and popularity of local programs, and hence the *differences* between the actual programs seen by A/NZ and overseas audiences. This is what made TV unlike the audio-visual medium that preceded it, film, where the local box office was and is dominated by Hollywood movies. Australian TV drama had its first big success in the 1960s and increasingly effective program quotas plus government tax concessions and subsidies in the 1980s helped generate a boom, especially in Australian historical mini-series. In New Zealand, the big local drama breakthrough did not come until the early 1990s after the newly-established funding agency New Zealand on Air supported a daily serial, *Shortland Street*. Some regulation had encouraged a common A/NZ audio-visual space from the outset: Australia required all advertising to be produced locally and allowed New Zealand commercials to qualify. From the mid–1990s, New Zealand programs have qualified for Australian program quotas.

Second, US-based phases take for granted a level of commercialization of television that was internationally uncommon at the time of its 'Network Era'. This was highlighted by many European analyses of change in the industry from the late 1980s, when liberalization and privatization removed some of the sharp distinctions between television markets on each side of the Atlantic. New Zealand's early television system was a state monopoly until the late 1980s, like so many in Europe; Australia's was a 'dual system', combining three-commercial-station competition in the largest four cities with a publicly-funded national broadcaster.

Third, Australia's three commercial stations took a long time to generate the truly national commercial networks that quickly characterized US TV. Restrictions in place until the late 1980s on the numbers of stations in non-metropolitan markets and on common ownership meant that even the national capital, Canberra, just 300km from Sydney, had only one commercial station for around 30 years. Television's reach was limited by a combination of politics, economics and geography—topography in New Zealand's case, distance in Australia's—and 'equalising' access to the same services as city-dwellers became a durable policy issue. Satellite technology was transformational, and not just in delivering TV to remote households for the first time. In Australia, the debate about how to use it to expand TV services drove a fundamental overhaul of regulation that precipitated significant structural change in the industry and finally allowed the creation of fully national commercial networks.

Fourth, both countries created publicly-funded broadcasters, separate from their well-established national broadcasters, to reflect and shape their nations' distinctive cultural origins and diversity. Australia's, the SBS, came first, beginning regular TV broadcasts in 1980, and was followed by a National Indigenous Television service in 2007 that became part of SBS in 2012. New Zealand's Maori Television began broadcasting in 2004.

Fifth, Australia and New Zealand came later to multichannel subscription television than the US, Australia much later. Having arrived early at US-style three-commercial station competition in the largest cities in the mid–1960s, Australia's incumbent broadcasters successfully resisted the introduction of multichannel competition until 1995. This did not simply defer a 'Multichannel Transition', because other changes, such as the arrival of commercial internet services and the DVD format, still occurred in the mid/late 1990s as in the US. Cable and satellite television faced much more competition and only ever reached around 50% of households in New Zealand and just 30% in Australia, where tough 'anti-siphoning' rules also prevented pay TV channels acquiring exclusive rights to a long list of the most popular sporting events. This was nothing like the almost universal take-up it achieved in the US—it remained a premium service rather than becoming a utility—and changed the opportunities and challenges posed by subsequent developments. Digital TV services offered most Australian viewers their first multichannel TV experience; digital TV switchover was especially sensitive because so many TV viewers still relied on over-the-air transmission; online subscription video services did not require consumers to cut or shave cords—most did not have one—but to pay for 'television' for the first time.

In summary, while there is plenty in the US phases that is recognizable in Australia's and New Zealand's television history, especially the long, gradual shift from network or station control towards increasing viewer choice and a wider range of viewing and using practices, there is also plenty that is distinctive, especially about the timing of events that involved government action (the expansion of services and technical changes like colour and digital TV), and therefore the precise combination of factors in play at any time. These have given rise to unique TV systems and practices that shape the possibilities enabled by emerging technologies, enterprises, behaviours and ideas. They prompt a slightly different question to whether or not television is ending: that is whether, in the Post Network, TiVo-to-YouTube, Post TV, Post Broadcast, digital era, these distinctions will endure, narrow, dissolve, or morph into new forms of difference. This article tries to answer this question by analysing the pre-history, launch and response to Netflix's arrival in A/NZ and contrasting it with the introduction of digital TV in the early 2000s. The emphasis on Netflix highlights the role of drama programming in television's future; the discussion of digital TV reminds us that drama is just one part of what television has been and might be in the future.

2. The Netflix Moment

2.1. Noticing Netflix

Netflix was noticed in Australia and New Zealand as soon as a significant number of customers started signing up to the mail order subscription DVD rental business launched in the United States in September 1999 (Netflix, 2003). Helpfully, one was the brother-in-law of a *Sydney Morning Herald* journalist, giving the California start-up a distant Australian influencer: "Netflix is a delicious service that could work here given Australia Post's express mail service, and my hope is that if I keep talking about it someone will pick up on the idea" (Easdown, 2002). Across the Tasman Sea in New Zealand, a 35-year-old IT consultant tried to do just that. Netflix declined his request to establish a local franchise, so he launched his own DVD rental business, fatso.co.nz, in July 2004.

Rejecting such overtures, the young Netflix determined and revealed its strategy for any future overseas expansion. The company was not 'born global'; it was local but with global aspirations. 'Born Globals', according to one contemporary definition, "seek out international business through the application of resources to the sale of output in multiple countries within three years' of…establishment" (Li, G. Qian, & Z. Qian, 2012). Netflix did not do this, but once it did pursue international markets, it aimed to be a truly global operator rather than a US-based business with international franchises or affiliates. This meant its strategies for acquiring and eventually commissioning programming would have disruptive implications for a business that was overwhelmingly territorial. "[W]e are kind of alone in the space of buying [global] rights", said chief content officer Ted Sarandos in December 2015. "It's a pretty big change and at the end of the day it's a real structural change" (Sarandos, 2015).

Many similar online DVD services were established in Australia and New Zealand in the early 2000s. Like Netflix, they were initially seen mainly as challengers to bricks-and-mortar DVD stores. Their names self-identified most as *film* services at a time before the boom in TV programming on DVD. (In 2003, 70% of DVD sales revenues in Australia were for movies and just 13% for TV series—the rest was mainly music, children's and documentaries. See GfK/Screen Australia, 2015). An internet entrepreneur founded Webflicks in Australia in 2002; Movieshack started in Auckland and Quickflix in Perth in 2004. Some TV operators took stakes in the emerging sector. New Zealand's satellite subscription TV incumbent, Sky TV, acquired an online DVD start-up, DVD Unlimited, around the time Fatso was founded. Major A/NZ cinema exhibitor Hoyts, then controlled by Australia's most powerful TV broadcaster Kerry Packer, launched Homescreen in 2003, arguing it was "a natural extension of the company's film and cinema business" (Groves, 2003). Telcos got involved as well: Australia's Telstra established fetchmemovies in 2004, then rebadged it with their ISP brand, as BigPond Movies; Optus entered into a marketing arrangement with Quickflix (Best, 2004).

Also like Netflix, A/NZ DVD mail order services generally saw their technology and distribution process as transitional, a first move into a business that would eventually shift to online digital delivery (see Keating, 2013, p. 48). Netflix started a streaming service in the US in 2007 which it extended to Canada in 2010 and Latin America and the Caribbean the following year. The telcos, especially, saw online video as a big opportunity. Telstra's BigPond sold its DVD mail order business to Quickflix in 2011 after launching online streaming and downloads. Quickflix started its own digital service in Australia in 2011 (Curtis, Given, & McCutcheon, 2012, p. 31) then launched as a digital-only service in New Zealand the following year (Pullar-Strecker, 2012). Online video was where so many media, communications and IT businesses seemed to be converging—as well as the telcos and TV operators, online video services were launched or announced by local DVD retailers and cinema exhibitors, as well as international search and consumer device giants. Google acquired YouTube in 2006 and launched separate Australian and New Zealand versions of the site in 2007 (infonewsNZ, 2007). Apple launched the iTunes Australian music store in October 2005, added television programs to it in June 2008 and a film catalogue in August 2008.

Unlike the US, where the first mover Netflix established itself as the market leader first in online DVD rentals and then in subscription streaming, the early online DVD enterprises in A/NZ consolidated and many investors sold out. New Zealand's three merged in 2008 into a company controlled by Sky TV but trading under the Fatso brand (Scott, 2008). Homescreen was sold to Quickflix in 2005 and the latter's ownership went through many changes. Lachlan Murdoch's Illyria and the regional TV network WIN bought in then sold out; HBO did the same in 2012, selling to Nine Entertainment Corporation, owner of the Nine TV network. Each of these seemed to be preparing to use Quickflix's business as their vehicle for entering the A/NZ video streaming market, before settling on another route. Some speculated that Netflix itself would do that; like the others, it seems to have decided it could win the customers without having to pay for them (Kohler, 2015).

2.2. Watching Netflix

Once Netflix launched its streaming service in the United States in 2007, technically literate overseas customers started subscribing to it using virtual private networks (VPNs) that masked their location. Without launching a global service, Netflix became a global enterprise. This cross-border 'pre-history', lasting until

the formal launch of Netflix in Australia and New Zealand in March 2015, had precedents. New Zealanders listened fortuitously to Australian long wave radio stations in the 1920s until the wavelengths used in Australia were changed to enable more local stations to be licensed and to improve listening quality. Canadians living along the US border watched American television well before the CBC commenced TV services in Quebec and Toronto in 1952; some in Ireland received BBC TV signals for fifteen years after its post-war relaunch, before RTE officially started TV in the Republic. In each case, broadcasting acquired a national identity that was not intrinsic to the technology. The official beginnings of TV are generally remembered as the moments when a national operator commenced transmission inside the territory. More accurately, these pre-histories demonstrate the technical, political, economic, geographic and cultural contingencies of the official institutional forms.

Such transnational contingencies also had counterparts within nations. To Sydney's north and south, many homes in Newcastle and Wollongong retain the tall external antennae erected to receive TV from Sydney stations before local ones launched in the early 1960s. They continued to be used for the nearly three decades that non-metropolitan centres had only one commercial station while Sydney had three. A young Rupert Murdoch bought into the commercial TV station in Wollongong, about 90km south of Sydney, in 1963, intending to use its signal overlap to broadcast to a large proportion of Sydney viewers. Already a deal-making opportunist, he settled for a 25% stake in one of the Sydney licensees instead! Tensions like these had popular, commercial and policy consequences. Local stations got big audiences for local news programs but not for the foreign programs their audiences had already seen on the Sydney channels, leading to tussles with overseas program suppliers (Herd, 2012, pp. 102-104).

The unofficial availability and official unavailability of Netflix in A/NZ from 2007 became a significant part of a wider struggle about pricing and access to media content and the quality of broadband infrastructure. Consumer group CHOICE commissioned research that found 340,000 Australian households were accessing Netflix in November 2014, four months before its official launch, and nearly 700,000 were subscribing to at least one overseas content provider or buying direct through an overseas store like iTunes USA. (CHOICE, 2014) Even months after the service launched officially in A/NZ, "tens of thousands" of New Zealanders were believed to be accessing the US version of the service, according to an unattributed estimate (Pullar-Strecker, 2015a).

Netflix' low cost highlighted the premium pricing strategies of the near-monopoly cable and satellite TV operators in the two territories, Foxtel and Sky, and the lack of flexibility in their channel bundles. The prices of IT hardware and software products from international vendors like Apple, Microsoft and Adobe were the target of a 2013 parliamentary committee inquiry which found that Australians often paid 50%–100% more for the same products than their counterparts in comparable economies. "Particularly when it comes to digitally delivered content…many IT products are more expensive in Australia because of regional pricing strategies implemented by major vendors and copyright holders. Consumers often refer to these pricing strategies as the 'Australia tax'." (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications, 2013, p. viii) Already aware of delays between US and A/NZ TV transmission dates, especially for big US drama series, unofficial access to the US Netflix service gave viewers a more legitimate way besides unauthorised P2P file-sharing for getting timely access to at least some titles. Broadcasters and the cable and satellite operators responded with 'Express from the US' scheduling, and made episodes of marquee series available online at strange hours, as soon as they had screened overseas, such as the ABC did with Series 7 of *Doctor Who* in 2012 (Kidman, 2012). Large public investments in fixed line broadband were announced by both the Australian and New Zealand governments in 2009 (Given, 2010) but a Netflix executive told a 2011 conference in Auckland that poor household take-up of fast broadband was one of the reasons his company had not launched a service there (Gruenwedel, 2011).

In all these debates, Netflix was often represented as a liberator for far-away consumers. "It is remarkable that a service which is officially blocked to Australians…and doesn't spend a cent on local marketing…is the biggest single driver of competition in our entertainment market", said a spokesperson for CHOICE. "It's a perfect case study of how competition from international markets can shake up protected industries and deliver benefits for Australian consumers" (CHOICE, 2014). Yet, from many perspectives, the California-based company was a surprising saviour. Digital consumers had criticised record companies and subscription TV operators for bundling content into albums and channel packages that forced consumers to buy things they didn't want along with those they did. The unbundling of songs, movies and TV shows by iTunes had been welcomed, but the celebration was brief: now Netflix, like Spotify in music, was attracting customers with all-you-can-eat monthly subscriptions, though at much lower price-points than multichannel subscription TV operators. Netflix was not the long-promised digital fantasy, Paul Goldstein's 'celestial jukebox' (2003), offering all the video content ever made, but a carefully chosen collection. The collection was large, certainly, but just as important were the company's skills at directing subscribers around it and learning from their choices. Like other members of a large chorus of over-the-top (OTT) service providers, Netflix lamented the state of fixed line broadband in

Australia and New Zealand that disappointed video consumers, but its solution was not to invest in that crucial element of its delivery infrastructure, but to support the heavy public investments proposed by governments and their taxpayers.

One of the factors that seems to have appealed most about Netflix to many consumers was that it was a new entrant into these distant markets (see Pash, 2014). It was not one of the local mainstream media incumbents, those products of decades of policy that had been designed to make national media systems distinctive, but who were now increasingly blamed for the fact that those national media systems were not delivering an identikit of services available elsewhere. Of those incumbent 'dinosaurs', probably the most criticised—the titanosaurs—were the broadcast television networks.

2.3. Anticipating Netflix

Netflix' structure and business model for delivering video online was quite different to the TV networks and most other incumbent A/NZ video providers. It was a standalone business and it charged for its content. A 2012 analysis of 25 video-heavy websites popular with Australian internet users (Curtis et al., 2012) noted the overwhelming majority offered content without direct charge to consumers. These 'free' services were funded by advertising, public funding (national broadcaster sites), cross-subsidy from other activities or a combination.

Most were controlled by entities with other interests, so the online video services were part of wider business strategies. Eight were catch-up sites controlled by Australian-based broadcasters, eleven were controlled by other kinds of media and communications enterprises and just six were standalone online video operations. Two of the broadcasters operated their online presence in partnership with US-based companies, Yahoo! (Seven) and Microsoft (Nine). Of the other kinds of media and communications enterprises, major US technology companies were prominent—Google (YouTube and Google Video, which was subsequently effectively integrated into YouTube), Apple (iTunes), Amazon (IMDb), Microsoft (Bing Video and the stake in ninemsn, subsequently restructured as Mi9, wholly owned by Nine Entertainment Corporation, but retaining a relationship with Microsoft technology and advertising products) and InterActiveCorp (Vimeo). Two were international production and distribution companies, Disney and FremantleMedia (controlling the *Neighbours* program site); two were telecommunications companies, Australia's Telstra (BigPond Movies) and France Telecom-Orange (which sold a controlling stake in Daily Motion to Vivendi in 2015); and one was the A/NZ newspaper company Fairfax Media (SMH TV). Of the six standalone operations, three were P2P BitTorrent sites (each undergoing significant change since), two were the video sharing and search sites MetaCafe and Blinkx, and the other was Quickflix.

The study did not include Netflix, which was still three years from launching an official Australian service. For a time, some suggested it was doing well enough from VPN customers without the expense of launching an official service, certainly well enough for the incumbents to feel they needed to respond. In New Zealand, Sky and the dominant broadcast network, the still state-owned TVNZ, launched a joint pay–TV-lite service, Igloo TV, in late 2012 (Keall, 2012), and online subscription video services were launched in 2014 by Sky (Neon) and the telco Spark (Lightbox) (Slabbert, 2014). In Australia, subscription TV operator Foxtel launched the Presto online movie service in March 2014, halved its price in August, brought in Seven West Media (which owns the top-rating Seven Network) as a partner in December, and added TV programs to it in January 2015. Free-to-air TV rival Nine Entertainment joined with Fairfax Media in August 2014 to announce the online video service Stan, and launched it on Australia Day, 26 January 2015.

Netflix finally ended the rumours in November 2014, confirming it would start the service in Australia and New Zealand that began on 24 March 2015. Several industry representatives interviewed around this time for a study of the future of TV predicted consolidation in the sector. Said Overture Management's Ben Liebmann (ex-Shine360):

> "No matter what the local providers can throw at it, Netflix has deeper pockets. It has global scale, and it has time. While it may not have the most extraordinary content offering on day one, it can wait, and sit it out till broadcast and pay TV rights come up and then it can swoop. At some point I suspect there will be Netflix and probably one other. And the one other will be a great competitor because it will eventually have Seven, Nine, Ten, ABC, SBS, Foxtel, all in one." (Given, Brealey, & Gray, 2015, p. 24)

2.4. Launching Netflix

Two features of Netflix's launch in Australia and New Zealand in March 2015 provide striking contrasts with earlier phases in television history. First, official TV services started in New Zealand several years after Australia's in 1956; Netflix launched simultaneously in the two territories, an implicit recognition of an increasingly shared cross-Tasman audio-visual marketplace. Theatrical distributors have licensed A/NZ rights together for decades, the major cinema chains operate in both markets, Sky News delivers a 24-hour news channel to both markets, and the biggest New Zealand and Australian newspapers are all owned by Fairfax, News Limited and APN, which also controls commercial radio networks in the two countries.

Second, Netflix was an outsider. The technology of broadcast television was first deployed by local and national media incumbents—in NZ, the BCNZ; in Australia, the ABC and commercial companies in Sydney and Melbourne formed by the major newspapers. New Zealand had welcomed TV outsiders soon after private TV services were first authorized in the late 1980s. The Canadian CanWestGlobal bought into TV3 and eventually acquired 100% of it in 1997, the same year a company controlled by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation acquired a controlling stake in the satellite subscription TV operator, Sky, from the American media (Time Warner, TCI) and telecoms (Bell Atlantic, Ameritech) companies that founded it (Withers, 1997). In Australia, almost all the later expansions of television services had also been delivered by incumbents. These included colour TV in the 1970s, extra services in country areas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and digital TV in the 2000s, as discussed below. Even multichannel subscription TV services, initially offered by the entrant Australis in 1995, had consolidated into Foxtel, controlled by the biggest local telco Telstra and biggest newspaper publisher, Murdoch's News Limited.

Yet, like television itself in the late 1950s and 1960s, already an international phenomenon when it launched officially in A/NZ, Netflix was a *known* outsider. By November 2014, it had more than 50 million streaming customers in the US and overseas, including the VPN subscribers in A/NZ discussed above. The company's first program commissions, *House of Cards* and *Orange Is the New Black*, had screened on other television and video services in Australia and New Zealand and were well known as Netflix shows. This time, offering the next generation of TV services, A/NZ incumbents were the start-ups trying to create awareness for new brands in their own backyards: "The outsider, Netflix, was already at home" (Given, Brealey, & Gray, 2015, pp. 6-7).

Also like the introduction of television, although Netflix seemed to be known, the versions that Australians and New Zealanders got to see were not the same as the one they thought they knew. Licensing deals already in place meant some of the marquee content available to Netflix subscribers in other countries was not available to early A/NZ customers. This even included some Netflix-commissioned shows, where existing series had been licensed exclusively to local subscription TV operators, leading to considerable confusion about where viewers would find forthcoming series. Some recent Disney and Marvel programs that were part of Netflix' Australian service could not be screened in New Zealand because Sky TV held the relevant rights (Pullar-Strecker, 2015b). It would take time for the official, local Netflix's to look like the US or UK Netflix that many had been subscribing to via VPNs, but also for the reality of Netflix's wide and deep but not infinite content offerings to be understood.

Historically, television services around the world had diverged as revenues grew, local production skills developed, policy measures were implemented and took effect, and audiences revealed and learned distinctive tastes. Netflix's premise was that, as territorial licensing deals expired, its services around the world would converge towards a global service, satisfying the increasingly global tastes of local viewers.

2.5. Dealing with Netflix

Soon after Netflix launched, market researchers, financial analysts and journalists began reporting "explosive adoption of the platform" and "stunning growth" (White, 2015). Here again was an urgent narrative about the end of television, founded in the arrival of a different kind of television. "Netflix is the new black", declared Roy Morgan Research, estimating the company signed nearly 300,000 Australian customers in its first month, April 2015. In New Zealand, 164,000 households were estimated to be subscribing in the first three months, 9.4% of the roughly 1.75 million total (Roy Morgan Research, 2015c). After seven months, Morgan estimated more than a million Australian households were subscribing, 11.4% of the 9 million total (Roy Morgan Research, 2015b, 2015d). Broadband customers complained that their access speeds had slowed; telcos confirmed the surge in online video consumption (Bingemann, 2015).

It appeared clear enough that Netflix was signing up many more subscribers than its local SVOD rivals, Presto and Stan in Australia and Lightbox and Neon in New Zealand, although the battle for customers spawned a war over metrics. Mumbrella deputy editor Nic Christensen thought the figures published by operators were "at best confusing and at worse close to misleading". Different SVOD providers cited 'gross sign-ups' (which included people who had churned or were on free trials), 'total customers' (which included TVOD customers who had bought a single movie as well as ongoing SVOD subscribers), 'paying subscribers' and 'people using the service' (paying subscribers multiplied by the average number of people in households). Netflix, "the godfather of secrecy in this space", published no breakdowns of its Australian and New Zealand subscribers at all. "SVOD offers a level of targeted ad delivery that is unrivalled in traditional television" plus a lucrative side business trading the data, wrote Christensen. But for that to work, "unanimity about the metric" for subscription streaming and "basic level transparency" were essential. Christensen wanted 'paying subscribers' to acquire the same kind of universal currency for SVOD services that 'unique audience' and 'time spent' metrics had acquired for AVOD (ad-supported VOD) services like YouTube and catch-up TV. The fact that most SVOD services did not carry advertising was not a reason for accepting spurious audience data: "While it may not be part of their immediate

business plans…at some point the sheer weight of money being offered by advertisers will be too great" (Christensen, 2015).

The good news for video service providers was that some of the SVOD customers were paying for television for the first time. In Australia, where household penetration of cable and satellite subscription TV had been stuck at around 30% of households for years, over 40% had signed up to some kind of subscription video service, including cable or satellite TV or SVOD, a few months after Netflix launched (Roy Morgan Research, 2015b). The bad news for incumbent subscription and broadcast TV operators was a significant decline in television viewing, especially linear viewing. Australia's TV ratings provider reported that 'total TV screen use' for all Australians fell nearly three-and-a-half hours (from an average of 123 hours 43 minutes to 120 hours 19 minutes per month) between the third quarter of 2014 and the same period in 2015—live TV viewing fell around 6 hours, playback rose 11 minutes and 'other screen use' rose 2 hours 18 minutes (OzTAM, RegionalTAM, Nielsen, 2015).

Roy Morgan Research CEO Michele Levine speculated that the media behaviour of 14–24 year-olds "may foreshadow the wider norms ten years from now", noting the average time this age group spent with TV, radio and print media a decade ago resembled the wider national norm in 2015. According to her data, Australians aged 14–24 now spend more time online than with all other traditional media combined: 27.6 hours on average each week using the internet (much more than the 17.9 hours spent by all Australians aged 14+), 12.5 hours a week with TV (much less than the 18.8 hours spent by all Australians 14+), 6.7 hours with radio (12.8 hours for all 14+) and less than an hour and half with newspapers or magazines (3.4 hours) (Roy Morgan Research, 2015a).

Citi Research analyst Justin Diddams predicted that more Australian households would be subscribing to an SVOD service within three years than to the 20-year old dominant subscription TV company Foxtel. This didn't mean "the death of Foxtel but it means an explosion in content consumption…in the 70 per cent of households that don't pay anything today". Nor did it mean free-to-air television was dying, but growth in broadcasters' earnings was likely to be limited, because "expensive, risky, cutting-edge content" would be needed to keep their linear channels relevant (White, 2015; White & McIntyre, 2015a, 2015b). The local SVOD services announced they would commission more local programs (Bodey, 2015); departing ABC managing director Mark Scott called for debate about the idea of "a digital content fund, requiring new digital content companies, many of which dwarf their Australian competitors, to contribute a percentage of revenue to support local content requirements" (Scott, 2015); Netflix announced it was backing a TV series to be directed by Australian Baz Luhrmann (*The Great Gatsby*, *Australia*, *Moulin Rouge!*, *Romeo+Juliet*), about 1970s New York. It would be "a mythic saga of how New York at the brink of bankruptcy gave birth to hip-hop, punk and disco—told through the lives and music of the South Bronx kids who changed the city, and the world…forever" (Stanhope, 2015).

3. The Digital Moment

Digital television technology was expected to change television forever and did, though not in precisely the ways many anticipated. It originated in efforts to improve TV's image quality. The only way to achieve the improvements sought within the constraints of existing channel allocations was to use digital techniques. By using them, many other possibilities were created, with both revolutionary and evolutionary capabilities and consequences. For TV broadcasters, there were threats as well as opportunities. If digital TV was a revolution and TV-as-we-knew-it was going to end, it was hard for broadcasters to argue that they should be the only enterprises able to use the technology. If it was an evolution, a technical upgrade to a well-established medium that would not fundamentally transform it, it might be difficult to expect governments to offer regulatory favours and subsidies to help make it happen.

In the late 1990s, digital TV pioneers emphasized the capacity for it to put television in the centre of the digital revolution that garnered so much attention after Netscape's 1995 initial public offering. Digital transmission was widely described as the most important development in television since the medium was introduced. In the UK, one of the first countries to launch the technology in 1998, an early policy paper said it would provide many people with "their first experience of the full potential of the information superhighways" (Department of National Heritage, 1995, p. 1). Australia's communications minister promised this "quantum leap in television technology" would provide the capacity "for the humble television set to become a central information point in every home" (Alston, 1998). (End-of-television narratives often recall eras when TV sets were 'humble'!)

After the telecoms and internet crash in 2000, the collapse of ITV Digital in the UK in 2002, and the disappointing early take-up of digital TV in some territories including the US, Sweden, Finland and Australia (see Starks, 2013, pp. 42-51), the evolutionary nature of digital TV transmission was emphasized more strongly. Announcing New Zealand's plans for digital TV in 2006, a decade after Britain's, the broadcasting minister said the move to digital television was "essential to securing the future viability of free-to-air broadcasting in New Zealand", and the continuing strength of public broadcasting's place in it (Maharey, 2006). TV would change, but modestly. Any larger transformations would come from what was done with spectrum vacated by broad-

casters. By the time switchover was completed in Australia and New Zealand at the end of 2013, it was difficult to get anyone to notice. Digital TV was just TV.

Yet TV, plainly, was not what it had been. Australians and New Zealanders had replaced their TV sets and chosen to watch the increased range of free-to-air channels on wide-screen receivers with much better image and sound quality. Given the relative sizes of the advertising markets and government budgets, Australians got many more new ad-supported and public-funded channels than New Zealand (Given & Norris, 2010): by November 2014, free-to-air digital multichannels achieved a share of more than a quarter of the Australian viewing audience from 6p.m. to midnight, compared with about 56% for the main channels and 17% for subscription TV channels (OzTAM, 2014). Many more households in both countries came to rely on satellite signals for their TV reception, because both governments decided to subsidise multichannel satellite packages. This enabled them to reduce the number of terrestrial TV transmission sites and hence frequencies used and so increase the amount of spectrum vacated, the 'digital dividend'. Australia's early emphasis on HDTV and the rapid fall in prices of HD sets meant that a very high proportion of the receivers sold were capable of receiving HD signals, although the wholesale transition to HD programming, even in genres like sport, has not occurred. New Zealand's later start meant it could use the DVB-T2 transmission standard from the outset; Australia anticipates a further migration to that standard.

Despite the significance of these changes, as in other territories, digital broadcasting and the first generation of digital TV receivers in A/NZ did not themselves generate the kinds of changes to television through interactivity, convergence with other media forms, and mobile reception that were part of the early rationales for digital TV. These things all occurred, but not so much within the incumbent TV business as outside it or around its edges. TV viewers interacted with TV content and each other, but they generally used SMS and then social media rather than the 'red button' interactivity that digital television enabled. They integrated amateur and professionally-produced content, but were more likely to do it using desktop and laptop computers, smartphones and tablets, than TV sets. They increasingly watched video content on mobile devices, but trials of mobile broadcasting services using transmission standards like DVB-H did not prove popular. Rather than being in the centre of the digital revolution, as the digital TV industry and policy pioneers had enthused, broadcast television was, to some extent, overrun by it, even as it has adopted digital tools throughout its production, distribution, transmission, sales and marketing activities.

The scale of that overrunning, at least in the eyes of investors, is demonstrated by the stock prices of television companies in the region. Shares in Australia's Number 3 commercial network, Network Ten, worth around $2.50 a decade ago, ended 2015 at less than 20 cents (they were consolidated, 1 for 10, in January 2016). Seven West Media, owner of the top-rating Seven Network, hit a post-GFC low of AU$4 in 2009 before strengthening, but were back down below 80 cents in late 2015. The Nine Network was recapitalized in a new company floated in 2013; the shares ended 2015 below their issue price. The gloom was not restricted to broadcast networks. Multichannel subscription operator Sky TV's shares fell below NZ$4.50 in December 2015 after reaching nearly NZ$7 in July 2014 (Murdoch sold out in 2013). Broadcast television's commercial decline was also reflected in the long, gentle easing of the once-seemingly-unassailable political power that helped it to call so many of the policy shots in the debates about digital TV. Some anticipated the complete shutdown of analogue TV and vacating of large amounts of spectrum for alternate purposes would simply lead to new spectrum demands by the old incumbents. Requests were made, but the Australian and New Zealand governments resisted them. Generous 'digital dividends' were engineered, broadcasters shut down the last of their analogue transmitters in December 2013, the vacated spectrum was re-auctioned, and the mobile broadband companies that acquired it launched more affordable, higher bandwidth services that inspired and helped manage surging mobile video consumption.

The devices many consumers used to watch mobile video, beginning with the iPhone launched in 2007 and joined by smartphones from other suppliers and later tablets, gave concrete expression to the "alternate uses of vacated spectrum" that figured prominently in debates about the benefits of digital TV switchover. That the spectrum once used for 'television' was redeployed for 'non-television' purposes in which incumbent television broadcasters had such a direct interest confirmed James Bennett's observation that digital TV switchover, based on "a traditional understanding of television as the 'box in the corner' [a]rguably…tell[s] us only half the story". Digital TV was *not* just TV. "Television as digital media must be understood as a non-site-specific, hybrid cultural and technological form that spreads across multiple platforms" (Bennett, 2011, p. 2).

As a "non-site-specific, hybrid cultural and technological form", digital television followed the international experience of analogue television before it. "Figures from official switchover programs…call our attention not only to some of the not-so-radical shifts that television's digitization engenders, but also to the fact that such transformations occur within specific national and local configurations", writes Bennett. The broad policy agenda was global—introduce digital transmission, eventually shutdown analogue and reallocate the spectrum for alternate purposes—but the precise policy elements were regional, national and local. "Although a variety of international contexts might all promote the digital switchover by emphasizing the

benefits that digital TV will bring consumers…and governments…the experience of digital TV differs greatly according to geography, but also to economic and cultural factors that speak to the role television has played in defining modernity" (Bennett, 2011, p. 3).

Analysing digital TV policy in the UK and the US, Hernan Galperin found little evidence that these nation states had yielded their capacity to shape their communications sectors to "the twin forces of technological change and globalisation" (Galperin, 2004, p. 272). Despite claims of global convergence in the regulation of media and telecoms industries towards 'common rules based on free market principles', he concluded:

> "Faced with common macroeconomic challenges and a technology that challenged the fundamental parameters of the analog[ue] TV regime, nations forged distinct policy responses that in many ways strengthened their pre-existing differences in the organisation of broadcasting…..Such resilience of national media systems should not be surprising. In a sense, our modernist fascination with technology often obscures the fact that, while technological innovations are universal and rather easily transferable across borders, the economic and political arrangements that define how these innovations are deployed are not.…Whereas many globalisation scholars would predict a gradual vanishing of historical differences in the organisation of media systems across nations—what the more alarmist of them would associate with an irreversible trend toward worldwide cultural homogenisation—we find that the transition to digital TV has been a vehicle for cementing those differences….[T]he future of television seems less wedded to the evolution of technology or global market forces than to politics, as usual." (Galperin, 2004, pp. 275-276, 285-287)

Galperin's conclusion is convincing for international policies about digital TV, but, so far, is less persuasive for the present 'end of television' moment, the introduction of streaming video services. It may even be less persuasive for policies at the end of the digital TV transition than it was for those at the start. Australia and New Zealand launched digital TV years apart in 2001 and 2008; they switched off their last analogue transmitters in the same month, December 2013. Netflix launched in both markets simultaneously 15 months later.

