

**Appendix 1:**

Name	Country	Description
Brasil contra Fake	Brazil	Brazilian governmental fact-checking unit established to disseminate governmental propaganda. Launched in 2023, this initiative is part of the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) and is integrated into the presidency's Secretary of Communication (SECOM) department. It focuses on addressing rumors about Brazil's government and promoting information about programs launched by the government. It was selected for the study as an example of government-led initiatives that shape the fight against misinformation for the purposes of domestic propaganda.
Verdade dos Fatos	Brazil	Brazilian hyperpartisan Twitter account that impersonates accredited fact-checking organizations operating in Brazil. Launched at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it aims to downplay the severity of the pandemic while directing criticism against Brazil's Supreme Court. It was selected for the study as an example of how far-right partisan groups weaponize the appearance of fact-checking to undermine the credibility of legitimate fact-checkers.
Война с фейками (War on Fakes)	Russia	Russian pro-government Telegram channel mimicking fact-checking practices and spreading pro-Kremlin narratives and disinformation. Being launched after the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it focuses predominantly on the "debunks" of war-related information. It was selected for the study as an extreme example of how fact-checking can be weaponized to disseminate state propaganda and delegitimize the news. For this study, we only considered War on Fakes' main Telegram channel and a website in Russian as its main operation spaces. However, it also includes a channel and a website in English, as well as a network of regional channels in Russian, albeit the latter are not explicitly linked to the main operation spaces.
Lapsha Media (Noodles Media)	Russia	Russian "fact-checking source" that claims to debunk different mis- and disinformation on the internet and in the media. Lapsha Media is a project of the Autonomous non-commercial organization Dialogue Regions, an organization created by the government of the city of Moscow. Lapsha Media seems to collect and report any rebuttals of information published earlier in mainstream media and present them as new fact checks. The organisation has a big presence on Russian social media platforms with hundreds of thousands of subscribers on VK. It has two formats of content on its website: "fakes" and "long reads".
OpIndia	India	OpIndia is a right-wing media outlet in India which was launched in 2014. They run a fact-check unit within their website. Their fact-check unit has been in controversy as its application for IFCN recognition was rejected on the basis of blatant bias towards fact-checking as it consistently uses biased language while attacking other media outlets or the opposition political party leaders in India.
PIB Fact Check	India	PIB Fact Check is part of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) India and is a state-run fact-check unit. It mostly fact checks claims around Indian government policies and laws. It came into the controversial limelight when the Indian government passed an amendment to the IT Rules (Act, 2021) for the establishment of the Indian government as the sole authority for fact-checking claims around the workings of the Indian government. At the moment the Supreme Court of India has stayed the amendment as it hears the case to adjudicate if the amendment is violative of the constitution of India.
中国互联网联合辟谣平台 (Chinese Internet united)	China	(Launched in 2018) A governmental rumors debunking platform. A daily rumor debunking report is the core program that focuses on domestic news on domestic social media for reporting, verifying, and fighting against rumors (false information). It was selected for the study as an example of government-led

rumor-debunking platform)		initiatives in mainland China that shape the fight against mis/disinformation for the purposes of domestic propaganda and public benefit, particularly debunking health misinformation and correcting claims related to criticism of government policies directed at public benefit.
有据 (Youju China Fact Check)	China	(Launched in 2020) Started by a journalist in China to push back against the flood of misinformation about the coronavirus and operated by the volunteering practice from journalists and college students/teachers and supervised by professional journalists. It focuses on the international news in Chinese-language media. Whilst working under the 'Red lines' (media censorship in China), their operation scheme is regularised by IFCN rules and formulates a professional fact-checking methodology. It was selected because it was one of the pioneers as an independent fact-checker and operated in a professional scheme.
Factually	Singapore	Operated by the Public Communications Division of the Ministry of Communications and Information as part of the Singaporean government's efforts to address the electronic communication in Singapore of false statements of fact. Factually published content that is in breach of Singapore's Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA). This site is designed to debunk misinformation and disinformation relevant to a wide range of topics including economy, finance, and health. This site claims to be part of the government's broader effort to ensure accurate information is accessible, thereby fostering a well-informed public. It was selected for this study as an example of a government-supported fact-checking effort with a public good mission.

## Appendix 2: Codes for Operations and Content pillars (22 variables)

### 1. Descriptive Information

- a. Is the channel still active?
- b. Operating spaces and the size of audience for each spaces

### 2. Ownership

- a. Are the owners of the entity explicitly listed? If No, are they easily findable using searches on public domains? (e.g. a Google Search)
- b. Names of the owners

### 3. Funding Source

- a. Are the funding sources clearly stated? If No, are they easily findable using searches on public domains? (e.g. a Google Search)
- b. Names of the sources: a statement of commitment to transparency of funding and organization
- c. Sponsored content or advertisement

### 4. Transparency

- a. Transparency information aligning with the code of principles adopted by the International Fact Checking Network (IFCN) - <https://www.ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/the-commitments>
- b. Which aspects of the operations are transparently listed

- i. Code of practice: a statement of commitment to non-partisanship and fairness
  - ii. Methodology: a statement of commitment to standards and transparency of methodology
  - iii. Sources: a statement of commitment to standards and transparency of sources
  - iv. Verification Process: a statement of commitment to an open and honest corrections policy
5. Activity and Operations
  - a. Unique published posts in the past 2 months.
  - b. Has the entity been flagged by institutional fact-checkers (IFCN) as posting misinformation?
6. Labeling or Rating system
  - a. Labeling or rating system for verification posts.
    - i. Textual, but no visual label
    - ii. Only "fake news" visual label
    - iii. Binary (true/false)
    - iv. Nuanced (multiple labels)
    - v. Other (plus description)
  - b. Out of 30, how many posts contain claims that are verified as true?
7. Covered Topics
  - a. Topics that have been covered in a certain period (e.g. past 2 months and/or 30 posts).
    - i. Health information/misinformation
    - ii. Domestic Politics
    - iii. International Politics
    - iv. Conspiracy Theories
    - v. Elections
    - vi. Climate change
    - vii. War/conflict
    - viii. Other (plus details and description)
  - b. Details of the selected topics.
8. Alignments
  - a. Explicitly stated political or ideological alignment
  - b. Is more than half of the content related to a particular political or ideological alignment?

## 9. Targets

- a. Exclusively fact-check particular groups, organisations, or persons
- b. Choose targets
  - i. Politicians
  - ii. Opposition groups or activists
  - iii. Another country or region
  - iv. Religious figures
  - v. Conspiracy theories
  - vi. Another fact-checker
  - vii. Domestic media
  - viii. International media
  - ix. Businesses/Companies/Industries
  - x. Social media users
  - xi. State bodies and officials
  - xii. Ruling government
  - xiii. Opposition government
  - xiv. Political parties
  - xv. International actors/countries/regions
  - xvi. Other (plus details)

## 10. Bias and Incorrect content

- a. Does the entity publish or amplify conspiracy theories and/or other problematic information?
- b. Out of 30, how many of the posts contain such problematic information?

## 11. Report approach

- a. Out of 30, how many of the posts use sources to verify claims?
- b. What are the sources provided?
  - i. Confidential/unnamed/insider sources
  - ii. Scientific bodies or articles
  - iii. Politicians (from official statements)
  - iv. Politicians (interviewed or directly contacted)

- v. Other media
- vi. Other fact-checkers
- vii. Other (plus details)