This may be scant evidence or simply a reflection of the increasing closeness of the two countries' economies over the three decades since they established what is now one of the most liberal free trade regions in the world. But it may also reflect significant shifts in the nature of some of the brands, services and devices that have risen to prominence since the Dot Com crash in the early 2000s. NBC and CBS did not operate services in Australia or New Zealand and were never significant brands there. So discrete were the national markets that Australia and the US could both have large ABC's that were completely separate organisations. International brands existed in media and communications—Hollywood studios like MGM, movie franchises like James Bond, stars from Charlie Chaplin to Steve McQueen, Nellie Melba to Madonna—but rarely for broadcasters or communications companies, unless they had imperial origins like the BBC and Cable & Wireless. Now, Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook and Netflix are major retail brands in A/NZ and throughout much of the world. They all have millions of regular overseas customers who expect they will be able to continue to use the services when they travel internationally—a practice much more common than it was even two decades ago. Netflix's Ted Sarandos promotes the idea that no matter where a subscriber signs up, "when you push play [Netflix] works everywhere in the world on all different broadband speeds on all different devices" (Sarandos, 2015). Mobile devices travel around the world with their owners in ways that TV and radio sets rarely did, and need to connect seamlessly to mobile and wifi networks using several frequency bands. Different receivers have long been manufactured to suit incompatible electrical power and transmission standards; smartphones and other mobile devices are much more likely to incorporate multiple standards in models that can be manufactured, sold and used anywhere. Regional and global harmonisation of the frequency bands used for particular services and devices helps to reduce their cost, hence the intense work Australia put into developing the Asia Pacific Telecommunity (APT) plan for the 700 MHz band vacated by the shutdown of analogue TV in many countries (Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2015). To undersell these developments, while emphasising the intricate government policy manoeuvres about digital switchover, risks mistaking activity for impact. As Lotz notes of the US, most of the changes in industry operation that she discusses in *The Television will be Revolutionised* did not result from the competition that regulatory change was supposed to inspire; "instead they came largely from the actions of…consumer electronics and computing…companies outside the [regulator's] purview" (Lotz, 2014, p. 52). Netflix is the exemplar of this trend.

The largely domestic identity of the enterprises that dominated national broadcasting systems and debates about digital TV in the 1990s and early 2000s was not an accident, it was policy. National governments created national public broadcasters and, even in the US, prohibited or limited foreign ownership of broadcasting enterprises. In the US, the companies that have come to dominate online music, books, video, search and social media since then are also domestic, often headquartered in the same state that still houses some of the giants of the movie and broadcasting businesses.

In A/NZ markets, the same California-based companies dominate digital services, but, unlike the TV broadcasters, they are distant. This may prove to be an outcome of some cultural consequence. In his book about Jim Clark, a co-founder of Silicon Graphics, Netscape and Healtheon/WebMD, one of the most engaging chroniclers of commerce in the digital age, Michael Lewis, wrote "The business of creating and foisting new technology upon others that goes on in Silicon Valley is near the core of the American experience. It is distinctively us" (Lewis, 2000, p. xii).

4. Conclusions

For the *TV 2025* study referred to earlier, interviewees were asked if, in 2025, there would there still be something we call 'television'. Intel's Tawny Schlieski responded "TV for me is episodic content in our home. It's a unique form that breaks away from the plays and movies that preceded it. It provides us with characters and continuity that we want to invite into our intimate spaces over and over again. That isn't going anywhere." Joshua Green, from Arnold Worldwide, co-author of *YouTube* (2007) and *Spreadable Media* (2013), thought, "Television has trodden the edge of significant revolution its entire life. It has never been static. I think it's got at least another decade in it." "Consumers will still call it TV", said AOL Platforms's Mitch Waters, "but whether people in our [advertising] industry will view it that way, I'm not sure". "As a device and as a medium," said Yahoo!7's Arul Baskaran, "I think television as we know it is going to disappear" (Given et al., 2015, p. 11).

Television in Australia and New Zealand did not end with digital transmission and it is not ending with Netflix or Fetch TV, but nor is the new television simply television—as some have suggested Michael Wolff argues, unfairly equating his recent title with his argument (Wolff, 2015). In Australia, New Zealand and everywhere else, television is and has been, in James Bennett's phrase, a "hybrid media form" (Bennett, 2011, p. 7). It is what Milly Buonanno calls an "open medium…resistant both to theoretical imposition and to the empirical experience of fixed, essential and unchanging characteristics" (Buonanno, 2008, p. 41). Disagreements about the phases of its history in different parts of the world often reflect disagreements about the truth of this central proposition. There is no classic form of television, touched at some point in every TV market, away from which they are all now speeding. There is, instead, a set of technologies, social practices, cultural forms, industries, institutions, words and ideas that constantly transform, finding new shapes that sometimes embody features of old ones.

Digital TV, Fetch TV and Netflix offer different television futures. The policy-driven digital switchover process was intended to make incumbent broadcasters central to the continuing structure of television in the two markets. The compelling reason for doing so was that it gave this most popular media form, the largest source of finance for local audio-visual production and a crucial contributor to cultural activity and understanding, the best chance to adapt to the transformations of the digital era. The risk was that broadcast networks would over-use the control to try to over-determine the outcome. Before the transition to all-digital transmission was complete, it was becoming clear that broadcasters had overplayed their hands, trying to do too much determining with the politicians who had played such a big part in crafting their medium, while adapting too little in the market place. They thought they *were* television, and for a long time they were. Right now they seem out of time. Many others can do what they do, and some of the biggest influences on their business are not just out of their hands but outside their places.

Fetch TV is one kind of response to the radical pluriformity of contemporary television, from an enterprise that believes television will endure, though perhaps with a different moniker. It seeks to muster all the televisions under a single service, bill and brand—the big screens in living rooms and the mobile screens in people's hands, the channels, programs and user-generated content that is worth watching wherever it comes from, even the brands they crave, like Netflix. Fetch hopes that even if viewers and users stop talking about it as TV they won't stop watching and interacting with it and recommending it to others.

At the time of writing, the most successful challenge to television in A/NZ was coming from a company that talks up the end of television (Guthrie, 2015), but serves up a very specific form of it. Netflix offers drama, documentary and children's shows, a much more limited range of genres than broadcast or linear subscription operators; it offers them for a monthly all-you-can-eat price; and it offers them on-demand. Ted Sarandos says they are not interested in news—"The newsgathering space…is fairly commoditized and not particularly in line with our on-demand model". Nor are they especially interested in sport. "The leagues have all the pricing power in that business forever [but] if there was a model where we could create our own sports league that might be interesting." Further, "on-demand doesn't make the sports experience better for the viewer. It's the liveness of it" (Sarandos, 2015). Netflix is the opposite of Fetch. It is trying to be one kind of TV rather than all. Yet this constraint, this clarity of focus, does not imply fixity. The company has already undergone several profound strategic shifts, first transforming itself from a DVD rental company in the US (though it still has DVD mail order customers) to an online digital provider, then from a domestic to an international service, then again from a reseller of other people's content to a producer of its own (Keating, 2013). It is not just that the current SVOD business

model appears to be working, because it is not working well for others. Netflix' A/NZ clone Quickflix moved early, adapted constantly and attracted many powerful supporters along the way: its shares were down from more than 20 cents in 2007 to just one cent in late 2015.

The political responses that Galperin would anticipate are already apparent. Both New Zealand and Australia decided in 2015 to extend their value-added taxes to "offshore intangible supplies", ensuring that digital content services like Netflix and iTunes would have to charge the same VAT as their A/NZ-based competitors. Incumbents called it "levelling the playing field"; others called it the "Netflix tax". While plainly prompted by the arrival of Netflix in 2015, the measures also made New Zealand and Australia early adopters of potentially global guidelines for business-to-consumer supplies of digital products and services being developed by the OECD (Sanyal, 2015). The Nine Network's chief executive declared that without changes to Australian media laws, Netflix's success in the local market would jeopardise Australian jobs and local programming. "Things are getting hairy amid increasing competition from overseas entrants", he warned. Netflix employed just one person in Australia and no journalists, was taxed differently and, because it did not use spectrum, paid no licence fee like TV and radio broadcasters (Davidson & Crowe, 2016).

Painted as a homogenous global conduit, Netflix talked of accelerating the distinctiveness of the services it was launching in a dizzying number of countries. "I like to say we differentially understand the marketplace", Sarandos told a UBS conference in December 2015. "I think every time we launch a new country we learn more about that region. There is very little that you can learn about operating in Australia by operating in Mexico." He wanted "people to love Netflix because they love the programming on Netflix and if part of that means local language programming versus subtitled and dubbed shows then we want to be part of that as well. And I think we can, we have the scale to do that." But so too, the company had found in Japan that whereas:

> "90 per cent of the box office is Japanese film and 95 per cent of TV watching…is Japanese television…we are doing 30 to 50 per cent watching with non-Japanese programming….So I think that this very concentrated local viewing is more a reflection of the business climate than its local taste….The more international we are and the more global we are the more we can get better and better at that which I think is the next phase of film entertainment." (Sarandos, 2015)

This is the paradox of TV after TV: the more successful this new, global form of television is, the greater will be its capacity to assume from local incumbents the role they reluctantly accepted decades ago, of distinguishing their television from what was available elsewhere.

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Article

Re-Locating the Spaces of Television Studies

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Abstract
This paper will extend work originally presented in Pertierra and Turner's *Locating Television* (2013) to argue that the reasons for which the demise of television was prematurely assumed can be understood and corrected by critically examining the geopolitics of television scholarship. The spaces from which television has been taken seriously as a topic of investigation have enabled a neglect of empirical and theoretical research that genuinely engages with the ways in which television might be understood as variously surviving, growing, innovating and even leading the current and future global media landscapes. The paper offers two ways in which television scholars might productively re-locate their spheres of concentration to understand the diversity of television worlds today: 1) empirically, it considers the case of the Philippines where broadcast television is successful in ways that could only be dreamed of by television executives in the so-called 'world centres' of the global entertainment industry. 2) theoretically, the paper refers to complementary attempts in sociology, literary and cultural studies to offer alternatives to Europe and North America from which scholars might locate the vanguard for modernity, globalization and innovation. It is by engaging with both of these strands in concert—empirically investigating television beyond the 'usual places' in such a way that responds to the call of cultural theorists to question our very assumptions about where television studies' 'usual places' should be, that more nuanced understandings, and fewer premature declarations, might be made about what television is, and where it is going.

Keywords
entertainment television; television studies; Philippines; social media

Issue
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1. Introduction

In recent years, growing numbers of media scholars, drawing from diverse examples around the world, have argued against the idea that the medium of television is in terminal decline. Certainly, in some places—most notably the United States—the models of free to air broadcasting through which much twentieth century media was both practiced and theorized have been seriously disrupted (see for example Katz & Scannell, 2009; Spigel & Olsson, 2004; see also discussion in Turner & Tay, 2009). But around the world, and even within the United States, it has increasingly been recognized that television remains enduring in some ways, while changed in others (Pertierra & Turner, 2013). Understanding how television can be defined in the post-broadcast era has become more complicated, certainly (Turner & Tay, 2009). But the new potential definitions of what television might today be, in some ways seem to have *widened* television's presence and grasp across a greater number of spaces than before: television can now be said to exist across multiple platforms and devices, it is accessed in multiple ways, sometimes simultaneously, at a wider range of times and across a greater proportion of the world than every before. Rather than rehearsing such debates, which have been discussed in my previous collaborations with Graeme Turner and are addressed in diverse ways across this special issue, this paper turns to consider whether there are ways in which television studies remains too

narrow in scope, in particular by drawing from too narrow a set of global examples. It seeks both to look backward and critically ask how television might ever have been thought to be at an end, and to look forward at how television studies might proceed in the face of multiplied and diversified understandings of what television is and, particularly, where we should be looking for it. It extends work originally presented in Pertierra and Turner's *Locating Television* (2013) to argue that the reasons for which the demise of television was prematurely assumed can be understood and corrected by critically examining the 'geopolitics' (Mignolo, 2002) of television scholarship. The platforms and technologies through which audiences now find television are changing, but the concern of this paper is rather with revising the countries and communities which might be considered as spaces of innovation, beyond the previously imagined world centres of television practice and television theory. In particular, the example of the Philippines is proposed as a largely overlooked space in which broadcast television remains powerful, but in which new innovations for developing other platforms of television consumption are also being successfully explored. This case study of the Philippines is in itself a rich example to add to the growing field of television studies drawn from beyond the Anglophone West or the so-called Global North. Empirically, it offers evidence of the ways in which broadcast television continues to thrive in tandem with the arrival of new platforms such as social media and mobile technologies. But the case study also aims to provide a valuable lesson for television theory, illustrating how questions about the history and future of television can be shifted when we revise assumptions about where the 'centres' of television might actually be today, if indeed centres have ever been in any one place[1].

If television is not yet dead—and if even apparently traditional broadcast television remains enduring in many parts of the world—it is worth considering why the question of television's demise has even been an important one in television scholarship of the 21st century. Clearly, that debate was in large part shaped by transformations to television that were taking place in the United States and, in some different ways, in Western Europe. But it cannot be said that mainstream television studies were absent from or ignorant of numerous serious and well-circulated studies of television from across the Americas, the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere (Curtin, 2010; Keane, Moran, & Fung, 2007; Kraidy, 2010; McMillin, 2006; Sinclair, 1999; Straubhaar, 2007). Published in English with international readerships, such work has for some time now increasingly diversified the knowledge base from which media and cultural studies scholars are understanding their field globally, in addition to the many specific histories and debates that occupy national and regional networks of media scholars in different parts of the world. What Curran and Park proposed as the 'de–Westernization of media studies' (2000) was aided in part by a wave of interest from adjacent disciplines, including cultural anthropology, in the diverse social consequences of the growing presence of television and other media across different parts of the world (Abu-Lughod, 2005; Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod, & Larkin, 2002; Mankekar, 1993; Rofel, 1994). These developments have made an impact, as Graeme Turner recently argued:

> "The de–Westernisation of media studies may still have some way to go, but media studies in the West is becoming more aware of the diversity of media systems around the globe—and that this diversity is constitutive, rather than just a passing phase in the inevitable evolution of 'their' system to become just like 'ours' as globalization kicks in. Pleasingly, we have moved beyond an assumption, implicit in much earlier work on television as well as on media cultures in general, that a focus upon the West or upon leading nations in Anglophone media studies would be enough to enable us to properly understand the function of the media, wherever it operates." (Turner, 2016, p. 127)

Progress in shifting attention outwards, to understand television across a wider range of spaces, is clearly important. But it does remain the case that the privileging of particular spaces from which the television industry has been taken seriously as a topic of investigation enabled a neglect of empirical and theoretical research that genuinely engaged with the ways in which television might be understood as variously surviving, growing, innovating and even leading the current and future global media landscapes. To put it another way, while television studies has moved along the path of diversifying the countries or regions in which it might be researched, the theoretical concerns of the global field have remained overly determined by the interests and trends of media in the (problematically–titled) Global North. It is timely to insist not only upon a globalized, diversified empirical base from which to account for contemporary television industries, cultures and practices—but actually to take seriously the possibility that television innovation, the futures of broadcasting, and the cultural practices through which we can theorise

[1] The case study selected for this paper was researched from June to December 2015 through the analysis of television episodes, newspaper commentary, and relevant social media feeds (the Twitter, Facebook and YouTube accounts of the *Eat Bulaga* program and television personalities Alden Richards and Maine Mendoza). The case study is underpinned by an ongoing research project on the cultural history of entertainment television in the Philippines, which was funded in 2011–2013 by the Australian Research Council Discovery Grant with Professor Graeme Turner at the University of Queensland (DP110100075).

what television is and why it is important—can be driven from and by the (equally problematically–titled) Global South.

As discussed in the final section of this paper, across the humanities and social sciences a number of scholars and debates have grappled with similar questions within their respective fields: why do some places (usually Europe and the United States) become the spaces from which intellectual agendas, research directions, or historical transformations are formed? And how can such inequities in who gets to shape the questions or identify social innovations, be undone or reconstituted? Such questions go well beyond the specific parameters of television, but these broader reflections from other fields are useful for reflection and re-integration into the potential new spaces from which our understanding of television's pasts, presents and futures may emerge. This article offers a specific case study of a recent media event as one example of how empirical research can work to reorient television theory; in doing so it will consider how television producers continue to enthral their audiences in a place that rarely appears on the map of international television scholarship: the Philippines.

2. Finding Television's Future in Overlooked Places: A Case Study from the Philippines

The era in which broadcast television's decline was first beginning to be heralded in the case of the United States—from the 1990s to the turn of the 21st century—was precisely an era in which globalization, neoliberal reforms and technological changes were making a very different impact in the Philippines and many other places. Across a number of countries with developing economies, large urban populations, and regulatory reforms of privatization—including India, Mexico, Brazil, and much of East Asia—conditions were conspiring to produce some of the world's biggest television audiences, albeit in diverse conditions and with specific histories. As noted earlier, a body of television scholarship has documented these transformations in what led to an increasing and important globalization of media studies from which counter-narratives to the 'end of television' thesis have increasingly been drawn (Curtin, 2010; Keane et al., 2007; Straubhaar, 2007; Turner & Tay, 2009).

Yet even while this scholarship flourished, the Philippines remained largely overlooked in recent analyses of global television (but see Ong, 2015). Such an oversight seems puzzling given the relatively long history and the on-going power of television as a mass medium across the Philippines' population of 100 million and a diaspora of more than 10 million overseas workers and migrants. The country's first broadcast took place in 1953, and within the following decade several key characteristics of the industry became consolidated in ways that continue to shape the nature of Philippine television today. The issuing of broadcasting licenses to elite family–led businesses ensured that, as with other media enterprises in the country, television ownership was controlled by a handful of powerful families whose vast interests across the national economy was matched by a deep involvement in national politics. Despite disruption to this model during a nationalized period under the Marcos dictatorship (1972–1986), in the post-Marcos era from the late 1980s onwards, television stations were returned to the former model of operating commercially and competitively. Indeed, it was precisely in this period that Philippine television can be said to have flourished: whereas television had previously been mostly a middle-class affair, by the early 1990s broadcasting was reaching all but the most remote of rural areas. Also extremely important was the reach of television into the households of the urban poor, a community whose population had grown exponentially. This working class sector of the population, deeply immersed in everyday consumer culture of interest to advertisers, has become the definitive audience of popular Philippine television. The Philippine television industry, then, is similar to a number of other large and emerging economies in which broadcast television continues to dominate the media landscape, reaching the vast majority of urban and rural households and attracting more than 75% of nationwide advertising revenue[2]. While the Philippines does not have a direct of equivalent of Brazil's Globo or Mexico's Televisa empires, single players who capture most of the television ratings, there are two market leaders who between them take more than 80% of market share (Soriano et al., 2015, p. 2). Managed by members of the same elite families who founded them, or by a handful of their immediate associates and successors, the rival companies operating these two channels—ABS–CBN and GMA 7—each have extensive networks of local television and radio interests in addition to other subsidiaries across media, entertainment and telecommunications. In a situation that parallels the story of broadcast television in Mexico (Pertierra & Turner, 2013), these channels and the family–led companies that own them are not faceless private commercial broadcasters, but are deeply immersed in the building of national communities, whether through such company mottos as being 'in the service of the Filipino', through their highly–publicised philanthropic activities (Ong, 2015), or through their deep interconnections with the political process.

At first glance, the continuing power of free to air television in a country like the Philippines may seem

[2] World bank data lists television ownership between 2005–2012 as being 74% of the population (World Bank, 2015) while other sources put it at around 90% of households (Soriano, Lim, & Rivera-Sanchez, 2015).

outdated or somehow 'behind' other media industries in which television was presumed to be in decline. But far from being old-fashioned in their centrality to the modern Filipino nation–state, television broadcasters in the Philippines, and the most successful productions that make up their programming, have been extremely successful in harnessing new technological developments to consolidate and expand upon their enduring success in the post-broadcast era. There are several reasons for this; certainly the relevance of the oligarchic control that cuts across media, politics and other industries of the Philippines should not be underestimated. Indeed, the limited number of players in the game of politics and business that Benedict Anderson (1988) described as a 'well-run casino', has enabled the market leaders to control and at times curtail the entry of rival platforms into the Philippine market. Cable subscriptions and direct to home satellite services have remained relatively low at 1.5 million and about 100,000 subscribers respectively in 2010, and offer little threat to broadcast television (Periabras, 2015). But even if they did gain pace, they are largely owned and operated by subsidiaries of the major broadcast television companies. Emerging platforms that offer substantially more promise for new or shifted television audiences—particularly the smartphone as a vehicle for the consumption of mobile television content—are similarly being unrolled through consortia that comprise the same group of key players who have dominated the media and telecommunications landscape, more or less since their inception.

In the case of the Philippines, it could be argued that the very stranglehold that 'old' broadcast interests continue to exert on the national media landscape has offered possibilities for quite a smooth transition to a converged media–telecommunications industry, precisely because it is unlikely to represent any serious disruption to the political economy of either industry. Market leader ABS–CBN has established subsidiaries to move into the telecommunications market, while also providing mobile accessible versions of their television content to subscribers (Enterprise Innovation, 2014; Paul Budde Communication, 2014). ABS–CBN excels in digitizing both old and new content produced for free to air broadcast for distribution across their multiple platforms and channels, both national and global. But the development of particular importance in the Philippines, and one which alerts us to the benefits of looking for innovation in overlooked places, is the growing role of mobile media in a country where mobile phones have reached an ownership rate of more than 110% (Paul Budde Communication, 2014). As the following case study indicates, television producers in the Philippines are keenly alert to the ways in which social media and mobile technologies have transformed the media practices of their audiences, and far from fearing such transformations, they have found ways to harness new media practices and re-integrate them into deeply traditional genres of free to air programming.

3. Television Goes Viral: The Case of *Eat Bulaga* and the 'AlDub' Phenomenon

In 2015, one of the Philippines' longest running television programs, a noontime variety entertainment show called *Eat Bulaga,* was responsible for the largest ever number of tweets to be sent to a specific hashtag. On Monday 26 October, a world record of 41 million tweets were sent with the hashtag #AlDubEBTamangPanahon, referring to a live charity concert being held to celebrate the face-to-face meeting of a young couple who had 'fallen in love' while appearing on-screen during the television show. The story behind the love match popularly known as *AlDub* (a combination of the young man's name, Alden, and his female admirer's character, Yaya Dub), is worth telling in some detail. Until July 2015, Alden Richards was a Filipino actor and television host with a moderate following, a recent addition to the large and rotating ensemble of presenters on *Eat Bulaga.* This television program has broadcast live, six days a week, since 1979, attracting consistently high ratings and propelling multiple generations of comedians, models, actors and musicians to fame. The program is intentionally improvisational in tone, comprising games segments, comedy sketches, and song and dance numbers. Hosts interact constantly with the large excited audiences, as well as with one another, and much of the program's humour comes from the adlibs and the 'mistakes' that occur within a chaotically rich layering of noises, colours and movements.

Most of *Eat Bulaga* is filmed with a live studio audience in a former cinema in the north of Metro Manila. But one of the show's most popular segments has, for several years, been filmed in the streets of a different low-income neighborhood each day. Until recently, this outdoor segment was hosted by three popular comedians, who would joke with local residents, and banter via a live cross with the primary television hosts back in the studio. From July 2015, however, they were joined by a woman, Maine Mendoza, whose self-produced videos using the mobile application Dubsmash had gained her a sudden and massive social media following[3]. A few months before being recruited to *Eat Bulaga,* Mendoza had posted a video compilation to her Facebook account, in which she mimed to audio samples of the famous Philippine actress (and sister to the President) Kris Aquino. Within a day the video had been viewed more than one million times, and the attention initially generated by viral videos on Mendoza's social media accounts quickly spread to national press, radio and television coverage. *Eat Bulaga* cast Maine

[3] Dubsmash is a mobile application that allows people to film short videos of themselves miming to famous audio samples.

Mendoza to take part in an improvised segment that was a soap opera parody; she played Yaya Dub, a young and innocent companion (half caretaker, half housemaid) to a demanding older woman, played by male comedian Wally Bayola in drag. Yaya Dub does not speak, and only mimes to songs and audio snippets in keeping with Mendoza's original rise to fame as the 'Queen of Dubsmash'. Her charm and physical comedic abilities struck a chord with audiences, and producers of *Eat Bulaga* capitalised on this popularity by expanding her role in the outdoor segment, which is performed live and largely improvised in streets and houses of different low-income communities.

Soon after her addition to the show, it was revealed that Yaya Dub (and, the audience is led to believe, perhaps Maine Mendoza herself) had a crush on Alden, whom she had never met, but had only seen onscreen. As Alden and Yaya Dub, amidst much joking and teasing from the co-hosts, began to flirt with each other during live crosses between the outdoor location and the indoor studio, television audiences at home became transfixed by their courtship. Prohibited from meeting or speaking, Yaya Dub and Alden communicated only through holding signs, or miming to songs and audio grabs. Soon the *Eat Bulaga* production team had built their love story into the ever-more-popular soap opera parody segment of their show. As the weeks drew on, from July to October, the 'love team' known as AlDub were faced with obstacle after obstacle, prevented from meeting, but increasingly amorous in their non-verbal communications. While television ratings for *Eat Bulaga* boomed, it was the social media fascination of the AlDub phenomenon that was especially noteworthy, with 26 million #AlDub tweets in the leadup to the couple's meeting, and between one million and three million views of videos for many of the daily videos posted to Facebook from the *Eat Bulaga* account. The October 2015 live concert, for which more than 55,000 tickets sold out in two days, was judged by some media commentators as the high point of the AlDub craze in the Philippines. But the producers of *Eat Bulaga* continued to develop new directions in which to build upon the popularity of Maine Mendoza and Alden Richards, including a spin-off scripted series in addition to the live appearances and substantial social media activities with which both are regularly engaged.

Eat Bulaga is certainly not what is typically defined in television studies circles as quality television. But the speed with which the production team capitalized upon the AlDub phenomenon is indicative of the production team's competence and expertise in achieving what makes the program so highly successful. *Eat Bulaga* relies on its longstanding and predictable structure that makes it deeply predictable to audiences, who know that on any given day, the order of segments and the types of activities to be found onscreen will be largely consistent. But within this predictability, producers and performers constantly improvise and interact with their audience. While the interactivity of *Eat Bulaga* hosts in previous decades was largely restricted to engaging with an enthusiastic studio audience, from the 2000s onwards it became increasingly possible for interactivity to include mobile production teams outside the studio, text messages from viewers, video submissions, and an increasing mobilization of social media to encourage participation from audiences. As of 2015, *Eat Bulaga* has more than 11 million followers on Facebook, where videos and photographs are posted daily, and a mobile application for people to watch videos on their smartphones. As a television show, *Eat Bulaga* is flexible, innovative and responsive to technological changes in its industry, while retaining the enduring core of what makes broadcast television so powerful. Rather than becoming fragmented or diminished by the rise of social media and mobile content, it harnesses content and mobilises audiences in such a way that the daily TV program could best be seen as the core product which defines a brand with multi-platform reach.

This capacity to be responsive, innovative and participatory is however not a result of *Eat Bulaga* being a new form of television. On the contrary, the style and structure of *Eat Bulaga* has deep roots in the genre of variety entertainment, drawing from the pre-television heritage of popular radio shows and vaudeville (Enriquez, 2008, pp. 88-127; Fernandez, 1996, p. 20). These traditions, with their focus on improvisation and interaction, are perfectly matched to the new age of television, as producers and performers draw the ingredients for new content from virtual or mediated audiences in much the same way that they have always done with their live or studio audiences. Just as the comedians who host *Eat Bulaga* onscreen are constantly observing, provoking or teasing their interlocutors from the audience in order to make audiences laugh, the program's production staff are also constantly looking for new ideas from social media feeds, and scanning the reactions of their audience online as much as in studio to encourage participation or provoke new creative directions. In the case of Indian reality television, Arvind Punathambekar (2010) has argued that participatory television cultures are engaging with mobile media technologies in ways that generate potentially new, or renewed, modes of public interaction. In the case of the Philippines, it is abundantly clear that the sort of mediated participation Punathambekar productively describes as 'mobile publics' is not only making television successful in the contemporary media landscape, but is also drawing upon television producers' long and deep understanding of how to produce participatory audiences. Although the mobile technologies may be new, the television production practices they are enabling have long been at the heart of successful entertainment television.

In the case of the Philippines, the success of television programs like *Eat Bulaga* in harnessing the power of social media and mobile technologies can also be understood by acknowledging the Philippines' pioneering role in the take-up of the mobile phone. In the field of mobile media studies, the Philippines has been recognized as a place in which a number of cultural, technological and economic factors converged to integrate the use of mobile phones, for SMS texting rather than for voice calls, much earlier and more successfully than many other markets in the world (Pertierra, 2014). Indeed, the global history of mobile phones is instructive for television scholars trying to re-locate the spaces and places of their own field: the very mobility of mobile media—that it is cheap, portable, and relies on new commercial infrastructures rather than state-provided national infrastructures—meant that the global development of mobile phone businesses and mobile media cultures was led not from the United States, but from such diverse places as Ghana, India, Indonesia, Korea, Finland—and the Philippines (Goggin & Hjorth, 2014; Katz & Castells, 2008). In the field of mobile media studies, it was never really possible to imagine that the 'centre' of mobile phone development was the United States or the United Kingdom. Scholars interested in any development of mobile technologies, whether that be the industrial or regulatory conditions of mobile telephony, or the political consequences for a mobile connected public, or in the many cultural consequences that range from family relations to sexual identities, have been obliged to understand the multiple and contingent contexts through which this technology of the mobile phone has been fundamentally constituted. Mobile media studies, then, did not have same degree of the opportunity that television studies did, to imagine one 'world centre' from which research agendas could be set. This difference in perspective may largely be a result of the time at which the technology took off. But the example of mobile media, and the places (such as the Philippines) in which mobile media seem to be enhancing rather than detracting from the power of television, is suggestive of the benefits that come from correcting the historical focus of television studies on the Anglophone West. To understand the future of television, we not only need to look more broadly afield, but also to question how we may have overlooked important elements in television's past.

4. (Not Yet) The End of Television Studies: So What Comes Next?

At first glance, a comedy show in the Philippines may have seemed an odd place from which to develop an argument about the enduring presence of television. But this example is illustrative of the research questions that emerge differently in television studies depending upon where you look (Pertierra & Turner, 2013, p. 15). Exploring overlooked places to better understand television offers value both empirical and theoretical; empirically, it unfolds new chapters in the global history of how television industries have developed, and gives us additional insights into the ways that television broadcasters are adapting to digital and multi-platform environments in relatively successful ways. The case study of the AlDub phenomenon is not presented in this paper as necessarily representative of how television is changing in the contemporary world; however it is one extremely successful example of the wide range of ways in which broadcast television is adapting to and allying with other media platforms according to specific national and regional contexts. The AlDub phenomenon and the *Eat Bulaga* program may be seen as a vanguard case of how innovative uses of social media in television are developing in corners of the global television industry that only rarely garner attention from international scholars.

But this case study also alerts us to broader theoretical implications for the research agenda of a field such as contemporary television studies that aims to be global. To understand some of these implications, the final section of this paper turns to a brief consideration of a number of attempts across the humanities and social sciences—some of which have taken place in conversation while others have developed in parallel—in rethinking how we might account for the global transformations of the modern era. Such attempts aim to reveal and challenge the ethnocentric premises upon which many debates across anthropology, sociology, literary and cultural studies (to name just a few examples) have been constituted (Alvarez, Arias, & Hale, 2011; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012; Connell, 2007; Mignolo, 2011). Manifesto-like in tone and intended as interventions into their respective fields, what many of these examples share is a concern with what Mignolo has described as a 'geopolitics of knowledge' (2002): the ways in which forms of knowledge from certain places have become privileged over others as a result of global modernity and coloniality. The social sciences, even in their most critical and reflexive attempts, for Mignolo are nevertheless deeply ethnocentric; he argues that:

> "It is no longer possible, or at least it is not unproblematic, to 'think' from the canon of Western philosophy, even when part of the canon is critical of modernity. To do so means to reproduce the blind epistemic ethnocentrism that makes difficult, if not impossible, any political philosophy of inclusion. (Mignolo, 2002, p. 66)"

From a different intellectual trajectory but along some similar lines, Raewyn Connell's *Southern Theory* offers a critique of the field of sociology, observing that Euro–American perspectives have continued to dominate

supposedly new sociological thought in an era of globalization theory (2007, pp. 62-68). While the South has become more written about in Northern social theory, it is still not, Connell argues, regarded as a place from which intellectual production might actually be taken seriously. Rather, the South continues to be the place from which data is gathered, to be reformulated in the North and assembled into nominally global (but really Northern) accounts. Overturning these hegemonies requires both critiquing those Northern accounts which masquerade as global, *and* paying proper attention to other perspectives that have been marginalized as the domain of parochial 'local' debates. The geopolitics of whose debates merit being played out on a global stage, and whose research becomes marginalised as parochial, is particularly powerful in the networks of area studies that have historically carved up the post-colonial world along lines that effectively reproduce 'a North American style of knowing' (Rafael, 1994, p. 91). In the case of Latin American studies, Alvarez, Arias and Hale (2011) grapple with the question of how to overturn the Northern domination of a field of research whose foundation was largely an effect of US Cold War interests. They suggest that what is required is both a de-centring of US American frameworks *and* a re-visioning of the region that incorporates Latin American ontologies and histories in all their diversity. Such a task is easier said than done.

While television scholars may not feel it is necessary to abandon the various projects, agendas and approaches of media studies in order to re-imagine and reconstruct an entirely new field, it is valuable to consider how these broader interventions into the geopolitics of knowledge might shift our perspectives on how and where television is best studied. The challenge, then is to engage theoretically with the ideas raised by Mignolo, Connell and many others to 'de-centre' research while also translating this spirit into the empirical study of contemporary television. It is by engaging with both of these strands in concert—empirically investigating television beyond the 'usual places' in such a way that responds to the call of cultural theorists to question our very assumptions about where television studies' 'usual places' should be—that more nuanced understandings, and fewer premature declarations, might be made about what television is, and where it is going. Sometimes, as in the case of variety television's long history of participatory publics and audience interaction, we need to reconceptualise our understanding of media's past as much as opening up our imaginations of the future. Why shouldn't the Philippines, in this example, be a vanguard space from which debates and models for the future of television is drawn? And how might Philippine television's history as *always* having been worthy of generative research be reclaimed?

It is encouraging and significant that in contemporary television scholarship, it is today quite unsustainable for whole arguments about the nature or future of television—whether as a technology, as an industry, or as a complex of cultural practices—to be mounted without reference to the diverse and contingent histories that have constituted television around the world. But to simply collect global accounts of television is not enough, and nor should the purpose of such accounts be merely to intervene in debates and definitions wherein the United States or the United Kingdom are still assumed as the core models against which these 'minor' histories are contrasted. It is time for critical television studies to go one step further, and work towards a television studies which takes cross-cultural, multiple, peripheral, Southern, de-centered perspectives as a starting point rather than an admirable correction.

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Article

Not Yet the Post-TV Era: Network and MVPD Adaptation to Emergent Distribution Technologies

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Abstract
Television as a medium is in transition. From DVRs, to Netflix, to HBO Now, consumers have never before had such control over how they consume televisual content. The rapid changes to the medium have led to rhetoric heralding the impending "post-TV era." Looking at the ways that legacy television companies have adapted to new technologies and cultural practices suggests that rather than traditional television going the way of radio, television as a medium is actually not terribly different, at least not enough to conclude that we have entered a new era. Press releases, discursive practices by the news media, corporate structures and investments, and audience research all point to the rhetoric of post-TV as being overblown. By thinking about contemporary television as being in transition, greater emphasis and attention can be placed on the role that major media conglomerates play in developing, funding, and legitimizing new forms of television distribution, in addition to co-opting disruptive technologies and business models while hindering others.

Keywords
convergence; hulu; Netflix; networks; over-the-top; streaming; television

Issue
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1. Introduction

In 2012, a new 'television' service was launched that would allow subscribers to access live and recorded over-the-air (OTA) television programming on any device with an Internet connection. Dubbed Aereo, the service challenged traditional definitions and business models for television by rending the 'Where?' of live television consumption out of the living room and severing the 'How?' of it from the television device. Aereo's business model was built on the assumption that viewers wanted to consume content on the go; they wanted to be unshackled from the living room couch (Stelter, 2012a). By capturing OTA signals and storing them on a cloud-based server, Aereo gave its customers what was essentially a DVR that could be accessed by phone, tablet, or computer.

Company executives realized Aereo would upset the broadcast networks and their affiliates and thus tried to avoid litigation by providing each customer with an antenna (and thus a license) which would transmit the feed to the cloud-based server. Doing so meant that Aereo itself was not transmitting the signal, a legality which they believed meant they were in the clear. However, the networks sought an injunction which was initially denied (Stelter, 2012b) before moving to the Supreme Court. There, the streaming service was handed a resounding 6–3 defeat with the Court agreeing with broadcasters that Aereo functioned as a cable system by retransmitting signals (Liptak & Steel, 2014). Shortly thereafter, Aereo filed for bankruptcy and sold off its remaining assets.

Despite its fate, Aereo is an interesting case study in the rapidly evolving field of television distribution and consumption. While the company attempted to disrupt entrenched models of the industry, it also followed practices of multichannel vídeo programming distributors (MVPDs)—namely, the retransmission of local broadcasts. The only difference was Aereo would not be paying retransmission fees to broadcasters and their affili-

ates. Effectively, what Aereo did was begin the construction of a cable system (Handel, 2014), complete with a wide selection of OTA channels, as well as licensed cable networks (such as Bloomberg News). The methods of distribution and consumption for Aereo were different than those of traditional cable and satellite providers, but the way in which the programming and content was structured was remarkably similar (indeed, MVPDs were silently rooting for Aereo to succeed because it would allow them to challenge the legality of the compulsory carriage fees from broadcasters). Rather than a revolutionary actor in the contemporary media landscape, Aereo might be considered a service which is caught between traditional and emergent paradigms.

Aereo is not alone in the rapidly evolving television landscape. Numerous platforms like internet protocol television (IPTV)[1], over-the-top (OTT) content[2], or subscription video on demand (SVOD) services like Netflix and Hulu have emerged in the past decade as challengers to traditional television broadcasters and MVPDs. The situation has reached such a critical mass that many scholars and journalists have begun touting the 'post-TV era' as a *fait accompli* or at the very least a moment that is looming in the near future (Leverette, Ott, & Buckley, 2008; Poniewozik, 2014; Strangelove, 2015; Thompson, 2015). The industry itself seems cognizant of the tumultuous waters it is seeking to traverse, as many media conglomerates endured a week-long stock market rollercoaster in August of 2015, due in part to uncertainties surrounding television's future (Lang, 2015b). Perhaps most exemplary of the television industry's uncertain future was Disney CEO Bob Iger's suggestion that ESPN—widely considered the most valuable channel in cable and satellite packages—could be sold as an OTT offering in the coming years (Pallotta, 2015). Such a move could be the straw that breaks the camel's back with regards to the bloated bundles that have come to characterize MVPD television packages.

However, we have yet to reach that point. While the media landscape has diversified and expanded at unprecedented rates in the past 20 years, the industry itself has largely remained composed of the same players present in the 1940s during the medium's formative years and the 1980s when MVPDs emerged as important components of the television ecosystem, although market consolidation and conglomeration have introduced a mix of new owners[3]. Not only are the major corporations that control traditional television production and distribution outfits mostly the same, they also are positioning themselves in strategic locations in the 'post-television' distribution field, as shall be discussed later in the article. If the major media corporations remain at the heart of emerging forms of television production, distribution, and consumption, how useful is it to discuss the contemporary media landscape as 'post-TV'? When home video arose in the late 1970s, why was that socioindustrial development not discussed in the context of 'post-cinema'? The historical moments seem congruent. Thus, if we want to better understand the contemporary historical context of television as both an industry and sociotechnological apparatus, we must avoid assuming that new systems of distribution and consumption inherently signal revolutionary changes.

Instead, as media archaeologist Geert Lovink reminds us, scholars should read their media object of study "into history, not the other way around" (2003, p. 11). Taking such an approach limits teleological pitfalls and allows the scholar to make connections between distinct historical eras, emphasizing the links between different technological apparatuses. While media archaeology generally deals with technologies and not industries, I incorporate elements of it as a methodology when appropriate, particularly when examining the ways new methods of television distribution and consumption relate to traditional ones. Along with media archaeology, I also employ a critical political economy approach as elucidated by David Hesmondhalgh in order to better situate the relationships between industry, technology, and culture. In particular I utilize a critical political economy approach because it examines long-term changes in the relationships between politics, industry, and media in culture (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p. 33), a component that is essential in understanding the connection between contemporary television and 'traditional' TV. By taking the pertinent aspects of media archaeology and augmenting them with a critical political economy approach, I avoid both engaging in the rhetoric of technological determinism and developing a grand narrative of television distribution history.

Put simply, I argue that rather than use the rhetoric of 'post-TV' to describe the current moment in television history, scholars should consider this a period of transition for the medium, similar to the way that Amanda Lotz (2007) formulates her conception of the 'post-network era.' By thinking about contemporary television as being in transition, greater emphasis and attention can be placed on the role that major media conglomerates play in developing, funding, and legitimizing new forms of television distribution, in addition to co-opting disruptive technologies and business

[1] IPTV is television that is transmitted over the Internet that does not require an MVPD contract.

[2] OTT describes any content which can be accessed independently from MVPDs, although it still usually requires a subscription to the content provider.

[3] As of 2012, 90% of media outlets (including television) were owned by the same six firms: News Corporation, Comcast, CBS, Disney, Viacom, and Time Warner (Lutz, 2012). There have been no major changes in media consolidation since, although Comcast attempted to purchase Time Warner Cable before the FCC implied it would reject the deal (Brodkin, 2015).

models and at the same time hindering others. While being cognizant that consumers have greater agency in this transitory period, I focus most of my attention on industrial firms in this essay because they are the ones who are, for the most part, currently shaping the way content is distributed. Despite new delivery technologies emerging across the globe, I generally focus on an American context because many of the largest media corporations and new methods of distribution are located in the country or have been rapidly adopted there; similar studies could be conducted across different cultures using the same framework, however.

2. What Is Television?

When discussing the applicability of the term 'post-TV' to today's media landscape, it is important to first define what is actually meant by television. Television is more than just the material technologies and the stories they broadcast, just as cinema is more than the theater and films. Television includes (but is not limited to): advertising; the cable and satellite infrastructure necessary to transmit signals; systems of audience measurement; national communications regulations; regimes of copyright; audiences; labor negotiations; and transnational flows of culture. The interconnected structure of television is an integral part of understanding it as a concept rather than an object or technology. Thus, I will be referring to the 'television apparatus' throughout, often shortening it just to television, in order to highlight the important relationships between technology, culture, industry, and the state.

The capabilities of modern televisions are indicative of technological convergence and its attendant convergence culture, which Henry Jenkins (2006) suggests opens up the possibilities for a greater participatory culture. New forms of culture require new ways of talking about them, particularly as consumers find new and resistant uses for technology. Amanda Lotz suggests that in an era of increasing technological convergence we should reconceptualize television audiences as niche groups that seek narrowcasting as opposed to broadcasting (2007, p. 5), while at the same time acknowledging that no medium has yet to fill the void for a mass, heterogeneous audience. Lotz's recognition of the lack of replacement for the needs of a mass audience is important because the audience still exists, particularly for marquee events like major world news and high profile sporting events like the Super Bowl or the Olympics, and speaks to the continuing relevance of television as the main technological apparatus that can serve the needs of a wide, diverse audience.[4]

Technological convergence impacts more than just the way audiences are constructed by networks, it also influences the forms and content of television productions. Working from a production studies perspective, John Caldwell has argued that television aesthetics in the digital era work in accordance with production practices that prefigured Lotz's post-network era; specifically, Caldwell points to five 'protodigital' elements of production: "ancillary textuality (repurposing, migrating content); conglomerating textuality (convergence texts, TV/dot-com sites); marketing textuality (branding); ritual textuality (pitching, writing by committee); and programming textuality (stunting, sweeps)" (2004, pp. 46-47). These are protodigital strategies because they prefigure the post-TV era, yet see their utility maximized in an era of convergence. For example, ancillary textuality is arguably responsible for the way that (American) television is structured today (Kompare, 2005); while much critical attention is paid to original network programming, syndication makes up most of the programming for a large number of television channels. An era with a proliferation of viewing devices and platforms only increases the necessity of repurposed content and many of the 'disruptive' television services like Hulu relied exclusively on licensed television content to attract customers. The Web also allows the television industry to expand on its practice of conglomerating textuality by providing a space for viewers to interact with augmented narratives and worlds, such as webisodes or alternate reality games (ARGs).[5] Caldwell's reading of contemporary television production practices as protodigital is useful in refocusing scholars' attention towards residual cultural practices, emphasizing their connection with the past.

Along the same lines, William Uricchio points to the continued relevance of Raymond Williams' (1974) concept of 'flow' for contemporary television. Whereas Williams conceptualized flow as an industrial strategy to suture television programming (including advertising) into a coherent, never-ending cavalcade of content, Uricchio positions his definition of flow in terms of the viewer. Owing to the technological interventions of the VCR and remote control, Uricchio's flow is dependent on the actions and choices of the viewer as opposed to the network programmer (2004, pp. 168-172). Uricchio's point is well taken: Not only does he repurpose a bedrock concept of the field, he also historically contextualizes both Williams' and his own concept of flow, noting the myriad technological, regulatory, social, and economic generative mechanisms that define how we interface with television. Uricchio

[4] Despite the increasing prevalence of streaming video, live events are still primarily watched on television.

[5] Webisodes are shortform pieces that provide more story or background information for the main televisual text. ARGs use the main text as the source for different types of games that fans play alone or with one another in order to connect more deeply with a text. One of the most famous ARGs was *The Lost Experience*, a complicated narrative based on ABC's *Lost* and the show's mythology.

also keenly notes that rather than the contemporary televisual moment being one of revolution, we should instead consider it as a transitory period and, in this way, presages Amanda Lotz's (2007) categorization of television's tripartite industrial history.

Writing from a slightly different perspective with regards to the ongoing transformation of television, Michael Strangelove suggests that "a major industrial shift is occurring in the nature of viewing devices, modes of production, and distribution systems" and that the "primary movers of this are not the television and film industries but the consumer electronics industry, the Internet, and the online audience" (2015, pp. 9-10). Like Uricchio, Strangelove sees the increasing agency of viewers and users as acutely symptomatic of contemporary television. Unlike Uricchio, though, Strangelove attributes this shifting of agency to a new technological order, one whose ideological ground is dictated by consumer electronics manufacturers and telecommunications companies rather than the media industries. This is one point where Strangelove's argument is lacking: many of the traditional media powers are part of multinational conglomerates that include manufacturers and telecommunications giants. Elihu Katz (1996) also sees shifts in television audiences, although his research focuses on the disintegration of the last medium of public space, laying the blame with a proliferation of channels from which audiences can choose. From Katz, we can see further evidence that the decline of 'television' has been heralded for decades. However, the continuing prominence of established media corporations is an essential component of my argument that television is in a transitory period with regards to production, distribution, and consumption practices, yet is not truly removed from the broadcast model that has informed its operations for 70 years.

Despite the "developing analytical orthodoxy" (Tay & Turner, 2010) of the end of television, the myriad social and industrial practices, technologies, and regulations that constitute the television apparatus suggest that television as we know it remains a vibrant if not evolving medium and cultural object. Audiences may have more consumptive agency and the devices on which they consume content may be changing, but the fact remains that a small number of media corporations determine the layout of the televisual landscape and audiences continue to engage with their media firms (Webster, 2014). In the next section, I unpack the myriad ways in which media and telecommunications companies, with the help of the state via de-regulatory policies, continue to maintain a stronghold on the meaning of television.

3. A Crowded Field

The options audiences have for consuming television are rapidly expanding. By the MPAA's count, there were zero legal services for American viewers to watch film and television online in 1997, while that number has since grown to more than 110. Through these services, consumers watched more than 66.6B television episodes with that number estimated to grow to 101.6B by 2019 (Fried, 2015). Such numbers are certainly gaudy and speak to the potential offered by the Internet to expand the way consumers access television content; however, scholars should be careful to take them at their face value because the raw numbers do not speak to the ownership structures and business models behind online video distribution. To get a better sense of what the 66.6B television episodes watched online mean in the larger televisual landscape, I will look first look at the digital services offered by legacy television, including networks and MVPDs. Far from conceding defeat, traditional television players are actively integrating disruptive technologies and models to fortify their position within the market. I will then look at two of the newer, most prominent SVOD services currently in the field—Hulu and Netflix—in order to contrast the narrative of the post-TV era, focusing specifically on their financial structures and market shares, followed by a brief examination of YouTube. Rather than a steady march towards the end of television, closer examination of the contemporary home media field reveals a complex industry made up of traditional and emergent firms competing against and complementing one another, often with both coopting each other's business practices and distribution methods.

3.1. Networks and MVPDs Go OTT

Entrenched media powers have been historically hesitant to alter their business models in ways that might jeopardize their bottom line. Film studios were initially reluctant to embrace home video out of fear that it would crater theatrical attendance and take copyright control out of their hands (Greenberg, 2008); more recently, the music industry's reticence to distribute material online led to Apple becoming a dominant figure in the market and dictating licensing terms (Burkart & McCourt, 2006; Parks, 2012). Despite the Luddism of media industries, they have each successfully integrated emergent business models into their own. Television is no different and after initial reluctance to change from a linear model, networks and MVPDs are slowly offering OTT and IPTV options for viewers.

Network veteran CBS was the first broadcaster to offer a standalone OTT package in 2014. The network announced it would offer viewers access to full seasons of most of its current shows, as well as older programming (although not to their NFL coverage) for $5.99 per month with CBS All Access (Poggi, 2014). CBS' decision was remarkable because both networks and MVPDs have historically been against standalone services as it would damage the viability of the cable television bun-

dle (Kafka, 2015). Speaking at the international television trading expo MIPCOM, Starz executive John Penney goes further: "OTT is a real part of the ecosystem at this point. It's no longer a second or third choice or window for a market; it's considered right along with the cable channels and broadcasters. It's not a scary thing so much as an opportunity—an opportunity to grow the pie and reach more people" (Dawn, 2015). Penney's comments make clear that networks recognize that distributing their content online, in conjunction with either a MVPD or standalone OTT subscription, is now a virtual requirement for survival. This may be construed as evidence that we are now in a post-TV age; however, considering the political economy behind such moves, it seems the dominant interests have adapted aspects of disruptive services to retain their power. Many other networks, both broadcast and cable, have also recognized the necessity to adapt to the new technoeconomic environment, including Showtime, NBC, and AMC (Roettgers, 2015; Spangler, 2015a; Spangler, 2015c).

One network that has embraced alternative forms of distribution with gusto is HBO. Historically an innovator in television, HBO became the first network to transmit its programming via satellite in 1975, leading the way for the MVPD revolution in the 1980s. The company's most relevant contributions to the discussion of a 'post-TV' era are HBO Go and HBO Now, two OTT subscription services. HBO Go launched in 2010 and was available to all subscribers of its linear television counterpart; the service allowed viewers to watch HBO original programming, licensed films, and sporting events on the Web, mobile and TV-connected devices (such as Roku or AppleTV), and select videogame consoles. HBO Now—launched in April of 2015—is identical in terms of features to HBO Go with one major difference: HBO Now is available as a standalone OTT subscription service.

HBO Now is an important player in the field of disruptive TV services because it demonstrates that networks are willing to adapt to a changing field and embrace streaming while retaining their linear outlets. Critics have suggested that services like HBO Now threaten the business models of linear television, but HBO CEO Richard Plepler disagrees, arguing that telecommunications companies like Comcast and AT&T should be embracing the service because it allows those companies to upsell other broadband-based products (Wallenstein, 2015). Essentially, Plepler is saying HBO Now is targeted at ISP customers who do not have a cable or satellite subscription yet are interested in specific TV content. It should be noted that HBO Now has not become a revenue generator for the network yet due to initial marketing and technology costs (Lang, 2015a), although executives see it becoming highly profitable in the near future as cable providers realize its potential to bring in consumers who use the Internet for their media entertainment yet do not subscribe to television.

While in part a reaction to the new distribution models of SVOD and other streaming services, OTT subscription models have precedent with linear television in the form of premium cable networks like HBO, Showtime, and Cinemax. It is true that premium networks require a cable or satellite subscription, yet OTT services also require subscriptions to distribution infrastructure via an ISP or cellular service provider. Thus, while network adoption of OTT is in part reactionary, it should still be viewed as evidence of the staying power of the dominant television paradigm.

Additionally, MVPDs have begun experimenting with new viewing options for consumers. Recognizing the necessity to adapt to the new environment of cord-cutters and cord-nevers,[6] providers like AT&T and Comcast are offering IPTV services at lower prices than linear TV bundles. Comcast executive Matt Strauss compared new digital distribution models to the music industry, suggesting that Xfinity Stream and others will be as easy as ordering a song online (Spangler, 2015b). Consumer demand has been the impetus behind the new services and is a major part of the emerging TV Everywhere movement which has seen cable providers offer untethered access to programming on mobile devices and MVPDs and networks recognize the urgency of the situation due to the increasing number of households which pay for broadband service but not TV with 10.7 million households opting out in 2014, up 16% from 9.2 million of 2012 (Steel, 2015a).

Cable providers' willingness to adapt their business models should give scholars pause before perpetuating the narrative of the death of television. With the Telecommunications Act of 1996 deregulating the media landscape, an almost unprecedented number of ISPs, MVPDs, and networks have been merged into telecommunications behemoths. While the effect this has had on television and Internet subscription prices is concerning, it has allowed for greater flexibility among traditional TV firms, most recently evidenced by AT&T and DirecTV's merger fostering the birth of AT&T's new telephone, Internet, and TV bundle that allows subscribers access from any device with an Internet connection. The increased diversity of options available to the consumer from legacy TV firms have caused some media analysts to caution against expecting a revolution in television distribution (Koblin, 2015), particularly because the rate of cord-cutting has slowed significantly as the economy improves (Nielsen, 2013). With that said, it is important not to downplay the effect

[6] Cord-cutter refers to consumers who cancel their linear television service to watch content online; cord-never refers to younger consumers who have never subscribed to television and have grown up watching content online and on mobile devices.

new entrants into the market like Hulu and Netflix have had, especially in terms of forcing the entrenched powers' hands.

3.2. Hulu

Part of the SVOD classification of online services, Hulu was conceived as a web-based TV distribution portal in 2007; by 2008, the venture was ready for launch to the public and rolled out the red carpet by purchasing an ad during the Super Bowl in early 2009 featuring *30 Rock* star Alec Baldwin promoting the service (Stone, 2009). The choice of Baldwin was not a coincidence as Hulu initially grew via partnership with NBCUniversal and News Corp. (owners of Fox) and was given an unspecified amount of money that would be allotted for advertising the nascent platform on networks owned by the media giants (the Super Bowl aired on NBC that year). Hulu also received $100 million in investment capital from Providence Equity Partners in 2007 (James, 2012), a global investment firm which created Newport Television, LLC, a holding company founded for the express purpose of purchasing Clear Channel Communications' 56 television stations. Furthermore, Disney became a partner in 2009, adding content from its family of channels to Hulu (Kramer, 2009); more importantly, though, was the addition of three Disney executives to Hulu's board: Chairman Bob Iger, co-chair Anne Sweeney, and executive vice president Kevin Mayer. Combined with NBCUniversal and News Corp. members, the board of directors at Hulu could be easily mistaken with any traditional television giant's.

Disney's investment in Hulu was critical to the viability of the platform because it extended the exclusive agreements with NBC and News Corp. whereby only Hulu would have access to content licensed by the investment partners (agreements which were about to expire) for another two years. One final aspect of the Disney deal that exemplified the power wielded by the major media conglomerates was that some of Disney's most popular programming would be initially unavailable on Hulu, including *Hannah Montana* (2006-2011) and *High School Musical* (2006) (Schechner & Holmes, 2009). By denying users its most popular programming, Disney was flexing its muscles and letting it be known in no uncertain terms that traditional television powers would dictate, at the very least, the content available to Hulu users.

Beyond major media conglomerate investment and executive board occupation, Hulu also follows the ad-supported model of American television. Hulu initially launched as a completely free service that generated revenue by inserting ads throughout a television episode. While much of the world operates under a public television model whereby governments fund programming to varying degrees and by a variety of methods (Hoskins, McFadyen, & Finn, 1997, pp. 92-95), the United States has, from its inception, been strongly influenced by neoliberal ideology. Either through program sponsorship or selling time during a broadcast for advertising, American television has consistently been organized around a free market approach. Hulu is no different, as it inserts advertising breaks throughout a user's viewing session (although a user is able to group together the advertisements at the beginning if she wants to watch uninterrupted). Hulu did introduce a subscription option that with limited ads and premium programming options for $7.99 per month, although the premium tier only has 9 million subscribers as of 2015, nearly 50 million behind rival Netflix (Kastranakes, 2015). The company has not released numbers for how many users opt for the free version of the site, but it seems apparent based on the 700 million hours watched in the first quarter of 2015 that there are far more users choosing the free model (Neuts, 2015). Hulu's subscription numbers are not worthy of ridicule; indeed, they have shown impressive growth recently. However, this does not deny that the service's most active business model is the free, ad-supported one, a model that is derived explicitly from the traditional American television model.

Far from being economically and formally disruptive towards the broadcast model of television, Hulu seems to have largely adopted the dominant cultural model for American television. Even subscription pricing speaks to the model pioneered by HBO and other premium cable networks. Hulu should be considered an important part of the new televisual landscape, though, as many networks are partnering with the company to distribute content online. Comparing Hulu to a much different model will help illustrate how indebted the platform is to traditional television.

3.3. Netflix

Starting out as a retail DVD distribution service, Netflix initially emphasized cinema over television series and served as competition for brick-and-mortar video rental stores like Blockbuster and Hollywood Video. However, founder Reed Hastings always intended for Netflix to be an Internet-based service, glibly remarking that there was a reason it was called Netflix and not 'DVD-by-Mail' (Hastings, 2005). In 2007, Netflix launched its streaming service and by 2009 had accumulated 3 million users, an unusually robust level of growth for a nascent service in an emerging field of media distribution (Roth, 2009). Shortly thereafter in 2012, Netflix released its first in-house production, *Lilyhammer* (2012–2015), and has since continued to ramp up its TV and film production with critically acclaimed content like *House of Cards* (2013–), *Orange is The New Black* (2013–), and *Beasts of No Nation* (2015). Clearly Netflix envisions itself as a major player in the media industry; indeed, Hastings has suggested

that the traditional linear model of television will be extinct within 10 to 20 years due to consumer demand (Yarow, 2015). However, while such growth and production expansion is important and should not be downplayed as it relates to the health of the traditional television industry, it is a mistake to assume that the ascendance of Netflix is symptomatic of the demise of the television as we know it for two reasons: Netflix's business model, as it is structured in 2015, is not mature enough to judge its viability and viewers' attention is not a zero-sum equation[7].

The first reason scholars should be skeptical of the claim that Netflix will revolutionize linear television is that its long-term financial viability is far from proven. Netflix operates under a SVOD model whereby consumers have access to Netflix's entire library of content for a flat monthly fee. As of the third quarter of 2015, Netflix had 43 million American subscribers and 69 million global subscribers for their streaming service, dwarfing their competition (Netflix, 2015a). Netflix's subscription numbers are certainly impressive, but they do not speak to the financial solvency of their model, particularly as it relates to their ongoing international expansion into new markets like Spain, Portugal, and Japan (Mai-Duc, 2015; Scott & Peltier, 2015). Cultivating their brand in new markets is expensive and requires not only capital to develop their infrastructure locally, but also to acquire content that is culturally proximate (Straubhaar, 2003) so as to be able to compete with local video-on-demand services, such as Sky Italia in Italy and Telefonica's Movistar TV in Spain (Anderson & Rolfe, 2015). In the process of entering new international markets, Netflix's revenue streams have taken a hit, with the company losing $68 million internationally in Q3 of 2015 with the company expecting to lose $117 million in Q4. These international losses are felt throughout the company: in Q4 of 2014 the company posted a global net income of $83 million; in Q4 of 2015, Netflix expects to make a net profit of just $10 million (Netflix, 2015a). While the company expects its investment to pay off internationally, local telecommunications infrastructure should caution against rosy outlooks, particularly in southern European markets where broadband penetration rates lag behind the United States.

Netflix also missed its expected domestic subscriber growth mark in Q3 of 2015, adding only 880,000 new customers, falling short of the projected 1,15 million. Poorer-than-expected domestic growth, along with the capital required to expand internationally dampened investors' outlook on the company with the stock tumbling nearly 20 cents per share after the report was announced (Armental & Ramachandran, 2015).[8] Investors appear concerned with the new directions that Netflix is taking, but for now it appears that it is too early to say whether or not the company is overheating through in-house productions and international expansion. The uncertain long-term viability of its business model should give scholars caution before accepting Reed Hastings' proclamation that Netflix will be the death of linear television.

The second reason why Netflix is not indicative of the impending 'post-TV' era is simply that viewers are not abandoning television for Netflix. Viewers are able to choose from many options in the contemporary mediascape, of which Netflix is just but one choice. Accordingly, we should think about Netflix's role in the contemporary home media market as similar to that of television in the middle of the 20th century. Initially viewed as a threat to the film industry, television was thought to be a cheap alternative to cinema that afforded the viewer greater choice in content and a more comfortable viewing experience. While television cut into movie-going audiences, it eventually came to be an important revenue source for movie studios as a separate window, as well as a vital advertising outlet (Wasser, 2001, pp. 39-45). We should look at Netflix in the same way—as a competitor for eyeballs, but also an additional revenue outlet for media producers.

Moreover, streaming platforms like Netflix simply are not cannibalizing television at this point in time. As of May 2015, Nielsen found that during primetime, television accounts for 66% of all home media consumption (Nielsen, 2015b).[9] The long-term trend may eventually tip the balance of viewing habits in Netflix and company's favor, but at the moment television remains king. Just as cinema adapted its business model and production practices to television, so too will television adapt to streaming competitors.

Netflix is undeniably altering the ways in which people interface with home media, be it through shattering the franchised brick-and-mortar video retail market (Herbert, 2014) or popularizing the consumption habit of binge-watching. However, Netflix itself admits that the entertainment market is big enough for multiple platforms to be successful and that the increased competition will lead to improved services from everyone (Netflix, 2015b). Indeed, as Nielsen found in 2014, the increased number of digital services has spurred a growth in total media consumption, particularly among the prized 18–34 demographic, which saw a 4% increase in total hours watched (Nielsen, 2014). Dominant forms of mass media have always had to contend with leisure

[7] Netflix has all but disowned its DVD-by-mail service, yet there is a large enough consumer base (roughly 5 million) that the company cannot kill it off completely. That there is still a relatively large subscriber-base for an 'outdated' model suggests that for a variety of technological and cultural reasons, significant portions of viewers remain committed to older methods of media consumption.

[8] The company's stock has since rebounded.

[9] Radio accounts for the remaining users.

time competitors and, generally, they have survived. Television may eventually be relegated to the fate of radio, but that time has not yet come.

3.4. YouTube

YouTube appears to be diametrically opposed to traditional TV. At Google's Q2 2015 Earnings Report, Chief Business Officer and SVP Omid Kordestani (Google, 2015) reported more 18–49 year old Americans accessed YouTube via mobile devices than any cable network; moreover, the average amount of time users spend on YouTube rose to more than 40 minutes, a 50% year-over-year increase. A survey conducted by DEFY Media (2015) found that 96% of 13–24 year olds watch YouTube or similar platforms for an average of 11.3 hours per week compared to just 81% who watch scheduled television. Furthermore, a 2015 Nielsen study (2015a) revealed that between December of 2013 and December of 2014, television viewing by 18–49 year olds fell by 10% while YouTube use increased by 44%. YouTube, it would appear, is cannibalizing television audiences.

Certainly the Google-owned video platform is ascendant in the media ecosystem. The service captures the millennial zeitgeist of snackable content (Grainge, 2011, p. 7) while allowing regular people the chance to create and disseminate media they create without institutional gatekeepers. However, it would be a mistake to argue that YouTube's rise signals traditional television's demise. DEFY Media's survey, while signaling the prominence of YouTube use among 13–24 year olds, also speaks to the staying power of television. When recorded, live, and online TV habits are combined, respondents reported watching 22.2 hours of television per week, almost double that of YouTube and similar platforms (DEFY Media, 2015). This suggests that rather than YouTube muscling out television for viewers' attention, it has carved out a niche with younger audiences, particularly those 24 and under. Additionally, media consumption is not a zero sum game—viewers may be interacting with two screens at once, watching YouTube during commercials for example.

Another item to consider is that media conglomerates have a symbiotic relationship with YouTube, creating much of the site's most popular content and even finding talent for traditional television programming. While it is true that one of the major appeals of YouTube is user-generated content, many of the most popular videos on the site are the products of major media conglomerates, including TV clips, movie trailers, and music videos. The actual percentage of content contributed by the traditional media industries is not quantified, but a 2007 report puts the number between 30% and 70% (Holson, 2007). Even if only 30 percent of YouTube content is owned by media corporations, it remains a significant percentage and scholars should estimate that the percentage of content produced by media corporations that users watch is closer to 70 percent. It should also be noted that YouTube introduced an ad-free subscription service named YouTube Red in October of 2015 which could alter the dynamics of user expectations. For example, MTV gave YouTube star Todrick Hall his own show in 2015, viewing it as an opportunity to create content that connects with younger viewers. This particular working relationship benefits all parties involved: Hall is given more creative opportunities, MTV has access to new audiences, and YouTube potentially gains more users.

Rather than look at YouTube as assaulting traditional television, scholars should instead consider the complex ways in which the media and tech industries negotiate balances of power, particularly as media conglomerates absorb aesthetic and economic practices from insurgent platforms.

4. Conclusions

Michael Strangelove's suggestion that 'post-TV' orthodoxy may be a strawman is well-taken. It is true that many scholars and critics writing about the state of contemporary television do not explicitly argue that the dominant television paradigm has been usurped by upstarts like Netflix, Hulu, and YouTube; however, what many who write about television distribution and consumption do is rhetorically characterize the contemporary television landscape in terms of a revolution. Indeed, despite his stated temperance, Strangelove posits that "the television industry may be letting the audience slip through its hands" in a migration towards digital options (2015, pp. 8-15); moreover, the book itself is titled *Post-TV*! Regardless of their stated intentions, Strangelove and others rhetorically position traditional television's death as a *fait accompli*.

What this article has done is provided a counterbalance to such arguments by illustrating the myriad ways in which the TV industry, in accord with telecommunications companies, have begun adapting to a new technocultural environment where the audience expects to consume content when, where, and how they want. Not only are standalone OTT services becoming *de rigeur* for networks, MVPDs have begun offering skinny bundles to consumers and TV Everywhere to subscribers. Even the MPAA, normally stridently resistant to any change that might threaten its member studios, has recognized the importance of streaming services to television, arguing against Congressional regulation (Fried, 2015). Rather than declare the contemporary era as that of 'post-TV,' it seems clear that television is in transition and Lotz's (2007) approach of categorizing television in terms of industry practices is more useful for scholars (the post-network era seems most appropriate).

It should be noted that because the rate of change

in the television industry is so rapid, this article may appear outdated soon after publication. That is a necessary risk when writing about industries in flux, but it does appear that stabilization is in the near-future as cord-cutting rates have slowed and domestic subscriptions to services like Netflix are leveling out. With that said, scholars may well want to examine subscription rates over a 5–10 year period for Netflix to try and discern any trends, particularly with regards to the Great Recession and subsequent economic recovery. Furthermore, in-depth analyses of the economic success or failure of network OTT services, particularly in comparison to rival streaming services, might shed further light on whether or not consumers really are rejecting legacy television in favor of 'post-TV' options.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Article

The End of Television—Again! How TV Is Still Influenced by Cultural Factors in the Age of Digital Intermediaries

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Abstract
This article discusses the impact of convergence and digital intermediaries for television as a medium, industry and political and cultural institution. There is currently widespread debate about the future of television and the impact of technological and market changes. Our argument is that the answer to what is happening to television cannot be adequately addressed on a general level; local and contextual factors are still important, and so is the position and strategic response of existing television institutions in each national context. Based on analyses of political documents, statistics, audience research and media coverage, as well as secondary literature, the article explores the current situation for Norwegian television and point to four contexts that each plays a part in constraining and enabling existing television operators: the European context, the public service context, the welfare state context and the media ecosystem context.

Keywords
convergence; Norway; public service broadcasting; television

Issue
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1. Introduction

There is currently widespread debate about what is happening with television and how technological and market changes may undermine the medium's future.[1] The article argues that the answer to what is happening to television cannot be adequately answered on a general level—television's future is not just determined by technological and economic developments, but also by local and contextual factors: history, structure, regulation, user patterns, as well as the position and strategic response of specific institutions in each national context. The article draws on political documents, statistics, audience research, and media coverage, as well as previous studies and secondary literature, to discuss factors influencing the future of television and relate these to a specific national case. With few exceptions (see, for example, Dhoest & Simons, 2013; Turner & Tay, 2009) the debate about the future of television builds on evidence from large countries, predominantly from the Anglo-American sphere. The article contributes by focusing on a Nordic country, characterized by a combination of a high usage of global online streaming services, but also high use of public service television and high demand for domestic content. As Pertierra and Turner (2013) argue, television studies can only move forward if the object of study is more explicitly located within specific political economic and geo-linguistic spaces.

Theoretically, the article draws on perspectives on economic and technological change, as well as theories of "media welfare state" and "media ecosystems" pointing to cultural and political factors. The analysis is

[1] For an overview over how the forces challenging traditional television are discussed on the level of policy, see, for example, (DAF/COMP/GF (2013)13).

divided into three parts, each with an accompanying research question. These are: 1) What are the current changes in contemporary technologies, contents, markets and industries that point towards a fundamental change in the understanding of and conditions for television? 2) Which political, economic and cultural contexts may help to explain differences between national cases in how television develops, which contexts are particularly relevant in the Norwegian case, and how do these contexts enable or constrain existing TV companies? 3) How do traditional television institutions in Norway—public service as well as private—respond to the general and specific challenges and with what impact? The discussion is framed by a general introduction on "the end of television" debate and ends with a concluding discussion on the factors shaping television today.

2. "The End of Television"—Again!

The changing conditions for television are a hot topic, both in the trade press and in academic conferences and papers. Titles like *Traditional TV has survived the net threat, but for how much longer?* (Naughton, 2012), *Online streaming services are becoming a threat to broadcast television* (Morrison, 2014), and *Cord-nevers could be bigger threat to TV than cord-cutters* (Harris, 2015), indicate a new turnaround in the spiral of change that for decades have dominated industry and journalistic discourse on television. Changes in technologies and markets, as well as the emergence of new services with new business models, are not only seen to threaten the position of established market actors, but the very understanding and definition of television. Indeed, in academic contributions the very term "television" seems to need an increasing number of add-ons to be precise. Since the turn of the century, research literature has suggested to separate between definitions such as "broadcast TV" and "post-broadcast TV", "TV" and "television", "linear-TV" and "non-linear TV" (Lotz, 2007; Olsson & Spiegel, 2004; Turner & Tay, 2009).

Despite attempts at clarification, it is not always easy to understand which aspects of television that are challenged or threatened by which forces. The most common understanding of (traditional) television is that it is a system of distributing mixed schedule programming simultaneously to a mass audience watching in their homes on traditional sets, and where advertising and fees are the most important sources of revenue (Doyle, 2015; Ellis, 2000; Katz & Scannell, 2009). This model seems to be challenged on at least three counts. First, the fragmentation of audiences may undermine the mass media aspect of television; second, traditional television companies may not be able to acquire the content they need to uphold an attractive schedule, and third, the very business model may be undermined as both viewers and advertisers are seen as migrating away from the broadcast platform.

The challenges are real and important and have considerable impact on both the understanding of and conditions for television. Yet, we agree with those who are sceptical of the current tendency to talk in terms of boom and doom—boom for new media and doom for television (Donders, Pauwels, & Loisen, 2013, pp 11-20). The rhetoric in the debates is infused by expectations of immense progress or of steep decline, and the predictions about revolution in the TV sector are often voiced by actors who have vested interests in the realization of these predictions. An illustrative example is that the co-founder and chief executive officer (CEO) of the online TV streaming company *Netflix*, Reed Hastings, in 2015 argued that "In ten years-time, or twenty at the most, linear TV with a fixed schedule will be dead". He points to how the landline telephone became irrelevant with the introduction of the cell phone, and predicts that online streaming will similarly replace traditional TV. This type of rhetoric gets broad coverage; the press covers new actors such as *Netflix* and new trends in TV usage such as "binge watching" extensively, but are less fascinated with stories about the resilience of traditional forms of television. A key rhetorical challenge for traditional TV companies is to combat the image of an old-fashioned, irrelevant, and dying industry, which is partly constructed by their new competitors' marketing strategists.

In the light of the dire predictions for traditional television, two points are particularly important. The first point is *historical*: We are not the first generation to be faced with the question of "what is television?" (or what is any other medium for that matter). Television was not defined from the start, and the introduction of the new medium caused a series of debates about how to characterize TV, most often based on definitions of existing media technologies (Enli, 2015 p. 48). Since these early days, television has gone through many phases and taken on various forms such as experimental, monopoly, paternalist public service, competition, scheduling, niche channels, cable and satellite, on-demand and pay-tv—each with separate features that impact on how television is understood.

In the last three decades, debates about television have increasingly been framed in a context of radical change. From the 1990s onwards, cyber-optimists such as George Gilder have celebrated the coming of internet as liberation from the "tyranny" of television (*Life after television,* 1992). The predictions and debates continued throughout the late 1990s and 2000s with debates and book titles such as *The end of television?* (e.g. Katz & Scannell, 2009). While all this went on, however, there was massive reorientation and strategic decision-making in television companies, including the decision to digitalise production and distribution and develop niche channels and online services. After a quarter of a century of "the end of television", it is interesting that there is still so much television left to debate.

The other initial point is *political*: Different stakeholders have different stakes in defining television; definitions are not apolitical but serve specific purposes. A lot of the current confusion around how to define television is rooted in regulatory challenges; for regulators it is important to decide whether or not something is television because this determines how it should be regulated. The regulatory definitions need to be very precise, because imposing a wrong framework may be perilous to innovation, unfair to certain operators and damage the reputation of the regulators. As a rule, traditional broadcasters are regulated stricter than pay-television whereas online services have the least strict regulatory framework.[2] Faced with new types of audiovisual content, regulators struggle with categorization, and decisions are contested. Girginova (2015) discuss some interesting examples where the British regulator OFCOM has determined that certain clips are "TV-like", based on technical and economic dimensions; cultural and contextual dimensions, and the degree to which the purpose of the services are comparable with TV (Girginova, 2015). Operators often disagree, however, and in the case of a particular on-line service, "Top Gear YouTube", the BBC protested, claiming that clips were not intended to be consumed like TV, but as "tasters" of the television shows (Ofcom, 2013).

This demonstrates that the understanding of what TV is has not only changed historically, but fluctuates according to perspective and stakeholder interest. The definition of television cannot be reduced to technical specificities as television is infused with history and cultural meaning. While it is easy to describe a linear model of television using technological and economic characteristics, what we may call "cultural models of television" display varying features from context to context.

From the medium's early history, many have analysed television as culture, cf. seminal analyses such as Raymond Williams' *Television—technology and cultural form* (1974/2008). As Lotz (2014) points out, "[f]oundational understandings of television view it as a—if not *the*—central communicative and cultural force in society." This position derives from television's "*availability* and *ubiquity"* (emphasis in original) and its role as a conveyor of information that "reflects, challenges and respond to shared debates and concerns" (p. 37). In addition, Lotz discusses television as a cultural industry, which in the US implies that it "operates as a commercial enterprise that primarily seeks to maximise profits, while nonetheless producing programs that are important creative and cultural forms that communicate social values and beliefs" (p. 37). In this article, we are concerned with television both as a transmitter of culture and as a cultural industry, in this case as an industry with somewhat different characteristics than US television. However, we are also concerned with television as culture in a wider sense; television as a product of, and a constitutive element in, certain national and regional political cultures. We discuss how different cultural and political contexts impose general and specific expectations of what television should do that goes beyond television as a cultural industry or medium of storytelling.

In the article we join forces with scholars who point to the importance of continuity when studying the development of television (Dhoest & Simons, 2013; Ellis, 2000; Gripsrud, 2010; Tay & Turner, 2010).[3] Perriera and Turner (2013) use the concept of "zones" to describe "the various contexts and scales in which television can be located" (p. 6); zones include households, communities and nations, as well as a more discursive zone of "modernity". By locating television in various zones, Pertierra and Turner identify disruptive as well as stabilising forces and point to several forms of resilience that is underestimated in the current debates, such as the "resilience of the state as an actor in the media sector" (p. 47), "the resilience and persistence of the national even within highly commercialized media environments" (p. 52) and "what some see as a surprising resilience in the free-to-air audience" (p. 9). Accordingly, Pertierra and Turner (2013) argue that research should increasingly focus on the impact of cultural factors on TV's development, and suggests that studies should draw on evidence from different contexts to counter the tendency to see developments as "linear, evolutionary process with only a single point of destination" (p. 11).

The authors of this article have previously analysed transitions in television (Enli, 2008, 2015; Enli, Moe, Sundet, & Syvertsen, 2013; Ihlebæk, Syvertsen, & Ytreberg, 2013; Syvertsen, 1992, 1997, 2008). We observe that each transition to some degree recycles established patterns, yet, in each transition there are also new elements creating a particular kind of confusion and disruption. Consequently, we are concerned about both continuity and change, and both about general forces and the geographical and cultural specificities in a national setting.

3. Convergence and Digital Intermediaries

We turn now to the first of our analytical research questions 1) What are the current changes in contemporary technologies, contents, markets and industries that point towards a fundamental change in the understanding of and conditions for television? The specific impact of convergence for existing media is complex to disentangle and subject to much discussion and debate

[2] See for example Levy (1999).

[3] As Dhoest and Simons (2013, p. 19) argue, the current changes are real and important, yet, "[i]ndustry and journalistic discourses in particular seem to be so preoccupied with changes and innovations that mainstream contemporary television practices all but disappear from view".

(Dwyer, 2010; Jenkins, 2006; Jensen, 2010; Lotz, 2014; Staiger & Hake, 2009). In this article, the discussion is narrowed down to the challenges which are currently causing most tensions: the disruptive impact of so-called digital intermediaries.

Digital intermediaries, also called "internet intermediaries" or "digital disruptive intermediaries (DDI)", are often understood as a third party which enters an industry and provides new digital services that challenge established business models and change the way value is created or distributed (Riemer, Gal, Hamann, Gilchriest, & Teixeira, 2015). The term digital intermediaries refers to a mixed group of services that have in common that they function as algorithm-based gatekeepers; among the prominent sub-categories are news aggregators, social media, search engines, digital stores and content providers (Mansell, 2015). The most disruptive digital intermediaries in regards to linear television are content aggregators such as *Netflix*, *HBO*, *Amazon* and *YouTube*, in addition to the digital media player and micro console *AppleTV*, which represents a significant gatekeeper to and third party provider of TV content.

The impact of digital intermediaries varies between the services and there are also differences in production, distribution, and business models. *YouTube* is a hybrid media environment where both users and established companies distribute their content without costs, thus reducing the traditional distinction between professionally produced and user-generated content. *Netflix*, on the other hand, distributes professionally produced content to paying subscribers, and competes much more directly with established TV operators for content, audiences and revenue. Along with similar services (such as *HBO* and *Hulu* in the US), these services directly challenge the principles of linear distribution and mixed scheduling. Social media such as *Facebook* may be both disruptive and supportive to traditional television in a variety of ways; they provide viewers with audio-visual content, serve as add-ons to existing shows, are used for promotion (MarketingCharts, 2014) and viewer engagement, and work as a vehicle for interactive advertising.

In addition to their separate features, the digital intermediaries together accelerate the general economic and technological pressures on television. First, digital intermediaries increase audience fragmentation by making viewing more individualized; viewers are liberated from schedules and freed to make personalized choices about what programmes to watch at what times, on what devices and through which platforms. New technologies have, as Lotz (2014, p. 40) puts it "ruptured the norm of simultaneity in television experience and enabled audiences to capture television on their own terms". Consequently, TV begins to function less as a "flow" medium and more like publishing (bookstore, library) (p. 39), and it is more difficult to uphold a common sphere.

Second, digital intermediaries challenge television's position as content-provider. Internet-only channels like *Netflix* and *Amazon Prime Instant Video* do not only compete with traditional TV-firms by delivering content directly to fee-payers, they also produce original content based on more specific user data than traditional TV companies (Carr, 2013). As competition for attractive content increases, new divisions are becoming visible between different types of content that defies traditional genre divisions. Lotz (2014) distinguishes between three tentative categories based on functions for the viewers: "Prized content" which "people seek out and specifically desire" such as original and popular drama series (p. 12), "live sports and contests" which are exceptional and time sensitive (p. 13), and "linear content" which is what audiences watch for companionship, distraction and entertainment (p. 15).

Third, digital intermediaries position themselves to challenge established business models through a mixture or marketing strategies, content strategies, and rhetorical strategies. The new entrants argue that streaming and online services contribute to progress and innovation, price-reduction and customer satisfaction, as well as increased quality in content. The confidence of the newcomers is partly based on the tendency of "cord-cutting" among the so-called millennials (a term referring to consumers dropping cable or satellite TV subscription in favour of online video sources)[4], and the fact that younger viewers everywhere watch less linear television. Although convergence and cord-cutting challenge both advertising and licence fees as business models, the threat to advertising is more profound because it is more dependent on linear-TV. Internet advertising is growing and about to close the gap to television in the market for audio-visual advertising, there is yet no viable business model for audio-visual content on platforms such as smart phones that equals the traditional thirty second ad, and television increasingly must supplement traditional sources of revenue with show-by-show-based funding such as placement, integration, branded events and sponsorship (Lotz, 2014).

The fourth factor is of a more political nature pointing beyond market and technology to the next part of our analysis; the digital intermediaries' reluctance to being defined as media companies, defining themselves instead as technology companies not subject to audio-visual regulations (Napoli, 2014). Digital intermediaries are not regulated through licences or contracts with governments and not obliged to provide certain programming or contribute to local content production. The companies still engage with policy; *Netflix* has for example engaged lobbyists in Washing-

[4] see e.g. Strangelove (2015), and http://www.digitaltrends.com/topic/cord-cutting-101

ton DC to promote liberalization of restrictions on personal data-sharing, as well as voicing their interests in net neutrality and bandwidth caps (Johnston, 2012) but tend to ignore invitations to consultations regarding for example contributions to domestic production. In a response to such an invitation from the Norwegian Ministry of Culture, *Netflix'* chief of communication Joris Evers claimed that executives were busy: "We follow the Norwegian debate with interest, but can unfortunately not be present in all forums." (Tobiassen, 2015; Vollan 2015).

These examples demonstrate the potential impact of digital intermediaries for televisions' relationship with audiences, producers, financiers and stakeholders. But television isn't just a technology with some content—or "a toaster with pictures" as former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler named it at the height of deregulation in the US.[5] Television is infused with meaning, history and culture, and is deeply woven into the social fabric.

4. Political and Cultural Contexts

Comparative studies show that political and cultural contexts continue to be important for how television develops, and not least for the ability of existing television companies to design effective strategies in the current situation.[6] We turn now to the second research question: 2) Which political, economic and cultural contexts may help to explain differences between national cases in how television develops, which contexts are particularly relevant in the Norwegian case, and how do these contexts enable or constrain existing TV companies? Four contexts will be discussed with relevance for Norwegian television: the European context, the public service media context, the welfare state context and the "media ecosystem" context.

Norway is a *European* country, i.e. part of a territory where television to a high degree has been ascribed social and cultural functions. In Europe, there is much concern and public debate about the challenges of new digital services. The European market is fragmented compared to the US, and one concern is about whether increased competition and new distribution models will undermine demand for European content and/or production. Just as concerns were raised about "Dallasification of TV content" in the 1970s and 1980s (Miller, 2003) the term "Googlization of everything" (Vaidhyanathan, 2011) can stand as a metaphor for some of the current debates. A concern for EU policy makers is that the current digital market in Europe is made up by 54% US online services, 42% national online services, and only 4% EU cross-border online services (European Commission, 2015a). The European political strategy, under the label of the Digital Single Market, encompasses different responses to encourage free flow of online services and entertainment across European national borders. A stated goal for EU policy makers is to safeguard media pluralism, and to guarantee the independence of national media regulators in the age of convergence. The on-going review of the EU Audiovisual Media Service Directive includes a public consultation where member states and other stakeholders expressed their opinions, European Commission (2015b) and is intended to outline new principles for deciding whether new types of services should be subject to regulation, and to reduce the uneven playing field between operators. In addition to regulatory changes, the EU is continuing the financial support for European culture and media through the Creative Europe programme such as drama, animations and documentaries (European Commission, 2016) This type of content may not just serve as "prized content" specifically desired by audiences; it is also a type of content desired by regulators, policy makers and stakeholders active in the cultural sphere. Parallel to the increased availability of US content, there is increased production of national content and Nordic and European coproduction. This counter-trend can additionally be explained by institutional strategies and international trends, such as the BBCs strategies for export, increased global format trade, and the popularity of Nordic noir (Hill & Steemers, 2011; Weissmann, 2009). This fits well with a historical lesson: even if US products have become hugely popular in Europe, there have been continued demand for domestic services and products, and willingness to use public funding to sustain quality productions.[7]

The second context is the *public service media context*; Norway belongs to the group of countries constituting the heartland of public service broadcasting, along with Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Japan (McKinsey, 2004; Mendel, 2000; Moe & Syvertsen, 2009). The public service tradition in these countries is very different from the US system of public broadcasting which is much more marginal and poorly funded (Freedman, 2008). At each point of transition, the public service broadcasting institutions have lost audiences and key content to competitors, and there are constant discussions over the viability of public funding (Born, 2003; Donders & Pauwels, 2008; Levy, 1999). In spite of this on-going debate, however, the public service media companies have retained a stronger position than most observers expected, and have sustained popularity and legitimacy (Lowe & Martin, 2014; Moe, 2009; Syvertsen, 2008; Syvertsen, Enli,

[6] See, for example, Ibarra, Nowak and Kuhn (2015) on public service television and Donders et al. (2013) for private television.

[7] In the US only a couple of dollars per capita are spent on public media whereas spending in Northern Europe are above fifty or even hundred dollars per capita (Kenyon, 2014, p. 387)

Moe, & Mjøs, 2014). The attempts to restrict public service on the European level have not been successful (Donders, 2013), instead, much of the future of public service media continue to be determined nationally (Moe, 2007, p. 52). In the countries representing the heartland of public service broadcasting, the institutions' future continues to be one of the most salient issues in cultural debates, and a variety of stakeholders are engaged to preserve what they see as their crucial characteristics. Two issues are indicative of the type of support the institutions are enjoying: the legitimacy of the business model and the degree to which they are allowed to develop online services in new markets. On both counts the Norwegian conditions are favourable for public broadcasters: in 2015, 70% said they were getting value for money by paying the fee (Myhre, 2015) and the conservative/right-wing government in 2015 decided to retain the licence fee for the time being (Kulturdepartementet, 2015). Legislation has also allowed the public media company to expand onto digital and online platforms in order to sustain a competitive position (Bulck & Donders, 2014; Moe, 2009).

In addition to the European and public service context, Norway belongs to the Nordic region of *welfare states*. Also the implications of this context point in different directions. On the one hand, Nordic welfare states have attached great importance on media as a vehicle to change society. Syvertsen et al. (2014) labels the media policy construction in the Nordic countries "the media welfare state" and argues that national media, and in particular television, continue to be treated as important welfare state institutions: universally available, with social purposes and a stated mission to facilitate integration, democratic dialogue and national culture. Like other fundamental aspects of the welfare state, there has been political consensus surrounding central media policy aims, and broad support for the idea that the state is obliged to uphold infrastructure to facilitate "an enlightened public conversation"[8] (see also Kulturdepartementet, 2015, p. 7). On the other hand, this also implies that there is consensus about the need for public institutions and policies to change and adapt, not least to become more innovative in terms of a digital future (Moe, 2009). Nordic welfare states are not just characterised by a high level of state regulation, they are also known for economic wealth and adaptability, and high take-up of new services such as online news, online shopping, social media, and digital streaming services (Syvertsen et al., 2014). The take-up of *Netflix* in Norway is a telling example; since its launch in October 2012 the service grew rapidly to reach 30% of all households in 2015 making Norway a top user of the streaming service (Fossbakken, 2015). Consequently, the context of a (wealthy) Nordic media welfare state implies an interesting combination of enabling and constraining factors: both increased competition for traditional television institutions and continuing support for their cultural and political functions.

The fourth context is that of *media ecosystems.* The concept of media ecosystem is used in many different ways, pointing to the increasing interdependence of different media and technologies and how developments in one sector affect others (Colapinto, 2010; Hiler, 2002; Lasica, 2003). In this context, the concept of ecosystem implies a perspective where existing national television companies are not judged solely on their own merits, but seen as vehicles to regulate and obtain results across the media market. A study of private-public partnership in another small TV market, that of Flanders (part of Belgium) describe the regulatory approach to television as a strategic "ecosystem approach" in which policy-makers encourage collaboration between private and public institutions (Raats & Pauwels, 2013).[9] In this approach, public and private media are not seen as opposites competing with each other, but as elements in a common system, complementing each other, and the role of public service media are explicitly defined as that of a standard setter for the whole industry. Public media companies are expected to raise quality and diversity overall, as well as serving as a "digital locomotive"; spearheading the transition to information societies and lead in innovation and risk-taking (Aslama & Syvertsen, 2007). Furthermore, public service companies are increasingly obligated to decrease their competitive stance vs other operators; instead of competing head-on with private television and new media, they should cooperate and act as facilitators. The Norwegian Government's recent white paper on public service broadcasting suggests that the Norwegian broadcasting corporation (NRK) should have "an independent responsibility for media pluralism" (Kulturdepartementet, 2015). The 'ecosystem' approach is a response to strong criticism that public media institutions have become too privileged and a threat to private actors, and is part of an effort to find new legitimation for public service media. At the same time, the approach has the potential of making existing television institutions more outward-looking as the focus is moved to the public broadcasters' sur-

[8] This expectation is to some degree strengthened in recent decades. In 2004, the Norwegian constitutions' paragraph on free speech (para. 100) was amended obliging the state to facilitate infrastructure to secure "an enlightened public conversation" (Sønneland, n.d.), and this obligation was used in 2015 to justify the current conservative-right wing government's continuing support for publicly funded media (Kulturdepartementet, 2015).

[9] This type of public-private cooperation is also described within the context of "the media welfare state", but is discussed under this heading since it also has much to do with market size and certain cooperative traditions (Syvertsen et al., 2014).

rounding stakeholders, such as cultural actors and private media companies (Raats & Pauwels, 2013, p. 205).

In this part we have taken Norway as a case and discussed four contexts that each illustrates the continuing importance of political and cultural factors for how television is defined and understood. These types of contexts are important for filtering and modifying the general challenges in each national case, and they are crucial for enabling and constraining the means that existing television companies can employ to design strategies for the future.

5. Strategic Responses of National Broadcasters

Convergence, as well as the specific challenges related to digital intermediaries, has significant impact on the conditions for existing television companies. Most notably, the future is becoming less predictable for television and it has become more difficult for executives to invest in long-term perspectives (Küng, 2015). Television companies are still expected serve the public sphere as well as competing in the market; in the past as well as in the present this duality has proved a difficult balancing act. We turn now to the third research question: 3) How do traditional television institutions in Norway—public service as well as private—respond to the general and specific challenges and with what impact?

First, a common strategy for both public and private TV companies is to *expand onto new platforms to combat audience fragmentation and secure new sources of revenue.* Historically, television companies have been afraid of losing out to competitors if they are cut off from new platforms, and have embraced digital television as well as mobile and online services (Enli, 2008; Levy, 1999; McQuail & Siune, 1998; Moe, 2009). More recently, Norwegian television companies have adapted strategies used by the digital intermediaries, such as releasing drama series for online streaming before aired on broadcast TV, releasing an entire season in one bulk, rather than weekly episodes, launching applications for Apple-TV, iPhone, and Android, and filming in mobile phone friendly format (Jerijervi, 2015). The established broadcasters have also become increasingly aware of the marketing effect of social media, using Facebook, as well as Instagram and Snapchat, as new platforms for distribution of content (Tolonen et al., 2015). The broadcasters typically use digital platforms to create a universe to support the brand and to point users from television programs to mobile and online services, and back to television. In NRK vocabulary, this strategy is termed "keeping them and moving them" (Ihlebæk et al., 2013, p. 478). Moreover, TV companies increasingly facilitate activities on a second screen, and Twitter is particularly used as a "backchannel" for user- debates while watching sports, news events, drama series or entertainment shows (Bruns, Moe, Burgess, & Burgess, 2015). This has placed traditional broadcasters in a strategically important position, not only as a provider of audio-visual content, but as a point of reference in social media debates and online environments. A study of Twitter hashtags for example found that the established broadcasters and their flagship news programmes are the most used hashtags in Norwegian Twitter debates (Enli & Simonsen, 2016).

Second, the public and private companies are increasingly keen to *cooperate and build alliances in order to protect content and common interests.* In particular, there is increased cooperation between the public broadcaster *NRK* and the private broadcaster *TV 2*, the second national broadcaster with some public service obligations. As a response to the high costs of sports rights and the small size of the Norwegian TV-market, the two companies joined forces to buy *FIFA World Cup* (2014), and divided the matches between them. The CEO's of the two companies have also proclaimed their intention to cooperate more strategically in the future, regretting in an interview that they had been too busy competing against each other for rights and distribution to discover that "Netflix was moving straight into their markets grabbing 500,000 customers" (Aune, 2015, authors' translation) Reflecting current technological convergence, TV companies also seek partnership across media sectors, such as when the Norwegian commercial channel *TvNorge*[10] recently collaborated with the newspaper *VG* to acquire the rights to the national football league. Another example which reflects the new potential for cooperation is the partnership between *Netflix* and the public broadcaster *NRK* in the production of the series *Lilyhammer.* Such cross-sector partnership are also challenging, however; the public broadcaster and the US-based technology company turned out to have diverging interests regarding both the storyline and the distribution model (Sundet, 2016). The conflicts reflected a culture crash between a global commercial player and a national player with obligations to produce content reflecting Norwegian culture and identity. In spite of such challenges, both the national and the international co-production has expanded and increased the relevance of the traditional broadcasters in online and mobile environments.

Third, both public and private broadcasters aim for a *sustained flow by strategic scheduling, and use national content to reclaim the role as a national cultural arena.* In spite of the technical possibility of time-shifting and non-linear viewing, the majority of TV viewing in Norway, and internationally, is still linear. In contrast to the media hype about new intermediaries replacing TV the statistical evidence points towards continuity: "It is an underestimated fact that TV viewing has actually in-

[10] *TvNorge* owned by *Discovery* since 2012, continues to pull in money. *Turnover* increased with 10% in stagnating market in 2014. Apart from main channel *TvNorge*, all channels (*Max*, *Fem* and *Discovery*) licenced in UK with British rules.

creased in the last decade" (Tolonen et al., 2015, p. 7). In 2015, linear television accounted for a major share of the average daily viewing time, even among young people, by far exceeding streaming and recorded watching. Moreover, the role of the PBS channels has remained noticeably strong in light of recent market changes; in line with their Scandinavian counterparts, Swedish SVT and Danish DR, the NRK is popular and practically everyone uses public broadcasting or their digital services, most on a daily basis.[11] Likewise, the main commercial channels in Norway *TV 2*, *TvNorge,* and *TV3* have largely retained their market positions in spite of increased competition from global players.

This sustainability can be explained by a combination of continuity and change; the broadcasters have not abandoned elementary flow strategies, meaning that they schedule popular lead-in programme early in the evening and seek to build on their popularity throughout the evening. The relationship between a variety of niche channels and the main channels have made the flow more complex, as schedulers lead viewers in vertical and horizontal directions across the company's channels. With the increase in niche channels as well as new digital and mobile platforms, the role of the main channels has become more distinct and might best be described as "the mother ship"; research interviews with producers in Norwegian television show that the web units depend heavily on the TV platform to draw a mass audience and thereby generate interest in the digital and interactive features (Ihlebæk et al., 2013, pp. 475-483). The established broadcasters' main window to the audience is their main channels as this will in turn drive traffic also to their other channels, and to their new digital platforms. The programmes that are most often scheduled in the attractive prime time slots on the main channels are original productions such as high-cost drama series, which provides the public and private TV companies with an advantage in the competition from the global digital intermediaries. In sum, the broadcasters' strategies have impacted on their market shares, and reduced their vulnerability in the new convergent market for audio-visual content.

6. Conclusion

The main aim of this article is to discuss the future of television in light of recent changes, and in particular to what degree the impact of convergence and digital intermediaries is a game-changer for traditional television. Taking Norway as an example, we analyse TV as a medium, industry and political and cultural institution in relation to technological and market changes. We particularly emphasised the cultural contexts of Norwegian television; the European policy framework, the national arrangement of PSB, the Media Welfare State and characteristics of the Nordic region and the ecosystem approach in which public and private television companies collaborate. Moreover, we analysed the responses from traditional private and public broadcasters to technological changes and market changes related to new global players.

An overarching finding in the analysis is that "the death of television" rhetoric is not supported by empirical evidence, and the rumours about TVs death is thus exaggerated. Even though the TV industry is currently undergoing significant changes, not least as a response to convergence and new digital intermediaries, these changes do not represent the full picture. In tandem with change and renewal, there is stability and continuity. Traditional TV is still an economic, cultural, and social important medium, and as pinpointed by Lotz (2014, p. 170) television remains an incredible profitable industry, yet not as profitable as before.

We have demonstrated that television has also been in transition in previous phases, such as when the monopoly was demolished, when generalist channels were fragmented into niche channels, and when the user-generated audio-visual service *YouTube* was launched. In light of the importance of television, both as an economic factor in the cultural industry and as a constitutive cultural element, it is fairly logic that television should be in transition. The fact that there are many stakeholders in television, both politically and culturally, and that they will impact on its development in various directions might explain why TV is not stable, but in more or less constant flux. The new turns television has taken during each phase of transition underlines TV's ability to adjust to change, and might even demonstrate the strength, sustainability and success of TV as a medium.

In turn, we found that the development of television is not linear and universal across various cultural contexts; TV is formed not only by technological and economic factors, but also by political, historical, and cultural factors. A reason for the dominance of the "end of television paradigm" is that the US context is often taken as universal, or as argued by Pertierra & Turner (2013), the "relative disinterest in acknowledging the diverse ways in which television has developed in various parts of the world" (p. 11). Moreover, Pertierra & Turner (2013, p. 8) explicitly criticise what they call the "mythology of the disappearing state". This article demonstrates that there are diverse approaches to television across different political systems, and that interventions by the state, such as in the Nordic region, impacts on the developments of television to a degree that makes it more useful to talk about several cultural models for television, than to subscribe to one form of technologically-determinist speculation.

[11] Recent audience research shows that more than 90% of the population tune into the respective public service broadcasting services in Norway (NRK), Denmark (DR), and Sweden (SVT) over the course of a week (see Syvertsen et al., 2014).

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Digital Media Platforms and the Use of TV Content: Binge Watching and Video-on-Demand in Germany

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Abstract
The advancing digitalization and media convergence demands TV broadcasting companies to adjust their content to various platforms and distribution channels. The internet, as convergent carrier medium, is increasingly taking on a central role for additional media. Classical linear TV is still important, but for some audiences it has been developing from a primary medium to a secondary medium. Owing to the growing melding of classical-linear TV contents with online offerings (e.g. video-on-demand platforms or Web–TV), a great dynamic can be seen which has triggered numerous discussions about the future of TV for some time now. This article will summarize the results of two different audience studies. Film and television shows are meanwhile distributed online via Video-on-Demand platforms such as Netflix or Amazon Prime Video. The first audience study has dealt with the use of VoD-platforms in Germany investigating user rituals, user motivation to watch films and TV shows on these platforms, and the meaning of VoD in everyday life. Most of the participants in this study reported that they mainly watch TV drama series at Netflix or Amazon Prime. Therefore, the second audience study focused the online use of television drama series of individuals and couples elaborating the phenomenon of binge watching. In relating the audience practice to the new structures of the television market the article will shed light on the future of television.

Keywords
audiences; binge watching; convergence; digitalization; television, television culture; television series; video-on-demand

Issue
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1. Introduction

Recently there has been a spate of declarations that the end of television, usually with the qualifier "as we know it", is imminent. The medium is perceived as an obsolete model whose future is anything but certain. At the same time, however, the number of television channels has grown considerably in most Western countries, including Denmark, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the US. We are said to be living in the "multichannel age" (D'Arma, 2010). There is more and more television, and television is still a contemporary technology and form of culture (Lotz, 2007; Williams, 1974). In the autumn of 2009, Henry Jenkins posed the critical question in a blog: "In a social networking world, what's the future of TV?" (Jenkins, 2009). The same year, Elihu Katz (2009) gave a very general answer to the question "The End of Television?" by pointing out that television had been undergoing institutional change from its beginnings, and moreover, the values and the everyday lives of its audience had also changed. Television has always been a medium in transition, subject to constant transformation. Beginning in the mid–1990s, digitalization led to a transformation of television's technology, distribution, economics, media policy and use. "Digitalization allowed interoperability between television and other technologies that came to define the contemporary

media world. Convergence between television and computers was a key outcome of interoperability" (Lotzl, 2009, p. 53). The phenomenon of convergence has been described variously (cf. Bruhn Jensen, 2010; Dwyer, 2010; Jenkins, 2006; Keane, 2007; Murdock, 2000). As Fagerjord and Storsul (2007) have found, the term convergence is used as a "rhetorical tool" to describe significant changes in the media environment that were set in motion by digitalization. They write: "The current media developments are diverse. What we see are several parallel developments resulting in a higher level of complexity, with new alignments of networks, terminals, services and markets" (Fagerjord & Storsul, 2007, p. 27). Convergence is used as a simple metaphor to refer to these complex changes. We can surmise, however, that we in the 21st century are living in convergent media environments in which the conventional media (film, television, print) are fusing with the telecommunications and IT industry, both in their technology, economics and aesthetics and at the user level. In view of these developments, Tay and Turner (2010, p. 44) found, "The special question for television studies in the digital era is whether the advent of digital technology has categorically changed the social practice of watching television." For television in the "post-network era" (Lotz, 2007) is diversifying. Television content is no longer receivable only linearly by means of the conventional television set, but can now be used on different platforms and technical devices. The present article collates the findings of two empirical studies dealing with this changed use of television. One of the studies examined the use of video-on-demand in general in Germany; the other focused specifically on the phenomenon of "binge watching" of television series. The findings will be integrated in general tendencies of the development of digital television, and will show that television is a central element of the future of digital media.

2. Video-on-Demand in Germany

The market for video-on-demand (VoD) in Germany is growing at an increasing rate. The results of the 2015 ARD/ZDF online study show a clear trend in the younger target group. Among all Internet users, 65% of Germans of all ages watched moving pictures over the Internet at least occasionally in 2015 (Kupferschmitt, 2015, p. 383), and 20% watched moving images online every day. But among 14 to 29-year-old Germans who are online, 98% watch moving pictures on the Internet at least occasionally (ibid., p. 385). Twenty-eight per cent of the young target group do so using video-streaming services such as Netflix and Amazon Prime. Access to VoD among online users overall, whether in the form of subscriptions (S-VoD) or individual transactions (T-VoD), is around a low four percent, however (Zubayr & Gerhard, 2015, p. 110). Thus the digital use of moving images still makes up a small portion of the time devoted to media use. The trend towards video-on-demand use is expected to grow, however, and mainly among the young target group.

The study described here, conducted in 2014 by Babelsberg Film University, presents a user-oriented survey of the VoD providers available in Germany and their use (Nooke, Jørgensen, & Mikos, 2015). In the analysis, which is mentioned here only briefly, the offerings considered are those Electronic Sell-Through (EST), S-VoD and T-VoD providers in the German-speaking countries which are independent of broadcasters' linear programming and act as paid, curated portals for the distribution of professionally produced content. These criteria exclude TV networks' media libraries and portals with user-generated content such as YouTube, for example. (If such portals are included, according to a study of video portals in Europe by the European Commission [quoted in Puffer, 2015, p. 24], there are a total of 171 video portals in Germany.) Under the restrictive definition, there are 22 VoD providers, of which ten were selected as relevant in the market and representative of the various niches for a more detailed examination of their content portfolios and user-friendliness.

The analysis shows that the German VoD market is highly diverse and fragmented due to a variety of business models. For example, there are providers which have specialized in the S-VoD delivery model (Netflix, Watchever); others which support only one-time access by pay-per-view or digital purchase (iTunes, Sony Entertainment Network); and others still which combine all three business models (maxdome, Amazon Prime Instant Video). Nonetheless, the providers can be classified, in an analogy with the conventional linear TV environment, as ten full-content portals and twelve special-interest portals. The latter are characterized by a clear thematic focus in their content, with offerings limited to between 100 and 1,500 titles. This is an advantage in terms of user-friendliness, since viewers can orient themselves more easily in the simpler portal structure, and do not have to explore the portal by trial and error. The full-content providers offer more comprehensive, but often more confusing portfolios of up to 60,000 titles. They include mainly mainstream content and popular international productions.

In addition to the analysis of the content offerings, the researchers conducted seven group discussions with a total of 21 men and eleven women aged from 23 to 62 years. The study also incorporated four individual interviews, two with persons less than 18 years old and two with persons over 50 years old. The participants were recruited online and via word of mouth in Berlin and Potsdam. They have to fulfil the criteria of having used a VoD platform and they should belong to different age groups. The objective was to discover patterns of VoD use. The key findings of the study are summarized below.

The five big full-content providers are both the best-known portals among the respondents to the reception study and those they used most. For that reason, the following presentation of VoD use in Germany refers primarily to Amazon Prime Instant Video, iTunes, maxdome, Netflix and Watchever. The most important motivating factors for the use of VoD portals are scheduling freedom and freedom of movement and equipment. The respondents access VoD portals when they want to consume content relevant to them personally, and they appreciate the freedom to watch a new episode of their favorite series whenever they want, whether or not they are at home. A 44-year-old man explained it in the following terms: "The critical factor is of course to watch it at a time when I need it, when I can make my own schedule…and am not dependent on a program magazine or a program sequence….To me that's the big advantage of VoD". American series such as *Breaking Bad*, *Mad Men* and *House of Cards* were the proximate motivation for many users to subscribe to a VoD portal. In the long term, however, users must be satisfied with the film offerings as well as series in order to stay with a portal. Users see the absence of commercial interruptions as a clear advantage of VoD portals. Several of the respondents also valued the option of watching films and series in the original language with subtitles. Because the users still prefer a large picture and good audio and video quality, most of them use devices such as television sets or laptops for VoD. Mobile devices such as tablets and smartphones play only a marginal role in VoD use.

S-VoD portals are used differently from T-VoD portals. S-VoD portals, which permit users to watch unlimited content for a monthly fee, invite both daily use and phases of intense consumption such as binge watching. The use of T-VoD portals is more selective, since users must pay a fee for each film or series episode they watch. The VoD users surveyed described a number of different search behaviors. There are people who search for specific content, who almost always have a certain film or series title in mind when they access a VoD portal, and people who like to browse through and get ideas from the available content. Many of the respondents use the VoD portals' genre and recommendation rubrics as a sorting function. They repeatedly criticized the genre categories and the platforms' recommendation algorithms, however.

In general, users felt that the term video-on-demand or VoD was unclear. Confusion is caused by the fact that the various platforms offer T-VoD or S-VoD or a combination of the two. One 26-year-old woman, for example, said, "I have a problem distinguishing between all these video platforms: is it VoD; is it simply a film platform? What's the business model behind it?" The constantly changing market is also a source of confusion. Furthermore, users differed widely in their evaluation of the platforms' prices and value for money. Up-to-date content and the scope of the offerings were very important criteria. Pure S-VoD offerings are seen as more affordably priced. Many S-VoD portals present little current content, however, which the respondents see as a disadvantage. Many users saw T-VoD as too expensive, but as more up-to-date and offering the widest selection of content. Many of the respondents viewed a mixture of S-VoD and T-VoD as confusing and a disadvantage.

Furthermore, it would appear that VoD is not necessarily a threat to cinema and television, since the respondents evaluated it as no substitute for cinema. Cinema still offers many advantages in their view, including the big screen, very good sound and picture quality, the latest content, and technical refinements such as 3D images and Dolby sound. The respondents also view cinema as a social event. VoD is rather a supplement in several respects to linear television consumption. Yet television still offers formats that are rarely found, if at all, in VoD offerings. All kinds of shows and live broadcasts of sports and other events worldwide are watched on conventional television.

In spite of the perceived advantages of VoD, including independent scheduling and selection of content and the variety of devices on which it can be consumed, the respondents also expressed criticism and suggested improvements. Problems they mentioned often concerned the delivery infrastructure and the speed of data transfer. In all of the group discussions, VoD users complained mainly about the sometimes poor data communications performance, which causes jerky video, brief interruptions and degraded video resolution. Especially during the evenings and on Sundays when traffic is heavy, the network is often overloaded. In regard to the future of VoD in Germany, one of the respondents, a 62-year-old man, said, "I believe that how all this develops will depend heavily on the development of a good, stable Internet. That is a very important criterion." The respondents likewise complained that several portals advertise the availability of original versions and subtitles, but only provide them for individual films or series. Yet the surveyed viewers' main complaint about video-on-demand was that most portals only offer a thematically limited selection of content. They frequently mentioned their wish for a general platform offering highly up-to-date and comprehensive content for a uniform price. Many users referred to the music streaming provider Spotify as a model. According to the respondents, Spotify offers not only the desired comprehensive selection, but also solves the second major problem that still exists with VoD offerings due to licensing conflicts: the long delay before new content is available, since it must first be commercialized in other media or other countries. Film content is available immediately only on illegal platforms. Most of the respondents are well aware that this is due to the license holders' conditions, and that

the commercialization system would have to be changed overall to compete with the pirate sites.

Video-on-demand makes up only a small proportion of media use overall, but the duration of VoD consumption is steadily growing, especially in the young target group. The five major video portals, Amazon Prime Instant Video, iTunes, maxdome, Netflix and Watchever, are not only those with the largest selection of films and television series in the market, catering primarily to the main stream, but are also the best-known among the users. The general public so far has little knowledge of the smaller video portals, which primarily serve special interests such as children's films, animé or art-house films. Viewers find the market confusing. Those who are looking for certain films or series have to consult several providers to find what they want. Furthermore, most of the content offered is available only for a limited time due to the licenses that the video portals obtain from the distributors. Hence it is not surprising that the viewers surveyed wanted a single, general platform where they can find everything. Poor Internet access is also an obstacle to the expansion of the video-on-demand market in some places. No one wants to watch films with jerking motion or unintelligible sound.

Nonetheless, VoD portals offer several advantages for viewers. For a relatively affordable subscription price, users of the big portals have access to a huge selection of content. Viewers appreciate being able to watch their films and series without regard to a programming schedule (as in linear television), and can choose the content themselves. These results of the present study corroborate those of other investigations: "scheduling flexibility and independence are identified as the most important motives for VoD consumption" (Puffer, 2015, p. 26). At the same time, the respondents appreciated the advantages of technical availability: most VoD portals can be used not only with a stationary or laptop computer, but also with hybrid or smart TVs, game consoles, smart phones and tablets. Mobile access to the content is perceived as a great advantage.

Video-on-demand does not compete with conventional television, but supplements it. The platforms allow users to watch films and television series, which are otherwise available only on broadcast television or on DVD or Blu-ray, without regard to programs and schedules. In the medium term, the classic home entertainment market will be conquered mainly by S-VoD, supplanting physical media such as DVD and Blu-ray. In Scandinavia and other European countries where S-VoD portals such as Netflix are well represented, sales of physical media have declined drastically, by almost 40% in Norway, almost 20% in Denmark, France and Great Britain, and almost ten percent in Switzerland; only in Germany the market for physical media grew in 2013 by almost 5% (Keen, 2014). While the market share of portals financed by advertising and T-VoD portals is slowly declining, the future appears to be in the S-VoD sector: video portals which offer subscribers a broad selection are increasingly conquering the market. To date, however, the business is not yet profitable in Germany. In the long run, only large portals such as Netflix or Amazon Prime Instant Video will prevail, since they can afford to operate for a number of years before breaking even. The portal Watchever, owned by Universal, got to the break even at the end of 2015, after two years in which they had to face losses of up to 30 million Euro per quarter.

3. Binge Watching of Television Series Online

The term "binge watching" is a metaphor to describe an intensive form of consumption of television series. There is no precise definition. Charlotte Brunsdon (2010, p. 65) calls it "domestic viewing of multiple episodes sequentially." In general we can say that binge watching occurs when a viewer watches two or more episodes of a series in one session. Binge watching is a form of "media marathoning", which places emotional and cognitive demands on the viewers (Perks, 2015), and has its roots in home entertainment via VCR and DVD. The VoD industry has used the term "binge watching" as a marketing tool, exploiting this form of series reception as a unique selling point (Jenner, 2015; Tryon, 2015). DVD boxes of TV series had the same potential, allowing a distinction from mainstream audiences in the consumption of cult films and series (Hills, 2007). Complex narrative structures (Mittell, 2015) reinforce the distinction, since viewers can immerse themselves more deeply in the fictional worlds and so experience the "complex pleasures of narrative, in which one is caught in the contradictory desire to find out what happens next and for the story not to end" (Brunsdon, 2010, p. 66). Moreover, DVDs and VoD platforms allow the viewer to enjoy the narrative without being interrupted by advertising (Jacobs, 2011). Binge watching of television series can be seen as a form of television consumption which only became possible with certain technological and commercial developments in the media market, and at the same time was promoted by certain aesthetic and narrative developments in the television series market.

The study on binge watching at Babelsberg Film University was aimed at discerning patterns of this form of reception (Kranz, 2015a; Kranz, 2015b). The methodology involved group discussions with a total of 16 participants aged from 20 to 61 years. The participants were recruited online and via word of mouth in Berlin, Brandenburg and Saxonia. A condition for participation was that the respondents regularly watch, but not necessarily binge-watch, television series. The key findings of the study are summarized below.

All the respondents were found to have indulged in

intensive consumption of series at least once. Some of the series viewers had watched whole seasons of series in the space of a few weeks or even days. The series watched in this way ranged from comedies such as *How I Met Your Mother* to dramas such as *Desperate Housewives*, *Game of Thrones* and *House of Cards*. The respondents confirmed that the complex narratives of the television series are conducive to binge watching: "That is, it really is the fascination of the story being told….What's being told and most of all how it's told" (28-year-old woman). Viewers continue watching a series because they become accustomed to it, and because they identify more strongly with the characters than with those of a film, a 33-year-old woman remarks. A 53-year-old woman adds, "And of course the series are so attractive, *Game of Thrones* for example just as much as *Arne Dahl*, or *Borgen*, because of the stories they tell." The development of the characters is an important part of the narrative: "Yes, the character development is shown in so much more detail. I mean, it's like a good film, but one that runs 12 hours, or even 40 hours. *The Sopranos* is a very good example of a good dramatic series in which the characters develop from the beginning over six seasons in which everything kind of fits together. That was in *Breaking Bad* too; I thought that was quite good too, the way it…yeah, actually there is only one way it can end. That…Walter sooner or later dies, of whatever cause, cancer or drugs. And still you want to know how it happens," said a 33-year-old man. The same respondent added that the complex narrative forms and the development of the heroes of the series make watching more intensive: "I mean, the whole feeling that you build up over such a long time, and so much suspense is sustained for you, that you are completely 'invested'. Emotionally, in the good and the bad things, so that if your favorite character dies, which was the case with *Game of Thrones* for example." Intensive watching of complex television series requires a high degree of emotional and cognitive participation on the part of the viewers. The public discussion of the new, complex television series, which are considered "quality TV", is one reason for intensive series consumption: "Because these new, good series, people talk about them a lot, and you have an exchange about them with people, that's another reason I feel like watching them. I want to watch *The Wire* too sometime because people always mention it. So I just want to see it. I'm actually interested in exploring this genre of the new quality series and kind of catching up" (32-year-old woman).

But the viewers try to integrate intensive series watching in their everyday lives. Most of them find the time to watch on weekends. During the week, other activities take priority. A 28-year-old woman reflects on the fact that her professional life leaves her less time to watch series: "Well, in any case I had a lot of time to see a great number of series, and films too. And that happened, on a very large scale. That is, that I really consumed a great deal in a very short time, both on television and on the Internet…and now, as a working person so to speak, tied to getting up early, to a personal life in which I now live together with someone else, where I simply don't have the time for it any more…but sometimes I wish there were no other obligations and I could just watch episodes for four hours at a time. But unfortunately it's out of the question, both for personal and for professional reasons." Binge watching has to be adapted to the viewer's personal circumstances.

Viewers whose professional obligations do not allow intensive watching of series every evening find time primarily on weekends. Binge watching is organized as a kind of personal leisure-time event, sometimes as a social event in a group of friends, or with the viewer's partner, although viewers sometimes binge alone. A 61-year-old man finds he cannot watch together with his wife because theirs is a long-distance relationship. Consequently, when one of the couple discovers a new series, he or she watches it alone and then give the DVD to other: "For example, she watched *Boardwalk Empire* first and then gave it to me…then she bought the DVD and then I watch it during the week so to speak, or vice versa, because once I lent her *The Borgias* for example." When they get together on the weekend, they watch "four to five" episodes in a row. In most couples, the partners watch both alone and together. A 25-year-old woman watched *True Detective* together with her partner, but prefers to watch comedy series such as *Modern Family* alone: "When I watch alone, it's more a matter of boredom, and I have time on my hands. And when we watch together, it's before bedtime, and then we usually watch just one episode, sometimes two." A problem arises for series fans when one partner is not interested in series, or is interested in different series. Then they plan to watch certain series that are currently the subject of public discussion together. Two of the participating women named series such as *Breaking Bad* and *Game of Thrones* as a means of arranging joint watching with their partners. When interests diverge, it is difficult for the respondents to integrate series and binge watching in their relationship. A 28-year-old woman commented, "The question is what he wants to see. And he has *Breaking Bad*, and all right, then I bow to him so that we can watch a series at all. But he's not at all interested in these series like *Revenge* and *Under the Dome* and so on. So I have to watch that when he's doing something else. Then I have time, and then I also watch because I have the time: 'Oh my God, now I can watch five episodes in a row.' And then I watch it. So, partnership, and…we don't live together yet, but something like it, in any case it's another big change." A separation can also change the viewers' use of series. When a partner with whom the viewer used to watch

series together moves out, there's something missing. A woman and a man, both 33 years old, found their series consumption changed after their separation. While she watches alone still more intensively, he now watches with friends. The examples indicate that series consumption is a social phenomenon. People who watch alone have a need to communicate with friends about the series they have seen. Couples integrate their series consumption in their everyday rituals. Friends plan to watch series as an evening event, mostly on weekends.

Binge watching of television series is a cultural practice that viewers integrate in their everyday lives and adapt to their personal circumstances. The social conditions of their lives limit their consumption of series as both work and partners and children demand a share of their time. When personal circumstances change, series consumption changes too. In addition to DVDs, the new VoD platforms make intensive consumption possible by freeing the content from the fixed programming structure of linear television networks. Complex television series also lend themselves to binge watching since they require more intensive and attentive reception.

4. Conclusion: Binge Watching, VoD and the Future of Television

Digitalization has not only changed the marked for audio-visual media, leading to the increasing importance of video portals, but has also changed the audience's behavior. Although conventional television is still dominant, more and more viewers use mobile devices to watch films and television series asynchronously and autonomously. Their changed use habits go hand in hand with new offerings that invite intensive reception. Video-on-demand use and binge watching are examples that illustrate a trend from mass communications to massive personalization (Bolin, 2014). Video-on-demand platforms are the latest form of time-shifting technologies that began with the VCR. The large offer of the platforms allows consumers to individualize their consumption practice. They integrate the new practices in their everyday routines, and sometimes they celebrate the consumption of television series as social event. The freedom of the traditional program schedule of classical linear television is the most important motive for audiences to use VoD platforms. These platforms such as Netflix collect data on their users and use them to produce popular series such as *House of Cards*, and at the same time to present their users a personalized selection of content. The users in our study repeatedly criticized the platforms recommendation algorithms and they were really unsatisfied with the genre categories that the platform uses to classify their offer.

In the "on-demand culture" (Tryon, 2013), users can consume all kinds of audiovisual content at any time, not only at home, but wherever they go with their mobile devices. Such individualized use is no longer oriented after the conventional, linear programming structures of broadcast television, and leads to a fragmentation of the audience, is connected with the fragmentation of content offerings into increasing numbers of television channels and growing numbers of video portals, such as YouTube, and VoD platforms, such as Netflix and Amazon Prime. Furthermore, more and more conventional television broadcasters and cable networks are going online, offering their content over the Internet, as for example, HBO is doing with HBO NOW. Other platforms are now looking for the "flow" associated with linear television (Williams, 1974) to hold viewers. Two current trends can be observed: First, VoD platforms put whole seasons of newly produced television series online, encouraging consumers to binge-watch them and so access the platform longer. Second, more and more television series are becoming centers of transmedia extension (Evans, 2011) to encourage consumer loyalty to the series as a single brand on all available platforms. The first trend is a change in production practice, since all episodes of a season have to be finished at once; it is no longer possible to produce the later episodes when the first are already being distributed, as was customary in broadcast television. The aesthetics of the serial narrative are also changing, since the option of watching episodes in rapid succession undermines the effect of cliffhangers and recaps. Yet VoD platforms are a form of television, since all platforms focus their marketing campaigns on the production of new drama and comedy series—the classic forms of television shows, and since most of their customers are looking for television series like the participants in our study. Even if consumers watch films at the platforms they do not evaluate it as a substitute for cinema. For the participants in our study cinema still offer many advantages, including the big screen, fantastic quality of sound and picture, and the latest content. VoD platforms as home entertainment and small screen practice do not compete with the big screen experience of the movie theaters. The cultural practice of cinema going is not substituted by home entertainment. Home technologies such as VCR, DVD, and VoD platforms and their use complement the older practice of cinema going.

The fascination of television stems from the viewer's active participation in the production of meaning; that is what makes the symbolic material of television possible. Yet television continues to develop; it has always been and still is a medium in transition (Spigel, 2004). It is constantly changing. In the digital era, television is able to distribute its content by more paths than before, and can reach the audience in different and better ways. The participants in our study use television content mainly on TV screens and laptops, sel-

dom on tablets. Meanwhile the genres and formats have not changed very much. The new digital distribution paths are accompanied by a boom in television series and by new forms of marketing of show formats in connection with social media activities. As the results of our study on binge watching have shown, the narrative complexity and the ambiguous characters of Quality TV series drag audiences into the immersive experience of binge watching. Intensive watching of complex television series requires a high degree of emotional and cognitive participation on the part of the audiences. In this respect the results of our study coincide with the study of Perks (2015) in which the author described the affective and cognitive involvement of viewers during media marathoning.

The greatest challenge to the users will be to find their way around in the huge selection of available channels and platforms. For in the digital era, "First, media content and services are proliferating at such a rapid rate that the volume of material is essentially unlimited. Second, media, both old and new, are increasingly available on demand via fully integrated digital networks that allow users to move easily from one thing to the next. Third, the total supply of human attention available to consume those offerings has an upper bound. The widening gap between limitless media and limited attention makes it a challenge for anything to attract an audience" (Webster, 2014, p. 4). As our study shows audiences of VoD platforms are very critically not only about search functions and recommendation algorithms but also about poor data transfer and confusion of the seemingly indefinite offer of the platforms. The participants highlighted the music streaming service Spotify as a model for an excellent online offer. Spotify serves as horizon of expectations for VoD platforms. Users want a convenient service that is easy to handle and has satisfying recommendation algorithms. Consumers need navigational aids to find their shows and to discover new ones. To generate attention among consumers, the operators of platforms and producers of content must increasingly invest in program advertising and marketing, and use channels such as social networks to position themselves in the "marketplace of attention" (Webster, 2014).

The viewers will integrate the brave new television world in their everyday lives just as they did the old. Gauntlett and Hill (1999) have shown how users integrate new technologies into their everyday life. In the chapter "Video and Technology in the Home" they summarize: "More common and domestic concerns about new technologies and services were based around three key concerns—cost, aesthetics and available time…" (Gauntlett & Hill, 1999, p. 171). This is still true for the respondents in our study. Whereas cost and aesthetic were important concerns about VoD platforms, aesthetic and available time were important concerns about binge watching. As the circumstances of their lives permit, they will develop individual patterns of media use, adapting the use of television content on the various platforms to their equally various life situations. The option of mobile use increases the time spent with television content. Television will not disappear: it will only become available on all existing screens—and so become more present and more important. Nevertheless, it will remain what it always was: a technology and a cultural form (Williams, 1974). The technology has changed, and the cultural practices of consumption have become more diverse, but the consumers are still trying to integrate the use of television series and television shows in their everyday lives and adapt it to their circumstances.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

The End of the Television Archive as We Know It? The National Archive as an Agent of Historical Knowledge in the Convergence Era

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Abstract
Professionals in the television industry are working towards a certain future—rather than end—for the medium based on multi-platform storytelling, as well as multiple screens, distribution channels and streaming platforms. They do so rooted in institutional frameworks where traditional conceptualizations of television still persist. In this context, we reflect on the role of the national television archive as an agent of historical knowledge in the convergence era. Contextualisation and infrastructure function as important preconditions for users of archives to find their way through the enormous amounts of audio-visual material. Specifically, we consider the case of the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision, taking a critical stance towards the archive's practices of contextualisation and preservation of audio-visual footage in the convergence era. To do so, this article considers the impact of online circulation, contextualisation and preservation of audio-visual materials in relation to, first, how media policy complicates the re-use of material, and second, the archive's use by television professionals and media researchers. This article reflects on the possibilities for and benefits of systematic archiving, developments in web archiving, and accessibility of production and contextual documentation of public broadcasters in the Netherlands. We do so based on an analysis of internal documentation, best practices of archive-based history programmes and their related cross-media practices, as well as media policy documentation. We consider how audio-visual archives should deal with the shift towards multi-platform productions, and argue for both a more systematic archiving of production and contextual documentation in the Netherlands, and for media researchers who draw upon archival resources to show a greater awareness of an archive's history. In the digital age, even more people are part of the archive's processes of selection and aggregation, affecting how the past is preserved through audio-visual images.

Keywords
archival footage; broadcasting; convergence; cross-media; digital media; history programming; media policy; online circulation; preservation and contextualization practices; production research documentation

Issue
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1. Introduction

Television increasingly plays an important role in present-day societies by making archival and contextual materials accessible on online platforms. Televisual practices that re-use archival footage also connect users with the past and provide necessary contextual frameworks through cross-media and transmedia storytelling (Hagedoorn, 2016, p. 168). This is especially due to improvements in the digitisation of audio-visual

archival collections, a development in the digital era of which the Netherlands is an important frontrunner (Consortium Beelden voor de Toekomst, 2015). Many hours of audio-visual material have been digitised in the Netherlands since 2007 thanks to a government-financed programme called *Images for the Future* (http://www.beeldenvoordetoekomst.nl). As a result, the access to film and television programmes from the past has increased immensely, offering more opportunities for re-use. In this process described as the archival turn (De Leeuw, 2011, p. 11), infrastructure and contextualisation function as important preconditions for users of archives to find their way through the enormous amounts of audio-visual material. Such users include television programme makers, media professionals and academic researchers.

At present, the 'end of' television is often predicted, particularly for broadcast television. Creators and policy makers are working towards a certain future—rather than end—for the medium based on multi-platform storytelling, multiple screens, distribution channels and streaming platforms, but do so rooted in national and institutional contexts where broadcasting and traditional conceptualizations of the medium still persist. In this article, we reflect on the contemporary role of the national television archive as an agent (intermediary) of historical knowledge. The function of the archive used to be defined by institutionalization and distribution, but both these pillars are changing in the convergence era. More specifically, we consider the case of the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision (hereafter Sound and Vision). We take a critical stance towards its practices of contextualisation and preservation of archival footage in the era of television in transition, and reflect on the tensions of preservation, re-using archival material and the 'opening' up of archives. As a result, this article reflects on the possibilities for and benefits of systematic archiving, developments in web archiving and accessibility of production and contextual documentation of public broadcasters in the Netherlands. The studied materials entail internal documentation, best practices of archive-based history programmes and their related cross-media practices, and finally, media policy documentation.

To do so, this article considers the impact of online circulation, contextualisation and preservation of audio-visual archival materials in the Netherlands on two levels. First, we consider the discourse of media policy and how media policy complicates the re-use of material. More specifically, we reflect on the relation between new policies for online, digital circulation in the context of public service broadcasting in the Netherlands. What type of contextualisation and re-use of archival material, and its connected rights issues, is anticipated in the move beyond broadcast television? Second, we consider the discourse of television archives and their use for television professionals and media researchers. What is the discourse of the Dutch audio-visual archive in these new and converging contexts, particularly regarding the archive's role and function as a content provider? In this context, we discuss the enriching of archive-based programming through cross-media practices by means of specific case studies, in particular *Na de Bevrijding* [*After the Liberation*] (NTR, 2014). Finally, we consider the relevance of systematic archiving of production and contextual documentation, especially for television studies research and the preservation of cultural heritage in the Netherlands. In conclusion, we reflect on how audio-visual archives should deal with the shift towards multi-platform productions and whether the national archive should focus more on contextual archiving in the digital era.

2. New Policies for Online and Digital Circulation

In the Netherlands, the public broadcasters are independent in the production of their programmes. Policy changes in the 1990s increased the direct political power over budget and organisation. Coordination, budgeting, programming and innovation are the task of a general organisation called Dutch Public Broadcasting (NPO). In the past 15 years, the power of this organisation has increased. Since the early 2010s, reducing the number of broadcasters and for broadcasters to work more efficiently have been main issues for the Dutch government. Subsequently, the public broadcasters have seen increasing budget cuts from 2010 onwards. In current media policies and strategies in the Netherlands, new forms of media use, new players in a global market and new forms of distribution have urged changes in the public media. Apart from traditional public values, such as pluralism and liability of news, creative cross-media innovation is considered crucial by the government and NPO. The function and value of public service broadcasting is thus not only in dispute as result of the competition with commercial broadcasters, but also due to changes in online transmission and digitisation.

Considering the current political debate on public broadcasting in the Netherlands, many issues relate to developments in public broadcast television at the end of the 1980s and onwards. Broadcasting in the Netherlands is an institutional as well as a political matter (Wijfjes & Smulders, 1994). Initially, starting in the early 1950s, five public broadcasting organisations in the Netherlands were producing television programmes. Halfway through the 1960s, the law was changed to offer new organisations the opportunity to become a public broadcasting organisation. From the end of the 1980s onwards, technological developments in distribution through cable and the global infrastructure by satellite gave rise to commercial television channels (see for instance Hogenkamp, De Leeuw, & Wijfjes,

2012). As a result, the function and value of public broadcasting was no longer merely an ideological debate, but also an economic one.

In this context, the Dutch media policy seems to be twofold. On the one hand, there is political discourse regarding the NPO being too focused on their own programmes. This is for example reflected in the statement by Sander Dekker, the Undersecretary for the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, that 'the programming is too much of a compromise in which individual interests and administrative agreements are too dominant' (Dekker, 2014). Here, there seems to be a return to the traditional idea of the institution of public service broadcasting in the Netherlands that originated in the early 1950s. On the other hand, changes in media use are also recognised by Dekker (2014) in his policy paper:

> 'The media television, radio, newspapers and the Internet are in a dynamic period in which changes follow one another in rapid succession….It is even more important for media organizations to distinguish oneself by means of unique content, due to the increase in supply and distribution routes.'

Subsequently, attracting young generations in public media consumption is an important strategy for both the government and the NPO, because only an older audience is reached by merely traditional television viewing.

One proposal is changing the traditional structure: no longer exclusive airtime for broadcasters, but also for external production companies. This way, the NPO (2015, pp. 9, 18) hopes that new cross-media concepts and innovative content will be delivered. In his policy paper, Dekker (2014) claims that production at broadcasters is still traditional. However, there is no proof that this strategy will result in new formats, since broadcasters create programmes and concepts in collaboration with external producers. Many larger production companies are working globally or are part of an international conglomeration. Whereas the producers work commercially there seems to be a tension in the policy concerning the function of public service broadcasting and the business model of its innovative producers. It seems that regarding innovation, the policy stresses innovation in ways of storytelling or public participation, and more specifically in the main domains of public broadcasting, information and education. One could ask whether the government policies facilitate the public innovation it requires. Dekker's plans were challenged by many political parties and it was only after the proposal was adjusted that the new Media law was accepted in March 2016. Yet, the process of changing public broadcasting in the Netherlands is for a large part as described above.

Rather than a shift towards 'the end of television', we argue that in the Dutch televisual landscape a development towards the end of public service broadcasting as the specific institution that originated from the early 1950s can be observed—particularly its ideology towards how television is organised, and especially in more collaborative contexts. It is this end of public service television as a particular institution that is anticipated in media policy. The more collaborations of the type described above are achieved, the more this ideology and institutional organization of television will disappear. This also raises further questions regarding the traditional public service merit of public service broadcasting—inform, educate, entertain—in the convergence era and the extent in which public service broadcasting can be distinguished from commercial broadcasting.

In the contemporary media landscape, television programme makers do not only create content for television. Jenkins (2006, p. 2) has therefore described the convergence era as mapping a new territory:

> 'Where old and new media intersect, where grassroots and corporate media collide, where the power of the media producer and the power of the consumer interact in unpredictable ways.'

In these new and changing contexts, television creators also produce specific content to be (re-)used in online and multi-platform contexts. What type of re-use of archival material and its connected rights issues is anticipated, then, in new policies for online and digital circulation, beyond broadcast television? Although watching television is still dominant, since the 2000s, advancing technology has brought a greater demand of non-linear television viewing (Sonk & De Haan, 2015, p. 123). Both television broadcasters and archives are anticipating new types of consumer engagement, including more on-demand, more open and more participatory experiences with television content. In the Netherlands, this trend has coincided with an increased production of history and documentary programming for television, making use of cross-media and interactive forms of storytelling, and subsequently, the online and digital circulation of content that re-uses archival audio-visual footage in different ways.

The increasing budget cuts in the Dutch public broadcasting system also affect the production, online presentation and online access of programmes, as well as the presentation of contextual materials like websites and supplementary content. The focus of the new policy plan for the NPO (2015) in the period 2016–2020 concerns a more integral programming and multi-platform strategy to offer broadcasts that are in line with how audiences are expected to watch television. Consequently, only websites of programmes that are actively broadcast will be available online on the NPO website (Hagedoorn, 2016, pp. 109-111). On the 'up'

side, the broadcast material of past programmes will be moved to the Sound and Vision archive, which will become online and made available. Websites for strong brands that have considerable public value and reach a large audience—for instance the history series *Andere Tijden* [*Changing Times*] (NPS/NTR/VPRO, 2000–…)—will also be expanded and function as portals for dissemination of archival and contextual materials. In this context, institutional roles are visibly changing. Whilst broadcasters deliver on the level of production and presentation, the national archive is not only an active agent on the level of being a curator of cultural heritage and a supplier of audio-visual materials, but also on the level of presentation and performance.

As previous research (see also Hagedoorn, 2016) has shown, contextualisation practices are necessary to make online information usable. As De Leeuw (2012) has argued, the audience's understanding of selected content remains limited without a framework for interpretation. However, on the 'down' side, specific types of contextual materials, like websites of past programmes, will be discontinued in the Netherlands based on these new policies for online and digital circulation. Online and open environments also bring new challenges for the online circulation of re-used archival materials—including rights issues, privacy and ethical issues. Copyright and license fees to use audio-visual archival footage have to be obtained not only for broadcast on linear television, but also for on-demand distribution via the internet (see for instance Nuchelmans, 2014, p. 33). Another complication is that rightful claimants of programme copyrights need to be tracked down and financially compensated. With a greater emphasis on on-demand and open platforms, media policy and rights issues play an increased role in framing and conditioning what kind of programmes that re-use archival footage can be broadcast and circulated online. Furthermore, whereas Sound and Vision as the national archive for the audio-visual history of the Netherlands preserves Dutch television programmes, contextual materials such as websites and production research documentation are not preserved systematically (Hagedoorn, 2016, pp. 110-112).

Sound and Vision has been archiving context collections that were actively handed over by producers themselves. Whilst the archive is not purposely seeking out such collections for preservation, these context collections are supporting or auxiliary collections. However, production documentation of Dutch public broadcasters is not preserved structurally. Furthermore, the question is what content the broadcasters preserve by themselves, and for what purpose. For these reasons, a recent research study has called for a more systematic archiving and improved accessibility of (written) production documentation, necessary to keep a record of production processes and the business history of public broadcasters in the Netherlands (Hagedoorn, 2016, p. 31). Academic television research as well as producers and documentalists of (historical) television programmes would greatly benefit from this. This research study has also questioned how the success of narrowcasting and contextualisation practices for smaller and fragmented niche audiences is measured by television institutions, especially in the case of specialised audiences that value deepening one's knowledge and linear television viewing. In the contemporary convergence era, where content is dispersed across numerous platforms and television resembles a dynamic and hybrid repertoire, this is even more complex to evaluate (Hagedoorn, 2016, p. 105). This brings new challenges for programmes that re-use large amounts of audio-visual archival materials—such as *Changing Times* and *After the Liberation,* discussed further below—including accompanying rights issues for circulation on on-demand channels, financial compensation and other limits to material circulation online.

The strategic plans of NPO are based on a particular future vision of media production contexts and subsequently, a specific type of anticipated media use. Based on the new challenges for programmes that re-use large amounts of audio-visual archival materials—affecting the production, access and online presentation of contextual materials like websites and supplementary content as outlined above—we argue that the re-use of archival material and its connected rights issues does not seem to anticipate that future. Then, what is the impact of greater accessibility of audio-visual archival materials and changes in collection policies? What is the discourse of the Dutch national audio-visual archive in these new and converging contexts, particularly regarding the archive's role and function as a content provider?

3. The Discourse of the National Audio-Visual Archive

The creation of television archives has always been a national issue, as shown by comparisons of the archives of Sound and Vision, the British Film Institute (BFI), and the French Institut National de l'Audiovisual (INA) show (Bryant, 2010, pp. 61-62). The organisation of (public) broadcasting and legislative regulations define the function and position of an archive. From 1958 onwards, the Dutch broadcast and facilitating organisation NTS archived film material and incidentally made tele-recordings of live broadcasts. Media historians urged the government in the 1980s to improve archiving of audio-visual heritage. During the 1990s, the audio-visual archives in the Netherlands were transformed. A study commissioned by the government (Vonhoff, 1995) resulted in a merger of three audio-visual archives and the national broadcast museum in 1997. Whilst the archives all had different objectives for preservation, the broadcast archive's main focus was re-use for professionals. In an international con-

text, Sound and Vision is characterized by its mix of sources beyond the preservation of television programming.

Sound and Vision is both the company archive for the public broadcasters in the Netherlands as well as a cultural heritage institution. Similar to the medium of television, it is a nationally organised institution with a focus on national cultural production.[1] Most of the collection is considered cultural heritage. The re-use of audio-visual materials is still important, and the infrastructure offers professionals online accessibility for viewing, rights management and downloading. In 2015 approximately 125,000 downloads were counted, of which 78,000 from public broadcasters. Most of the material used was 'born digital', which means that it was produced after 2006. Increasing accessibility to archival materials in combination with the opportunities offered by online and digital platforms means that television creators are not only re-using archival material in television programmes.[2] The largest part of re-used materials are current and recent productions. The older the archival footage is, the less it is re-used.

With the introduction of a third public channel and commercial stations, the broadcast schedule increased. Subsequently, the number of programmes on Dutch television increased and the practice of archiving professionalised. Increasing accessibility also would suggest that more television programmes are using archival material. News programmes and current affairs have been traditional users of the broadcast archive, demanding quick delivery of clips. Few studies offer specific information about early re-use. An exception is Chris Vos' research on the representation of the Nazi occupation in the Netherlands. Vos calculated that in the period 1951-1990 about 3500 documentaries were produced for Dutch television, of which 893 were about Dutch history (Vos, 1995, p. 33). Many of these programmes used archival material.

With the advent of YouTube in 2005–2006, an archival database model of online media emerged. This model has gradually developed into a global media phenomena and is arguably unparalleled in media history (Snickars, 2012, p. 30). This points out the expectations of audiences about the availability of content in general and public content in particular. However, using archival materials legally for audio-visual stories is still the domain of the professional. In the digital era, especially for entertainment or infotainment programmes, a quick search by editors can rapidly create programmes which thematically construct a storyline around clips from television's past—retro television, countdown television or what Amy Holdsworth (2007) has described as 'list TV', programmes which recycle archival material composed into countdowns and framed by nostalgic commentary of celebrities or cultural commentators. According to De Leeuw (2011, p. 15), the recycling of television material can be considered as an articulation of a medium in transition. It feeds what can be called the nostalgia industry, repeatedly offering content from the past to revoke memories and keep them alive. However, archive-based history and documentary programmes such as the previously mentioned *Changing Times*[3] are quality programmes, for which (image) researchers require research time in the archive. Programmes that need research time to create a story are almost all created by public broadcasters.

Limitations in copyright mean that only a small percentage of the collection is available online, about 1500 hours and mostly non-broadcast film collections. However, the archive does offer the opportunity to a general audience to participate with open access content via the use of YouTube, the Sound and Vision website (http://in.beeldengeluid.nl) and the platform *Open Images* (http://www.openbeelden.nl/.en). With its online material, Sound and Vision has reached more than 12 million page views. A recent agreement with the Dutch public broadcasters will offer the opportunity to distribute the 'out-of-commerce' programmes by public broadcasters online within the next few years. The archive has also been involved in innovative projects in cooperation with broadcasters. This includes non-television projects like the *T-visionarium* at the International Documentary Film Festival Amsterdam in 2009 (see Figure 1). The audience could navigate interactively in a 3D space through an audio-visual collection of archive material in this installation. It was part of a cross-media project called *De Eeuw van de Stad* [*The Century of the City*] by broadcaster VPRO and the International Architecture Biennale Rotterdam (http://eeuwvandestad.nl/archives/7403).

[1] The new building of Sound and Vision opened in 2006—it is a public space as well as a living archive in which the Dutch public broadcasts are preserved. The museum that opened in 2006 was the most prominent way for public presentation of the archive. Over 10,000 hours of material could be watched in a curated way in the Sound and Vision Media Experience. The concept of the museum is renewed in 2016, with online possibilities for watching audio-visual content.

[2] For example, the archive is a partner in online platforms for education and has researched the opportunities of streaming media in higher education. With a licensing model it offered opportunities to watch part of the digitalised collection on the location of the university or school. In 2002–2004, one of the first was Davideon.nl, initiated by the University of Amsterdam (UvA), the University of Groningen (RUG) and Windesheim. The current system, Academia, will be transformed in 2016 into an open model.

[3] The topical history series *Andere Tijden* [*Changing Times*] (NPS/NTR/VPRO) started broadcasting in 2000 and has since then produced well over 500 episodes.

Figure 1. *T-visionarium*, International Documentary Film Festival Amsterdam, 2009.

Such developments do not at all signal the 'end of' linear forms of storytelling via television, but rather such forms of storytelling are opened up by the access to digitalised archival collections and are further expanded through interactive experiences for users. A specific case study in the context outlined above is *After the Liberation*, a particular example of enriching archive-based programming through cross-media practices.

4. Case Studies: *After the Liberation XL* and the Archive in the Apparatus

In 2014, public service broadcaster NTR created a seven-part television series about the first five years after World War II in the Netherlands, *After the Liberation*. The series paints a pervasive picture about this lesser known period in Dutch history, in which the recently liberated nation slowly began to recover from the chaos of war. Sound and Vision cooperated with NTR to provide a tablet-first site to expand and enrich the television series in an online context. Each episode is accompanied by an online 'XL' edition (http://www.nadebevrijding.nl). This interactive version (see Figures 2 and 3) lets visitors browse through the original archival sources by providing full access to the films, soundtracks, photos and newspaper articles used in the series, as well as source annotation—thus creating more direct connections between different archival sources and enabling the viewer to browse interactively through the different layers of the site. Traditional viewing is still dominant: between 600,000 and 850,000 viewers for an episode. In the same period, the website had about 50,000 page views of 28,000 users. Between the last episode in March 2014 and 1 January 2015, there were another 10,000 visitors with 19,000 page views.

After the Liberation XL is an example of expanding a television programme online, by offering several 'media layers' within one frame. The screen shows the episode, and while watching the programme on the left side of the screen (at specific timed intervals) information about the archival clip appears within the frame. On a time line below, decorated as a filmstrip, the original archival clips can selected and watched in their entirety. All the archival sources in *After the Liberation XL* were added manually, based on the research logs of the NTR editors. Sound and Vision was responsible for the technical development of the site, for which it cooperated with an external technical company, Videodock. The web editors of the online history site by NTR/VPRO broadcasters (http://www.npogeschiedenis.nl) selected and edited the materials on the website.

Besides contextualising and enriching *After the Liberation*, a second goal of the project was to explore the technical possibilities for Sound and Vision to develop other interactive publications. However, neither the broadcasters nor the archive has produced similar channels since. Although copyright issues and traditional production methods do limit the enthusiasm to create television programmes with an online component, the main conclusion in this project was that in order to scale the process of enriching programmes or larger parts of the archive with related sources, all elements in the enrichment chain would need to become automated. For production the budgets are cut, but online enrichment is too labour-intensive (Baltussen et al., 2014b). Subsequently, the digital collection resembles what William Uricchio (2010, p. 37) has described as the art of *selection* changing into art of *aggregation*:

'The shift underway is from the art of selection (the

broadcast and cable eras) to the art of aggregation, and the far more active reassembly of sequence. And if we complicate this by factoring in the increasing importance of cross-platform prowling, the possibilities are daunting.'

Therefore, documentalists and media researchers especially need to remain critical of the motivations behind the aggregation of digitalised, beyond mere striving for all-inclusiveness. On the other hand, we can also observe changes regarding how the role of the user, for instance the researcher-as-producer, is envisioned and transformed—and to what extent the archive is or can be 'open' to such developments.



Figure 2. *After the Liberation XL* website. Source: http://www.nadebevrijding.nl



Figure 3. *After the Liberation XL* website. Source: http://www.nadebevrijding.nl

In this context, Sound and Vision is involved in research projects like *LinkedTV* and *AXES* that develop tools for contextualization and improve access to audio-visual collections as the 'big data' they have become. However, the question rises whether broadcasters pay similar attention to online presentation and online access as to the production of linear programmes. Although the NPO policy does suggest broadcasters should do so, it does not actually describe an innovation priority and seems to struggle with the specificity of genres and relation to commercial parties involved in the media. Moreover, what will be the effect of the space that external production companies will have in the new broadcast channels? As there is no 100% budget for productions, broadcasters need to agree on the online access to the programmes.

Questioning the extent in which broadcasters pay attention to online presentation and online access is particularly an issue for archive-based programmes. For example, for *Zomergasten* [*Summer Guests*] (VPRO, 1988–…), a three hour-long interview programme in which a public person successful in his or her profession—scientists, actors, authors, politicians—selects and presents his or her favourite television evening based on previously broadcast and clips from the past (see Figure 4). The programme consists of showing clips of 5 to 10 minutes and subsequently interviewing the person about their choice for the specific clip. As a live broadcast, it is a very particular example of the 'ephemeral' character of television online: due to the copyrights of the archival clips that are shown, the public can only review the programme online for a short period of two weeks. Furthermore, the amount of research time and juridical restrictions make it a complex production. One could argue that this programme cannot be developed within the current policy due to its lack of online accessibility. Yet, it is a highly acclaimed programme that has been broadcast since 1988. *Summer Guests* also experimented with an app offering extra information or clips on a second screen in 2011 and 2012 (http://www.vpro.nl/zomergasten.html). With only a small audience of less than 1% of its total viewers (Van Teefelen, 2012), the experiment stopped in 2013 and since then *Summer Guests* has mainly delivered additional information through Twitter as a 'second screen'.

Television creators nowadays produce more content than 'just' TV, and such cross-media practices offer important opportunities for contextualisation and in-depth knowledge gathering. In the context of preservation, however, research by Lotte Belice Baltussen et al. (2014a in Hagedoorn, 2016, p. 153) has pointed towards the complexity of archiving websites with television programmes of the Dutch public broadcaster. There is a large variety of web archiving projects on an international scale, but few of those projects focus on websites of broadcasters. Due to their dynamic and audio-visual content, websites of television programmes are particularly troublesome to archive, and funds for web archiving are often lacking.

Figure 4. Screenshot from *Summer Guests*, episode from 2013 with presenter Wilfried de Jong and guest Beatrice de Graaf. Source: Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision.

Figure 5. The iconic image of Settela Steinbach from Breslauer's Westerbork film. Her name was only discovered in 1994 after thorough research by a journalist and historians of Herinneringscentrum Kamp Westerbork (Wagenaar, 1995). Source: Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision.

Here, the 'Droste-effect of archiving' also comes into play. Generally speaking, the 'Droste-effect' (the name is derived from a picture appearing within itself on the tins of Dutch cocoa powder brand Droste) refers to the effect of a *mise en abyme*, or an image appearing within itself. We use the notion 'Droste-effect of archiving' to problematize the increasing amounts of original material already being preserved in the archive, which in turn are re-used, re-contextualised and archived in television broadcasts, and in addition are made available online, usually in again a different re-contextualisation—forming a multi-platform and hybrid 'repertoire' of memory (see also Hagedoorn, 2013). This includes new forms of the re-screening of previously broadcast materials in online and on-demand contexts—for example, *The Wonder Years* (ABC, 1988–1993) being repeated and reviewed via the on-demand streaming service Netflix, but with many of the originally included songs being replaced due to licencing issues.

This 'Droste-effect of archiving' is of course also possible with traditional media. For instance, Rudolf Breslauer's Westerbork film, filmed in Spring 1944, is without a doubt an iconic document. An analysis of the productions in the Dutch national archive shows that shots from this film are commonly used in television programmes about the occupation and the Holocaust. The origin of this document, shot by a Jewish prisoner in command of the camp commander, makes it unique. However, little is known about the filming itself. A copy of the document was first in Drenthe, then subsequently at the Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies (NIOD) [Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies], then at the Filmmuseum in Amsterdam and eventually at the Netherlands Government Information Service (RVD). In the meantime, many Dutch television programmes that have reused this particular film have been archived. In 1955, a fragment of the film showing the transport from Westerbork is for instance used in the classic documentary *Nuit et Brouillard* [*Night and Fog*] by the French filmmaker Alain Resnais. The image of the young girl Settela Steinbach, looking through a crevice of the car door into the camera, has become an iconic image around the world for the persecution of Jews (see Figure 5). However, documentation on international (re-)use is not easily available in the archive.

Such examples already point to the relevance of preserving production documentation. Production documents not only help the study of the productions themselves, but may also give insight into what is stored and in what way. Another short example to further illustrate this point is the *Changing Times* episode 'Breaking News: Kennedy Assassinated!' from 17 November 2013. This episode was produced around a unique telex message about the breaking news of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy Jr. However, the actual television broadcast on the evening of November 22, 1963 had not been preserved. Whilst archive did have some film items of the international news exchange, in what way these were transmitted was also unclear. Even so, by means of preservation of the log, it eventually was made clear what had been broadcast on television that particular evening.

These dynamics all raise further questions regarding selection and interpretation: what should an archive choose to preserve, and on what criteria should such a selection be based on—ranging from quality to online migration of content. Furthermore, are archives preserving their own materials presented on the web? Subsequently, these new layers of information online as well as responses by audiences on the web are a challenge for audio-visual archives preserving broadcast materials. John Mackenzie Owen (2005) argues that preservation should also imply the dynamic patterns of use. Within the audio-visual domain, this is reflected in the previous research examples that focus on connections or links between data. A shift towards a preservation strategy on the *digital fabric of society* has only gradually started (De Leeuw, 2011, p. 16). Since 2013, Sound and Vision is archiving broadcasters' websites, programme websites and forums to add context to the archived television programmes. Lynn Spigel argues that the television archive is not only a documentation of what was broadcast, but also an interpretation and a classification (in De Leeuw, 2011, p. 16). Therefore, the archive is considered an apparatus within a discourse of audio-visual production and distribution.

In the convergent media landscape, Sound and Vision is looking to expand its preservation strategy from a focus on linear broadcasts and film productions, to include online presentations and interactive produc-

tions such as games (Nederlands Instituut voor Beeld en Geluid, 2015). Within the apparatus, the archive has become a player in co-production, connecting broadcasters and online developers, developing tools together with academic researchers to make sense of the data within its collections. It is relevant to encourage research on the archive as a construction in the media network (see also De Leeuw, 2011, pp. 19-20), since broadcasters and institutions clearly struggle with production, use and access of audio-visual programmes.

5. The Necessity of Systematic Archiving of Production and Contextual Documentation

Based on these observations, we argue that a more systematic archiving of production and contextual documentation is a necessity, especially for television studies research and the preservation of cultural heritage in the Netherlands. Research into primary sources is an important pillar of academic television research. Such research contributes to the understanding of the central role that television plays in modern society as a window on the world and as a source of social and historical information. Primary written sources, such as documentation of substantive research, director's notes and minutes, are valuable knowledge documents because they have been produced in a specific historical context during the original production.

Sound and Vision provides context collections, but production documents of the Dutch public broadcasters are not archived in a systematic manner. The collection of paper and objects has been acquired through offers from individuals or companies clearing their cellars or desks. Contemporary changes of working processes in broadcast production, for instance the digital communication of editors and researchers, point to the necessity to undertake action and acquire documentation actively. In Figure 6, we give an overview of relevant examples of production documents, drawing upon a fruitful distinction made in production studies between internal, semi-internal and publicly accessible materials and activities (see Caldwell, 2009). A systematic improvement of accessibility and archiving of such electronic and paper production documentation is necessary to understand and interpret production processes and business histories of public broadcasters in the Netherlands. Academic researchers, television makers and documentarists of (historical) television programmes would benefit from this, and for several reasons that we outline below.

Internal texts and activities:

- Minutes and memos (editorial meetings, editorial board, pitches, project status updates)
- Research files (substantive research and research history)
- Vision documents (descriptions of the principles of the programme)
- Scenarios and programme outlines
- Grant applications
- Lists (sources, literature)
- Plans (including used copies, including for instance director's notes)
- Interviews / interview transcripts
- Contracts
- E-mails (programme makers)

Semi-internal texts and activities:

- Press information folders (information to the press)
- Publications in journals
- Submitted responses from viewers (letters, e-mails)
- Content descriptions of episodes

Publicly accessible texts and activities:

- Overviews of programming (for instance information for TV guides)
- Posters
- Trailers and 'making-of' documentaries
- Programme website and additional programme content shared in online / digital environments

Figure 6. Examples of production documents for archive-based history programmes: internal, semi-internal and publicly accessible texts and activities.

First, television plays an important role in today's society as a memory practice (Hagedoorn, 2016), not only through the production and through transmission of information about the past via history programmes, but also by making materials from audio-visual archives available across several platforms for a general audience. Therefore, production documentation is essential for a richer picture of the realization of these productions and understanding the original (historical) context of audio-visual archival materials. Production documentation can elucidate and preserve the contexts in which this material has been given a particular interpretation.

Second, reporting of the historical *and* practical context of television production makes it possible to reflect on what kinds of stories about the past were considered relevant for a mass audience in a given period, and how this knowledge has been introduced and deployed in society. Reflection on the past is a necessary part of how a culture is shaped and developed: individuals use knowledge of history to further develop societies and to innovate through the handing down of ideas, customs and (political) policy. Analysing the use of the past through documentation of this practice may therefore provide insight into both the social issues that engaged people at the time as well as the impact of television on (national) cultural memory and how this has changed over time.

Third, production documents clarify how academic studies and theories are applied in practice in audio-visual productions, particularly historical television and radio programmes and their connected cross-media practices like programme websites, and therefore help us to understand how scientific research is translated into audio-visual productions. The archiving of production documentation for historical television programs is particularly urgent in the current media landscape. Television is increasingly digitised and converging with other media. This not only offers new forms of participation for users, but also brings more diverse, complex and dispersed processes for programme makers.

Furthermore, an active reflection on these production processes based on company history (both on a broadcast level and at a programme level) can contribute to transparency and more effective organizational structures. In addition, documents describing the reception and public participation can provide interpretation on the effectiveness and impact of historical television programs. This constitutes an important addition to the knowledge of production processes, which producers of history programs can draw upon to develop and optimize their productions. The archiving of production documentation for historical television programs also plays a role in the tightening contacts between broadcasters, editors and documentalists. The fact that an editor already describes programmes generates less labour-intensive work for documentalists—specialists or media managers who do not only document audio-visual materials in the archives, but also assist researchers in their search for information and materials. For re-use, again logs are essential. Finally, on a policy level, questions are asked regarding the function and form of Dutch Public Broadcasting now and in the future.

Academic analysis of primary source materials gives further insight into reasons, developments and decision-making and (multi-platform) television productions as well as the influence of boundary conditions and (political) policy. Such analyses are important in order to understand these changes and to possibly steer them. Research into production and the impact of historical television programs can also give direction to future policy in the field of education, culture and science. Despite the fact that production documentation is an important source for scientific research, the relevance and archiving of these long been neglected. Production documentation is worth preserving for academics, programmers and documentalists of historical television programs. The systematic archiving production documents is not only now but also for the future of value to understand how knowledge about the past in society is used and is subject to production and policy decisions. In this way, the analysis of this primary source materials may contribute to the enrichment of the knowledge that plays a role in the production of historical and archive-based television programs, which contribute to lasting forms of education, partnerships and reflections that develop and shape modern societies.

6. The End of the Archive as We Know It?

Regarding the changing role of the national archive as an agent of historical knowledge through the re-use and (re-)contextualisation of archival footage in the digital era, there are first of all new opportunities to be seized and new types of questions that *can* be asked by archives, broadcasters and academic researchers. The increased access and more direct availably of high quality material promotes engagement with cultural memory and is an important precondition to encourage the (re-)use of television archives and audio-visual heritage. This includes metadata and contextualization—by whom, why, how…—without which material loses its value for research. The development of digital search tools facilitates new types of questions that can be asked by academic researchers, especially via tools for visualization and comparison. An example of such a tool is for instance AVResearcherXL. This tool is aimed at allowing media researchers to explore large amounts of metadata of audio-visual broadcasts based on traditional catalogue descriptions, spoken content (subtitles) and social chatter (tweets associated with broadcasts). This enables researchers to both compare

collections and contrast results for different content across time (see Huurnink et al., 2013, p. 1; Van Gorp, De Leeuw, Van Wees, & Huurnink, 2015). Such tools offer opportunities to more easily identify social and cultural trends over a longer period, generating new research questions in the process. For example, what if Chris Vos would carry out his previously mentioned research on the representation of the Nazi occupation in Dutch documentaries today? In the digital era, multimedia perspectives—cross-media practices, as well as searching and linking of various data sets—are par for the course and television broadcasters create more content than 'just' TV. We have therefore also raised questions what should an archive *choose* to archive in the digital convergence era, and on what criteria should their selections and interpretations be based.

In the digital era, there are second of all also new challenges through the production and contextualisation of archive-based programmes, and new questions that *should* be asked by archives, broadcasters and academic researchers. Television's role as a cultural medium has changed and developed over time—as for instance demonstrated by the gradual shift from broadcasting for mass audiences (including watching television at a fixed time in the nation's classrooms) to narrowcasting for more fragmented users. Many programmes produced in the broadcast era are not available for re-use or re-watching due to copyright issues. When research has not been recorded, permission also needs to be re-arranged. An example of such a programme from the broadcast era is *Weimar: Opkomst en Ondergang van een Republiek* [*Weimar: The Rise and Fall of the Republic*], a German production that aired in 1978 in an adaptation by Dutch broadcaster VPRO. WDR does not give its consent for the programme's circulation because it is unknown what archive material has been used. Most of the materials were created around 1918–1924 and are probably public domain. We are in this context not so much witnessing the end of television, but rather the end of a television programme as a limited engagement or experience—one of the fundamental characteristics of television programming. New forms of storytelling, and interactions between storytelling and access to audio-visual archival material fits into the context of what we call the medium of television.

This tension is also felt in government policy. On the one hand, policies are based on existing organizations, programming of public television and public values, but on the other hand, a focus on innovation, online availability, new production methods, and sharing airtime with new parties is being advocated. We have observed a development towards the end of public service broadcasting as the specific institution that originated from the early 1950s, particularly its ideology towards how television is organised—rather than 'the end of television' in the Dutch televisual landscape. The strategic plans of NPO are based on a specific future type of media production context and media use. Due to new challenges for programmes that re-use audio-visual archival materials, and affecting the production, access and online presentation of contextual materials like websites and supplementary content, the re-use of archival material and its connected rights issues does not seem to anticipate the future type of media production context and media use that the strategic plans of NPO are based on. Programmes that re-use large amounts of audio-visual archival footage are problematic to develop within the current policy due to their lack of online accessibility. It seems that both archivists as well as media policy makers are still figuring out how the media world has adapted in the convergence era.

Based on these observations, we have argued for a more systematic archiving of production and contextual documentation to understand and interpret production processes and business histories of public broadcasters in the Netherlands—and to be able to more fully understand the role of the archive in terms of selection and interpretation over a longer period. Such a preservation strategy would need to include both online (web archiving) as well as printed and digital production documentation for a complete memory of production processes in a particular historical context. Furthermore, a more systematic approach to preservation is of an even higher necessity in the convergence era, in the first place due to contemporary changes of working processes in broadcast production, such as digital communication between editors and researchers, but also because practices of cross-media and transmedia storytelling (such as a television programme web site with contextual information, ranging from audio, video and photo, text) are not only highly susceptible to change but also more complex and difficult to archive. In addition, regarding the impact of the greater accessibility of audio-visual archival materials and changes in collection policies, copyright issues and traditional production methods limit the enthusiasm to create television programmes with an online component, but mostly elements in the enrichment chain need to become automated: to reiterate Uricchio (2010), the art of selection is changing into art of aggregation. Subsequently, it is important for media researchers to show awareness of an archive's history when using an archive's resources in their own research. Key questions to reflect on are: how open can or should the archive be? What are the archive's selection criteria for particular types of materials (for instance, at Sound and Vision the selection is based on programme types rather than themes)? Are there institutional problematics? What is the role of changing licencing models? What are the right questions to ask to find particular materials, and perhaps more importantly, to whom? What particular types of history

and audio-visual sources are classified by the archive as valuable, which are not, and why?

In our discussion, we have reflected on different factors that interact in policy, production and consumption. A more thorough study of the commencement of television using both contextual sources and the programmes that have recently been digitised will enable researchers to better connect to recent developments on the levels of institutionalization, technology, reception, politics and policy. These new challenges also prompt new questions that need to be asked by researchers, broadcasters and archivists. These questions range from the politics of archiving, from how to select and interpret, to under what circumstances and conditions audio-visual material is made available, but also how to search and find. After all, audio-visual archival materials represent a specific construction *and* selection of our reality, and their availability in an image database or multi-platform repertoire is once more a selection by curators working in public service broadcasting and in the archive. In the digital age, even more people are part of this process of selection and aggregation, affecting how we remember the past through audio-visual images.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Still 'Watching' TV? The Consumption of TV Fiction by Engaged Audiences

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Abstract
There is no denying that television, as a medium and an institution, has drastically changed in the age of digitization and convergence. For audiences, this has not only opened up multiple opportunities to watch television content at other times and on other devices, but also to interact with its cross-media extensions. However, while much has been written about the new opportunities for audience engagement, we do not know much about the actual adoption of new technologies nor the motivations underlying such uses. Therefore, this paper draws on empirical audience research to address the key question: how do viewers engage with contemporary TV fiction? Through empirical audience research, using various qualitative research methods, three different aspects of the reception of cross-media TV fiction will be discussed: (1) how do viewers watch the TV episodes of contemporary TV fiction?, (2) how do viewers engage with the cross-media extensions of TV fiction?, and (3) how do viewers experience the social dimensions of contemporary TV fiction? We focus on a particular group, that of 'engaged' viewers, who are actively involved by personalizing their viewing practices, by communicating about it, by consuming cross-media elements of TV fiction, or producing TV fiction-related content. Our findings suggest that even this group does not make full use of all the available technological opportunities to personalize TV viewing, and that the classical TV text, linear viewing, and the social aspect of viewing remain of key importance.

Keywords
cross-media; Flanders; in-depth interviews; TV fiction; TV viewing

Issue
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1. Introduction

From the mid-2000s onwards, the future of television has been a hotly debated topic, both in journalistic and in academic writings, as the introduction of a range of digital technologies entailed substantial adjustments to the medium's form and use. Although television has continuously evolved since its inception, the multitude of changes and possibilities introduced by digitization was perceived as more transformative than ever. Digitization has detached television content from the television screen and stimulated convergence; more than ever, boundaries between TV and other media blur. A number of concepts have emerged in an attempt to grasp the increasing migration, integration and interaction of television content across a range of platforms (Caldwell, 2006). Beside broadly accepted terms like 'convergence', 'franchise', 'synergy', 'multiplatform' and 'cross-media', more author-specific concepts such as 'transmedia storytelling' (Jenkins, 2003, 2006), 'overflow' (Brooker, 2001), 'paratexts' (Gray, 2008, 2010), 'expanded TV text' (Askwith, 2007), 'add-ons'

(Brereton, 2007), 'media tie-ins' (Clarke, 2009), or 'bonus tracks' (Boccia Artieri, 2012) are all used to describe the phenomenon of television extending beyond the television set and to other media.

Academic articles and books on television and its future, with titles such as 'The television will be revolutionized' (Lotz, 2007), 'Television after TV' (Spigel & Olsson, 2006), 'Television studies after TV' (Turner & Tay, 2009), or 'Television 2.0' (Askwith, 2007), not only assume a drastic change—if not 'the end'—of television; they also tend to focus on industrial and technological changes, without empirically substantiating the actual adoption of the new possibilities these entail for audiences. Bold statements about television viewing practices—such as 'the nature of our television use has become increasingly complicated, deliberate and individualized' (Lotz, 2009a, p. 2), and 'watching television is evolving into an active perpetual process that happens everywhere and at all times' (Askwith, 2007, p. 12)—are often made without consulting the audience. These claims are based on the opportunities digital technologies create for viewers and on generalizing expectations about audience behaviour, rather than on actual practices and experiences. Therefore, this article will draw on empirical audience research to address the key question: how do viewers engage with contemporary television? We argue that empirical audience research is vital in a discussion about the future of television, as viewers are determinative for the evolution of the medium through their (non-)adoption of certain viewing opportunities. In our research, we focus in particular on Flanders, the northern Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, and on fiction, as this is one of the key genres in terms of 'new' audience practices such as digital recording, downloading and 'binge viewing'. In this research, we do not only address 'classical' TV texts but also their cross-media extensions. Three different aspects of TV fiction consumption will be discussed: (1) how do viewers watch the TV episodes of contemporary TV fiction? (2) how do viewers engage with the cross-media extensions of TV fiction? and (3) how do viewers experience the social dimensions of contemporary TV fiction? But before we do this, it is necessary to briefly discuss the characteristics of contemporary television.

2. TV Fiction in the Age of Digitization and Convergence

Lately, much has been written on the future of television. Although opinions diverge—from the death of broadcasting to the rise of user-generated online content—all agree that new versions of television are emerging that differ in crucial ways from its original industrial organization and social role (Lotz, 2009b, p. 50). Many scholars use a three-way division to structure the history of television (see e.g. Ellis, 2000; Lotz, 2007; Rogers, Epstein, & Reeves, 2002).

The first era is that of *broadcast television*, alternatively named the 'era of scarcity' (Ellis, 2000, pp. 39-60), the 'network era' (Lotz, 2007, p. 7) or 'TV I' by (Rogers, Epstein and Reeves, 2002, p. 55). In this period, the medium is characterized by a limited number of channels which broadcast only for part of the day. Television presents definitive and fixed programming to a mass audience; viewers can only access shows at appointed times in a routinized daily sequence of programming (Lotz, 2009b). In Belgium, as in many other European countries, this is the era of a public service broadcasting monopoly, financially supported and controlled by government. In terms of viewing practices, this period is characterized by immediacy, as the images on the screen are constantly changing, disappearing the moment they have appeared. Moreover, the structure of the broadcasting schedules reflects assumptions about the routines of everyday life (Bennett, 2011). Broadcasting television's immediacy limits the viewers' agency: viewers can tune in and (only) watch whichever show is broadcast (Evans, 2011). Television in the era of scarcity is a 'push environment': the linear daily sequence of programming is 'pushed' to the viewers and leaves them with minimal control (Gripsrud, 2010; Lotz, 2009b). Finally, television in this era is considered as 'social', addressing a unified national audience conceived as a collective of families watching together in the domestic sphere. One of the key characteristics of linear broadcasting is that millions of viewers are watching the same content at the same time. This synchronicity plays a vital role in creating a sense of being part of a particular audience. Watching traditional linear television is 'watching with', according to Milly Buonanno (2008, p. 24), meaning 'watching with all the other distant and unknown viewers whom one supposes or guesses are simply there in front of their screens at the same time as we are in front of ours, watching the same programme or part of a programme that we are watching ourselves'.

The second era is that of *cable and commercial television***,** multiple channels competing for the viewers' attention and introducing the 'era of availability' (Ellis, 2000, p. 61), a 'multi-channel transition period' (Lotz, 2007, p. 7), or the era of 'TV II' (Rogers, et al., 2002, p. 55). While the era of scarcity is characterized by social unity, the era of availability is characterized by social differentiation and choice (Ellis, 2000). The mass audience from the previous era is fragmented into niche audiences who turn their attention to specialised channels (Askwith, 2007). Across Europe, including Belgium, public service broadcasters loose audiences to commercial channels right after their introduction. TV stations begin to develop well thought out broadcasting schedules in order to create a specific channel identity and to attract and retain viewers (Aronson, Reddy, & Stam, 1998). There is also a shift in agency from the

networks to the viewers. Technologies giving power and control to the viewer, such as the remote control device and the video cassette recorder (VCR), are emerging (Lotz, 2009b). In this second era, the audience gets more dispersed because of the evolution from few channels to many channels, from broadcasting to narrowcasting, and because of the introduction of the first time-shifting technology (Lotz, 2009b).

The third and current era is that of *digitization and convergence*. In the new millennium, television starts moving into the 'era of plenty' (Ellis, 2000, pp. 162-178), the 'post-network era' (Lotz, 2007, 2009b), the 'post-broadcast era' (Turner & Tay, 2009b), or the phase of 'TV III' (Rogers, et al., 2002, p. 55). In this era, the diversification of the production and distribution of TV content that started in the second era continues and flourishes (Buonanno, 2008). Most changes can be ascribed to digitization: the digital transmission of television signals, but also the adoption of digital technologies in the production and reception of television (Lotz, 2007). The digital video recorder (DVR) and the personal video recorder (PVR) allow viewers to easily split up the flow of content into individual programmes that can be reordered, saved and re-viewed (Askwith, 2007; Lotz, 2009b). Partly in response to the threat of these convenience technologies, many television providers embrace video-on-demand (VOD) distribution technologies that allow viewers to purchase and watch individual programmes whenever they choose (Askwith, 2007). TV programmes are also made available on the computer by streaming or downloading through specialised websites (Van den Broeck, Pierson, & Lievens, 2007). In short, the interfaces and platforms through which a viewer can access television programmes have multiplied exponentially.

Digitization also enables media convergence, understood here as a multi-faceted process that refers to 'the new textual practices, branding and marketing strategies, industrial arrangements, technological synergies, and audience behaviours enabled and propelled by the emergence of digital media' (Kackman, Binfield, Payne, Perlman, & Sebok, 2011, p. 1). As convergence allows viewers to share 'television' content among their televisions, computers, mobile phones and other devices, content boundaries among screen technologies disintegrate (Lotz, 2007). What used to be television programmes is now evolving into 'content' that can be distributed and accessed on various platforms (Askwith, 2007). In terms of viewer practices, time-shifting and location-shifting technologies make traditional assumptions about the television viewer impossible, since networks no longer have the power to control when, where or how audiences consume their programming (Askwith, 2007). The converged and overcrowded media landscape results in an intense competition to attract and retain audiences. Henry Jenkins (2006, pp. 20, 61-62) defines this as 'affective economics': a marketing logic in which branding is the key concept, seeking to understand the emotional underpinnings of consumers' decision making as a driving force behind viewing and purchasing decisions. The aim is, firstly, to stimulate emotional engagement and create loyal brand communities. Secondly, this brand loyalty is then supposed to generate new revenues by making content available through a variety of screen technologies and releasing additional possibilities for viewer engagement

Because of these innovations, all the established knowledge about how audiences watch television is called into question. The time structuring element, the liveness and immediacy that were so typical for broadcasting television, are further challenged by digitization. As television viewing devices become more complex, digital, and networked, the opportunities for customization, personalization, and control increase. It is suggested that these changes shift the control or 'agency' over the programme schedule from the networks to the viewers (e.g., Carlson, 2006; Evans, 2011; Hoppenstand, 2006; Lotz, 2007; Mittell, 2011). In this sense, television does not consist of a flow of programmes available at a particular moment anymore, but it has become a platform for content, a 'library' with 'files' (Buonanno, 2008; Mittell, 2011), to be recorded, saved, viewed and re-viewed on-demand. The viewing environment evolves from a passive 'linear push environment' into an active 'non-linear pull environment', meaning that the viewer can pull the desired content (Gripsrud, 2010). Moreover, consuming TV content can consist of much more than just viewing as TV programmes are expanding to other media. Askwith (2007, p. 12) even states that the practice of consuming TV content is transforming from 'a passive process that happens in front of the screen into an active, perpetual process that happens everywhere and at all times'. Indeed, TV programmes that combine television with a brand website, online video, books, and other merchandize, invite viewers for an investment and immersion through a variety of (interactive) activities.

These changes also influence the social nature of TV consumption, as they have detached television content from the centrally placed television screen (Lotz, 2009b). Not only is television content available on the different television sets in the house, it is also available on computer screens, mobile phones and other portable devices. This implies that the act of watching television might become less social: the family viewing experience might disappear as family members now have different screens to watch TV content on. As a consequence, family members might no longer watch together but might spread out into separate rooms, which Elihu Katz (2009) describes as a move from a 'collectivist' phase to an 'individualist' phase. According to Katz (2009, p. 7) the television of 'sharedness' is no longer with us, having made room for a television of

hundreds of channels, of 'niche' broadcasting, of portability, one that is part of a system that integrates with the internet and other new media. Similarly, society-wide viewing of particular programmes was once the norm, but has now become an uncommon experience (Lotz, 2007). While linear broadcasting television joins people, keeps them together and unifies nations (Buonanno, 2008), post-linear television isolates and separates.

But does it really? Many of the claims made above are based on observations at the macro level, and focus on what is possible rather than on actual audience practices. While we do not question the overall changes described above, we do wonder what audiences actually 'do' in this new media landscape, and why. To explore this, the remainder of this article will discuss the findings of empirical research on the practices and motivations of contemporary TV 'viewers'.

3. Methods

As mentioned above, the research presented in this article was conducted in Flanders, the northern Dutch-speaking region of Belgium. In order to sharpen the focus of our study, we decided to narrow down our empirical research to TV fiction (including fiction series, serials, soaps and sitcoms), as previous research (e.g. Askwith, 2007) indicates that TV fiction is most likely to be time-shifted. Furthermore, as this study focuses on changing viewing practices for TV fiction and the reasons for these practices, the sample for this study consists of engaged TV fiction viewers, defined here as viewers who do more than just watching fiction through live broadcast television. They are actively involved with TV fiction in different ways: by personalizing their viewing practices (when, where and through which technology), by communicating about it, by consuming cross-media elements of TV fiction, and/or by producing TV fiction-related content. They are 'heavy consumers' or 'intense users' of TV fiction and 'early adopters' of new TV and media technologies. In other words, they are 'information-rich cases' (Creswell, 1998, p. 119) with regard to our object of study. This form of intensity sampling (Ritchie, Lewis, & Elam, 2003, p. 79) is very useful to research audiences in a constantly changing media landscape. First of all, in order to explore the reasons behind new and emerging media practices, it is necessary to select participants who are early adopters of these practices. Second, although these are only the initial uses of an unrepresentative group, these participants might provide us with clues about future uses of a broader population (Barkhuus, 2009; Lotz, 2007).

In order to select our sample, we set up a preliminary online survey enquiring into different ways of engagement with TV fiction. Respondents with high scores were approached to participate in the actual research. A total of 1,169 filled in the preliminary online survey. 157 people met the needs of the research and were interested in participating. In the end, 61 people (39 men and 22 women) completed the whole research process, ranging in age from 17 to 55 years. For the data collection we used TV diaries in combination with in-depth interviews. An online action based—instead of time based—TV diary was designed to chart how viewers engage with a TV show and its add-ons through different media platforms. Each day during one month, the participants reported all their actions (viewing, downloading, gaming, talking, shopping, reading, etc.) related to TV fiction in their online TV diaries. After the TV diary month, the research process was concluded with an in-depth interview, in which the reasons behind the various viewing practices were explored. During the interview, a copy of the completed TV diary was used to recall the actual viewing practices. In addition, to collect specific information about cross-media engagement, we conducted six focus groups with five to eight fans of the drama series *Lost*, *Stargate Universe*, *True Blood*, and *Gossip Girl*, and two focus groups with fans of the Flemish soap *Thuis*. Most of the participants for these focus groups were selected from the database of the preliminary online survey, while others were contacted via already selected participants based on their recommendations. All these interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed using the NVivo qualitative data analysis software. In what follows, the key findings and broad patterns rather than the detailed findings will be discussed, in order to come to an overarching answer to our research question.

4. Viewing Practices in the Digital Era

In our analysis, we focused on three subquestions to the main research question 'how do viewers engage with contemporary television?': (1) how do viewers watch the TV episodes of contemporary TV fiction, (2) how do viewers engage with the cross-media extensions of TV fiction, and (3) how do viewers experience the social dimensions of contemporary TV fiction?

First, we explored *how viewers engage with the core content of TV fiction* by examining how viewers watch the episodes of contemporary TV fiction. Through the TV diaries and in-depth interviews, we discovered an array of different viewing practices. These are related to different ways of time-shifting, as each viewing practice involves departing from the original moment of broadcasting to a certain extent. Three different levels of time-shifting can be distinguished, each with various categories: time-shifting on the level of technology (live television, digital video recording, downloading, or DVD), time-shifting on the level of the release date (original release date, Flemish release date, or DVD release date), and time-shifting on the level of the viewing rhythm (one episode or multiple

episodes). Certain categories of the three time-shifting elements coincide more than others, and together they form a continuum of viewing styles, through which the participants shift depending on external factors such as the origin or type of TV fiction, and the day and time of broadcasting.

Another important factor in this continuum of viewing styles are the reasons for time-shifting, where two main reasons recur: being in control, and the social context of viewing. First, we found that some of the participants prefer to be in control over when they watch and what they watch, while others prefer not to. For some viewers the feeling of being in control is necessary in order to be able to enjoy TV fiction, while for others the joy of watching TV fiction stems from not having to make any decisions about the time and content of viewing. The responses of the participants reveal that 'convenience' is the underlying common motive for these apparently opposite reasons. Watching TV fiction is perceived as a leisure activity, and thus must happen in the most convenient way. While new technological possibilities offer increasing power and control to the viewer, our research indicates that not everyone is looking for such control. Second, the social context also came forward as a dominant reason to opt for a certain viewing practice, whether by adapting the viewing practice in order to watch together or individually, or in order to discuss the episodes offline or online. While digitization enabled full flexibility and the industry predicted the rise of individualized and personalized viewing practices ('me TV'), the participants in this research seem to still value the social aspect of watching TV fiction a lot.[1]

Second, we analysed the *use and reception of cross-media extensions of TV fiction*. Here, our different research methods led to different results. Based on the TV diaries, the actual consumption of cross-media extensions was listed. These data show that such extensions are commonly consumed, especially the marketing driven cross-media extensions. However, analysis of the in-depth interviews and focus groups demonstrated an overall disinterest in opportunities for engagement with TV fiction through other media platforms. The large majority of the participants consume the TV fiction extensions almost by coincidence (stumbling upon them whilst using different media) and are not looking for a strong involvement with interactive media. Active viewer participation is not something they are consciously looking for: most viewers describe 'engaging with TV fiction' as 'watching TV episodes' and not as being actively involved through multiple media. The lack of enthusiasm for cross-media extensions can be explained by the mismatch between the viewing motivations as expected by TV producers and the actual motivations of viewers. While TV producers seek an audience looking for immersion in a multiplatform narrative story, the viewers we researched are mainly interested in being entertained by TV episodes. Hence, we can conclude that cross-media extensions of TV fiction are being evaluated in the light of the established form of engagement the viewers already know, namely the TV episodes.[2]

Third, we explored the *social dimensions of consuming cross-media TV fiction* by looking at the audiovisual TV fiction experience as a whole. After a qualitative analysis of the TV diaries and in-depth interviews, we discovered three dimensions in the social experience of engaging with TV fiction. First, viewers are watching together (especially Flemish TV fiction), for different reasons: practical ones (e.g. there is only one TV set), out of habit (it is a daily routine) or to have a better perception (a shared TV experience is a richer experience). Second, they are discussing TV fiction offline (short and usually superficial conversations) and online (more in-depth and substantive discussions) in order to share the experience with fellow viewers. Third, a few participants interact online with fictional TV characters and see this as a way to get closer to the show. The large majority of our participants thinks that discussing TV fiction is a fundamental part of 'following' a show and while doing so, many say they experience a sense of belonging to a certain television audience. Clearly, for these viewers consuming TV fiction is still a shared and social experience. Hence, we can conclude that new media technologies have not only divided the audience by providing time-shifting technologies, but have also brought viewers closer together by facilitating new options to watch TV fiction and talk about it with fellow viewers.[3]

Connecting the findings of these three analyses, we can distinguish different viewing styles. Each of these viewing styles is a combination of time-shifting practices (on the level of technology, release date and rhythm), ways of (not) consuming cross-media extensions, and social practices. The *live viewing style* is characterized by watching live at the moment of broadcasting, following the broadcasting rhythm (one episode at the time) and release date. This is a typical social viewing style: viewers choose to watch live in order to watch together with others and/or to discuss the episode afterwards. In our study, this live viewing style is also characterized by the consumption of some cross-media elements, such as a soap blog.

The *delayed viewing style* is characterized by watching Flemish or international TV fiction delayed (by recording or buying via DTV), at a better suited moment.

[1] For a more elaborate discussion of these findings, see Simons (2013).

[2] For a more elaborate discussion of these findings, see Simons (2014).

[3] For a more elaborate discussion of these findings, see Simons (2015).

The original broadcasting rhythm is still followed and the episodes are watched when released on Flemish TV channels. With this viewing style the direct social context is often decisive for the moment of watching (time-shifting), but there is less (online or offline) social interaction about TV fiction afterwards. Furthermore, in this viewing practice style there is very little consumption of cross-media elements.

Next, the *downloading viewing style* is characterized by consuming international TV fiction, downloaded at the original (usually American) release date and watched following the broadcasting rhythm (one episode at the time) or at one's own rhythm (multiple episodes at the time). Viewers who adopt this viewing style usually watch individually but often have online social interactions after watching. With regard to the consumption of cross-media elements, very little consumption can be noticed, as only real fans engage online.

Finally, the *DVD viewing style* is characterized by watching TV fiction on DVD, at a self-determined moment and rhythm, usually multiple episodes at a time. These are often group viewing sessions, so there is immediate social interaction while watching, but very little social interaction with regard to the series afterwards. In this viewing style, there is very little engagement with cross-media elements, except for the consumption of TV fiction related merchandize.

Overall, we found that most of the participants in this study switch between different viewing styles, but the large majority predominantly watches live at the moment of broadcasting, or almost live. Time-shifting technologies are being used to delay the moment of watching, which is usually only a bit later in the evening. The television medium is still key for the reception of fiction, as watching the episodes is the main ingredient in the engagement with cross-media TV fiction and the consumption of the expanded TV text plays only a marginal role. The social dimension is also important in viewers' engagement with cross-media TV fiction, as it determines how, when and where people watch the episodes and whether they interact with the cross-media extensions.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Returning to the changes in television as outlined in the literature review, we can now situate and discuss the implications of our empirical findings. First, with regard to viewing practices, a *shift in control* is generally observed, from the broadcasters to the viewers. Looking at the results of our study, it is clear that the participants do not make full use of all the technological opportunities to personalize TV viewing. Many of the participants still watch a lot of TV fiction (usually Flemish TV fiction) at the moment of the live broadcast. Moreover, although the participants do use a variety of time-shifting technologies, they do not actually view TV fiction episodes *à la carte*. Time-shifting can happen at (a combination of) three different levels (technology, the release date, and the rhythm of watching), but this usually results only in slightly delayed viewing, from a few hours to a day after the original broadcast. Whether they watch locally or internationally produced fiction, most participants still follow the broadcasting rhythm of weekly episodes instead of, for example, saving them all up to watch at a self-determined pace. While the agency—or increased control—that digitization brings is generally perceived as liberating, this is not the case for all viewers. For some, video-on-demand services and downloading offer an appreciated alternative to break free from television's temporal structure, which is necessary to properly enjoy TV fiction. For others, this enjoyment stems from not being in control and not having to make any decisions about the time and content of viewing. Thus, while the technological possibilities offer increasing power and control for the viewer, this study indicates that not everyone is looking for such control. Convenience seems to be the key explanatory factor here: as they watch TV fiction in their leisure time, viewers adopt the most user-friendly and convenient viewing style, which sometimes includes time-shifting technologies (taking control) and sometimes not (leaving control to the broadcaster). Based on these findings, it seems that the new viewing practices that have appeared when digital time-shifting technologies were introduced, have not replaced the modes of viewing that were dominant in the previous eras of television; rather, they exist side by side, as Lotz (2009a) and Bennett (2011) have also argued. There is a continuum of viewing practice styles, with more control for the broadcaster on one end and more control for the viewer on the other.

Second, concerning the evolution of the TV text, the literature suggests a *shift from divergent single-medium TV fiction to convergent cross-media fiction*. Looking at our empirical findings, it is clear that television is still very crucial in the engagement with contemporary fiction. The television episodes are the main ingredient of our participants' fiction experience. Moreover, even the extended texts are perceived as 'television content': whether accessed through television or another technology, and whether consumed as episodes or in another format, the content is still labelled as 'television'. Similar to what Evans (2008) found, the viewers in this research consider fiction extensions in terms of what they already know: the episodes. The television text is still the central point in their experience, to which other extended texts—if used—are compared. Engaging with TV fiction means watching the TV episodes and does not necessarily include a range of other mediated activities, as was predicted by some scholars (e.g. Askwith, 2007). The results reveal an overall disinterest in actively engaging

with cross-media fiction through various media platforms. The viewers want to experience the narrative storyworld through audio-visual content, preferably on a TV screen. They are not in favour of taking on an active role in the unfolding of the story, as this would hinder rather than improve immersion in the fictional world. To sum up, with regard to cross-media TV fiction, the media use of the participants in this research is characterized by divergence rather than convergence.

Third, according to the literature discussed above TV is supposed to have evolved *from a collective community medium to an individualistic* '*me*' *medium*. However, our research shows that the social aspect of TV viewing and engaging with TV fiction remains very important. The social context is one of the main determinants for the chosen viewing practice style (together with convenience, as explained above). Depending on whether they want to watch together with others or individually, viewers opt to time-shift or not and employ a certain viewing practice style (live viewing, delayed viewing, downloading or DVD viewing). Furthermore, the interaction with fellow viewers is also decisive in whether or not participants engage with cross-media extensions of TV fiction. If cross-media extensions are consumed, it is often after recommendation of family, friends or other fellow viewers who follow the same TV fiction series. In line with Evans (2011), we found that digital technologies can also be seen as means to enhance and strengthen the audience. Although these new technologies expand the possibilities for asynchronous viewing and thereby might influence the social aspect of watching television simultaneously, they also offer additional possibilities to keep up to date with TV programmes and to connect with fellow viewers. Recording technologies and catch-up possibilities can be used to reinforce the 'audience community', by ensuring that every viewer has access to the content. Online platforms connected to downloading services can function as facilitators of interpersonal relationships, enhancing the viewer's ability to perform as a member of the audience of a particular TV programme. Overall, our research shows that digital convergence has not caused a radical shift from social television to individualized 'me TV'.

To sum up, and echoing Lotz's (2007, p. 245) statement about the five Cs of post-network television (choice, control, convenience, customization, and community), it would have been nice to conclude this article with the three Cs of viewer engagement with cross-media fiction: convenience, convergence and community. However, our findings suggest that our participants' engagement is rather characterized by convenience, divergence, and community. First, *convenience* determines how participants engage with television as a technology. The viewing practices with regard to the TV fiction episodes involve control for the broadcaster or control for the viewer, depending on which mode of viewing is considered to be most convenient at that moment. Second, with regard to the dimension of the TV text, a shift was predicted from a single medium TV fiction text to extended multi-media (cross) fiction texts in a converged media landscape. However, the results show that the participants perceive a *divergence* between the TV series, as the central text, and its cross-media extensions. Third, as digitization increases the possibilities for a highly personalized and individualized television experience, it was expected that the medium would lose its status as social and unifying medium. Yet, it seems that a *community* feeling is still of key importance to viewers, who regard the social dimension of the TV fiction experience as essential.

To conclude, it is necessary to reflect on some limitations of this study. Firstly, it is not justified to make general statements based on this research with a very specific sample of engaged viewers in relation to a particular genre, fiction. How the viewers in this study experience cross-media TV fiction might not accurately capture about how these viewers engage with other types of programmes. Furthermore, the results of this research might not apply to how other, less engaged viewers experience TV fiction. Still, our conclusions—which reveal continuity and stability rather than drastic change—indicate that one should be very cautious about making bold statements about how the television viewing behaviour of the mainstream, less engaged, audience has changed. Second, television is constantly changing. Although this does not mean that the ways of engaging with television are continuously being replaced by new ways, it does have its consequences for empirical audience research. Thus, the data for this research were gathered between 2007 and 2011, before tablets became a common household item and Netflix was launched in Belgium, among other new ways of engaging with TV fiction. Thirdly, this research was conducted in a specific geographic and cultural setting, Flanders. Differences in reception between Flemish and U.S. cross-media TV fiction, such as the lack of knowledge about and consumption of cross-media extensions for U.S. TV fiction, might be the result of the delay in broadcast transmission and the much smaller-scale marketing campaigns of U.S. TV fiction (Catania, 2010). To summarise, the findings of this research should be contextualized and generalizing statements should be avoided. What we offer is a time and location bound analysis on how TV fiction is experienced, and we believe that it is actually the very specificity of our concrete, empirical and contextualised results that make this research a valuable counterweight to more abstract and generalizing writing on the topic.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Article

Taming Distraction: The Second Screen Assemblage, Television and the Classroom

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Abstract
This article argues that television's resilience in the current media landscape can best be understood by analyzing its role in a broader quest to organize attention across different media. For quite a while, the mobile phone was considered to be a disturbance both for watching television and for classroom teaching. In recent years, however, strategies have been developed to turn the second screen's distractive potential into a source for intensified, personalized and social attention. This has consequences for television's position in a multimedia assemblage: television's alleged specificities (e.g. liveness) become mouldable features, which are selectively applied to guide the attention of users across different devices and platforms. Television does not end, but some of its traditional features do only persist because of its strategic complementarity with other media; others are re-adapted by new technologies thereby spreading televisual modes of attention across multiple screens. The article delineates the historical development of simultaneous media use as a 'problematization'—from alternating (and competitive) media use to multitasking and finally complementary use of different media. Additionally, it shows how similar strategies of managing attention are applied in the 'digital classroom'. While deliberately avoiding to pin down, what television is, the analysis of the problem of attention allows for tracing how old and new media features are constantly reshuffled. This article combines three arguments: (1) the second screen is conceived of as both a danger to attention and a tool to manage attention. (2) To organize attention, the second screen assemblage modulates the specific qualities of television and all the other devices involved. (3) While being a fragile and often inconsistent assemblage, the second screen spreads its dynamics—and especially the problem of attention—far beyond television, e.g. into the realm of teaching.

Keywords
assemblage; economy of attention; e-learning; liveness; second screen; television

Issue
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1. Introduction

Television, like all media today, has become one of many possible objects of attention in a layered assemblage of platforms and devices. Especially the entanglement of mobile devices into television practices—what I will call second screen assemblages—organizes attention across several media, not least through harvesting, modulating, and combining the specific forms of attention characterizing different devices or different forms of content. Television's resilience in the current media landscape, I want to argue, can best be described with respect to a broader 'problem of attention'. The increasing interrelation between television and other media, on the one hand, provokes new ways of thinking about and dealing with attention; the strategies to create, organize and harvest attention, on the other hand, shape the media assemblage and grant particular, and often transitional, functions to one or the other device or cultural form. Television does not end, but its traditional features are re-adapted by new technologies thereby spreading televisual modes of attention across multiple screens.

The main aim of this article therefore is not to de-

scribe the details of actual existing applications or forms of use but to analyze the 'problematizations' (Castel, 1994; Deacon, 2000) of attention: what are the conceptual and actual re-definitions of attention emerging across popular, industrial and academic debates? What strategies and instruments are imagined and realized to deal with attention (and distraction)? What happens to television's traditional modes of attention and how do other devices and practices appropriate them? While deliberately avoiding the attempt to pin down what television is and what it will become, such an approach allows for tracing how old and new features are constantly reshuffled. Thereby it also touches on more general media theoretical questions: is it still possible—and does it still make sense—to distinguish individual media? Can we actually identify affordances specific to one medium? Some traditional temporal characteristics of television—e.g. flow or liveness—are partly re-animated and transformed in a cross-media landscape, but they also get partly dissociated from television. This makes it increasingly difficult to isolate a particular medium in order to describe its features and affordances. This article focuses on the question of attention to show how television's loss of familiarity is negotiated. 'Problematizations' react to uncertainty and develop 'the conditions in which possible responses can be given' (Foucault, 1997, p. 118). Analyzing debates and strategies (instead of a given medium) also allows us to see the extent to which television shares dynamics with other media practices. The second screen use in teaching for example, which doesn't include TV-sets or TV-programs, shows interesting similarities with television's second screen assemblage and thereby delivers insights into the broader interdependencies of the medium's current developments.

In the following I will focus on the emergence of the second screen to analyze how television got integrated in a cross-media assemblage that appropriates the medium's features as strategies among others to create and modulate attention. The growing research on the topic has mainly discussed how the second screen gets applied to integrate the more volatile use of mobile devices into the commercial strategies of the media industry (Lee & Andrejevic, 2014; Tussey, 2014) and how it creates moments of participation and liveness (van Es, 2015; Walsh, 2014). Other research has focused on the social circumstances of second screen use (Wilson, 2016), the spatial transformation of TV (Stauff, 2015), on the changing relationships between producers and audiences (Bennett, 2012), and on the second screen's potential to heighten a sense of citizenship (Selva, 2016). Dan Hassoun's rich work has shown how the second screen is policed in the cinema (Hassoun, 2016) and in the classroom (Hassoun, 2015) and how it relates to broader concerns of simultaneous media use (Hassoun, 2012, 2014). Adding to this growing body of research I want to focus more on the conceptual and theoretical implications of the second screen. First I will show how 'complementary simultaneous media use' (Nee & Dozier, 2015) became a plausible and manageable concept for the media industry. To achieve that, the different media's competition for attention and the simultaneous but unrelated use of several media (multitasking) had to be transformed into an assemblage that frames and tames attention. Second, I will use the example of liveness to show how television's alleged specificities are re-articulated and dispersed in that process—television rather becomes an occasional phenomenon than an individual medium. Finally, to show how television's transformation is entangled with a broader problematization of attention, I will extend the analysis to the field of teaching. Second screens are used in classrooms too to transform distraction into attention and the respective debates and strategies are insightful for understanding television's changing role in the cross-media assemblage.

2. TV, Digital Media and the Zero-Sum Game of Attention

Already before the rise of mass media like film and television, media technologies have aimed to modify, increase, and manage attention (Crary, 2001, 2014). Early on in this development, attention became reconceived as a complex and temporal process: distraction was now considered to be a constitutive part of an unavoidably distributed form of attention (Löffler, 2013, 2014). This ambivalent relationship between attention and distraction got thereby established as one of the key concepts for the evaluation and application of new media technologies, especially in the context of industrialization and urbanization since the mid-19th century: what looks like the danger of distraction at one moment, becomes a new form of attention at the next. The contemporary multiplication of screens and gadgets, and especially the second screen-assemblage, can be considered as yet another decisive turning point in this history. The simultaneous use of different media with allegedly each specific forms of temporality intensifies both the menace of constant distraction and the promise of micro-managed attention.

The dangers of mobile screens' distractive potential are most dramatically expressed in the context of driving. Many countries have enacted laws prohibiting the use of mobile phones while driving a car. Additionally, public awareness campaigns—with taglines such as 'don't text and drive' or 'keep your eyes on the road'—often sponsored by car manufacturers, aim to convince drivers not to be tempted to use their smartphones behind the wheel (e.g. "KeepYourEyesontheRoad.org.au," n.d.). Interestingly, a spot by car manufacturer VW fuses movie-going and driving: in a Hong Kong cinema, watching a film shot from the

point-of-view of a driver, audience members all simultaneously receive a text message. Grabbing their phones to read the message, they miss the moment in the movie where the driver has an accident—looking up from their mobile screens, all they see is a shattered windshield on the big screen (adsoftheworldvideos, 2014). For driving as for movie-going, the mobile screen is depicted as a problem of distraction—annoying at best, life threatening at worst.

While in fact many cinemas (or concert halls and theatre venues) do ask the audience to switch off their mobile devices before the start of the show (Hassoun, 2016), the case of multiple-screen use here has become much more ambivalent (and therefore productive) in recent years. Movies, theatre shows, and particularly television have begun to harness rather than ban the second screen—both to safeguard attention and to augment the experience.[1] Tellingly, one of television's early second screen apps was called GetGlue as if promising that the second screen intensifies rather than undermines the viewer's attachment to the screen. Before '*complementary simultaneous* media use' (Nee & Dozier, 2015, p. 2) could become a plausible concept, however, the *alternating* use of media and the mere *accidental simultaneous* use (multitasking) had to be molded into a densely interrelated and manageable assemblage.

Compared to cinema, television is notorious for affording a less focused but also more ambivalent mode of perception. Partly passively following the 'single irresponsible flow of images and feelings' (Williams, 1990, p. 92), partly distractedly zapping between channels or between watching television and other domestic activities, the viewer's attitude towards TV has been described as working through 'glance' rather than cinema's 'gaze' (e.g. Ellis, 1992). Ever since television's beginnings, people have read the newspaper, cooked dinner, or played board games while watching (or at least sometimes glancing at) a television.[2] Applying a somewhat more extended concept of media, the distraction of the second screen is thus nothing new. The industry constantly had to develop strategies to guarantee that the audience would at least pay attention to the commercials; the soundtrack of television—which can more easily be followed while doing other things—was e.g. adapted to the need to 'call the intermittent spectator back to the set' (Altman, 1986, p. 50). Characteristically, the growing presence of digital media in the domestic space during the 1990s was also considered both as a heightened danger to the already fragile attention levels the TV industry had to contend with and as an opportunity for more attentive TV-consumption.

On the one hand, it was far from clear in the 1990s whether television would survive the competition of digital media. The success of the personal computer and the first signs of the Internet's popularization were conceived of as instigating a 'war for eyeballs'[3]—the established TV industry and the growing IT industry fighting over consumers' attention. Until this day, the more radical proponents of the debate still consider television—notwithstanding all its digital transformations—a waste of time, and argue for its replacement by new media. In a blog post from 2008, for instance, new media scholar and consultant Clay Shirky calculated all the hours spent watching sitcoms and argued that this constitutes a waste of cognitive surplus that would be much better spent on writing blogs and editing Wikipedia entries, concluding: 'it's better to do something than to do nothing.' (Shirky, 2008) The underlying assumptions of such a dichotomy between television and new media are (1) that each medium is characterized by its specific form of attention and (2) that media consumption is a zero-sum game: the time spent with digital media will be taken out of the time previously spent watching television.

On the other hand, however, it became a plausible invocation to use new technologies to improve television's attention management. Already in 1986, a commercial for a (pre-digital) Panasonic VCR showed that a ringing phone is much less of an unwelcome distraction (and rather a temporary switch of attention) if you can voluntarily pause your viewing and continue where you stopped right after the call (mycommercials, 2007). This and similar situations (e.g. a decisive moment in a sports game while the postman rings or a dog that desperately asks to be taken out) have become staples of DVR advertising, promising that the upgraded medium can cope with the distractions of other media and life itself (Stauff, 2005, p. 215f). Increasingly, the inattentive consumption of scheduled (and thus not viewer-determined) television was portrayed as a waste of time (as in Shirky's blog); yet the new, digitized forms of TV (video on demand, digital video recorders, streaming services) promised to '"rationalize"' the act of watching television' (Dawson, 2014, p. 223). They allow for organizing the amount, time, and speed of reception and thereby for adapting television more closely to the patterns of a flexible, neoliberal work- and lifestyle (Dawson, 2014). Television and its multiple supplements thus got entangled with the 'attention economy', which re-introduced scarcity to the infor-

[1] Disney brought a re-vamped, second screen-version of some of its movies to the cinemas (Lawler, 2013); examples of second screen use in the opera are described by Kozinn (2014).

[2] This goes back to Raymond Williams' analysis of how television's flow fits into the broader development of 'mobile privatization' and was especially highlighted in the early feminist approaches to TV Studies, e.g. Modleski (1983). An extensive literature review is offered by Hassoun (2014).

[3] In 1996, Andy Grove, then president of chip producer Intel, introduced this notion (Grove, 1996).

mation economy's apparent abundance in the 1990s (Terranova, 2012).

The second screen assemblage partly builds on this promise of more flexible use of television. Yet is also epitomizes a new concept of the interrelation between television and new media, namely increasing saturation instead of competition or efficiency (Greer & Ferguson, 2015). Attention is now conceived of as something that can be spread (and can be managed to spread) across different media, which are establishing a veritable 'attention ecology' (Pettman, 2016). This implies that quite different modes of attention become combined, which also dissolves the idea that each medium is characterized by one specific mode of attention.

3. Simultaneous Media Use: From Multitasking to Second Screen Assemblage

It was in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the productive interrelations between different media were discovered as well as manufactured—first in the form of alternating and only later in the form of simultaneous media use. A telling anecdote of accidental discovery springs from the *Big Brother* brand. The first season of the reality show in 1999 already made innovative use of new media and allowed the audience to follow online live streams 24/7. The producer and co-inventor of the program, Paul Römer, however, revealed that in the beginning his team was wary of 'giving away' the most spectacular scenes online. In fact, they had a red button that could prevent specific juicy situations from live streaming, based on the assumption that otherwise no one would watch the daily summaries screening every night on TV. When quite early on a somewhat lurid interaction between participants was live-streamed by accident, the ratings of the evening show were very high, contrary to all expectations. The internet turned out not to act as a competitor or mere supplement, but as a teaser for watching more TV.[4] The manufacturing of such productive interrelations between television and new media got traction with 'second shift aesthetics' (Caldwell, 2003) and 'overflow'-strategies (Brooker, 2001), as the television industry tried to get a grip on the time users spend with media other than television by offering online content that is related to (and refers back to) television shows.

The second screen undermines and complicates these forms of cross-media flow since it transforms the alternation between different media into simultaneity. To achieve this, the habit of multitasking—the simultaneous but unconnected use of different media—has to be continuously transformed into the complementary use of distinct media infrastructures and devices. This is very much where television at the moment overlaps with broader problematizations of media culture: the specificities of media have to be arranged into an assemblage that allows for interconnection and interdependency, translating the always menacing threat of distraction into intensified attention.

At least since the start of the 21st century, multitasking has become one of the predominant ideas to conceptualize the problem of attention in a heterogeneous media landscape (Hassoun, 2012). For some, media-supported multitasking promises to equip humans with new powers—a scenario for which depictions of octopus-like humans managing different tasks and several media with their eight arms has become the corresponding 'meme' (Rieger, 2012). More often, however, the multiplication of media and the 'process of context switching' (Ellis, Daniels, & Jauregui, 2010), characterizing their simultaneous use, is supposed to undermine any longer-term or in-depth attention. At times, these concerns even provoke 'moral panics' around (especially children's) capacity to achieve and to have intense social, face-to-face communication (Bennett, Maton, & Kervin, 2008; Cellan-Jones, 2010). More generally, the worries and promises around multitasking systematically interrelate the reflection on the limits of human capabilities with the (quantifiable) analysis of technological capacities and the discussion of appropriate application of different media (Rieger, 2012, p. 16). Multitasking questions the quantity as well as the intensity of attention received by any single medium or individual cultural product, thereby also problematizing the specificities of media. With the evolving second screen assemblage, the much older concerns about multitasking while watching television could be translated into systematic industrial strategies.

In workplace ergonomics, multiple monitors are considered supportive to multitasking, since switching from one program (or task) to another no longer means that the first program (or task) disappears from sight (Manjoo, 2009). Such a multiplication of screens is aptly satirized in David Eggers' novel *The Circle*, in which the protagonist, who just got a job at a fictional new-media company, gets a new screen on her desk for each new task she is responsible for. Her desk becomes a veritable dashboard constantly reminding her of the parallel processes she is supposed to optimize (Eggers, 2014).

Until around 2007, the term 'second screen' was

[4] Paul Römer told this anecdote during a guest lecture at the University of Amsterdam's Media Studies department on 7 January 2015. Early research on the BBC version of *Big Brother* argues that there was no strong interrelation between internet use and watching the show on TV (Hill, 2002). More generally, *Big Brother* is considered to be a turning point in cross-media relationships: 'while interactive websites, phone services, texting and email were initially seen as supplementary media forms attached to pre-existing television programmes, in *Big Brother* it can be argued that the programme shifts from being the centre of a media ensemble to being one component in a wider mediascape whose title becomes a familiar brand.' (Bignell, 2005, p. 146)

most often used in such specialized contexts, e.g. for the use of an additional computer monitor in desktop publishing. Since then, however, 'second screen' has started to signify the awkward and hybrid combination of considerably different kinds of screens, especially the screen of a domestic TV set with a mobile screen, thereby also combining linear and pre-structured content on one screen with individually accessible, 'interactive' forms on the other. Of course, the second screen might mainly be used to keep busy with other things while watching television and thus to multitask: answering emails, playing games, sorting photographs etc. As such, it constitutes a threat to the TV industry since people are thought to be more likely to pick up their second screens during commercial breaks (just as VCR and the DVR were used to skip or fast-forward through commercials).

Yet viewers also take advantage of their second screens to do TV-related things: searching for additional information, starting online conversation about a show, etc. (Nee & Dozier, 2015) The industry, therefore, now envisions the second screen as a tool capable of transforming multitasking into a densely interrelated assemblage of devices and practices, and thus into a unified—if not necessarily coherent—experience. 'Unlike previous forms of "inattention", ancillary screens are seen as *increasing* cumulative exposure to media messages rather than *detracting* from them.' (Hassoun, 2014, p. 276)

As was the case with the *alternating* use of television and online media in the *Big Brother* 'discovery' relayed above, the possibility of a mutual intensification of *simultaneous* media use provides its own eye-opening anecdotes. One of the many telling examples for the interlocking of television and social media can be found in the Super Bowl of February 2013. The match was interrupted by a power outage shortly after the start of its second half and did not resume for more than half an hour. Since one team was already far in the lead when the game was interrupted, broadcasters worried that people would stop watching. Quite to the contrary, however, many new viewers learned about the unexpected development on social media, switched on their television sets, and shared pictures, jokes, and opinions online (Carter, 2013). It is now broadly understood that social-media conversation can direct attention towards television and television shows, and television has, in fact, become one of the most prominent topics of social media 'buzz'. This surely impacts the experience of watching television; a recent empirical study finds, e.g., that using a second screen while watching television adds to the 'perception among audience members that they had gained incidental knowledge.' (Nee & Dozier, 2015)

The complementary use of media technologies modulates the divided and unstable attention that characterizes multitasking into a highly flexible, yet structured form of attention organized around a central topic or event, and framed and tamed by the centripetal dynamics of technical, textual, social strategies. Hashtags, specialized second screen apps, 'appointment television', and other means offer distractions to stretch and heighten attention (as will be discussed further down, this is also described as 'continuous partial attention'). If transmedia storytelling has become one of the core strategies to organize attention across alternating media use (Jenkins, 2010), 'liveness' has turned out to be one of the most relevant strategies to transform multitasking into a structured assemblage of different media and different modes of attention. It thereby also is a valuable concept to discuss the persistence and transformation of key features of television in the transforming media landscape.

4. Second Screen-Liveness and The Non-Specificity of Attention

Ironically, media technologies and media practices that were introduced as an explicit challenge (if not alternative) to television's basic temporal characteristics (scheduling, liveness, flow), now seem to salvage and emphasize television's liveness, which—historically—had seemed to be in decline due to recording, on-demand, and streaming technologies. Moreover, the second screen creates its own, modulated forms of liveness for different kinds of shows to guarantee heightened attention. At first sight, big live events—from presidential addresses to sports events and natural catastrophes—quite simply combine two things: (1) they 'glue' people to their televisions and produce shared, synchronized, and focused attention, even in the era of 'whenever you want, where you want'; and (2) they simultaneously provide reasons and topics for conversations, and guarantee that others (either people one knows or perfect strangers) are watching the same show at the same time and thus are addressable in online communication.

The connection between liveness and attention is not a simple given, though. Instead, it is manufactured by the combination of multiple strategies involving different media. Liveness, as a substantial body of research has shown, always was a highly ambivalent, strategic, and partly ideological aspect of television. It comprises (and selectively highlights) the technical live transmission, the spontaneity of displayed behaviour, or the uninterrupted flow of images from heterogeneous locations (e.g. Caldwell, 2000; Feuer, 1983; White, 2004). In television history more generally, what appears to be a specific quality of the medium got continually re-defined in the assemblage of many different media. The consequences of video technology, first in production and later in reception, with the emergence of 'live on tape' or 'tape delayed'-events are proof of that.

Social media intervene in this strategic field, taking advantage of, but also transforming, the multiple aspects of liveness. Television-related live-chatting is one of the key activities contributing to the commercial value of social media, especially Twitter (Walsh, 2014, p. 12). Social media conversations in turn equip even traditionally scheduled shows with a certain temporal urgency: while you can record a show to watch it at a later time, you cannot record and tape-delay the conversation accompanying the show on social media.

> 'Social TV is the industry's latest response to the challenges of the digital era, as channel proliferation and audience control over television consumption have eroded the viewership of network broadcasts. It encourages viewers to tune in to episodes as they air—rather than later when they can choose to skip the advertisements—and to strengthen audience engagement through participation.' (van Es, 2015, p. 2)

Online communication, thus, is not just a productive side effect of live events, it contributes to, and modifies, television's liveness and the respective attention, e.g. through creating and 'reaggregating' a mass audience (Lee & Andrejevic, 2014).

The TV industry strategically boosts the 'eventfulness' of its programming with competitions and confrontations to provide repeated incentives for online discussion. Curated forms of participation, such as the possibility to vote or comment, entangle the immediacy of web communication with television's many forms of liveness (Ytreberg, 2009). Streaming services like Netflix or Amazon offer a non-scheduled and non-live mode of distribution that affords temporally flexible ways of (binge-) watching. Since such an individualized form of reception makes synchronization with social media difficult (not least because of possible spoilers for the viewers who started somewhat later), second screen use has to be carefully crafted. Netflix organized a 'live Twitter Q&A' with the cast of *Orange is the New Black* (Edelsburg, 2013).[5] And for another Netflix show, *House of Cards*, the second screen app Beamly promised to offer 'a TV room for each episode' (Dredge, 2014), that is, a space for conversation on one episode, independent from the moment of watching it, thereby compartmentalizing liveness even further. More generally, research has shown that watching TV shows via streaming 'distributes the articulated social space through time (diachronic) over a longer period than a single temporal (synchronic) event.' (Pittman & Tefertiller, 2015) Even if most of the audience might continue with their own idiosyncratic forms of second screen use and most of the industrial strategies are short-lived they nevertheless feed into the problematizations of attention.

In a second screen assemblage, liveness is used to suture (to use a metaphor from film theory[6]) the gap between previously opposed forms of temporality—most explicitly, of course, the scheduled temporality of what is now called 'appointment television' and the more flexible 'always-on' temporality of social and mobile media, which replaces the scheduled liveness of TV with 'online liveness' and 'group liveness' (Couldry, 2004). TV producers harvest the temporalities of the buoyant social-media communication to strategically equip all kinds of TV content with the attention-binding features of liveness. The second screen additionally aims to combine what Jenkins, Ford and Green (2013) sharply distinguish as 'stickiness' vs. 'spreadability'—simultaneous attention of a mass audience and non-synchronized attention of successive 'sharing'. It thereby transforms the parallel existence of different modes of perception and especially the threat of multitasking into an assemblage that promises to frame and tame the interplay of distraction and attention.

This is clearly not the end of television, since at least some aspects of the medium are used and intensified by 'new media'. Nevertheless, the example of the second screen also shows that television has—like any other individual medium—become part of a broader assemblage that selectively appropriates, modulates and re-articulates features of different media to tackle the problem of attention. Here, television's current development provokes some more general media theoretical questions concerning the specific affordances of different media. While media assemblages are often conceived of as 'stabilized systems made of elements, actors, and processes that are shaped and "fixed" to "fit" together…in order to produce a culturally stable form of communication' (Langlois, 2012, p. 93), the second screen's mixed and changing strategies to organize attention seem rather to create continuously new relations between textual and technical elements familiar from traditional television and emerging from the social-media context (Rizzo, 2015).

The social-media platforms Twitter and Facebook in particular were quite explicitly established as modes of social communication completely different from television. Both platforms, however, have become seminal pillars of the second screen assemblage. Similarly, mobile media, tablets and phones, are characterized by their ability to disconnect the access to content from a pre-determined place (the living room) and from the rigid schedules of television. Nevertheless, in the past few years media development has been shaped by the highly productive overlap between certain aspects and

[5] Partly due to contractual obligations, Netflix also releases some shows weekly, thereby undermining a too-clearcut distinction between ('traditional') scheduled TV and non-scheduled streaming services (Arnold, 2015).

[6] For the debate in film studies, e.g. Miller (1977).

features of social media with certain aspects and features of television. The characteristics that are allegedly specific to individual media have in the process also become highly ambivalent and interdependent.

The individual devices and platforms contributing to the assemblage can be analyzed with respect to each of their specific temporal affordances (e.g. Weltevrede, Helmond, & Gerlitz, 2014). Looked at separately, each has a specific pace of incoming information, of refreshing, and of trending, and therefore each requires different modes of attention. Liveness, as I have shown, persists as a strategy to manufacture productive interconnections and synchronization across devices—thereby affecting and modulating their characteristic temporalities and modes of attention. It 'has to be understood in the context of the entire multiplatform and interactive mediascape that it is part of, and evolving around, as well as in relation to the dynamics between devices, platforms and content providers' (Sørensen, 2016, p. 396). Additionally, in a cross-media ensemble, liveness eventually does not so much synchronize but rather strategically 'hypermodulate' attention, producing micro-delays, stuttering interrelations and 'deliberate dissonance' (Pettman, 2016).

The second screen assemblage undermines any clear-cut identification of one medium with one mode of attention. It frames and tames attention by combining media-event liveness with group liveness, and stickiness with spreadability. It thereby also combines the two modes of attention, identified by Katherine Hayles in comparing print-dominated and online culture—deep attention (characteristic of the practice of 'close reading') and hyper attention: 'hyper attention is characterized by preference for multiple information streams, flexibility in rapidly switching between information streams, sensitivity to environmental stimuli, and a low threshold for boredom, typified, for example, by a video game player.' (Hayles, 2012) The second screen, on the one hand, does fit most of the characteristics listed here. On the other hand, the abstract classification of 'hyper attention' risks obscuring the fact that the 'multiple information streams' only get connected because they offer different forms of (manipulating) attention, including (at least the promise of) deep attention.[7]

After all, the second screen assemblage gets explicitly introduced as a tool to manage (different forms of) attention in social situations. An instructional video for Google's Chromecast, a small device that enables an easy connection between tablets or smartphones and a TV set, can be taken as quite typical here. It shows a young man sitting down on a couch, where a young woman is already sitting, taking notes in a booklet with a pencil; he touches her, she briefly looks up, but continues focusing on her booklet. He activates Google Chromecast and opens a photo app on his smartphone to display the pictures on the big TV screen. When he choses a short video clip showing the young woman sitting on a kitchen counter throwing nuts in the air to catch them with her mouth, he finally gets her attention and they start teasing each other (Google Chrome, 2014). Well beyond TV-related liveness, the second screen assembles different forms of attention in competitive interrelation and along the way allows for the redefinition of a social situation by determining a (momentary) shared focus of perception.

Most of the strategies discussed so far can be ascribed to the television industry's endeavours to tame the disruptive potential of mobile media by connecting them to the entertainment industry's more traditional and well-proven commercial strategies (Tussey, 2014). The second screen's entanglement with the problem of attention, however, is feared and harnessed in other contexts as well. In this sense, the second screen can be considered a 'dispositif' or an 'assemblage' that inserts its particular rationalities and problematizations into a variety of media and into different social practices—including the practices of teaching and lecturing, as I will discuss in the remainder of this article. The analysis of television's transformation might benefit from such a comparison since it allows us to see more clearly, how particular strategies organize a cross-media assemblage partly independent of individual devices. The second screen, one could argue, imports features and concerns of television—or problematizations related to the current transformation of television—to circumstances in which no TV set and no broadcaster is present.

5. Managing Attention in the Classroom

If television's current transformation is being shaped by the way it is integrated into a media assemblage that organizes attention and distraction across several devices and platforms, much the same can be said about transformations in teaching and lecturing. In education, the question of attention is as hot an issue as it is in advertising and the entertainment industry, and here too the emergence of ever new assemblages is organized by the alleged potentials of different media in producing attention/distraction.

For centuries, pedagogy has been struggling with the problem of distracted pupils, and as early as the 1780s the Swiss education reformer Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, in the context of a more general reassessment of distraction, 'assigned a value to distraction as a pedagogical tool. He recommended giving pupils two tasks simultaneously so that they have to distribute their attention.' (Löffler, 2013, p. 14; see also Löffler, 2014, p. 60f). Regularly, media have played a promi-

[7] While focusing on individual choice, access, and social communication, commercials for second screen use do regularly include images of immersion, absorption, and focused attention.

nent role in such pedagogical efforts to re-organize and intensify the attention of learners. In this context, media were often tweaked and used in alternative forms, thereby adding features and characteristics to media that were otherwise overlooked (for film see e.g. Hediger & Vonderau, 2009). Even television, so often considered detrimental to all forms of rational learning (most prominently in Postman, 1986) was praised and appropriated for its potential to improve teaching (e.g. Keilbach & Stauff, 2013). No wonder then that the second screen's problem of attention is intensely articulated in the field of education: the second screen is both banned from class for its distracting potential *and* intensely appropriated to frame and tame the unavoidable allure of its own and other distractions—not to mention adapting the classroom to the world and habits of contemporary students. Comparing the application of the second screen in education with its application in the field of television highlights the extent to which the problem of attention structures the emergence of media assemblages and thereby changes the role and function of individual devices.

Media were accused of having a detrimental effect on children's capacity to learn long before those media entered the classroom—television was considered especially harmful:[8] If children were twitchy on Mondays, this could easily be ascribed to their excessive TV consumption during the weekend.[9] More generally, TV is criticized for taking time from other more beneficial activities—reading, exercising, etc. These concerns only intensify once screens are brought into the classroom via the rise of mobile media and compete simultaneously with the teacher for the students' attention. Since individual media use in the classroom has become ubiquitous and nearly unavoidable (Hassoun, 2015), the classroom itself becomes a field of competing strategies to foster attention. Mirroring the transition from alternating to simultaneous media use discussed earlier, the discussion in didactics also seeks to establish a media assemblage that could tame multitasking and intensify the overall attention.

First of all, individual media in the classroom are considered a source of distraction from the 'main screen'—the teacher and his/her blackboard, whiteboard, or presentation screen. The Dutch center of expertise for media literacy, *mediawijzer*, recently published a survey showing that about 50% of the pupils use their mobile phones during lessons for private matters—sending messages to friends, surreptitiously taking photographs and videos, checking social media, etc. ("Monitor Jeugd en Media 2015," 2015). A discussion paper from LSE's Centre for Economic Performance more dramatically argues that banning mobile phones from schools would equal a learning advantage of one extra week of teaching per year (Beland & Murphy, 2015). Already in 2014, Clay Shirky (who has repeatedly been criticized as an 'Internet guru' (e.g. Morozov, 2011, p. 21)) surprised his audience with a blog post in which he laid out the reasons for banning laptops from his classroom: they do not only distract the attention of users, but also create a distracting atmosphere for students not using their gadgets (Shirky, 2014). Neurological and psychological research seems to corroborate these concerns, showing that students regularly overestimate their potential for multitasking (Weimer, 2012) and that extensive multitasking results in lower grades (Ellis et al., 2010). My interest doesn't lie in denying or even debating these insights. Rather, I want to discuss how these problematizations contribute to the emergence of a media assemblage in which quasi-televisual and new-media forms of communication are re-organized.

Eventually, for many, new media have become tools for getting and keeping the attention of the younger generation and methods are developed so that the attention that is unavoidably spent on new media can be redirected to teaching endeavors. More hesitant strategies—as for example outlined in a book with the telling title *Teaching Naked* (Bowen, 2012)—still keep the classroom free from media but argue that media can and should be used to expand teaching (and attention to the objects of teaching) beyond the time and space of the classroom. In accordance with the imperative of 'lifelong learning', media create a 'teaching environment' or a 'teaching ecosystem' where teaching (similar to what HBO GO and similar initiatives promise for entertainment media) can be taken with you 'wherever you go' and 'whenever you have time' for it.[10] The 'gamification' movement is likewise based on such an effort to carefully translate the detrimental potentials of media into productive strategies. One of the books introducing the topic argues that the attention given to, e.g., World of Warcraft could be redirected to more useful and beneficial things—

[8] For an overview of several issues, see e.g. the University of Michigan Health System's page on TV: http://www.med.umich.edu/yourchild/topics/tv.htm; for an academic reversal that argues for TV's benefits for teaching in general, see Hartley (1999).

[9] In Germany, this was often called the 'Monday syndrome' ('Montags-Syndrom'). In 2000, a newspaper article on the topic quoted a teacher stating that pupils behaved 'as if their central nervous system was short-circuited by television' (Struck, 2000).

[10] On *Twist*, the official blog of The Elearning Guild, program director David Kelly explains the concept of the learning ecosystem as follows: 'In today's digital world, a web of learning resources surrounds every individual. It's an environment wherein each resource connects to others, creating an overall structure in which all learning takes place. The learning ecosystem is the combination of technologies and support resources available to help individuals learn within an environment.' (Kelly, 2013).

'harnessing the characteristics that make them [games] so engaging and applying them to other aspects of lives' (Penenberg, 2013, p. 11).

The less fearful proponents of the debate actually do urge the use of new media in the classroom simultaneously with, and in augmentation of, the teacher-student relationship. The most pragmatic argument for this strategy is often that for the younger generation multitasking has become the norm (see Bennett et al., 2008, for a critical perspective on this argument). Even if the multiple sources of information might distract from the main focus (i.e., the teacher), this is nevertheless considered the best strategy to keep students interested by at least fostering 'continuous partial attention' (Muir, 2012; Yardi, 2006)—a mode of attention that distinguishes itself from the worrisome multitasking since it is organized around one main focus but concedes (or incites) the constant scanning of the environment for additional information (Löffler, 2013, p. 17).

While chatting in the classroom might still be an annoyance, the mediated real-time conversation alongside a common activity (a lecture or a workshop) is considered beneficial for 'continuous partial attention', as such 'backchannel' communication purportedly transforms students (or 'the audience') from passive listeners into participants of an on-going discussion. Additionally, the 'conspicuous covertness' (Hassoun, 2015, p. 1686) of students' private use of social media is overcome by harnessing this media use for the ends of learning. Schools and universities are advised to use social media to enhance the feeling of a learning community. Again in parallel to the recent developments in the TV industry, 'social' or 'community' are here defined in terms of conversation and interaction, rather than in terms of common listening or watching.[11] In both cases this understanding of the social is inseparable from the assumption that social exchange keeps you more active and more attentive.

Quite similarly to the attention problem of commercial television, the teaching context provokes the emergence of strategies and specialized tools with the aim of managing the relation between the (potentially distracting) second screens and the designated main focus of attention. This ranges from low-tech arrangements (e.g. the common agreement on a 'cell phone etiquette' in the classroom [Nielsen & Webb, 2011]), to highly specific technical tools offered by a veritable and thriving e-learning industry. The teachers' roles change in this context—they need to 'manage' the classroom and to monitor what the students are actually doing with their phone, thereby transforming 'the classroom dynamic from lecturing at the front of the room to having no traditional front of the classroom at all' (Graham, n.d.).

[11] The limitations of this concept of the social are e.g. outlined by Lacey (2013) and Peters (2005).

The tensions that have to be navigated here become especially clear with respect to backchannel communication, that is, the use of the second screen for online conversation 'as a secondary or background complement to an existing frontchannel, which may consist of a professor, teacher, speaker, or lecturer' (Yardi, 2006, p. 852). The backchannel is always threatening to take over attention from the main focus point and thereby pulling students back into the problematic mode of multitasking—either by going off-topic or by focusing on aspects of the learning situation that do not belong to the content. Exchange that is supposed to augment the frontchannel slips into 'miscellaneous conversations' (Du, Rosson, & Carroll, 2012, p. 135), snarking about the manner of presentation, the haircut of the presenter, etc. Often, such '[a]ttention issues [are] mentioned in the backchannel itself' (McCarthy & boyd, 2005, p. 1643).

Extending my selection of examples beyond the classroom to conferences, I want to point to social-media researcher danah boyd's report of a case from her own experience as a presenter. While she gave a talk during the WEB 2.0 Expo in 2009, the attention in the room was overtaken by the backchannel communication where some people commented on boyd's style of presentation. Reflecting on the experience in a blog post, she states that a Twitter stream '*forces* the audience to pay attention [to] the backchannel. So even audience members who want to focus on the content get distracted' (boyd, 2009a). Quite similarly to TV shows which are made more eventful in reaction to second screen use, the conference talk (which, ironically, compared broadcast and online modes of attention [boyd 2009b]) needs to adapt to compete (or interrelate) with the attention-sucking backchannel, according to boyd:

> 'Had I known about the Twitter stream, I would've given a more pop-y talk that would've bored anyone who has heard me speak before and provided maybe 3–4 nuggets of information for folks to chew on. It would've been funny and quotable but it wouldn't have been content-wise memorable.' (boyd, 2009a)

Media use that is supposed to be augmenting an already established communication situation can thus provoke changes in the content and form of teaching, so that multitasking gets modulated into continual partial attention and actually heightens instead of damages the attention. An advice book on backchannel communication has an entire chapter titled 'Making your ideas Twitter-friendly' (Atkinson, 2009). Interestingly, another suggestion for disciplining the backchannel is to display it for everybody. Snarking is thus avoided through a form of public monitoring (Yardi, 2006, p. 855). Additionally, the presenter is expected to have an eye on the back-

channel as well—though some authors also warn that the audience might not like it when a speaker pays more attention to backchannel than to the content of the actual presentation (Atkinson, 2009, p. 25).

This tricky balance is the main rationale behind the development and the promotion of special appliances that frame and tame distraction or multitasking similarly to the second screen apps of television: quizzes students can take part in during lectures, the results of which can be immediately integrated into the slides of the teachers, etc.[12] As if a lecture would not be sufficiently 'live', the *Polleverywhere* app, for instance, aims to integrate a 'moment of excitement' into lectures when 'live results flash on the wall'; a professor's testimonial on their webpage claims: 'Poll Everywhere helps me keep my overworked residents awake when I talk!' For conferences and business meetings, the 'event software provider' Lintelus presented its second screen technologies as the 'best tools for engaging the audience'. They are supposed to transform 'a simple presentation' into 'an attention-grabbing interactive experience for all' by 'personalizing the experience for every attendee' and allowing the participants to 'chat with other participants'.[13]

We might very well doubt whether chatting with other conference participants during a talk does in fact connect presenter and audiences 'like never before' (as is also claimed). Significantly, however, the debate takes for granted that attention for different media is no longer considered a zero-sum game and that only the mix of different media creates liveness, collectively shared focus and continuing engagement. As with television's second screen assemblage, the interconnection of different forms of perception (e.g. 'passively' listening, 'actively' texting) promises to harvest different modes of attention and thereby changes the very temporality of the involved activities and technologies. In teaching, as in watching television, the 'specificities' of different media are only invoked and addressed to be modulated in the dynamic assemblage that is constantly re-arranged, distributing attention across the multiple screens. The function of teacher / lecturer is not just augmented through the additional media, but it becomes more volatile and strategic—being the main attraction for some moments while functioning as mere inducer and organizer of further activities at others.

[12] E-learning company *socrative* promises: 'through the use of real time questioning, instant result aggregation and visualization, teachers can gauge the whole class' current level of understanding. Socrative saves teachers time so the class can further collaborate, discuss, extend and grow as a community of learners' ("Socrative," n.d.).

[13] The quotes where retrieved from the webpage of Lintelus (lintelus.com), which is no longer accessible; an instructional video with a similar rhetoric is still available on (Lintelus, 2014).

6. Conclusion

In teaching as in television, what was previously considered to be a dominant center of collective attention is very much re-organized in a multiple-media landscape. Interestingly, this past dominance is questioned and supported by new media which appear as competitors but quickly become supplements—partly reanimating established features, partly creating new ones. The assemblage, television (and teaching) becomes part of, seems neither defined by the affordances of each of the involved devices and platforms, nor by the diagram of their connections and interrelations. It is rather the problematizations that are articulated through the transformation of this assemblage that endow it with particular functions and dynamics; one and the same platform or device—e.g. what we used to call television—at times is strategically harnessed for some of its established characteristics but at other moments becomes transformed beyond recognition. This is not yet the end of television, indeed; some of its traditional features gain a new dynamic in the complementary relationship with new technologies. While it becomes more and more difficult to point at one device or one mode of media use that clearly *is* television, the contemporary problematizations of the media assemblage re-adapt features that gain all their plausibility from the history and current transformations of television.

The endeavor to convert multitasking into simultaneous and interrelated (or 'continuous partial') attention is one of the dominant problematizations of contemporary media assemblages. The second screen's entanglement with the problem of attention continues a trend that goes back to at least the 19th century: while technical media have long provoked concerns about human attention, they have simultaneously been appropriated to gauge and manage attention (and distraction) so that it can be harvested, sold, and exploited. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that without media, attention wouldn't exist—neither as epistemic object, nor as an everyday concern of common people. While people might have always paid attention (or not) to things happening, the 'imperative of a concentrated attentiveness' (Crary, 2001, p. 1) could only start shaping subjectivities when different media, each with a specific temporal structure, compete for attention at work places and in leisure time. Attention can thus best be conceived of as 'the contingent product of changing relations between individuals, collectivities, technological conditions, and social habits' (Read, 2014).

The increasing diversity and ubiquity of media forms and devices provoked by digital and mobile media is often described as a dynamic that divests each individual and society at large of the basic capability to self-determine when to pay attention and to what. Barbara Stafford claims that 'the proliferation of autopoietic devices and zombie media' (Stafford, 2009, p.

289) takes the distinction between what matters and what doesn't out of our hands (or rather our minds); Giorgio Agamben states that no one captured by television or a cell phone can 'acquire a new subjectivity' (Agamben, 2009, p. 21). Jonathan Crary, in his aptly titled book *24/7*, argues that television was an important step in adapting our attention and experience to capitalisms' 'uninterrupted operation of markets, information networks, and other systems.' (Crary, 2014, p. 9) With ever more media and their respective 'infinite cafeteria of solicitation and attraction perpetually available, 24/7 disables vision through processes of homogenization, redundancy, and acceleration.' (Crary, 2014, p. 33) While Crary does not discuss the second screen explicitly, it can easily be understood as one of the strategies of further intensification he hints at: '24/7 capitalism is not simply a continuous or sequential capture of attention, but also a dense layering of time, in which multiple operations or attractions can be attended to in near-simultaneity, regardless of where one is or whatever else one might be doing.' (Crary, 2014, p. 84)

With respect to the examples from the TV industry and from the context of teaching, I would however also like to highlight the heterogeneity and the fragility of the second screen's modes of attention. The different narrative forms of television each already allow their own specific combination of attention and distraction (Pape, 2014). The second screen additionally exemplifies that attention for a show or a lecture—and even more so attention 24/7—is at the moment considered to be best enabled by entangling different and competing temporalities. This can be understood as yet another overstraining of the individual's perceptual capabilities characterizing industrial capitalism and urban life since the 19th century. It can, however, also be taken as another example of modernity's ambivalent constitution of attention, summarized by Crary himself (referring to Sigmund Freud's description of a public place in Rome): Instead of a seamless regime 'it will be a patchwork of fluctuating effects in which individuals and groups continually reconstitute themselves—either creatively or reactively' (Crary, 2001, p. 370). In a similar vein, Tiziana Terranova argues that new media's capture of attention (and, I would add, the second screen's combination of TV- and group-liveness) can ably develop new forms of social attention and 'trigger the emergence of a new collective organization' (Terranova, 2012, p. 12).

Additionally, I hope my analysis has shown that the second screen assemblage produces as many attention problems and tensions as it offers solutions. Attention, thus, is not something that media quite simply capture, manufacture, or manipulate; rather it is one of several problematizations that structure the assemblage of heterogeneous elements. The idea of the specific affordances of different media, on the one hand, is unavoidable for the management of attention. Television with its rich history of industrial and reformist strategies fighting the worrying distractive or time-wasting affordances of the medium still remains a major reference point here. On the other hand, the distribution of attention across devices and media forms has become one of the key concepts that allow for the entanglement of different media in an assemblage that modulates each of their characteristic qualities. Media studies should not focus on the unlimited capturing capabilities of the increasingly connected media machinery alone, but also on the wider cultural problems that are more articulated than solved by the ongoing transformation of the media assemblage. Here, television figures less as one medium that continues or ceases to exist than as a set of traditions, concerns and strategies that contributes to this transformation.

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